Compare commits
1
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 clawbot
|
3df8876728 |
@@ -465,10 +465,7 @@ idle timestamp is rewritten at most once per tenth of the idle window rather
|
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than on every request, which means a session may expire up to 10% early relative
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to the user's true last request, but never late.
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Both clocks are anchored by timestamps stored in the session cookie. Sessions
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issued before this feature existed carry neither, so they are treated as
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expired: upgrading to a build that has it logs every existing session out once,
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and those users sign in again.
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Both clocks are anchored by timestamps stored in the session cookie.
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#### Invalid values abort startup
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@@ -702,11 +699,11 @@ app as that user.
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`webhooker.db` holds target configuration in plaintext — bearer tokens, API
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keys, Slack webhook URLs — along with the session encryption key, so webhooker
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creates every SQLite file it owns `0600`: each database and both of its `-wal`
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and `-shm` sidecars, across all three tiers. Files an earlier build left `0644`
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are tightened when they are opened. The directory's `0750` is defence in depth —
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it stops other local users listing the directory and learning your webhook UUIDs
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from the `events-{uuid}.db` filenames — not the barrier protecting the
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credentials.
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and `-shm` sidecars, across all three tiers. Any of them found at another mode
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is set to `0600` when the database is opened. The directory's `0750` is defence
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in depth — it stops other local users listing the directory and learning your
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webhook UUIDs from the `events-{uuid}.db` filenames — not the barrier protecting
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the credentials.
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### Running under upaas
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@@ -918,7 +915,7 @@ replaces the `max-age` it stored, so to end the policy sooner, set a short
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`HSTS_MAX_AGE` such as `1s` and keep it until returning browsers have picked it
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up, or have a reverse proxy send `max-age=0`.
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## Backup, Restore, and Upgrades
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## Backup and Restore
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### What to back up
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@@ -1071,60 +1068,14 @@ beside it, or wait until there are none.
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4. Start the service. The container gives the directory and the restored files
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to the `webhooker` user before the app starts, whoever restored them (see
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[Running with Docker](#running-with-docker)). Each restored database gets any
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of its SQL migrations it has not had as it is opened (see
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[Upgrades](#upgrades)).
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### Upgrades
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**Back up before every upgrade.** Each kind of database file has its schema in
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SQL files built into the binary, one directory per kind under
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`internal/db/migrations/`. In each, `000_migration.sql` creates the
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`schema_migrations` table, which records the number of every file the database
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has had, and `001_schema.sql` holds the whole schema. Opening a database runs,
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in one transaction, every file in its directory that `schema_migrations` does
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not list:
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- `main/` for the main database, on connect — settings, users, API keys,
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webhooks, entrypoints and targets
|
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- `events/` for each event database, when it is lazily opened — events,
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deliveries, delivery results and their running totals
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- `archive/` for each archive database, on every open and reopen
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There are no down migrations.
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Upgrade procedure:
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1. Stop the service.
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2. Back up `DATA_DIR` using one of the procedures above.
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3. Pull the new image and start it.
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4. Confirm `database migrations completed` in the logs before putting traffic
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back on it.
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5. Confirm the new build is the one running:
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`curl -s http://host:8080/.well-known/healthcheck` reports the version it was
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stamped with (see [Version stamping](#version-stamping)).
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|
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**Upgrading past the introduction of `BIND_ADDRESS`:** earlier versions always
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bound every interface. **Container deployments are unaffected** — the image
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ships `ENV BIND_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0`, so a `docker run` or Compose service that
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worked before still works with nothing changed.
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|
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A **bare binary** is the case that changes: the listener now binds `127.0.0.1`
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unless `BIND_ADDRESS` says otherwise, so a deployment that relied on reaching it
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from another host becomes unreachable until it sets the address the proxy
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connects to. Check the `bindAddress` field of the startup log to see what a
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running process bound. See [Bind address](#bind-address).
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**Downgrade is unsupported.** Once a newer binary has migrated the files there
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is no way to move them back. The only supported way back to an older version is
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restoring the pre-upgrade backup, which discards everything received since that
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backup was taken.
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[Running with Docker](#running-with-docker)).
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|
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### Version stamping
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The binary reports its version at `/.well-known/healthcheck` (the `version`
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field), in the UI footer, and in the startup log line (`msg=starting`,
|
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`version=...`). It is also the Sentry release name, as `webhooker-{version}`.
|
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`curl -s http://host:8080/.well-known/healthcheck` shows which build is running.
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The value is stamped in at build time by the linker; it is not read from a file
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at runtime, so it identifies the build itself.
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@@ -1583,8 +1534,7 @@ The cap is not arbitrary: the reaper computes its cutoff as a `time.Duration`,
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an int64 nanosecond count, and a longer period overflows it. An overflowed
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cutoff lands in the future, where it matches every row, so the sweep would
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delete every event the webhook has instead of none. The reaper also clamps the
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value it is given, so a row written by an older version cannot trigger that
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either.
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value it reads to the cap, so no stored value can trigger that either.
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#### Entrypoint
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@@ -1967,7 +1917,7 @@ and application state:
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- **APIKeys** — programmatic access credentials
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On first startup the main database is created from its SQL files (see
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[Upgrades](#upgrades)), a session encryption key is generated and stored, and an
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[Schema](#schema)), a session encryption key is generated and stored, and an
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`admin` user is created.
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**Per-Webhook Event Databases** (`{DATA_DIR}/events-{webhook_uuid}.db`) — each
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@@ -2164,6 +2114,21 @@ The database uses the
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though CGO is required at build time due to the transitive `mattn/go-sqlite3`
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dependency from `gorm.io/driver/sqlite`.
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#### Schema
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|
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Each kind of database file has its schema in SQL files built into the binary,
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one directory per kind under `internal/db/migrations/`. In each,
|
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`000_migration.sql` creates the `schema_migrations` table, which records the
|
||||
number of every file the database has had, and `001_schema.sql` holds the whole
|
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schema. Opening a database runs, in one transaction, every file in its directory
|
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that `schema_migrations` does not list:
|
||||
|
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- `main/` for the main database, on connect — settings, users, API keys,
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webhooks, entrypoints and targets
|
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- `events/` for each event database, when it is lazily opened — events,
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deliveries, delivery results and their running totals
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- `archive/` for each archive database, on every open and reopen
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### Request Flow
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```
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@@ -12,14 +12,24 @@ One issue per unit of work, one branch and one PR per issue:
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`main` without notice. One `next` -> `main` PR accumulates the milestone;
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releases are cut from `main` separately.
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||||
|
||||
The tracker (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues) is the record of what
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is done and what is under way. This file keeps no list of either.
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Issue branches do NOT touch this file — the manager maintains it on `next`.
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Every branch editing `TODO.md` conflicts with every other (#112).
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# Status
|
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What is still open for 1.0.0 is in its milestone
|
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(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/milestone/9). `v1.0.0` is not tagged, and
|
||||
only @sneak tags it.
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The milestone (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/milestone/9) is the
|
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authoritative list, and the only place to read a count or a state of play from.
|
||||
This file records where the project is, not what is in flight: a sentence whose
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truth depends on a branch being unmerged is wrong the moment it merges, and this
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file has been wrong that way before.
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||||
|
||||
The durability defect that held the tag has landed
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||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/256, commit `8d64259`). Every SQLite
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||||
handle opens with WAL journaling and a busy timeout, a bookkeeping write that
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||||
fails leaves its delivery in a recoverable state rather than a lying one, and
|
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recovery skips a delivery that already has a successful result row. Final
|
||||
pre-tag verification exercised it and confirmed it holds. Whatever the milestone
|
||||
still shows open is what remains before `v1.0.0`.
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Delivery is at-least-once by design, not by accident: a send whose result row
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does not land is attempted again, so a receiver can see a duplicate. That is
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@@ -28,31 +38,338 @@ under Rationale. It is not a defect to re-file.
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# Next Step
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@sneak runs webhooker in limited production, then tags `v1.0.0`. Merging `next`
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into `main` is a separate act from tagging and waits on neither of those: `next`
|
||||
is kept mergeable at all times, which is the point of the branch.
|
||||
Clear the rest of the open 1.0.0 milestone
|
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(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/milestone/9) and tag `v1.0.0`. Merging
|
||||
`next` into `main` is a separate act from tagging and waits on neither of those:
|
||||
`next` is kept mergeable at all times, which is the point of the branch.
|
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# Completed Steps
|
||||
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- 2026-08-24 Bind the plaintext HTTP listener deliberately, via `BIND_ADDRESS`
|
||||
defaulting to `127.0.0.1`, and document the reverse-proxy deployment. A
|
||||
hostname, an empty value or a value carrying a port is a startup error, and
|
||||
the `Dockerfile` sets `0.0.0.0` because a loopback bind inside a container is
|
||||
unreachable (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/268). The same commit
|
||||
removed the shutdown race: `httpServer` is built in the constructor rather
|
||||
than assigned from the serving goroutine, which orders the write before every
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||||
fx hook and rules out the nil dereference a SIGTERM arriving first would have
|
||||
caused, and `sentryEnabled` is an `atomic.Bool`
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/226)
|
||||
- 2026-08-24 Remove inbound request signature verification. The entrypoint UUID
|
||||
is the authentication secret, so the per-entrypoint shared secret, the
|
||||
`internal/signature` package, the receiver check, the model fields and the
|
||||
forms are all gone. This reverses the feature that landed earlier in the same
|
||||
milestone (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/67,
|
||||
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/279)
|
||||
- 2026-08-24 Stamp the build version into the binary and render it in the UI
|
||||
footer. `script/version` is the single source — `$VERSION`, else
|
||||
`git describe --tags --always --dirty`, else `unknown` — so a `make build`
|
||||
binary and a `make docker` image from one checkout report the same thing, and
|
||||
nothing in it varies between two builds of the same commit, which the release
|
||||
gate's byte-identical assertion would catch
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/253)
|
||||
- 2026-08-24 Derive cookie `Secure` and CSRF strictness from the request
|
||||
transport rather than from `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT`. Behind a real TLS proxy
|
||||
with the environment left at its `dev` default, the session cookie silently
|
||||
lost `Secure` while the CSRF cookie on the same response kept it.
|
||||
`X-Forwarded-Proto` is now matched case-insensitively on its first
|
||||
comma-separated element, so `HTTPS` and `https, http` no longer fall to the
|
||||
relaxed CSRF path (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/269)
|
||||
- 2026-08-24 Roll back a failed webhook deletion instead of committing it. A
|
||||
failing delete committed whatever had already succeeded, hard-deleted the
|
||||
per-webhook event database anyway, and redirected as though it had worked —
|
||||
orphaned config plus permanently destroyed history, reported as success. All
|
||||
three delete positions now roll back with the event database intact
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/262)
|
||||
- 2026-08-24 Name a deleted target on its historical deliveries, marked
|
||||
`(deleted)`, rather than leaving the event log unable to say where a delivery
|
||||
went. A deleted target's credentials stay masked exactly as a live one's, and
|
||||
it cannot become deliverable again through the receiver, resubmit, replay, the
|
||||
edit form or the toggle (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/211)
|
||||
- 2026-08-24 Bound both request-controlled `/metrics` label dimensions, so the
|
||||
unauthenticated receiver is no longer a memory-exhaustion vector: `handler`
|
||||
carries the chi route pattern, and `method` folds anything chi cannot route
|
||||
onto a single `(unmatched)` sentinel. Both were reproduced before the fix —
|
||||
300 random method tokens took the series count from 106 to 7,631, and path
|
||||
flooding reached 62,532 — and a label audit across a live scrape found no
|
||||
third unbounded dimension (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/254,
|
||||
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/261)
|
||||
- 2026-08-24 Validate `max_retries` on both target forms. `abc`, `2.7` and `-5`
|
||||
silently became 0 — fire-and-forget — including on the edit path, where it
|
||||
destroyed a working value, and `999999999` stored verbatim. The ceiling of 20
|
||||
is the `max` both templates already declared
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/221)
|
||||
- 2026-08-24 Resubmit a stored event as a new undelivered event, so a backend
|
||||
under development can be tested against real captured traffic. Per-delivery
|
||||
replay cannot serve that: it re-sends one finished delivery to its own
|
||||
original target, and a target created for a dev backend has no prior delivery
|
||||
to replay. Resubmit re-injects the stored event at the top of the receiver
|
||||
path and fans it out to whatever targets are active now
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/250)
|
||||
- 2026-08-20 Take an exclusive lock on `DATA_DIR` at startup, so two instances
|
||||
on one directory cannot both deliver
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/201)
|
||||
- 2026-08-20 Shut down the app when the HTTP listener fails. The `OnStart` hook
|
||||
returned as soon as the serving goroutine was spawned, so a failed listen left
|
||||
fx reporting RUNNING and a live process with nothing bound — invisible to
|
||||
systemd and Docker restart policies
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/200)
|
||||
- 2026-08-20 Stop target credentials leaking into the per-webhook event
|
||||
databases (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206), log SQL with
|
||||
placeholders rather than bound values
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/207), and fail loudly on half-set
|
||||
metrics auth credentials (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/205)
|
||||
- 2026-08-20 Read queue depths with `Find`, not `Scan`. `Scan` swaps GORM's own
|
||||
trace recorder in for the logging adapter, and that recorder does not
|
||||
implement `gorm.ParamsFilter`, so those statements logged their bound values
|
||||
interpolated and bypassed the suppression above. The two units gated green
|
||||
against a `next` that lacked the other, and `next` went red when both landed
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/234)
|
||||
- 2026-08-20 Render per-attempt delivery detail in the event log
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/202) and add replay of a
|
||||
terminally failed delivery (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/203)
|
||||
- 2026-08-20 Expose delivery metrics on `/metrics`
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/209) and document the backup,
|
||||
restore and upgrade procedures
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/210)
|
||||
- 2026-08-20 Add a `webhooker resetpw` subcommand and a bootstrap banner. The
|
||||
admin bootstrap password was printed once among roughly 45 fx lines, and under
|
||||
`docker run -d` went to container logs subject to rotation; there was no reset
|
||||
path at all, so recovery meant hand-deleting the users row, documented
|
||||
nowhere. The password is read from stdin or generated, never from argv where
|
||||
`/proc` would publish it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/208)
|
||||
- 2026-08-20 Add `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS`, an allowlist-only escape hatch for the
|
||||
SSRF guard, so a self-hosted proxy can forward into the operator's own
|
||||
network. The guard's always-blocked set cannot be reopened by configuration
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/204)
|
||||
- 2026-08-20 Harden operator-set target headers, which were carried unsafely
|
||||
across a redirect (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/233)
|
||||
- 2026-08-20 Add a target edit form with headers and timeout fields
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/127)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Raise `script/test`'s per-package timeout from 30s to 90s, matching
|
||||
the org-wide backstop. `go test` applies `-timeout` per package, and
|
||||
`internal/handlers` had grown past the old budget: a cache-defeated build
|
||||
failed outright at `GOMAXPROCS=4`, and every run under deliberate host load
|
||||
breached 30s. The measurement table lives in the script (#194)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Re-sync `REPO_POLICIES.md` from `prompts`. The local copy was stale
|
||||
and still mandated a 20s test target with a 30s timeout, which the org
|
||||
replaced with a 60s cap and a 90s backstop. A synced copy is not a source;
|
||||
reading it as one nearly produced a PR against `prompts` proposing a change
|
||||
already merged there (#196)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Report handler panics through the logger and answer 500. chi
|
||||
v1.5.5's `Recoverer` scans for a `panic(0x` frame the runtime no longer emits,
|
||||
then indexes `pkg[-1:]`, so it panicked inside its own stack printer before
|
||||
writing a byte: the recovery never ran, the client got a dropped connection
|
||||
instead of a 500, and the original panic was lost. A local middleware replaces
|
||||
it, bounded by `MaxPanicLogLineBytes` (#187)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Route GORM's logger through `slog` and bound it. Every `gorm.Open`
|
||||
left `logger.Default` in place at `Warn` with `IgnoreRecordNotFoundError`
|
||||
false, so **every record-not-found printed the fully interpolated SQL to
|
||||
stdout** — including the client-chosen path on `/webhook/{uuid}` and the
|
||||
submitted username on the login form, at no level the operator set and outside
|
||||
`internal/logger` entirely. Three call sites, not the two the issue named
|
||||
(#178)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Bound every `slog` line against client-chosen text. Eight sites
|
||||
reachable unauthenticated, found by reading every `slog` call in the tree
|
||||
rather than only the one reported; the budget moved to a shared
|
||||
`internal/logfield` so no second truncation exists. `DEBUG` being off by
|
||||
default is not a bound and is not treated as one (#176)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Stop a slow host turning a login-guard test into a segfault. A
|
||||
non-fatal `assert` on an acquire result was dereferenced on the next line, so
|
||||
one timing miss killed the whole `internal/middleware` binary and reddened CI
|
||||
for unrelated PRs. The fix also removed a real production race — `acquire`
|
||||
could shed a request with a slot standing free, because Go picks uniformly
|
||||
among ready `select` cases (#186)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Send the chi route pattern to Sentry rather than the concrete path.
|
||||
The receiver's path carries the entrypoint capability token, so every Sentry
|
||||
event from `/webhook/{uuid}` shipped a live credential to a third party.
|
||||
Request `Data`, `QueryString`, `Cookies` and `Env` are dropped and headers
|
||||
reduced to an allowlist (#179)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Read form fields from the POST body only. `r.FormValue` merges the
|
||||
query string, so a login could be driven by URL parameters — putting the
|
||||
password somewhere that lands in access logs, proxy logs and browser history
|
||||
(#160)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Verify login credentials before spending rate-limit budget, so a
|
||||
flood of wrong passwords cannot lock out the account it is guessing at. The
|
||||
manager took this decision rather than stall the queue; it is flagged on the
|
||||
issue for reversal (#150)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Run all linting in Docker via `Dockerfile.lint`. Host lint was
|
||||
wrong in both directions from version skew and shared caches. `script/lint`
|
||||
asserts the summary line, because `--no-cache-filter` silently ignores a stage
|
||||
name it does not match — the flag that makes the gate meaningful fails open
|
||||
(#109)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Serve an event's full stored body over HTTP. The list query
|
||||
truncates for rendering, and that truncated value was the only way to read a
|
||||
body, so the full payload was unreachable (#157)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Bound the access log line against client-chosen text.
|
||||
`internal/logfield` budgets by _encoded_ bytes, not runes, so a handler's JSON
|
||||
escaping cannot multiply a field past its allowance (#146)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Mark superseded CI commits `failure` rather than `skipped`. A
|
||||
skipped run rolls up green, so a commit that was never tested reported success
|
||||
(#152)
|
||||
- 2026-08-18 Set `fx.StopTimeout` inside the container stop grace, so shutdown
|
||||
hooks are bounded by a deadline the orchestrator will actually honour rather
|
||||
than being killed mid-flush (#134)
|
||||
- 2026-08-17 Bucket IPv6 rate-limit keys by `/64`. A single allocation hands out
|
||||
2^64 addresses, so per-address keying let one client mint unlimited buckets.
|
||||
Manager decision, recorded on the issue (#125)
|
||||
- 2026-08-17 Correct release-blocking README and startup-warning inaccuracies,
|
||||
including claims about behaviour the code does not have (#151)
|
||||
- 2026-08-17 Fetch and verify Alpine.js at build time against
|
||||
`static/vendor.sha256` instead of committing the minified blob, so the
|
||||
dependency is pinned by hash rather than by trust (#145)
|
||||
- 2026-08-17 Bound the event log's rendered bodies in the query itself, so a
|
||||
large stored payload cannot be read into memory just to be truncated for
|
||||
display (#135)
|
||||
- 2026-08-17 Mask the `http` target's destination URL in the UI: it can carry a
|
||||
bearer credential in its path or query, and was rendered verbatim. Manager
|
||||
decision to mask unconditionally (#115)
|
||||
- 2026-08-14 Bound shutdown hooks by their stop context, so a hook that hangs
|
||||
cannot hold the process past its grace period (#102)
|
||||
- 2026-08-14 Render templates via a buffer rather than the `ResponseWriter`, so
|
||||
a template error part-way through cannot commit a 200 and then fail — the
|
||||
response is written only once it is whole (#123)
|
||||
- 2026-08-14 Align the session codec's max-age with the 7-day absolute cap. The
|
||||
codec accepted cookies the session layer considered expired, so the cap was
|
||||
enforced in one place and not the other (#108)
|
||||
- 2026-08-12 Warn when `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty in production, where the safe
|
||||
default silently discards forwarded headers and every client rate-limits as
|
||||
the proxy's address (#149)
|
||||
- 2026-08-12 Bound the receiver rate limit per client IP across the whole
|
||||
`/webhook/*` route. The existing limiter keyed on the request path and
|
||||
`/webhook/{uuid}` matches any single segment, so a client that invented a
|
||||
fresh path per request minted a fresh bucket per request: the limit on the
|
||||
only unauthenticated endpoint bounded nothing in aggregate, and every request
|
||||
still cost an entrypoint lookup before it 404ed. An outer limiter keyed on the
|
||||
client address alone now bounds that, chained in front of the unchanged
|
||||
per-entrypoint limiter (#139)
|
||||
- 2026-08-12 Correct release-blocking documentation inaccuracies: the README
|
||||
promised manual redelivery in the present tense in three places when nothing
|
||||
implements it (the same false claim also sat in the doc comment that was its
|
||||
source text), the env table omitted `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL`, and `TODO.md`
|
||||
itself omitted five landed units (#141)
|
||||
- 2026-08-12 Make the CI gate execute the checks it reports on. The workflow now
|
||||
writes a build-context fingerprint before calling `script/cibuild`, so a code
|
||||
commit invalidates the `COPY` layer of the lint and builder stages while a
|
||||
docs-only commit still replays from cache; a superseding run also rewrites the
|
||||
`failure` status Gitea leaves on commits it cancelled and never tested.
|
||||
Verified by pushing a deliberately broken test and watching CI go red (#119)
|
||||
- 2026-08-12 Require a positive `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL`: a non-positive value
|
||||
reached `time.NewTicker` in both the retention reaper and the archive sweeper,
|
||||
panicking two goroutines with no recover after startup had already reported
|
||||
success (#140)
|
||||
- 2026-08-12 Bound the `X-Forwarded-For` scan's allocation to the hop cap: the
|
||||
reverse walk cuts entries with `strings.LastIndexByte` instead of joining and
|
||||
splitting, so a 1 MB header allocates 16 bytes rather than 1.6 MB per request
|
||||
on the unauthenticated receiver. Semantics proven unchanged by differential
|
||||
testing against the previous implementation (#133)
|
||||
- 2026-08-12 Cap the `X-Forwarded-For` hop walk at 64 entries, so an
|
||||
attacker-supplied chain cannot burn unbounded CPU in the rate-limit key
|
||||
function; running off the end falls back to the peer address (#124)
|
||||
- 2026-08-12 Gate forwarded-header trust behind a `TRUSTED_PROXIES` CIDR list:
|
||||
all three rate limiters key on the connection's own address unless the direct
|
||||
peer is a configured proxy, in which case `X-Forwarded-For` is walked right to
|
||||
left for the first non-proxy hop. Default trusts nothing, and a
|
||||
set-but-unparseable value aborts startup. Before this, any client could mint a
|
||||
fresh bucket or drain another's by rotating a spoofed header (#88)
|
||||
- 2026-08-11 Web UI cleanup: nav terminology unified on Webhooks, the Profile
|
||||
settings placeholder removed, a progressive-enhancement copy button for the
|
||||
entrypoint URL, and retention form copy that states the actual policy
|
||||
(deletion by the reaper, 0 retains forever) (#57)
|
||||
- 2026-08-11 Mask the webhook credential in delivery errors and logs: Go embeds
|
||||
the request URL in `*url.Error`, so every transport failure persisted the full
|
||||
Slack webhook URL into the per-webhook event database via
|
||||
`DeliveryResult.Error`, a field a future REST API would have served.
|
||||
`maskURLError` drops path, query and userinfo while preserving the wrapped
|
||||
cause, so `errors.Is`/`As` and `Timeout()` still work and DNS, TLS and timeout
|
||||
failures still read differently (#118)
|
||||
- 2026-08-11 Rate-limit the public webhook receiver endpoint
|
||||
(`RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`, default 120/min), keyed on client IP plus entrypoint
|
||||
path so one entrypoint cannot exhaust another's budget; over-limit requests
|
||||
get 429 with `Retry-After`. It was the one unauthenticated, internet-facing
|
||||
endpoint with no limit at all (#64)
|
||||
- 2026-08-11 Enforce the body size limit before CSRF parses the form:
|
||||
`MaxBodySize` is now first in all four form-parsing route groups, so an
|
||||
oversized request is rejected with 413 instead of being read in full by the
|
||||
CSRF middleware before any cap applied (#90)
|
||||
- 2026-08-11 Mask target config on the source detail page, which rendered the
|
||||
stored blob verbatim and so exposed the Slack incoming-webhook URL — a bearer
|
||||
credential that cannot be revoked per-holder. Config reaches the template only
|
||||
as a `TargetView` of labelled fields, and header values are rendered as a
|
||||
count (#113)
|
||||
- 2026-08-11 Allow `retention_days` of 0 to mean retain forever, via a sentinel
|
||||
written in `BeforeSave` so the GORM column default cannot win the race. Also
|
||||
bounds the reaper's cutoff arithmetic: day counts above 106751 overflowed
|
||||
`time.Duration` and wrapped the cutoff into the future, where every row
|
||||
matched and the sweep deleted everything (#79)
|
||||
- 2026-08-09 Inactivity-based session timeout: sliding idle expiry
|
||||
(`SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`, default `24h`) refreshed on authenticated requests,
|
||||
with the 7-day absolute cap kept as an independent backstop that activity
|
||||
never extends (#66)
|
||||
- 2026-08-09 Restart recovery and the 60s retry sweep terminally fail an
|
||||
orphaned `retrying` delivery whose target type no longer supports retries,
|
||||
recording a `DeliveryResult` with the reason instead of leaving the delivery
|
||||
stuck forever (#82)
|
||||
- 2026-08-09 Root the delivery engine's worker pool and the retention reaper's
|
||||
sweep loop at `context.Background()` rather than the fx `OnStart` hook context
|
||||
(#97), which carries fx's 15s start timeout and killed both roughly fifteen
|
||||
seconds after boot: the proxy silently stopped delivering webhooks entirely,
|
||||
and the reaper never ran a single sweep under its default one-hour interval
|
||||
- 2026-08-09 Archive writer lifecycle (#89): deleting a webhook (or its last
|
||||
`database` target) evicts the cached archive writer and closes its handle
|
||||
while deliberately leaving `archive-{webhookID}.db` on disk, and a new
|
||||
`ArchiveSweeper` prunes idle archives on the existing
|
||||
`RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` without ever creating an archive file
|
||||
- 2026-08-09 Configuration parsing fails loudly on set-but-unparseable
|
||||
environment values: `envInt` removed in favour of `envPositiveInt` plus a
|
||||
`PORT` range check, `envBool` now parses with `strconv.ParseBool`, and
|
||||
defaults apply only to unset variables (#80)
|
||||
- 2026-08-07 Automatic event retention cleanup based on `retention_days`,
|
||||
deleting expired events, deliveries, and delivery results from each
|
||||
per-webhook event database (#63)
|
||||
- 2026-08-07 Update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 (Docker image digest in
|
||||
`Dockerfile`, release-archive sha256 pins in `script/bootstrap`), adopt the
|
||||
canonical `.golangci.yml` (v2 `linters.settings` layout so
|
||||
`lll`/`funlen`/`cyclop`/`dupl` thresholds actually apply), and fix all newly
|
||||
surfaced lint findings
|
||||
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints, Makefile
|
||||
shims, README Entrypoints section
|
||||
- 2026-03-25 pin golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
|
||||
- 2026-03-18 CSRF middleware detects TLS per-request, fixing login over plain
|
||||
HTTP and behind reverse proxies (#54)
|
||||
- 2026-03-17 root path redirects based on auth state (#52)
|
||||
- 2026-03-17 CSRF protection, SSRF prevention for HTTP delivery targets with DNS
|
||||
rebinding defense, and per-IP login rate limiting (#42)
|
||||
- 2026-03-17 Slack target type for incoming webhook notifications (#47)
|
||||
- 2026-03-17 Dockerfile absolute paths and static linking (#49); absolute dev
|
||||
DATA_DIR default and clarified env docs (#46)
|
||||
- 2026-03-05 security headers middleware, session regeneration on login, request
|
||||
body size limits (#41)
|
||||
- 2026-03-04 tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages (#32); removed
|
||||
the build-architecture global (#31)
|
||||
- 2026-03-04 1.0 MVP merge: Webhook/Entrypoint/Target rename, core delivery
|
||||
engine with bounded worker pool and circuit breaker, parallel fan-out,
|
||||
per-webhook event databases, management UI (#16)
|
||||
- 2026-03-01 repo brought to REPO_POLICIES standards; TODO.md folded into README
|
||||
(#6)
|
||||
|
||||
# Future Steps
|
||||
|
||||
- Per-webhook rate limits, set in the web UI and enforced in the receiver
|
||||
handler, on top of the receiver's existing limits, which `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`
|
||||
sets for the whole server (see Rate Limiting in the README)
|
||||
- API key authentication for programmatic access (the `APIKey` model exists, but
|
||||
nothing creates a key and no middleware checks one)
|
||||
- Delivery status and retry management UI. Replay of a terminally failed
|
||||
delivery and per-attempt detail already landed
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/203,
|
||||
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/202)
|
||||
- Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config plus
|
||||
handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver endpoints)
|
||||
- API key authentication for programmatic access (APIKey model exists; Bearer
|
||||
token middleware does not)
|
||||
- REST API v1
|
||||
- CRUD for webhooks, entrypoints, targets
|
||||
- event viewing and filtering endpoints
|
||||
- event redelivery endpoint
|
||||
- OpenAPI specification
|
||||
- Analytics in the web UI: response times summarised per webhook or per target,
|
||||
and figures for all webhooks together. The webhook page already shows event,
|
||||
delivery and failure counts and failure percentages, the target list counts
|
||||
each target's deliveries, the event log and each event's page show every
|
||||
attempt's duration, and `/metrics` carries server-wide counts and delivery
|
||||
durations
|
||||
- A remember-me option at login. Every session already survives a browser
|
||||
restart: it lasts up to 7 days, and ends sooner after `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`
|
||||
(default 24 hours) without activity
|
||||
- Analytics dashboard: success rates, response times, volume
|
||||
- A remember-me option at login
|
||||
- Password reset flow for a forgotten password over the web. The authenticated
|
||||
password _change_ flow already landed, and a lost password is recoverable from
|
||||
the console with `webhooker resetpw`
|
||||
@@ -60,13 +377,7 @@ is kept mergeable at all times, which is the point of the branch.
|
||||
- Later, nice to have
|
||||
- email delivery target type
|
||||
- SNS and S3 delivery targets
|
||||
- data transformations (e.g. a configurable Slack message format; the Slack
|
||||
target sends one fixed format today)
|
||||
- JSONL file delivery with periodic S3 upload (the `database` target already
|
||||
archives events to SQLite files, rotated hourly, daily or monthly if set,
|
||||
and the webhook page offers them as one gzipped JSON download)
|
||||
- webhook event search, and filtering beyond the event log's failed and
|
||||
pending views
|
||||
- multi-user with role-based access control (each webhook already belongs to
|
||||
one account, but there is only the account made at first boot and no way
|
||||
to add another)
|
||||
- data transformations (e.g. webhook to Slack message formatting)
|
||||
- JSONL file delivery with periodic S3 upload
|
||||
- webhook event search and filtering
|
||||
- multi-user with role-based access control
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user