Compare commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
7c273d2d19 |
@@ -802,12 +802,7 @@ comes up, serves pages, and is broken in a way nothing reports.
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proxy's log names it regardless. nginx's default `combined` format already
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logs `$remote_addr`; do not replace it with one that drops the client
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address, and retain those logs as long as you would want to answer a question
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about traffic. That log also records the full request path, so it holds the
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entrypoint UUID of every event a sender posts. webhooker's own log does not,
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apart from the line a `log` target writes. Protect the proxy's log as you
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would the entrypoint URLs themselves: anyone who can read it can post events
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to every entrypoint in it (see
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[The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret)).
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about traffic.
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### nginx
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@@ -833,9 +828,7 @@ server {
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client_max_body_size 1m;
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# $remote_addr is the client. webhooker's own log names it, as
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# clientIP, only while TRUSTED_PROXIES covers this proxy. The
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# request path in this log holds the entrypoint UUID, so protect
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# the file like the entrypoint URL itself.
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# clientIP, only while TRUSTED_PROXIES covers this proxy.
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access_log /var/log/nginx/webhooker.access.log combined;
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location / {
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@@ -1167,16 +1160,7 @@ What that means for an operator:
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- **The URL is a capability, so treat it as a secret.** Keep it out of logs,
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ticket bodies, chat messages and screenshots. Anyone who reads it anywhere can
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post events as that sender. Apart from a `log` target's line, webhooker's own
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log lines never carry the UUID: they name a request to the receiver by the
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route pattern `/h/{uuid}`, the `webhook request received` line names the
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entrypoint by its `entrypoint_id`, and the access log keeps only the scheme
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and host of a `Referer`. A `log` target writes the request's headers as
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received, so a `Referer` naming the entrypoint URL appears in its line, as it
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does when a sender has followed a redirect from `http://` to `https://`. The
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reverse proxy's access log does carry the UUID, in the request path, so it
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must be protected like the URL itself (see
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[Deployment behind a reverse proxy](#deployment-behind-a-reverse-proxy)).
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post events as that sender.
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- **Rotating means minting a new entrypoint, not changing a key.** There is no
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way to rotate the UUID in place. To retire one, delete the entrypoint (or
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deactivate it, which answers `410`) and create a new one, then point the
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@@ -1251,37 +1235,34 @@ markup. The CSP build runs no expressions, so every Alpine directive in
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`static/js/app.js`: `x-data="collapsible"` and `@click="toggle"`, never
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`x-data="{ open: false }"` or `@click="open = !open"`.
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A browser test in `internal/server` loads the sign-in page, the webhook page,
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its edit pages, the event log, the webhook list, the settings page, the profile
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page and the `404` error page shown for a path that does not exist, under the
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real policy and checks that: the add entrypoint form stays hidden until Add is
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clicked; for every target type, the targets section's Add shows only a choice of
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type with Next and Cancel, Next shows only that type's fields (no url field for
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`database` or `log`), Cancel at either step closes the form, and saving adds the
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target; a refused target comes back with its form open, the values entered and
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the reason, and after Cancel the next Add starts with an empty form and no
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reason; a refused save on the target edit page and on the webhook edit page
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comes back with the reason and every value entered; the Copy button beside an
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entrypoint URL reads "Copied" once clicked; an entrypoint's Edit button shows
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its edit form in place of its description and hides until the form closes,
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Cancel hides the form and drops what was typed, as does leaving the page and
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going back to it, and Save changes the description; of the recent events on the
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webhook page only the newest starts expanded, each expands and collapses, and
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Open leads to the event's own page; of the events in the event log only the
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newest starts expanded, and an event there expands and collapses when its row's
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caret or its ID is clicked, and from the keyboard, but not when its ID is
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selected with the mouse, and a delivery's attempts inside it expand and
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collapse; at phone width the menu button opens and closes the mobile menu, and
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neither the webhook page nor the event log, with a delivery's attempts open,
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scrolls sideways or cuts anything off at the page's or a card's edge; and a
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target's Delete asks first, naming the target, sends nothing when the answer is
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no and deletes the target when it is yes. It also fails if the browser reports a
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console warning or error, an uncaught exception, or anything the policy refused.
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`make check` and the image build lint it but do not run it, and `make test`
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leaves it out (its file is built only with the `browser` build tag). Run it with
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`make test-browser` after changing `templates/` or `static/js/`: that builds
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`Dockerfile.browser`, which runs the test in a digest-pinned headless browser
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image, so the host needs no browser.
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A browser test in `internal/server` loads the webhook page, its edit pages and
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the event log under the real policy and checks that: the add entrypoint form
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stays hidden until Add is clicked; for every target type, the targets section's
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Add shows only a choice of type with Next and Cancel, Next shows only that
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type's fields (no url field for `database` or `log`), Cancel at either step
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closes the form, and saving adds the target; a refused target comes back with
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its form open, the values entered and the reason, and after Cancel the next Add
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starts with an empty form and no reason; a refused save on the target edit page
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and on the webhook edit page comes back with the reason and every value entered;
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the Copy button beside an entrypoint URL reads "Copied" once clicked; an
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entrypoint's Edit button shows its edit form in place of its description and
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hides until the form closes, Cancel hides the form and drops what was typed, as
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does leaving the page and going back to it, and Save changes the description; of
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the recent events on the webhook page only the newest starts expanded, each
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expands and collapses, and Open leads to the event's own page; of the events in
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the event log only the newest starts expanded, and an event there expands and
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collapses when its row's caret or its ID is clicked, and from the keyboard, but
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not when its ID is selected with the mouse, and a delivery's attempts inside it
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expand and collapse; and at phone width the menu button opens and closes the
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mobile menu, and neither the webhook page nor the event log, with a delivery's
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attempts open, scrolls sideways or cuts anything off at the page's or a card's
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edge. It also fails if the browser reports a console warning or error, an
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uncaught exception, or anything the policy refused. `make check` and the image
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build lint it but do not run it, and `make test` leaves it out (its file is
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built only with the `browser` build tag). Run it with `make test-browser` after
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changing `templates/` or `static/js/`: that builds `Dockerfile.browser`, which
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runs the test in a digest-pinned headless browser image, so the host needs no
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browser.
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The package's tarball is committed as `3p/alpinejs-csp-3.14.9.tgz`, byte for
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byte as the npm registry publishes it. It is a dependency, not this repo's build
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@@ -1314,9 +1295,7 @@ and commit the regenerated file with the change. Tailwind takes classes only
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from the files that `input.css` names in its `@source` lines; a class written in
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any other file is not generated until that file is named there too. `make check`
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and the image build fail when the committed file differs from what `make css`
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generates. `static/css/style.css` is hand-written and is not generated. The
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pages' Content-Security-Policy refuses inline styles, so a template styles an
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element with a class, never a `style` attribute.
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generates. `static/css/style.css` is hand-written and is not generated.
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`make css` runs the Tailwind standalone CLI in Docker, at the version and sha256
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pinned in the Dockerfile's stylesheet stages; it is never installed on the host.
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@@ -1517,47 +1496,35 @@ the rotation chosen below that (none, monthly, daily or hourly). Both are
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validated as on the add target form, and the webhook and its targets are created
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together or not at all.
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| Field | Type | Description |
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| ---------------- | ------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `id` | UUID | Primary key |
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| `user_id` | UUID | Foreign key → User |
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| `name` | string | Human-readable name |
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| `description` | string | Optional description |
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| `retention_days` | integer | Days to retain events (default: 30; 0 means retain forever) |
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| Field | Type | Description |
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| ---------------- | ------- | --------------------------------------------- |
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| `id` | UUID | Primary key |
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| `user_id` | UUID | Foreign key → User |
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| `name` | string | Human-readable name |
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| `description` | string | Optional description |
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| `retention_days` | integer | Days to retain events; 0 means retain forever |
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**Relations:** Belongs to User. Has many Entrypoints. Has many Targets.
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The `retention_days` field controls how long event data is kept in the webhook's
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dedicated database before automatic cleanup.
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Setting `retention_days` to `0` means "retain events forever". Because the
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column carries a default of 30, a literal zero cannot survive an insert, so a
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zero is rewritten on save to a sentinel of `365 * 1000` days
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(`database.RetentionForeverDays`). The retention reaper recognises that sentinel
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and skips the webhook entirely, and the web UI displays such a webhook's
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retention as "forever" rather than as a day count.
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The value is stored as entered. Setting `retention_days` to `0` means "retain
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events forever": the retention reaper skips the webhook entirely, and the web UI
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displays its retention as "forever" rather than as a day count.
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Submitted `retention_days` values therefore fall into three bands, not two:
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- `1` up to `database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays` (106751 days, about 292 years) is
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accepted as a finite retention.
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- Above that ceiling but below the retain-forever sentinel of 365000
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(`database.RetentionForeverDays`) is rejected with a 400. This is the band the
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cap exists for.
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- `0`, and `365000` or above, are accepted and mean retain forever, collapsing
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to the sentinel — `0` in `Webhook.BeforeSave`, the large values in
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`parseRetentionDays`. The large values are not out of range: the edit form
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pre-fills the sentinel for a retain-forever webhook, so submitting that form
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back unchanged has to keep meaning "forever".
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A negative value is in none of the three: `parseRetentionDays` rejects it with a
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400 before `BeforeSave` ever sees it.
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The new webhook and edit forms accept `0`, or a whole number of days from `1` up
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to `database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays` (106751 days, about 292 years). Anything
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else, a negative value or one above that cap included, is rejected with a 400. A
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blank field gives the default of 30 days (`database.DefaultRetentionDays`) on
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the new webhook form, and leaves the stored value unchanged on the edit form.
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The cap is not arbitrary: the reaper computes its cutoff as a `time.Duration`,
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an int64 nanosecond count, and a longer period overflows it. An overflowed
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cutoff lands in the future, where it matches every row, so the sweep would
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delete every event the webhook has instead of none. The reaper also clamps the
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value it reads to the cap, so no stored value can trigger that either.
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value it reads to the cap, and reads a negative value as forever, so no stored
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value can trigger that either.
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#### Entrypoint
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@@ -2443,32 +2410,27 @@ log volume it caps rather than eliminates. A path that names no entrypoint is
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recorded by the handler at `DEBUG`, and the aggregate limiter logs its own
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rejections at `DEBUG` and without the path, so neither appears at all under the
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default level. The per-entrypoint limiter is the loud one: it logs every
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rejection at `WARN`, naming the route pattern `/h/{uuid}` rather than the
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request path. A client hammering a single invented path is served
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rejection at `WARN` with the request path, which on this route is
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attacker-controlled text. A client hammering a single invented path is served
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`RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` requests and has the rest of its aggregate budget rejected
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there, so the aggregate limit is what bounds the _number_ of those `WARN` lines
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— to under ten times `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` per minute per client IP, 1080 at the
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defaults, where before it there was no bound at all. The access log is bounded
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by neither limit: every request is recorded once at `INFO`, served or rejected
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alike.
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defaults, where before it there was no bound at all. Their _width_ is bounded by
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the field budgets below, the same ones the access log spends. The access log is
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bounded by neither limit: every request is recorded once at `INFO`, served or
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rejected alike.
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What the access log does bound is the _content_ of those lines. On the receiver
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route it logs the route pattern `/h/{uuid}` whatever the status, because the
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concrete path carries the entrypoint UUID, which is the entrypoint's credential
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(see
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[The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret)).
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A request chi never routed, because it matched no route or because a middleware
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answered it first, logs the literal `(unmatched)` whatever the status. In the
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`dev` environment the CORS middleware answers a preflight that way, so a
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preflight to the receiver does not log its UUID either. On every other route, a
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3xx or 4xx response logs the chi route pattern, such as `/user/{username}//`, in
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place of the concrete URL. Those are the outcomes an unauthenticated client can
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drive for free: a 404 on any invented path, a login redirect on any invented
|
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profile path. Logging the URL there would let a flood write text of its own
|
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choosing, at a length of its own choosing, into the log. 2xx and 5xx responses
|
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keep the concrete path — a success resolved against a static route or against
|
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the operator's own data, and a 5xx is a bug in this service, where the exact
|
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path is the evidence and no client can provoke one at will.
|
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What the access log does bound is the _content_ of those lines. A 3xx or 4xx
|
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response logs the chi route pattern — `/h/{uuid}`, `/user/{username}//`, or the
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literal `(unmatched)` when the request hit no route at all — in place of the
|
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concrete URL. Those are the outcomes an unauthenticated client can drive for
|
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free: 404 and 429 on any invented receiver path, a login redirect on any
|
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invented profile path. Logging the URL there would let a flood write text of its
|
||||
own choosing, at a length of its own choosing, into the log. 2xx and 5xx
|
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responses keep the concrete path — a success resolved against a static route or
|
||||
against the operator's own data (on the receiver, against a stored entrypoint
|
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UUID), and a 5xx is a bug in this service, where the exact path is the evidence
|
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and no client can provoke one at will.
|
||||
|
||||
The query string is never logged; it is replaced by the fixed marker
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||||
`?(redacted)`. It is client-chosen on every route, and
|
||||
@@ -2480,11 +2442,6 @@ to, `notice`, which names the line a page shows after an action, and the event
|
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log's `show`, which picks the events it lists. A query string sent to an
|
||||
entrypoint is not lost either: the event stores it, and the event log shows it.
|
||||
|
||||
The `referer` field keeps only the scheme and host of the request's `Referer`,
|
||||
and logs `(redacted)` for one without them, because its path can be an
|
||||
entrypoint URL: a sender that follows the `http://` to `https://` redirect in
|
||||
the nginx example sends the URL it was redirected from.
|
||||
|
||||
Client-supplied request content does not leave the host by the other route
|
||||
either. The Sentry SDK attaches the request to every event it captures,
|
||||
independently of the access log, and `SendDefaultPII=false` does not cover all
|
||||
@@ -2499,10 +2456,9 @@ The same hook rewrites the request URL. The SDK builds it as
|
||||
`scheme://host/path` from the concrete path, which on the receiver route is
|
||||
`/h/<uuid>` in full — and that UUID is a write capability, not an identifier:
|
||||
anyone holding it can post events this service accepts and its targets then
|
||||
deliver. What is sent is the chi route pattern instead: `http://host/h/{uuid}`.
|
||||
A tracker has its own retention, access control and deletion policy, so the
|
||||
pattern is sent on every route, including the 2xx and 5xx responses outside the
|
||||
receiver for which the access log keeps the concrete path.
|
||||
deliver. A tracker has its own retention, access control and deletion policy, so
|
||||
the rule the access log follows above does not carry across that boundary. What
|
||||
is sent is the chi route pattern instead: `http://host/h/{uuid}`.
|
||||
|
||||
The scheme and the host are kept, and everything else in the URL is discarded
|
||||
rather than edited, so a future SDK version that starts appending a query string
|
||||
@@ -2631,7 +2587,9 @@ than it:
|
||||
| ------------------------------------------ | ------- | ------------------- | ------------------------------------------ |
|
||||
| `request body exceeds limit` (413) | `WARN` | path, method | yes — `MaxBodySize` precedes `RequireAuth` |
|
||||
| `csrf: token validation failed` (403) | `WARN` | path, method | yes — `CSRF` precedes `RequireAuth` |
|
||||
| `... rate limit exceeded` (429) | `WARN` | path | yes, on the receiver |
|
||||
| `auth middleware: unauthenticated request` | `DEBUG` | path, method | yes, by definition |
|
||||
| `entrypoint not found` | `DEBUG` | entrypoint UUID | yes, on the receiver |
|
||||
| `user not found` / `invalid password` | `DEBUG` | username | yes, on the sign-in form |
|
||||
| `login failure limit exceeded` (429) | `WARN` | path | yes, on the sign-in form |
|
||||
| `password verification capacity exhausted` | `WARN` | path | yes, on the sign-in form |
|
||||
@@ -2659,12 +2617,13 @@ wider of the two handlers spends more on than the client spent sending them.
|
||||
Every case holds each line to the 2,560-byte ceiling. That per-line ceiling is
|
||||
what the figure above states, and every row establishes it.
|
||||
|
||||
Two of the sites go further and bound the whole flood's output — the total bytes
|
||||
a run of distinct invented values wrote, which is the shape an operator sizing
|
||||
storage cares about. They are `request body exceeds limit`
|
||||
(`TestMaxBodySize_FloodOfOversizePathsDoesNotGrowTheLog`) and `user not found`
|
||||
(through `assertBoundedFlood`). The other rows carry no aggregate assertion; the
|
||||
per-line ceiling is what they establish.
|
||||
Three of the sites go further and bound the whole flood's output — the total
|
||||
bytes a run of distinct invented values wrote, which is the shape an operator
|
||||
sizing storage cares about. They are `request body exceeds limit`
|
||||
(`TestMaxBodySize_FloodOfOversizePathsDoesNotGrowTheLog`),
|
||||
`entrypoint not found` and `user not found` (the last two through
|
||||
`assertBoundedFlood`). The other rows carry no aggregate assertion; the per-line
|
||||
ceiling is what they establish.
|
||||
|
||||
`internal/logfield/logfield_test.go` measures the per-rune charge against what
|
||||
the handlers really emit, over roughly 3,000 code points on each, so an
|
||||
@@ -2682,7 +2641,7 @@ everything else, so its lines take the level the operator set and the handler
|
||||
`internal/logger` selected, and every value it emits is spent through the same
|
||||
`internal/logfield` budget. A record-not-found is not logged as an error: it is
|
||||
the expected outcome on both of those paths, and each handler already records
|
||||
its own miss at `DEBUG`, without the SQL and within the ceiling above. Slow
|
||||
its own miss at `DEBUG` — bounded, per the table above — without the SQL. Slow
|
||||
statements are kept, at `WARN`, above the same 200 ms threshold GORM used and
|
||||
with the statement bounded, because that report is the one thing GORM's logger
|
||||
gave an operator that nothing else here does. The adapter orders its cases
|
||||
@@ -3111,8 +3070,8 @@ webhooker/
|
||||
│ ├── static.go # //go:embed directive
|
||||
│ ├── css/input.css # Tailwind input, source for tailwind.css (make css)
|
||||
│ ├── css/tailwind.css # Generated stylesheet the pages load
|
||||
│ ├── css/style.css # Hand-written, loaded after tailwind.css: btn-small, the pointer cursor for input.css's buttons, the webhook list cards' focus outline, the rule hiding x-cloak elements
|
||||
│ ├── js/app.js # Copy-to-clipboard, the delete prompts, and the Alpine.js components
|
||||
│ ├── css/style.css # Hand-written, loaded after tailwind.css: btn-small, the pointer cursor for input.css's buttons, the webhook list cards' focus outline
|
||||
│ ├── js/app.js # Copy-to-clipboard, and the Alpine.js components
|
||||
│ └── js/alpine.min.js # Alpine.js CSP build, extracted from 3p/ by make assets, not committed
|
||||
├── templates/ # Go HTML templates (base, login, sources, etc.)
|
||||
├── script/ # Scripts to Rule Them All entrypoints
|
||||
@@ -3166,9 +3125,8 @@ Applied to all routes in this order:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **RequestID** — Generate unique request IDs (chi built-in)
|
||||
2. **SecurityHeaders** — Production security headers on every response (HSTS
|
||||
unless `HSTS_MAX_AGE` is `0`, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP
|
||||
`default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'`, Referrer-Policy,
|
||||
Permissions-Policy)
|
||||
unless `HSTS_MAX_AGE` is `0`, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP,
|
||||
Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy)
|
||||
3. **Logging** — Structured request logging (method, URL, status, latency,
|
||||
remote IP, client IP, user agent, request ID)
|
||||
4. **Metrics** — Prometheus HTTP metrics (if `METRICS_USERNAME` and
|
||||
@@ -3253,12 +3211,6 @@ credential check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
|
||||
- Production security headers on all responses: HSTS (unless `HSTS_MAX_AGE` is
|
||||
`0`), X-Content-Type-Options (`nosniff`), X-Frame-Options (`DENY`),
|
||||
Content-Security-Policy, Referrer-Policy, and Permissions-Policy
|
||||
- The Content-Security-Policy is
|
||||
`default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'`: a page takes
|
||||
scripts and styles only from files webhooker serves, and the browser runs no
|
||||
inline script or event handler and ignores any `<style>` element or `style`
|
||||
attribute in a page. The pages need none: their scripts are in `static/js/`
|
||||
and their styles in `static/css/`
|
||||
- Request body size limits (1 MB) on all form POST endpoints, enforced by
|
||||
middleware that runs before CSRF parses the form
|
||||
- **CSRF protection** via [gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf) on all
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,27 +4,13 @@ import (
|
||||
"math"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"gorm.io/gorm"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// DefaultRetentionDays is the event retention period applied to a
|
||||
// webhook created without an explicit retention value. It is the
|
||||
// single source of truth for that policy and must stay in sync
|
||||
// with the `gorm:"default:30"` column default on
|
||||
// Webhook.RetentionDays below; a struct tag cannot reference a
|
||||
// constant, so a test asserts the two agree.
|
||||
// DefaultRetentionDays is the event retention period the new
|
||||
// webhook form applies when its retention field is left blank.
|
||||
DefaultRetentionDays = 30
|
||||
|
||||
// RetentionForeverDays is the sentinel RetentionDays value meaning
|
||||
// "retain events forever". Users express that intent as 0, which
|
||||
// Webhook.BeforeSave rewrites to this value: the column default
|
||||
// substitutes DefaultRetentionDays for a zero value at insert
|
||||
// time, so a zero can never survive a round trip to the database.
|
||||
// Nothing outside this file may hardcode the number.
|
||||
RetentionForeverDays = 365 * 1000
|
||||
|
||||
// MaxFiniteRetentionDays is the largest finite retention period the
|
||||
// reaper's cutoff arithmetic can represent, and therefore the
|
||||
// largest one a caller may request. It is derived from that
|
||||
@@ -38,9 +24,7 @@ const (
|
||||
// turns the cutoff into a timestamp in the far future that matches
|
||||
// every row in the webhook's database. That is why this bound is
|
||||
// enforced on input and why retentionCutoff saturates underneath
|
||||
// it. Note that RetentionForeverDays deliberately sits above this
|
||||
// ceiling: such webhooks are skipped before any cutoff is
|
||||
// computed, and never reach the arithmetic at all.
|
||||
// it.
|
||||
MaxFiniteRetentionDays = int(
|
||||
math.MaxInt64 / int64(time.Hour) / hoursPerDay,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -48,12 +32,10 @@ const (
|
||||
|
||||
// Webhook represents a webhook processing unit that groups entrypoints and targets
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Every method below takes a pointer receiver. BeforeSave has to,
|
||||
// because it mutates the record and GORM only invokes hooks declared
|
||||
// that way; the display helpers follow suit so the receiver kinds do
|
||||
// not mix. Handlers therefore put a *Webhook into template data:
|
||||
// html/template cannot call a pointer method on a value held in a map,
|
||||
// because a map element is not addressable.
|
||||
// Every method below takes a pointer receiver, so handlers put a
|
||||
// *Webhook into template data: html/template cannot call a pointer
|
||||
// method on a value held in a map, because a map element is not
|
||||
// addressable.
|
||||
type Webhook struct {
|
||||
BaseModel
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -61,10 +43,9 @@ type Webhook struct {
|
||||
Name string `gorm:"not null" json:"name"`
|
||||
Description string `json:"description"`
|
||||
|
||||
// RetentionDays is the number of days to retain events. A value of
|
||||
// RetentionForeverDays means retain forever. The column default
|
||||
// must equal DefaultRetentionDays.
|
||||
RetentionDays int `gorm:"default:30" json:"retentionDays"`
|
||||
// RetentionDays is the number of days to retain events, and 0
|
||||
// means retain them forever.
|
||||
RetentionDays int `json:"retentionDays"`
|
||||
|
||||
// Relations. No model marshals the record it belongs to:
|
||||
// User.Webhooks leads back here, and the JSON could loop.
|
||||
@@ -73,36 +54,17 @@ type Webhook struct {
|
||||
Targets []Target `json:"targets,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BeforeSave normalises RetentionDays on every insert and update. A
|
||||
// non-positive value is the user's way of asking for "retain forever",
|
||||
// which is stored as the RetentionForeverDays sentinel.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This has to happen in a hook rather than at the call sites. GORM
|
||||
// substitutes the column default (DefaultRetentionDays) for a zero
|
||||
// value while building the insert statement, which runs after
|
||||
// BeforeSave; rewriting any later than this loses that race and the
|
||||
// row lands at 30 days. Living on the model also means a future call
|
||||
// site, such as a REST API or a fixture, cannot bypass it.
|
||||
func (w *Webhook) BeforeSave(_ *gorm.DB) error {
|
||||
if w.RetentionDays <= 0 {
|
||||
w.RetentionDays = RetentionForeverDays
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// retainsForever reports whether a stored RetentionDays value means
|
||||
// "keep events indefinitely". It is the single definition of that
|
||||
// question, shared by Webhook.RetainsForever and by the reaper's
|
||||
// retainsForever reports whether a RetentionDays value means "keep
|
||||
// events indefinitely", which 0 does. It is the single definition of
|
||||
// that question, shared by Webhook.RetainsForever and by the reaper's
|
||||
// cutoff computation so the two cannot disagree about which webhooks
|
||||
// are exempt from reaping.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It accepts the RetentionForeverDays sentinel written by BeforeSave
|
||||
// and, defensively, any non-positive value, which BeforeSave treats
|
||||
// as a request to retain forever.
|
||||
// A negative value, which the forms refuse, is read the same way: as a
|
||||
// day count it would put the cutoff in the future, where it matches
|
||||
// every event the webhook has.
|
||||
func retainsForever(retentionDays int) bool {
|
||||
return retentionDays <= 0 ||
|
||||
retentionDays >= RetentionForeverDays
|
||||
return retentionDays <= 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RetainsForever reports whether this webhook's events are kept
|
||||
@@ -119,7 +81,8 @@ func (w *Webhook) RetentionCutoff(now time.Time) (time.Time, bool) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RetentionLabel returns the webhook's retention policy as display
|
||||
// text, so that no template has to know about the sentinel value.
|
||||
// text: "forever" rather than "0 days" for a webhook that keeps its
|
||||
// events.
|
||||
func (w *Webhook) RetentionLabel() string {
|
||||
if w.RetainsForever() {
|
||||
return "forever"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ package database_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"reflect"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -47,8 +45,7 @@ func storedRetention(t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, id string) int {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newWebhookWithRetention creates a webhook through the ordinary Create
|
||||
// path, so the BeforeSave hook and the GORM column default both apply
|
||||
// exactly as they do in production.
|
||||
// path, as the new webhook form does.
|
||||
func newWebhookWithRetention(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
db *gorm.DB,
|
||||
@@ -67,7 +64,7 @@ func newWebhookWithRetention(
|
||||
return wh.ID
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestWebhookBeforeSave_ZeroBecomesForeverSentinel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestWebhookRetentionDays_ZeroIsStoredAsZero(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
db := startedTestDB(t)
|
||||
@@ -75,31 +72,10 @@ func TestWebhookBeforeSave_ZeroBecomesForeverSentinel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
wh := &database.Webhook{RetentionDays: 0}
|
||||
id := newWebhookWithRetention(t, db, wh)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
storedRetention(t, db, id),
|
||||
"a zero retention must be stored as the sentinel, "+
|
||||
"not replaced by the column default",
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 0, storedRetention(t, db, id))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestWebhookBeforeSave_NegativeBecomesForeverSentinel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
db := startedTestDB(t)
|
||||
|
||||
wh := &database.Webhook{RetentionDays: -5}
|
||||
id := newWebhookWithRetention(t, db, wh)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
storedRetention(t, db, id),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestWebhookBeforeSave_PositiveIsPreserved(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestWebhookRetentionDays_DayCountIsStored(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
db := startedTestDB(t)
|
||||
@@ -110,10 +86,9 @@ func TestWebhookBeforeSave_PositiveIsPreserved(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 7, storedRetention(t, db, id))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestWebhookBeforeSave_UpdateToZeroBecomesSentinel proves the hook
|
||||
// fires on update as well as insert, via the same Save call the edit
|
||||
// handler makes.
|
||||
func TestWebhookBeforeSave_UpdateToZeroBecomesSentinel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// TestWebhookRetentionDays_UpdateToZeroIsStoredAsZero changes a day
|
||||
// count to 0 through the same Save call the edit handler makes.
|
||||
func TestWebhookRetentionDays_UpdateToZeroIsStoredAsZero(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
db := startedTestDB(t)
|
||||
@@ -125,28 +100,7 @@ func TestWebhookBeforeSave_UpdateToZeroBecomesSentinel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
wh.RetentionDays = 0
|
||||
require.NoError(t, db.Omit(clause.Associations).Save(wh).Error)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
storedRetention(t, db, id),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestWebhookRetentionColumnDefaultMatchesConstant guards the one place
|
||||
// the default lives twice: a struct tag cannot reference a constant, so
|
||||
// this asserts the tag and DefaultRetentionDays agree.
|
||||
func TestWebhookRetentionColumnDefaultMatchesConstant(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
field, ok := reflect.TypeFor[database.Webhook]().
|
||||
FieldByName("RetentionDays")
|
||||
require.True(t, ok, "Webhook.RetentionDays must exist")
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
"default:"+strconv.Itoa(database.DefaultRetentionDays),
|
||||
field.Tag.Get("gorm"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 0, storedRetention(t, db, id))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestMaxFiniteRetentionDaysIsTheOverflowCeiling asserts that the
|
||||
@@ -176,14 +130,6 @@ func TestMaxFiniteRetentionDaysIsTheOverflowCeiling(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
time.Duration(overCeiling*hoursPerDay)*time.Hour,
|
||||
"one day past the ceiling must overflow",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Less(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays,
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
"the sentinel sits above the ceiling and is only safe "+
|
||||
"because retain-forever webhooks skip the arithmetic",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestWebhookRetainsForeverAndLabel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -195,16 +141,8 @@ func TestWebhookRetainsForeverAndLabel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
forever bool
|
||||
label string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{
|
||||
"sentinel",
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays, true, testForeverLabel,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"above sentinel",
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays + 1, true, testForeverLabel,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{"legacy zero", 0, true, testForeverLabel},
|
||||
{"legacy negative", -1, true, testForeverLabel},
|
||||
{"zero", 0, true, testForeverLabel},
|
||||
{"negative", -1, true, testForeverLabel},
|
||||
{"default", database.DefaultRetentionDays, false, "30 days"},
|
||||
{"one day", 1, false, "1 day"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -243,7 +243,8 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) reapWebhook(
|
||||
|
||||
// retentionCutoff returns the timestamp before which a webhook's
|
||||
// events have expired, and whether any cutoff applies at all. It
|
||||
// reports false for a retain-forever policy, so no DELETE is issued.
|
||||
// reports false for a retention of 0, which means retain forever, so
|
||||
// no DELETE is issued.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The day count is clamped to MaxFiniteRetentionDays first. This is
|
||||
// defense in depth rather than decoration: a time.Duration is an int64
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -85,41 +85,6 @@ func createWebhook(
|
||||
db.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Webhook.BeforeSave rewrites a non-positive RetentionDays to the
|
||||
// retain-forever sentinel, and the column's GORM default would
|
||||
// otherwise substitute 30. Force the requested value with a
|
||||
// column-level update so tests can plant legacy rows that predate
|
||||
// the sentinel and still carry a literal 0 or negative value.
|
||||
require.NoError(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
db.Model(wh).
|
||||
Update("retention_days", retentionDays).Error,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return wh.ID
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// createWebhookNormally inserts a webhook through the ordinary Create
|
||||
// path, with no column-level forcing, so Webhook.BeforeSave applies
|
||||
// exactly as it does in production. Passing 0 therefore yields a row
|
||||
// holding the RetentionForeverDays sentinel.
|
||||
func createWebhookNormally(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
db *gorm.DB,
|
||||
retentionDays int,
|
||||
) string {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
wh := &database.Webhook{
|
||||
UserID: uuid.New().String(),
|
||||
Name: testWebhookName,
|
||||
RetentionDays: retentionDays,
|
||||
}
|
||||
require.NoError(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
db.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return wh.ID
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -281,19 +246,19 @@ func TestRetentionReaper_ReapsExpiredKeepsRecent(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assertChainPresent(t, db, recent)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRetentionReaper_SkipsSentinelReapsFiniteInSameSweep covers the
|
||||
// end-to-end retain-forever path: a webhook created the normal way with
|
||||
// a requested retention of 0 lands on the RetentionForeverDays
|
||||
// sentinel, and the reaper leaves its ancient events alone while still
|
||||
// reaping a finite-retention webhook in the very same sweep.
|
||||
func TestRetentionReaper_SkipsSentinelReapsFiniteInSameSweep(
|
||||
// TestRetentionReaper_SkipsZeroReapsFiniteInSameSweep covers the
|
||||
// end-to-end retain-forever path: a webhook created with a retention
|
||||
// of 0 reads back 0, and the reaper leaves its ancient events alone
|
||||
// while still reaping a finite-retention webhook in the very same
|
||||
// sweep.
|
||||
func TestRetentionReaper_SkipsZeroReapsFiniteInSameSweep(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
|
||||
|
||||
foreverID := createWebhookNormally(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 0)
|
||||
foreverID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 0)
|
||||
|
||||
var stored database.Webhook
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -302,14 +267,12 @@ func TestRetentionReaper_SkipsSentinelReapsFiniteInSameSweep(
|
||||
env.mainDB.DB().Where("id = ?", foreverID).
|
||||
First(&stored).Error,
|
||||
)
|
||||
require.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
stored.RetentionDays,
|
||||
"a requested retention of 0 must persist as the sentinel",
|
||||
require.Zero(
|
||||
t, stored.RetentionDays,
|
||||
"a retention of 0 must be stored as 0",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
finiteID := createWebhookNormally(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
|
||||
finiteID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
|
||||
|
||||
foreverDB, err := env.mgr.GetDB(foreverID)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
@@ -335,14 +298,10 @@ func TestRetentionReaper_SkipsSentinelReapsFiniteInSameSweep(
|
||||
// negative, so subtracting it moves the cutoff into the far future,
|
||||
// where "created_at < cutoff" matches every row: an event created a
|
||||
// moment ago, and its delivery and delivery result, were all deleted
|
||||
// on the first sweep. 200000 is inside that band and below the
|
||||
// retain-forever sentinel, so it is treated as a finite policy and
|
||||
// really does reach the arithmetic.
|
||||
// on the first sweep. 200000 is inside that band.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The row is planted at the column level because such a value can no
|
||||
// longer be submitted through the form; the point of the test is that
|
||||
// a row from an older version, or a future call site, still cannot
|
||||
// trigger the wipe.
|
||||
// The form refuses such a value; the point of the test is that a row
|
||||
// written by any other path still cannot trigger the wipe.
|
||||
func TestRetentionReaper_HugeFiniteRetentionRetainsRecentEvents(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
@@ -358,12 +317,6 @@ func TestRetentionReaper_HugeFiniteRetentionRetainsRecentEvents(
|
||||
database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays,
|
||||
"the test value must exceed what the cutoff can represent",
|
||||
)
|
||||
require.Less(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
overflowingRetentionDays,
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
"the test value must not be treated as retain-forever",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
webhookID := createWebhook(
|
||||
t, env.mainDB.DB(), overflowingRetentionDays,
|
||||
@@ -379,14 +332,15 @@ func TestRetentionReaper_HugeFiniteRetentionRetainsRecentEvents(
|
||||
assertChainPresent(t, db, fresh)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRetentionReaper_RetainsForeverWhenNonPositive(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// TestRetentionReaper_RetainsForeverWhenNegative checks that a negative
|
||||
// retention, which the forms refuse, keeps every event rather than
|
||||
// putting the cutoff in the future, where it would match them all.
|
||||
func TestRetentionReaper_RetainsForeverWhenNegative(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
|
||||
|
||||
// A legacy row written before the sentinel existed still carries a
|
||||
// literal 0; the <= 0 guard must keep honouring it.
|
||||
webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 0)
|
||||
webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), -1)
|
||||
|
||||
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ CREATE TABLE webhooks (
|
||||
user_id uuid NOT NULL,
|
||||
name text NOT NULL,
|
||||
description text,
|
||||
retention_days integer DEFAULT 30,
|
||||
retention_days integer,
|
||||
PRIMARY KEY (id),
|
||||
CONSTRAINT fk_users_webhooks FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users (id)
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_RendersFailedAttempt(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// TestHandleSourceLogs_EscapesResponseBody proves the
|
||||
// response body is treated as the untrusted remote content it
|
||||
// is. The remote chooses these bytes and the page is rendered
|
||||
// inside the operator's authenticated origin.
|
||||
// inside the operator's authenticated origin, where the
|
||||
// application's own CSP allows inline script from 'self'.
|
||||
func TestHandleSourceLogs_EscapesResponseBody(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,10 +35,11 @@ const eventBodyQuery = "SELECT cast(body as blob) " +
|
||||
// response is deliberately not renderable. Content-Disposition
|
||||
// makes the browser download rather than display it, and the
|
||||
// octet-stream type plus nosniff stop it being interpreted as
|
||||
// HTML or script. Without those a stored payload would be shown
|
||||
// as a page of the operator's own origin. The application's CSP
|
||||
// is a second defence behind them: it allows no inline script,
|
||||
// so such a page could not run script of its own.
|
||||
// HTML or script. Without those a stored payload would execute
|
||||
// as the logged-in operator. The application's CSP does not
|
||||
// help here: script-src allows 'unsafe-inline' from 'self', so
|
||||
// a document served from this origin could run its own inline
|
||||
// script.
|
||||
func (h *Handlers) HandleEventBodyDownload() http.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
webhook, ok := h.ownedWebhook(w, r)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func TestHandleEventDetail_ShowsEventWholeWithDeliveries(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, page, strconv.Itoa(len(body))+" bytes")
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, page, "{\n "pad": "xxx")
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, page, ""tail": ""+sentinel+""\n}")
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, page, `break-all max-h-[32rem] overflow-y-auto"`)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, page, `style="max-height: 32rem; overflow-y: auto"`)
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, page, "Showing the first")
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, page, target.Name)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, page, ">failed</span>")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
|
||||
package handlers_test
|
||||
|
||||
// The handler-side half of the log-field audit. The slog calls in
|
||||
// this package that reach a value an UNAUTHENTICATED client picks
|
||||
// outright, and of a length it picks outright, are the failed-login
|
||||
// DEBUG lines, whose username is a form field.
|
||||
// The handler-side half of the log-field audit. Two slog calls in
|
||||
// this package reach a value an UNAUTHENTICATED client picks outright
|
||||
// and of a length it picks outright:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// They are at DEBUG, which is off in production by default. That is
|
||||
// - the unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line on /h/{uuid}, whose
|
||||
// path segment matched no stored entrypoint and so is bounded by
|
||||
// nothing;
|
||||
// - the failed-login DEBUG lines, whose username is a form field.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Both are at DEBUG, which is off in production by default. That is
|
||||
// not a bound: an operator turning DEBUG on to diagnose a flood must
|
||||
// not thereby hand the flood an unbounded write. They spend the same
|
||||
// internal/logfield budget as the access log, and are held here to
|
||||
// middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes.
|
||||
// not thereby hand the flood an unbounded write. Both spend the same
|
||||
// internal/logfield budget as the access log, and both are held here
|
||||
// to middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The two login lines past the username lookup — "invalid password"
|
||||
// and "user logged in" — carry the same cap without needing it, since
|
||||
@@ -256,6 +260,43 @@ func postLoginWithPassword(
|
||||
return w.Code
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestUnknownEntrypoint_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize drives 8 KB of
|
||||
// client-chosen path at the unauthenticated receiver's
|
||||
// unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line and holds it to the same ceiling the
|
||||
// access log states.
|
||||
func TestUnknownEntrypoint_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
|
||||
for fillName, fill := range escapeFills() {
|
||||
t.Run(handlerName+"/"+fillName, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
h, buf := capturingHandlers(t, newHandler)
|
||||
router := receiverRouter(h)
|
||||
|
||||
for i := range floodRequests {
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
http.StatusNotFound,
|
||||
postReceiver(
|
||||
t, router,
|
||||
oversizedFill(fill)+
|
||||
strings.Repeat("y", i),
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
lines := logLines(t, buf)
|
||||
require.Len(t, lines, floodRequests)
|
||||
assertNoClientText(t, buf)
|
||||
|
||||
assertBoundedFlood(t, buf.Len())
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestFailedLogin_LogLineDoesNotTrackUsernameSize drives 8 KB of
|
||||
// client-chosen username at the unauthenticated login endpoint's
|
||||
// DEBUG line and holds it to the same ceiling.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,21 +16,16 @@ import (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// An empty value yields fallback, which lets the create path apply the
|
||||
// default and the edit path leave the stored value unchanged. A value
|
||||
// of 0 is returned as 0 and is rewritten to the retain-forever
|
||||
// sentinel by database.Webhook's BeforeSave hook. Anything unparseable
|
||||
// or negative is refused rather than silently given a default.
|
||||
// of 0 means retain events forever and is returned as it is. Anything
|
||||
// unparseable or negative is refused rather than silently given a
|
||||
// default.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The upper bound is not cosmetic. The reaper computes its cutoff as a
|
||||
// time.Duration, an int64 nanosecond count, so a day count above
|
||||
// database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays overflows, puts the cutoff in the
|
||||
// future, and deletes every event the webhook has. A finite value
|
||||
// above that ceiling is therefore refused, and the message names the
|
||||
// ceiling rather than implying the input was not a number.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A value at or above the retain-forever sentinel is not out of range:
|
||||
// it is what the edit form pre-fills for a retain-forever webhook, so
|
||||
// submitting the form back unchanged has to keep meaning "forever"
|
||||
// rather than being rejected.
|
||||
// future, and deletes every event the webhook has. A value above that
|
||||
// ceiling is therefore refused, and the message names the ceiling
|
||||
// rather than implying the input was not a number.
|
||||
func parseRetentionDays(raw string, fallback int) (int, string) {
|
||||
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
|
||||
if raw == "" {
|
||||
@@ -43,10 +38,6 @@ func parseRetentionDays(raw string, fallback int) (int, string) {
|
||||
"retain events forever."
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if v >= database.RetentionForeverDays {
|
||||
return database.RetentionForeverDays, ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if v > database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays {
|
||||
return 0, "Retention must be at most " +
|
||||
strconv.Itoa(database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays) +
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDetail_FitsWideAndNarrowWindows(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Contains(
|
||||
t, body,
|
||||
`<div class="max-w-[108rem] mx-auto px-6 py-8">`,
|
||||
`<div class="mx-auto px-6 py-8" style="max-width: 108rem"`,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert.Contains(
|
||||
t, body,
|
||||
@@ -286,8 +286,8 @@ func TestHandleSourceDetail_FitsWideAndNarrowWindows(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// target and says what deleting it loses, that the webhook's gives its
|
||||
// number of stored events (5 received, 2 removed by retention, so 3,
|
||||
// the statistics pane's "Within retention" figure), and that an
|
||||
// entrypoint with no description is named by its URL. Each prompt is
|
||||
// its form's data-confirm attribute, where is a line break.
|
||||
// entrypoint with no description is named by its URL. The template
|
||||
// writes the slashes after http: as \/, which the browser reads as /.
|
||||
func TestHandleSourceDetail_DeletePromptsNameWhatIsLost(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -325,28 +325,29 @@ func TestHandleSourceDetail_DeletePromptsNameWhatIsLost(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, body,
|
||||
`data-confirm="Delete webhook "delete-me"? `+
|
||||
`Delete webhook "delete-me"?\n\n`+
|
||||
`This deletes its stored events (3) and their deliveries. `+
|
||||
`Any archive files it wrote are kept."`)
|
||||
`Any archive files it wrote are kept.`)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, body,
|
||||
`data-confirm="Delete entrypoint "Stripe"? `+
|
||||
`Delete entrypoint "Stripe"?\n\n`+
|
||||
`Senders using its URL get an error from now on, `+
|
||||
`and the URL cannot be restored."`)
|
||||
`and the URL cannot be restored.`)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, body,
|
||||
`data-confirm="Delete entrypoint "http://example.com/h/`+
|
||||
unnamed.Path+`"? `)
|
||||
`Delete entrypoint "http:\/\/example.com/h/`+
|
||||
unnamed.Path+`"?`)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, body,
|
||||
`data-confirm="Delete target "t-log"? `+
|
||||
`Delete target "t-log"?\n\n`+
|
||||
`Nothing more is delivered to it. `+
|
||||
`Its past deliveries stay in the event log."`)
|
||||
`Its past deliveries stay in the event log.`)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHandleSourceDetail_DeletePromptKeepsQuotesInName checks that a
|
||||
// webhook name with quotes, a backslash, a closing script tag and a
|
||||
// newline reaches its delete prompt escaped for the attribute, which
|
||||
// the browser reads back as the name typed: each quote and angle
|
||||
// bracket as a character reference, the rest as typed. An unescaped
|
||||
// double quote would end the attribute and cut the prompt short.
|
||||
// newline reaches its delete prompt escaped for the script, which the
|
||||
// browser reads back as the name typed: each quote and angle bracket
|
||||
// as a \u escape, the slash as \/, the newline as \n and the backslash
|
||||
// doubled. An unescaped newline would break the prompt's script, and
|
||||
// the form would then submit without asking.
|
||||
func TestHandleSourceDetail_DeletePromptKeepsQuotesInName(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -372,6 +373,6 @@ func TestHandleSourceDetail_DeletePromptKeepsQuotesInName(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, body,
|
||||
"Delete webhook "Bob's "best" \\ hook"+
|
||||
"</script>\nline two"?")
|
||||
"Delete webhook "Bob\\u0027s \\u0022best\\u0022 \\\\ hook"+
|
||||
"\\u003c\\/script\\u003e\\nline two"?")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -137,8 +137,7 @@ func onlyWebhook(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// seedWebhookWithRetention inserts a webhook owned by the test user
|
||||
// with an exact stored retention value, bypassing Webhook.BeforeSave
|
||||
// via a column-level update so that legacy rows can be planted too.
|
||||
// with the given retention.
|
||||
func seedWebhookWithRetention(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
db *database.Database,
|
||||
@@ -155,13 +154,6 @@ func seedWebhookWithRetention(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
|
||||
)
|
||||
require.NoError(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
db.DB().Model(wh).
|
||||
Update("retention_days", retentionDays).Error,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
wh.RetentionDays = retentionDays
|
||||
|
||||
return *wh
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -225,10 +217,9 @@ func setupSourceTest(t *testing.T) *sourceTestEnv {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_ZeroRetentionPersistsForever is the core
|
||||
// regression test for the bug: the create form's 0 must reach the
|
||||
// database as the retain-forever sentinel rather than being replaced by
|
||||
// the column's default of 30.
|
||||
// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_ZeroRetentionPersistsForever checks
|
||||
// that the create form's 0 reaches the database as 0, which means
|
||||
// retain forever.
|
||||
func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_ZeroRetentionPersistsForever(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
@@ -241,30 +232,55 @@ func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_ZeroRetentionPersistsForever(
|
||||
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
|
||||
|
||||
wh := onlyWebhook(t, env.db)
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 0, storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID))
|
||||
assert.True(t, wh.RetainsForever())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_OmittedRetentionUsesDefault(
|
||||
func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_DayCountIsStored(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
env := setupSourceTest(t)
|
||||
days := "45"
|
||||
|
||||
w := submitCreate(t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "finite", &days)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
|
||||
|
||||
wh := onlyWebhook(t, env.db)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 45, storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_BlankRetentionUsesDefault covers a
|
||||
// retention field left empty and one missing from the form: both
|
||||
// give the default, not forever.
|
||||
func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_BlankRetentionUsesDefault(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
env := setupSourceTest(t)
|
||||
blank := ""
|
||||
|
||||
w := submitCreate(t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "defaulted", nil)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
|
||||
for name, retention := range map[string]*string{
|
||||
"blank": &blank,
|
||||
"omitted": nil,
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
wh := onlyWebhook(t, env.db)
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
database.DefaultRetentionDays,
|
||||
storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
|
||||
)
|
||||
env := setupSourceTest(t)
|
||||
|
||||
w := submitCreate(
|
||||
t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "defaulted", retention,
|
||||
)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
|
||||
|
||||
wh := onlyWebhook(t, env.db)
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
database.DefaultRetentionDays,
|
||||
storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHandleSourceCreate_PrefillsDefaultFromConstant keeps the create
|
||||
@@ -290,7 +306,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceCreate_PrefillsDefaultFromConstant(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert.NotContains(
|
||||
t, body, `max="365"`,
|
||||
"a max below the sentinel would block retain-forever",
|
||||
"a max of 365 would block any longer retention",
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, body, `min="0"`)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -368,40 +384,6 @@ func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_OverflowingRetentionIsRejected(
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_SentinelIsAcceptedAsForever guards the
|
||||
// boundary between "too large to represent" and "retain forever": the
|
||||
// sentinel is above MaxFiniteRetentionDays, but it is the value the
|
||||
// edit form pre-fills, so it must be accepted rather than rejected as
|
||||
// out of range. A value above the sentinel is stored as the sentinel.
|
||||
func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_SentinelIsAcceptedAsForever(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
for _, days := range []int{
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays + 1,
|
||||
} {
|
||||
raw := strconv.Itoa(days)
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run(raw, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
env := setupSourceTest(t)
|
||||
|
||||
w := submitCreate(t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "forever", &raw)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
|
||||
|
||||
wh := onlyWebhook(t, env.db)
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_RejectedFormKeepsUserInput checks that a
|
||||
// validation failure hands the user's typing back, matching what the
|
||||
// edit form already does. Losing a long description to a mistyped
|
||||
@@ -480,11 +462,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceEditSubmit_ZeroRetentionPersistsForever(
|
||||
w := submitEdit(t, env, wh, "0")
|
||||
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 0, storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestHandleSourceEditSubmit_InvalidRetentionIsRejected(
|
||||
@@ -867,18 +845,15 @@ func TestHandleSourceEditSubmit_ArchiveNameTaken(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, oldName, stored.Name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSourceEditForm_ForeverWebhookRoundTrips walks the exact path that
|
||||
// the removed max="365" cap used to break: render the edit form for a
|
||||
// retain-forever webhook, confirm the pre-filled sentinel is not capped
|
||||
// by browser validation, then submit that pre-filled value straight
|
||||
// back and confirm the retention policy survives untouched.
|
||||
// TestSourceEditForm_ForeverWebhookRoundTrips renders the edit form for
|
||||
// a retain-forever webhook, confirms it pre-fills 0, then submits that
|
||||
// pre-filled value straight back and confirms the retention policy
|
||||
// survives untouched.
|
||||
func TestSourceEditForm_ForeverWebhookRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
env := setupSourceTest(t)
|
||||
wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(
|
||||
t, env.db, database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
)
|
||||
wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 0)
|
||||
|
||||
req := getRequest(
|
||||
t, "/hook/"+wh.ID+"/edit", env.cookies,
|
||||
@@ -889,17 +864,12 @@ func TestSourceEditForm_ForeverWebhookRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
|
||||
|
||||
sentinel := strconv.Itoa(database.RetentionForeverDays)
|
||||
body := w.Body.String()
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Contains(
|
||||
t, body, `value="`+sentinel+`"`,
|
||||
t, body, `name="retention_days" value="0"`,
|
||||
"the edit form pre-fills the stored retention",
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert.NotContains(
|
||||
t, body, `max="365"`,
|
||||
"a max below the sentinel would block saving any edit",
|
||||
)
|
||||
// "Currently forever." is the rendered RetentionLabel, not the
|
||||
// static hint below the input, which says "Enter 0 to retain events
|
||||
// forever." A bare Contains of "forever" would pass for any
|
||||
@@ -910,29 +880,20 @@ func TestSourceEditForm_ForeverWebhookRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Submit the pre-filled value back, exactly as a browser would.
|
||||
post := submitEdit(t, env, wh, sentinel)
|
||||
post := submitEdit(t, env, wh, "0")
|
||||
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, post.Code)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 0, storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotTheSentinelNumber checks that
|
||||
// the retain-forever value is never rendered to the user as a raw day
|
||||
// count on either read-only view.
|
||||
func TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotTheSentinelNumber(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
// TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotZeroDays checks that a
|
||||
// retention of 0 is shown as forever, never as a day count, on either
|
||||
// read-only view.
|
||||
func TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotZeroDays(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
env := setupSourceTest(t)
|
||||
wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(
|
||||
t, env.db, database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
)
|
||||
sentinel := strconv.Itoa(database.RetentionForeverDays)
|
||||
wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 0)
|
||||
|
||||
listW := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
env.handlers.HandleSourceList().ServeHTTP(
|
||||
@@ -941,7 +902,7 @@ func TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotTheSentinelNumber(
|
||||
|
||||
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, listW.Code)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, listW.Body.String(), "Retention: forever")
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, listW.Body.String(), sentinel)
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, listW.Body.String(), "Retention: 0 days")
|
||||
|
||||
detailW := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
env.handlers.HandleSourceDetail().ServeHTTP(
|
||||
@@ -954,5 +915,5 @@ func TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotTheSentinelNumber(
|
||||
|
||||
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, detailW.Code)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, detailW.Body.String(), "Retention: forever")
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, detailW.Body.String(), sentinel)
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, detailW.Body.String(), "Retention: 0 days")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -184,8 +184,7 @@ func TestEventLogPageIsCalledFullEventLog(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// TestCreateFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour pins the create form's
|
||||
// retention copy to what the code does: the reaper permanently deletes
|
||||
// events past the cutoff, an empty field falls back to
|
||||
// DefaultRetentionDays, and 0 is rewritten to the retain-forever
|
||||
// sentinel by Webhook.BeforeSave.
|
||||
// DefaultRetentionDays, and 0 means retain forever.
|
||||
func TestCreateFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -253,10 +252,7 @@ func TestEditFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
"blank means unchanged, not forever",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
forever := &database.Webhook{
|
||||
Name: "wh",
|
||||
RetentionDays: database.RetentionForeverDays,
|
||||
}
|
||||
forever := &database.Webhook{Name: "wh", RetentionDays: 0}
|
||||
forever.ID = "wh-2"
|
||||
|
||||
foreverBody := renderPage(
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"gorm.io/gorm"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -48,13 +49,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleWebhook() http.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Logged only once the lookup has found the entrypoint, so
|
||||
// an invented path writes no INFO line; a miss is logged at
|
||||
// DEBUG. The entrypoint is named by its ID: the UUID is its
|
||||
// credential and is never logged.
|
||||
// Logged only once the UUID is known to name a real
|
||||
// entrypoint. The UUID comes straight out of the path on
|
||||
// the one unauthenticated endpoint, so logging it before
|
||||
// the lookup let a client write an INFO line per invented
|
||||
// path; the request itself is already in the access log
|
||||
// and a miss is already logged at DEBUG.
|
||||
h.log.Info("webhook request received",
|
||||
"entrypoint_id", entrypoint.ID,
|
||||
"webhook_id", entrypoint.WebhookID,
|
||||
"entrypoint_uuid", entrypointUUID,
|
||||
"method", r.Method,
|
||||
"remoteIP", middleware.RemoteIP(r),
|
||||
"clientIP", middleware.ClientIP(r),
|
||||
@@ -131,10 +133,17 @@ func (h *Handlers) lookupEntrypoint(
|
||||
"path = ?", entrypointUUID,
|
||||
).First(&entrypoint)
|
||||
if result.Error != nil {
|
||||
// Not even an unknown UUID is logged. The receiver's log
|
||||
// lines never carry the path segment, which is a credential
|
||||
// whenever it names an entrypoint.
|
||||
h.log.Debug("entrypoint not found")
|
||||
// The receiver is unauthenticated and /h/{uuid}
|
||||
// matches any single segment, so this value is entirely
|
||||
// client-chosen on exactly the branch where the lookup
|
||||
// failed. DEBUG is off by default; the cap is what keeps
|
||||
// turning it on from restoring an unbounded write.
|
||||
h.log.Debug(
|
||||
"entrypoint not found",
|
||||
"path", logfield.Truncate(
|
||||
entrypointUUID, logfield.MaxBytes,
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
http.NotFound(w, r)
|
||||
|
||||
return entrypoint, false
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ func TestWebhookStats_PaneShowsRetentionPeriod(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
want string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{30, "30 days"},
|
||||
{database.RetentionForeverDays, "forever"},
|
||||
{0, "forever"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tt := range tests {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,15 +12,12 @@ import (
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
|
||||
"github.com/google/uuid"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware/middlewaretest"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHandleWebhook_LogsClientNextToThePeer checks that the
|
||||
@@ -102,87 +99,6 @@ func TestHandleWebhook_LogsClientNextToThePeer(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHandleWebhook_LogsNoEntrypointUUID sends an accepted event, a
|
||||
// request over the receiver rate limit and a request for an unknown
|
||||
// UUID through the receiver as routes.go mounts it, and checks that
|
||||
// nothing logged, at any level, carries either UUID.
|
||||
func TestHandleWebhook_LogsNoEntrypointUUID(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
h *handlers.Handlers
|
||||
db *database.Database
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
cfg := &config.Config{DataDir: t.TempDir(), ReceiverRateLimit: 1}
|
||||
|
||||
app := newTestAppWithConfig(t, cfg, &h, &db)
|
||||
app.RequireStart()
|
||||
|
||||
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
|
||||
|
||||
buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
|
||||
log := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(
|
||||
buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
|
||||
))
|
||||
h.SetLogForTest(log)
|
||||
mw := middlewaretest.New(t, log, cfg, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
webhook := seedWebhook(t, db)
|
||||
entrypoint := &database.Entrypoint{
|
||||
WebhookID: webhook.ID,
|
||||
Path: uuid.New().String(),
|
||||
Active: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).
|
||||
Create(entrypoint).Error)
|
||||
|
||||
unknownUUID := uuid.New().String()
|
||||
|
||||
router := chi.NewRouter()
|
||||
router.Use(mw.Logging())
|
||||
router.With(mw.ReceiverRateLimit()).HandleFunc(
|
||||
middleware.ReceiverRoute, h.HandleWebhook(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// In order: the limit is one request per minute per path, so the
|
||||
// second request for the known UUID is the rejected one.
|
||||
for _, step := range []struct {
|
||||
entrypointUUID string
|
||||
wantStatus int
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{entrypoint.Path, http.StatusOK},
|
||||
{entrypoint.Path, http.StatusTooManyRequests},
|
||||
{unknownUUID, http.StatusNotFound},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
|
||||
context.Background(), http.MethodPost,
|
||||
"/h/"+step.entrypointUUID, strings.NewReader("{}"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
require.Equal(t, step.wantStatus, w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The lines this test is about were all written, so the checks
|
||||
// below are not passing on an empty log.
|
||||
for _, msg := range []string{
|
||||
"webhook request received",
|
||||
"webhook receiver rate limit exceeded",
|
||||
"entrypoint not found",
|
||||
} {
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), `"msg":"`+msg+`"`)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), entrypoint.Path)
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), unknownUUID)
|
||||
|
||||
line := receivedLine(t, buf)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, entrypoint.ID, line["entrypoint_id"])
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, webhook.ID, line["webhook_id"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// receivedLine returns the one "webhook request received" line in the
|
||||
// captured JSON log.
|
||||
func receivedLine(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer) map[string]any {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,13 +27,6 @@ const floodRequests = 64
|
||||
// line for a redirected or rejected request may contain it.
|
||||
const attackerMarker = "QQATTACKERTEXTQQ"
|
||||
|
||||
// knownEntrypointUUID and failingEntrypointUUID are the UUIDs the
|
||||
// stand-in receiver in accessLogRouter answers 200 and 500 to.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
knownEntrypointUUID = "6f1e2a9c-4b7d-4e3a-9c2f-1d8b5a7e3c60"
|
||||
failingEntrypointUUID = "0b7c3e5a-2d9f-4a61-8e4b-7c1d6f2a9e35"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// maxLineBytes bounds a single access log line whose client-supplied
|
||||
// fields are of ordinary size. Well above what the fixed fields need,
|
||||
// well below the length of the oversized input the amplification tests
|
||||
@@ -140,21 +132,17 @@ func accessLogRouter(m *middleware.Middleware) *chi.Mux {
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
router.HandleFunc(
|
||||
middleware.ReceiverRoute,
|
||||
"/h/{uuid}",
|
||||
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
// Stands in for the real handler: a known entrypoint
|
||||
// UUID succeeds, a failing one is a server error, and
|
||||
// any other 404s.
|
||||
switch chi.URLParam(r, "uuid") {
|
||||
case knownEntrypointUUID:
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
||||
case failingEntrypointUUID:
|
||||
http.Error(
|
||||
w, "boom", http.StatusInternalServerError,
|
||||
)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
// Stands in for the real handler: an unknown entrypoint
|
||||
// UUID 404s, a known one succeeds.
|
||||
if chi.URLParam(r, "uuid") != "known" {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
|
||||
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -347,13 +335,11 @@ func oversizedValue(ch string) string {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// oversizedHeaders fills every client-supplied header the access log
|
||||
// reads with the same value. The Referer carries it as the host of an
|
||||
// absolute URL, because the access log keeps only a Referer's scheme
|
||||
// and host.
|
||||
// reads with the same value.
|
||||
func oversizedHeaders(value string) map[string]string {
|
||||
return map[string]string{
|
||||
"User-Agent": value,
|
||||
"Referer": "http://" + value,
|
||||
"Referer": value,
|
||||
"X-Request-Id": value,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -663,111 +649,17 @@ func TestAccessLog_SuccessKeepsConcretePathAndRedactsQuery(
|
||||
router := accessLogRouter(m)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t, http.StatusOK,
|
||||
get(t, router, "/.well-known/healthcheck?src=ci"),
|
||||
t, http.StatusOK, get(t, router, "/h/known?src=ci"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// The path resolved against a stored entrypoint, so it stays. The
|
||||
// query never does: see TestAccessLog_UnauthenticatedSuccess...
|
||||
entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
|
||||
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t, "/.well-known/healthcheck?(redacted)", entries[0]["url"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "/h/known?(redacted)", entries[0]["url"])
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), "src=ci")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAccessLog_ReceiverNeverLogsTheUUID covers the two statuses that
|
||||
// keep the concrete path on every other route. On the receiver that
|
||||
// path carries the entrypoint UUID, so the line names the route
|
||||
// pattern instead.
|
||||
func TestAccessLog_ReceiverNeverLogsTheUUID(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
for entrypointUUID, wantStatus := range map[string]int{
|
||||
knownEntrypointUUID: http.StatusOK,
|
||||
failingEntrypointUUID: http.StatusInternalServerError,
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(strconv.Itoa(wantStatus), func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
|
||||
router := accessLogRouter(m)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t, wantStatus,
|
||||
get(t, router, "/h/"+entrypointUUID+"?src=ci"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
|
||||
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.ReceiverRoute, entries[0]["url"])
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), entrypointUUID)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAccessLog_ReceiverPreflightNeverLogsTheUUID sends a CORS
|
||||
// preflight to the receiver in dev, in the production middleware
|
||||
// order. CORS answers it with 200 before chi routes it, so the line
|
||||
// names no route and carries no UUID.
|
||||
func TestAccessLog_ReceiverPreflightNeverLogsTheUUID(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
|
||||
|
||||
router := chi.NewRouter()
|
||||
router.Use(m.Logging())
|
||||
router.Use(m.CORS())
|
||||
router.HandleFunc(
|
||||
middleware.ReceiverRoute,
|
||||
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
|
||||
context.Background(), http.MethodOptions,
|
||||
"/h/"+knownEntrypointUUID, nil,
|
||||
)
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://sender.example")
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Method", http.MethodPost)
|
||||
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
|
||||
|
||||
entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
|
||||
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, unmatchedRouteLiteral, entries[0]["url"])
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), knownEntrypointUUID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAccessLog_RefererNeverLogsTheUUID sends receiver requests whose
|
||||
// Referer is the entrypoint URL, as a sender's is after it follows a
|
||||
// redirect from http:// to https://. The referer field keeps only the
|
||||
// scheme and host, and a Referer without them is logged as a marker.
|
||||
func TestAccessLog_RefererNeverLogsTheUUID(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
m, buf := capturingMiddleware(t)
|
||||
router := accessLogRouter(m)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, referer := range []string{
|
||||
"http://webhooker.example/h/" + knownEntrypointUUID + "?src=ci",
|
||||
"/h/" + knownEntrypointUUID,
|
||||
} {
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, getWithHeaders(
|
||||
t, router, "/h/"+knownEntrypointUUID,
|
||||
map[string]string{"Referer": referer},
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
|
||||
require.Len(t, entries, 2)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "http://webhooker.example", entries[0]["referer"])
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "(redacted)", entries[1]["referer"])
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), knownEntrypointUUID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAccessLog_ServerErrorKeepsConcreteURL(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,10 +10,8 @@ package middleware_test
|
||||
// the client's choosing.
|
||||
// - CSRF's 403 rejection, at WARN, also registered ahead of
|
||||
// RequireAuth.
|
||||
// - The rate limiters' 429 rejection, at WARN. On the receiver
|
||||
// route it names the route pattern rather than the path, and
|
||||
// the limiters that log a path sit behind RequireAuth, so its cap
|
||||
// is defensive.
|
||||
// - The rate limiters' 429 rejection, at WARN, on the
|
||||
// unauthenticated receiver among others.
|
||||
// - RequireAuth's own unauthenticated-request line, at DEBUG.
|
||||
// - RecordLoginFailure's throttle rejection, at WARN. Its cap is
|
||||
// defensive rather than load-bearing today: chi pins the one
|
||||
@@ -270,14 +268,10 @@ func logSites() map[string]logSite {
|
||||
send: postNoToken,
|
||||
wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
},
|
||||
// The 429 line every limiter but the aggregate one shares.
|
||||
// Mounted outside any route, as here, it logs the path, as
|
||||
// it does for the limiters behind RequireAuth; on
|
||||
// ReceiverRoute it names the pattern instead. The
|
||||
// per-entrypoint receiver limiter's bucket is keyed on the
|
||||
// path, so the first request through a fresh path is served
|
||||
// and only the ones after it are rejected; sendUntilLimited
|
||||
// absorbs that.
|
||||
// The per-entrypoint receiver limiter, unauthenticated. Its
|
||||
// bucket is keyed on the path, so the first request through a
|
||||
// fresh path is served and only the ones after it are
|
||||
// rejected; sendUntilLimited absorbs that.
|
||||
"receiver rate limit 429": {
|
||||
build: func(
|
||||
t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,8 +41,7 @@ const unmatchedMethod = unmatchedRoute
|
||||
// after /h/ is client-chosen, so labelling by path lets any
|
||||
// unauthenticated client mint permanent series at will, and publishes
|
||||
// the entrypoint UUID (the receiver's only credential) in the scrape
|
||||
// while doing it. The access log and the 429 line read it for the
|
||||
// same reason: see ReceiverRoute.
|
||||
// while doing it.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// chi populates the route context during routeHTTP, so this is only
|
||||
// valid once routing has run. Every caller below is on the recording
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
basicauth "github.com/99designs/basicauth-go"
|
||||
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
|
||||
"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/go-chi/cors"
|
||||
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
|
||||
@@ -48,10 +49,6 @@ const (
|
||||
// pick the size of the line it writes.
|
||||
redactedQuery = "?(redacted)"
|
||||
|
||||
// redactedReferer stands in for a Referer the access log cannot
|
||||
// reduce to its scheme and host; see accessLogReferer.
|
||||
redactedReferer = "(redacted)"
|
||||
|
||||
// maxLogRequestIDBytes bounds the request id, which is also
|
||||
// client-supplied: chi's RequestID middleware passes an inbound
|
||||
// X-Request-Id header through verbatim. Its generated form is an
|
||||
@@ -99,14 +96,14 @@ const (
|
||||
// It is also the ceiling on every OTHER line this service writes
|
||||
// THROUGH SLOG that carries text an UNAUTHENTICATED client
|
||||
// supplies. Those lines — the MaxBodySize rejection, the CSRF
|
||||
// rejection, the unauthenticated-request DEBUG line, the
|
||||
// failed-login DEBUG lines, and the two login-throttle WARN
|
||||
// lines ("login failure limit exceeded" in loginguard.go and
|
||||
// "password verification capacity exhausted" in
|
||||
// internal/handlers/auth.go) — spend the same per-field budgets,
|
||||
// and each carries strictly fewer client-supplied fields than the
|
||||
// access log does, so none of them can reach a width the access
|
||||
// log cannot. That is
|
||||
// rejection, the rate-limit rejection, the unauthenticated-request
|
||||
// and unknown-entrypoint DEBUG lines, the failed-login DEBUG
|
||||
// lines, and the two login-throttle WARN lines ("login failure
|
||||
// limit exceeded" in loginguard.go and "password verification
|
||||
// capacity exhausted" in internal/handlers/auth.go) — spend the
|
||||
// same per-field budgets, and each carries strictly fewer
|
||||
// client-supplied fields than the access log does,
|
||||
// so none of them can reach a width the access log cannot. That is
|
||||
// asserted directly, per line and under both handlers, rather than
|
||||
// left to the reasoning: see logbound_test.go in this package and
|
||||
// in internal/handlers.
|
||||
@@ -154,12 +151,6 @@ const (
|
||||
MaxAccessLogLineBytes = 2560
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ReceiverRoute is the route pattern the webhook receiver is served
|
||||
// at. Its path carries the entrypoint UUID, which is the receiver's
|
||||
// only credential, so the log lines this package writes name a
|
||||
// request on this route by the pattern, never by its path.
|
||||
const ReceiverRoute = "/h/{uuid}"
|
||||
|
||||
//nolint:revive // MiddlewareParams is a standard fx naming convention.
|
||||
type MiddlewareParams struct {
|
||||
fx.In
|
||||
@@ -277,14 +268,14 @@ func (lrw *loggingResponseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
|
||||
// marker.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The path on those branches is bounded by the service's routes or by
|
||||
// the operator's data — a 2xx under /s means the file is in the
|
||||
// embedded tree. The query is not bounded by anything:
|
||||
// /.well-known/healthcheck and /s/* take no authentication and sit
|
||||
// behind no rate limiter, and /pages/login behind only the login
|
||||
// limiter, so any of them will answer 200 to a URL carrying an
|
||||
// arbitrary number of arbitrary bytes after the '?'. Keeping the path
|
||||
// and dropping the query is what makes this branch as bounded as the
|
||||
// pattern branches below.
|
||||
// the operator's data — a 2xx on the receiver means the UUID named a
|
||||
// stored entrypoint, a 2xx under /s means the file is in the embedded
|
||||
// tree. The query is not bounded by anything: /.well-known/healthcheck
|
||||
// and /s/* take no authentication and sit behind no rate limiter, and
|
||||
// /pages/login behind only the login limiter, so any of them will
|
||||
// answer 200 to a URL carrying an arbitrary number of arbitrary bytes
|
||||
// after the '?'. Keeping the path and dropping the query is what makes
|
||||
// this branch as bounded as the pattern branches below.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Nothing debuggable is lost. The only query parameters the service
|
||||
// reads are the login page's `next`, the page to return to,
|
||||
@@ -306,61 +297,36 @@ func concreteLogURL(r *http.Request) string {
|
||||
|
||||
// accessLogURL returns the value for the access log's url field.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// On ReceiverRoute it is the route pattern whatever the status, so
|
||||
// the entrypoint UUID in the path is never logged. A request chi never
|
||||
// routed gets unmatchedRoute whatever the status, for the same reason:
|
||||
// in dev, CORS answers a preflight to the receiver before routing.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// On every other route, 2xx and 5xx responses get the concrete path
|
||||
// (see concreteLogURL). A success resolved against a static route or
|
||||
// against the operator's own data, and a server error is our own bug,
|
||||
// where the exact URL is the primary evidence and which no client can
|
||||
// provoke at will.
|
||||
// 2xx and 5xx responses get the concrete path (see concreteLogURL). A
|
||||
// success resolved against a static route or against the operator's
|
||||
// own data — on the receiver, a 2xx means the UUID named a stored
|
||||
// entrypoint — and a server error is our own bug, where the exact URL
|
||||
// is the primary evidence and which no client can provoke at will.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 3xx and 4xx responses get the chi route pattern instead. Those are
|
||||
// the outcomes an unauthenticated client drives for free, such as a
|
||||
// 303 to the login page on any invented /user/ path. Logging the
|
||||
// concrete URL there lets a flood write attacker-chosen text, of
|
||||
// attacker-chosen length, into the operator's log at one line per
|
||||
// request. The pattern comes from the router's own table, so it is
|
||||
// bounded by the service's routes while still naming which class of
|
||||
// request was rejected.
|
||||
// the outcomes an unauthenticated client drives for free: 404 or 429
|
||||
// on any invented /h/ path, 303 to the login page on any
|
||||
// invented /user/ path. Logging the concrete URL there lets a flood
|
||||
// write attacker-chosen text, of attacker-chosen length, into the
|
||||
// operator's log at one line per request. The pattern comes from the
|
||||
// router's own table, so it is bounded by the service's routes while
|
||||
// still naming which class of request was rejected.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The pattern is only populated once routing has run, so this must be
|
||||
// called after the handler returns, not before.
|
||||
func accessLogURL(r *http.Request, status int) string {
|
||||
pattern := routePatternID(r.Context())
|
||||
if pattern == ReceiverRoute || pattern == unmatchedRoute {
|
||||
return pattern
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if status < http.StatusMultipleChoices ||
|
||||
status >= http.StatusInternalServerError {
|
||||
return concreteLogURL(r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return pattern
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// accessLogReferer returns the value for the access log's referer
|
||||
// field: the Referer's scheme and host, never its path or query. The
|
||||
// path can be an entrypoint URL, which carries the UUID: a sender that
|
||||
// follows a redirect from http:// to https:// sends the URL it was
|
||||
// redirected from, and a browser sends the 404 page's URL under /h/
|
||||
// when it fetches that page's stylesheet. A Referer without both a
|
||||
// scheme and a host is logged as redactedReferer.
|
||||
func accessLogReferer(r *http.Request) string {
|
||||
referer := r.Referer()
|
||||
if referer == "" {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
if rc := chi.RouteContext(r.Context()); rc != nil {
|
||||
if pattern := rc.RoutePattern(); pattern != "" {
|
||||
return pattern
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
parsed, err := url.Parse(referer)
|
||||
if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" {
|
||||
return redactedReferer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return parsed.Scheme + "://" + parsed.Host
|
||||
return unmatchedRoute
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Logging returns middleware that logs each HTTP request with
|
||||
@@ -413,7 +379,7 @@ func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
requestID, maxLogRequestIDBytes,
|
||||
),
|
||||
"referer", logfield.Truncate(
|
||||
accessLogReferer(r), logfield.MaxBytes,
|
||||
r.Referer(), logfield.MaxBytes,
|
||||
),
|
||||
"proto", r.Proto,
|
||||
"remoteIP", RemoteIP(r),
|
||||
@@ -572,9 +538,7 @@ func (s *Middleware) MetricsAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
// SecurityHeaders returns middleware that sets production security
|
||||
// headers on every response: HSTS (unless HSTS_MAX_AGE is zero),
|
||||
// X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP, Referrer-Policy, and
|
||||
// Permissions-Policy. The CSP takes scripts and styles only from
|
||||
// files on this origin, so a template may hold no inline script,
|
||||
// event handler or style attribute.
|
||||
// Permissions-Policy.
|
||||
func (s *Middleware) SecurityHeaders() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
maxAge := s.params.Config.HSTSMaxAge
|
||||
hsts := "max-age=" + strconv.FormatInt(int64(maxAge/time.Second), 10) +
|
||||
@@ -596,8 +560,8 @@ func (s *Middleware) SecurityHeaders() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
w.Header().Set(
|
||||
"Content-Security-Policy",
|
||||
"default-src 'self'; "+
|
||||
"script-src 'self'; "+
|
||||
"style-src 'self'",
|
||||
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "+
|
||||
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
|
||||
)
|
||||
w.Header().Set(
|
||||
"Referrer-Policy",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -747,10 +747,10 @@ func TestNoCache_SetsHeaders(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
// --- SecurityHeaders Middleware Tests ---
|
||||
|
||||
// securityHeaders serves one request through SecurityHeaders built
|
||||
// over a Config with the given HSTSMaxAge, and returns the response's
|
||||
// headers.
|
||||
func securityHeaders(t *testing.T, maxAge time.Duration) http.Header {
|
||||
// hstsHeaders serves one request through SecurityHeaders built over
|
||||
// a Config with the given HSTSMaxAge, and returns every
|
||||
// Strict-Transport-Security value on the response.
|
||||
func hstsHeaders(t *testing.T, maxAge time.Duration) []string {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
cfg := &config.Config{HSTSMaxAge: maxAge}
|
||||
@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ func securityHeaders(t *testing.T, maxAge time.Duration) http.Header {
|
||||
|
||||
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
return w.Header()
|
||||
return w.Header().Values("Strict-Transport-Security")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestSecurityHeaders_HSTS(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -804,28 +804,11 @@ func TestSecurityHeaders_HSTS(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t, tt.expected,
|
||||
securityHeaders(t, tt.maxAge).Values(
|
||||
"Strict-Transport-Security",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, hstsHeaders(t, tt.maxAge))
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSecurityHeaders_CSP pins the Content-Security-Policy: a page
|
||||
// takes its scripts and styles only from files on its own origin,
|
||||
// never from an inline script, event handler or style.
|
||||
func TestSecurityHeaders_CSP(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t, "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'",
|
||||
securityHeaders(t, 0).Get("Content-Security-Policy"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- MaxBodySize Middleware Tests ---
|
||||
|
||||
const testBodyLimit int64 = 64
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -259,28 +259,26 @@ func (m *Middleware) clientAddr(r *http.Request) (netip.Addr, bool) {
|
||||
return peer, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// tooManyRequests returns the 429 handler used by the postRateLimit
|
||||
// limiters and the per-entrypoint receiver limiter: it logs the
|
||||
// tooManyRequests returns the 429 handler used by the
|
||||
// password-change and per-entrypoint receiver limiters: it logs the
|
||||
// rejection with logMessage and answers with responseMessage.
|
||||
// httprate adds the Retry-After header (RFC 6585). The aggregate
|
||||
// receiver limiter uses floodTooManyRequests instead.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// On ReceiverRoute the line names the route pattern, so the
|
||||
// entrypoint UUID in the path is never logged. Elsewhere it names the
|
||||
// path, capped against the same budget as the access log's url field;
|
||||
// the limiters there sit behind RequireAuth, so the cap is defensive.
|
||||
// The path is capped against the same budget as the access log's url
|
||||
// field. The per-entrypoint receiver limiter is unauthenticated and
|
||||
// its path is a client-chosen segment of client-chosen length, so at
|
||||
// WARN an uncapped path would let a sender pick the size of the line
|
||||
// it writes — the same defect the access log capping closed.
|
||||
func (m *Middleware) tooManyRequests(
|
||||
logMessage, responseMessage string,
|
||||
) http.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
path := r.URL.Path
|
||||
if routePatternID(r.Context()) == ReceiverRoute {
|
||||
path = ReceiverRoute
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
m.log.Warn(
|
||||
logMessage,
|
||||
"path", logfield.Truncate(path, logfield.MaxBytes),
|
||||
"path", logfield.Truncate(
|
||||
r.URL.Path, logfield.MaxBytes,
|
||||
),
|
||||
"remoteIP", RemoteIP(r),
|
||||
"clientIP", ClientIP(r),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ const (
|
||||
// TestAlpineRunsUnderTheSecurityPolicy loads the webhook page and the
|
||||
// event log in a headless browser, served by the real router and so
|
||||
// under the real Content-Security-Policy, and checks that the pages'
|
||||
// Alpine.js directives, the copy control and the delete prompts work,
|
||||
// and that a target's row shows its delivery counts.
|
||||
// Alpine.js directives and the copy control work, and that a target's
|
||||
// row shows its delivery counts.
|
||||
func TestAlpineRunsUnderTheSecurityPolicy(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -74,10 +74,6 @@ func TestAlpineRunsUnderTheSecurityPolicy(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "browser", "browser-password")
|
||||
webhook, older, event, target := seedBrowserWebhook(t, env, userID)
|
||||
|
||||
// The sign-in page is loaded before the browser signs in, since a
|
||||
// signed-in visit to it is sent on to another page.
|
||||
checkOtherPages(ctx, t, srv.URL+"/pages/login")
|
||||
|
||||
require.NoError(t, chromedp.Run(
|
||||
ctx, setCookies(srv.URL, env.authCookies(t, userID, "browser")),
|
||||
))
|
||||
@@ -103,11 +99,6 @@ func TestAlpineRunsUnderTheSecurityPolicy(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
checkEventLog(ctx, t, page+"/events", event.ID, older.ID, target.Name)
|
||||
checkMobileMenu(ctx, t, page)
|
||||
checkPhoneWidth(ctx, t, page, page+"/events", target.Name)
|
||||
checkOtherPages(ctx, t,
|
||||
srv.URL+"/hooks", srv.URL+"/settings", srv.URL+"/user/browser",
|
||||
// A path that does not exist, which gets the 404 error page.
|
||||
srv.URL+"/no-such-page")
|
||||
checkDeletePrompt(ctx, t, page, target)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, problems(), "the browser reported problems")
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1397,75 +1388,3 @@ func checkPhoneWidth(
|
||||
assert.False(t, sideways, "the event log scrolls sideways on a phone")
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, cutOff, "the event log cuts these off on a phone")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// checkOtherPages loads the pages at urls, which no other check opens,
|
||||
// so that anything the browser reports going wrong on them fails the
|
||||
// test too.
|
||||
func checkOtherPages(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, urls ...string) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
for _, url := range urls {
|
||||
require.NoError(t, chromedp.Run(ctx, loadPage(url)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// answerPrompt returns a script that stands in for the user at the
|
||||
// browser's prompt: it makes window.confirm record the question in
|
||||
// window.asked and give answer. It also records in window.sent whether
|
||||
// a form is sent once its submit event is handled, from a listener on
|
||||
// window, which the event reaches after the listener static/js/app.js
|
||||
// adds to document.
|
||||
func answerPrompt(answer bool) string {
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf(`
|
||||
window.asked = "";
|
||||
window.sent = false;
|
||||
window.confirm = (question) => {
|
||||
window.asked = question;
|
||||
return %t;
|
||||
};
|
||||
window.addEventListener("submit", (event) => {
|
||||
window.sent = !event.defaultPrevented;
|
||||
});`, answer)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// checkDeletePrompt loads a webhook page and clicks Delete beside
|
||||
// target. It checks that the browser asks first, naming the target,
|
||||
// that answering no leaves the form unsent, and that answering yes
|
||||
// sends it and the target is deleted.
|
||||
func checkDeletePrompt(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, url string, target *database.Target,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
form := `form[action$="/targets/` + target.ID + `/delete"]`
|
||||
question := `Delete target "` + target.Name + `"?` + "\n\n" +
|
||||
"Nothing more is delivered to it. " +
|
||||
"Its past deliveries stay in the event log."
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
asked string
|
||||
sent bool
|
||||
listed bool
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
require.NoError(t, chromedp.Run(
|
||||
ctx, loadPage(url), chromedp.Evaluate(answerPrompt(false), nil),
|
||||
))
|
||||
click(ctx, t, form+" button")
|
||||
require.NoError(t, chromedp.Run(
|
||||
ctx,
|
||||
chromedp.Evaluate(`window.asked`, &asked),
|
||||
chromedp.Evaluate(`window.sent`, &sent),
|
||||
))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, question, asked, "Delete does not ask about the target")
|
||||
assert.False(t, sent, "answering no still sends the delete form")
|
||||
|
||||
require.NoError(t, chromedp.Run(
|
||||
ctx, chromedp.Evaluate(answerPrompt(true), nil),
|
||||
))
|
||||
clickAndLoad(ctx, t, form+" button")
|
||||
require.NoError(t, chromedp.Run(ctx, chromedp.Evaluate(
|
||||
`document.querySelector('`+form+`') !== null`, &listed,
|
||||
)))
|
||||
assert.False(t, listed, "answering yes does not delete the target")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,8 +6,7 @@ import (
|
||||
|
||||
sentryhttp "github.com/getsentry/sentry-go/http"
|
||||
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
|
||||
chimw "github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/static"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
|
||||
s.router.Use(chimw.RequestID)
|
||||
s.router.Use(middleware.RequestID)
|
||||
s.router.Use(s.mw.SecurityHeaders())
|
||||
s.router.Use(s.mw.Logging())
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -346,7 +345,7 @@ func (s *Server) setupWebhookRoutes() {
|
||||
// unauthenticated endpoint's body; TestReceiver_OversizeBodyRefused
|
||||
// pins it.
|
||||
s.router.With(s.mw.ReceiverRateLimit()).HandleFunc(
|
||||
middleware.ReceiverRoute,
|
||||
"/h/{uuid}",
|
||||
s.h.HandleWebhook(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+3
-11
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The two shared styles for the controls a user clicks, and the rule that
|
||||
* hides an element marked x-cloak. Every page loads this file after
|
||||
* tailwind.css. It is plain CSS: make css does not build it.
|
||||
* The two shared styles for the controls a user clicks. Every page loads
|
||||
* this file after tailwind.css. It is plain CSS: make css does not build
|
||||
* it.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A button is btn-primary, btn-secondary or btn-danger, from input.css.
|
||||
* A secondary or inline action, such as Copy beside an entrypoint URL or
|
||||
@@ -46,11 +46,3 @@
|
||||
outline-offset: 2px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Alpine.js removes x-cloak from an element once it has started, so
|
||||
* something Alpine hides is not seen on the page while it loads.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
[x-cloak] {
|
||||
display: none !important;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
@@ -58,18 +58,6 @@
|
||||
}
|
||||
})();
|
||||
|
||||
// Asks before a form with a data-confirm attribute is sent, such as a
|
||||
// delete form on the webhook page. The browser's own prompt shows the
|
||||
// attribute's text, and the form is sent only if the user accepts.
|
||||
document.addEventListener("submit", function (event) {
|
||||
"use strict";
|
||||
|
||||
const message = event.target.getAttribute("data-confirm");
|
||||
if (message !== null && !window.confirm(message)) {
|
||||
event.preventDefault();
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Alpine.js components.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The pages' Content-Security-Policy forbids eval, so the UI loads
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
|
||||
{{if .Binary}}
|
||||
<p class="text-xs text-gray-500">This body is binary ({{.Size}} bytes) and is not shown. <a href="{{.EventURL}}/body" class="btn-small">Download the body</a></p>
|
||||
{{else if .Text}}
|
||||
<pre class="rounded-md border border-gray-200 bg-white p-2 text-xs text-gray-700 overflow-x-auto whitespace-pre-wrap break-all{{if .Scroll}} max-h-[32rem] overflow-y-auto{{end}}">{{.Text}}</pre>
|
||||
<pre class="rounded-md border border-gray-200 bg-white p-2 text-xs text-gray-700 overflow-x-auto whitespace-pre-wrap break-all"{{if .Scroll}} style="max-height: 32rem; overflow-y: auto"{{end}}>{{.Text}}</pre>
|
||||
{{if .Cut}}
|
||||
<p class="mt-2 text-xs text-gray-500">Showing the first {{.ShownBytes}} of {{.Size}} bytes, unformatted. <a href="{{.EventURL}}" class="btn-small">Show the whole body</a> <a href="{{.EventURL}}/body" class="btn-small">Download the body</a></p>
|
||||
{{end}}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,5 +4,6 @@
|
||||
<title>{{block "title" .}}Webhooker{{end}}</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/s/css/tailwind.css">
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/s/css/style.css">
|
||||
<style>[x-cloak] { display: none !important; }</style>
|
||||
{{block "head" .}}{{end}}
|
||||
{{end}}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,11 +13,13 @@
|
||||
<div class="p-4">
|
||||
<!-- A value too wide to sit beside its name moves to the
|
||||
next line, where a list breaks only at the spaces
|
||||
between its entries. wrap-anywhere breaks inside a
|
||||
value only when it alone is wider than the line. -->
|
||||
between its entries. overflow-wrap: anywhere breaks
|
||||
inside a value only when it alone is wider than the
|
||||
line; an inline style, because the committed
|
||||
tailwind.css has no class for it. -->
|
||||
<div class="flex flex-wrap justify-between items-start gap-4">
|
||||
<code class="text-sm font-medium text-gray-900">{{.Name}}</code>
|
||||
<code class="text-sm text-gray-900 wrap-anywhere">{{.Value}}</code>
|
||||
<code class="text-sm text-gray-900" style="overflow-wrap: anywhere">{{.Value}}</code>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<p class="text-sm text-gray-500 mt-1">{{.Description}}</p>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@
|
||||
{{define "content"}}
|
||||
<!-- 108rem, half again the 72rem (max-w-6xl) of the webhook list, the
|
||||
event log, the navbar and the footer, so an entrypoint URL fits on
|
||||
one line. wrap-anywhere goes only on names and descriptions: a
|
||||
row too wide for a phone must still run past the edge, where the
|
||||
browser test sees it, rather than break its controls mid-word. -->
|
||||
<div class="max-w-[108rem] mx-auto px-6 py-8">
|
||||
one line. An inline style, because the committed tailwind.css has
|
||||
no class this wide. wrap-anywhere goes only on names and
|
||||
descriptions: a row too wide for a phone must still run past the
|
||||
edge, where the browser test sees it, rather than break its
|
||||
controls mid-word. -->
|
||||
<div class="mx-auto px-6 py-8" style="max-width: 108rem">
|
||||
<div class="mb-6">
|
||||
<a href="/hooks" class="btn-small">← Back to webhooks</a>
|
||||
<div class="flex flex-wrap justify-between items-center gap-2 mt-2">
|
||||
@@ -21,12 +23,11 @@
|
||||
<div class="flex gap-2">
|
||||
<a href="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/events" class="btn-secondary">Full Event Log</a>
|
||||
<a href="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/edit" class="btn-secondary">Edit</a>
|
||||
<!-- Before a delete form is sent, static/js/app.js
|
||||
asks in the browser's own prompt, with the form's
|
||||
data-confirm text; is a line break. The
|
||||
template escapes each name for the attribute, so a
|
||||
quote in it shows as typed. -->
|
||||
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/delete" data-confirm="Delete webhook "{{.Webhook.Name}}"? This deletes its stored events{{with .Stats}} ({{.WithinRetention.Events}}){{end}} and their deliveries. Any archive files it wrote are kept.">
|
||||
<!-- The delete prompts are the browser's own, so they
|
||||
work without the page's scripts. The template
|
||||
escapes each name for the script, so a quote or a
|
||||
backslash in it shows as typed. -->
|
||||
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete webhook "{{.Webhook.Name}}"?\n\nThis deletes its stored events{{with .Stats}} ({{.WithinRetention.Events}}){{end}} and their deliveries. Any archive files it wrote are kept.')">
|
||||
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
|
||||
<button type="submit" class="btn-danger">Delete</button>
|
||||
</form>
|
||||
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@
|
||||
{{if .Active}}Deactivate{{else}}Activate{{end}}
|
||||
</button>
|
||||
</form>
|
||||
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints/{{.ID}}/delete" data-confirm="Delete entrypoint "{{if .Description}}{{.Description}}{{else}}{{$.BaseURL}}/h/{{.Path}}{{end}}"? Senders using its URL get an error from now on, and the URL cannot be restored." class="inline">
|
||||
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints/{{.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete entrypoint "{{if .Description}}{{.Description}}{{else}}{{$.BaseURL}}/h/{{.Path}}{{end}}"?\n\nSenders using its URL get an error from now on, and the URL cannot be restored.')" class="inline">
|
||||
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
|
||||
<button type="submit" class="btn-small text-red-600" title="Delete">Delete</button>
|
||||
</form>
|
||||
@@ -277,7 +278,7 @@
|
||||
{{if .Active}}Deactivate{{else}}Activate{{end}}
|
||||
</button>
|
||||
</form>
|
||||
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/targets/{{.ID}}/delete" data-confirm="Delete target "{{.Name}}"? Nothing more is delivered to it. Its past deliveries stay in the event log." class="inline">
|
||||
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/targets/{{.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete target "{{.Name}}"?\n\nNothing more is delivered to it. Its past deliveries stay in the event log.')" class="inline">
|
||||
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
|
||||
<button type="submit" class="btn-small text-red-600" title="Delete">Delete</button>
|
||||
</form>
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user