Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak e1e9ba85ea Re-read a delivery before failing it for a missing target
check / check (push) Successful in 4m10s
failMissingTarget failed the delivery as the batch had read it, so a
delivery a worker sent and let go between the batch read and the
ownership check could end failed after a successful attempt. It now
reads the row once it owns the delivery and fails it only if the
status is still the one the batch read, as processNewTask does. A row
that cannot be read is left alone.

TestSweepPending_TargetDeleted now checks that the first sweep already
queues the healthy delivery and the second does not queue it again.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 03:16:13 +00:00
clawbot 08894ce16e Fail a pending delivery whose target was deleted (closes #293)
check / check (push) Successful in 4m21s
Restart recovery and the pending sweep skipped a pending delivery
whose target was missing from the batch's target map, and the sweep
did so again every minute for the life of the database. A miss now
asks loadTarget: no row fails the delivery with a recorded reason,
through the ownership-gated function the retrying paths already use,
renamed failMissingTarget with its log line and reason text made to
fit both statuses. Any other error leaves the delivery pending,
because the map is also empty when its query failed.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 02:43:49 +00:00
34 changed files with 372 additions and 740 deletions
+4 -2
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,10 @@
# stage of the Dockerfile.
.git/
bin/
# Extracted from 3p/ by `make assets` inside the build; a host copy is not
# needed. The tarball in 3p/ must stay in the context.
# Third-party browser assets are fetched and hash-verified inside the build by
# script/fetch-assets. Excluding any host copy keeps a developer's working tree
# from supplying the bytes that get shipped. The script and its
# static/vendor.sha256 manifest stay in the context.
static/js/alpine.min.js
*.md
LICENSE
+4 -3
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ temp/
# CI cache barrier, written into the build context by the check workflow
.ci-fingerprint
# Alpine.js, extracted by `make assets` from its tarball in 3p/, which is
# what is committed.
/static/js/alpine.min.js
# Third-party browser assets, fetched and hash-verified by
# script/fetch-assets against static/vendor.sha256. Not committed:
# REPO_POLICIES.md forbids minified bundles in version control.
/static/js/alpine.min.js
Binary file not shown.
+11 -4
View File
@@ -51,8 +51,15 @@ RUN go mod download
# the lint stage above.
COPY . .
# Run tests and build. Both first run script/assets, which extracts Alpine.js
# from its tarball in 3p/.
# Fetch the third-party browser assets the UI serves. They are not committed
# (REPO_POLICIES.md forbids minified bundles in version control) and
# .dockerignore keeps any host copy out of the build context, so this step is
# the only way they enter the image. Each download is checked against a
# hardcoded sha256 and the build fails on mismatch; make test re-checks the
# hashes against the bytes go:embed actually put in the binary.
RUN script/fetch-assets
# Run tests and build
RUN make test
# Version stamped into the binary. .dockerignore excludes .git/, so
@@ -60,8 +67,8 @@ RUN make test
# host and passes it in. The default is what a bare `docker build .`
# with no --build-arg gets, and it names no tag the tree may not be at.
#
# Declared here, below the test step, so a changed version does not
# invalidate its cached layer.
# Declared here, below the test and asset steps, so a changed version
# does not invalidate their cached layers.
ARG VERSION=unknown
RUN make build VERSION="$VERSION"
+3 -3
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ setup:
@script/setup
assets:
@script/assets
@script/fetch-assets
test:
@script/test
@@ -45,13 +45,13 @@ fmt-check:
check:
@script/check
build: assets
build:
go build -ldflags '$(strip -X main.version=$(VERSION) $(GO_LDFLAGS))' -o bin/webhooker ./cmd/webhooker
run: build
./bin/webhooker
dev: assets
dev:
go run ./cmd/webhooker
deps:
+76 -77
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ before deploying one.
- Go 1.26.1+ (the version in `go.mod`)
- Docker (for linting, for the test stage of the CI gate, and for
containerized deployment)
- `curl`, used by `script/fetch-assets` to download the third-party
browser assets, which are not committed (`make bootstrap` installs
it if missing)
golangci-lint is not a prerequisite and must not be installed on the
host: `script/bootstrap` does not install it, and `make lint` runs the
@@ -33,7 +36,9 @@ digest-pinned linter image via `Dockerfile.lint`.
git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker.git
cd webhooker
# Install the Go toolchain if missing, and the Go dependencies
# Install Go dependencies and the third-party browser assets.
# `make deps` alone is not enough: it only runs go mod download/tidy,
# and the checks below need the fetched assets.
make bootstrap
# Run all checks (test, lint, format check)
@@ -53,7 +58,7 @@ make docker
```bash
make bootstrap # Install all dependencies (idempotent)
make setup # Bootstrap + install git pre-commit hook
make assets # Extract Alpine.js from 3p/ (test, check, build, dev run it)
make assets # Fetch + verify third-party browser assets
make fmt # Format code (gofmt + goimports)
make fmt-check # Fail if gofmt would change anything (writes nothing)
make lint # Run golangci-lint in Docker (Dockerfile.lint)
@@ -152,11 +157,6 @@ private and reserved ranges — RFC 1918, loopback, CGNAT, link-local and
the rest — are refused, which stops a target from being used to make
webhooker probe the network it sits in.
Besides the private and reserved ranges, the default blocklist refuses
public cloud metadata addresses: currently only `168.63.129.16`, Azure's
WireServer, which serves an Azure VM its credentials. Because it is a
public address, listing it in `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` reopens it.
That default is also inconvenient for the thing webhooker is mostly
for: taking a public webhook and forwarding it to something on your own
network. A container on the same Docker network, a box on `10.x`, a
@@ -195,16 +195,15 @@ Two things this setting cannot do:
the list is always an allowlist; an empty list (the default) means
every private and reserved range stays refused. Note that
`0.0.0.0/0` gets you most of the way there anyway, per above.
- **It cannot open link-local, or a cloud metadata endpoint at a
non-public address that discloses credentials or user data.** An
address is on the list below when it is not a public address and both
of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it cannot collide with
anything you run; and reaching it hands out credentials, user data or
bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no matter what you list,
including when you list them outright or list a supernet such as
`0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`. Treat this as best
effort rather than a guarantee — it is a hand-maintained list and the
caveat below the table applies:
- **It cannot open link-local, or a cloud metadata endpoint that
discloses credentials or user data.** An address is on the list below
when both of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it cannot collide
with anything you run; and reaching it hands out credentials, user
data or bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no matter what you
list, including when you list them outright or list a supernet such
as `0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`. Treat this as
best effort rather than a guarantee — it is a hand-maintained list
and the caveat below the table applies:
| Blocked unconditionally | What it is |
| ----------------------- | ---------- |
@@ -243,8 +242,7 @@ Two things this setting cannot do:
encodings, which the default blocklist does not match. A publicly
routable metadata address is not listed here, because nothing on this
list can be reopened and blocking one that way would leave you no
escape hatch at all; Azure's `168.63.129.16` is refused by the default
blocklist instead, as described above.
escape hatch at all.
This list is not exhaustive of every cloud's metadata address — if
yours is not here, do not allowlist the block that contains it.
@@ -970,10 +968,15 @@ scratch file**: it holds committed transactions that are not yet in the
have no readable schema at all. `-shm` is regenerable, but there is no
reason to separate the two — copy the directory and you have them.
A clean shutdown closes every database, which checkpoints and removes
its sidecars; a killed or crashed instance leaves them, and they must be
carried with the `.db`. An archive the service has not opened since a
crash keeps that crash's sidecars, even across a later clean stop.
A clean shutdown closes `webhooker.db` and every `events-*.db`, which
checkpoints and removes their sidecars; a killed or crashed instance
leaves them, and they must be carried with the `.db`. **Archive
databases are different**: their handle is not closed at shutdown, so
`archive-*.db-wal` and `-shm` normally survive a clean stop and the
`-wal` can hold every row the archive has. Measured on a stopped
instance: `archive-….db` 4096 bytes with no table, its `-wal` 157 KB
holding all 8 archived events. Copying `DATA_DIR` in full is what makes
this a non-issue; copying `.db` files out of it by name is not.
Configuration is **not** in `DATA_DIR` — it comes from the environment
and from a `.env` file read out of the process working directory. Back
@@ -1048,9 +1051,10 @@ The file becomes self-contained again when the handle closes, which
happens on the next write past the debounce window, when the connection
pool retires the idle connection (about a minute after the last write),
or at the idle archive sweep — measured, the same file was a complete
20 KB `.db` with no sidecars about a minute after its last write. A
clean stop closes it too. So either move `archive-{uuid}.db` together
with any `-wal`/`-shm` beside it, or wait until there are none.
20 KB `.db` with no sidecars about a minute after its last write.
Shutdown is **not** on that list: the archive handle is not closed when
the service stops. So either move `archive-{uuid}.db` together with any
`-wal`/`-shm` beside it, or wait until there are none.
### Restore
@@ -1069,10 +1073,12 @@ with any `-wal`/`-shm` beside it, or wait until there are none.
They are part of the database, and dropping a `-wal` silently
discards every transaction it still holds. An `.backup` set will not
contain any: it writes a single consolidated file per database. A
stop-and-copy set normally has none, because a clean stop closes
every database and checkpoints its sidecars away; the exception is an
archive not opened since a crash. A copy salvaged from a crashed
instance has them for everything, and needs all of them.
stop-and-copy set has none for `webhooker.db` or the `events-*.db`,
because a clean stop closes those and checkpoints their sidecars
away — but it will normally have them for `archive-*.db`, whose
handle stays open across shutdown, and those carry the archive's
rows. A copy salvaged from a crashed instance has them for
everything, and needs all of them.
4. **Fix ownership.** The container runs as the non-root `webhooker`
user, UID 1000 / GID 1000. Restored files must be owned by (or
@@ -1249,14 +1255,14 @@ This repository adheres to the
standard: normalized scripts in `script/` are the entrypoints for the
development workflow. Ten of the Makefile's seventeen targets are thin
shims that call them; `build`, `run`, `dev`, `deps`, `clean`, `css` and
`version` are inline commands with no script behind them, though `build`
and `version` both take their value from `script/version`.
`version` are inline commands with no script behind them, though
`build` and `version` both take their value from `script/version`.
`script/test`, `make build` and `make dev` each run `script/assets`
first, which writes the ignored `static/js/alpine.min.js` (see
[Third-party browser assets](#third-party-browser-assets)), so
`make test`, `make check` and the pre-commit hook work on a fresh clone
without a separate step.
`make check` needs the third-party browser assets in `static/`, which
are not committed, so run `make bootstrap` (or just `make assets`) once
after cloning. Without them the tests fail with a message naming that
remedy. `make check` does not fetch them itself because it must not
change any files in the repo.
We provide:
@@ -1264,8 +1270,8 @@ We provide:
- `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development
(bootstrap, then install-precommit)
- `script/projectname` — output the project name ("webhooker")
- `script/assets` — extract Alpine.js from its tarball in `3p/` (see
[Third-party browser assets](#third-party-browser-assets))
- `script/fetch-assets` — download the third-party browser assets into
`static/`, verifying each against its pinned sha256
- `script/test` — run the test suite
- `script/lint` — run golangci-lint in Docker (see Linting below)
- `script/fmt` — format all code (writes)
@@ -1287,25 +1293,24 @@ We provide:
## Third-party browser assets
The web UI serves one third-party script, Alpine.js. Its npm package tarball
is committed as `3p/alpinejs-3.14.9.tgz`, byte for byte as the npm registry
publishes it. It is a dependency, not this repo's build output, so
`REPO_POLICIES.md`'s rule against committed build artifacts does not apply.
The directory is `3p/` rather than `vendor/` because Go treats a root
`vendor/` directory as its module vendor directory.
The web UI serves one third-party script, Alpine.js. It is **not** committed:
a minified bundle in the tree is unreviewable, and `REPO_POLICIES.md` bars
both committed build artifacts and unpinned external references.
`script/assets` (`make assets`) extracts the browser build,
`package/dist/cdn.min.js`, from the tarball to `static/js/alpine.min.js`,
where `go:embed` picks it up. `script/test`, `make build` and `make dev` run
it first, and the Dockerfile builds through `make test` and `make build`, so
nothing downloads Alpine.js. The extracted file is not committed, and
`.dockerignore` keeps any host copy out of the build context.
Instead `script/fetch-assets` downloads it from a pinned URL, checks the
download against a hardcoded sha256, and installs it under `static/`. The
sha256 of every installed asset is recorded in `static/vendor.sha256`, and
`static/vendor_test.go` re-hashes the bytes `go:embed` put in the binary
against that manifest — so the pin is enforced on what actually ships, not
merely written down. Any mismatch fails the build.
To move to a new version: download
`https://registry.npmjs.org/alpinejs/-/alpinejs-<version>.tgz`, check it
against the `dist.integrity` hash listed at
`https://registry.npmjs.org/alpinejs/<version>`, replace the tarball in `3p/`
with it, update its file name in `script/assets`, and run `make check`.
`make bootstrap` runs the fetch for local development, and the Dockerfile
runs it in the build stage; `.gitignore` and `.dockerignore` keep the
artifact out of both the repo and the build context.
To move to a new version: update the version, URL, and tarball sha256 in
`script/fetch-assets` and the asset sha256 in `static/vendor.sha256`, then
run `make assets && make check`.
## Rationale
@@ -2046,7 +2051,7 @@ rescans the database anyway).
| ----------- | -------- |
| **Closed** | Normal operation. Deliveries flow through. Consecutive failures are counted. |
| **Open** | Target appears down. Deliveries are skipped and rescheduled for after the cooldown. |
| **Half-Open** | Cooldown expired. One probe delivery is allowed to test if the target has recovered. Other deliveries are rescheduled for one whole cooldown later. |
| **Half-Open** | Cooldown expired. One probe delivery is allowed to test if the target has recovered. |
**Transitions:**
@@ -2084,9 +2089,7 @@ operations), and log targets (stdout) do not use circuit breakers.
When a circuit is open and a new delivery arrives, the engine marks the
delivery as `retrying` and schedules a retry timer for after the
remaining cooldown period. This ensures no deliveries are lost — they're
just delayed until the target is healthy again. A delivery already in
`retrying` keeps that status without another database write each time
the breaker turns it away.
just delayed until the target is healthy again.
### Metrics
@@ -2100,7 +2103,7 @@ arriving and being stored, they are just not getting anywhere.
| Metric | Type | Meaning |
| ------ | ---- | ------- |
| `webhooker_events_received_total` | counter | Events received and durably stored. Compare against the delivery counters on one dashboard |
| `webhooker_delivery_attempts_total` | counter | Delivery attempts actually dispatched to a target. A delivery a circuit breaker refused is not one: it is counted as a retry instead, but only when the refusal moves it into `retrying` |
| `webhooker_delivery_attempts_total` | counter | Delivery attempts actually dispatched to a target. A delivery an open circuit breaker refused is not one: it is counted as a retry instead |
| `webhooker_deliveries_succeeded_total` | counter | Deliveries that reached `delivered` |
| `webhooker_deliveries_failed_total` | counter | Deliveries that failed terminally and will not be retried |
| `webhooker_delivery_retries_total` | counter | Deliveries put back into `retrying` |
@@ -2717,7 +2720,7 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
| ------ | --------------------------- | ----------- |
| `GET` | `/` | Root redirect, 303 (authenticated → `/sources`, unauthenticated → `/pages/login`) |
| `GET` | `/.well-known/healthcheck` | Health check (JSON: `status`, `now`, `uptimeSeconds`, `uptimeHuman`, `version`, `appname`, `maintenanceMode`) |
| `GET`, `HEAD` | `/s/*` | Static file serving (embedded CSS, JS). `GET` and `HEAD` only — `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, `OPTIONS`, `TRACE` and `CONNECT` are answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: GET, HEAD`. Any other method (such as `PROPFIND`) is refused by chi before it reaches this route, and gets `405` without an `Allow` header. Pinned by `TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead` |
| any | `/s/*` | Static file serving (embedded CSS, JS). Mounted for every method, not just `GET`/`HEAD`: chi's `Mount` registers all methods and `http.FileServer` special-cases only `HEAD` (by omitting the body), so a `POST` or `DELETE` to an asset is answered `200` with the file. Pinned by `TestStaticServesEveryMethod` |
| `POST` | `/webhook/{uuid}` | Webhook receiver endpoint. `POST` only — every other method is answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: POST`. Rate limited (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
#### Authentication Endpoints
@@ -2784,8 +2787,6 @@ imports. The entry point is `cmd/webhooker/main.go`.
```
webhooker/
├── 3p/
│ └── alpinejs-3.14.9.tgz # Alpine.js npm package, extracted by make assets
├── cmd/webhooker/
│ └── main.go # Entry point: subcommand dispatch; no args locks DATA_DIR and wires fx
├── internal/
@@ -2879,7 +2880,8 @@ webhooker/
│ ├── css/tailwind.css # Generated stylesheet the pages load
│ ├── css/style.css # Older hand-written stylesheet, no longer loaded
│ ├── js/app.js # Progressive-enhancement copy-to-clipboard
│ └── js/alpine.min.js # Alpine.js, extracted from 3p/ by make assets, not committed
│ ├── js/alpine.min.js # Alpine.js, fetched by script/fetch-assets, not committed
│ └── vendor.sha256 # Pinned hashes the fetched assets are verified against
├── templates/ # Go HTML templates (base, login, sources, etc.)
├── script/ # Scripts to Rule Them All entrypoints
├── Dockerfile # Three stages: lint, test+build, Alpine runtime
@@ -3084,8 +3086,7 @@ each hook. The order, read off the fx stop-hook log:
3. `server` — the HTTP drain, bounded separately by
`server.ShutdownTimeout` (**3 seconds**), then a Sentry flush if
`SENTRY_DSN` is set
4. `delivery.Engine` — waits for its workers, then closes the archive
databases
4. `delivery.Engine`
5. `healthcheck`
6. `WebhookDBManager`
7. the database close
@@ -3187,14 +3188,14 @@ version is fixed independently of the compiler's:
`make fmt-check`, then `golangci-lint config verify` and
`golangci-lint run`, both with `--network=none`.
2. **Builder stage** (`golang:1.26.1-bookworm`) — depends on the lint
stage passing (it copies a file from it), runs `make test` and
`make build` (both extract Alpine.js from `3p/` first), and finally
rebuilds the binary with `CGO_ENABLED=1` and static linking so it
runs on musl. Both builds go through `make build`, the relink adding
its `-extldflags` via `GO_LDFLAGS`, so neither can drop the `-X` that
stamps the version. The version arrives as the `VERSION` build arg,
since the context has no `.git` (see
[Version stamping](#version-stamping)).
stage passing (it copies a file from it), runs `script/fetch-assets`
to download and verify the third-party browser assets, then runs
`make test` and `make build`, and finally rebuilds the binary with
`CGO_ENABLED=1` and static linking so it runs on musl. Both builds
go through `make build`, the relink adding its `-extldflags` via
`GO_LDFLAGS`, so neither can drop the `-X` that stamps the version.
The version arrives as the `VERSION` build arg, since the context
has no `.git` (see [Version stamping](#version-stamping)).
3. **Runtime stage** (`alpine:3.21`) — copies the static binary,
creates the `/var/lib/webhooker` directory for all SQLite databases,
runs as the non-root `webhooker` user (UID 1000), exposes port 8080,
@@ -3277,5 +3278,3 @@ MIT
## Author
[@sneak](https://sneak.berlin)
+9 -12
View File
@@ -192,10 +192,9 @@ type Config struct {
// alwaysBlockedNetworks stays blocked no matter what is listed
// here. That set is link-local plus the cloud metadata
// endpoints outside it that disclose credentials or user data
// at a provider-fixed, non-public address; it is not
// exhaustive of every cloud's metadata address. See
// alwaysBlockedNetworks for the authoritative list and the
// criterion it is built from.
// at a provider-fixed address; it is not exhaustive of every
// cloud's metadata address. See alwaysBlockedNetworks for the
// authoritative list and the criterion it is built from.
AllowedEgressCIDRs []netip.Prefix
params *ConfigParams
@@ -747,14 +746,12 @@ func (c *Config) warnEgressAllowlist(log *slog.Logger) {
log.Warn(
"ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS lets delivery targets reach these "+
"otherwise-blocked networks. Anyone who can create a "+
"delivery target can now make this process issue "+
"requests into them, and read back the response. Only "+
"the addresses the README lists as blocked "+
"unconditionally stay blocked regardless of what is "+
"listed here; a public cloud metadata address such as "+
"168.63.129.16 is reachable once it, or a block "+
"covering it, is listed.",
"otherwise-blocked private/reserved networks. Anyone "+
"who can create a delivery target can now make this "+
"process issue requests into them, and read back the "+
"response. Link-local and the known cloud instance "+
"metadata endpoints outside it stay blocked "+
"regardless of what is listed here.",
"allowedEgressCIDRs",
strings.Join(PrefixStrings(c.AllowedEgressCIDRs), ","),
)
+6 -7
View File
@@ -834,13 +834,12 @@ func TestEgressAllowlistWarning(t *testing.T) {
// to be able to read back which networks are open.
assert.Contains(t, logged, "10.0.0.0/8")
assert.Contains(t, logged, "127.0.0.0/8")
// What stays shut is the whole unconditional set, not
// link-local alone; a public metadata address is not in
// it, so a listed block covering it opens it.
assert.Contains(t, logged, "blocked unconditionally")
assert.Contains(t, logged, "168.63.129.16 is reachable")
// The listed blocks need not be private or reserved.
assert.NotContains(t, logged, "private/reserved")
// What stays shut. Asserted on the clause naming the
// wider set rather than on "Link-local" alone, so the
// string cannot narrow back to link-local only while
// the always-blocked set covers ULA, CGNAT and two
// public metadata addresses as well.
assert.Contains(t, logged, "metadata endpoints outside it")
})
}
}
+2 -10
View File
@@ -76,20 +76,12 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) Allow() bool {
}
}
// CooldownRemaining returns how long a delivery that Allow refused
// should wait before it is tried again. Closed, it returns zero.
// Open, it returns what is left of the cooldown, or zero once that
// has passed. Half-open, it returns the whole cooldown: the one
// probe delivery is still in flight, and if it fails the circuit
// reopens for that long.
// CooldownRemaining returns how much time is left before
// an open circuit transitions to half-open.
func (cb *CircuitBreaker) CooldownRemaining() time.Duration {
cb.mu.Lock()
defer cb.mu.Unlock()
if cb.state == CircuitHalfOpen {
return cb.cooldown
}
if cb.state != CircuitOpen {
return 0
}
+3 -5
View File
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_ClosedReturnsZero(
)
}
func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_HalfOpenReturnsCooldown(
func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_HalfOpenReturnsZero(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -282,11 +282,9 @@ func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_HalfOpenReturnsCooldown(
require.True(t, cb.Allow())
// The cooldown newShortCooldownCB gives the breaker.
assert.Equal(t, 50*time.Millisecond,
assert.Equal(t, time.Duration(0),
cb.CooldownRemaining(),
"a delivery refused while half-open should wait "+
"a whole cooldown",
"half-open circuit should have zero cooldown remaining",
)
}
-11
View File
@@ -362,15 +362,6 @@ func (e *Engine) start() {
// stop cancels the worker pool's context and waits for the pool
// to drain, bounded by the stop hook's context: a wedged worker
// must not hang the process past fx's stop timeout.
//
// Once the pool has drained it closes the archive writers, so a
// clean stop leaves no archive -wal behind. Nothing else holds a
// writer for long by then: the archive sweeper stops before the
// engine, and deleting a webhook only closes one. If the pool did
// not drain in time, the writers are left open, as a kill would
// leave them. Closing them would wait for any write in progress,
// and a worker still running would then open new writers that
// nothing closes, so it gains nothing over a kill.
func (e *Engine) stop(ctx context.Context) error {
e.log.Info("delivery engine stopping")
@@ -385,8 +376,6 @@ func (e *Engine) stop(ctx context.Context) error {
return err
}
e.dbTarget.evictAll()
e.log.Info("delivery engine stopped")
return nil
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -271,88 +269,3 @@ func TestEngine_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout(t *testing.T) {
requireStopHookExpires(t, lc.hooks[0], "delivery engine")
}
// deliverToArchive runs one delivery to a database target through
// the running engine and returns the webhook's archive file path.
// The archive writer holds the file open afterwards.
func deliverToArchive(t *testing.T, s iSetup) string {
t.Helper()
deliveryID, task := seedLogTask(t, s)
task.TargetType = database.TargetTypeDatabase
s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{task})
iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID)
return filepath.Join(
filepath.Dir(s.DBMgr.DBPath(s.WebhookID)),
fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", s.WebhookID),
)
}
// TestEngine_StopHookClosesArchives is the regression test for an
// archive split across two files by a clean stop. The engine never
// closed its archive writers, so after a stop the archived rows
// could sit in archive-{id}.db-wal while archive-{id}.db held no
// table at all, and copying the .db on its own gave an empty
// database.
func TestEngine_StopHookClosesArchives(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
path := deliverToArchive(t, s)
require.FileExists(
t, path+"-wal",
"an open archive should have a -wal for the stop to remove",
)
require.NoError(t, lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background()))
wals, err := filepath.Glob(
filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(path), "archive-*.db-wal"),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Empty(
t, wals, "a clean stop must leave no archive -wal behind",
)
// With no -wal beside it, the row can only be in the .db.
count, err := countArchivedRows(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, int64(1), count)
}
// TestEngine_StopHookTimeoutLeavesArchivesOpen covers a stop whose
// budget runs out while a worker is still running. The archive
// writers are left open, as a kill would leave them: closing them
// would wait for any write in progress, and that worker would then
// open new writers that nothing closes.
func TestEngine_StopHookTimeoutLeavesArchivesOpen(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
deliverToArchive(t, s)
release := make(chan struct{})
t.Cleanup(func() {
close(release)
s.Engine.EvictWebhook(s.WebhookID)
})
s.Engine.ExportWedgeWorker(release)
requireStopHookExpires(t, lc.hooks[0], "delivery engine")
require.True(
t, s.Engine.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(s.WebhookID),
"a stop that timed out must not close archive writers",
)
}
-175
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
@@ -25,7 +24,6 @@ import (
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
)
// testContentType is the event content type used in tests.
@@ -896,100 +894,6 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_CircuitBreakerBlocks(t *testing.T) {
)
}
// recordingScheduler keeps the delay of every retry it is asked to
// schedule, and schedules nothing.
type recordingScheduler struct {
delays []time.Duration
}
func (s *recordingScheduler) ScheduleRetry(
_ delivery.Task, delay time.Duration,
) {
s.delays = append(s.delays, delay)
}
// TestDeliverHTTP_HalfOpenBreakerDelaysQueuedTasks proves that while a
// half-open breaker's one probe delivery is in flight, every other task
// for the target is put back with a whole cooldown as its delay rather
// than none, and that its status is written the first time the breaker
// turns it away and not on each pass after that.
func TestDeliverHTTP_HalfOpenBreakerDelaysQueuedTasks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
// Every write of retrying moves the retry counter, so on a registry
// this test owns the counter is the number of those writes.
reg := prometheus.NewRegistry()
e.ExportSetMetrics(metrics.New(reg))
targetID := uuid.New().String()
cb := newShortCooldownCB(t)
e.ExportSetCircuitBreaker(targetID, cb)
for range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold {
cb.RecordFailure()
}
time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
require.True(t, cb.Allow(), "the probe delivery should go through")
require.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitHalfOpen, cb.State())
cfg := newHTTPTargetConfig(
"http://will-not-be-called.invalid",
)
sched := &recordingScheduler{}
const queued, passes = 3, 4
for range queued {
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{"cb":"half-open"}`)
dlv := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
for range passes {
// Each pass starts from the stored row, as a retry does.
var row database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, db.First(
&row, "id = ?", dlv.ID,
).Error)
fix := buildHTTPFixture(
row, event, targetID,
"test-cb-half-open", cfg, 5, 1,
)
e.ExportDeliverHTTPWithScheduler(
context.TODO(), db, fix.Delivery, fix.Task, sched,
)
}
assertDeliveryStatus(t, db, dlv.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
}
require.Len(t, sched.delays, queued*passes)
for _, delay := range sched.delays {
// The cooldown newShortCooldownCB gives the breaker.
assert.Equal(t, 50*time.Millisecond, delay,
"a task turned away while half-open should wait "+
"a whole cooldown",
)
}
assert.InDelta(t, float64(queued),
mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP), 0,
"status should be written once per task, not once per pass",
)
}
func TestGetCircuitBreaker_CreatesOnDemand(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -1166,10 +1070,6 @@ func TestIsForwardableHeader(t *testing.T) {
assert.False(t,
delivery.ExportIsForwardableHeader("Content-Length"),
)
assert.False(t,
delivery.ExportIsForwardableHeader("Content-Type"),
)
}
func TestTruncate(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1251,81 +1151,6 @@ func TestDoHTTPRequest_ForwardsHeaders(t *testing.T) {
)
}
// The event's stored inbound headers carry the same Content-Type the
// receiver saved as the event's ContentType, so a delivery could send
// it twice. It must go out exactly once, with a Content-Type configured
// on the target winning, then the event's ContentType.
func TestApplyRequestHeaders_SendsOneContentType(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := map[string]struct {
inbound string
event string
configured string
want []string
}{
"inbound and event agree": {
inbound: testContentType,
event: testContentType,
want: []string{testContentType},
},
"inbound and event disagree": {
inbound: "text/plain",
event: testContentType,
want: []string{testContentType},
},
"event has none": {
inbound: testContentType,
want: nil,
},
"target configures its own": {
inbound: testContentType,
event: testContentType,
configured: "application/xml",
want: []string{"application/xml"},
},
}
for name, tc := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
inbound, err := json.Marshal(map[string][]string{
headerContentType: {tc.inbound},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
cfg := &delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{}
if tc.configured != "" {
cfg.Headers = map[string]string{
headerContentType: tc.configured,
}
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"https://target.example.com/hook",
http.NoBody,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
delivery.ExportApplyRequestHeaders(
req,
&database.Event{
Headers: string(inbound),
ContentType: tc.event,
},
cfg,
)
assert.Equal(t,
tc.want, req.Header.Values(headerContentType),
)
})
}
}
func TestProcessDelivery_RoutesToCorrectHandler(
t *testing.T,
) {
-36
View File
@@ -101,19 +101,6 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverHTTP(
e.httpTarget.Deliver(ctx, webhookDB, d, task, e)
}
// ExportDeliverHTTPWithScheduler delivers via the http target, handing
// any retry to sched instead of the engine, so a test can see the
// delay each retry is given.
func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverHTTPWithScheduler(
ctx context.Context,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
d *database.Delivery,
task *Task,
sched Scheduler,
) {
e.httpTarget.Deliver(ctx, webhookDB, d, task, sched)
}
// ExportDeliverDatabase delivers via the database target.
func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverDatabase(
webhookDB *gorm.DB, d *database.Delivery,
@@ -192,14 +179,6 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportGetCircuitBreaker(
return e.httpTarget.getCircuitBreaker(targetID)
}
// ExportSetCircuitBreaker makes cb the http target's circuit breaker
// for targetID, so a test can use one with a short cooldown.
func (e *Engine) ExportSetCircuitBreaker(
targetID string, cb *CircuitBreaker,
) {
e.httpTarget.circuitBreakers.Store(targetID, cb)
}
// ExportParseHTTPConfig exposes parseHTTPConfig.
func (e *Engine) ExportParseHTTPConfig(
configJSON string,
@@ -352,21 +331,6 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportFailMissingTarget(
e.failMissingTarget(webhookDB, webhookID, d)
}
// ExportSendRecoveredDeliveries exposes sendRecoveredDeliveries, so a
// test can hand it a target map that lacks a delivery's target.
func (e *Engine) ExportSendRecoveredDeliveries(
ctx context.Context,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
deliveries []database.Delivery,
webhookID string,
targetMap map[string]database.Target,
settled map[string]struct{},
) {
e.sendRecoveredDeliveries(
ctx, webhookDB, deliveries, webhookID, targetMap, settled,
)
}
// ExportDeliveryCh returns the delivery channel.
func (e *Engine) ExportDeliveryCh() chan Task {
return e.deliveryCh
+3 -4
View File
@@ -412,10 +412,9 @@ func TestDeliveryMetrics_BreakerBlockedIsNotAnAttempt(
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(context.TODO(), &blocked)
// The breaker refused it: rescheduled without rewriting the
// retrying status it already had, so the retry counter did not
// move, and nothing was attempted or timed.
assert.InDelta(t, retriesBefore,
// The breaker refused it: rescheduled, so the retry counter
// moved, but nothing was attempted or timed.
assert.InDelta(t, retriesBefore+1,
mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, threshold,
mCounter(t, reg, mAttempts, mTypeHTTP), 0)
+6 -12
View File
@@ -339,11 +339,10 @@ func TestRedirectPolicy_StopsAtHopCap(t *testing.T) {
// The set the redirect policy strips is whatever the delivery path
// actually put on the wire, so a header added to the forward set is
// covered without a second edit. A header the event never carried
// is not in the set, and neither is the inbound Content-Type, because
// it is not forwarded. Two more are deliberately excluded: a
// Content-Type configured on the target describes the body, which a
// 307 carries across hosts, and the inbound User-Agent every real
// sender supplies is overwritten before the request goes out.
// is not in the set, and the delivery path's own two are deliberately
// excluded: Content-Type describes the body, which a 307 carries
// across hosts, and the inbound User-Agent every real sender supplies
// is overwritten before the request goes out.
func TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -372,7 +371,6 @@ func TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames(t *testing.T) {
&delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
Headers: map[string]string{
probeHeaderName: probeHeaderValue,
"Content-Type": testContentType,
},
},
)
@@ -380,11 +378,7 @@ func TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t,
[]string{probeHeaderName, inboundHeaderName}, names,
"both header classes are reported, and only those: "+
"Host and the inbound Content-Type are never "+
"forwarded, User-Agent is the delivery path's own",
)
assert.NotContains(t, names, "Content-Type",
"a Content-Type configured on the target must survive "+
"a cross-origin 307/308 with the body it describes",
"Host is never forwarded, Content-Type and "+
"User-Agent are the delivery path's own",
)
}
+7 -10
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ var (
"hostname resolved to no IP addresses",
)
errBlockedIP = errors.New(
"blocked private, reserved or cloud metadata address",
"blocked private/reserved IP range",
)
errBlockedMetadata = errors.New(
"blocked link-local or cloud instance metadata " +
@@ -37,10 +37,9 @@ var (
)
)
// blockedNetworks is the default blocklist: the private and
// reserved IP ranges, plus the public cloud metadata addresses,
// that are blocked to prevent SSRF attacks. An operator can
// permit specific blocks out of this set with
// blockedNetworks contains all private/reserved IP ranges
// that should be blocked to prevent SSRF attacks. An operator
// can permit specific blocks out of this set with
// ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS; see Guard.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
@@ -123,8 +122,6 @@ func init() {
"::1/128",
"fc00::/7",
"fe80::/10",
// Azure WireServer, a public address that serves VM credentials.
"168.63.129.16/32",
})
// Every entry is named. The set must not grow or shrink
@@ -219,8 +216,8 @@ func matchesAny(networks []*net.IPNet, ip net.IP) bool {
}
// isBlockedIP checks whether an IP address falls within
// the default blocklist, before any operator allowlist is
// considered.
// any blocked private/reserved network range, before any
// operator allowlist is considered.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return matchesAny(blockedNetworks, ip)
}
@@ -323,7 +320,7 @@ func (g *Guard) allows(ip net.IP) bool {
//
// 1. alwaysBlockedNetworks is refused before the allowlist is
// consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local or a
// cloud metadata endpoint at a non-public address.
// cloud instance metadata endpoint.
// 2. The allowlist is consulted next, so a listed private
// network becomes reachable.
// 3. Everything else keeps the default blocklist's answer.
-35
View File
@@ -390,41 +390,6 @@ func TestGuardAllowlist_PublicUnaffected(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestGuardAllowlist_AzureWireServerReopenable covers Azure's
// WireServer, a public address that serves VM credentials. The
// default guard refuses it, but because it is public it sits in
// the default blocklist rather than the unconditional set, so an
// operator who lists it can reach it.
func TestGuardAllowlist_AzureWireServerReopenable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const wireServerIP = "168.63.129.16"
target := "http://" + wireServerIP + "/?comp=versions"
defaultGuard := delivery.NewTestGuard()
err := defaultGuard.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target)
require.Error(t, err,
"WireServer must be refused with no allowlist set",
)
assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), metadataRefusalClause,
"WireServer must be refused by the default blocklist, "+
"which an allowlist can override",
)
assertDialRefused(t, defaultGuard, target)
listed := delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix(wireServerIP + "/32"),
)
assert.NoError(t,
listed.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target),
"an operator who lists WireServer must be able to reach it",
)
}
// TestGuardCheckIP_BothPathsShareOneDecision asserts that the
// validator and the dialer are not two policies that happen to
// agree: both are defined in terms of checkIP, so the exported
-18
View File
@@ -277,24 +277,6 @@ func (t *databaseTarget) evict(webhookID string) {
)
}
// evictAll evicts every cached archive writer, exactly as evict
// does for one webhook. The engine calls it at shutdown, once its
// workers have returned. Closing the last handle on an archive
// moves the contents of its -wal into the .db and removes the
// -wal, so a clean stop leaves each archive as a single file.
func (t *databaseTarget) evictAll() {
t.mu.Lock()
writers := t.writers
t.writers = nil
t.mu.Unlock()
for _, w := range writers {
w.evict()
}
}
// sweepWebhook prunes one webhook's archive of rows older than
// expiry, without requiring a write. It returns nil (nothing to
// do) when the archive file does not exist, so a sweep never
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
@@ -362,46 +361,3 @@ func TestEvictWebhook_LaterDeliveryRecreatesWriter(t *testing.T) {
"a later delivery should recreate the writer",
)
}
// TestEngineStop_WriteAfterStopIsRefused proves the engine's stop
// closes each archive writer the way deleting its webhook does: a
// write that reaches a writer after the stop is refused, reopens
// nothing and adds no row.
func TestEngineStop_WriteAfterStopIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
eng, _ := evictTestEngine(t)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
w := eng.ExportArchiveWriterFor(event.WebhookID)
require.NotNil(t, w)
require.True(t, w.HandleOpen())
require.NoError(t, eng.ExportStop(context.Background()))
err := w.Write(evictTestRow("ev-after-stop"), 0)
require.ErrorIs(
t, err, delivery.ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted,
"a write after the stop must be refused",
)
assert.False(
t, w.HandleOpen(),
"a refused write must not reopen the archive",
)
assert.False(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(event.WebhookID),
"the stop should empty the registry",
)
count, err := countArchivedRows(w.Path())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(
t, int64(1), count, "the refused row must not be written",
)
}
+1 -2
View File
@@ -11,11 +11,10 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// Literals these tests repeat, named so that the header names and the
// Literals these tests repeat, named so that the header name and the
// keep-forever archive config each have one definition.
const (
headerAuthorization = "Authorization"
headerContentType = "Content-Type"
bearerValue = "Bearer abc"
archiveConfigNever = "{\"expiry\":\"never\"}"
)
+8 -21
View File
@@ -197,14 +197,10 @@ func (c *httpCore) circuitBreakerBlock(
"cooldown_remaining", remaining,
)
// A delivery already at retrying is left as it is, so a task
// the breaker keeps turning away writes nothing each time.
if d.Status != database.DeliveryStatusRetrying {
c.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
}
c.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
retryTask := *task
sched.ScheduleRetry(retryTask, remaining)
@@ -541,11 +537,6 @@ func isForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
"Upgrade", "Proxy-Authorization",
"Proxy-Connection", "Content-Length":
return false
case "Content-Type":
// applyRequestHeaders sets Content-Type itself. The receiver
// already stored this inbound value as the event's
// ContentType, so forwarding it too would send it twice.
return false
default:
return true
}
@@ -558,10 +549,6 @@ func isForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
// policy strips exactly that set on a hop that leaves the origin,
// so the forward set is decided here and only here — a header added
// to it is covered off-origin without a second edit elsewhere.
//
// Content-Type goes out once: a Content-Type configured on the target
// wins, otherwise the event's ContentType, otherwise none. The inbound
// Content-Type in the event's headers is never forwarded.
func applyRequestHeaders(
req *http.Request,
event *database.Event,
@@ -582,10 +569,10 @@ func applyRequestHeaders(
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "webhooker/1.0")
// A Content-Type configured on the target describes the body
// being sent rather than the sender. A 307/308 preserves the
// body across hosts, so stripping it would send that body
// untyped.
// Content-Type describes the body being sent rather than the
// sender, and the delivery path sets it from the event itself.
// A 307/308 preserves the body across hosts, so stripping it
// would send that body untyped.
delete(originScoped, "Content-Type")
// User-Agent is overwritten just above, so an inbound one never
-47
View File
@@ -696,53 +696,6 @@ func TestSweepPending_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "was deleted")
}
// TestSendRecoveredDeliveries_TargetMissingFromMap: the batch's target
// map is empty when its query failed, so every delivery in the batch is
// looked up on its own. A healthy one is sent to the target that lookup
// finds.
func TestSendRecoveredDeliveries_TargetMissingFromMap(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "found-on-lookup",
database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"map":"empty"}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
s.Engine.ExportSendRecoveredDeliveries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookDB,
[]database.Delivery{d}, s.WebhookID,
map[string]database.Target{}, nil,
)
tasks := fDrain(s.Engine)
require.Len(t, tasks, 1,
"the healthy delivery was not queued exactly once",
)
assert.Equal(t, d.ID, tasks[0].DeliveryID)
assert.Equal(t, targetID, tasks[0].TargetID)
assert.Equal(t, database.TargetTypeLog, tasks[0].TargetType)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
}
// TestRecoverPending_TargetUnreadable_LeavesDeliveryAlone: a failed
// read of the main database is not a deleted target. Restart recovery
// holds every pending delivery of the webhook in one batch, so failing
-7
View File
@@ -133,11 +133,6 @@ func (w *recoverResponseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
// what the access log records and the metrics count, and outside the
// sentryhttp handler, whose Repanic option depends on something
// further out recovering what it re-raises.
//
// Unlike http.Error on its own, it deletes any Set-Cookie the handler
// set before panicking, because a request that failed must not hand
// the client a credential; every other header is left to http.Error.
// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/193.
func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(
@@ -169,8 +164,6 @@ func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return
}
rw.Header().Del("Set-Cookie")
http.Error(
rw,
http.StatusText(
+2 -31
View File
@@ -304,44 +304,16 @@ func TestRecovererRepanicsErrAbortHandler(t *testing.T) {
)
}
// TestRecovererDropsSetCookieFromTheRecovered500 covers a handler that
// sets a cookie and a redirect target and then panics before sending
// anything. A request that failed must not hand the client a
// credential, so the 500 carries no cookie; Location is left alone.
func TestRecovererDropsSetCookieFromTheRecovered500(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
probe := newRecovererProbe(
t, false,
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Set-Cookie", "session=x")
w.Header().Set("Location", "/after")
panic(panicMarker)
},
)
resp, err := probe.get(t)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, resp.Body.Close())
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, resp.StatusCode)
assert.Empty(t, resp.Cookies())
assert.Equal(t, "/after", resp.Header.Get("Location"))
}
// TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse covers a handler that
// panics after sending its status. The bytes are already on the wire,
// cookie included, so a second WriteHeader would change nothing the
// client sees and would draw net/http's "superfluous
// response.WriteHeader" report.
// so a second WriteHeader would change nothing the client sees and
// would draw net/http's "superfluous response.WriteHeader" report.
func TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
probe := newRecovererProbe(
t, false,
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Set-Cookie", "session=x")
w.WriteHeader(committedStatus)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("partial"))
@@ -359,7 +331,6 @@ func TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, committedStatus, resp.StatusCode)
assert.Equal(t, "partial", string(body))
assert.Len(t, resp.Cookies(), 1)
record := probe.panicRecord(t)
assert.Equal(t, panicMarker, record["panic"])
+3 -17
View File
@@ -92,25 +92,11 @@ func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
s.router.Get("/", s.h.HandleIndex())
// Static assets answer GET and HEAD only. chi's default 405
// carries no Allow header, so this group supplies its own.
staticFiles := http.StripPrefix(
"/s", http.FileServer(http.FS(static.Static)),
s.router.Mount(
"/s",
http.StripPrefix("/s", http.FileServer(http.FS(static.Static))),
)
s.router.Route("/s", func(r chi.Router) {
r.MethodNotAllowed(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Allow", "GET, HEAD")
http.Error(
w,
"Method Not Allowed",
http.StatusMethodNotAllowed,
)
})
r.Method(http.MethodGet, "/*", staticFiles)
r.Method(http.MethodHead, "/*", staticFiles)
})
s.router.Route("/api/v1", func(_ chi.Router) {
// API routes will be added here.
})
+16 -39
View File
@@ -396,15 +396,13 @@ func (e *testEnv) storedHash(t *testing.T, username string) string {
// --- /s static group ---
// TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead pins the methods the static group
// answers: GET and HEAD are served the asset, and the other methods
// chi routes (POST, PUT, DELETE and the rest) are refused with 405
// and an Allow header naming those two. A method chi does not route,
// such as PROPFIND, is refused with 405 by the top-level router
// before it reaches the static group, so it gets no Allow header.
// The README documents this; the test is what keeps the two from
// drifting.
func TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead(t *testing.T) {
// TestStaticServesEveryMethod pins what the static mount actually
// answers. chi's Mount registers the handler for all methods and
// http.FileServer only special-cases HEAD (by suppressing the body),
// so a POST or a DELETE to an asset is served the file rather than
// refused. The README documents this; the test is what keeps the two
// from drifting.
func TestStaticServesEveryMethod(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
@@ -419,7 +417,6 @@ func TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead(t *testing.T) {
http.MethodPost,
http.MethodPut,
http.MethodDelete,
"PROPFIND",
} {
t.Run(method, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -431,38 +428,18 @@ func TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead(t *testing.T) {
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
switch method {
case http.MethodGet:
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, body, w.Body.Bytes(),
"the asset itself is returned")
case http.MethodHead:
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
"static mount answers every method")
if method == http.MethodHead {
assert.Empty(t, w.Body.Bytes(),
"HEAD must not carry a body")
case "PROPFIND":
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, w.Code,
)
assert.Empty(t, w.Header().Get("Allow"),
"chi refuses a method it does not route "+
"before the static group runs")
assert.NotContains(
t, w.Body.String(), string(body),
"a refused method must not get the asset",
)
default:
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, w.Code,
)
assert.Equal(
t, "GET, HEAD", w.Header().Get("Allow"),
)
assert.NotContains(
t, w.Body.String(), string(body),
"a refused method must not get the asset",
)
return
}
assert.Equal(t, body, w.Body.Bytes(),
"the asset itself is returned")
})
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ import (
// TestBaseTemplateScriptsAreServed walks every /s/ script the base
// template loads on each page and fetches it through the real router.
// Alpine.js is extracted from its tarball in 3p/ at build time, so the
// file is not in the tree: this is the check that the page still gets
// the JavaScript it asks for.
// Alpine.js is fetched at build time rather than committed, so nothing
// in the repo guarantees it is present: this is the check that the page
// still gets the JavaScript it asks for.
func TestBaseTemplateScriptsAreServed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
-16
View File
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/assets: extract Alpine.js from its npm package tarball, committed
# in 3p/, to static/js/alpine.min.js, where go:embed reads it. The
# extracted file is not committed. script/test, make build and make dev run
# this first.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
tar -xzOf 3p/alpinejs-3.14.9.tgz package/dist/cdn.min.js \
>static/js/alpine.min.js
}
main "$@"
+8 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
# installed tools are skipped. Base tooling comes from nix, apt, brew,
# or apk (detected in that order); assumes NOTHING is present (not git,
# make, or go). golangci-lint is deliberately not installed: linting runs
# only in docker, via script/lint and Dockerfile.lint.
# only in docker, via script/lint and Dockerfile.lint. Finishes by running
# script/fetch-assets, which installs the hash-pinned third-party browser
# assets the repo does not commit.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
@@ -67,6 +69,11 @@ main() {
go mod download
# Third-party browser assets are not committed; fetch and verify them
# so a fresh clone can build and test.
if missing curl; then pkg_install curl curl curl curl; fi
"$ROOT/script/fetch-assets"
echo "bootstrap complete"
}
+104
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/fetch-assets: download the third-party browser assets the web UI
# ships and install them under static/. Minified bundles are not committed
# (REPO_POLICIES.md: no build artifacts in version control), so the build
# fetches them here. Every download is verified against a hardcoded sha256
# before it is installed, and any mismatch aborts. Idempotent: an asset
# already present with its pinned hash is left alone.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
# The sha256 of each installed asset lives in static/vendor.sha256, in
# sha256sum(1) format, with paths relative to static/. That file is the
# single source of truth: this script verifies against it, and
# static/vendor_test.go asserts the bytes embedded into the binary match
# it, so the hash cannot rot into a value nothing checks.
MANIFEST="static/vendor.sha256"
# Alpine.js 3.14.9, 2026-08-17. Fetched from registry.npmjs.org, the
# publisher of record; the jsDelivr and unpkg copies are mirrors of this
# same tarball. dist/cdn.min.js is the browser build Alpine publishes for
# a <script> tag.
ALPINE_VERSION="3.14.9"
ALPINE_URL="https://registry.npmjs.org/alpinejs/-/alpinejs-${ALPINE_VERSION}.tgz"
# sha256 of alpinejs-3.14.9.tgz
ALPINE_TARBALL_SHA256="97dad7c0c81e659cfc8e7700055da9770f8186187cb9a8a76efb57e00d5ce52a"
ALPINE_MEMBER="package/dist/cdn.min.js"
ALPINE_DEST="js/alpine.min.js"
sha256_of() {
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sha256sum "$1" | cut -d' ' -f1
else
shasum -a 256 "$1" | cut -d' ' -f1
fi
}
# expected_sha256 <path-relative-to-static>
expected_sha256() {
awk -v want="$1" '$2 == want { print $1; found = 1 }
END { if (!found) exit 1 }' "$ROOT/$MANIFEST"
}
# verify <file> <expected-sha256> <what>
verify() {
actual="$(sha256_of "$1")"
if [ "$actual" != "$2" ]; then
echo "fetch-assets: sha256 mismatch for $3" >&2
echo " expected: $2" >&2
echo " actual: $actual" >&2
exit 1
fi
}
# up_to_date <path-relative-to-static> <expected-sha256>
up_to_date() {
[ -f "$ROOT/static/$1" ] || return 1
[ "$(sha256_of "$ROOT/static/$1")" = "$2" ]
}
fetch_alpine() {
want="$(expected_sha256 "$ALPINE_DEST")"
if up_to_date "$ALPINE_DEST" "$want"; then
echo "fetch-assets: static/$ALPINE_DEST already at $want"
return 0
fi
echo "fetch-assets: fetching Alpine.js $ALPINE_VERSION from $ALPINE_URL"
tmp="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' EXIT INT TERM
curl -fsSL -o "$tmp/alpine.tgz" "$ALPINE_URL"
verify "$tmp/alpine.tgz" "$ALPINE_TARBALL_SHA256" "alpinejs-${ALPINE_VERSION}.tgz"
tar -xzOf "$tmp/alpine.tgz" "$ALPINE_MEMBER" >"$tmp/alpine.min.js"
verify "$tmp/alpine.min.js" "$want" "$ALPINE_MEMBER from alpinejs-${ALPINE_VERSION}.tgz"
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$ROOT/static/$ALPINE_DEST")"
cp "$tmp/alpine.min.js" "$ROOT/static/$ALPINE_DEST"
rm -rf "$tmp"
trap - EXIT INT TERM
echo "fetch-assets: installed static/$ALPINE_DEST ($want)"
}
# Re-check every manifest entry against what is now on disk, so an entry
# no script installs fails loudly instead of passing silently.
verify_manifest() {
while read -r want path; do
case "$want" in '' | '#'*) continue ;; esac
if [ ! -f "$ROOT/static/$path" ]; then
echo "fetch-assets: $MANIFEST lists static/$path, which is missing" >&2
exit 1
fi
verify "$ROOT/static/$path" "$want" "static/$path"
done <"$ROOT/$MANIFEST"
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
fetch_alpine
verify_manifest
echo "fetch-assets: all assets in $MANIFEST verified"
}
main "$@"
-1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
"$ROOT/script/assets"
go test -v -race -timeout 90s ./...
}
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
3ed1eed252488921df65e363d6715deb04d7f92aaedb9e52199fdf73cb1e0ad3 js/alpine.min.js
+92
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
package static_test
import (
"bufio"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/static"
)
const manifestPath = "vendor.sha256"
// fetchHint is appended to every failure here: the assets the manifest
// covers are fetched by the build, not committed, so a fresh clone that
// has not run script/fetch-assets fails this test and should be told why.
const fetchHint = "run `script/fetch-assets` (or `make assets`) to install " +
"the pinned third-party assets"
// TestVendoredAssetsMatchManifest asserts that every asset listed in
// static/vendor.sha256 is embedded in the binary with exactly the pinned
// bytes. script/fetch-assets verifies the same hashes at download time;
// this test verifies them again on what actually ships, so a build that
// skipped, cached, or subverted the fetch cannot produce a binary serving
// unpinned third-party JavaScript.
func TestVendoredAssetsMatchManifest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
entries := readManifest(t)
require.NotEmpty(t, entries, "%s lists no assets", manifestPath)
for path, want := range entries {
t.Run(path, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
data, err := static.Static.ReadFile(path)
require.NoErrorf(
t, err,
"%s is listed in %s but is not embedded; %s",
path, manifestPath, fetchHint,
)
sum := sha256.Sum256(data)
got := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
require.Equalf(
t, want, got,
"embedded %s does not match its pinned sha256 in %s; %s",
path, manifestPath, fetchHint,
)
})
}
}
// readManifest parses static/vendor.sha256, which is in sha256sum(1)
// format with paths relative to static/.
func readManifest(t *testing.T) map[string]string {
t.Helper()
f, err := os.Open(manifestPath)
require.NoError(t, err, "opening %s", manifestPath)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, f.Close()) }()
entries := make(map[string]string)
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(f)
for scanner.Scan() {
line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
continue
}
fields := strings.Fields(line)
require.Lenf(
t, fields, 2,
"%s: malformed entry %q, want \"<sha256> <path>\"",
manifestPath, line,
)
sum, path := fields[0], fields[1]
require.Lenf(t, sum, 64, "%s: %q is not a sha256", manifestPath, sum)
entries[path] = sum
}
require.NoError(t, scanner.Err(), "reading %s", manifestPath)
return entries
}