Close archive writers when the delivery engine stops (closes #280)

The engine cached archive writers and never closed them at shutdown,
so after a clean stop an archive's rows could sit in its -wal while
the .db held no table. The engine's stop hook now evicts every cached
writer once its workers have returned, the same way deleting a webhook
does, so a clean stop leaves each archive as one file and a late write
is refused. If the workers do not return within the stop budget, the
writers are left open as a kill would leave them.

The README no longer says archives keep their sidecars across a clean
stop.

Model: opus-5-5

Dockerfile

@@ -88,9 +88,7 @@ RUN CGO_ENABLED=1 make build VERSION="$VERSION" GO_LDFLAGS='-extldflags "-static
 # alpine:3.21, 2026-03-17
 FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:c3f8e73fdb79deaebaa2037150150191b9dcbfba68b4a46d70103204c53f4709
 
-# su-exec 0.2-r3 (Alpine 3.21), 2026-09-29: the entrypoint runs the app
-# as webhooker with it.
-RUN apk --no-cache add ca-certificates su-exec=0.2-r3
+RUN apk --no-cache add ca-certificates
 
 # Create non-root user
 RUN addgroup -g 1000 -S webhooker && \
@@ -101,17 +99,13 @@ WORKDIR /app
 # Copy binary from builder
 COPY --from=builder /build/bin/webhooker /app/webhooker
 
-# Not under /app, which belongs to webhooker: this script runs as root.
-COPY deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
-
 # Create data directory for all SQLite databases (main app DB +
 # per-webhook event DBs). DATA_DIR defaults to /var/lib/webhooker.
 RUN mkdir -p /var/lib/webhooker
 
 RUN chown -R webhooker:webhooker /app /var/lib/webhooker
 
-# No USER: the entrypoint starts as root to make the data directory
-# webhooker's, then runs the app as webhooker.
+USER webhooker
 
 EXPOSE 8080
 
@@ -130,5 +124,4 @@ ENV BIND_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0
 HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
     CMD wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://localhost:8080/.well-known/healthcheck || exit 1
 
-ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh"]
 CMD ["/app/webhooker"]

README.md

@@ -157,11 +157,6 @@ private and reserved ranges — RFC 1918, loopback, CGNAT, link-local and
 the rest — are refused, which stops a target from being used to make
 webhooker probe the network it sits in.
 
-Besides the private and reserved ranges, the default blocklist refuses
-public cloud metadata addresses: currently only `168.63.129.16`, Azure's
-WireServer, which serves an Azure VM its credentials. Because it is a
-public address, listing it in `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` reopens it.
-
 That default is also inconvenient for the thing webhooker is mostly
 for: taking a public webhook and forwarding it to something on your own
 network. A container on the same Docker network, a box on `10.x`, a
@@ -200,16 +195,15 @@ Two things this setting cannot do:
   the list is always an allowlist; an empty list (the default) means
   every private and reserved range stays refused. Note that
   `0.0.0.0/0` gets you most of the way there anyway, per above.
-- **It cannot open link-local, or a cloud metadata endpoint at a
-  non-public address that discloses credentials or user data.** An
-  address is on the list below when it is not a public address and both
-  of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it cannot collide with
-  anything you run; and reaching it hands out credentials, user data or
-  bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no matter what you list,
-  including when you list them outright or list a supernet such as
-  `0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`. Treat this as best
-  effort rather than a guarantee — it is a hand-maintained list and the
-  caveat below the table applies:
+- **It cannot open link-local, or a cloud metadata endpoint that
+  discloses credentials or user data.** An address is on the list below
+  when both of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it cannot collide
+  with anything you run; and reaching it hands out credentials, user
+  data or bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no matter what you
+  list, including when you list them outright or list a supernet such
+  as `0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`. Treat this as
+  best effort rather than a guarantee — it is a hand-maintained list
+  and the caveat below the table applies:
 
   | Blocked unconditionally | What it is |
   | ----------------------- | ---------- |
@@ -248,8 +242,7 @@ Two things this setting cannot do:
   encodings, which the default blocklist does not match. A publicly
   routable metadata address is not listed here, because nothing on this
   list can be reopened and blocking one that way would leave you no
-  escape hatch at all; Azure's `168.63.129.16` is refused by the default
-  blocklist instead, as described above.
+  escape hatch at all.
 
   This list is not exhaustive of every cloud's metadata address — if
   yours is not here, do not allowlist the block that contains it.
@@ -538,12 +531,6 @@ its Argon2id hash. There is no second account and no forgot-password
 flow, so the banner and the reset command below are the only two ways
 in.
 
-A start that finds no `webhooker.db` in `DATA_DIR` also logs
-`created a new, empty database` at `WARN`, with the file's path,
-shortly before the banner. On a deployment that has run before, that
-line means `DATA_DIR` was empty, most often because its volume is not
-mounted.
-
 #### Recovering a lost admin password
 
 `webhooker resetpw` sets an existing account's password from the
@@ -558,9 +545,8 @@ printf '%s' "$NEW_PASSWORD" | \
     DATA_DIR=/var/lib/webhooker webhooker resetpw admin
 ```
 
-In a container it is the same binary. The image's `CMD` is
-`/app/webhooker`, and a command given to `docker run` replaces all of
-it, so the whole command has to be given:
+In a container it is the same binary, which the image sets as `CMD`
+rather than `ENTRYPOINT`, so the whole command has to be given:
 
 ```bash
 docker run --rm -v webhooker-data:/var/lib/webhooker \
@@ -697,22 +683,38 @@ those three values rather than trusting the figure. Measured at 65s on
 Docker 29.7.2.) A container `unhealthy` with `connection refused` in
 its health log, or a published port that resets connections, is this.
 
-The app runs as a non-root user (`webhooker`, UID 1000), exposes port
-8080, and includes a health check against `/.well-known/healthcheck`.
-The `/var/lib/webhooker` volume holds all SQLite databases: the main
-application database (`webhooker.db`), the per-webhook event databases
-(`events-{uuid}.db`), and any archive databases written by `database`
-targets (`archive-{uuid}.db`). Mount this as a persistent volume to
-preserve data across container restarts.
+The container runs as a non-root user (`webhooker`, UID 1000), exposes
+port 8080, and includes a health check against
+`/.well-known/healthcheck`. The `/var/lib/webhooker` volume holds all
+SQLite databases: the main application database (`webhooker.db`), the
+per-webhook event databases (`events-{uuid}.db`), and any archive
+databases written by `database` targets (`archive-{uuid}.db`). Mount
+this as a persistent volume to preserve data across container
+restarts.
 
-**The container sets its data directory's owner and mode itself
-before the app starts**, so a host directory can be mounted as it is,
-whoever owns it. The image's `ENTRYPOINT`,
-`deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh`, starts as root, creates `DATA_DIR` if
-it is missing, gives the directory and anything in it that belongs to
-another user to `webhooker`, sets the directory to `0750`, and only
-then runs the app as `webhooker`. Started with `--user`, it changes
-nothing and runs the app as that user.
+**The bind-mounted directory must be owned by UID 1000, or the
+container does not start.** Docker creates a `-v` source path that
+does not exist yet as `root:root`, and the process runs as UID 1000,
+so it cannot take its `DATA_DIR` lock:
+
+```
+webhooker: locking data directory /var/lib/webhooker: open
+/var/lib/webhooker/webhooker.lock: permission denied
+```
+
+It exits non-zero at that point, before opening any database. Create
+the directory ahead of the first `docker run`:
+
+```bash
+mkdir -p /path/to/data
+chown 1000:1000 /path/to/data
+chmod 750 /path/to/data
+```
+
+The same `chown` is what a restore needs — see step 4 of
+[Restore](#restore). A **named volume** does not have this problem:
+Docker copies the image's ownership onto a volume it initializes, and
+the image creates `/var/lib/webhooker` owned by `webhooker`.
 
 **The file modes are not yours to set, and do not depend on the
 directory.** `webhooker.db` holds target configuration in plaintext —
@@ -720,10 +722,13 @@ bearer tokens, API keys, Slack webhook URLs — along with the session
 encryption key, so webhooker creates every SQLite file it owns `0600`:
 each database and both of its `-wal` and `-shm` sidecars, across all
 three tiers. Files an earlier build left `0644` are tightened when
-they are opened. The directory's `0750` is defence in depth — it stops
-other local users listing the directory and learning your webhook
-UUIDs from the `events-{uuid}.db` filenames — not the barrier
-protecting the credentials.
+they are opened. A `DATA_DIR` webhooker creates itself is `0750`, but
+a bind mount supplies its own directory and Docker's default for one
+it creates is `0755`; the `0600` files hold there regardless. The
+`chmod 750` above is defence in depth — it stops other local users
+listing the directory and learning your webhook UUIDs from the
+`events-{uuid}.db` filenames — not the barrier protecting the
+credentials.
 
 ### Running under upaas
 
@@ -739,6 +744,17 @@ repository's `Dockerfile` and runs it. The app needs:
   app name, port `8080`. Leave `PORT` unset: the image's health check
   probes `8080`.
 - **Volume:** one host directory mounted at `/var/lib/webhooker`.
+  upaas bind-mounts the host path it is given and does not create it,
+  and the container does not start unless UID 1000 owns it (see
+  [Running with Docker](#running-with-docker)). Create it before the
+  first deploy:
+
+    ```bash
+    mkdir -p /path/to/data
+    chown 1000:1000 /path/to/data
+    chmod 750 /path/to/data
+    ```
+
 - **Environment variables:**
     - `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod`
     - `TRUSTED_PROXIES`: your reverse proxy's address on that Docker
@@ -997,12 +1013,12 @@ done
 `.backup` reads through the WAL and writes a single consistent file with
 no sidecars of its own, so the destination is complete as it stands.
 Two caveats. First, the runtime image is `alpine:3.21` with only
-`ca-certificates` and `su-exec` added — the `sqlite3` CLI is **not** in
-it, so run this on the host against the volume path, or from a
-throwaway container that mounts the volume. Second, each file is
-captured at its own instant, so a webhook created or an event delivered
-between two files being copied lands in one and not the other. If you
-need the whole set coherent as of a single moment, stop the service.
+`ca-certificates` added — the `sqlite3` CLI is **not** in it, so run
+this on the host against the volume path, or from a throwaway container
+that mounts the volume. Second, each file is captured at its own
+instant, so a webhook created or an event delivered between two files
+being copied lands in one and not the other. If you need the whole set
+coherent as of a single moment, stop the service.
 
 Note that `sqlite3 <db> .dump` is **not** one of these procedures: it is
 an export, it holds a read transaction open for as long as it runs, and
@@ -1056,11 +1072,21 @@ with any `-wal`/`-shm` beside it, or wait until there are none.
    archive not opened since a crash. A copy salvaged from a crashed
    instance has them for everything, and needs all of them.
 
-4. Start the service. The container gives the directory and the
-   restored files to the `webhooker` user before the app starts,
-   whoever restored them (see
-   [Running with Docker](#running-with-docker)). `AutoMigrate` runs
-   against each restored database as it is opened.
+4. **Fix ownership.** The container runs as the non-root `webhooker`
+   user, UID 1000 / GID 1000. Restored files must be owned by (or
+   writable by) that UID, and so must the directory itself — SQLite
+   creates the `-wal` and `-shm` sidecars beside the database, so a
+   writable file inside a directory it cannot write is not enough:
+
+    ```bash
+    chown -R 1000:1000 /path/to/data
+    ```
+
+    Restoring as `root` on the host and forgetting this step is the
+    usual way a restore fails.
+
+5. Start the service. `AutoMigrate` runs against each restored database
+   as it is opened.
 
 ### Upgrades
 
@@ -2688,7 +2714,7 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
 | ------ | --------------------------- | ----------- |
 | `GET`  | `/`                         | Root redirect, 303 (authenticated → `/sources`, unauthenticated → `/pages/login`) |
 | `GET`  | `/.well-known/healthcheck`  | Health check (JSON: `status`, `now`, `uptimeSeconds`, `uptimeHuman`, `version`, `appname`, `maintenanceMode`) |
-| `GET`, `HEAD` | `/s/*`              | Static file serving (embedded CSS, JS). `GET` and `HEAD` only — `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, `OPTIONS`, `TRACE` and `CONNECT` are answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: GET, HEAD`. Any other method (such as `PROPFIND`) is refused by chi before it reaches this route, and gets `405` without an `Allow` header. Pinned by `TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead` |
+| any    | `/s/*`                      | Static file serving (embedded CSS, JS). Mounted for every method, not just `GET`/`HEAD`: chi's `Mount` registers all methods and `http.FileServer` special-cases only `HEAD` (by omitting the body), so a `POST` or `DELETE` to an asset is answered `200` with the file. Pinned by `TestStaticServesEveryMethod` |
 | `POST` | `/webhook/{uuid}`           | Webhook receiver endpoint. `POST` only — every other method is answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: POST`. Rate limited (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
 
 #### Authentication Endpoints
@@ -3038,11 +3064,7 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
 - Prometheus metrics behind basic auth
 - Static assets embedded in binary (no filesystem access needed at
   runtime)
-- The app runs as the non-root `webhooker` user (UID 1000) in the
-  container. The image sets no `USER`, so these run as root: the
-  `ENTRYPOINT` script, which sets the data directory's owner and mode
-  before the app starts; the image's health check; and `docker exec`,
-  unless given `--user`
+- Container runs as non-root user (UID 1000)
 - GORM soft deletes on every entity that carries `BaseModel`, which is
   all of them but `Setting` (data preserved for audit)
 
@@ -3169,13 +3191,10 @@ version is fixed independently of the compiler's:
    `GO_LDFLAGS`, so neither can drop the `-X` that stamps the version.
    The version arrives as the `VERSION` build arg, since the context
    has no `.git` (see [Version stamping](#version-stamping)).
-3. **Runtime stage** (`alpine:3.21`) — copies the static binary and
-   `deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh`, creates the `/var/lib/webhooker`
-   directory for all SQLite databases, exposes port 8080, and includes
-   a health check against `/.well-known/healthcheck`. It sets no
-   `USER`: the `ENTRYPOINT` script starts as root, sets the data
-   directory's owner and mode, and runs the app as the non-root
-   `webhooker` user (UID 1000) through `su-exec`.
+3. **Runtime stage** (`alpine:3.21`) — copies the static binary,
+   creates the `/var/lib/webhooker` directory for all SQLite databases,
+   runs as the non-root `webhooker` user (UID 1000), exposes port 8080,
+   and includes a health check against `/.well-known/healthcheck`.
 
 The lint stage invokes `golangci-lint` directly rather than `make lint`:
 it is already the pinned linter image, and `make lint` builds
@@ -3254,5 +3273,3 @@ MIT
 ## Author
 
 [@sneak](https://sneak.berlin)
-
-

deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh: the image's ENTRYPOINT. A bind-mounted
-# data directory keeps its owner from the host, often root, and the app
-# could not write to it. Started as root, this creates DATA_DIR if
-# needed, gives it and everything in it to webhooker, sets its mode, and
-# runs the command as webhooker, so the app never runs as root. Started
-# as another user, it only runs the command.
-set -eu
-
-main() {
-    if [ "$(id -u)" != 0 ]; then
-        exec "$@"
-    fi
-
-    dir="${DATA_DIR:-/var/lib/webhooker}"
-    mkdir -p "$dir"
-    find "$dir" ! -user webhooker -exec chown -h webhooker:webhooker {} +
-    chmod 750 "$dir"
-    exec su-exec webhooker "$@"
-}
-
-main "$@"

internal/config/config.go

@@ -192,10 +192,9 @@ type Config struct {
 	// alwaysBlockedNetworks stays blocked no matter what is listed
 	// here. That set is link-local plus the cloud metadata
 	// endpoints outside it that disclose credentials or user data
-	// at a provider-fixed, non-public address; it is not
-	// exhaustive of every cloud's metadata address. See
-	// alwaysBlockedNetworks for the authoritative list and the
-	// criterion it is built from.
+	// at a provider-fixed address; it is not exhaustive of every
+	// cloud's metadata address. See alwaysBlockedNetworks for the
+	// authoritative list and the criterion it is built from.
 	AllowedEgressCIDRs []netip.Prefix
 
 	params *ConfigParams
@@ -747,14 +746,12 @@ func (c *Config) warnEgressAllowlist(log *slog.Logger) {
 
 	log.Warn(
 		"ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS lets delivery targets reach these "+
-			"otherwise-blocked networks. Anyone who can create a "+
-			"delivery target can now make this process issue "+
-			"requests into them, and read back the response. Only "+
-			"the addresses the README lists as blocked "+
-			"unconditionally stay blocked regardless of what is "+
-			"listed here; a public cloud metadata address such as "+
-			"168.63.129.16 is reachable once it, or a block "+
-			"covering it, is listed.",
+			"otherwise-blocked private/reserved networks. Anyone "+
+			"who can create a delivery target can now make this "+
+			"process issue requests into them, and read back the "+
+			"response. Link-local and the known cloud instance "+
+			"metadata endpoints outside it stay blocked "+
+			"regardless of what is listed here.",
 		"allowedEgressCIDRs",
 		strings.Join(PrefixStrings(c.AllowedEgressCIDRs), ","),
 	)

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -834,13 +834,12 @@ func TestEgressAllowlistWarning(t *testing.T) {
 			// to be able to read back which networks are open.
 			assert.Contains(t, logged, "10.0.0.0/8")
 			assert.Contains(t, logged, "127.0.0.0/8")
-			// What stays shut is the whole unconditional set, not
-			// link-local alone; a public metadata address is not in
-			// it, so a listed block covering it opens it.
-			assert.Contains(t, logged, "blocked unconditionally")
-			assert.Contains(t, logged, "168.63.129.16 is reachable")
-			// The listed blocks need not be private or reserved.
-			assert.NotContains(t, logged, "private/reserved")
+			// What stays shut. Asserted on the clause naming the
+			// wider set rather than on "Link-local" alone, so the
+			// string cannot narrow back to link-local only while
+			// the always-blocked set covers ULA, CGNAT and two
+			// public metadata addresses as well.
+			assert.Contains(t, logged, "metadata endpoints outside it")
 		})
 	}
 }

internal/database/bootstrap_banner_test.go

@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ package database_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
-	"log/slog"
-	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
@@ -85,37 +83,3 @@ func TestFirstBoot_PrintsTheAdminPasswordAsABanner(t *testing.T) {
 		t, ok, "the printed password must open the seeded account",
 	)
 }
-
-// TestNewDatabase_IsLoggedWithItsPath is the log half of
-// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/359. A DATA_DIR that is
-// unexpectedly empty boots exactly like a first start, so the start
-// that creates the database must say so, and where. Opening that
-// database again must not.
-func TestNewDatabase_IsLoggedWithItsPath(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-
-	open := func() string {
-		var out bytes.Buffer
-
-		db, err := database.Open(dir, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&out, nil)))
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-		require.NoError(t, db.Close())
-
-		return out.String()
-	}
-
-	const created = `level=WARN msg="created a new, empty database"`
-
-	first := open()
-	second := open()
-
-	assert.Contains(
-		t, first,
-		created+" path="+filepath.Join(dir, database.MainDBFileName),
-	)
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, second, created, "an existing database is not new",
-	)
-}

internal/database/database.go

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
-	"io/fs"
 	"log/slog"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -200,12 +199,6 @@ func (d *Database) connectTo(dataDir string) error {
 	// Construct the main application database path inside DATA_DIR.
 	dbPath := filepath.Join(dataDir, MainDBFileName)
 
-	// Checked before opening, which creates the file. A DATA_DIR that
-	// is unexpectedly empty -- its volume not mounted, say -- looks
-	// exactly like a first start, so a new database is a warning.
-	_, statErr := os.Stat(dbPath)
-	created := errors.Is(statErr, fs.ErrNotExist)
-
 	// Opened through OpenSQLite so this handle carries the same WAL
 	// journaling, busy timeout, immediate-transaction locking, and pool
 	// bounds as every other database file. See sqlite_open.go.
@@ -236,12 +229,7 @@ func (d *Database) connectTo(dataDir string) error {
 	}
 
 	d.db = db
-
-	if created {
-		d.log.Warn("created a new, empty database", "path", dbPath)
-	} else {
-		d.log.Info("connected to database", "path", dbPath)
-	}
+	d.log.Info("connected to database", "path", dbPath)
 
 	// Run migrations
 	return d.migrate()

internal/delivery/engine.go

@@ -368,9 +368,9 @@ func (e *Engine) start() {
 // writer for long by then: the archive sweeper stops before the
 // engine, and deleting a webhook only closes one. If the pool did
 // not drain in time, the writers are left open, as a kill would
-// leave them. Closing them would wait for any write in progress,
-// and a worker still running would then open new writers that
-// nothing closes, so it gains nothing over a kill.
+// leave them: a worker still running may be mid-write, and
+// closing its writer would wait on that write and then fail the
+// next delivery the worker archives.
 func (e *Engine) stop(ctx context.Context) error {
 	e.log.Info("delivery engine stopping")
 

internal/delivery/engine_lifecycle_test.go

@@ -327,10 +327,10 @@ func TestEngine_StopHookClosesArchives(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // TestEngine_StopHookTimeoutLeavesArchivesOpen covers a stop whose
-// budget runs out while a worker is still running. The archive
-// writers are left open, as a kill would leave them: closing them
-// would wait for any write in progress, and that worker would then
-// open new writers that nothing closes.
+// budget runs out while a worker is still running. That worker may
+// be in the middle of an archive write, so the archive writers are
+// left open, as a kill would leave them, rather than closed
+// underneath it.
 func TestEngine_StopHookTimeoutLeavesArchivesOpen(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 

internal/delivery/engine_test.go

@@ -1166,10 +1166,6 @@ func TestIsForwardableHeader(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.False(t,
 		delivery.ExportIsForwardableHeader("Content-Length"),
 	)
-
-	assert.False(t,
-		delivery.ExportIsForwardableHeader("Content-Type"),
-	)
 }
 
 func TestTruncate(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1251,81 +1247,6 @@ func TestDoHTTPRequest_ForwardsHeaders(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }
 
-// The event's stored inbound headers carry the same Content-Type the
-// receiver saved as the event's ContentType, so a delivery could send
-// it twice. It must go out exactly once, with a Content-Type configured
-// on the target winning, then the event's ContentType.
-func TestApplyRequestHeaders_SendsOneContentType(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	cases := map[string]struct {
-		inbound    string
-		event      string
-		configured string
-		want       []string
-	}{
-		"inbound and event agree": {
-			inbound: testContentType,
-			event:   testContentType,
-			want:    []string{testContentType},
-		},
-		"inbound and event disagree": {
-			inbound: "text/plain",
-			event:   testContentType,
-			want:    []string{testContentType},
-		},
-		"event has none": {
-			inbound: testContentType,
-			want:    nil,
-		},
-		"target configures its own": {
-			inbound:    testContentType,
-			event:      testContentType,
-			configured: "application/xml",
-			want:       []string{"application/xml"},
-		},
-	}
-
-	for name, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			inbound, err := json.Marshal(map[string][]string{
-				headerContentType: {tc.inbound},
-			})
-			require.NoError(t, err)
-
-			cfg := &delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{}
-			if tc.configured != "" {
-				cfg.Headers = map[string]string{
-					headerContentType: tc.configured,
-				}
-			}
-
-			req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
-				context.Background(),
-				http.MethodPost,
-				"https://target.example.com/hook",
-				http.NoBody,
-			)
-			require.NoError(t, err)
-
-			delivery.ExportApplyRequestHeaders(
-				req,
-				&database.Event{
-					Headers:     string(inbound),
-					ContentType: tc.event,
-				},
-				cfg,
-			)
-
-			assert.Equal(t,
-				tc.want, req.Header.Values(headerContentType),
-			)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
 func TestProcessDelivery_RoutesToCorrectHandler(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {

internal/delivery/redirect_test.go

@@ -339,11 +339,10 @@ func TestRedirectPolicy_StopsAtHopCap(t *testing.T) {
 // The set the redirect policy strips is whatever the delivery path
 // actually put on the wire, so a header added to the forward set is
 // covered without a second edit. A header the event never carried
-// is not in the set, and neither is the inbound Content-Type, because
-// it is not forwarded. Two more are deliberately excluded: a
-// Content-Type configured on the target describes the body, which a
-// 307 carries across hosts, and the inbound User-Agent every real
-// sender supplies is overwritten before the request goes out.
+// is not in the set, and the delivery path's own two are deliberately
+// excluded: Content-Type describes the body, which a 307 carries
+// across hosts, and the inbound User-Agent every real sender supplies
+// is overwritten before the request goes out.
 func TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
@@ -372,7 +371,6 @@ func TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames(t *testing.T) {
 		&delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
 			Headers: map[string]string{
 				probeHeaderName: probeHeaderValue,
-				"Content-Type":  testContentType,
 			},
 		},
 	)
@@ -380,11 +378,7 @@ func TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t,
 		[]string{probeHeaderName, inboundHeaderName}, names,
 		"both header classes are reported, and only those: "+
-			"Host and the inbound Content-Type are never "+
-			"forwarded, User-Agent is the delivery path's own",
-	)
-	assert.NotContains(t, names, "Content-Type",
-		"a Content-Type configured on the target must survive "+
-			"a cross-origin 307/308 with the body it describes",
+			"Host is never forwarded, Content-Type and "+
+			"User-Agent are the delivery path's own",
 	)
 }

internal/delivery/ssrf.go

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ var (
 		"hostname resolved to no IP addresses",
 	)
 	errBlockedIP = errors.New(
-		"blocked private, reserved or cloud metadata address",
+		"blocked private/reserved IP range",
 	)
 	errBlockedMetadata = errors.New(
 		"blocked link-local or cloud instance metadata " +
@@ -37,10 +37,9 @@ var (
 	)
 )
 
-// blockedNetworks is the default blocklist: the private and
-// reserved IP ranges, plus the public cloud metadata addresses,
-// that are blocked to prevent SSRF attacks. An operator can
-// permit specific blocks out of this set with
+// blockedNetworks contains all private/reserved IP ranges
+// that should be blocked to prevent SSRF attacks. An operator
+// can permit specific blocks out of this set with
 // ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS; see Guard.
 //
 //nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
@@ -123,8 +122,6 @@ func init() {
 		"::1/128",
 		"fc00::/7",
 		"fe80::/10",
-		// Azure WireServer, a public address that serves VM credentials.
-		"168.63.129.16/32",
 	})
 
 	// Every entry is named. The set must not grow or shrink
@@ -219,8 +216,8 @@ func matchesAny(networks []*net.IPNet, ip net.IP) bool {
 }
 
 // isBlockedIP checks whether an IP address falls within
-// the default blocklist, before any operator allowlist is
-// considered.
+// any blocked private/reserved network range, before any
+// operator allowlist is considered.
 func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
 	return matchesAny(blockedNetworks, ip)
 }
@@ -323,7 +320,7 @@ func (g *Guard) allows(ip net.IP) bool {
 //
 //  1. alwaysBlockedNetworks is refused before the allowlist is
 //     consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local or a
-//     cloud metadata endpoint at a non-public address.
+//     cloud instance metadata endpoint.
 //  2. The allowlist is consulted next, so a listed private
 //     network becomes reachable.
 //  3. Everything else keeps the default blocklist's answer.

internal/delivery/ssrf_allowlist_test.go

@@ -390,41 +390,6 @@ func TestGuardAllowlist_PublicUnaffected(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestGuardAllowlist_AzureWireServerReopenable covers Azure's
-// WireServer, a public address that serves VM credentials. The
-// default guard refuses it, but because it is public it sits in
-// the default blocklist rather than the unconditional set, so an
-// operator who lists it can reach it.
-func TestGuardAllowlist_AzureWireServerReopenable(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const wireServerIP = "168.63.129.16"
-
-	target := "http://" + wireServerIP + "/?comp=versions"
-
-	defaultGuard := delivery.NewTestGuard()
-
-	err := defaultGuard.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target)
-	require.Error(t, err,
-		"WireServer must be refused with no allowlist set",
-	)
-	assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), metadataRefusalClause,
-		"WireServer must be refused by the default blocklist, "+
-			"which an allowlist can override",
-	)
-
-	assertDialRefused(t, defaultGuard, target)
-
-	listed := delivery.NewTestGuard(
-		netip.MustParsePrefix(wireServerIP + "/32"),
-	)
-
-	assert.NoError(t,
-		listed.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target),
-		"an operator who lists WireServer must be able to reach it",
-	)
-}
-
 // TestGuardCheckIP_BothPathsShareOneDecision asserts that the
 // validator and the dialer are not two policies that happen to
 // agree: both are defined in terms of checkIP, so the exported

internal/delivery/target_headers_test.go

@@ -11,11 +11,10 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
 )
 
-// Literals these tests repeat, named so that the header names and the
+// Literals these tests repeat, named so that the header name and the
 // keep-forever archive config each have one definition.
 const (
 	headerAuthorization = "Authorization"
-	headerContentType   = "Content-Type"
 	bearerValue         = "Bearer abc"
 	archiveConfigNever  = "{\"expiry\":\"never\"}"
 )

internal/delivery/target_http.go

@@ -541,11 +541,6 @@ func isForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
 		"Upgrade", "Proxy-Authorization",
 		"Proxy-Connection", "Content-Length":
 		return false
-	case "Content-Type":
-		// applyRequestHeaders sets Content-Type itself. The receiver
-		// already stored this inbound value as the event's
-		// ContentType, so forwarding it too would send it twice.
-		return false
 	default:
 		return true
 	}
@@ -558,10 +553,6 @@ func isForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
 // policy strips exactly that set on a hop that leaves the origin,
 // so the forward set is decided here and only here — a header added
 // to it is covered off-origin without a second edit elsewhere.
-//
-// Content-Type goes out once: a Content-Type configured on the target
-// wins, otherwise the event's ContentType, otherwise none. The inbound
-// Content-Type in the event's headers is never forwarded.
 func applyRequestHeaders(
 	req *http.Request,
 	event *database.Event,
@@ -582,10 +573,10 @@ func applyRequestHeaders(
 
 	req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "webhooker/1.0")
 
-	// A Content-Type configured on the target describes the body
-	// being sent rather than the sender. A 307/308 preserves the
-	// body across hosts, so stripping it would send that body
-	// untyped.
+	// Content-Type describes the body being sent rather than the
+	// sender, and the delivery path sets it from the event itself.
+	// A 307/308 preserves the body across hosts, so stripping it
+	// would send that body untyped.
 	delete(originScoped, "Content-Type")
 
 	// User-Agent is overwritten just above, so an inbound one never

internal/middleware/recoverer.go

@@ -133,11 +133,6 @@ func (w *recoverResponseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
 // what the access log records and the metrics count, and outside the
 // sentryhttp handler, whose Repanic option depends on something
 // further out recovering what it re-raises.
-//
-// Unlike http.Error on its own, it deletes any Set-Cookie the handler
-// set before panicking, because a request that failed must not hand
-// the client a credential; every other header is left to http.Error.
-// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/193.
 func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 		return http.HandlerFunc(func(
@@ -169,8 +164,6 @@ func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 					return
 				}
 
-				rw.Header().Del("Set-Cookie")
-
 				http.Error(
 					rw,
 					http.StatusText(

internal/middleware/recoverer_test.go

@@ -304,44 +304,16 @@ func TestRecovererRepanicsErrAbortHandler(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }
 
-// TestRecovererDropsSetCookieFromTheRecovered500 covers a handler that
-// sets a cookie and a redirect target and then panics before sending
-// anything. A request that failed must not hand the client a
-// credential, so the 500 carries no cookie; Location is left alone.
-func TestRecovererDropsSetCookieFromTheRecovered500(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	probe := newRecovererProbe(
-		t, false,
-		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			w.Header().Set("Set-Cookie", "session=x")
-			w.Header().Set("Location", "/after")
-
-			panic(panicMarker)
-		},
-	)
-
-	resp, err := probe.get(t)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NoError(t, resp.Body.Close())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, resp.StatusCode)
-	assert.Empty(t, resp.Cookies())
-	assert.Equal(t, "/after", resp.Header.Get("Location"))
-}
-
 // TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse covers a handler that
 // panics after sending its status. The bytes are already on the wire,
-// cookie included, so a second WriteHeader would change nothing the
-// client sees and would draw net/http's "superfluous
-// response.WriteHeader" report.
+// so a second WriteHeader would change nothing the client sees and
+// would draw net/http's "superfluous response.WriteHeader" report.
 func TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	probe := newRecovererProbe(
 		t, false,
 		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			w.Header().Set("Set-Cookie", "session=x")
 			w.WriteHeader(committedStatus)
 			_, _ = w.Write([]byte("partial"))
 
@@ -359,7 +331,6 @@ func TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse(t *testing.T) {
 
 	assert.Equal(t, committedStatus, resp.StatusCode)
 	assert.Equal(t, "partial", string(body))
-	assert.Len(t, resp.Cookies(), 1)
 
 	record := probe.panicRecord(t)
 	assert.Equal(t, panicMarker, record["panic"])

internal/server/routes.go

@@ -92,25 +92,11 @@ func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
 func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
 	s.router.Get("/", s.h.HandleIndex())
 
-	// Static assets answer GET and HEAD only. chi's default 405
-	// carries no Allow header, so this group supplies its own.
-	staticFiles := http.StripPrefix(
-		"/s", http.FileServer(http.FS(static.Static)),
+	s.router.Mount(
+		"/s",
+		http.StripPrefix("/s", http.FileServer(http.FS(static.Static))),
 	)
 
-	s.router.Route("/s", func(r chi.Router) {
-		r.MethodNotAllowed(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			w.Header().Set("Allow", "GET, HEAD")
-			http.Error(
-				w,
-				"Method Not Allowed",
-				http.StatusMethodNotAllowed,
-			)
-		})
-		r.Method(http.MethodGet, "/*", staticFiles)
-		r.Method(http.MethodHead, "/*", staticFiles)
-	})
-
 	s.router.Route("/api/v1", func(_ chi.Router) {
 		// API routes will be added here.
 	})

internal/server/routes_test.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/url"
 	"regexp"
-	"slices"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -221,21 +220,9 @@ func (e *testEnv) csrfFrom(
 	// out of the markup has to be unescaped before it is submitted.
 	token := html.UnescapeString(match[1])
 
-	// A cookie the page sets replaces the one of the same name, as in
-	// a browser. Sent both, the server would read the first, older one.
-	set := w.Result().Cookies()
-	combined := make([]*http.Cookie, 0, len(cookies)+len(set))
-
-	for _, c := range cookies {
-		replaced := slices.ContainsFunc(set, func(n *http.Cookie) bool {
-			return n.Name == c.Name
-		})
-		if !replaced {
-			combined = append(combined, c)
-		}
-	}
-
-	combined = append(combined, set...)
+	combined := make([]*http.Cookie, 0, len(cookies))
+	combined = append(combined, cookies...)
+	combined = append(combined, w.Result().Cookies()...)
 
 	return token, combined
 }
@@ -409,15 +396,13 @@ func (e *testEnv) storedHash(t *testing.T, username string) string {
 
 // --- /s static group ---
 
-// TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead pins the methods the static group
-// answers: GET and HEAD are served the asset, and the other methods
-// chi routes (POST, PUT, DELETE and the rest) are refused with 405
-// and an Allow header naming those two. A method chi does not route,
-// such as PROPFIND, is refused with 405 by the top-level router
-// before it reaches the static group, so it gets no Allow header.
-// The README documents this; the test is what keeps the two from
-// drifting.
-func TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead(t *testing.T) {
+// TestStaticServesEveryMethod pins what the static mount actually
+// answers. chi's Mount registers the handler for all methods and
+// http.FileServer only special-cases HEAD (by suppressing the body),
+// so a POST or a DELETE to an asset is served the file rather than
+// refused. The README documents this; the test is what keeps the two
+// from drifting.
+func TestStaticServesEveryMethod(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	env := newTestEnv(t)
@@ -432,7 +417,6 @@ func TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead(t *testing.T) {
 		http.MethodPost,
 		http.MethodPut,
 		http.MethodDelete,
-		"PROPFIND",
 	} {
 		t.Run(method, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
@@ -444,38 +428,18 @@ func TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead(t *testing.T) {
 			w := httptest.NewRecorder()
 			env.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
 
-			switch method {
-			case http.MethodGet:
-				assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
-				assert.Equal(t, body, w.Body.Bytes(),
-					"the asset itself is returned")
-			case http.MethodHead:
-				assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+				"static mount answers every method")
+
+			if method == http.MethodHead {
 				assert.Empty(t, w.Body.Bytes(),
 					"HEAD must not carry a body")
-			case "PROPFIND":
-				assert.Equal(
-					t, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, w.Code,
-				)
-				assert.Empty(t, w.Header().Get("Allow"),
-					"chi refuses a method it does not route "+
-						"before the static group runs")
-				assert.NotContains(
-					t, w.Body.String(), string(body),
-					"a refused method must not get the asset",
-				)
-			default:
-				assert.Equal(
-					t, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, w.Code,
-				)
-				assert.Equal(
-					t, "GET, HEAD", w.Header().Get("Allow"),
-				)
-				assert.NotContains(
-					t, w.Body.String(), string(body),
-					"a refused method must not get the asset",
-				)
+
+				return
 			}
+
+			assert.Equal(t, body, w.Body.Bytes(),
+				"the asset itself is returned")
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -627,59 +591,6 @@ func TestPagesLogin_CorrectPasswordSurvivesASpentBudget(
 	)
 }
 
-// TestPagesLogin_CookiesFromAnEarlierDatabase is
-// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/359. A new database
-// brings a new session key, and the operator's browser still holds
-// the session and CSRF cookies signed with the old one. Logging in
-// must work as from a fresh browser and leave cookies the new key
-// accepts.
-func TestPagesLogin_CookiesFromAnEarlierDatabase(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const (
-		username = "operator"
-		password = "correct-horse-battery-staple"
-	)
-
-	earlier := newTestEnv(t)
-	earlierID, _ := earlier.seedUser(t, username, password)
-	_, stale := earlier.csrfFrom(t, "/pages/login", nil)
-	stale = append(stale, earlier.authCookies(t, earlierID, username)...)
-
-	env := newTestEnv(t)
-	env.seedUser(t, username, password)
-
-	token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, "/pages/login", stale)
-
-	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("csrf_token", token)
-	form.Set("username", username)
-	form.Set("password", password)
-
-	w := env.post("/pages/login", form, cookies)
-	require.Equal(
-		t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code,
-		"a session cookie from another key must not fail the login",
-	)
-
-	// The response deletes the old session cookie and then sets the
-	// new one; a browser keeps the last.
-	var fresh *http.Cookie
-
-	for _, c := range w.Result().Cookies() {
-		if c.Name == session.SessionName {
-			fresh = c
-		}
-	}
-
-	require.NotNil(t, fresh, "login must set a session cookie")
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, "/sources",
-		env.get("/", []*http.Cookie{fresh}).Header().Get("Location"),
-		"the new session cookie must authenticate",
-	)
-}
-
 // --- /user/{username} group ---
 
 // TestPasswordChange_OversizeBody_RejectedAndPasswordUnchanged

internal/session/codec_test.go

@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ import (
 )
 
 // The tests below exercise the securecookie codecs underneath the
-// store and nothing else: they decode through the store itself, so no
-// server-side expiry check takes part in the result. They exist because
+// store and nothing else: Session.Get only decodes, so no server-side
+// expiry check takes part in the result. They exist because
 // NewCookieStore gives its codecs a 30-day max age that assigning
 // store.Options does not override, which would let the codec accept a
 // cookie weeks past the cap the cookie attribute advertises.
@@ -75,11 +75,10 @@ func restamp(
 	return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(payload)
 }
 
-// decodeCookie feeds value back through the store's decode path. It
-// asks the store rather than Session.Get, which treats a cookie that
-// does not decode as absent and so hides the codec's reason.
+// decodeCookie feeds value back through the store's decode path.
 func decodeCookie(
 	t *testing.T,
+	s *session.Session,
 	value string,
 ) (*sessions.Session, error) {
 	t.Helper()
@@ -95,7 +94,7 @@ func decodeCookie(
 		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
 	})
 
-	sess, err := session.NewStore(testKey()).Get(req, session.SessionName)
+	sess, err := s.Get(req)
 	require.NotNil(t, sess)
 
 	return sess, err
@@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ func TestCodec_AcceptsCookieInsideAbsoluteCap(t *testing.T) {
 
 	s := testSession(t)
 
-	sess, err := decodeCookie(t, restamp(
+	sess, err := decodeCookie(t, s, restamp(
 		t,
 		issuedCookie(t, s),
 		time.Now().Add(-(testAbsoluteMaxAge-time.Hour)),
@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ func TestCodec_RejectsCookiePastAbsoluteCap(t *testing.T) {
 
 	s := testSession(t)
 
-	sess, err := decodeCookie(t, restamp(
+	sess, err := decodeCookie(t, s, restamp(
 		t,
 		issuedCookie(t, s),
 		time.Now().Add(-(testAbsoluteMaxAge+time.Hour)),

internal/session/session.go

@@ -224,22 +224,10 @@ func New(
 }
 
 // Get retrieves a session for the request.
-//
-// A session cookie that does not decode -- one signed with an earlier
-// session key, say, because the database was made anew -- is treated
-// as absent: the caller gets a new, empty session and no error, and
-// the next save replaces the cookie.
 func (s *Session) Get(
 	r *http.Request,
 ) (*sessions.Session, error) {
-	sess, err := s.store.Get(r, SessionName)
-	if sess == nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	// For a cookie that does not decode, gorilla/sessions returns a
-	// new, empty session alongside the error that is dropped here.
-	return sess, nil
+	return s.store.Get(r, SessionName)
 }
 
 // GetKey returns the raw 32-byte authentication key used for