Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 8b0854ccb7 Name every rate limit that shares the client key
check / check (push) Waiting to run
"Trusted proxies" now says a block covering clients makes every rate
limit bypassable, not "all three"; Rate Limiting lists delivery replay
and event resubmit among the limiters sharing the key. The
Configuration table and the TrustedProxies comment say a private
client behind a trusted proxy chooses its key, not behind any proxy.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-01 20:01:45 +00:00
sneak 70e708ee4f Say the proxy is covered by default or by a set value
The rate-limit test comments on trustedProxyCIDR and forwardedKeyFor
said production needs TRUSTED_PROXIES set; another said only
operator-listed addresses are trusted. The README's Rate Limiting
paragraph said "listed in", and the login endpoint section assumed
every proxied deployment shares one bucket. All now match the
RFC 1918 default.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-01 20:01:45 +00:00
clawbot 815260b405 Point to the proxy's access log for a login flood's source
No log line records the client address taken from X-Forwarded-For,
so the login endpoint section no longer says the source shows in the
failure logs; it names the proxy's access log instead.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-01 20:01:45 +00:00
clawbot 6af979420b Say that any private-addressed client can choose its rate-limit key
Under the default, a client with a private address picks its own
rate-limit key through X-Forwarded-For whether it connects directly or
through the proxy, so the README and the TrustedProxies comment now
tell an operator with any such clients to set the list to the proxy
alone. The login endpoint section no longer assumes the proxy is
uncovered by default.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-01 20:01:45 +00:00
clawbot cfd043ed24 Trust the RFC 1918 ranges as proxies when TRUSTED_PROXIES is unset (closes #333)
Unset or empty, TRUSTED_PROXIES now defaults to 10.0.0.0/8,
172.16.0.0/12 and 192.168.0.0/16, so a reverse proxy reaching the app
over a Docker network or a private LAN gets per-client rate-limit
buckets without configuration. A set value replaces the default; an
unparseable one still fails startup.

The startup warning for an empty list goes, with its test hook and
test, since the default is no longer empty. The README's
configuration table, Trusted proxies, upaas and reverse-proxy sections
describe the new default and when to narrow it to the proxy alone.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-01 20:01:45 +00:00
30 changed files with 203 additions and 1492 deletions
+92 -104
View File
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
| `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` | How often the retention reaper and archive sweeper run (Go duration, must be positive) | `1h` |
| `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` | Idle session timeout (Go duration) | `24h` |
| `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` | Receiver requests/minute per IP per entrypoint (10x that per IP across the route) | `120` |
| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | CIDRs whose forwarded headers are trusted (unset: all clients behind a proxy share one rate-limit bucket; a correct login password is never throttled either way) | `""` (none) |
| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | CIDRs whose forwarded headers are trusted. A set value replaces the default. Under the default, any client with a private address, whether it connects directly or through a trusted proxy, can choose its own rate-limit key by sending its own `X-Forwarded-For`; if any clients have private addresses, set it to the proxy's address alone. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies) | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` (RFC 1918) |
| `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` | CIDRs that delivery targets may reach despite the SSRF blocklist. Read [Allowing egress to your own network](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network) before setting it | `""` (none) |
#### Allowing egress to your own network
@@ -379,41 +379,48 @@ unlocked.
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` is a comma-separated list of CIDR blocks (a bare
address such as `192.168.1.7` is accepted and treated as a single
host), for example `192.168.1.7, 2001:db8::5`. It decides whose
`X-Forwarded-For` header the rate limiters believe, so it should name
the addresses of your reverse proxies and nothing else.
`X-Forwarded-For` header the rate limiters believe, so it should cover
the addresses of your reverse proxies.
`X-Forwarded-For` is honoured **only** when the connecting peer is
inside one of these blocks; for every other peer the client identity is
the connection's own address and the header is ignored. The default is
the empty list, which trusts nobody — anything else would let any
client pick its own rate limit bucket, minting a fresh one per request
or draining someone else's. Set it to the address of your reverse
proxy, and to nothing wider. A set but unparseable value aborts
startup.
the connection's own address and the header is ignored. Unset (or
empty), the list is the RFC 1918 private ranges: `10.0.0.0/8`,
`172.16.0.0/12` and `192.168.0.0/16`. That covers a reverse proxy
reaching webhooker over a Docker network or a private LAN without
anything set. A set value replaces the default entirely. A set but
unparseable value aborts startup.
That default is safe against forged headers, but leaving it unset in
production has a cost you must know about. Production runs behind a
TLS-terminating reverse proxy, so with `TRUSTED_PROXIES` unset every
request keys on the proxy's own address and all clients share a single
Trusting those ranges has two consequences for clients with private
addresses:
- Any such client, whether it connects directly or through the proxy,
can choose its own rate-limit key by sending its own
`X-Forwarded-For`. A direct client's header is walked because the
client is itself trusted; behind the proxy, the client's own address
is skipped as a trusted hop when the chain is walked (below), so the
entry it wrote is taken as the client. If any of your clients have
private addresses, you must set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the proxy's
address alone.
- A client behind the proxy that sends no `X-Forwarded-For` of its own
shares the proxy's bucket, because its own address is skipped too.
Setting the list to the proxy's address alone gives each its own
bucket.
A proxy the list does not cover, such as nginx on the same host
reaching webhooker over loopback, is not trusted: every request through
it keys on the proxy's own address and all clients share a single
bucket per limit. The receiver limits become service-wide ceilings,
and the login endpoint's failure counting collapses onto one key, so a
stranger's wrong passwords throttle every other client's wrong
passwords.
passwords. Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to that proxy's address to restore
per-client buckets.
What it cannot do is lock the operator out. The login endpoint
verifies credentials **before** it consults any limit and charges only
failures, so a correct password is never throttled no matter how full
the bucket is. See [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting).
The remedy is to set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to your reverse proxy's
address, which restores per-client buckets. webhooker logs a warning
at startup whenever `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty, in every environment,
because behind a proxy every client shares one bucket in `dev` and
`prod` alike. The warning is informational when nothing proxies to the
process: with no proxy in front, the peer address is the client's own
and the buckets are already per-client. See
[Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting) for what each limit shares.
`X-Real-IP` and `True-Client-IP` are **never** read, from any peer.
Reverse proxies append to `X-Forwarded-For` but forward other client
headers verbatim, so a single-valued header is client-controlled even
@@ -435,14 +442,14 @@ Two operator requirements follow:
(nginx `$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for`, HAProxy `option forwardfor`,
Caddy and AWS ALB by default), and must append a bare address with
no port.
- List proxy hosts **only**. Any address inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`
- Keep clients out of the list. Any address inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`
chooses its own rate-limit key: its `X-Forwarded-For` is walked, so
it can name a different address on every request to get a fresh
bucket each time, or name another client's address to drain that
client's bucket. Never list a block that also covers clients — a
broad `10.0.0.0/8` on a network where clients live in the same range
makes all three limits, including the unauthenticated webhook
receiver, silently bypassable by every client in the block.
client's bucket. A block that also covers clients — the default, on
a network where clients have private addresses — makes every rate
limit, including the unauthenticated webhook receiver's, silently
bypassable by every client in the block.
#### Sessions
@@ -741,10 +748,16 @@ repository's `Dockerfile` and runs it. The app needs:
- **Volume:** one host directory mounted at `/var/lib/webhooker`.
- **Environment variables:**
- `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod`
- `TRUSTED_PROXIES`: your reverse proxy's address on that Docker
network. The `remoteIP` field of the `http request` log line for a
request that came through the proxy shows it; the health check's
own lines show `::1`. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies).
- `TRUSTED_PROXIES`: Docker networks use private addresses, so the
default covers your reverse proxy on that network. Under the
default, any client with a private address, whether it connects
directly or through the proxy, can choose its own rate-limit key
by sending its own `X-Forwarded-For`. If any clients have private
addresses, or the network's addresses are outside the RFC 1918
ranges, set it to the proxy's address there. The `remoteIP` field
of the `http request` log line for a request that came through
the proxy shows it; the health check's own lines show `::1`. See
[Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies).
- Leave `BIND_ADDRESS` and `DATA_DIR` unset: the image sets
`BIND_ADDRESS` to `0.0.0.0`, and `DATA_DIR` defaults to
`/var/lib/webhooker`.
@@ -807,12 +820,14 @@ reports.
behind a proxy means the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header. The block below
sets it; without it every request is read as plaintext and cookies
ship without `Secure`. See [Configuration](#configuration).
3. **Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the proxy's address.** Unset, every rate
limiter keys on the connecting peer, which behind a proxy is the
proxy on every request: all clients collapse into one global bucket
per limit and the receiver's per-IP limits become service-wide
ceilings. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). List the proxy
and nothing else.
3. **Make sure `TRUSTED_PROXIES` covers the proxy's address.** Unset,
it covers the RFC 1918 private ranges, so a proxy on a Docker
network or a private LAN is covered and one on loopback is not. For
a proxy it does not cover, every rate limiter keys on the connecting
peer, which is the proxy on every request: all clients collapse into
one global bucket per limit and the receiver's per-IP limits become
service-wide ceilings. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). If
any clients have private addresses, list the proxy and nothing else.
4. **Send `Host` as `$http_host`, not `$host`.** `$host` strips the
port. webhooker's Origin/Referer check compares against the host it
was given, so on any port other than 443 `$host` makes every form
@@ -1070,7 +1085,7 @@ unconditionally against whatever files it finds:
- the main database on connect — `Setting`, `User`, `APIKey`, `Webhook`,
`Entrypoint`, `Target`
- each event database when it is lazily opened — `Event`, `Delivery`,
`DeliveryResult`, `Totals`
`DeliveryResult`
- each archive database on every open and reopen
There is no schema version table, no migration ledger, and no down
@@ -1363,10 +1378,11 @@ It uses:
- **[go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate)** for
sliding-window rate limiting of the password-change and webhook
receiver endpoints. The bucket is per client IP only when
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the reverse proxy; unset, every client
behind that proxy shares one bucket per limit. The login endpoint
counts failed attempts itself instead, so that a correct password is
never throttled (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` covers the reverse proxy (by default it covers the
RFC 1918 private ranges); otherwise every client behind that proxy
shares one bucket per limit. The login endpoint counts failed
attempts itself instead, so that a correct password is never
throttled (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
- **[Prometheus](https://prometheus.io)** for metrics, served at
`/metrics` behind basic auth
- **[Sentry](https://sentry.io)** for optional error reporting
@@ -1384,7 +1400,7 @@ The codebase uses consistent naming throughout (rename completed in
### Data Model
webhooker's data model has ten entities organized into two tiers: the
webhooker's data model has nine entities organized into two tiers: the
**application tier** (user and webhook configuration) and the **event
tier** (event ingestion, delivery, and logging).
@@ -1413,10 +1429,6 @@ tier** (event ingestion, delivery, and logging).
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ │
│ │ Event │──1:N──│ Delivery │──1:N──│ DeliveryResult │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └─────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ Totals │ (one row of running counts) │
│ └──────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
@@ -1669,7 +1681,6 @@ status across potentially multiple attempts.
| `event_id` | UUID | Foreign key → Event |
| `target_id`| UUID | Foreign key → Target |
| `status` | DeliveryStatus | One of: `pending`, `delivered`, `failed`, `retrying` |
| `finished_at` | timestamp | When the delivery became `delivered` or `failed` (nullable; empty while `pending` or `retrying`) |
**Relations:** Belongs to Event. Belongs to Target. Has many
DeliveryResults.
@@ -1737,29 +1748,6 @@ retries) is individually logged for full observability.
**Relations:** Belongs to Delivery.
#### Totals
The one row of running counts in each event database, read by the
statistics pane at the top of the webhook page.
| Field | Type | Description |
| -------------------- | ------- | ----------- |
| `events` | integer | Events ever stored, resubmitted copies included |
| `deliveries` | integer | Deliveries ever created, replays included |
| `failures` | integer | Deliveries that ever became `failed` |
| `events_removed` | integer | Events retention has deleted |
| `deliveries_removed` | integer | Deliveries retention has deleted |
| `failures_removed` | integer | Failed deliveries retention has deleted |
Each count changes in the transaction that writes or deletes the rows it
counts. The pane shows each of the first three as a lifetime figure, and
less what retention removed as the figure within retention, so neither
needs the rows themselves. Its last-10-minutes and last-24-hours figures
are counted from the `events` and `deliveries` indexes over just that
window. Its failure percentage for a window is the deliveries that became
`failed` in it out of all that became `delivered` or `failed` in it, and
a dash when none did.
#### Event-tier indexes
These indexes on the per-webhook event databases are declared in the model
@@ -1767,10 +1755,10 @@ tags, so `AutoMigrate` creates them on a fresh and on an existing database:
| Table | Columns | Serves |
| ------------------ | --------------------------- | ------ |
| `deliveries` | `status`, `deleted_at`, `finished_at` | Startup recovery, the retry and pending sweeps every 60 seconds and the queue-depth sampler every 30 seconds, which select deliveries by status, and the webhook page's statistics, which count deliveries by status and when they finished |
| `deliveries` | `status`, `deleted_at` | Startup recovery, the retry and pending sweeps every 60 seconds and the queue-depth sampler every 30 seconds, which select deliveries by status |
| `deliveries` | `event_id`, `deleted_at` | The event log, which loads each event's deliveries, and retention, which selects and deletes the deliveries of expired events |
| `delivery_results` | `delivery_id`, `deleted_at` | The event log, which loads the attempts of a page's deliveries, and retention, which deletes the attempts of expired events |
| `events` | `deleted_at`, `created_at` | Retention, which selects expired events by age, and the webhook page's statistics, which count recent events and find the newest |
| `events` | `deleted_at`, `created_at` | Retention, which selects expired events by age |
| `events` | `created_at` | Retention's delete of the expired events themselves |
GORM's soft delete adds `deleted_at IS NULL` to these queries; retention's
@@ -1784,10 +1772,9 @@ and SQLite narrows by a `<` only on the last column it uses.
#### Common Fields
Every entity except `Setting` and `Totals` includes these fields from
`BaseModel`. `Setting` is a bare key-value row with no `id`, no
timestamps and no soft delete, and `Totals` is a single row of counts
with only a numeric `id`:
Every entity except `Setting` includes these fields from `BaseModel`.
`Setting` is a bare key-value row with no `id`, no timestamps and no
soft delete:
| Field | Type | Description |
| ------------ | --------- | ----------- |
@@ -1829,7 +1816,6 @@ encryption key is generated and stored, and an `admin` user is created.
- **Events** — captured incoming webhook payloads
- **Deliveries** — event-to-target pairings and their status
- **DeliveryResults** — individual delivery attempt logs
- **Totals** — running counts of the above, kept through retention
Per-webhook databases are created automatically when a webhook is
created (and lazily on first access for webhooks that predate this
@@ -2566,47 +2552,48 @@ the tree is checked out: four checkouts have reported 3,959, 3,961,
client-supplied field was cut, and that the shipped chain's stack
arrived uncut — never the numbers.
Every limiter here — receiver, login, and password change — identifies
the client the same way, through one shared key function: the
connection's own address, unless the peer is listed in
`TRUSTED_PROXIES`, in which case the forwarded client address is used
instead. That address becomes a bucket by family: IPv4 keys on the full
address, IPv6 on its `/64` prefix. A routed `/64` is the normal
Every limiter here — receiver, login, password change, delivery replay
and event resubmit — identifies the client the same way, through one
shared key function: the connection's own address, unless the peer is
inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, in which case the forwarded client address is
used instead. That address becomes a bucket by family: IPv4 keys on
the full address, IPv6 on its `/64` prefix. A routed `/64` is the normal
residential and mobile IPv6 allocation, so keying IPv6 per address would
let one subscriber rotate source addresses and mint a fresh bucket per
request, evading these limits at the network layer without spoofing
anything; the cost is that distinct clients inside one `/64` share a
bucket. IPv4-mapped addresses (`::ffff:1.2.3.4`) key as the IPv4 address
they carry. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). Deployed without that
variable set, a client behind a reverse proxy shares one bucket with
every other client behind the same proxy. Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the
proxy's address to get per-client limits back. What the shared bucket
they carry. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). When that variable
does not cover the reverse proxy, a client behind it shares one bucket
with every other client behind the same proxy. Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to
the proxy's address to get per-client limits back. What the shared bucket
costs is not the same for every limiter, and the two cases pull in
opposite directions:
- For the **receiver** limits it costs throughput, which is the safe
direction to be wrong in: sharing can only make a limit bind sooner,
never let a sender past it. It matters more for the aggregate limit
than for the per-entrypoint one: with `TRUSTED_PROXIES` unset behind
the reverse proxy a production deployment is required to run behind,
every request keys on the proxy, so the aggregate limit becomes a
service-wide ceiling of 1200 requests per minute across all senders
and all entrypoints, where the per-entrypoint limit's capacity still
grows with the number of entrypoints. Any deployment with more than a
handful of busy entrypoints must set `TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
than for the per-entrypoint one: when `TRUSTED_PROXIES` does not
cover the reverse proxy a production deployment is required to run
behind, every request keys on the proxy, so the aggregate limit
becomes a service-wide ceiling of 1200 requests per minute across all
senders and all entrypoints, where the per-entrypoint limit's
capacity still grows with the number of entrypoints. Any deployment
with more than a handful of busy entrypoints must make sure
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` covers its proxy.
- For the **login and password-change** limits it costs precision, not
availability. Login failures from every client land in one counter,
so a stranger's wrong passwords make the operator's own wrong
passwords answer `429` sooner; the operator's _correct_ password is
never affected, because it is never counted. Production deployments
should still set `TRUSTED_PROXIES`; webhooker warns at startup
whenever it is empty, in any environment.
should still make sure `TRUSTED_PROXIES` covers their proxy.
#### The login endpoint
The login `POST` is the one endpoint with no pre-emptive limiter in
front of it, and that is deliberate. A limiter that spends budget on
arrival is a lockout in this deployment shape: sharing one bucket, a
arrival is a lockout wherever clients share one bucket, as they do
behind a reverse proxy that `TRUSTED_PROXIES` does not cover: a
stranger sending five POSTs a minute — about 0.08 requests per second,
from anywhere — keeps it permanently full, and the operator has no
second administrative path. So the handler inverts the order:
@@ -2703,8 +2690,10 @@ re-fills both verification slots on its first two requests. The
remedies are to block the source at the reverse proxy, or to
rate-limit `POST /pages/login` there — the one place a limit can be
applied without reintroducing the lockout, because the proxy sees the
real client address. Setting `TRUSTED_PROXIES` does not stop the
saturation, but it makes the source visible in the failure logs.
real client address. `TRUSTED_PROXIES` does not stop the saturation.
The flood's source is in the proxy's access log: webhooker's own logs
record the proxy's address, not the client's (see
[Deployment behind a reverse proxy](#deployment-behind-a-reverse-proxy)).
Finer-grained per-webhook rate limits (configured in the web UI and
enforced in the webhook handler) can layer on top of this env-level
@@ -3061,10 +3050,9 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
It runs behind session auth, so only a client already holding a
valid session reaches it, and an operator throttled out of changing
a password can still log in. The bucket is per client IP only when
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the reverse proxy; unset, every client
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` covers the reverse proxy; otherwise every client
shares one bucket, which costs precision rather than availability
(see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)). webhooker warns at startup
whenever `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty
(see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
- Prometheus metrics behind basic auth
- Static assets embedded in binary (no filesystem access needed at
runtime)
+22 -60
View File
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ const (
// internet-exposed endpoint.
defaultReceiverRateLimit = 120
// defaultTrustedProxies is TRUSTED_PROXIES when it is unset: the
// RFC 1918 private ranges, which a reverse proxy reaching the
// process over a Docker network or a private LAN connects from.
defaultTrustedProxies = "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
// maxPort is the highest valid TCP port number. The lower
// bound (at least 1) is enforced by envPositiveInt.
maxPort = 65535
@@ -172,13 +177,14 @@ type Config struct {
// TrustedProxies is the set of networks whose members are
// allowed to speak for the client with X-Forwarded-For, the
// only forwarded header read. It is empty unless
// TRUSTED_PROXIES is set, and empty means no peer is
// trusted: forwarded headers are then ignored entirely and
// clients are identified by the connection's own address.
// Members can choose their own rate-limit key, so this must
// name proxy hosts only, never a block that also covers
// clients.
// only forwarded header read. Unless TRUSTED_PROXIES is set it
// is the RFC 1918 private ranges (defaultTrustedProxies).
// Other peers' forwarded headers are ignored and they are
// identified by the connection's own address. Under the
// default any client with a private address, directly or
// through a trusted proxy, can choose its own rate-limit
// key, so where any clients have private addresses this must
// be set to the proxy hosts alone.
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// AllowedEgressCIDRs is the set of networks a delivery target
@@ -460,14 +466,15 @@ func parseCIDR(entry string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
// envPrefixList returns the value of the named environment variable
// parsed as a comma-separated list of CIDR blocks (bare addresses
// allowed). An unset, empty, or blank value yields an empty list. A
// set value containing an unparseable entry is a hard error naming
// the key and the bad entry, so startup fails loudly rather than
// silently running with a list the operator did not intend.
func envPrefixList(key string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
// allowed). An unset, empty, or blank value is read as defaultValue
// instead. A set value containing an unparseable entry is a hard
// error naming the key and the bad entry, so startup fails loudly
// rather than silently running with a list the operator did not
// intend.
func envPrefixList(key, defaultValue string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key))
if v == "" {
return nil, nil
v = defaultValue
}
var prefixes []netip.Prefix
@@ -681,12 +688,12 @@ func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
return nil, err
}
trustedProxies, err := envPrefixList("TRUSTED_PROXIES")
trustedProxies, err := envPrefixList("TRUSTED_PROXIES", defaultTrustedProxies)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
allowedEgressCIDRs, err := envPrefixList("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS")
allowedEgressCIDRs, err := envPrefixList("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS", "")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -760,50 +767,6 @@ func (c *Config) warnEgressAllowlist(log *slog.Logger) {
)
}
// warnSharedRateLimitBucket logs a startup warning whenever
// TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any environment.
//
// With no trusted proxies every rate limiter keys on the connecting
// peer's address. Whether that is harmless or dangerous depends on
// what is in front of the process, which this code cannot observe:
// with nothing in front, the peer is the client and the limits are
// per-client as intended; behind a reverse proxy the peer is the proxy
// for every request, so all clients share one bucket per limiter.
//
// The login endpoint no longer spends budget on arrival — it verifies
// credentials first and charges only failures — so a shared bucket
// cannot deny the operator a correct password. What it does collapse
// is the failure counting: one client's wrong passwords throttle
// everyone else's wrong passwords, and the receiver's limits become
// service-wide ceilings.
//
// The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT:
// behind a proxy every client shares one bucket in dev and prod alike.
//
// The default of trusting nobody is deliberate — trusting forwarded
// headers from arbitrary peers lets any client choose its own bucket —
// so this warns rather than failing startup or changing the key.
func (c *Config) warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log *slog.Logger) {
if len(c.TrustedProxies) > 0 {
return
}
log.Warn(
"TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty: every rate limit keys on the "+
"connecting peer's address. With nothing proxying to "+
"this process that is the client itself and the limits "+
"are per-client as intended. Behind a reverse proxy the "+
"peer is the proxy on every request, so all clients "+
"share one bucket per limit: the receiver limits become "+
"service-wide ceilings, and one client's failed logins "+
"throttle every other client's failed logins — a "+
"correct password still gets in. If anything proxies to "+
"this process, set TRUSTED_PROXIES to its address.",
"environment", c.Environment,
"trustedProxies", len(c.TrustedProxies),
)
}
// New creates a Config by reading environment variables.
//
//nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused.
@@ -849,7 +812,6 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
"hasMetricsAuth", s.MetricsAuthEnabled(),
)
s.warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log)
s.warnEgressAllowlist(log)
return s, nil
+14 -101
View File
@@ -551,6 +551,11 @@ func testReceiverRateLimitSuccess(
}
func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
// Unset, the RFC 1918 private ranges are trusted, so a reverse
// proxy on a Docker network or a private LAN is covered without
// configuration.
defaultProxies := []string{cidrPrivateV4, "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16"}
tests := []struct {
name string
set bool
@@ -559,18 +564,21 @@ func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
expected []string
}{
{
// The default must be "trust nobody": an empty list
// means forwarded headers are ignored, never that
// every peer may speak for the client.
name: caseUnsetUsesDefault,
set: false,
expected: []string{},
expected: defaultProxies,
},
{
name: "blank value trusts nothing",
name: "blank value uses default",
set: true,
value: " ",
expected: []string{},
expected: defaultProxies,
},
{
name: "set value replaces the default entirely",
set: true,
value: "203.0.113.7",
expected: []string{"203.0.113.7/32"},
},
{
name: caseValidValueParsed,
@@ -845,101 +853,6 @@ func TestEgressAllowlistWarning(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning covers the startup warning that
// tells an operator a deployment behind a reverse proxy shares one
// rate-limit bucket between every client, which turns the receiver
// limits into service-wide ceilings and collapses login failure
// counting. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any
// environment, because behind a proxy every client shares one bucket
// in dev and prod alike. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
environment string
trustedProxies string
expectWarning bool
}{
{
name: "prod without trusted proxies warns",
environment: config.EnvironmentProd,
expectWarning: true,
},
{
name: "prod with trusted proxies is quiet",
environment: config.EnvironmentProd,
trustedProxies: cidrPrivateV4,
expectWarning: false,
},
{
name: "dev without trusted proxies warns",
environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
expectWarning: true,
},
{
name: "dev with trusted proxies is quiet",
environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
trustedProxies: cidrPrivateV4,
expectWarning: false,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", tt.environment)
if tt.trustedProxies == "" {
require.NoError(
t, os.Unsetenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES"),
)
} else {
t.Setenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES", tt.trustedProxies)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
log := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(
&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: slog.LevelDebug,
},
))
require.NoError(
t,
config.WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest(log),
)
if !tt.expectWarning {
assert.Empty(t, buf.String())
return
}
logged := buf.String()
assert.Contains(t, logged, `"level":"WARN"`)
assert.Contains(t, logged, "TRUSTED_PROXIES")
assert.Contains(t, logged, "share one bucket")
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "throttle every other client's failed logins",
)
// The warning must not claim a lockout the login
// endpoint no longer permits: credentials are verified
// before any budget is spent.
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "a correct password still gets in",
)
// The text must stay accurate for a developer with
// nothing in front of the process, where an empty
// list costs nothing.
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "nothing proxying to this process",
)
})
}
}
// metricsEnv describes what one subtest below puts in the
// environment for a single METRICS_ variable. A variable that is
// set to the empty string and one that is not set at all are
-15
View File
@@ -6,21 +6,6 @@ import "log/slog"
// the external config_test package so each helper can be covered by
// its own table-driven test without weakening the package API.
// WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest loads a Config from the current
// environment and emits its startup warnings to log. The real logger
// writes to stdout, so this lets the warning's firing condition be
// asserted against a handler the test controls.
func WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest(log *slog.Logger) error {
c, err := loadFromEnv()
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log)
return nil
}
// WarnEgressAllowlistForTest loads a Config from the current
// environment and emits its egress-allowlist startup warning to
// log, so a test can assert both that the warning fires only when
+5 -69
View File
@@ -93,7 +93,6 @@ func TestEventTierQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
deliveries []database.Delivery
results []database.DeliveryResult
depths []struct{ Depth int }
failed struct{ Count int64 }
)
byStatus := "idx_deliveries_status (status=? AND deleted_at=?)"
@@ -124,7 +123,7 @@ func TestEventTierQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
Order("attempt_num ASC").Find(&results),
"idx_delivery_results_delivery_id (delivery_id=? AND deleted_at=?)")
// Retention's deletes (deleteExpired), whose subqueries are built
// Retention's three deletes (reapExpired), whose subqueries are built
// afresh for each statement as it builds them.
expiredEventIDs := func() *gorm.DB {
return dry.Model(&database.Event{}).Select("id").
@@ -136,12 +135,6 @@ func TestEventTierQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
Select("id").Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs()),
).Delete(&database.DeliveryResult{}),
"idx_delivery_results_delivery_id (delivery_id=?)", byEvent, byAge)
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Select("count(CASE WHEN status = ? THEN 1 END) AS count",
database.DeliveryStatusFailed).
Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs()).
Take(&failed),
"idx_deliveries_event_id (event_id=?)", byAge)
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Where(
"event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs(),
).Delete(&database.Delivery{}),
@@ -151,54 +144,6 @@ func TestEventTierQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
).Delete(&database.Event{}), "idx_events_created_at (created_at<?)")
}
// TestStatisticsQueriesUseTheirIndexes does the same for the webhook
// page's statistics (readEventStats in the handlers): deliveries in
// progress, deliveries finished and events received since a time, and
// the newest event, which must come straight off an index rather than
// from sorting every event.
func TestStatisticsQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
db, err := mgr.GetDB(uuid.New().String())
require.NoError(t, err)
dry := db.Session(&gorm.Session{DryRun: true})
since := time.Now()
var (
count int64
newest []time.Time
)
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("status IN ?", []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
}).Count(&count),
"idx_deliveries_status (status=? AND deleted_at=?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("status = ? AND finished_at >= ?",
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, since).Count(&count),
"idx_deliveries_status "+
"(status=? AND deleted_at=? AND finished_at>?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("created_at >= ?", since).Count(&count),
"idx_events_deleted_at_created_at "+
"(deleted_at=? AND created_at>?)")
newestEvent := dry.Model(&database.Event{}).
Order("created_at DESC").Limit(1).Pluck("created_at", &newest)
assertPlanUses(t, db, newestEvent,
"idx_events_deleted_at_created_at (deleted_at=?)")
assert.NotContains(t, queryPlan(t, db, newestEvent), "TEMP B-TREE")
}
// assertPlanUses asserts that SQLite's plan for a statement GORM built
// in a dry run, run with the same SQL and arguments GORM would send,
// names each of the given indexes.
@@ -207,18 +152,6 @@ func assertPlanUses(
) {
t.Helper()
plan := queryPlan(t, db, built)
for _, index := range indexes {
assert.Contains(t, plan, index, built.Statement.SQL.String())
}
}
// queryPlan returns SQLite's plan for a statement GORM built in a dry
// run, run with the same SQL and arguments GORM would send.
func queryPlan(t *testing.T, db, built *gorm.DB) string {
t.Helper()
var plan []struct{ Detail string }
require.NoError(t, db.Raw(
@@ -226,5 +159,8 @@ func queryPlan(t *testing.T, db, built *gorm.DB) string {
built.Statement.Vars...,
).Scan(&plan).Error)
return fmt.Sprint(plan)
for _, index := range indexes {
assert.Contains(t, fmt.Sprint(plan), index,
built.Statement.SQL.String())
}
}
+1 -11
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
package database
import (
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
import "gorm.io/gorm"
// DeliveryStatus represents the status of a delivery
type DeliveryStatus string
@@ -49,12 +45,6 @@ type Delivery struct {
// gives.
DeletedAt gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:"index:idx_deliveries_event_id,priority:2;index:idx_deliveries_status,priority:2" json:"deletedAt,omitzero"`
// FinishedAt is when the delivery became delivered or failed, and
// nil while it is pending or retrying. It ends the status index,
// so the webhook page counts the deliveries that finished in a
// recent window by reading that window from the index.
FinishedAt *time.Time `gorm:"index:idx_deliveries_status,priority:3" json:"finishedAt,omitempty"`
// Relations
Event Event `json:"event,omitzero"`
Target Target `json:"target,omitzero"`
-73
View File
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
package database
import (
"fmt"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// Totals is the single row of running totals in a webhook's event
// database. It is what keeps the webhook page's lifetime figures right
// after retention has removed the rows they count, and what lets the
// page show them without counting every row.
//
// Storing an event, creating a delivery and failing a delivery each
// add one, and retention adds what it deletes to the Removed columns.
// Every addition goes through AddTotals, in the transaction that
// writes or deletes the rows it counts.
type Totals struct {
ID int64 `gorm:"primaryKey"`
Events int64 `gorm:"not null"`
Deliveries int64 `gorm:"not null"`
Failures int64 `gorm:"not null"`
EventsRemoved int64 `gorm:"not null"`
DeliveriesRemoved int64 `gorm:"not null"`
FailuresRemoved int64 `gorm:"not null"`
}
// TableName names the table AddTotals updates.
func (Totals) TableName() string {
return "totals"
}
// EventsWithinRetention is how many of the webhook's events are still
// stored.
func (t Totals) EventsWithinRetention() int64 {
return t.Events - t.EventsRemoved
}
// DeliveriesWithinRetention is how many of the webhook's deliveries
// are still stored.
func (t Totals) DeliveriesWithinRetention() int64 {
return t.Deliveries - t.DeliveriesRemoved
}
// FailuresWithinRetention is how many of the webhook's failed
// deliveries are still stored.
func (t Totals) FailuresWithinRetention() int64 {
return t.Failures - t.FailuresRemoved
}
// AddTotals adds each count in add to the webhook's running totals.
// Call it on the transaction that writes or deletes the rows it
// counts, so the totals change exactly when those rows do.
func AddTotals(tx *gorm.DB, add Totals) error {
err := tx.Exec(
`UPDATE totals SET
events = events + ?,
deliveries = deliveries + ?,
failures = failures + ?,
events_removed = events_removed + ?,
deliveries_removed = deliveries_removed + ?,
failures_removed = failures_removed + ?`,
add.Events, add.Deliveries, add.Failures,
add.EventsRemoved, add.DeliveriesRemoved, add.FailuresRemoved,
).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("adding to running totals: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ package database
// Migrate runs database migrations for the main application database.
// Only configuration-tier models are stored in the main database.
// Event-tier models (Event, Delivery, DeliveryResult, Totals) live in
// Event-tier models (Event, Delivery, DeliveryResult) live in
// per-webhook dedicated databases managed by WebhookDBManager.
func (d *Database) Migrate() error {
return d.db.AutoMigrate(
+13 -59
View File
@@ -267,101 +267,55 @@ func retentionCutoff(
// reapExpired hard-deletes, in foreign-key-safe order, the delivery
// results, deliveries, and events associated with events older than
// cutoff, and adds what it deleted to the running totals, all in one
// transaction. Deletes are unscoped so rows are physically removed
// rather than soft-deleted, reclaiming disk. It returns the number of
// events deleted.
// cutoff. Deletes are unscoped so rows are physically removed rather
// than soft-deleted, reclaiming disk. It returns the number of events
// deleted.
func reapExpired(db *gorm.DB, cutoff time.Time) (int64, error) {
var removed Totals
err := db.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
var err error
removed, err = deleteExpired(tx, cutoff)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return AddTotals(tx, removed)
})
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return removed.EventsRemoved, nil
}
// deleteExpired runs reapExpired's deletes and returns how many
// events, deliveries and failed deliveries they removed.
func deleteExpired(tx *gorm.DB, cutoff time.Time) (Totals, error) {
var removed Totals
// Fresh subqueries are built per statement to avoid reusing a
// mutated builder across executions.
expiredEventIDs := func() *gorm.DB {
return tx.Model(&Event{}).
return db.Model(&Event{}).
Select("id").
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff)
}
expiredDeliveryIDs := func() *gorm.DB {
return tx.Model(&Delivery{}).
return db.Model(&Delivery{}).
Select("id").
Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs())
}
// 1. Delivery results whose delivery belongs to an expired event.
res := tx.Unscoped().
res := db.Unscoped().
Where("delivery_id IN (?)", expiredDeliveryIDs()).
Delete(&DeliveryResult{})
if res.Error != nil {
return removed, fmt.Errorf(
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"deleting expired delivery results: %w",
res.Error,
)
}
// 2. Deliveries belonging to an expired event, after counting the
// failed ones among them. The status is tested in the select list
// rather than the WHERE clause: there, SQLite would read every
// failed delivery the webhook has through the status index,
// instead of only the expired ones through the event_id index.
var failed struct{ Count int64 }
err := tx.Unscoped().Model(&Delivery{}).
Select("count(CASE WHEN status = ? THEN 1 END) AS count",
DeliveryStatusFailed).
Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs()).
Take(&failed).Error
if err != nil {
return removed, fmt.Errorf(
"counting expired failed deliveries: %w", err,
)
}
del := tx.Unscoped().
// 2. Deliveries belonging to an expired event.
del := db.Unscoped().
Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs()).
Delete(&Delivery{})
if del.Error != nil {
return removed, fmt.Errorf(
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"deleting expired deliveries: %w",
del.Error,
)
}
// 3. The expired events themselves.
ev := tx.Unscoped().
ev := db.Unscoped().
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff).
Delete(&Event{})
if ev.Error != nil {
return removed, fmt.Errorf(
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"deleting expired events: %w",
ev.Error,
)
}
removed.EventsRemoved = ev.RowsAffected
removed.DeliveriesRemoved = del.RowsAffected
removed.FailuresRemoved = failed.Count
return removed, nil
return ev.RowsAffected, nil
}
-126
View File
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
package database_test
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// readTotals reads a webhook database's row of running totals,
// asserting that it has exactly one.
func readTotals(t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB) database.Totals {
t.Helper()
var rows []database.Totals
require.NoError(t, db.Find(&rows).Error)
require.Len(t, rows, 1)
return rows[0]
}
// TestWebhookDBManager_TotalsRowSurvivesReopen verifies that a new
// event database starts with one row of zero totals, and that opening
// it again keeps that row and what was added to it.
func TestWebhookDBManager_TotalsRowSurvivesReopen(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
fresh := readTotals(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, database.Totals{ID: fresh.ID}, fresh)
require.NoError(t, database.AddTotals(db, database.Totals{
Events: 2, Deliveries: 3, Failures: 1,
}))
// Drop the cached connection so the next open reopens the file,
// as a restart would.
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
db, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, database.Totals{
ID: fresh.ID, Events: 2, Deliveries: 3, Failures: 1,
}, readTotals(t, db))
}
// TestRetentionReaper_AddsWhatItRemovesToTotals verifies that a sweep
// leaves the lifetime totals alone and adds the events, deliveries and
// failed deliveries it deletes to the removed totals, so the totals
// within retention match the rows still stored.
func TestRetentionReaper_AddsWhatItRemovesToTotals(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
now := time.Now()
expired := now.Add(-40 * 24 * time.Hour)
seedEventChain(t, db, webhookID, expired)
expiredFailure := seedEventChain(t, db, webhookID, expired)
recentFailure := seedEventChain(
t, db, webhookID, now.Add(-24*time.Hour),
)
for _, id := range []string{
expiredFailure.deliveryID, recentFailure.deliveryID,
} {
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("id = ?", id).
Update("status", database.DeliveryStatusFailed).Error)
}
// The totals storing those rows would have left.
require.NoError(t, database.AddTotals(db, database.Totals{
Events: 3, Deliveries: 3, Failures: 2,
}))
env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
totals := readTotals(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, database.Totals{
ID: totals.ID,
Events: 3, Deliveries: 3, Failures: 2,
EventsRemoved: 2, DeliveriesRemoved: 2, FailuresRemoved: 1,
}, totals)
var events, deliveries, failures int64
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&events).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Count(&deliveries).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("status = ?", database.DeliveryStatusFailed).
Count(&failures).Error)
assert.Equal(t, events, totals.EventsWithinRetention())
assert.Equal(t, deliveries, totals.DeliveriesWithinRetention())
assert.Equal(t, failures, totals.FailuresWithinRetention())
// A sweep with nothing left to remove changes nothing.
env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.Equal(t, totals, readTotals(t, db))
}
+2 -14
View File
@@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ var errInvalidCachedDBType = errors.New(
// WebhookDBManager manages per-webhook SQLite database files
// for event storage. Each webhook gets its own dedicated
// database containing Events, Deliveries, DeliveryResults and the
// running Totals of them.
// database containing Events, Deliveries, and DeliveryResults.
// Database connections are opened lazily and cached.
type WebhookDBManager struct {
dataDir string
@@ -295,7 +294,7 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(
// Run migrations for event-tier models only
err = db.AutoMigrate(
&Event{}, &Delivery{}, &DeliveryResult{}, &Totals{},
&Event{}, &Delivery{}, &DeliveryResult{},
)
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
@@ -306,17 +305,6 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(
)
}
// A new database gets its row of running totals, all zero.
err = db.FirstOrCreate(&Totals{}).Error
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"creating running totals for webhook database %s: %w",
webhookID, err,
)
}
m.log.Info(
"opened per-webhook database",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
-100
View File
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// failureTotal reads the running failure total of a webhook database.
func failureTotal(t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB) int64 {
t.Helper()
var totals database.Totals
require.NoError(t, db.Take(&totals).Error)
return totals.Failures
}
// TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_FinishTimeAndFailureTotal pins what a status
// write records for the webhook page's statistics: the time a delivery
// finished, set only when it becomes delivered or failed, and one more
// on the failure total when it fails.
func TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_FinishTimeAndFailureTotal(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
status database.DeliveryStatus
finished bool
failures int64
}{
{database.DeliveryStatusRetrying, false, 0},
{database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, true, 0},
{database.DeliveryStatusFailed, true, 1},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(string(tt.status), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{}`)
d := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, uuid.New().String(),
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
before := time.Now()
require.NoError(t, e.ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
db, &d, tt.status,
))
var stored database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, db.First(&stored, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
assert.Equal(t, tt.status, stored.Status)
if tt.finished {
require.NotNil(t, stored.FinishedAt)
assert.False(t, stored.FinishedAt.Before(before))
} else {
assert.Nil(t, stored.FinishedAt)
}
assert.Equal(t, tt.failures, failureTotal(t, db))
})
}
}
// TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_DeletedDeliveryIsNotCounted covers a
// delivery retention deleted while the engine still held it. Failing
// it afterwards writes no row, so it adds no failure either: retention
// has already counted what it removed.
func TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_DeletedDeliveryIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{}`)
d := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, uuid.New().String(),
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
require.NoError(t, db.Unscoped().
Delete(&database.Delivery{}, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
require.NoError(t, e.ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
db, &d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
))
assert.Zero(t, failureTotal(t, db))
}
+2 -30
View File
@@ -1554,9 +1554,8 @@ func (e *Engine) updateDeliveryStatus(
targetType database.TargetType,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
) error {
err := webhookDB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
return writeDeliveryStatus(tx, d, status)
})
err := webhookDB.Model(d).
Update("status", status).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"updating delivery %s to status %s: %w",
@@ -1575,33 +1574,6 @@ func (e *Engine) updateDeliveryStatus(
return nil
}
// writeDeliveryStatus writes a delivery's new status. A delivery that
// becomes delivered or failed also gets the time it finished, and a
// failed one is added to the webhook's running failure total. The
// failure is counted only if the row was still there to update:
// retention may have deleted it while the engine was working on it.
func writeDeliveryStatus(
tx *gorm.DB,
d *database.Delivery,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
) error {
columns := map[string]any{"status": status}
if status.Terminal() {
columns["finished_at"] = time.Now()
}
res := tx.Model(d).Updates(columns)
if res.Error != nil {
return res.Error
}
if status == database.DeliveryStatusFailed && res.RowsAffected > 0 {
return database.AddTotals(tx, database.Totals{Failures: 1})
}
return nil
}
// settleStatus moves a delivery to its outcome status and reports a
// failed write through bookkeepingFailed, which leaves the row
// recoverable. It exists so the target call sites read as one
-2
View File
@@ -57,9 +57,7 @@ func testWebhookDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
&database.Event{},
&database.Delivery{},
&database.DeliveryResult{},
&database.Totals{},
))
require.NoError(t, db.Create(&database.Totals{}).Error)
return db
}
-10
View File
@@ -150,16 +150,6 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverSlack(
)
}
// ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus exposes updateDeliveryStatus. It passes no
// target type, so no metric moves.
func (e *Engine) ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
d *database.Delivery,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
) error {
return e.updateDeliveryStatus(webhookDB, d, "", status)
}
// ExportProcessNewTask exposes processNewTask.
func (e *Engine) ExportProcessNewTask(
ctx context.Context, task *Task,
+4 -3
View File
@@ -103,9 +103,10 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderLoginError(
// The credential check runs BEFORE any rate-limit budget is
// consulted, and only a failed check spends budget. That is what
// keeps the single administrative path reachable: behind the reverse
// proxy this deployment requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset, every
// client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent on arrival lets any
// stranger deny the operator's own correct password indefinitely.
// proxy this deployment requires, when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not cover
// it, every client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent on arrival
// lets any stranger deny the operator's own correct password
// indefinitely.
//
// Verifying first means every login POST costs an Argon2id hash, so
// the work is taken under a bounded number of verification slots.
+6 -6
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ const (
// sharedProxyPeer is the whole point of this file. Production is
// required to run behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy, and
// TRUSTED_PROXIES defaults to empty, so every client — attacker
// when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not cover it every client — attacker
// and operator alike — reaches the process from the proxy's
// address and shares one rate-limit bucket. Both parties in
// these tests therefore use the same RemoteAddr.
@@ -115,11 +115,11 @@ func floodFailures(
// done-criterion of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/150.
//
// The attacker and the operator share one rate-limit bucket, because
// behind the mandated reverse proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset every
// client keys on the proxy's address. The attacker floods the
// operator's own username — a single-admin product has a predictable
// one — far past the failure limit. The operator must still be able
// to log in with the correct password.
// behind the mandated reverse proxy, when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not
// cover it, every client keys on the proxy's address. The attacker
// floods the operator's own username — a single-admin product has a
// predictable one — far past the failure limit. The operator must
// still be able to log in with the correct password.
//
// This fails if credentials stop being verified ahead of the limiter.
func TestLogin_StrangersFloodCannotLockOutTheOperator(t *testing.T) {
+2 -10
View File
@@ -299,8 +299,7 @@ func countInFlightDeliveries(
return count, err
}
// createReplayDelivery writes the new pending delivery row, adds it to
// the webhook's running totals in the same transaction, and returns
// createReplayDelivery writes the new pending delivery row and returns
// the task that carries it to the delivery engine.
//
// The row is written with associations omitted, and neither Event nor
@@ -320,14 +319,7 @@ func createReplayDelivery(
Status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
}
err := webhookDB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
err := tx.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(dlv).Error
if err != nil {
return err
}
return database.AddTotals(tx, database.Totals{Deliveries: 1})
})
err := webhookDB.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(dlv).Error
if err != nil {
return delivery.Task{}, err
}
-15
View File
@@ -69,21 +69,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) LoadEventLogViewsForTest(
return views
}
// WebhookStatsForTest returns the figures the statistics pane on a
// webhook's page shows, from the webhook's entrypoints and targets
// loaded as that page loads them.
func (s *Handlers) WebhookStatsForTest(webhookID string) *WebhookStats {
var entrypoints []database.Entrypoint
s.db.DB().Where("webhook_id = ?", webhookID).Find(&entrypoints)
var targets []database.Target
s.db.DB().Where("webhook_id = ?", webhookID).Find(&targets)
return s.loadWebhookStats(webhookID, entrypoints, targets)
}
// AddTemplateForTest registers a template under a page name so that
// the handlers_test package can drive the render path with a
// template of its own.
+12 -16
View File
@@ -91,22 +91,18 @@ type Handlers struct {
// parsePageTemplate parses a page-specific template set from the
// embedded FS. Each page template is combined with the shared
// base, htmlheader, and navbar templates, and with any further files
// the page includes. The page file must be listed first so that its
// root action ({{template "base" .}}) becomes the template set's entry
// point.
func parsePageTemplate(
pageFile string, included ...string,
) *template.Template {
files := append([]string{
pageFile,
"base.html",
"htmlheader.html",
"navbar.html",
}, included...)
// base, htmlheader, and navbar templates. The page file must be
// listed first so that its root action ({{template "base" .}})
// becomes the template set's entry point.
func parsePageTemplate(pageFile string) *template.Template {
return template.Must(
template.ParseFS(templates.Templates, files...),
template.ParseFS(
templates.Templates,
pageFile,
"base.html",
"htmlheader.html",
"navbar.html",
),
)
}
@@ -135,7 +131,7 @@ func New(
"profile.html": parsePageTemplate("profile.html"),
"sources_list.html": parsePageTemplate("sources_list.html"),
"sources_new.html": parsePageTemplate("sources_new.html"),
"source_detail.html": parsePageTemplate("source_detail.html", "webhook_stats.html"),
"source_detail.html": parsePageTemplate("source_detail.html"),
"source_edit.html": parsePageTemplate("source_edit.html"),
"source_logs.html": parsePageTemplate("source_logs.html"),
"target_edit.html": parsePageTemplate("target_edit.html"),
-1
View File
@@ -450,7 +450,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderSourceDetail(
"Targets": delivery.NewTargetViews(targets),
"Events": events,
"BaseURL": baseURL,
"Stats": h.loadWebhookStats(webhook.ID, entrypoints, targets),
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "source_detail.html", data)
+5 -16
View File
@@ -252,12 +252,11 @@ func requestEventSource(
}
}
// createAndFanOut writes the event and one pending delivery per target,
// and adds them to the webhook's running totals, in a single
// transaction, then hands the tasks to the delivery engine. It is the
// only path by which an event and its deliveries are created, so a
// resubmitted event is retried, SSRF-guarded and circuit-broken
// exactly as a received one is.
// createAndFanOut writes the event and one pending delivery per target
// in a single transaction, then hands the tasks to the delivery
// engine. It is the only path by which an event and its deliveries are
// created, so a resubmitted event is retried, SSRF-guarded and
// circuit-broken exactly as a received one is.
//
// The tasks are returned as well as queued, so a caller can report how
// many targets the event went to.
@@ -297,16 +296,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) createAndFanOut(
return nil, nil, err
}
err = database.AddTotals(tx, database.Totals{
Events: 1,
Deliveries: int64(len(tasks)),
})
if err != nil {
tx.Rollback()
return nil, nil, err
}
err = tx.Commit().Error
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(
-212
View File
@@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"fmt"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// The spans of the two recent windows the statistics pane reports on:
// the last 10 minutes and the last 24 hours.
const (
shortWindow = 10 * time.Minute
longWindow = 24 * time.Hour
)
// percent turns a fraction into a percentage.
const percent = 100
// WebhookStats holds the figures in the statistics pane at the top of
// the webhook page.
type WebhookStats struct {
Entrypoints int
ActiveEntrypoints int
Targets int
ActiveTargets int
// Totals holds the lifetime counts of events, deliveries and
// failures, and how many of each retention has removed.
Totals database.Totals
// InProgress counts the deliveries still pending or retrying.
InProgress int64
// LastEventAt is when the newest stored event arrived, or nil when
// none is stored.
LastEventAt *time.Time
Last10Minutes RecentWindow
Last24Hours RecentWindow
}
// RecentWindow holds what happened in one recent window: the events
// received in it, and the deliveries that became delivered or failed in
// it.
type RecentWindow struct {
Events int64
Delivered int64
Failed int64
}
// FailurePercent is the share of the deliveries finished in the window
// that failed, or a dash when none finished. Deliveries still pending
// or retrying are not counted either way.
func (w RecentWindow) FailurePercent() string {
finished := w.Delivered + w.Failed
if finished == 0 {
return "—"
}
return fmt.Sprintf(
"%.1f%%", percent*float64(w.Failed)/float64(finished),
)
}
// loadWebhookStats gathers the figures for the statistics pane from the
// webhook's entrypoints and targets, as the page has already loaded
// them, and from its event database. It returns nil, and logs why, when
// the event database cannot be read.
func (h *Handlers) loadWebhookStats(
webhookID string,
entrypoints []database.Entrypoint,
targets []database.Target,
) *WebhookStats {
stats := &WebhookStats{
Entrypoints: len(entrypoints),
Targets: len(targets),
}
for i := range entrypoints {
if entrypoints[i].Active {
stats.ActiveEntrypoints++
}
}
for i := range targets {
if targets[i].Active {
stats.ActiveTargets++
}
}
// Opening an event database that does not exist would create it,
// and it would hold nothing to count.
if !h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhookID) {
return stats
}
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhookID)
if err == nil {
err = readEventStats(webhookDB, time.Now(), stats)
}
if err != nil {
h.log.Error(
"failed to read webhook statistics",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"error", err,
)
return nil
}
return stats
}
// readEventStats fills in the figures that come from the webhook's
// event database. None of them reads every stored row: the totals are
// one row, and every other figure is read from an index, over only the
// rows it counts.
func readEventStats(
db *gorm.DB, now time.Time, stats *WebhookStats,
) error {
err := db.Take(&stats.Totals).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reading running totals: %w", err)
}
err = db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("status IN ?", []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
}).
Count(&stats.InProgress).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("counting deliveries in progress: %w", err)
}
var newest []time.Time
err = db.Model(&database.Event{}).
Order("created_at DESC").
Limit(1).
Pluck("created_at", &newest).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reading newest event time: %w", err)
}
if len(newest) > 0 {
stats.LastEventAt = &newest[0]
}
stats.Last10Minutes, err = readRecentWindow(
db, now.Add(-shortWindow),
)
if err != nil {
return err
}
stats.Last24Hours, err = readRecentWindow(
db, now.Add(-longWindow),
)
return err
}
// readRecentWindow counts the events received, and the deliveries that
// became delivered or failed, since the given time.
func readRecentWindow(
db *gorm.DB, since time.Time,
) (RecentWindow, error) {
var w RecentWindow
err := db.Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("created_at >= ?", since).
Count(&w.Events).Error
if err != nil {
return w, fmt.Errorf("counting recent events: %w", err)
}
w.Delivered, err = countFinishedSince(
db, database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, since,
)
if err != nil {
return w, err
}
w.Failed, err = countFinishedSince(
db, database.DeliveryStatusFailed, since,
)
return w, err
}
// countFinishedSince counts the deliveries that reached the given
// final status since the given time.
func countFinishedSince(
db *gorm.DB, status database.DeliveryStatus, since time.Time,
) (int64, error) {
var n int64
err := db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("status = ? AND finished_at >= ?", status, since).
Count(&n).Error
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"counting deliveries %s recently: %w", status, err,
)
}
return n, nil
}
-328
View File
@@ -1,328 +0,0 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// statsEntrypoint adds an entrypoint to a webhook and returns its path.
func statsEntrypoint(
t *testing.T, db *database.Database, webhookID string, active bool,
) string {
t.Helper()
ep := &database.Entrypoint{
WebhookID: webhookID,
Path: uuid.New().String(),
}
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(ep).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Model(ep).Update("active", active).Error)
return ep.Path
}
// statsDelivery returns the id of an event's delivery to a target.
func statsDelivery(
t *testing.T, webhookDB *gorm.DB, eventID, targetID string,
) string {
t.Helper()
var d database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Where(
"event_id = ? AND target_id = ?", eventID, targetID,
).First(&d).Error)
return d.ID
}
// statsFinish settles a delivery as the delivery engine does: its
// final status and the time it finished, and for a failure one more on
// the webhook's failure total, in one transaction.
func statsFinish(
t *testing.T,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
deliveryID string,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
at time.Time,
) {
t.Helper()
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
err := tx.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("id = ?", deliveryID).
Updates(map[string]any{"status": status, "finished_at": at}).
Error
if err != nil || status != database.DeliveryStatusFailed {
return err
}
return database.AddTotals(tx, database.Totals{Failures: 1})
}))
}
// statsAge moves an event's arrival back to the given time.
func statsAge(
t *testing.T, webhookDB *gorm.DB, eventID string, at time.Time,
) {
t.Helper()
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("id = ?", eventID).
Update("created_at", at).Error)
}
// seedStatsHistory builds the webhook the statistics test checks: one
// day of retention, two entrypoints (one inactive) and three targets
// (one inactive). Three events arrive through the receiver, and so
// each has a delivery to the two active targets. The oldest event is
// past retention, the middle one six hours old, the newest just in.
// Their deliveries are settled as the delivery engine would, and a
// replay adds a pending delivery to the oldest event. It returns the
// webhook, its event database and the newest event.
func seedStatsHistory(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sess *session.Session,
db *database.Database,
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
) (*database.Webhook, *gorm.DB, database.Event) {
t.Helper()
wh := &database.Webhook{
UserID: deleteTestUserID, Name: "stats", RetentionDays: 1,
}
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error)
path := statsEntrypoint(t, db, wh.ID, true)
statsEntrypoint(t, db, wh.ID, false)
first := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeHTTP,
`{"url":"`+replayTargetURL+`"}`,
)
second := seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
inactive := seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Model(inactive).
Update("active", false).Error)
router := receiverRouter(h)
for range 3 {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, postReceiver(t, router, path))
}
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
events := listEvents(t, webhookDB)
require.Len(t, events, 3)
oldest, middle, newest := events[0], events[1], events[2]
now := time.Now()
statsAge(t, webhookDB, oldest.ID, now.Add(-50*time.Hour))
statsAge(t, webhookDB, middle.ID, now.Add(-6*time.Hour))
oldestFailure := statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, oldest.ID, first.ID)
statsFinish(t, webhookDB, oldestFailure,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-49*time.Hour))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, oldest.ID, second.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, now.Add(-49*time.Hour))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, middle.ID, first.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-5*time.Hour))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, middle.ID, second.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-time.Minute))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, newest.ID, first.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, now.Add(-2*time.Minute))
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther,
postReplay(t, h, sess, wh.ID, oldestFailure).Code)
return wh, webhookDB, newest
}
// statsPrune runs the real retention reaper until it has removed one
// event from the webhook's database, then stops it.
func statsPrune(
t *testing.T,
db *database.Database,
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
log *logger.Logger,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
) {
t.Helper()
lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
database.NewRetentionReaper(lc, database.RetentionReaperParams{
Config: &config.Config{
RetentionSweepInterval: 10 * time.Millisecond,
},
Database: db,
DBManager: dbMgr,
Logger: log,
})
lc.RequireStart()
require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
var totals database.Totals
err := webhookDB.Take(&totals).Error
return err == nil && totals.EventsRemoved == 1
}, 10*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond)
lc.RequireStop()
}
// assertStatsTotals checks the lifetime events, deliveries and
// failures, and those within retention.
func assertStatsTotals(
t *testing.T, totals database.Totals, lifetime, within [3]int64,
) {
t.Helper()
gotLifetime := [3]int64{
totals.Events, totals.Deliveries, totals.Failures,
}
gotWithin := [3]int64{
totals.EventsWithinRetention(),
totals.DeliveriesWithinRetention(),
totals.FailuresWithinRetention(),
}
assert.Equal(t, lifetime, gotLifetime,
"lifetime events, deliveries, failures")
assert.Equal(t, within, gotWithin,
"events, deliveries, failures within retention")
}
// TestWebhookStats_EveryFigureAcrossRetentionPrune checks every figure
// the statistics pane shows for the history seedStatsHistory builds,
// before and after the real retention reaper removes the oldest event.
func TestWebhookStats_EveryFigureAcrossRetentionPrune(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
log *logger.Logger
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr, &log)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh, webhookDB, newest := seedStatsHistory(t, h, sess, db, dbMgr)
stats := h.WebhookStatsForTest(wh.ID)
require.NotNil(t, stats)
assert.Equal(t, 2, stats.Entrypoints)
assert.Equal(t, 1, stats.ActiveEntrypoints)
assert.Equal(t, 3, stats.Targets)
assert.Equal(t, 2, stats.ActiveTargets)
assertStatsTotals(t, stats.Totals, [3]int64{3, 7, 3}, [3]int64{3, 7, 3})
assert.Equal(t, int64(2), stats.InProgress)
require.NotNil(t, stats.LastEventAt)
assert.True(t, newest.CreatedAt.Equal(*stats.LastEventAt))
assert.Equal(t, handlers.RecentWindow{
Events: 1, Delivered: 1, Failed: 1,
}, stats.Last10Minutes)
assert.Equal(t, handlers.RecentWindow{
Events: 2, Delivered: 1, Failed: 2,
}, stats.Last24Hours)
assert.Equal(t, "50.0%", stats.Last10Minutes.FailurePercent())
assert.Equal(t, "66.7%", stats.Last24Hours.FailurePercent())
// Retention removes the oldest event with its three deliveries,
// one of them failed and one the pending replay.
statsPrune(t, db, dbMgr, log, webhookDB)
after := h.WebhookStatsForTest(wh.ID)
require.NotNil(t, after)
assertStatsTotals(t, after.Totals, [3]int64{3, 7, 3}, [3]int64{2, 4, 2})
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), after.InProgress)
assert.Equal(t, stats.LastEventAt, after.LastEventAt)
assert.Equal(t, stats.Last10Minutes, after.Last10Minutes)
assert.Equal(t, stats.Last24Hours, after.Last24Hours)
body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.Contains(t, body, "Statistics")
assert.Contains(t, body, "Within retention")
assert.Contains(t, body, "50.0%")
assert.Contains(t, body, "66.7%")
}
// TestWebhookStats_WebhookWithNoEvents covers a webhook whose event
// database has never been opened: every count is zero, the
// percentages are a dash, and showing the page does not create the
// database.
func TestWebhookStats_WebhookWithNoEvents(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, &handlers.WebhookStats{}, h.WebhookStatsForTest(wh.ID))
assert.Equal(t, "—", handlers.RecentWindow{}.FailurePercent())
body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.Contains(t, body, "Statistics")
assert.False(t, dbMgr.DBExists(wh.ID))
}
// TestRecentWindow_FailurePercent pins the percentage: failed
// deliveries out of all that finished in the window.
func TestRecentWindow_FailurePercent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
window handlers.RecentWindow
want string
}{
{handlers.RecentWindow{}, "—"},
{handlers.RecentWindow{Events: 4}, "—"},
{handlers.RecentWindow{Delivered: 3, Failed: 1}, "25.0%"},
{handlers.RecentWindow{Failed: 2}, "100.0%"},
{handlers.RecentWindow{Delivered: 2}, "0.0%"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, tt.window.FailurePercent(), tt.window)
}
}
+4 -4
View File
@@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ type failureWindow struct {
//
// A limiter that spends budget on arrival cannot protect a
// single-admin product: behind the reverse proxy the deployment
// requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset, every client keys on the
// proxy, so a stranger trickling five POSTs a minute keeps the one
// bucket full and the operator's own correct password is answered 429
// forever. There is no second administrative path.
// requires, when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not cover it, every client
// keys on the proxy, so a stranger trickling five POSTs a minute
// keeps the one bucket full and the operator's own correct password
// is answered 429 forever. There is no second administrative path.
//
// So budget is spent only by a FAILED verification. A correct
// password is never throttled, whatever the counters say, which is
+2 -3
View File
@@ -123,9 +123,8 @@ func bucketKey(addr netip.Addr) string {
return prefix.String()
}
// isTrustedProxy reports whether addr belongs to a network the
// operator listed in TRUSTED_PROXIES. The list is empty by default,
// so by default nothing is trusted.
// isTrustedProxy reports whether addr belongs to a network in
// TRUSTED_PROXIES, which by default is the RFC 1918 private ranges.
func (m *Middleware) isTrustedProxy(addr netip.Addr) bool {
for _, prefix := range m.params.Config.TrustedProxies {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
+10 -9
View File
@@ -384,8 +384,8 @@ const (
// trustedProxyCIDR is the proxy network the forwarded-path
// tests configure, and trustedPeer an address inside it. A
// production deployment is required to run behind a reverse
// proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES set, so this is the shape the
// bucketing has to hold in.
// proxy that TRUSTED_PROXIES covers, either by the default or by
// a set value, so this is the shape the bucketing has to hold in.
trustedProxyCIDR = "10.0.0.0/8"
trustedPeer = "10.0.0.1:44444"
)
@@ -426,8 +426,8 @@ func assertSharedBucket(
}
// TestRateLimitKey_SpoofedForwardedFromUntrustedPeer is the test
// this gating exists for: with no trusted proxies configured (the
// default), a client that rotates a forwarded header on every
// this gating exists for: from a peer that is not a trusted
// proxy, a client that rotates a forwarded header on every
// request must stay in one bucket. If forwarded headers were
// trusted unconditionally, each spoofed value would mint a fresh
// bucket and the limit would stop no one.
@@ -1097,8 +1097,9 @@ func TestPostRateLimit_IPv4IndependentPerAddress(t *testing.T) {
// that arrives from trustedPeer — a configured trusted proxy — and
// names forwarded as its client in X-Forwarded-For. That is the
// production path: a deployment is required to run behind a reverse
// proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES set, so the forwarded address, not the
// peer, is what the limiters bucket on there.
// proxy that TRUSTED_PROXIES covers, either by the default or by a
// set value, so the forwarded address, not the peer, is what the
// limiters bucket on there.
func forwardedKeyFor(
t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware, forwarded string,
) string {
@@ -1178,9 +1179,9 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedIPv6BucketsByPrefix(t *testing.T) {
//
// Every existing test of this fallback uses an IPv4 proxy, where
// bucketKey is the identity function, so replacing the call with
// peer.String() leaves the whole suite green. Only operator-listed
// addresses reach this line and the fallback is fail-closed, so this
// pins behaviour rather than fixing a defect.
// peer.String() leaves the whole suite green. Only addresses inside
// TRUSTED_PROXIES reach this line and the fallback is fail-closed, so
// this pins behaviour rather than fixing a defect.
func TestRateLimitKey_TrustedPeerUnusableForwardedMasksPeer(
t *testing.T,
) {
+6 -5
View File
@@ -154,11 +154,12 @@ func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
// The login POST carries no pre-emptive rate limiter. Behind
// the reverse proxy production requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES
// unset, every client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent
// on arrival lets any stranger deny the operator the only
// administrative path. The handler verifies credentials first
// and charges only failures; see Handlers.authenticateUser.
// the reverse proxy production requires, when TRUSTED_PROXIES
// does not cover it, every client shares one bucket, so a
// limiter spent on arrival lets any stranger deny the operator
// the only administrative path. The handler verifies
// credentials first and charges only failures; see
// Handlers.authenticateUser.
r.Get("/login", s.h.HandleLoginPage())
r.Post("/login", s.h.HandleLoginSubmit())
-2
View File
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@
</div>
</div>
{{template "webhook_stats" .}}
<div class="grid grid-cols-1 lg:grid-cols-2 gap-6">
<!-- Entrypoints -->
<div class="card">
-87
View File
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
{{define "webhook_stats"}}
<!-- Statistics pane at the top of the webhook page. -->
<div class="card mb-6">
<div class="p-4 border-b border-gray-200">
<h2 class="text-lg font-medium text-gray-900">Statistics</h2>
</div>
{{with .Stats}}
<div class="p-4 flex flex-wrap gap-6 text-sm border-b border-gray-200">
<div>
<span class="text-gray-500">Entrypoints</span>
<span class="font-medium text-gray-900">{{.Entrypoints}}</span>
<span class="text-gray-500">({{.ActiveEntrypoints}} active)</span>
</div>
<div>
<span class="text-gray-500">Targets</span>
<span class="font-medium text-gray-900">{{.Targets}}</span>
<span class="text-gray-500">({{.ActiveTargets}} active)</span>
</div>
<div>
<span class="text-gray-500">Deliveries in progress</span>
<span class="font-medium text-gray-900">{{.InProgress}}</span>
</div>
<div>
<span class="text-gray-500">Last event</span>
<span class="font-medium text-gray-900">{{with .LastEventAt}}{{.Format "2006-01-02 15:04:05 UTC"}}{{else}}none{{end}}</span>
</div>
<div>
<span class="text-gray-500">Retention</span>
<span class="font-medium text-gray-900">{{$.Webhook.RetentionLabel}}</span>
</div>
</div>
<div class="p-4 grid grid-cols-1 lg:grid-cols-2 gap-6 text-sm">
<div>
<div class="flex py-2 border-b border-gray-200 text-xs text-gray-500 uppercase tracking-wide">
<span class="flex-1"></span>
<span class="w-32 text-center">Lifetime</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center">Within retention</span>
</div>
<div class="divide-y divide-gray-100">
<div class="flex py-2">
<span class="flex-1 text-gray-600">Events</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center text-gray-900">{{.Totals.Events}}</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center text-gray-900">{{.Totals.EventsWithinRetention}}</span>
</div>
<div class="flex py-2">
<span class="flex-1 text-gray-600">Deliveries</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center text-gray-900">{{.Totals.Deliveries}}</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center text-gray-900">{{.Totals.DeliveriesWithinRetention}}</span>
</div>
<div class="flex py-2">
<span class="flex-1 text-gray-600">Failures</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center text-gray-900">{{.Totals.Failures}}</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center text-gray-900">{{.Totals.FailuresWithinRetention}}</span>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div class="flex py-2 border-b border-gray-200 text-xs text-gray-500 uppercase tracking-wide">
<span class="flex-1"></span>
<span class="w-32 text-center">Last 10 minutes</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center">Last 24 hours</span>
</div>
<div class="divide-y divide-gray-100">
<div class="flex py-2">
<span class="flex-1 text-gray-600">Events</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center text-gray-900">{{.Last10Minutes.Events}}</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center text-gray-900">{{.Last24Hours.Events}}</span>
</div>
<div class="flex py-2">
<span class="flex-1 text-gray-600">Failures</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center text-gray-900">{{.Last10Minutes.Failed}}</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center text-gray-900">{{.Last24Hours.Failed}}</span>
</div>
<div class="flex py-2">
<span class="flex-1 text-gray-600">Failure percentage</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center text-gray-900">{{.Last10Minutes.FailurePercent}}</span>
<span class="w-32 text-center text-gray-900">{{.Last24Hours.FailurePercent}}</span>
</div>
</div>
<p class="mt-2 text-xs text-gray-500">Failure percentage is the failed deliveries out of all deliveries that finished in the window. Deliveries still pending or retrying are not counted.</p>
</div>
</div>
{{else}}
<div class="p-4 text-sm text-gray-500">The statistics could not be read.</div>
{{end}}
</div>
{{end}}