Drop 'unsafe-inline' from the Content-Security-Policy (closes #530 )

The delete prompts on the webhook page were inline onsubmit handlers. Each delete form now carries its question in a data-confirm attribute, which one submit listener in static/js/app.js asks. The three style attributes became Tailwind classes, with tailwind.css regenerated, and the x-cloak rule moved to style.css. The policy now sends script-src 'self' and style-src 'self'. The browser test now answers a target's delete prompt no and then yes, and also loads the sign-in page, the webhook list, the settings and profile pages and the 404 error page under the policy. The README states the policy as sent. Model: opus-5-5
Bind 0.0.0.0 to IPv4 only (closes #528 )
2026-10-15 16:18:26 +02:00 · 2026-10-15 15:44:42 +02:00 · 2026-10-15 14:58:35 +02:00
59 changed files with 1447 additions and 1120 deletions
@@ -274,8 +274,17 @@ EXPOSE 8080
 # port.
 ENV BIND_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0

+# The probe requests the container's own address, not loopback, so a
+# listener that answers only on loopback (an empty or loopback
+# BIND_ADDRESS) fails it. On a network with IPv4, hostname -i prints the
+# container's IPv4 address, which 0.0.0.0 and :: both answer. On an
+# IPv6-only network it prints none, and the probe requests the IPv6
+# address /etc/hosts lists under the container's hostname instead, which
+# only :: answers.
 HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
-    CMD wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://localhost:8080/.well-known/healthcheck || exit 1
+    CMD addr="$(hostname -i 2>/dev/null | cut -d ' ' -f 1)"; \
+        [ -n "$addr" ] || addr="[$(getent hosts "$(hostname)" | cut -d ' ' -f 1)]"; \
+        wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider "http://$addr:8080/.well-known/healthcheck" || exit 1

 ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh"]
 CMD ["/app/webhooker"]
@@ -310,16 +310,17 @@ the namespace, whatever the process bound. Exposure is decided at the publish
 flag instead — `-p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080` rather than `-p 8080:8080` — which is
 the operator's to choose and is what [Running with Docker](#running-with-docker)
 shows. A loopback bind inside a container buys nothing and makes the process
-unreachable through its own published port.
+unreachable through its own published port. A container on an IPv6-only Docker
+network has no IPv4 address for `0.0.0.0` to answer on, so there it needs
+`BIND_ADDRESS=::`.

 The value must be an IP address literal:

 - `127.0.0.1` — loopback only (the binary's default). Use this with a reverse
  proxy on the same host.
- `0.0.0.0` — every IPv4 address. The image's default; on a bare host, only
-  behind a firewall on the port.
- `::` — every address, IPv6 and (on Linux, with the default
-  `net.ipv6.bindv6only=0`) IPv4 as well.
+- `0.0.0.0` — every IPv4 address and no IPv6 address. The image's default; on a
+  bare host, only behind a firewall on the port.
+- `::` — every IPv6 address and every IPv4 address.
 - A specific address such as `10.0.0.5` — that interface only.

 An **empty** value is treated as unset, as everywhere else here, and takes the
@@ -340,7 +341,8 @@ machine that has no such interface — is a valid literal, so it reaches the
 listener and fails there. The process logs the bind error and exits non-zero
 rather than staying up with nothing listening. The effective value is in the
 `bindAddress` field of the startup log line, which is the way to check what a
-running deployment actually bound.
+running deployment actually bound. On a bare host, `ss -ltn` lists the socket
+itself as `0.0.0.0:8080` for a `0.0.0.0` bind and as `*:8080` for `::`.

 #### Metrics credentials

@@ -668,9 +670,9 @@ Either set a literal or leave the variable out entirely.
 Overriding `BIND_ADDRESS` to a loopback address in a container — by that route
 or deliberately — makes the container unreachable from outside its namespace
 even with `-p`. The published port answers nothing, and the health check fails
-too: it requests `http://localhost:8080`, `localhost` resolves to `::1` first,
-and a `127.0.0.1` bind is not listening there. The container then goes
-`unhealthy` about **65 seconds** after start — from
+too: it requests the container's own address (its IPv4 address, or its IPv6
+address on an IPv6-only network), where a loopback bind is not listening. The
+container then goes `unhealthy` about **65 seconds** after start — from
 `HEALTHCHECK --start-period=5s --interval=30s --retries=3`, so failing probes at
 5s, 35s and 65s, and `unhealthy` on the third. (Docker's probe cadence during
 the start period has changed between versions; re-derive from those three values
@@ -726,8 +728,8 @@ the credentials.
      address (directly, or through anything that can rewrite source addresses,
      such as NAT or a published container port). The `remoteIP` field of the
      `http request` log line for a request that came through the proxy shows
-      that address; the health check's own lines show `::1`. See
-      [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies).
+      that address; the health check's own lines show the container's own
+      address. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies).
    - Leave `BIND_ADDRESS` and `DATA_DIR` unset: the image sets `BIND_ADDRESS`
      to `0.0.0.0`, and `DATA_DIR` defaults to `/var/lib/webhooker`.
    - Everything else is optional; see [Configuration](#configuration).
@@ -802,7 +804,12 @@ comes up, serves pages, and is broken in a way nothing reports.
   proxy's log names it regardless. nginx's default `combined` format already
   logs `$remote_addr`; do not replace it with one that drops the client
   address, and retain those logs as long as you would want to answer a question
-   about traffic.
+   about traffic. That log also records the full request path, so it holds the
+   entrypoint UUID of every event a sender posts. webhooker's own log does not,
+   apart from the line a `log` target writes. Protect the proxy's log as you
+   would the entrypoint URLs themselves: anyone who can read it can post events
+   to every entrypoint in it (see
+   [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret)).

 ### nginx

@@ -828,7 +835,9 @@ server {
    client_max_body_size 1m;

    # $remote_addr is the client. webhooker's own log names it, as
-    # clientIP, only while TRUSTED_PROXIES covers this proxy.
+    # clientIP, only while TRUSTED_PROXIES covers this proxy. The
+    # request path in this log holds the entrypoint UUID, so protect
+    # the file like the entrypoint URL itself.
    access_log /var/log/nginx/webhooker.access.log combined;

    location / {
@@ -1160,7 +1169,16 @@ What that means for an operator:

 - **The URL is a capability, so treat it as a secret.** Keep it out of logs,
  ticket bodies, chat messages and screenshots. Anyone who reads it anywhere can
-  post events as that sender.
+  post events as that sender. Apart from a `log` target's line, webhooker's own
+  log lines never carry the UUID: they name a request to the receiver by the
+  route pattern `/h/{uuid}`, the `webhook request received` line names the
+  entrypoint by its `entrypoint_id`, and the access log keeps only the scheme
+  and host of a `Referer`. A `log` target writes the request's headers as
+  received, so a `Referer` naming the entrypoint URL appears in its line, as it
+  does when a sender has followed a redirect from `http://` to `https://`. The
+  reverse proxy's access log does carry the UUID, in the request path, so it
+  must be protected like the URL itself (see
+  [Deployment behind a reverse proxy](#deployment-behind-a-reverse-proxy)).
 - **Rotating means minting a new entrypoint, not changing a key.** There is no
  way to rotate the UUID in place. To retire one, delete the entrypoint (or
  deactivate it, which answers `410`) and create a new one, then point the
@@ -1235,34 +1253,37 @@ markup. The CSP build runs no expressions, so every Alpine directive in
 `static/js/app.js`: `x-data="collapsible"` and `@click="toggle"`, never
 `x-data="{ open: false }"` or `@click="open = !open"`.

-A browser test in `internal/server` loads the webhook page, its edit pages and
-the event log under the real policy and checks that: the add entrypoint form
-stays hidden until Add is clicked; for every target type, the targets section's
-Add shows only a choice of type with Next and Cancel, Next shows only that
-type's fields (no url field for `database` or `log`), Cancel at either step
-closes the form, and saving adds the target; a refused target comes back with
-its form open, the values entered and the reason, and after Cancel the next Add
-starts with an empty form and no reason; a refused save on the target edit page
-and on the webhook edit page comes back with the reason and every value entered;
-the Copy button beside an entrypoint URL reads "Copied" once clicked; an
-entrypoint's Edit button shows its edit form in place of its description and
-hides until the form closes, Cancel hides the form and drops what was typed, as
-does leaving the page and going back to it, and Save changes the description; of
-the recent events on the webhook page only the newest starts expanded, each
-expands and collapses, and Open leads to the event's own page; of the events in
-the event log only the newest starts expanded, and an event there expands and
-collapses when its row's caret or its ID is clicked, and from the keyboard, but
-not when its ID is selected with the mouse, and a delivery's attempts inside it
-expand and collapse; and at phone width the menu button opens and closes the
-mobile menu, and neither the webhook page nor the event log, with a delivery's
-attempts open, scrolls sideways or cuts anything off at the page's or a card's
-edge. It also fails if the browser reports a console warning or error, an
-uncaught exception, or anything the policy refused. `make check` and the image
-build lint it but do not run it, and `make test` leaves it out (its file is
-built only with the `browser` build tag). Run it with `make test-browser` after
-changing `templates/` or `static/js/`: that builds `Dockerfile.browser`, which
-runs the test in a digest-pinned headless browser image, so the host needs no
-browser.
+A browser test in `internal/server` loads the sign-in page, the webhook page,
+its edit pages, the event log, the webhook list, the settings page, the profile
+page and the `404` error page shown for a path that does not exist, under the
+real policy and checks that: the add entrypoint form stays hidden until Add is
+clicked; for every target type, the targets section's Add shows only a choice of
+type with Next and Cancel, Next shows only that type's fields (no url field for
+`database` or `log`), Cancel at either step closes the form, and saving adds the
+target; a refused target comes back with its form open, the values entered and
+the reason, and after Cancel the next Add starts with an empty form and no
+reason; a refused save on the target edit page and on the webhook edit page
+comes back with the reason and every value entered; the Copy button beside an
+entrypoint URL reads "Copied" once clicked; an entrypoint's Edit button shows
+its edit form in place of its description and hides until the form closes,
+Cancel hides the form and drops what was typed, as does leaving the page and
+going back to it, and Save changes the description; of the recent events on the
+webhook page only the newest starts expanded, each expands and collapses, and
+Open leads to the event's own page; of the events in the event log only the
+newest starts expanded, and an event there expands and collapses when its row's
+caret or its ID is clicked, and from the keyboard, but not when its ID is
+selected with the mouse, and a delivery's attempts inside it expand and
+collapse; at phone width the menu button opens and closes the mobile menu, and
+neither the webhook page nor the event log, with a delivery's attempts open,
+scrolls sideways or cuts anything off at the page's or a card's edge; and a
+target's Delete asks first, naming the target, sends nothing when the answer is
+no and deletes the target when it is yes. It also fails if the browser reports a
+console warning or error, an uncaught exception, or anything the policy refused.
+`make check` and the image build lint it but do not run it, and `make test`
+leaves it out (its file is built only with the `browser` build tag). Run it with
+`make test-browser` after changing `templates/` or `static/js/`: that builds
+`Dockerfile.browser`, which runs the test in a digest-pinned headless browser
+image, so the host needs no browser.

 The package's tarball is committed as `3p/alpinejs-csp-3.14.9.tgz`, byte for
 byte as the npm registry publishes it. It is a dependency, not this repo's build
@@ -1295,7 +1316,9 @@ and commit the regenerated file with the change. Tailwind takes classes only
 from the files that `input.css` names in its `@source` lines; a class written in
 any other file is not generated until that file is named there too. `make check`
 and the image build fail when the committed file differs from what `make css`
-generates. `static/css/style.css` is hand-written and is not generated.
+generates. `static/css/style.css` is hand-written and is not generated. The
+pages' Content-Security-Policy refuses inline styles, so a template styles an
+element with a class, never a `style` attribute.

 `make css` runs the Tailwind standalone CLI in Docker, at the version and sha256
 pinned in the Dockerfile's stylesheet stages; it is never installed on the host.
@@ -1568,27 +1591,29 @@ did not arrive on the URL and counts in neither.
 A delivery destination for events. Each target defines where and how events
 should be forwarded.

-| Field          | Type       | Description                                                                                                                                                                             |
-| -------------- | ---------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `id`           | UUID       | Primary key                                                                                                                                                                             |
-| `webhook_id`   | UUID       | Foreign key → Webhook                                                                                                                                                                   |
-| `name`         | string     | Human-readable name                                                                                                                                                                     |
-| `type`         | TargetType | One of: `http`, `slack`, `database`, `log`                                                                                                                                              |
-| `active`       | boolean    | Whether deliveries are enabled (default: true)                                                                                                                                          |
-| `config`       | JSON text  | Type-specific configuration                                                                                                                                                             |
-| `max_attempts` | integer    | How many times an `http` or `slack` target attempts each delivery in all: at least 1, and 1 by default. Ignored by `database` and `log` targets. The web UI labels it Delivery attempts |
+| Field         | Type       | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
+| ------------- | ---------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `id`          | UUID       | Primary key                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
+| `webhook_id`  | UUID       | Foreign key → Webhook                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
+| `name`        | string     | Human-readable name                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
+| `type`        | TargetType | One of: `http`, `slack`, `database`, `log`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
+| `active`      | boolean    | Whether deliveries are enabled (default: true)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
+| `config`      | JSON text  | Type-specific configuration                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
+| `max_retries` | integer    | Total delivery attempts for `http` and `slack` targets, not retries on top of the first: 0 is a single fire-and-forget attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker, and a value of N makes N attempts in all, with exponential backoff and a per-target circuit breaker. Ignored by `database` and `log` targets. The web UI labels it Delivery attempts |

 **Relations:** Belongs to Webhook. Has many Deliveries.

 **Target types:**

- **`http`** — Forward the event as an HTTP POST to a configured URL. With
-  `max_attempts` at 1 the target makes a single attempt; above 1 it retries a
-  failed delivery with exponential backoff, up to that many attempts in all,
-  behind a per-target circuit breaker.
+- **`http`** — Forward the event as an HTTP POST to a configured URL.
+  `max_retries` is the total number of delivery attempts, not retries on top of
+  the first: when `max_retries` is 0 (the default), the target operates in
+  fire-and-forget mode, a single attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker;
+  a value of N makes up to N attempts in all, retrying failed deliveries with
+  exponential backoff and protecting them with a per-target circuit breaker.
 - **`slack`** — Post the event as a formatted message to a Slack-compatible
  incoming webhook URL (`webhookUrl` in `config`). It is built on the same HTTP
-  core as `http` and honours `max_attempts` identically, circuit breaker
+  core as `http` and honours `max_retries` identically, circuit breaker
  included. See the Slack target section under "Per-Webhook Event Databases" for
  the message format.
 - **`database`** — Archive the full event as a row into the target's own archive
@@ -2163,11 +2188,11 @@ External Service
                              ▼                ▼                    ▼
                       ┌────────────┐   ┌────────────┐      ┌────────────┐
                       │ HTTP Target│   │ HTTP Target│      │ Log Target │
-                       │max_attempts│   │max_attempts│      │ (stdout)   │
-                       │   == 1,    │   │   > 1,     │      └────────────┘
-                       │ one attempt│   │ backoff +  │
+                       │(max_retries│   │(max_retries│      │ (stdout)   │
+                       │   == 0)    │   │   > 0,     │      └────────────┘
+                       │ fire+forget│   │ backoff +  │
                       └────────────┘   │ circuit    │
-                                        │ breaker    │
+                                        │ breaker)   │
                                        └────────────┘
 ```

@@ -2244,7 +2269,7 @@ re-inject it to every currently active target.

 ### Circuit Breaker (HTTP and Slack Targets with Retries)

-`http` and `slack` targets with `max_attempts` > 1 are protected by a
+`http` and `slack` targets with `max_retries` > 0 are protected by a
 **per-target circuit breaker** that prevents hammering a down target with
 repeated failed delivery attempts. The circuit breaker is in-memory only and
 resets on restart (which is fine — startup recovery rescans the database
@@ -2285,10 +2310,10 @@ anyway).
 - **Cooldown:** 30 seconds in open state before probing

 **Scope:** Circuit breakers apply to **`http` and `slack` targets with
-`max_attempts` > 1**. The Slack target is built on the same HTTP core and hands
-its own `max_attempts` to the same retry path, so it gets a breaker with the
-same 5-failure / 30-second defaults. Single-attempt targets of either type
-(`max_attempts` == 1), database targets (local operations), and log targets
+`max_retries` > 0**. The Slack target is built on the same HTTP core and hands
+its own `max_retries` to the same retry path, so it gets a breaker with the same
+5-failure / 30-second defaults. Fire-and-forget targets of either type
+(`max_retries` == 0), database targets (local operations), and log targets
 (stdout) do not use circuit breakers.

 When a circuit is open and a new delivery arrives, the engine marks the delivery
@@ -2420,27 +2445,32 @@ log volume it caps rather than eliminates. A path that names no entrypoint is
 recorded by the handler at `DEBUG`, and the aggregate limiter logs its own
 rejections at `DEBUG` and without the path, so neither appears at all under the
 default level. The per-entrypoint limiter is the loud one: it logs every
-rejection at `WARN` with the request path, which on this route is
-attacker-controlled text. A client hammering a single invented path is served
+rejection at `WARN`, naming the route pattern `/h/{uuid}` rather than the
+request path. A client hammering a single invented path is served
 `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` requests and has the rest of its aggregate budget rejected
 there, so the aggregate limit is what bounds the _number_ of those `WARN` lines
 — to under ten times `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` per minute per client IP, 1080 at the
-defaults, where before it there was no bound at all. Their _width_ is bounded by
-the field budgets below, the same ones the access log spends. The access log is
-bounded by neither limit: every request is recorded once at `INFO`, served or
-rejected alike.
+defaults, where before it there was no bound at all. The access log is bounded
+by neither limit: every request is recorded once at `INFO`, served or rejected
+alike.

-What the access log does bound is the _content_ of those lines. A 3xx or 4xx
-response logs the chi route pattern — `/h/{uuid}`, `/user/{username}//`, or the
-literal `(unmatched)` when the request hit no route at all — in place of the
-concrete URL. Those are the outcomes an unauthenticated client can drive for
-free: 404 and 429 on any invented receiver path, a login redirect on any
-invented profile path. Logging the URL there would let a flood write text of its
-own choosing, at a length of its own choosing, into the log. 2xx and 5xx
-responses keep the concrete path — a success resolved against a static route or
-against the operator's own data (on the receiver, against a stored entrypoint
-UUID), and a 5xx is a bug in this service, where the exact path is the evidence
-and no client can provoke one at will.
+What the access log does bound is the _content_ of those lines. On the receiver
+route it logs the route pattern `/h/{uuid}` whatever the status, because the
+concrete path carries the entrypoint UUID, which is the entrypoint's credential
+(see
+[The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret)).
+A request chi never routed, because it matched no route or because a middleware
+answered it first, logs the literal `(unmatched)` whatever the status. In the
+`dev` environment the CORS middleware answers a preflight that way, so a
+preflight to the receiver does not log its UUID either. On every other route, a
+3xx or 4xx response logs the chi route pattern, such as `/user/{username}//`, in
+place of the concrete URL. Those are the outcomes an unauthenticated client can
+drive for free: a 404 on any invented path, a login redirect on any invented
+profile path. Logging the URL there would let a flood write text of its own
+choosing, at a length of its own choosing, into the log. 2xx and 5xx responses
+keep the concrete path — a success resolved against a static route or against
+the operator's own data, and a 5xx is a bug in this service, where the exact
+path is the evidence and no client can provoke one at will.

 The query string is never logged; it is replaced by the fixed marker
 `?(redacted)`. It is client-chosen on every route, and
@@ -2452,6 +2482,11 @@ to, `notice`, which names the line a page shows after an action, and the event
 log's `show`, which picks the events it lists. A query string sent to an
 entrypoint is not lost either: the event stores it, and the event log shows it.

+The `referer` field keeps only the scheme and host of the request's `Referer`,
+and logs `(redacted)` for one without them, because its path can be an
+entrypoint URL: a sender that follows the `http://` to `https://` redirect in
+the nginx example sends the URL it was redirected from.
+
 Client-supplied request content does not leave the host by the other route
 either. The Sentry SDK attaches the request to every event it captures,
 independently of the access log, and `SendDefaultPII=false` does not cover all
@@ -2466,9 +2501,10 @@ The same hook rewrites the request URL. The SDK builds it as
 `scheme://host/path` from the concrete path, which on the receiver route is
 `/h/<uuid>` in full — and that UUID is a write capability, not an identifier:
 anyone holding it can post events this service accepts and its targets then
-deliver. A tracker has its own retention, access control and deletion policy, so
-the rule the access log follows above does not carry across that boundary. What
-is sent is the chi route pattern instead: `http://host/h/{uuid}`.
+deliver. What is sent is the chi route pattern instead: `http://host/h/{uuid}`.
+A tracker has its own retention, access control and deletion policy, so the
+pattern is sent on every route, including the 2xx and 5xx responses outside the
+receiver for which the access log keeps the concrete path.

 The scheme and the host are kept, and everything else in the URL is discarded
 rather than edited, so a future SDK version that starts appending a query string
@@ -2597,9 +2633,7 @@ than it:
 | ------------------------------------------ | ------- | ------------------- | ------------------------------------------ |
 | `request body exceeds limit` (413)         | `WARN`  | path, method        | yes — `MaxBodySize` precedes `RequireAuth` |
 | `csrf: token validation failed` (403)      | `WARN`  | path, method        | yes — `CSRF` precedes `RequireAuth`        |
-| `... rate limit exceeded` (429)            | `WARN`  | path                | yes, on the receiver                       |
 | `auth middleware: unauthenticated request` | `DEBUG` | path, method        | yes, by definition                         |
-| `entrypoint not found`                     | `DEBUG` | entrypoint UUID     | yes, on the receiver                       |
 | `user not found` / `invalid password`      | `DEBUG` | username            | yes, on the sign-in form                   |
 | `login failure limit exceeded` (429)       | `WARN`  | path                | yes, on the sign-in form                   |
 | `password verification capacity exhausted` | `WARN`  | path                | yes, on the sign-in form                   |
@@ -2627,13 +2661,12 @@ wider of the two handlers spends more on than the client spent sending them.
 Every case holds each line to the 2,560-byte ceiling. That per-line ceiling is
 what the figure above states, and every row establishes it.

-Three of the sites go further and bound the whole flood's output — the total
-bytes a run of distinct invented values wrote, which is the shape an operator
-sizing storage cares about. They are `request body exceeds limit`
-(`TestMaxBodySize_FloodOfOversizePathsDoesNotGrowTheLog`),
-`entrypoint not found` and `user not found` (the last two through
-`assertBoundedFlood`). The other rows carry no aggregate assertion; the per-line
-ceiling is what they establish.
+Two of the sites go further and bound the whole flood's output — the total bytes
+a run of distinct invented values wrote, which is the shape an operator sizing
+storage cares about. They are `request body exceeds limit`
+(`TestMaxBodySize_FloodOfOversizePathsDoesNotGrowTheLog`) and `user not found`
+(through `assertBoundedFlood`). The other rows carry no aggregate assertion; the
+per-line ceiling is what they establish.

 `internal/logfield/logfield_test.go` measures the per-rune charge against what
 the handlers really emit, over roughly 3,000 code points on each, so an
@@ -2651,7 +2684,7 @@ everything else, so its lines take the level the operator set and the handler
 `internal/logger` selected, and every value it emits is spent through the same
 `internal/logfield` budget. A record-not-found is not logged as an error: it is
 the expected outcome on both of those paths, and each handler already records
-its own miss at `DEBUG` — bounded, per the table above — without the SQL. Slow
+its own miss at `DEBUG`, without the SQL and within the ceiling above. Slow
 statements are kept, at `WARN`, above the same 200 ms threshold GORM used and
 with the statement bounded, because that report is the one thing GORM's logger
 gave an operator that nothing else here does. The adapter orders its cases
@@ -3080,8 +3113,8 @@ webhooker/
 │   ├── static.go              # //go:embed directive
 │   ├── css/input.css          # Tailwind input, source for tailwind.css (make css)
 │   ├── css/tailwind.css       # Generated stylesheet the pages load
-│   ├── css/style.css          # Hand-written, loaded after tailwind.css: btn-small, the pointer cursor for input.css's buttons, the webhook list cards' focus outline
-│   ├── js/app.js              # Copy-to-clipboard, and the Alpine.js components
+│   ├── css/style.css          # Hand-written, loaded after tailwind.css: btn-small, the pointer cursor for input.css's buttons, the webhook list cards' focus outline, the rule hiding x-cloak elements
+│   ├── js/app.js              # Copy-to-clipboard, the delete prompts, and the Alpine.js components
 │   └── js/alpine.min.js       # Alpine.js CSP build, extracted from 3p/ by make assets, not committed
 ├── templates/                 # Go HTML templates (base, login, sources, etc.)
 ├── script/                    # Scripts to Rule Them All entrypoints
@@ -3135,8 +3168,9 @@ Applied to all routes in this order:

 1. **RequestID** — Generate unique request IDs (chi built-in)
 2. **SecurityHeaders** — Production security headers on every response (HSTS
-   unless `HSTS_MAX_AGE` is `0`, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP,
-   Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy)
+   unless `HSTS_MAX_AGE` is `0`, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP
+   `default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'`, Referrer-Policy,
+   Permissions-Policy)
 3. **Logging** — Structured request logging (method, URL, status, latency,
   remote IP, client IP, user agent, request ID)
 4. **Metrics** — Prometheus HTTP metrics (if `METRICS_USERNAME` and
@@ -3221,6 +3255,12 @@ credential check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
 - Production security headers on all responses: HSTS (unless `HSTS_MAX_AGE` is
  `0`), X-Content-Type-Options (`nosniff`), X-Frame-Options (`DENY`),
  Content-Security-Policy, Referrer-Policy, and Permissions-Policy
+- The Content-Security-Policy is
+  `default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'`: a page takes
+  scripts and styles only from files webhooker serves, and the browser runs no
+  inline script or event handler and ignores any `<style>` element or `style`
+  attribute in a page. The pages need none: their scripts are in `static/js/`
+  and their styles in `static/css/`
 - Request body size limits (1 MB) on all form POST endpoints, enforced by
  middleware that runs before CSRF parses the form
 - **CSRF protection** via [gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf) on all
@@ -29,11 +29,9 @@ type Target struct {
 	// handler that marshals the model itself.
 	Config string `gorm:"type:text" json:"-"` // JSON configuration

-	// MaxAttempts is how many times an HTTP or Slack target attempts
-	// each delivery in all, at least 1. 1 is a single attempt with no
-	// circuit breaker; above 1, a failed attempt is retried with
-	// backoff behind the breaker.
-	MaxAttempts int `json:"maxAttempts,omitempty"`
+	// For HTTP targets (max_retries=0 means fire-and-forget,
+	// >0 enables retries with backoff)
+	MaxRetries int `json:"maxRetries,omitempty"`

 	// Relations. No model marshals the record it belongs to:
 	// Webhook.Targets leads back here, and the JSON could loop.
@@ -87,13 +87,13 @@ func TestMainSchemaHoldsEveryModel(t *testing.T) {
 		Active:      true,
 	})
 	assertRoundTrip(t, db, &database.Target{
-		BaseModel:   newBaseModel(),
-		WebhookID:   uuid.New().String(),
-		Name:        "target",
-		Type:        database.TargetTypeHTTP,
-		Active:      true,
-		Config:      `{"url":"https://example.com/"}`,
-		MaxAttempts: 3,
+		BaseModel:  newBaseModel(),
+		WebhookID:  uuid.New().String(),
+		Name:       "target",
+		Type:       database.TargetTypeHTTP,
+		Active:     true,
+		Config:     `{"url":"https://example.com/"}`,
+		MaxRetries: 3,
 	})
 }

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ CREATE TABLE targets (
    type text NOT NULL,
    active numeric DEFAULT true,
    config text,
-    max_attempts integer,
+    max_retries integer,
    PRIMARY KEY (id),
    CONSTRAINT fk_webhooks_targets
        FOREIGN KEY (webhook_id) REFERENCES webhooks (id)
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ type Task struct {
 	TargetName   string
 	TargetType   database.TargetType
 	TargetConfig string
-	MaxAttempts  int
+	MaxRetries   int

 	Method      string
 	RawQuery    string
@@ -1769,10 +1769,10 @@ func buildEventFromTask(task *Task) database.Event {

 func buildTargetFromTask(task *Task) database.Target {
 	target := database.Target{
-		Name:        task.TargetName,
-		Type:        task.TargetType,
-		Config:      task.TargetConfig,
-		MaxAttempts: task.MaxAttempts,
+		Name:       task.TargetName,
+		Type:       task.TargetType,
+		Config:     task.TargetConfig,
+		MaxRetries: task.MaxRetries,
 	}

 	target.ID = task.TargetID
@@ -2028,7 +2028,7 @@ func (e *Engine) countAttemptsBatch(
 	// One delivery id per recorded attempt, tallied here rather than
 	// grouped in SQL: internal/gormlog forbids (*gorm.DB).Scan, which
 	// a GROUP BY into a struct would need, and an attempt row per
-	// delivery is bounded by the target's MaxAttempts.
+	// delivery is bounded by the target's MaxRetries.
 	var attemptIDs []string

 	err := webhookDB.
@@ -2106,7 +2106,7 @@ func buildRecoveryTask(
 		TargetName:   target.Name,
 		TargetType:   target.Type,
 		TargetConfig: target.Config,
-		MaxAttempts:  target.MaxAttempts,
+		MaxRetries:   target.MaxRetries,
 		Method:       event.Method,
 		RawQuery:     event.RawQuery,
 		Headers:      event.Headers,
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ func iTask(
 	d database.Delivery,
 	event database.Event,
 	webhookID, targetID, name, config string,
-	maxAttempts, attemptNum int,
+	maxRetries, attemptNum int,
 	body *string,
 ) delivery.Task {
 	return delivery.Task{
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func iTask(
 		TargetName:   name,
 		TargetType:   database.TargetTypeHTTP,
 		TargetConfig: config,
-		MaxAttempts:  maxAttempts,
+		MaxRetries:   maxRetries,
 		Method:       event.Method,
 		Headers:      event.Headers,
 		ContentType:  event.ContentType,
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ func TestProcessNewTask_InlineBody(t *testing.T) {
 	cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
 	task := iTask(
 		d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
-		"test-target", cfg, 1, 1, &bodyStr,
+		"test-target", cfg, 0, 1, &bodyStr,
 	)

 	s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ func TestProcessNewTask_LargeBody_FetchFromDB(
 	cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
 	task := iTask(
 		d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
-		"test-large", cfg, 1, 1, nil,
+		"test-large", cfg, 0, 1, nil,
 	)

 	s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ func TestProcessNewTask_InvalidWebhookID(t *testing.T) {
 		TargetName:   "test",
 		TargetType:   database.TargetTypeHTTP,
 		TargetConfig: iHTTPConfig("http://localhost:9999"),
-		MaxAttempts:  1,
+		MaxRetries:   0,
 		Body:         nil,
 		AttemptNum:   1,
 	}
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ func TestRecoverPendingDeliveries(t *testing.T) {

 	iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
 		s.WebhookID, "recovery-target",
-		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 1,
+		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
 	)

 	iSeedPendingDeliveries(
@@ -686,17 +686,17 @@ func iCreateTarget(
 	targetID, webhookID, name string,
 	targetType database.TargetType,
 	config string,
-	maxAttempts int,
+	maxRetries int,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()

 	target := database.Target{
-		WebhookID:   webhookID,
-		Name:        name,
-		Type:        targetType,
-		Active:      true,
-		Config:      config,
-		MaxAttempts: maxAttempts,
+		WebhookID:  webhookID,
+		Name:       name,
+		Type:       targetType,
+		Active:     true,
+		Config:     config,
+		MaxRetries: maxRetries,
 	}
 	target.ID = targetID

@@ -1077,7 +1077,7 @@ func TestRecoverInFlight_WithPendingDeliveries(

 	iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
 		s.WebhookID, "recover-target",
-		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 1,
+		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
 	)

 	event := iSeedEvent(
@@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_CustomTargetHeaders(t *testing.T) {
 	task := iTask(
 		d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
 		"auth-target", string(cfgJSON),
-		1, 1, &bodyStr,
+		0, 1, &bodyStr,
 	)

 	s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(
@@ -1277,7 +1277,7 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_TargetTimeout(t *testing.T) {

 	task, d := iHTTPTaskAndDelivery(
 		event, del, "timeout-target",
-		string(cfgJSON), 1, 1,
+		string(cfgJSON), 0, 1,
 	)

 	e.ExportDeliverHTTP(context.TODO(), db, d, task)
@@ -1339,7 +1339,7 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_CutsStoredResponseAtMaxBodyLog(
 	bodyStr := event.Body
 	task := iTask(
 		del, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
-		"cut-target", cfgJSON, 1, 1, &bodyStr,
+		"cut-target", cfgJSON, 0, 1, &bodyStr,
 	)

 	s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
@@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ func iHTTPTaskAndDelivery(
 	event database.Event,
 	del database.Delivery,
 	name, config string,
-	maxAttempts, attemptNum int,
+	maxRetries, attemptNum int,
 ) (*delivery.Task, *database.Delivery) {
 	task := &delivery.Task{
 		DeliveryID:   del.ID,
@@ -1413,7 +1413,7 @@ func iHTTPTaskAndDelivery(
 		TargetName:   name,
 		TargetType:   database.TargetTypeHTTP,
 		TargetConfig: config,
-		MaxAttempts:  maxAttempts,
+		MaxRetries:   maxRetries,
 		AttemptNum:   attemptNum,
 	}

@@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_InvalidConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	)

 	task, d := iHTTPTaskAndDelivery(
-		event, del, "bad-config", `not-json`, 1, 1,
+		event, del, "bad-config", `not-json`, 0, 1,
 	)

 	e.ExportDeliverHTTP(context.TODO(), db, d, task)
@@ -1490,7 +1490,7 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_InvalidConfigUnrecordedStaysPending(t *testing.T) {
 	)

 	task, d := iHTTPTaskAndDelivery(
-		event, del, "bad-config", `not-json`, 1, 1,
+		event, del, "bad-config", `not-json`, 0, 1,
 	)

 	require.NoError(t, db.Exec("drop table delivery_results").Error)
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ func TestEngine_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout(t *testing.T) {
 }

 // seedHeldDelivery gives the setup's webhook an http target with
-// maxAttempts, pointed at a receiver that keeps every request open until
+// maxRetries, pointed at a receiver that keeps every request open until
 // the client gives up on it, and seeds one delivery to that target at
 // status. It returns the task that sends attempt attemptNum of the
 // delivery, and a channel that is closed when a request reaches the
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ func TestEngine_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout(t *testing.T) {
 func seedHeldDelivery(
 	t *testing.T,
 	s iSetup,
-	maxAttempts int,
+	maxRetries int,
 	status database.DeliveryStatus,
 	attemptNum int,
 ) (delivery.Task, <-chan struct{}) {
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ func seedHeldDelivery(
 	iCreateWebhook(t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "hook")
 	iCreateTarget(
 		t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "held",
-		database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, maxAttempts,
+		database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, maxRetries,
 	)

 	event := iSeedEvent(t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"held":true}`)
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ func seedHeldDelivery(

 	return iTask(
 		d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID, "held", cfg,
-		maxAttempts, attemptNum, &bodyStr,
+		maxRetries, attemptNum, &bodyStr,
 	), arrived
 }

@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ func TestEngine_StopLeavesFireAndForgetAttemptPending(t *testing.T) {
 	lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)

 	task, arrived := seedHeldDelivery(
-		t, s, 1, database.DeliveryStatusPending, 1,
+		t, s, 0, database.DeliveryStatusPending, 1,
 	)

 	s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{task})
@@ -404,13 +404,13 @@ func TestEngine_StopLeavesFireAndForgetAttemptPending(t *testing.T) {
 func TestEngine_StopLeavesLastRetryAttemptRetrying(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	const maxAttempts = 2
+	const maxRetries = 2

 	s := newISetup(t)
 	lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)

 	task, arrived := seedHeldDelivery(
-		t, s, maxAttempts, database.DeliveryStatusRetrying, maxAttempts,
+		t, s, maxRetries, database.DeliveryStatusRetrying, maxRetries,
 	)
 	iSeedFailedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, task.DeliveryID)

@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ func buildHTTPFixture(
 	dlv database.Delivery,
 	event database.Event,
 	targetID, name, config string,
-	maxAttempts, attemptNum int,
+	maxRetries, attemptNum int,
 ) httpDeliveryFixture {
 	task := &delivery.Task{
 		DeliveryID:   dlv.ID,
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ func buildHTTPFixture(
 		TargetName:   name,
 		TargetType:   database.TargetTypeHTTP,
 		TargetConfig: config,
-		MaxAttempts:  maxAttempts,
+		MaxRetries:   maxRetries,
 		AttemptNum:   attemptNum,
 	}

@@ -162,10 +162,10 @@ func buildHTTPFixture(
 		Status:   dlv.Status,
 		Event:    event,
 		Target: database.Target{
-			Name:        name,
-			Type:        database.TargetTypeHTTP,
-			Config:      config,
-			MaxAttempts: maxAttempts,
+			Name:       name,
+			Type:       database.TargetTypeHTTP,
+			Config:     config,
+			MaxRetries: maxRetries,
 		},
 	}
 	d.ID = dlv.ID
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_Success(t *testing.T) {

 	cfg := newHTTPTargetConfig(ts.URL)
 	fix := buildHTTPFixture(
-		dlv, event, targetID, "test-http", cfg, 1, 1,
+		dlv, event, targetID, "test-http", cfg, 0, 1,
 	)

 	e.ExportDeliverHTTP(
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_Failure(t *testing.T) {
 	cfg := newHTTPTargetConfig(ts.URL)
 	fix := buildHTTPFixture(
 		dlv, event, targetID,
-		"test-http-fail", cfg, 1, 1,
+		"test-http-fail", cfg, 0, 1,
 	)

 	e.ExportDeliverHTTP(
@@ -473,23 +473,14 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_WithRetries_Success(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }

-// TestDeliverHTTP_MaxAttemptsExhausted proves a target with three
-// delivery attempts makes at most three: the first two failures are
-// retried, the third is final, and each attempt goes through the
-// target's circuit breaker.
-func TestDeliverHTTP_MaxAttemptsExhausted(t *testing.T) {
+func TestDeliverHTTP_MaxRetriesExhausted(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	const maxAttempts = 3
-
 	db := testWebhookDB(t)

-	var requests atomic.Int32
-
 	ts := httptest.NewServer(
 		http.HandlerFunc(
 			func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-				requests.Add(1)
 				w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadGateway)
 			},
 		),
@@ -498,103 +489,26 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_MaxAttemptsExhausted(t *testing.T) {

 	e := testEngine(t, 1)
 	targetID := uuid.New().String()
-
-	// It opens on the last failure only if every attempt reached it.
-	cb := delivery.NewTestCircuitBreaker(maxAttempts, time.Minute)
-	e.ExportSetCircuitBreaker(targetID, cb)
-
 	event := seedEvent(t, db, `{"retry":"exhaust"}`)

 	dlv := seedDelivery(
 		t, db, event.ID, targetID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
-	)
-
-	cfg := newHTTPTargetConfig(ts.URL)
-	sched := &recordingScheduler{}
-
-	for attempt := 1; attempt <= maxAttempts; attempt++ {
-		fix := buildHTTPFixture(
-			dlv, event, targetID,
-			"test-http-exhaust", cfg, maxAttempts, attempt,
-		)
-
-		e.ExportDeliverHTTPWithScheduler(
-			context.TODO(), db, fix.Delivery, fix.Task, sched,
-		)
-	}
-
-	assert.Equal(t, int32(maxAttempts), requests.Load())
-	assert.Len(t, sched.delays, maxAttempts-1,
-		"every failure but the last should be retried",
-	)
-	assertDeliveryStatus(t, db, dlv.ID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
-	)
-	assert.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitOpen, cb.State(),
-		"every attempt should be counted by the circuit breaker",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestDeliverHTTP_SingleAttemptSkipsCircuitBreaker proves a target
-// with one delivery attempt makes exactly that attempt, even while
-// its circuit breaker is open, and that a failure is final.
-func TestDeliverHTTP_SingleAttemptSkipsCircuitBreaker(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	db := testWebhookDB(t)
-
-	var requests atomic.Int32
-
-	ts := httptest.NewServer(
-		http.HandlerFunc(
-			func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-				requests.Add(1)
-				w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadGateway)
-			},
-		),
-	)
-	defer ts.Close()
-
-	e := testEngine(t, 1)
-	targetID := uuid.New().String()
-
-	cb := e.ExportGetCircuitBreaker(targetID)
-
-	for range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold {
-		cb.RecordFailure()
-	}
-
-	require.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitOpen, cb.State())
-
-	event := seedEvent(t, db, `{"retry":"none"}`)
-
-	dlv := seedDelivery(
-		t, db, event.ID, targetID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
+		database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 	)

 	cfg := newHTTPTargetConfig(ts.URL)
 	fix := buildHTTPFixture(
 		dlv, event, targetID,
-		"test-http-single", cfg, 1, 1,
-	)
-	sched := &recordingScheduler{}
-
-	e.ExportDeliverHTTPWithScheduler(
-		context.TODO(), db, fix.Delivery, fix.Task, sched,
+		"test-http-exhaust", cfg, 3, 3,
 	)

-	assert.Equal(t, int32(1), requests.Load(),
-		"the open circuit breaker should not hold the attempt back",
+	e.ExportDeliverHTTP(
+		context.TODO(), db, fix.Delivery, fix.Task,
 	)
-	assert.Empty(t, sched.delays, "no retry should be scheduled")
+
 	assertDeliveryStatus(t, db, dlv.ID,
 		database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
 	)
-	assertDeliveryResult(
-		t, db, dlv.ID, false, http.StatusBadGateway,
-	)
 }

 func TestDeliverHTTP_SchedulesRetryOnFailure(
@@ -827,7 +741,7 @@ func seedConcurrencyTasks(
 			TargetName:   tasks[i].Target.Name,
 			TargetType:   tasks[i].Target.Type,
 			TargetConfig: tasks[i].Target.Config,
-			MaxAttempts:  1,
+			MaxRetries:   0,
 			AttemptNum:   1,
 		}
 	}
@@ -2137,10 +2051,10 @@ func buildSlackRetryDelivery(
 		Status:   database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 		Event:    event,
 		Target: database.Target{
-			Name:        "test-slack-retry",
-			Type:        database.TargetTypeSlack,
-			Config:      cfg,
-			MaxAttempts: 5,
+			Name:       "test-slack-retry",
+			Type:       database.TargetTypeSlack,
+			Config:     cfg,
+			MaxRetries: 5,
 		},
 	}
 	d.ID = dlv.ID
@@ -2175,11 +2089,11 @@ func TestDeliverSlack_WithRetries_SchedulesRetry(
 	)

 	task := &delivery.Task{
-		DeliveryID:  dlv.ID,
-		TargetID:    targetID,
-		TargetType:  database.TargetTypeSlack,
-		MaxAttempts: 5,
-		AttemptNum:  1,
+		DeliveryID: dlv.ID,
+		TargetID:   targetID,
+		TargetType: database.TargetTypeSlack,
+		MaxRetries: 5,
+		AttemptNum: 1,
 	}

 	e.ExportProcessDelivery(context.TODO(), db, d, task)
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ func TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRowsOnFailedDelivery(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 	task := iTask(
 		d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
-		"leaky-target", cfg, 1, 1, &body,
+		"leaky-target", cfg, 0, 1, &body,
 	)

 	s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ func tsTask(
 		TargetName:   target.Name,
 		TargetType:   database.TargetTypeSlack,
 		TargetConfig: target.Config,
-		MaxAttempts:  1,
+		MaxRetries:   0,
 		Method:       event.Method,
 		Headers:      event.Headers,
 		ContentType:  event.ContentType,
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ func TestOwnershipIsReleasedAfterDelivery(t *testing.T) {

 	iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
 		s.WebhookID, "released",
-		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 1,
+		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
 	)

 	event := iSeedEvent(
@@ -291,20 +291,20 @@ func TestDeliveryMetrics_CircuitBreakerGauge(t *testing.T) {
 	body := event.Body
 	cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)

-	// An attempt budget above the failure threshold, so the breaker
+	// A retry budget above the failure threshold, so the breaker
 	// rather than the budget is what stops the delivery.
-	maxAttempts := delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold + 5
+	maxRetries := delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold + 5

 	// The retries below are only run if their target still exists;
 	// see https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/107.
 	iCreateTarget(
 		t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "metrics-trip",
-		database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, maxAttempts,
+		database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, maxRetries,
 	)

 	first := iTask(
 		d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
-		"metrics-trip", cfg, maxAttempts, 1, &body,
+		"metrics-trip", cfg, maxRetries, 1, &body,
 	)

 	s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &first)
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ func TestDeliveryMetrics_CircuitBreakerGauge(t *testing.T) {
 		ExportDefaultFailureThreshold; attempt++ {
 		task := iTask(
 			d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
-			"metrics-trip", cfg, maxAttempts, attempt, &body,
+			"metrics-trip", cfg, maxRetries, attempt, &body,
 		)

 		s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(
@@ -364,16 +364,16 @@ func TestDeliveryMetrics_BreakerBlockedIsNotAnAttempt(

 	body := event.Body
 	cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
-	maxAttempts := delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold + 5
+	maxRetries := delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold + 5

 	iCreateTarget(
 		t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "metrics-blocked",
-		database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, maxAttempts,
+		database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, maxRetries,
 	)

 	first := iTask(
 		d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
-		"metrics-blocked", cfg, maxAttempts, 1, &body,
+		"metrics-blocked", cfg, maxRetries, 1, &body,
 	)

 	s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &first)
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ func TestDeliveryMetrics_BreakerBlockedIsNotAnAttempt(
 		ExportDefaultFailureThreshold; attempt++ {
 		task := iTask(
 			d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
-			"metrics-blocked", cfg, maxAttempts, attempt, &body,
+			"metrics-blocked", cfg, maxRetries, attempt, &body,
 		)

 		s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(context.TODO(), &task)
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ func TestDeliveryMetrics_BreakerBlockedIsNotAnAttempt(

 	blocked := iTask(
 		d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
-		"metrics-blocked", cfg, maxAttempts,
+		"metrics-blocked", cfg, maxRetries,
 		delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold+1, &body,
 	)

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ func TestRecoverySkipsPendingWithSuccessfulResult(

 	iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
 		s.WebhookID, "already-delivered",
-		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 1,
+		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
 	)

 	event := iSeedEvent(
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ func TestRecoveryContinuesTheAttemptNumbering(t *testing.T) {

 	iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
 		s.WebhookID, "numbering",
-		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 1,
+		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
 	)

 	event := iSeedEvent(
@@ -444,10 +444,10 @@ func TestFailedResultWriteWithRetriesLeavesDeliveryRecoverable(
 				Status:   database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 				Event:    event,
 				Target: database.Target{
-					Name:        "unwritable",
-					Type:        database.TargetTypeHTTP,
-					Config:      iHTTPConfig(ts.URL),
-					MaxAttempts: 3,
+					Name:       "unwritable",
+					Type:       database.TargetTypeHTTP,
+					Config:     iHTTPConfig(ts.URL),
+					MaxRetries: 3,
 				},
 			}
 			full.ID = d.ID
@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ func unavailableConfigFields() []ConfigField {
 }

 // slackConfigFields describes a Slack target: its masked
-// webhook URL and its number of delivery attempts. Only the
-// masked URL is shown; the full URL is the credential.
+// webhook URL and its retry count. Only the masked URL is
+// shown; the full URL is the credential.
 func slackConfigFields(t *database.Target) []ConfigField {
 	cfg, err := parseSlackConfig(t.Config)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ func slackConfigFields(t *database.Target) []ConfigField {
 	return []ConfigField{{
 		Label: "Webhook URL",
 		Value: cfg.MaskedWebhookURL(),
-	}, maxAttemptsField(t)}
+	}, maxRetriesField(t)}
 }

 // httpConfigFields describes an HTTP target: its destination
@@ -178,18 +178,23 @@ func httpConfigFields(t *database.Target) []ConfigField {
 		})
 	}

-	fields = append(fields, maxAttemptsField(t))
+	fields = append(fields, maxRetriesField(t))

 	return fields
 }

-// maxAttemptsField describes a target's number of delivery
-// attempts, which lives on the target row rather than in its
-// configuration blob.
-func maxAttemptsField(t *database.Target) ConfigField {
+// maxRetriesField describes a target's retry count, which lives
+// on the target row rather than in its configuration blob. A
+// stored 0 makes a single attempt, so it is shown as 1.
+func maxRetriesField(t *database.Target) ConfigField {
+	attempts := strconv.Itoa(t.MaxRetries)
+	if t.MaxRetries == 0 {
+		attempts = "1 (fire-and-forget: no retries, no circuit breaker)"
+	}
+
 	return ConfigField{
 		Label: "Delivery attempts",
-		Value: strconv.Itoa(t.MaxAttempts),
+		Value: attempts,
 	}
 }

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ const (
 	viewMaskedOrigin  = viewExampleOrigin + "/..."
 	viewUnavailable   = "(unavailable)"
 	viewExpiryNever   = "never"
-	viewMaxAttempts   = "Delivery attempts"
+	viewMaxRetries    = "Delivery attempts"
 )

 func TestMaskedWebhookURL(t *testing.T) {
@@ -171,7 +171,6 @@ func slackTarget() database.Target {
 		Active: true,
 		Config: `{"webhookUrl":"` +
 			slackWebhookURL + `"}`,
-		MaxAttempts: 1,
 	}
 }

@@ -190,29 +189,28 @@ func TestNewTargetViews_Slack(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(
 		t,
 		map[string]string{
-			"Webhook URL":   slackMaskedURL,
-			viewMaxAttempts: "1",
+			"Webhook URL":  slackMaskedURL,
+			viewMaxRetries: "1 (fire-and-forget: no retries, no circuit breaker)",
 		},
 		fieldMap(view.Config),
 	)
 }

-// TestNewTargetViews_SlackAttempts proves a Slack target shows
-// its number of delivery attempts the same way an HTTP target
-// does.
-func TestNewTargetViews_SlackAttempts(t *testing.T) {
+// TestNewTargetViews_SlackRetries proves a Slack target shows
+// its retry count the same way an HTTP target does.
+func TestNewTargetViews_SlackRetries(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	target := slackTarget()
-	target.MaxAttempts = 2
+	target.MaxRetries = 2

 	view := viewFor(t, target)

 	assert.Equal(
 		t,
 		map[string]string{
-			"Webhook URL":   slackMaskedURL,
-			viewMaxAttempts: "2",
+			"Webhook URL":  slackMaskedURL,
+			viewMaxRetries: "2",
 		},
 		fieldMap(view.Config),
 	)
@@ -227,7 +225,7 @@ func TestNewTargetViews_HTTP(t *testing.T) {
 			`"timeout":30,` +
 			`"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer sekrit"},` +
 			`"forwardQuery":true}`,
-		MaxAttempts: 5,
+		MaxRetries: 5,
 	})

 	fields := fieldMap(view.Config)
@@ -239,7 +237,7 @@ func TestNewTargetViews_HTTP(t *testing.T) {
 			"Timeout":         "30s",
 			"Headers":         "1 configured",
 			"Query string":    "passed on to this target",
-			viewMaxAttempts:   "5",
+			viewMaxRetries:    "5",
 		},
 		fields,
 	)
@@ -250,22 +248,19 @@ func TestNewTargetViews_HTTP(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-// TestNewTargetViews_HTTPSingleAttempt proves a single attempt is
-// shown as the plain number, like any other.
-func TestNewTargetViews_HTTPSingleAttempt(t *testing.T) {
+func TestNewTargetViews_HTTPFireAndForget(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
-		Type:        database.TargetTypeHTTP,
-		Config:      `{"url":"` + viewExampleHook + `"}`,
-		MaxAttempts: 1,
+		Type:   database.TargetTypeHTTP,
+		Config: `{"url":"` + viewExampleHook + `"}`,
 	})

 	assert.Equal(
 		t,
 		map[string]string{
 			"Destination URL": viewMaskedOrigin,
-			viewMaxAttempts:   "1",
+			viewMaxRetries:    "1 (fire-and-forget: no retries, no circuit breaker)",
 		},
 		fieldMap(view.Config),
 	)
@@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ type httpCore struct {
 }

 // deliver runs one delivery attempt through the retry core.
-// A maxAttempts of 1 is a single attempt, recorded without
-// consulting a circuit breaker. A higher maxAttempts gates the
-// attempt on the circuit breaker and schedules a backed-off retry
-// on failure, until maxAttempts attempts have been made.
+// A maxRetries of 0 is fire-and-forget: a single attempt is
+// recorded and no circuit breaker is consulted. A positive
+// maxRetries gates the attempt on the circuit breaker and
+// schedules a backed-off retry on failure.
 //
 // ctx is the context attempt sends its request with. Stopping the
 // engine cancels it; see interruptedByStop.
@@ -66,17 +66,17 @@ func (c *httpCore) deliver(
 	d *database.Delivery,
 	task *Task,
 	sched Scheduler,
-	maxAttempts int,
+	maxRetries int,
 	attempt func() attemptResult,
 ) {
-	if maxAttempts <= 1 {
+	if maxRetries == 0 {
 		c.fireAndForget(ctx, webhookDB, d, attempt())

 		return
 	}

 	c.withRetry(
-		ctx, webhookDB, d, task, sched, maxAttempts, attempt,
+		ctx, webhookDB, d, task, sched, maxRetries, attempt,
 	)
 }

@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ func (c *httpCore) withRetry(
 	d *database.Delivery,
 	task *Task,
 	sched Scheduler,
-	maxAttempts int,
+	maxRetries int,
 	attempt func() attemptResult,
 ) {
 	cb := c.getCircuitBreaker(task.TargetID)
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ func (c *httpCore) withRetry(
 	cb.RecordFailure()

 	c.handleRetry(
-		webhookDB, d, task, sched, maxAttempts, attemptNum,
+		webhookDB, d, task, sched, maxRetries, attemptNum,
 	)
 }

@@ -266,10 +266,10 @@ func (c *httpCore) handleRetry(
 	d *database.Delivery,
 	task *Task,
 	sched Scheduler,
-	maxAttempts int,
+	maxRetries int,
 	attemptNum int,
 ) {
-	if attemptNum >= maxAttempts {
+	if attemptNum >= maxRetries {
 		c.eng.settleStatus(
 			webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
 			database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ func (t *httpTarget) Deliver(

 	t.deliver(
 		ctx, webhookDB, d, task, sched,
-		d.Target.MaxAttempts, attempt,
+		d.Target.MaxRetries, attempt,
 	)
 }

@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ type SlackTargetConfig struct {
 // slackTarget delivers events to Slack incoming webhooks. It
 // formats the event into a Slack message and posts it as
 // JSON. It shares the retry core with the HTTP target: a
-// MaxAttempts of 1 is a single attempt, while a higher one
-// adds backoff and circuit breaking.
+// MaxRetries of 0 stays single-attempt fire-and-forget
+// (preserving existing Slack targets), while a positive
+// MaxRetries adds backoff and circuit breaking.
 type slackTarget struct {
 	*httpCore

@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ func (t *slackTarget) Deliver(

 	t.deliver(
 		ctx, webhookDB, d, task, sched,
-		d.Target.MaxAttempts, attempt,
+		d.Target.MaxRetries, attempt,
 	)
 }

@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ func TestSendRecoveredDeliveries_TargetMissingFromMap(

 	iCreateTarget(
 		t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "found-on-lookup",
-		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 1,
+		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
 	)

 	event := iSeedEvent(
@@ -790,7 +790,7 @@ func TestRecoverPending_TargetUnreadable_LeavesDeliveryAlone(

 	iCreateTarget(
 		t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "healthy",
-		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 1,
+		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
 	)

 	event := iSeedEvent(
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ func createReplayDelivery(
 		TargetName:   target.Name,
 		TargetType:   target.Type,
 		TargetConfig: target.Config,
-		MaxAttempts:  target.MaxAttempts,
+		MaxRetries:   target.MaxRetries,
 		Method:       event.Method,
 		RawQuery:     event.RawQuery,
 		Headers:      event.Headers,
@@ -158,8 +158,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_RendersFailedAttempt(t *testing.T) {
 // TestHandleSourceLogs_EscapesResponseBody proves the
 // response body is treated as the untrusted remote content it
 // is. The remote chooses these bytes and the page is rendered
-// inside the operator's authenticated origin, where the
-// application's own CSP allows inline script from 'self'.
+// inside the operator's authenticated origin.
 func TestHandleSourceLogs_EscapesResponseBody(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -35,11 +35,10 @@ const eventBodyQuery = "SELECT cast(body as blob) " +
 // response is deliberately not renderable. Content-Disposition
 // makes the browser download rather than display it, and the
 // octet-stream type plus nosniff stop it being interpreted as
-// HTML or script. Without those a stored payload would execute
-// as the logged-in operator. The application's CSP does not
-// help here: script-src allows 'unsafe-inline' from 'self', so
-// a document served from this origin could run its own inline
-// script.
+// HTML or script. Without those a stored payload would be shown
+// as a page of the operator's own origin. The application's CSP
+// is a second defence behind them: it allows no inline script,
+// so such a page could not run script of its own.
 func (h *Handlers) HandleEventBodyDownload() http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		webhook, ok := h.ownedWebhook(w, r)
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func TestHandleEventDetail_ShowsEventWholeWithDeliveries(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Contains(t, page, strconv.Itoa(len(body))+" bytes")
 	assert.Contains(t, page, "{\n  &#34;pad&#34;: &#34;xxx")
 	assert.Contains(t, page, "&#34;tail&#34;: &#34;"+sentinel+"&#34;\n}")
-	assert.Contains(t, page, `style="max-height: 32rem; overflow-y: auto"`)
+	assert.Contains(t, page, `break-all max-h-[32rem] overflow-y-auto"`)
 	assert.NotContains(t, page, "Showing the first")
 	assert.Contains(t, page, target.Name)
 	assert.Contains(t, page, ">failed</span>")
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ const deliveryIDChunkSize = 500
 //
 // Each response body is cut by SQLite rather than in Go, for
 // the reason deliveryResultColumns gives. How many attempts a
-// delivery has is bounded by the target's MaxAttempts, which the
+// delivery has is the target's MaxRetries, which the
 // authenticated operator sets; how many of them reach the page
 // is bounded again by maxRenderedAttempts.
 func (h *Handlers) loadDeliveryResults(
@@ -37,10 +37,10 @@ const MaxRenderedResponseBytesForTest = maxRenderedResponseBytes
 // per-delivery attempt ceiling to the handlers_test package.
 const MaxRenderedAttemptsForTest = maxRenderedAttempts

-// MaxTargetAttemptsForTest exposes the target max_attempts ceiling to
+// MaxTargetRetriesForTest exposes the target max_retries ceiling to
 // the handlers_test package, so the tests assert against the constant
 // the handlers enforce rather than a number copied beside it.
-const MaxTargetAttemptsForTest = maxTargetAttempts
+const MaxTargetRetriesForTest = maxTargetRetries

 // EventDBLeftMsgForTest and SidecarLeftMsgForTest expose the two
 // messages the webhook delete handler logs when a file of the event
@@ -1,19 +1,15 @@
 package handlers_test

-// The handler-side half of the log-field audit. Two slog calls in
-// this package reach a value an UNAUTHENTICATED client picks outright
-// and of a length it picks outright:
+// The handler-side half of the log-field audit. The slog calls in
+// this package that reach a value an UNAUTHENTICATED client picks
+// outright, and of a length it picks outright, are the failed-login
+// DEBUG lines, whose username is a form field.
 //
-//   - the unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line on /h/{uuid}, whose
-//     path segment matched no stored entrypoint and so is bounded by
-//     nothing;
-//   - the failed-login DEBUG lines, whose username is a form field.
-//
-// Both are at DEBUG, which is off in production by default. That is
+// They are at DEBUG, which is off in production by default. That is
 // not a bound: an operator turning DEBUG on to diagnose a flood must
-// not thereby hand the flood an unbounded write. Both spend the same
-// internal/logfield budget as the access log, and both are held here
-// to middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes.
+// not thereby hand the flood an unbounded write. They spend the same
+// internal/logfield budget as the access log, and are held here to
+// middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes.
 //
 // The two login lines past the username lookup — "invalid password"
 // and "user logged in" — carry the same cap without needing it, since
@@ -260,43 +256,6 @@ func postLoginWithPassword(
 	return w.Code
 }

-// TestUnknownEntrypoint_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize drives 8 KB of
-// client-chosen path at the unauthenticated receiver's
-// unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line and holds it to the same ceiling the
-// access log states.
-func TestUnknownEntrypoint_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
-		for fillName, fill := range escapeFills() {
-			t.Run(handlerName+"/"+fillName, func(t *testing.T) {
-				t.Parallel()
-
-				h, buf := capturingHandlers(t, newHandler)
-				router := receiverRouter(h)
-
-				for i := range floodRequests {
-					assert.Equal(
-						t,
-						http.StatusNotFound,
-						postReceiver(
-							t, router,
-							oversizedFill(fill)+
-								strings.Repeat("y", i),
-						),
-					)
-				}
-
-				lines := logLines(t, buf)
-				require.Len(t, lines, floodRequests)
-				assertNoClientText(t, buf)
-
-				assertBoundedFlood(t, buf.Len())
-			})
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 // TestFailedLogin_LogLineDoesNotTrackUsernameSize drives 8 KB of
 // client-chosen username at the unauthenticated login endpoint's
 // DEBUG line and holds it to the same ceiling.
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDetail_FitsWideAndNarrowWindows(t *testing.T) {

 	assert.Contains(
 		t, body,
-		`<div class="mx-auto px-6 py-8" style="max-width: 108rem"`,
+		`<div class="max-w-[108rem] mx-auto px-6 py-8">`,
 	)
 	assert.Contains(
 		t, body,
@@ -286,8 +286,8 @@ func TestHandleSourceDetail_FitsWideAndNarrowWindows(t *testing.T) {
 // target and says what deleting it loses, that the webhook's gives its
 // number of stored events (5 received, 2 removed by retention, so 3,
 // the statistics pane's "Within retention" figure), and that an
-// entrypoint with no description is named by its URL. The template
-// writes the slashes after http: as \/, which the browser reads as /.
+// entrypoint with no description is named by its URL. Each prompt is
+// its form's data-confirm attribute, where &#10; is a line break.
 func TestHandleSourceDetail_DeletePromptsNameWhatIsLost(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -325,29 +325,28 @@ func TestHandleSourceDetail_DeletePromptsNameWhatIsLost(t *testing.T) {
 	body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)

 	assert.Contains(t, body,
-		`Delete webhook &quot;delete-me&quot;?\n\n`+
+		`data-confirm="Delete webhook &quot;delete-me&quot;?&#10;&#10;`+
 			`This deletes its stored events (3) and their deliveries. `+
-			`Any archive files it wrote are kept.`)
+			`Any archive files it wrote are kept."`)
 	assert.Contains(t, body,
-		`Delete entrypoint &quot;Stripe&quot;?\n\n`+
+		`data-confirm="Delete entrypoint &quot;Stripe&quot;?&#10;&#10;`+
 			`Senders using its URL get an error from now on, `+
-			`and the URL cannot be restored.`)
+			`and the URL cannot be restored."`)
 	assert.Contains(t, body,
-		`Delete entrypoint &quot;http:\/\/example.com/h/`+
-			unnamed.Path+`&quot;?`)
+		`data-confirm="Delete entrypoint &quot;http://example.com/h/`+
+			unnamed.Path+`&quot;?&#10;&#10;`)
 	assert.Contains(t, body,
-		`Delete target &quot;t-log&quot;?\n\n`+
+		`data-confirm="Delete target &quot;t-log&quot;?&#10;&#10;`+
 			`Nothing more is delivered to it. `+
-			`Its past deliveries stay in the event log.`)
+			`Its past deliveries stay in the event log."`)
 }

 // TestHandleSourceDetail_DeletePromptKeepsQuotesInName checks that a
 // webhook name with quotes, a backslash, a closing script tag and a
-// newline reaches its delete prompt escaped for the script, which the
-// browser reads back as the name typed: each quote and angle bracket
-// as a \u escape, the slash as \/, the newline as \n and the backslash
-// doubled. An unescaped newline would break the prompt's script, and
-// the form would then submit without asking.
+// newline reaches its delete prompt escaped for the attribute, which
+// the browser reads back as the name typed: each quote and angle
+// bracket as a character reference, the rest as typed. An unescaped
+// double quote would end the attribute and cut the prompt short.
 func TestHandleSourceDetail_DeletePromptKeepsQuotesInName(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -373,6 +372,6 @@ func TestHandleSourceDetail_DeletePromptKeepsQuotesInName(t *testing.T) {
 	body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)

 	assert.Contains(t, body,
-		"Delete webhook &quot;Bob\\u0027s \\u0022best\\u0022 \\\\ hook"+
-			"\\u003c\\/script\\u003e\\nline two&quot;?")
+		"Delete webhook &quot;Bob&#39;s &#34;best&#34; \\ hook"+
+			"&lt;/script&gt;\nline two&quot;?")
 }
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-package handlers
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// maxTargetAttempts bounds a target's max_attempts.
-//
-// Both target forms already declare max="20" on the input, so this
-// enforces server-side what the UI has always advertised rather than
-// introducing a new limit.
-//
-// The number is not cosmetic. Every attempt writes a delivery_results
-// row that the event log then loads and renders, and the engine backs
-// off by 2^(n-1) seconds, so attempt 20 is already about six days
-// after the first. A value beyond this buys no additional durability
-// and only costs rows.
-const maxTargetAttempts = 20
-
-// Errors returned when a max_attempts form value cannot be turned into
-// a number of attempts.
-var (
-	// errAttemptsInvalid signals a max_attempts form value that is not
-	// a whole number of at least 1.
-	errAttemptsInvalid = errors.New(
-		"must be a whole number, at least 1",
-	)
-
-	// errAttemptsTooLarge signals a max_attempts form value that is a
-	// whole number but above maxTargetAttempts. It is distinguished
-	// from errAttemptsInvalid so the message can name the ceiling
-	// instead of implying the input was not a number.
-	errAttemptsTooLarge = errors.New("out of range")
-)
-
-// parseMaxAttempts interprets a max_attempts form value.
-//
-// An ABSENT value — the field empty or not submitted — yields
-// fallback, which lets the create path apply its default and the edit
-// path leave the stored value alone. A value that is SET BUT INVALID
-// is an error: unparseable, below 1, or above maxTargetAttempts.
-//
-// The distinction is the whole point of this function. Returning a
-// default for input the operator typed but that did not parse would
-// silently turn retries off on a store-and-forward proxy — and on the
-// edit path destroy a working configuration over a typo. A default
-// answers a question that was not asked; it never answers one that
-// was asked badly.
-func parseMaxAttempts(raw string, fallback int) (int, error) {
-	raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
-	if raw == "" {
-		return fallback, nil
-	}
-
-	v, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
-	if err != nil || v < 1 {
-		return 0, errAttemptsInvalid
-	}
-
-	if v > maxTargetAttempts {
-		return 0, errAttemptsTooLarge
-	}
-
-	return v, nil
-}
-
-// attemptsErrorMessage returns the message the create and edit forms
-// show for a rejected max_attempts value. Any error other than
-// errAttemptsTooLarge falls back to the generic wording, so an
-// unrecognised parse failure still produces a sensible 400.
-func attemptsErrorMessage(err error) string {
-	if errors.Is(err, errAttemptsTooLarge) {
-		return errAttemptsTooLarge.Error() +
-			": at most " + strconv.Itoa(maxTargetAttempts) +
-			" attempts"
-	}
-
-	return errAttemptsInvalid.Error()
-}
@@ -1,429 +0,0 @@
-package handlers_test
-
-import (
-	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
-	"strconv"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
-)
-
-// attemptsTargetURL is the destination the attempts-validation targets
-// point at. It is a literal public address rather than a hostname so
-// the SSRF check resolves nothing and a sandbox without DNS cannot
-// make these cases pass or fail for the wrong reason.
-const attemptsTargetURL = "https://93.184.216.34/hooks/attempts"
-
-const (
-	// wayAboveCeiling is the typo'd-extra-zero case from the report.
-	wayAboveCeiling = "999999999"
-
-	// notANumber is the plainest garbage an operator can type, and
-	// the value the report submitted on the edit form.
-	notANumber = "abc"
-
-	// workingAttempts is the number of attempts a seeded target is
-	// already delivering with, which a rejected submission must not
-	// disturb.
-	workingAttempts = 2
-)
-
-// aboveCeiling is the smallest rejected whole number.
-func aboveCeiling() string {
-	return strconv.Itoa(handlers.MaxTargetAttemptsForTest + 1)
-}
-
-// overCeilingAttempts is whole-number input past the limit, which is
-// rejected with the limit named.
-func overCeilingAttempts() []string {
-	return []string{aboveCeiling(), wayAboveCeiling}
-}
-
-// belowOneAttempts is whole-number input under the floor of one
-// attempt, which is rejected with the floor named.
-func belowOneAttempts() []string {
-	return []string{"0", "-5"}
-}
-
-// unparseableAttempts is input an operator can type into the field
-// that is not a number of attempts. Each must be REJECTED: silently
-// reading any of them as a default turns retries off on a
-// store-and-forward proxy without saying so.
-//
-// The twenty-digit case is here because it parses as digits but
-// overflows int, which is the one failure the field's own min/max
-// attributes cannot describe.
-func unparseableAttempts() []string {
-	return []string{
-		notANumber,
-		"2.7",
-		"12345678901234567890",
-		"1e3",
-	}
-}
-
-// createAttemptsForm is a complete, otherwise-valid HTTP target
-// creation, so the only thing any case below varies is max_attempts.
-func createAttemptsForm(attempts string) url.Values {
-	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("name", "attempts-target")
-	form.Set("type", string(database.TargetTypeHTTP))
-	form.Set("url", attemptsTargetURL)
-
-	if attempts != absentField {
-		form.Set("max_attempts", attempts)
-	}
-
-	return form
-}
-
-// absentField marks a field the form does not submit at all, which is
-// the case that legitimately takes a default and must stay distinct
-// from a field submitted with garbage in it.
-const absentField = "\x00absent"
-
-// absentAttempts is every way of saying "the operator did not set
-// this", each of which takes the default rather than a 400. Blank and
-// whitespace-only count as absent here because they do in the timeout
-// and retention controls on the same forms; a rule the fields do not
-// share would be its own surprise.
-func absentAttempts() []string {
-	return []string{absentField, "", "  "}
-}
-
-// createWithAttempts posts the target create form for a fresh webhook
-// and returns the webhook and the response.
-func createWithAttempts(
-	t *testing.T,
-	env *sourceTestEnv,
-	attempts string,
-) (database.Webhook, int, string) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	webhook := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 30)
-
-	w := serveTarget(
-		env, http.MethodPost,
-		"/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/targets",
-		createAttemptsForm(attempts),
-	)
-
-	return webhook, w.Code, w.Body.String()
-}
-
-// TestTargetCreate_AttemptsAboveCeilingRejected proves the create form
-// enforces a ceiling at all, and that the 400 names it — a rejection
-// that does not say what the limit is leaves the operator guessing.
-func TestTargetCreate_AttemptsAboveCeilingRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	env := setupSourceTest(t)
-	ceiling := strconv.Itoa(handlers.MaxTargetAttemptsForTest)
-
-	for _, attempts := range overCeilingAttempts() {
-		webhook, code, body := createWithAttempts(t, env, attempts)
-
-		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, code,
-			"max_attempts=%s should be rejected", attempts)
-		assert.Contains(t, body, ceiling,
-			"the rejection for %s should name the ceiling",
-			attempts)
-		assert.Empty(t,
-			targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID),
-			"no target should be created for %s", attempts)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTargetCreate_AttemptsBelowOneRejected proves the create form
-// refuses 0 and less, naming the floor: every delivery is attempted
-// at least once.
-func TestTargetCreate_AttemptsBelowOneRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	env := setupSourceTest(t)
-
-	for _, attempts := range belowOneAttempts() {
-		webhook, code, body := createWithAttempts(t, env, attempts)
-
-		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, code,
-			"max_attempts=%s should be rejected", attempts)
-		assert.Contains(t, body, "at least 1",
-			"the rejection for %s should name the floor",
-			attempts)
-		assert.Empty(t,
-			targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID),
-			"no target should be created for %s", attempts)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTargetCreate_UnparseableAttemptsRejected is the core of the
-// defect: each of these was accepted with HTTP 200 and stored as a
-// default.
-func TestTargetCreate_UnparseableAttemptsRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	env := setupSourceTest(t)
-
-	for _, attempts := range unparseableAttempts() {
-		webhook, code, body := createWithAttempts(t, env, attempts)
-
-		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, code,
-			"max_attempts=%q should be rejected, not coerced",
-			attempts)
-		assert.Contains(t, body, "whole number",
-			"the rejection for %q should say why", attempts)
-		assert.Empty(t,
-			targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID),
-			"no target should be created for %q", attempts)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTargetCreate_ValidAttemptsStored covers the accepting half,
-// including both bounds: a bound that rejects its own limit would
-// make the advertised range unreachable.
-func TestTargetCreate_ValidAttemptsStored(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	env := setupSourceTest(t)
-
-	for _, want := range []int{1, 3, handlers.MaxTargetAttemptsForTest} {
-		webhook, code, body := createWithAttempts(
-			t, env, strconv.Itoa(want),
-		)
-
-		require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, code, body)
-
-		targets := targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID)
-		require.Len(t, targets, 1)
-		assert.Equal(t, want, targets[0].MaxAttempts)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTargetCreate_AbsentAttemptsTakesDefault keeps the two cases
-// distinct. An omitted field is not an operator asking for something
-// invalid, so it still gets the default of one attempt rather than a
-// 400 — otherwise the fix above would make the form unusable.
-func TestTargetCreate_AbsentAttemptsTakesDefault(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	env := setupSourceTest(t)
-
-	for _, attempts := range absentAttempts() {
-		webhook, code, body := createWithAttempts(t, env, attempts)
-
-		require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, code, body)
-
-		targets := targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID)
-		require.Len(t, targets, 1)
-		assert.Equal(t, 1, targets[0].MaxAttempts,
-			"an absent max_attempts should take the default")
-	}
-}
-
-// seedAttemptsTarget creates an HTTP target already delivering with
-// workingAttempts attempts, through the real create handler.
-func seedAttemptsTarget(
-	t *testing.T,
-	env *sourceTestEnv,
-) (database.Webhook, database.Target) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	webhook, code, body := createWithAttempts(
-		t, env, strconv.Itoa(workingAttempts),
-	)
-	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, code, body)
-
-	targets := targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID)
-	require.Len(t, targets, 1)
-	require.Equal(t, workingAttempts, targets[0].MaxAttempts)
-
-	return webhook, targets[0]
-}
-
-// editAttemptsForm is a complete edit submission that changes the
-// target's name as well, so a rejected submission can be shown to
-// have written nothing at all rather than merely to have left
-// max_attempts alone.
-func editAttemptsForm(attempts string) url.Values {
-	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("name", "renamed-by-edit")
-	form.Set("url", attemptsTargetURL)
-
-	if attempts != absentField {
-		form.Set("max_attempts", attempts)
-	}
-
-	return form
-}
-
-// assertEditRejectedAndUnchanged submits an edit expected to fail and
-// checks both halves of the requirement: the 400 explains itself, and
-// the target it was submitted against is untouched.
-func assertEditRejectedAndUnchanged(
-	t *testing.T,
-	env *sourceTestEnv,
-	attempts, wantReason string,
-) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	webhook, target := seedAttemptsTarget(t, env)
-
-	w := submitTargetEdit(
-		env, webhook.ID, target.ID, editAttemptsForm(attempts),
-	)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code,
-		"max_attempts=%q should be rejected on edit", attempts)
-	assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), wantReason,
-		"the rejection for %q should say why", attempts)
-
-	stored := storedTarget(t, env, target.ID)
-	assert.Equal(t, workingAttempts, stored.MaxAttempts,
-		"a rejected edit must not destroy the working number "+
-			"of attempts with %q", attempts)
-	assert.Equal(t, "attempts-target", stored.Name,
-		"a rejected edit must write nothing at all")
-}
-
-// TestTargetEdit_UnparseableAttemptsRejected is the damaging half of
-// the defect. A target delivering with retries, re-saved with a typo
-// in the field, returned 200 and was left with retries disabled and
-// nothing said.
-func TestTargetEdit_UnparseableAttemptsRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	env := setupSourceTest(t)
-
-	for _, attempts := range unparseableAttempts() {
-		assertEditRejectedAndUnchanged(
-			t, env, attempts, "whole number",
-		)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTargetEdit_AttemptsBelowOneRejected proves the floor applies
-// to the edit path too.
-func TestTargetEdit_AttemptsBelowOneRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	env := setupSourceTest(t)
-
-	for _, attempts := range belowOneAttempts() {
-		assertEditRejectedAndUnchanged(t, env, attempts, "at least 1")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTargetEdit_AttemptsAboveCeilingRejected proves the ceiling
-// applies to the edit path too, naming itself, so the two paths
-// cannot disagree about what is storable.
-func TestTargetEdit_AttemptsAboveCeilingRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	env := setupSourceTest(t)
-	ceiling := strconv.Itoa(handlers.MaxTargetAttemptsForTest)
-
-	for _, attempts := range overCeilingAttempts() {
-		assertEditRejectedAndUnchanged(t, env, attempts, ceiling)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTargetEdit_ValidAttemptsStored covers the accepting half of the
-// edit path, so the bounds cannot be enforced by simply refusing
-// every submission.
-func TestTargetEdit_ValidAttemptsStored(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	env := setupSourceTest(t)
-
-	for _, want := range []int{1, 9, handlers.MaxTargetAttemptsForTest} {
-		webhook, target := seedAttemptsTarget(t, env)
-
-		w := submitTargetEdit(
-			env, webhook.ID, target.ID,
-			editAttemptsForm(strconv.Itoa(want)),
-		)
-		require.Equal(t,
-			http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, w.Body.String(),
-		)
-
-		assert.Equal(t, want,
-			storedTarget(t, env, target.ID).MaxAttempts)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTargetEdit_AbsentAttemptsLeavesStoredValue is the edit path's
-// absent-versus-invalid case. The field is only offered by the forms
-// for types that retry, so a submission without it must leave the
-// stored count alone rather than be rejected or reset.
-func TestTargetEdit_AbsentAttemptsLeavesStoredValue(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	env := setupSourceTest(t)
-
-	for _, attempts := range absentAttempts() {
-		webhook, target := seedAttemptsTarget(t, env)
-
-		w := submitTargetEdit(
-			env, webhook.ID, target.ID,
-			editAttemptsForm(attempts),
-		)
-		require.Equal(t,
-			http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, w.Body.String(),
-		)
-
-		assert.Equal(t, workingAttempts,
-			storedTarget(t, env, target.ID).MaxAttempts,
-			"an absent max_attempts must leave the stored "+
-				"count alone (%q)", attempts)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTargetAttempts_CreateAndEditAgreeOnEveryCase proves the two
-// paths cannot disagree, which is what let the create form and the
-// edit form drift apart in the first place. Every input is submitted
-// to both and the accept/reject verdicts are compared.
-func TestTargetAttempts_CreateAndEditAgreeOnEveryCase(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	env := setupSourceTest(t)
-
-	accepted := []string{
-		"1", "2",
-		strconv.Itoa(handlers.MaxTargetAttemptsForTest),
-	}
-	overCeiling := overCeilingAttempts()
-	belowOne := belowOneAttempts()
-	unparseable := unparseableAttempts()
-
-	cases := make(
-		[]string, 0,
-		len(accepted)+len(overCeiling)+len(belowOne)+
-			len(unparseable),
-	)
-	cases = append(cases, accepted...)
-	cases = append(cases, overCeiling...)
-	cases = append(cases, belowOne...)
-	cases = append(cases, unparseable...)
-
-	for _, attempts := range cases {
-		_, createCode, _ := createWithAttempts(t, env, attempts)
-
-		webhook, target := seedAttemptsTarget(t, env)
-		editCode := submitTargetEdit(
-			env, webhook.ID, target.ID,
-			editAttemptsForm(attempts),
-		).Code
-
-		assert.Equal(t,
-			createCode == http.StatusBadRequest,
-			editCode == http.StatusBadRequest,
-			"create and edit must agree on max_attempts=%q "+
-				"(create %d, edit %d)",
-			attempts, createCode, editCode,
-		)
-	}
-}
@@ -102,10 +102,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) newTarget(
 	in targetFormInput,
 ) (*database.Target, string, error) {
 	target := &database.Target{
-		WebhookID:   webhookID,
-		Type:        in.Type,
-		Active:      true,
-		MaxAttempts: 1,
+		WebhookID: webhookID,
+		Type:      in.Type,
+		Active:    true,
 	}

 	errMsg, err := h.setTargetFromForm(ctx, target, in)
@@ -118,10 +117,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) newTarget(

 // setTargetFromForm validates a target form against the target's type
 // and, when it accepts it, sets the target's name, configuration and
-// number of delivery attempts from it. It returns the message the form
-// shows for anything it refuses, an unknown type among them, and then
-// leaves the target unchanged; an error is the server's fault, as for
-// newTarget.
+// retry count from it. It returns the message the form shows for
+// anything it refuses, an unknown type among them, and then leaves the
+// target unchanged; an error is the server's fault, as for newTarget.
 // The add target form and the target edit form both go through here,
 // so the two cannot come to disagree about what a target may be.
 func (h *Handlers) setTargetFromForm(
@@ -138,20 +136,20 @@ func (h *Handlers) setTargetFromForm(
 		return errMsg, err
 	}

-	// An empty max_attempts keeps the target's count: the default of
-	// 1 for a new target, and the stored count for an edited one,
-	// since the forms for target types that do not retry have no such
-	// field. A value that is filled in but invalid is refused rather
-	// than becoming that count, so a typo cannot destroy the count a
-	// target is delivering with.
-	maxAttempts, err := parseMaxAttempts(in.MaxAttempts, target.MaxAttempts)
+	// An empty max_retries keeps the target's count: the
+	// fire-and-forget default of 0 for a new target, and the stored
+	// count for an edited one, since the forms for target types that
+	// do not retry have no such field. A value that is filled in but
+	// invalid is refused rather than becoming that count, so a typo
+	// cannot destroy the count a target is delivering with.
+	maxRetries, err := parseMaxRetries(in.MaxRetries, target.MaxRetries)
 	if err != nil {
-		return "Invalid delivery attempts: " + attemptsErrorMessage(err), nil
+		return "Invalid delivery attempts: " + retriesErrorMessage(err), nil
 	}

 	target.Name = in.Name
 	target.Config = configJSON
-	target.MaxAttempts = maxAttempts
+	target.MaxRetries = maxRetries

 	return "", nil
 }
@@ -178,8 +176,8 @@ type targetFormInput struct {
 	// ForwardQuery is an HTTP target's checkbox that passes each
 	// event's query string on to it.
 	ForwardQuery bool
-	// MaxAttempts is an HTTP or Slack target's max_attempts.
-	MaxAttempts string
+	// MaxRetries is an HTTP or Slack target's max_retries.
+	MaxRetries string
 	// Expiry is a database (archive) target's row expiry.
 	Expiry string
 	// Rotation is a database (archive) target's rotation.
@@ -206,7 +204,7 @@ func targetFormInputFrom(r *http.Request) targetFormInput {
 		Headers:      r.PostFormValue("headers"),
 		Timeout:      r.PostFormValue("timeout"),
 		ForwardQuery: r.PostFormValue("forward_query") != "",
-		MaxAttempts:  r.PostFormValue("max_attempts"),
+		MaxRetries:   r.PostFormValue("max_retries"),
 		Expiry:       r.PostFormValue("expiry"),
 		Rotation:     r.PostFormValue("rotation"),
 	}
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ func TestHandleTargetCreate_QueryStringCannotSupplyNameOrType(

 	w, _ := postTargetCreate(
 		t, env, webhook.ID,
-		"name=leaky&type=slack&max_attempts=9&expiry=30d&url="+
+		"name=leaky&type=slack&max_retries=9&expiry=30d&url="+
 			url.QueryEscape(targetSecretURL),
 		url.Values{},
 	)
@@ -21,24 +21,24 @@ func TestHandleTargetCreate_EveryType(t *testing.T) {

 	// fields is the rest of each submission, as a query string.
 	cases := []struct {
-		targetType   database.TargetType
-		fields       string
-		wantConfig   string
-		wantAttempts int
+		targetType  database.TargetType
+		fields      string
+		wantConfig  string
+		wantRetries int
 	}{
 		{
-			database.TargetTypeHTTP, "timeout=12&max_attempts=3",
+			database.TargetTypeHTTP, "timeout=12&max_retries=3",
 			`{"url":"` + editOriginalURL + `","timeout":12}`, 3,
 		},
 		{
-			database.TargetTypeSlack, "max_attempts=4",
+			database.TargetTypeSlack, "max_retries=4",
 			`{"webhookUrl":"` + editOriginalURL + `"}`, 4,
 		},
 		{
 			database.TargetTypeDatabase, "expiry=720h",
-			`{"expiry":"720h"}`, 1,
+			`{"expiry":"720h"}`, 0,
 		},
-		{database.TargetTypeLog, "", "", 1},
+		{database.TargetTypeLog, "", "", 0},
 	}

 	for _, tc := range cases {
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func TestHandleTargetCreate_EveryType(t *testing.T) {
 			targets := targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID)
 			require.Len(t, targets, 1)
 			assert.Equal(t, tc.targetType, targets[0].Type)
-			assert.Equal(t, tc.wantAttempts, targets[0].MaxAttempts)
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.wantRetries, targets[0].MaxRetries)

 			if tc.wantConfig == "" {
 				assert.Empty(t, targets[0].Config)
@@ -90,11 +90,11 @@ func TestHandleTargetCreate_RefusedFormComesBack(t *testing.T) {
 		{
 			database.TargetTypeHTTP,
 			"name=private&url=" + editBlockedURL +
-				"&timeout=12&max_attempts=3",
+				"&timeout=12&max_retries=3",
 			"Invalid target URL",
 		},
 		{
-			database.TargetTypeSlack, "name=no-url&max_attempts=4",
+			database.TargetTypeSlack, "name=no-url&max_retries=4",
 			"Webhook URL is required for Slack targets",
 		},
 		{
@@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ func TestHandleTargetCreate_RefusedFormComesBack(t *testing.T) {
 			assert.Contains(t, page, html.EscapeString(tc.reason))

 			// Each value comes back in a data attribute of the targets
-			// section named after its field (max_attempts as
-			// data-max-attempts), except url, which comes back in
+			// section named after its field (max_retries as
+			// data-max-retries), except url, which comes back in
 			// data-destination; templates/source_detail.html says why.
 			for field := range typed {
 				attr := "data-" + strings.ReplaceAll(field, "_", "-")
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetEdit() http.HandlerFunc {
 			Headers:      cfg.Headers,
 			Timeout:      cfg.Timeout,
 			ForwardQuery: cfg.ForwardQuery,
-			MaxAttempts:  strconv.Itoa(target.MaxAttempts),
+			MaxRetries:   strconv.Itoa(target.MaxRetries),
 			Expiry:       cfg.Expiry,
 			Rotation:     cfg.Rotation,
 		}
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ func seedHTTPTarget(
 	form.Set("url", editOriginalURL)
 	form.Set("headers", headers)
 	form.Set("timeout", timeout)
-	form.Set("max_attempts", "3")
+	form.Set("max_retries", "3")

 	w := serveTarget(
 		env, http.MethodPost,
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ func editForm(targetURL, headers, timeout string) url.Values {
 	form.Set("url", targetURL)
 	form.Set("headers", headers)
 	form.Set("timeout", timeout)
-	form.Set("max_attempts", "5")
+	form.Set("max_retries", "5")

 	return form
 }
@@ -280,9 +280,9 @@ func TestHandleTargetEditSubmit_Saves(t *testing.T) {
 		assertEditClearingRemovesThem(t, env)
 	})

-	t.Run("absent max_attempts is kept", func(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("absent max_retries is not zeroed", func(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Parallel()
-		assertEditKeepsAbsentMaxAttempts(t, env)
+		assertEditKeepsAbsentMaxRetries(t, env)
 	})
 }

@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ func assertEditChangesDestination(

 	reloaded := storedTarget(t, env, target.ID)
 	assert.Equal(t, "edited-name", reloaded.Name)
-	assert.Equal(t, 5, reloaded.MaxAttempts)
+	assert.Equal(t, 5, reloaded.MaxRetries)
 	assert.Equal(
 		t, database.TargetTypeHTTP, reloaded.Type,
 		"the edit form must not change a target's type",
@@ -368,25 +368,25 @@ func assertEditClearingRemovesThem(
 	assert.Zero(t, cfg.Timeout)
 }

-// Delivery attempts are offered only by the forms for target types
-// that retry. An absent field means the form does not edit them, not
-// that retries should be turned off.
-func assertEditKeepsAbsentMaxAttempts(
+// Retries are offered only by the forms for target types that retry.
+// An absent field means the form does not edit retries, not that
+// they should be turned off.
+func assertEditKeepsAbsentMaxRetries(
 	t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()

 	webhook, target := seedHTTPTarget(t, env, "", "")
-	require.Equal(t, 3, target.MaxAttempts)
+	require.Equal(t, 3, target.MaxRetries)

 	form := editForm(editOriginalURL, "", "")
-	form.Del("max_attempts")
+	form.Del("max_retries")

 	w := submitTargetEdit(env, webhook.ID, target.ID, form)
 	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, w.Body.String())

 	assert.Equal(
-		t, 3, storedTarget(t, env, target.ID).MaxAttempts,
+		t, 3, storedTarget(t, env, target.ID).MaxRetries,
 	)
 }

@@ -659,12 +659,12 @@ func TestHandleTargetEditSubmit_RefusedFormComesBack(t *testing.T) {
 		{
 			database.TargetTypeHTTP,
 			"name=edited&url=" + editBlockedURL +
-				"&headers=X-Edited:+kept&timeout=12&max_attempts=3",
+				"&headers=X-Edited:+kept&timeout=12&max_retries=3",
 			"Invalid target URL",
 		},
 		{
 			database.TargetTypeSlack,
-			"name=edited&url=" + editOriginalURL + "&max_attempts=25",
+			"name=edited&url=" + editOriginalURL + "&max_retries=25",
 			"Invalid delivery attempts",
 		},
 		{
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+package handlers
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// maxTargetRetries bounds a target's max_retries.
+//
+// Both target forms already declare max="20" on the input, so this
+// enforces server-side what the UI has always advertised rather than
+// introducing a new limit.
+//
+// The number is not cosmetic. Every attempt writes a delivery_results
+// row that the event log then loads and renders, and the engine backs
+// off by 2^(n-1) seconds, so attempt 20 is already about six days
+// after the first. A value beyond this buys no additional durability
+// and only costs rows.
+const maxTargetRetries = 20
+
+// Errors returned when a max_retries form value cannot be turned into
+// a retry count.
+var (
+	// errRetriesInvalid signals a max_retries form value that is not
+	// a non-negative whole number.
+	errRetriesInvalid = errors.New(
+		"must be a whole number",
+	)
+
+	// errRetriesTooLarge signals a max_retries form value that is a
+	// whole number but above maxTargetRetries. It is distinguished
+	// from errRetriesInvalid so the message can name the ceiling
+	// instead of implying the input was not a number.
+	errRetriesTooLarge = errors.New("out of range")
+)
+
+// parseMaxRetries interprets a max_retries form value.
+//
+// An ABSENT value — the field empty or not submitted — yields
+// fallback, which lets the create path apply its default and the edit
+// path leave the stored value alone. A value that is SET BUT INVALID
+// is an error: unparseable, negative, or above maxTargetRetries.
+//
+// The distinction is the whole point of this function. max_retries=0
+// means fire-and-forget, so returning 0 for input the operator typed
+// but that did not parse silently disables retries on a
+// store-and-forward proxy — and on the edit path it destroys a
+// working retry configuration over a typo. A default answers a
+// question that was not asked; it never answers one that was asked
+// badly.
+func parseMaxRetries(raw string, fallback int) (int, error) {
+	raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
+	if raw == "" {
+		return fallback, nil
+	}
+
+	v, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
+	if err != nil || v < 0 {
+		return 0, errRetriesInvalid
+	}
+
+	if v > maxTargetRetries {
+		return 0, errRetriesTooLarge
+	}
+
+	return v, nil
+}
+
+// retriesErrorMessage returns the message the create and edit forms
+// show for a rejected max_retries value. Any error other than
+// errRetriesTooLarge falls back to the generic wording, so an
+// unrecognised parse failure still produces a sensible 400.
+func retriesErrorMessage(err error) string {
+	if errors.Is(err, errRetriesTooLarge) {
+		return errRetriesTooLarge.Error() +
+			": at most " + strconv.Itoa(maxTargetRetries) +
+			" attempts"
+	}
+
+	return errRetriesInvalid.Error() +
+		", or 0 for fire-and-forget"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+package handlers_test
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"strconv"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
+)
+
+// retriesTargetURL is the destination the retry-validation targets
+// point at. It is a literal public address rather than a hostname so
+// the SSRF check resolves nothing and a sandbox without DNS cannot
+// make these cases pass or fail for the wrong reason.
+const retriesTargetURL = "https://93.184.216.34/hooks/retries"
+
+const (
+	// wayAboveCeiling is the typo'd-extra-zero case from the report.
+	wayAboveCeiling = "999999999"
+
+	// notANumber is the plainest garbage an operator can type, and
+	// the value the report submitted on the edit form.
+	notANumber = "abc"
+
+	// workingRetries is the retry count a seeded target is already
+	// delivering with, which a rejected submission must not disturb.
+	workingRetries = 2
+)
+
+// aboveCeiling is the smallest rejected whole number.
+func aboveCeiling() string {
+	return strconv.Itoa(handlers.MaxTargetRetriesForTest + 1)
+}
+
+// overCeilingRetries is whole-number input past the limit, which is
+// rejected with the limit named.
+func overCeilingRetries() []string {
+	return []string{aboveCeiling(), wayAboveCeiling}
+}
+
+// unparseableRetries is input an operator can type into the field
+// that is not a retry count. Each must be REJECTED: silently reading
+// any of them as 0 turns a store-and-forward proxy into
+// fire-and-forget without saying so.
+//
+// The twenty-digit case is here because it parses as digits but
+// overflows int, which is the one failure the field's own min/max
+// attributes cannot describe.
+func unparseableRetries() []string {
+	return []string{
+		notANumber,
+		"2.7",
+		"-5",
+		"12345678901234567890",
+		"1e3",
+	}
+}
+
+// createRetriesForm is a complete, otherwise-valid HTTP target
+// creation, so the only thing any case below varies is max_retries.
+func createRetriesForm(retries string) url.Values {
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("name", "retries-target")
+	form.Set("type", string(database.TargetTypeHTTP))
+	form.Set("url", retriesTargetURL)
+
+	if retries != absentField {
+		form.Set("max_retries", retries)
+	}
+
+	return form
+}
+
+// absentField marks a field the form does not submit at all, which is
+// the case that legitimately takes a default and must stay distinct
+// from a field submitted with garbage in it.
+const absentField = "\x00absent"
+
+// absentRetries is every way of saying "the operator did not set
+// this", each of which takes the default rather than a 400. Blank and
+// whitespace-only count as absent here because they do in the timeout
+// and retention controls on the same forms; a rule the fields do not
+// share would be its own surprise.
+func absentRetries() []string {
+	return []string{absentField, "", "  "}
+}
+
+// createWithRetries posts the target create form for a fresh webhook
+// and returns the webhook and the response.
+func createWithRetries(
+	t *testing.T,
+	env *sourceTestEnv,
+	retries string,
+) (database.Webhook, int, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	webhook := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 30)
+
+	w := serveTarget(
+		env, http.MethodPost,
+		"/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/targets",
+		createRetriesForm(retries),
+	)
+
+	return webhook, w.Code, w.Body.String()
+}
+
+// TestTargetCreate_RetriesAboveCeilingRejected proves the create form
+// enforces a ceiling at all, and that the 400 names it — a rejection
+// that does not say what the limit is leaves the operator guessing.
+func TestTargetCreate_RetriesAboveCeilingRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+	ceiling := strconv.Itoa(handlers.MaxTargetRetriesForTest)
+
+	for _, retries := range overCeilingRetries() {
+		webhook, code, body := createWithRetries(t, env, retries)
+
+		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, code,
+			"max_retries=%s should be rejected", retries)
+		assert.Contains(t, body, ceiling,
+			"the rejection for %s should name the ceiling",
+			retries)
+		assert.Empty(t,
+			targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID),
+			"no target should be created for %s", retries)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTargetCreate_UnparseableRetriesRejected is the core of the
+// defect: each of these was accepted with HTTP 200 and stored as 0.
+func TestTargetCreate_UnparseableRetriesRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+
+	for _, retries := range unparseableRetries() {
+		webhook, code, body := createWithRetries(t, env, retries)
+
+		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, code,
+			"max_retries=%q should be rejected, not coerced",
+			retries)
+		assert.Contains(t, body, "whole number",
+			"the rejection for %q should say why", retries)
+		assert.Empty(t,
+			targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID),
+			"no target should be created for %q", retries)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTargetCreate_ValidRetriesStored covers the accepting half,
+// including the ceiling itself: a bound that rejects its own limit
+// would make the advertised maximum unreachable.
+func TestTargetCreate_ValidRetriesStored(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+
+	for _, want := range []int{0, 3, handlers.MaxTargetRetriesForTest} {
+		webhook, code, body := createWithRetries(
+			t, env, strconv.Itoa(want),
+		)
+
+		require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, code, body)
+
+		targets := targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID)
+		require.Len(t, targets, 1)
+		assert.Equal(t, want, targets[0].MaxRetries)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTargetCreate_AbsentRetriesTakesDefault keeps the two cases
+// distinct. An omitted field is not an operator asking for something
+// invalid, so it still gets the fire-and-forget default rather than a
+// 400 — otherwise the fix above would make the form unusable.
+func TestTargetCreate_AbsentRetriesTakesDefault(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+
+	for _, retries := range absentRetries() {
+		webhook, code, body := createWithRetries(t, env, retries)
+
+		require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, code, body)
+
+		targets := targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID)
+		require.Len(t, targets, 1)
+		assert.Equal(t, 0, targets[0].MaxRetries,
+			"an absent max_retries should take the default")
+	}
+}
+
+// seedRetriesTarget creates an HTTP target already delivering with
+// workingRetries retries, through the real create handler.
+func seedRetriesTarget(
+	t *testing.T,
+	env *sourceTestEnv,
+) (database.Webhook, database.Target) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	webhook, code, body := createWithRetries(
+		t, env, strconv.Itoa(workingRetries),
+	)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, code, body)
+
+	targets := targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID)
+	require.Len(t, targets, 1)
+	require.Equal(t, workingRetries, targets[0].MaxRetries)
+
+	return webhook, targets[0]
+}
+
+// editRetriesForm is a complete edit submission that changes the
+// target's name as well, so a rejected submission can be shown to
+// have written nothing at all rather than merely to have left
+// max_retries alone.
+func editRetriesForm(retries string) url.Values {
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("name", "renamed-by-edit")
+	form.Set("url", retriesTargetURL)
+
+	if retries != absentField {
+		form.Set("max_retries", retries)
+	}
+
+	return form
+}
+
+// assertEditRejectedAndUnchanged submits an edit expected to fail and
+// checks both halves of the requirement: the 400 explains itself, and
+// the target it was submitted against is untouched.
+func assertEditRejectedAndUnchanged(
+	t *testing.T,
+	env *sourceTestEnv,
+	retries, wantReason string,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	webhook, target := seedRetriesTarget(t, env)
+
+	w := submitTargetEdit(
+		env, webhook.ID, target.ID, editRetriesForm(retries),
+	)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code,
+		"max_retries=%q should be rejected on edit", retries)
+	assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), wantReason,
+		"the rejection for %q should say why", retries)
+
+	stored := storedTarget(t, env, target.ID)
+	assert.Equal(t, workingRetries, stored.MaxRetries,
+		"a rejected edit must not destroy the working retry "+
+			"count with %q", retries)
+	assert.Equal(t, "retries-target", stored.Name,
+		"a rejected edit must write nothing at all")
+}
+
+// TestTargetEdit_UnparseableRetriesRejected is the damaging half of
+// the defect. A target delivering with two retries, re-saved with a
+// typo in the field, returned 200 and was left with retries disabled
+// and nothing said.
+func TestTargetEdit_UnparseableRetriesRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+
+	for _, retries := range unparseableRetries() {
+		assertEditRejectedAndUnchanged(
+			t, env, retries, "whole number",
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTargetEdit_RetriesAboveCeilingRejected proves the ceiling
+// applies to the edit path too, naming itself, so the two paths
+// cannot disagree about what is storable.
+func TestTargetEdit_RetriesAboveCeilingRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+	ceiling := strconv.Itoa(handlers.MaxTargetRetriesForTest)
+
+	for _, retries := range overCeilingRetries() {
+		assertEditRejectedAndUnchanged(t, env, retries, ceiling)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTargetEdit_ValidRetriesStored covers the accepting half of the
+// edit path, so the ceiling cannot be enforced by simply refusing
+// every submission.
+func TestTargetEdit_ValidRetriesStored(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+
+	for _, want := range []int{0, 9, handlers.MaxTargetRetriesForTest} {
+		webhook, target := seedRetriesTarget(t, env)
+
+		w := submitTargetEdit(
+			env, webhook.ID, target.ID,
+			editRetriesForm(strconv.Itoa(want)),
+		)
+		require.Equal(t,
+			http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, w.Body.String(),
+		)
+
+		assert.Equal(t, want,
+			storedTarget(t, env, target.ID).MaxRetries)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTargetEdit_AbsentRetriesLeavesStoredValue is the edit path's
+// absent-versus-invalid case. Retries are only offered by the forms
+// for types that retry, so a submission without the field must leave
+// the stored count alone rather than be rejected or zeroed.
+func TestTargetEdit_AbsentRetriesLeavesStoredValue(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+
+	for _, retries := range absentRetries() {
+		webhook, target := seedRetriesTarget(t, env)
+
+		w := submitTargetEdit(
+			env, webhook.ID, target.ID,
+			editRetriesForm(retries),
+		)
+		require.Equal(t,
+			http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, w.Body.String(),
+		)
+
+		assert.Equal(t, workingRetries,
+			storedTarget(t, env, target.ID).MaxRetries,
+			"an absent max_retries must leave the stored "+
+				"count alone (%q)", retries)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTargetRetries_CreateAndEditAgreeOnEveryCase proves the two
+// paths cannot disagree, which is what let the create form and the
+// edit form drift apart in the first place. Every input is submitted
+// to both and the accept/reject verdicts are compared.
+func TestTargetRetries_CreateAndEditAgreeOnEveryCase(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := setupSourceTest(t)
+
+	accepted := []string{
+		"0", "1",
+		strconv.Itoa(handlers.MaxTargetRetriesForTest),
+	}
+	overCeiling := overCeilingRetries()
+	unparseable := unparseableRetries()
+
+	cases := make(
+		[]string, 0,
+		len(accepted)+len(overCeiling)+len(unparseable),
+	)
+	cases = append(cases, accepted...)
+	cases = append(cases, overCeiling...)
+	cases = append(cases, unparseable...)
+
+	for _, retries := range cases {
+		_, createCode, _ := createWithRetries(t, env, retries)
+
+		webhook, target := seedRetriesTarget(t, env)
+		editCode := submitTargetEdit(
+			env, webhook.ID, target.ID,
+			editRetriesForm(retries),
+		).Code
+
+		assert.Equal(t,
+			createCode == http.StatusBadRequest,
+			editCode == http.StatusBadRequest,
+			"create and edit must agree on max_retries=%q "+
+				"(create %d, edit %d)",
+			retries, createCode, editCode,
+		)
+	}
+}
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ func TestHandleTargetToggle_DoesNotUndoAnEdit(t *testing.T) {
 	stored := storedTarget(t, env, tgt.ID)
 	assert.False(t, stored.Active)
 	assert.Equal(t, "edited-name", stored.Name)
-	assert.Equal(t, 5, stored.MaxAttempts)
+	assert.Equal(t, 5, stored.MaxRetries)
 	assert.Equal(
 		t, editReplacedURL, storedHTTPConfig(t, env, tgt.ID).URL,
 	)
@@ -348,19 +348,21 @@ func TestEntrypointCopyButtonIsProgressiveEnhancement(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }

-// maxAttemptsHelp is the wording both target forms must carry. The
-// delivery core makes max_attempts attempts in total, not that many
+// maxRetriesHelp is the wording both target forms must carry. The
+// delivery core makes max_retries attempts in total, not that many
 // retries on top of a first try (a fresh delivery starts at attempt 1
 // and target_http gives up once the attempt number reaches
-// max_attempts).
-const maxAttemptsHelp = "How many times each delivery is attempted in " +
-	"all, the first attempt included."
+// max_retries), and 0 is special-cased to a single fire-and-forget
+// attempt with no circuit breaker.
+const maxRetriesHelp = "How many times each delivery is attempted in " +
+	"all, the first attempt included. 0 means a single attempt with no " +
+	"retries and no circuit breaker."

-// TestTargetFormMaxAttemptsCopyMatchesBehaviour pins the max_attempts
+// TestTargetFormMaxRetriesCopyMatchesBehaviour pins the max_retries
 // label, "Delivery attempts", and help text on both the create form
 // (the add-target form on the webhook detail page) and the edit form,
 // so the copy cannot drift back to calling the number a retry count.
-func TestTargetFormMaxAttemptsCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {
+func TestTargetFormMaxRetriesCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	var h *handlers.Handlers
@@ -392,11 +394,11 @@ func TestTargetFormMaxAttemptsCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {

 	assert.Contains(t, createBody, "Delivery attempts:</label>")
 	assert.Contains(
-		t, createBody, maxAttemptsHelp,
-		"the add-target form must explain max_attempts as total attempts",
+		t, createBody, maxRetriesHelp,
+		"the add-target form must explain max_retries as total attempts",
 	)

-	// A slack target exercises the same max_attempts field while needing
+	// A slack target exercises the same max_retries field while needing
 	// only a URL from the edit template, so the test data stays
 	// minimal. The Target and TargetForm keys mirror the field names
 	// the template reads off the handler's values.
@@ -410,8 +412,8 @@ func TestTargetFormMaxAttemptsCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {
 				"Active": true,
 			},
 			"TargetForm": map[string]any{
-				"URL":         "https://hooks.slack.com/services/x",
-				"MaxAttempts": "3",
+				"URL":        "https://hooks.slack.com/services/x",
+				"MaxRetries": "3",
 			},
 			dataKeyError: "",
 		},
@@ -419,8 +421,8 @@ func TestTargetFormMaxAttemptsCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {

 	assert.Contains(t, editBody, `class="label">Delivery attempts</label>`)
 	assert.Contains(
-		t, editBody, maxAttemptsHelp,
-		"the target edit form must explain max_attempts as total attempts",
+		t, editBody, maxRetriesHelp,
+		"the target edit form must explain max_retries as total attempts",
 	)
 }

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
 )

@@ -49,14 +48,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleWebhook() http.HandlerFunc {
 			return
 		}

-		// Logged only once the UUID is known to name a real
-		// entrypoint. The UUID comes straight out of the path on
-		// the one unauthenticated endpoint, so logging it before
-		// the lookup let a client write an INFO line per invented
-		// path; the request itself is already in the access log
-		// and a miss is already logged at DEBUG.
+		// Logged only once the lookup has found the entrypoint, so
+		// an invented path writes no INFO line; a miss is logged at
+		// DEBUG. The entrypoint is named by its ID: the UUID is its
+		// credential and is never logged.
 		h.log.Info("webhook request received",
-			"entrypoint_uuid", entrypointUUID,
+			"entrypoint_id", entrypoint.ID,
+			"webhook_id", entrypoint.WebhookID,
 			"method", r.Method,
 			"remoteIP", middleware.RemoteIP(r),
 			"clientIP", middleware.ClientIP(r),
@@ -133,17 +131,10 @@ func (h *Handlers) lookupEntrypoint(
 		"path = ?", entrypointUUID,
 	).First(&entrypoint)
 	if result.Error != nil {
-		// The receiver is unauthenticated and /h/{uuid}
-		// matches any single segment, so this value is entirely
-		// client-chosen on exactly the branch where the lookup
-		// failed. DEBUG is off by default; the cap is what keeps
-		// turning it on from restoring an unbounded write.
-		h.log.Debug(
-			"entrypoint not found",
-			"path", logfield.Truncate(
-				entrypointUUID, logfield.MaxBytes,
-			),
-		)
+		// Not even an unknown UUID is logged. The receiver's log
+		// lines never carry the path segment, which is a credential
+		// whenever it names an entrypoint.
+		h.log.Debug("entrypoint not found")
 		http.NotFound(w, r)

 		return entrypoint, false
@@ -442,7 +433,7 @@ func buildDeliveryTasks(
 			TargetName:   targets[i].Name,
 			TargetType:   targets[i].Type,
 			TargetConfig: targets[i].Config,
-			MaxAttempts:  targets[i].MaxAttempts,
+			MaxRetries:   targets[i].MaxRetries,
 			Method:       event.Method,
 			RawQuery:     event.RawQuery,
 			Headers:      event.Headers,
@@ -12,12 +12,15 @@ import (
 	"testing"

 	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware/middlewaretest"
 )

 // TestHandleWebhook_LogsClientNextToThePeer checks that the
@@ -99,6 +102,87 @@ func TestHandleWebhook_LogsClientNextToThePeer(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+// TestHandleWebhook_LogsNoEntrypointUUID sends an accepted event, a
+// request over the receiver rate limit and a request for an unknown
+// UUID through the receiver as routes.go mounts it, and checks that
+// nothing logged, at any level, carries either UUID.
+func TestHandleWebhook_LogsNoEntrypointUUID(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var (
+		h  *handlers.Handlers
+		db *database.Database
+	)
+
+	cfg := &config.Config{DataDir: t.TempDir(), ReceiverRateLimit: 1}
+
+	app := newTestAppWithConfig(t, cfg, &h, &db)
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
+	log := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(
+		buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
+	))
+	h.SetLogForTest(log)
+	mw := middlewaretest.New(t, log, cfg, nil)
+
+	webhook := seedWebhook(t, db)
+	entrypoint := &database.Entrypoint{
+		WebhookID: webhook.ID,
+		Path:      uuid.New().String(),
+		Active:    true,
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).
+		Create(entrypoint).Error)
+
+	unknownUUID := uuid.New().String()
+
+	router := chi.NewRouter()
+	router.Use(mw.Logging())
+	router.With(mw.ReceiverRateLimit()).HandleFunc(
+		middleware.ReceiverRoute, h.HandleWebhook(),
+	)
+
+	// In order: the limit is one request per minute per path, so the
+	// second request for the known UUID is the rejected one.
+	for _, step := range []struct {
+		entrypointUUID string
+		wantStatus     int
+	}{
+		{entrypoint.Path, http.StatusOK},
+		{entrypoint.Path, http.StatusTooManyRequests},
+		{unknownUUID, http.StatusNotFound},
+	} {
+		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+			context.Background(), http.MethodPost,
+			"/h/"+step.entrypointUUID, strings.NewReader("{}"),
+		)
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+		require.Equal(t, step.wantStatus, w.Code)
+	}
+
+	// The lines this test is about were all written, so the checks
+	// below are not passing on an empty log.
+	for _, msg := range []string{
+		"webhook request received",
+		"webhook receiver rate limit exceeded",
+		"entrypoint not found",
+	} {
+		assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), `"msg":"`+msg+`"`)
+	}
+
+	assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), entrypoint.Path)
+	assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), unknownUUID)
+
+	line := receivedLine(t, buf)
+	assert.Equal(t, entrypoint.ID, line["entrypoint_id"])
+	assert.Equal(t, webhook.ID, line["webhook_id"])
+}
+
 // receivedLine returns the one "webhook request received" line in the
 // captured JSON log.
 func receivedLine(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer) map[string]any {
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"

@@ -27,6 +28,13 @@ const floodRequests = 64
 // line for a redirected or rejected request may contain it.
 const attackerMarker = "QQATTACKERTEXTQQ"

+// knownEntrypointUUID and failingEntrypointUUID are the UUIDs the
+// stand-in receiver in accessLogRouter answers 200 and 500 to.
+const (
+	knownEntrypointUUID   = "6f1e2a9c-4b7d-4e3a-9c2f-1d8b5a7e3c60"
+	failingEntrypointUUID = "0b7c3e5a-2d9f-4a61-8e4b-7c1d6f2a9e35"
+)
+
 // maxLineBytes bounds a single access log line whose client-supplied
 // fields are of ordinary size. Well above what the fixed fields need,
 // well below the length of the oversized input the amplification tests
@@ -132,17 +140,21 @@ func accessLogRouter(m *middleware.Middleware) *chi.Mux {
 	)

 	router.HandleFunc(
-		"/h/{uuid}",
+		middleware.ReceiverRoute,
 		func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-			// Stands in for the real handler: an unknown entrypoint
-			// UUID 404s, a known one succeeds.
-			if chi.URLParam(r, "uuid") != "known" {
+			// Stands in for the real handler: a known entrypoint
+			// UUID succeeds, a failing one is a server error, and
+			// any other 404s.
+			switch chi.URLParam(r, "uuid") {
+			case knownEntrypointUUID:
+				w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+			case failingEntrypointUUID:
+				http.Error(
+					w, "boom", http.StatusInternalServerError,
+				)
+			default:
 				http.Error(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
-
-				return
 			}
-
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 		},
 	)

@@ -335,11 +347,13 @@ func oversizedValue(ch string) string {
 }

 // oversizedHeaders fills every client-supplied header the access log
-// reads with the same value.
+// reads with the same value. The Referer carries it as the host of an
+// absolute URL, because the access log keeps only a Referer's scheme
+// and host.
 func oversizedHeaders(value string) map[string]string {
 	return map[string]string{
 		"User-Agent":   value,
-		"Referer":      value,
+		"Referer":      "http://" + value,
 		"X-Request-Id": value,
 	}
 }
@@ -649,17 +663,111 @@ func TestAccessLog_SuccessKeepsConcretePathAndRedactsQuery(
 	router := accessLogRouter(m)

 	assert.Equal(
-		t, http.StatusOK, get(t, router, "/h/known?src=ci"),
+		t, http.StatusOK,
+		get(t, router, "/.well-known/healthcheck?src=ci"),
 	)

-	// The path resolved against a stored entrypoint, so it stays. The
-	// query never does: see TestAccessLog_UnauthenticatedSuccess...
 	entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
 	require.Len(t, entries, 1)
-	assert.Equal(t, "/h/known?(redacted)", entries[0]["url"])
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, "/.well-known/healthcheck?(redacted)", entries[0]["url"],
+	)
 	assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), "src=ci")
 }

+// TestAccessLog_ReceiverNeverLogsTheUUID covers the two statuses that
+// keep the concrete path on every other route. On the receiver that
+// path carries the entrypoint UUID, so the line names the route
+// pattern instead.
+func TestAccessLog_ReceiverNeverLogsTheUUID(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for entrypointUUID, wantStatus := range map[string]int{
+		knownEntrypointUUID:   http.StatusOK,
+		failingEntrypointUUID: http.StatusInternalServerError,
+	} {
+		t.Run(strconv.Itoa(wantStatus), func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
+			router := accessLogRouter(m)
+
+			assert.Equal(
+				t, wantStatus,
+				get(t, router, "/h/"+entrypointUUID+"?src=ci"),
+			)
+
+			entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
+			require.Len(t, entries, 1)
+			assert.Equal(t, middleware.ReceiverRoute, entries[0]["url"])
+			assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), entrypointUUID)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAccessLog_ReceiverPreflightNeverLogsTheUUID sends a CORS
+// preflight to the receiver in dev, in the production middleware
+// order. CORS answers it with 200 before chi routes it, so the line
+// names no route and carries no UUID.
+func TestAccessLog_ReceiverPreflightNeverLogsTheUUID(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
+
+	router := chi.NewRouter()
+	router.Use(m.Logging())
+	router.Use(m.CORS())
+	router.HandleFunc(
+		middleware.ReceiverRoute,
+		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		},
+	)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodOptions,
+		"/h/"+knownEntrypointUUID, nil,
+	)
+	req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://sender.example")
+	req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Method", http.MethodPost)
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+
+	entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
+	require.Len(t, entries, 1)
+	assert.Equal(t, unmatchedRouteLiteral, entries[0]["url"])
+	assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), knownEntrypointUUID)
+}
+
+// TestAccessLog_RefererNeverLogsTheUUID sends receiver requests whose
+// Referer is the entrypoint URL, as a sender's is after it follows a
+// redirect from http:// to https://. The referer field keeps only the
+// scheme and host, and a Referer without them is logged as a marker.
+func TestAccessLog_RefererNeverLogsTheUUID(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
+	router := accessLogRouter(m)
+
+	for _, referer := range []string{
+		"http://webhooker.example/h/" + knownEntrypointUUID + "?src=ci",
+		"/h/" + knownEntrypointUUID,
+	} {
+		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, getWithHeaders(
+			t, router, "/h/"+knownEntrypointUUID,
+			map[string]string{"Referer": referer},
+		))
+	}
+
+	entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
+	require.Len(t, entries, 2)
+	assert.Equal(t, "http://webhooker.example", entries[0]["referer"])
+	assert.Equal(t, "(redacted)", entries[1]["referer"])
+	assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), knownEntrypointUUID)
+}
+
 func TestAccessLog_ServerErrorKeepsConcreteURL(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -10,8 +10,10 @@ package middleware_test
 //     the client's choosing.
 //   - CSRF's 403 rejection, at WARN, also registered ahead of
 //     RequireAuth.
-//   - The rate limiters' 429 rejection, at WARN, on the
-//     unauthenticated receiver among others.
+//   - The rate limiters' 429 rejection, at WARN. On the receiver
+//     route it names the route pattern rather than the path, and
+//     the limiters that log a path sit behind RequireAuth, so its cap
+//     is defensive.
 //   - RequireAuth's own unauthenticated-request line, at DEBUG.
 //   - RecordLoginFailure's throttle rejection, at WARN. Its cap is
 //     defensive rather than load-bearing today: chi pins the one
@@ -268,10 +270,14 @@ func logSites() map[string]logSite {
 			send:       postNoToken,
 			wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
 		},
-		// The per-entrypoint receiver limiter, unauthenticated. Its
-		// bucket is keyed on the path, so the first request through a
-		// fresh path is served and only the ones after it are
-		// rejected; sendUntilLimited absorbs that.
+		// The 429 line every limiter but the aggregate one shares.
+		// Mounted outside any route, as here, it logs the path, as
+		// it does for the limiters behind RequireAuth; on
+		// ReceiverRoute it names the pattern instead. The
+		// per-entrypoint receiver limiter's bucket is keyed on the
+		// path, so the first request through a fresh path is served
+		// and only the ones after it are rejected; sendUntilLimited
+		// absorbs that.
 		"receiver rate limit 429": {
 			build: func(
 				t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware,
@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ const unmatchedMethod = unmatchedRoute
 // after /h/ is client-chosen, so labelling by path lets any
 // unauthenticated client mint permanent series at will, and publishes
 // the entrypoint UUID (the receiver's only credential) in the scrape
-// while doing it.
+// while doing it. The access log and the 429 line read it for the
+// same reason: see ReceiverRoute.
 //
 // chi populates the route context during routeHTTP, so this is only
 // valid once routing has run. Every caller below is on the recording
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
 	"time"

 	basicauth "github.com/99designs/basicauth-go"
-	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
 	"github.com/go-chi/cors"
 	"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
@@ -49,6 +48,10 @@ const (
 	// pick the size of the line it writes.
 	redactedQuery = "?(redacted)"

+	// redactedReferer stands in for a Referer the access log cannot
+	// reduce to its scheme and host; see accessLogReferer.
+	redactedReferer = "(redacted)"
+
 	// maxLogRequestIDBytes bounds the request id, which is also
 	// client-supplied: chi's RequestID middleware passes an inbound
 	// X-Request-Id header through verbatim. Its generated form is an
@@ -96,14 +99,14 @@ const (
 	// It is also the ceiling on every OTHER line this service writes
 	// THROUGH SLOG that carries text an UNAUTHENTICATED client
 	// supplies. Those lines — the MaxBodySize rejection, the CSRF
-	// rejection, the rate-limit rejection, the unauthenticated-request
-	// and unknown-entrypoint DEBUG lines, the failed-login DEBUG
-	// lines, and the two login-throttle WARN lines ("login failure
-	// limit exceeded" in loginguard.go and "password verification
-	// capacity exhausted" in internal/handlers/auth.go) — spend the
-	// same per-field budgets, and each carries strictly fewer
-	// client-supplied fields than the access log does,
-	// so none of them can reach a width the access log cannot. That is
+	// rejection, the unauthenticated-request DEBUG line, the
+	// failed-login DEBUG lines, and the two login-throttle WARN
+	// lines ("login failure limit exceeded" in loginguard.go and
+	// "password verification capacity exhausted" in
+	// internal/handlers/auth.go) — spend the same per-field budgets,
+	// and each carries strictly fewer client-supplied fields than the
+	// access log does, so none of them can reach a width the access
+	// log cannot. That is
 	// asserted directly, per line and under both handlers, rather than
 	// left to the reasoning: see logbound_test.go in this package and
 	// in internal/handlers.
@@ -151,6 +154,12 @@ const (
 	MaxAccessLogLineBytes = 2560
 )

+// ReceiverRoute is the route pattern the webhook receiver is served
+// at. Its path carries the entrypoint UUID, which is the receiver's
+// only credential, so the log lines this package writes name a
+// request on this route by the pattern, never by its path.
+const ReceiverRoute = "/h/{uuid}"
+
 //nolint:revive // MiddlewareParams is a standard fx naming convention.
 type MiddlewareParams struct {
 	fx.In
@@ -268,14 +277,14 @@ func (lrw *loggingResponseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
 // marker.
 //
 // The path on those branches is bounded by the service's routes or by
-// the operator's data — a 2xx on the receiver means the UUID named a
-// stored entrypoint, a 2xx under /s means the file is in the embedded
-// tree. The query is not bounded by anything: /.well-known/healthcheck
-// and /s/* take no authentication and sit behind no rate limiter, and
-// /pages/login behind only the login limiter, so any of them will
-// answer 200 to a URL carrying an arbitrary number of arbitrary bytes
-// after the '?'. Keeping the path and dropping the query is what makes
-// this branch as bounded as the pattern branches below.
+// the operator's data — a 2xx under /s means the file is in the
+// embedded tree. The query is not bounded by anything:
+// /.well-known/healthcheck and /s/* take no authentication and sit
+// behind no rate limiter, and /pages/login behind only the login
+// limiter, so any of them will answer 200 to a URL carrying an
+// arbitrary number of arbitrary bytes after the '?'. Keeping the path
+// and dropping the query is what makes this branch as bounded as the
+// pattern branches below.
 //
 // Nothing debuggable is lost. The only query parameters the service
 // reads are the login page's `next`, the page to return to,
@@ -297,36 +306,61 @@ func concreteLogURL(r *http.Request) string {

 // accessLogURL returns the value for the access log's url field.
 //
-// 2xx and 5xx responses get the concrete path (see concreteLogURL). A
-// success resolved against a static route or against the operator's
-// own data — on the receiver, a 2xx means the UUID named a stored
-// entrypoint — and a server error is our own bug, where the exact URL
-// is the primary evidence and which no client can provoke at will.
+// On ReceiverRoute it is the route pattern whatever the status, so
+// the entrypoint UUID in the path is never logged. A request chi never
+// routed gets unmatchedRoute whatever the status, for the same reason:
+// in dev, CORS answers a preflight to the receiver before routing.
+//
+// On every other route, 2xx and 5xx responses get the concrete path
+// (see concreteLogURL). A success resolved against a static route or
+// against the operator's own data, and a server error is our own bug,
+// where the exact URL is the primary evidence and which no client can
+// provoke at will.
 //
 // 3xx and 4xx responses get the chi route pattern instead. Those are
-// the outcomes an unauthenticated client drives for free: 404 or 429
-// on any invented /h/ path, 303 to the login page on any
-// invented /user/ path. Logging the concrete URL there lets a flood
-// write attacker-chosen text, of attacker-chosen length, into the
-// operator's log at one line per request. The pattern comes from the
-// router's own table, so it is bounded by the service's routes while
-// still naming which class of request was rejected.
+// the outcomes an unauthenticated client drives for free, such as a
+// 303 to the login page on any invented /user/ path. Logging the
+// concrete URL there lets a flood write attacker-chosen text, of
+// attacker-chosen length, into the operator's log at one line per
+// request. The pattern comes from the router's own table, so it is
+// bounded by the service's routes while still naming which class of
+// request was rejected.
 //
 // The pattern is only populated once routing has run, so this must be
 // called after the handler returns, not before.
 func accessLogURL(r *http.Request, status int) string {
+	pattern := routePatternID(r.Context())
+	if pattern == ReceiverRoute || pattern == unmatchedRoute {
+		return pattern
+	}
+
 	if status < http.StatusMultipleChoices ||
 		status >= http.StatusInternalServerError {
 		return concreteLogURL(r)
 	}

-	if rc := chi.RouteContext(r.Context()); rc != nil {
-		if pattern := rc.RoutePattern(); pattern != "" {
-			return pattern
-		}
+	return pattern
+}
+
+// accessLogReferer returns the value for the access log's referer
+// field: the Referer's scheme and host, never its path or query. The
+// path can be an entrypoint URL, which carries the UUID: a sender that
+// follows a redirect from http:// to https:// sends the URL it was
+// redirected from, and a browser sends the 404 page's URL under /h/
+// when it fetches that page's stylesheet. A Referer without both a
+// scheme and a host is logged as redactedReferer.
+func accessLogReferer(r *http.Request) string {
+	referer := r.Referer()
+	if referer == "" {
+		return ""
 	}

-	return unmatchedRoute
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(referer)
+	if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" {
+		return redactedReferer
+	}
+
+	return parsed.Scheme + "://" + parsed.Host
 }

 // Logging returns middleware that logs each HTTP request with
@@ -379,7 +413,7 @@ func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 						requestID, maxLogRequestIDBytes,
 					),
 					"referer", logfield.Truncate(
-						r.Referer(), logfield.MaxBytes,
+						accessLogReferer(r), logfield.MaxBytes,
 					),
 					"proto", r.Proto,
 					"remoteIP", RemoteIP(r),
@@ -538,7 +572,9 @@ func (s *Middleware) MetricsAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 // SecurityHeaders returns middleware that sets production security
 // headers on every response: HSTS (unless HSTS_MAX_AGE is zero),
 // X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP, Referrer-Policy, and
-// Permissions-Policy.
+// Permissions-Policy. The CSP takes scripts and styles only from
+// files on this origin, so a template may hold no inline script,
+// event handler or style attribute.
 func (s *Middleware) SecurityHeaders() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	maxAge := s.params.Config.HSTSMaxAge
 	hsts := "max-age=" + strconv.FormatInt(int64(maxAge/time.Second), 10) +
@@ -560,8 +596,8 @@ func (s *Middleware) SecurityHeaders() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 			w.Header().Set(
 				"Content-Security-Policy",
 				"default-src 'self'; "+
-					"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "+
-					"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
+					"script-src 'self'; "+
+					"style-src 'self'",
 			)
 			w.Header().Set(
 				"Referrer-Policy",
@@ -747,10 +747,10 @@ func TestNoCache_SetsHeaders(t *testing.T) {

 // --- SecurityHeaders Middleware Tests ---

-// hstsHeaders serves one request through SecurityHeaders built over
-// a Config with the given HSTSMaxAge, and returns every
-// Strict-Transport-Security value on the response.
-func hstsHeaders(t *testing.T, maxAge time.Duration) []string {
+// securityHeaders serves one request through SecurityHeaders built
+// over a Config with the given HSTSMaxAge, and returns the response's
+// headers.
+func securityHeaders(t *testing.T, maxAge time.Duration) http.Header {
 	t.Helper()

 	cfg := &config.Config{HSTSMaxAge: maxAge}
@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ func hstsHeaders(t *testing.T, maxAge time.Duration) []string {

 	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

-	return w.Header().Values("Strict-Transport-Security")
+	return w.Header()
 }

 func TestSecurityHeaders_HSTS(t *testing.T) {
@@ -804,11 +804,28 @@ func TestSecurityHeaders_HSTS(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()

-			assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, hstsHeaders(t, tt.maxAge))
+			assert.Equal(
+				t, tt.expected,
+				securityHeaders(t, tt.maxAge).Values(
+					"Strict-Transport-Security",
+				),
+			)
 		})
 	}
 }

+// TestSecurityHeaders_CSP pins the Content-Security-Policy: a page
+// takes its scripts and styles only from files on its own origin,
+// never from an inline script, event handler or style.
+func TestSecurityHeaders_CSP(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'",
+		securityHeaders(t, 0).Get("Content-Security-Policy"),
+	)
+}
+
 // --- MaxBodySize Middleware Tests ---

 const testBodyLimit int64 = 64
@@ -259,26 +259,28 @@ func (m *Middleware) clientAddr(r *http.Request) (netip.Addr, bool) {
 	return peer, true
 }

-// tooManyRequests returns the 429 handler used by the
-// password-change and per-entrypoint receiver limiters: it logs the
+// tooManyRequests returns the 429 handler used by the postRateLimit
+// limiters and the per-entrypoint receiver limiter: it logs the
 // rejection with logMessage and answers with responseMessage.
 // httprate adds the Retry-After header (RFC 6585). The aggregate
 // receiver limiter uses floodTooManyRequests instead.
 //
-// The path is capped against the same budget as the access log's url
-// field. The per-entrypoint receiver limiter is unauthenticated and
-// its path is a client-chosen segment of client-chosen length, so at
-// WARN an uncapped path would let a sender pick the size of the line
-// it writes — the same defect the access log capping closed.
+// On ReceiverRoute the line names the route pattern, so the
+// entrypoint UUID in the path is never logged. Elsewhere it names the
+// path, capped against the same budget as the access log's url field;
+// the limiters there sit behind RequireAuth, so the cap is defensive.
 func (m *Middleware) tooManyRequests(
 	logMessage, responseMessage string,
 ) http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		path := r.URL.Path
+		if routePatternID(r.Context()) == ReceiverRoute {
+			path = ReceiverRoute
+		}
+
 		m.log.Warn(
 			logMessage,
-			"path", logfield.Truncate(
-				r.URL.Path, logfield.MaxBytes,
-			),
+			"path", logfield.Truncate(path, logfield.MaxBytes),
 			"remoteIP", RemoteIP(r),
 			"clientIP", ClientIP(r),
 		)
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ const (
 // TestAlpineRunsUnderTheSecurityPolicy loads the webhook page and the
 // event log in a headless browser, served by the real router and so
 // under the real Content-Security-Policy, and checks that the pages'
-// Alpine.js directives and the copy control work, and that a target's
-// row shows its delivery counts.
+// Alpine.js directives, the copy control and the delete prompts work,
+// and that a target's row shows its delivery counts.
 func TestAlpineRunsUnderTheSecurityPolicy(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ func TestAlpineRunsUnderTheSecurityPolicy(t *testing.T) {
 	userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "browser", "browser-password")
 	webhook, older, event, target := seedBrowserWebhook(t, env, userID)

+	// The sign-in page is loaded before the browser signs in, since a
+	// signed-in visit to it is sent on to another page.
+	checkOtherPages(ctx, t, srv.URL+"/pages/login")
+
 	require.NoError(t, chromedp.Run(
 		ctx, setCookies(srv.URL, env.authCookies(t, userID, "browser")),
 	))
@@ -99,6 +103,11 @@ func TestAlpineRunsUnderTheSecurityPolicy(t *testing.T) {
 	checkEventLog(ctx, t, page+"/events", event.ID, older.ID, target.Name)
 	checkMobileMenu(ctx, t, page)
 	checkPhoneWidth(ctx, t, page, page+"/events", target.Name)
+	checkOtherPages(ctx, t,
+		srv.URL+"/hooks", srv.URL+"/settings", srv.URL+"/user/browser",
+		// A path that does not exist, which gets the 404 error page.
+		srv.URL+"/no-such-page")
+	checkDeletePrompt(ctx, t, page, target)

 	assert.Empty(t, problems(), "the browser reported problems")
 }
@@ -354,11 +363,11 @@ func checkAddEachTargetType(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, url string) {
 	}{
 		{
 			"http", "http",
-			"csrf_token name type url headers timeout max_attempts",
+			"csrf_token name type url headers timeout max_retries",
 			map[string]string{"url": publicTargetURL},
 		},
 		{
-			"slack", "slack", "csrf_token name type url max_attempts",
+			"slack", "slack", "csrf_token name type url max_retries",
 			map[string]string{"url": publicTargetURL},
 		},
 		{
@@ -630,11 +639,11 @@ func checkRefusedEdits(
 		values map[string]string
 	}{
 		{page + "/targets/" + targetID + "/edit", map[string]string{
-			"#name":         "edited-target",
-			"#url":          "http://127.0.0.1/hook",
-			"#headers":      "X-Edited: kept",
-			"#timeout":      "12",
-			"#max_attempts": "3",
+			"#name":        "edited-target",
+			"#url":         "http://127.0.0.1/hook",
+			"#headers":     "X-Edited: kept",
+			"#timeout":     "12",
+			"#max_retries": "3",
 		}},
 		{page + "/edit", map[string]string{
 			"#name":           "edited-webhook",
@@ -1388,3 +1397,75 @@ func checkPhoneWidth(
 	assert.False(t, sideways, "the event log scrolls sideways on a phone")
 	assert.Empty(t, cutOff, "the event log cuts these off on a phone")
 }
+
+// checkOtherPages loads the pages at urls, which no other check opens,
+// so that anything the browser reports going wrong on them fails the
+// test too.
+func checkOtherPages(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, urls ...string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for _, url := range urls {
+		require.NoError(t, chromedp.Run(ctx, loadPage(url)))
+	}
+}
+
+// answerPrompt returns a script that stands in for the user at the
+// browser's prompt: it makes window.confirm record the question in
+// window.asked and give answer. It also records in window.sent whether
+// a form is sent once its submit event is handled, from a listener on
+// window, which the event reaches after the listener static/js/app.js
+// adds to document.
+func answerPrompt(answer bool) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf(`
+		window.asked = "";
+		window.sent = false;
+		window.confirm = (question) => {
+			window.asked = question;
+			return %t;
+		};
+		window.addEventListener("submit", (event) => {
+			window.sent = !event.defaultPrevented;
+		});`, answer)
+}
+
+// checkDeletePrompt loads a webhook page and clicks Delete beside
+// target. It checks that the browser asks first, naming the target,
+// that answering no leaves the form unsent, and that answering yes
+// sends it and the target is deleted.
+func checkDeletePrompt(
+	ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, url string, target *database.Target,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	form := `form[action$="/targets/` + target.ID + `/delete"]`
+	question := `Delete target "` + target.Name + `"?` + "\n\n" +
+		"Nothing more is delivered to it. " +
+		"Its past deliveries stay in the event log."
+
+	var (
+		asked  string
+		sent   bool
+		listed bool
+	)
+
+	require.NoError(t, chromedp.Run(
+		ctx, loadPage(url), chromedp.Evaluate(answerPrompt(false), nil),
+	))
+	click(ctx, t, form+" button")
+	require.NoError(t, chromedp.Run(
+		ctx,
+		chromedp.Evaluate(`window.asked`, &asked),
+		chromedp.Evaluate(`window.sent`, &sent),
+	))
+	assert.Equal(t, question, asked, "Delete does not ask about the target")
+	assert.False(t, sent, "answering no still sends the delete form")
+
+	require.NoError(t, chromedp.Run(
+		ctx, chromedp.Evaluate(answerPrompt(true), nil),
+	))
+	clickAndLoad(ctx, t, form+" button")
+	require.NoError(t, chromedp.Run(ctx, chromedp.Evaluate(
+		`document.querySelector('`+form+`') !== null`, &listed,
+	)))
+	assert.False(t, listed, "answering yes does not delete the target")
+}
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"strconv"
+	"syscall"
 	"testing"
 	"time"

@@ -25,6 +26,11 @@ const (
 	// its network namespace even with a published port.
 	wildcardV4 = "0.0.0.0"

+	// loopbackV6 and wildcardV6 are the IPv6 counterparts of the two
+	// above.
+	loopbackV6 = "::1"
+	wildcardV6 = "::"
+
 	// unavailableAddr is a TEST-NET-1 address (RFC 5737). It is a
 	// well-formed literal that no host is assigned, so binding it
 	// fails with EADDRNOTAVAIL rather than succeeding somewhere
@@ -116,6 +122,24 @@ func otherLocalAddr(t *testing.T) string {
 	return ""
 }

+// skipWithoutIPv6 skips the test when this host cannot bind
+// loopbackV6. Without IPv6 there is no second family for a bind to
+// claim or leave alone.
+func skipWithoutIPv6(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var listenCfg net.ListenConfig
+
+	l, err := listenCfg.Listen(
+		t.Context(), "tcp6", net.JoinHostPort(loopbackV6, "0"),
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Skip("host has no IPv6 loopback to bind")
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(t, l.Close())
+}
+
 // startBoundServer starts the wired app with the given bind address
 // on a free port and returns that port. The app is stopped on
 // cleanup.
@@ -292,6 +316,59 @@ func TestBindAddress_WildcardReachesOtherAddresses(t *testing.T) {
 	requireDialable(t, net.JoinHostPort(other, strconv.Itoa(port)))
 }

+// TestBindAddress_WildcardV4IsIPv4Only pins that 0.0.0.0 answers on
+// IPv4 alone, as the README says, whether it is written as 0.0.0.0 or
+// as the IPv4-mapped ::ffff:0.0.0.0. Go listens on 0.0.0.0 with a
+// socket that answers IPv6 too unless told otherwise, which put the
+// admin UI and the receiver on every IPv6 address of a host whose
+// operator had chosen an IPv4 bind.
+func TestBindAddress_WildcardV4IsIPv4Only(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	skipWithoutIPv6(t)
+
+	for _, bindAddress := range []string{wildcardV4, "::ffff:0.0.0.0"} {
+		t.Run(bindAddress, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			port := startBoundServer(t, bindAddress)
+
+			// Positive control: the service really is up, on IPv4.
+			requireDialable(
+				t, net.JoinHostPort(loopbackV4, strconv.Itoa(port)),
+			)
+
+			dialer := net.Dialer{Timeout: dialTimeout}
+
+			conn, err := dialer.DialContext(
+				t.Context(), "tcp",
+				net.JoinHostPort(loopbackV6, strconv.Itoa(port)),
+			)
+			if err == nil {
+				_ = conn.Close()
+			}
+
+			require.ErrorIs(
+				t, err, syscall.ECONNREFUSED,
+				"a %s bind answered on %s", bindAddress, loopbackV6,
+			)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestBindAddress_WildcardV6ReachesBothFamilies is the counterpart:
+// :: is the value that binds IPv6, and it answers IPv4 as well.
+func TestBindAddress_WildcardV6ReachesBothFamilies(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	skipWithoutIPv6(t)
+
+	port := startBoundServer(t, wildcardV6)
+
+	requireDialable(t, net.JoinHostPort(loopbackV6, strconv.Itoa(port)))
+	requireDialable(t, net.JoinHostPort(loopbackV4, strconv.Itoa(port)))
+}
+
 // TestBindAddress_ServesRequestsOnConfiguredAddress proves the bound
 // listener serves the application rather than merely accepting TCP,
 // so a bind address that is honoured cannot be mistaken for one that
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
 package server

 import (
+	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
 	"strconv"
 	"time"
 )
@@ -39,6 +41,23 @@ func (s *Server) listenAddr() string {
 	)
 }

+// listenNetwork returns the network the HTTP listener binds on, "tcp4"
+// for an IPv4 BindAddress and "tcp" for any other.
+//
+// On "tcp", Go binds 0.0.0.0 with a socket that answers IPv6 as well,
+// exactly as it binds ::. "tcp4" keeps 0.0.0.0 to IPv4, which is what
+// the README says it means. :: stays on "tcp" and answers both. An
+// IPv4-mapped address such as ::ffff:0.0.0.0 is the IPv4 address it
+// carries to Go's listener, so it gets "tcp4" too.
+func (s *Server) listenNetwork() string {
+	addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(s.params.Config.BindAddress)
+	if err == nil && addr.Unmap().Is4() {
+		return "tcp4"
+	}
+
+	return "tcp"
+}
+
 // newHTTPServer builds the HTTP server for this Server's
 // configuration.
 //
@@ -67,7 +86,17 @@ func (s *Server) serveUntilShutdown() {

 	s.log.Info("http begin listen", "listenaddr", s.httpServer.Addr)

-	err := s.httpServer.ListenAndServe()
+	// ListenAndServe always listens on "tcp", which would undo
+	// listenNetwork.
+	var listenCfg net.ListenConfig
+
+	listener, err := listenCfg.Listen(
+		context.Background(), s.listenNetwork(), s.httpServer.Addr,
+	)
+	if err == nil {
+		err = s.httpServer.Serve(listener)
+	}
+
 	if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
 		s.log.Error("listen error", "error", err)
 		s.shutdownWithFailure()
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ import (

 	sentryhttp "github.com/getsentry/sentry-go/http"
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
-	"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
+	chimw "github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/static"
 )

@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
 }

 func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
-	s.router.Use(middleware.RequestID)
+	s.router.Use(chimw.RequestID)
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.SecurityHeaders())
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.Logging())

@@ -345,7 +346,7 @@ func (s *Server) setupWebhookRoutes() {
 	// unauthenticated endpoint's body; TestReceiver_OversizeBodyRefused
 	// pins it.
 	s.router.With(s.mw.ReceiverRateLimit()).HandleFunc(
-		"/h/{uuid}",
+		middleware.ReceiverRoute,
 		s.h.HandleWebhook(),
 	)
 }
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ServerParams) (*Server, error) {
 	s.httpServer = s.newHTTPServer()

 	lc.Append(fx.Hook{
+		//nolint:contextcheck // The listener outlives this hook, whose
+		// context fx cancels once the app has started.
 		OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
 			s.startupTime = time.Now()
 			go s.Run()
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
- * The two shared styles for the controls a user clicks. Every page loads
- * this file after tailwind.css. It is plain CSS: make css does not build
- * it.
+ * The two shared styles for the controls a user clicks, and the rule that
+ * hides an element marked x-cloak. Every page loads this file after
+ * tailwind.css. It is plain CSS: make css does not build it.
 *
 * A button is btn-primary, btn-secondary or btn-danger, from input.css.
 * A secondary or inline action, such as Copy beside an entrypoint URL or
@@ -46,3 +46,11 @@
        outline-offset: 2px;
    }
 }
+
+/*
+ * Alpine.js removes x-cloak from an element once it has started, so
+ * something Alpine hides is not seen on the page while it loads.
+ */
+[x-cloak] {
+    display: none !important;
+}
@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@
    }
 })();

+// Asks before a form with a data-confirm attribute is sent, such as a
+// delete form on the webhook page. The browser's own prompt shows the
+// attribute's text, and the form is sent only if the user accepts.
+document.addEventListener("submit", function (event) {
+    "use strict";
+
+    const message = event.target.getAttribute("data-confirm");
+    if (message !== null && !window.confirm(message)) {
+        event.preventDefault();
+    }
+});
+
 // Alpine.js components.
 //
 // The pages' Content-Security-Policy forbids eval, so the UI loads
@@ -139,7 +151,7 @@ document.addEventListener("alpine:init", function () {
            headers: "",
            timeout: "",
            forwardQuery: false,
-            maxAttempts: "",
+            maxRetries: "",
            expiry: "",
            rotation: "",
            init() {
@@ -153,7 +165,7 @@ document.addEventListener("alpine:init", function () {
                this.timeout = refused.timeout;
                this.forwardQuery =
                    this.$root.hasAttribute("data-forward-query");
-                this.maxAttempts = refused.maxAttempts;
+                this.maxRetries = refused.maxRetries;
                this.expiry = refused.expiry;
                this.rotation = refused.rotation;
            },
@@ -173,7 +185,7 @@ document.addEventListener("alpine:init", function () {
                this.headers = "";
                this.timeout = "";
                this.forwardQuery = false;
-                this.maxAttempts = "";
+                this.maxRetries = "";
                this.expiry = "";
                this.rotation = "";
                this.$refs.form.reset();
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 {{if .Binary}}
 <p class="text-xs text-gray-500">This body is binary ({{.Size}} bytes) and is not shown. <a href="{{.EventURL}}/body" class="btn-small">Download the body</a></p>
 {{else if .Text}}
-<pre class="rounded-md border border-gray-200 bg-white p-2 text-xs text-gray-700 overflow-x-auto whitespace-pre-wrap break-all"{{if .Scroll}} style="max-height: 32rem; overflow-y: auto"{{end}}>{{.Text}}</pre>
+<pre class="rounded-md border border-gray-200 bg-white p-2 text-xs text-gray-700 overflow-x-auto whitespace-pre-wrap break-all{{if .Scroll}} max-h-[32rem] overflow-y-auto{{end}}">{{.Text}}</pre>
 {{if .Cut}}
 <p class="mt-2 text-xs text-gray-500">Showing the first {{.ShownBytes}} of {{.Size}} bytes, unformatted. <a href="{{.EventURL}}" class="btn-small">Show the whole body</a> <a href="{{.EventURL}}/body" class="btn-small">Download the body</a></p>
 {{end}}
@@ -4,6 +4,5 @@
 <title>{{block "title" .}}Webhooker{{end}}</title>
 <link rel="stylesheet" href="/s/css/tailwind.css">
 <link rel="stylesheet" href="/s/css/style.css">
-<style>[x-cloak] { display: none !important; }</style>
 {{block "head" .}}{{end}}
 {{end}}
@@ -13,13 +13,11 @@
            <div class="p-4">
                <!-- A value too wide to sit beside its name moves to the
                     next line, where a list breaks only at the spaces
-                     between its entries. overflow-wrap: anywhere breaks
-                     inside a value only when it alone is wider than the
-                     line; an inline style, because the committed
-                     tailwind.css has no class for it. -->
+                     between its entries. wrap-anywhere breaks inside a
+                     value only when it alone is wider than the line. -->
                <div class="flex flex-wrap justify-between items-start gap-4">
                    <code class="text-sm font-medium text-gray-900">{{.Name}}</code>
-                    <code class="text-sm text-gray-900" style="overflow-wrap: anywhere">{{.Value}}</code>
+                    <code class="text-sm text-gray-900 wrap-anywhere">{{.Value}}</code>
                </div>
                <p class="text-sm text-gray-500 mt-1">{{.Description}}</p>
            </div>
@@ -5,12 +5,10 @@
 {{define "content"}}
 <!-- 108rem, half again the 72rem (max-w-6xl) of the webhook list, the
     event log, the navbar and the footer, so an entrypoint URL fits on
-     one line. An inline style, because the committed tailwind.css has
-     no class this wide. wrap-anywhere goes only on names and
-     descriptions: a row too wide for a phone must still run past the
-     edge, where the browser test sees it, rather than break its
-     controls mid-word. -->
-<div class="mx-auto px-6 py-8" style="max-width: 108rem">
+     one line. wrap-anywhere goes only on names and descriptions: a
+     row too wide for a phone must still run past the edge, where the
+     browser test sees it, rather than break its controls mid-word. -->
+<div class="max-w-[108rem] mx-auto px-6 py-8">
    <div class="mb-6">
        <a href="/hooks" class="btn-small">&larr; Back to webhooks</a>
        <div class="flex flex-wrap justify-between items-center gap-2 mt-2">
@@ -23,11 +21,12 @@
            <div class="flex gap-2">
                <a href="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/events" class="btn-secondary">Full Event Log</a>
                <a href="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/edit" class="btn-secondary">Edit</a>
-                <!-- The delete prompts are the browser's own, so they
-                     work without the page's scripts. The template
-                     escapes each name for the script, so a quote or a
-                     backslash in it shows as typed. -->
-                <form method="POST" action="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete webhook &quot;{{.Webhook.Name}}&quot;?\n\nThis deletes its stored events{{with .Stats}} ({{.WithinRetention.Events}}){{end}} and their deliveries. Any archive files it wrote are kept.')">
+                <!-- Before a delete form is sent, static/js/app.js
+                     asks in the browser's own prompt, with the form's
+                     data-confirm text; &#10; is a line break. The
+                     template escapes each name for the attribute, so a
+                     quote in it shows as typed. -->
+                <form method="POST" action="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/delete" data-confirm="Delete webhook &quot;{{.Webhook.Name}}&quot;?&#10;&#10;This deletes its stored events{{with .Stats}} ({{.WithinRetention.Events}}){{end}} and their deliveries. Any archive files it wrote are kept.">
                    <input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
                    <button type="submit" class="btn-danger">Delete</button>
                </form>
@@ -90,7 +89,7 @@
                                    {{if .Active}}Deactivate{{else}}Activate{{end}}
                                </button>
                            </form>
-                            <form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints/{{.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete entrypoint &quot;{{if .Description}}{{.Description}}{{else}}{{$.BaseURL}}/h/{{.Path}}{{end}}&quot;?\n\nSenders using its URL get an error from now on, and the URL cannot be restored.')" class="inline">
+                            <form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints/{{.ID}}/delete" data-confirm="Delete entrypoint &quot;{{if .Description}}{{.Description}}{{else}}{{$.BaseURL}}/h/{{.Path}}{{end}}&quot;?&#10;&#10;Senders using its URL get an error from now on, and the URL cannot be restored." class="inline">
                                <input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
                                <button type="submit" class="btn-small text-red-600" title="Delete">Delete</button>
                            </form>
@@ -136,7 +135,7 @@
             data-headers="{{.TargetForm.Headers}}"
             data-timeout="{{.TargetForm.Timeout}}"
             {{if .TargetForm.ForwardQuery}}data-forward-query{{end}}
-             data-max-attempts="{{.TargetForm.MaxAttempts}}"
+             data-max-retries="{{.TargetForm.MaxRetries}}"
             data-expiry="{{.TargetForm.Expiry}}"
             data-rotation="{{.TargetForm.Rotation}}">
            <div class="p-4 border-b border-gray-200 flex justify-between items-center">
@@ -194,9 +193,9 @@
                            <div>
                                <div class="flex gap-2 items-center">
                                    <label class="text-sm text-gray-700">Delivery attempts:</label>
-                                    <input type="number" name="max_attempts" :value="maxAttempts" placeholder="1" min="1" max="20" class="input text-sm w-24">
+                                    <input type="number" name="max_retries" :value="maxRetries" placeholder="0" min="0" max="20" class="input text-sm w-24">
                                </div>
-                                <p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">How many times each delivery is attempted in all, the first attempt included.</p>
+                                <p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">How many times each delivery is attempted in all, the first attempt included. 0 means a single attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker.</p>
                            </div>
                        </div>
                    </template>
@@ -210,9 +209,9 @@
                            <div>
                                <div class="flex gap-2 items-center">
                                    <label class="text-sm text-gray-700">Delivery attempts:</label>
-                                    <input type="number" name="max_attempts" :value="maxAttempts" placeholder="1" min="1" max="20" class="input text-sm w-24">
+                                    <input type="number" name="max_retries" :value="maxRetries" placeholder="0" min="0" max="20" class="input text-sm w-24">
                                </div>
-                                <p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">How many times each delivery is attempted in all, the first attempt included.</p>
+                                <p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">How many times each delivery is attempted in all, the first attempt included. 0 means a single attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker.</p>
                            </div>
                        </div>
                    </template>
@@ -278,7 +277,7 @@
                                    {{if .Active}}Deactivate{{else}}Activate{{end}}
                                </button>
                            </form>
-                            <form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/targets/{{.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete target &quot;{{.Name}}&quot;?\n\nNothing more is delivered to it. Its past deliveries stay in the event log.')" class="inline">
+                            <form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/targets/{{.ID}}/delete" data-confirm="Delete target &quot;{{.Name}}&quot;?&#10;&#10;Nothing more is delivered to it. Its past deliveries stay in the event log." class="inline">
                                <input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
                                <button type="submit" class="btn-small text-red-600" title="Delete">Delete</button>
                            </form>
@@ -89,9 +89,9 @@

            {{if or (eq .Target.Type "http") (eq .Target.Type "slack")}}
            <div class="form-group">
-                <label for="max_attempts" class="label">Delivery attempts</label>
-                <input type="number" id="max_attempts" name="max_attempts" value="{{.TargetForm.MaxAttempts}}" min="1" max="20" class="input">
-                <p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">How many times each delivery is attempted in all, the first attempt included.</p>
+                <label for="max_retries" class="label">Delivery attempts</label>
+                <input type="number" id="max_retries" name="max_retries" value="{{.TargetForm.MaxRetries}}" min="0" max="20" class="input">
+                <p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">How many times each delivery is attempted in all, the first attempt included. 0 means a single attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker.</p>
            </div>
            {{end}}