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sneak/webhooker:issue-376-archive-filename-names sneak/webhooker:issue-230-fx-test-log sneak/webhooker:next sneak/webhooker:issue-394-list-activity sneak/webhooker:issue-341-ipv6-unspecified-blocklist sneak/webhooker:issue-421-todo-cache-caveat sneak/webhooker:issue-402-settings-page sneak/webhooker:issue-383-action-notices sneak/webhooker:issue-371-alpine-csp-build sneak/webhooker:issue-414-main sneak/webhooker:prod sneak/webhooker:main sneak/webhooker:issue-70-log-target
1 Commits
issue-341-ipv6-unspecified-blocklist .. 840c795c66
Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot 840c795c66 Add a statistics pane to the webhook page (closes #368)
check / check (push) Successful in 5m11s
Details 
Each webhook's event database keeps running totals: one row for its
events, and one row per target for that target's deliveries, delivered
and failed, each with what retention removed. Every write to them
shares the transaction of the rows it counts. Deliveries get a
finished_at column; it and target_id end the status index, so each
target's deliveries finished in a window come from one index-range
query grouped by target. Retention deletes 1000 expired events per
transaction. The pane is its own template, its figures in tables.

The schema changes in place with nothing back-filled, so an existing
database must be recreated.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-01 21:28:26 +00:00
103 changed files with 1096 additions and 4013 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
.dockerignore
+4 -10
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,14 @@
# .git is sent so the build can derive the version it stamps into the binary
# (script/version). Its config, which can hold a remote URL carrying a
# credential and which `git describe` does not need, is left out of a
# directory context. A context sent as a tar is not filtered by this file, so
# it carries .git/config unless its sender leaves it out.
.git/config
# No tracked file may be listed here: git in the build would see it as
# deleted and mark the version -dirty.
#
# .ci-fingerprint is deliberately NOT excluded: it is the CI cache barrier
# that keeps the check stages from replaying a cached pass. See the lint
# stage of the Dockerfile.
.git/
bin/
# Extracted from 3p/ by `make assets` inside the build; a host copy is not
# needed. The tarball in 3p/ must stay in the context.
static/js/alpine.min.js
*.md
LICENSE
.editorconfig
.env
.env.*
*.db
.gitea/workflows/check.yml
+13 -7
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2 2024-10-23
with:
# The superseded-status step needs history to walk ancestors (it
# aborts on a shallow clone).
# The fingerprint step below needs history to find the last commit
# that touched the Docker build context, and the superseded-status
# step needs it to walk ancestors (it aborts on a shallow clone).
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Mark superseded run statuses
@@ -27,11 +28,16 @@ jobs:
run: script/ci-mark-superseded
- name: Fingerprint the build context
# Writes the hash of the commit being checked into the context, which
# invalidates the `COPY . .` layer of both check stages: a commit
# that was never linted, format-checked, tested and built cannot
# report success from cache.
run: git rev-parse HEAD > .ci-fingerprint
# `.dockerignore` keeps docs out of the build context, so a docs-only
# commit legitimately replays the whole image from cache and stays
# cheap. Every other commit writes a new fingerprint into the context,
# which invalidates the `COPY . .` layer of both check stages: a
# commit that was never linted, formatted-checked, tested and built
# cannot report success from cache.
run: |
set -eu
fp="$(git log -1 --format=%H -- . ':!*.md' ':!LICENSE' ':!.editorconfig')"
printf '%s\n' "${fp:-$GITHUB_SHA}" > .ci-fingerprint
- name: Build Docker image (runs make check)
run: script/cibuild
Dockerfile
+9 -22
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
# Copy source code. In CI the context also carries .ci-fingerprint, which
# holds the hash of the commit being checked (see
# Copy source code. In CI the context also carries .ci-fingerprint, whose
# value changes with every commit that touches the build context (see
# .gitea/workflows/check.yml). That invalidates this layer, so the checks
# below cannot report success by replaying a cached pass. Do not add it to
# .dockerignore.
@@ -38,13 +38,8 @@ FROM golang:1.26.1-bookworm@sha256:4465644228bc2857a954b092167e12aa59c006a349228
COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
# jq is a runtime dependency of script/ci-mark-superseded, which the test
# suite executes. git is what script/version derives the version with.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make curl ca-certificates jq git && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# A build context sent as a tar archive keeps its files' owners, and git
# refuses to read a checkout owned by another user. Trust this one
# whoever owns it.
RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /build
# suite executes.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make curl ca-certificates jq && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /build
@@ -60,22 +55,14 @@ COPY . .
# from its tarball in 3p/.
RUN make test
# Version stamped into the binary: the VERSION build arg when one is
# given, otherwise what script/version derives from the .git the build
# context carries, so any `docker build .` of a clone stamps its commit.
# With neither, as from a source tarball, it is "unknown".
# Version stamped into the binary. .dockerignore excludes .git/, so
# nothing in this stage can derive it: script/docker resolves it on the
# host and passes it in. The default is what a bare `docker build .`
# with no --build-arg gets, and it names no tag the tree may not be at.
#
# Declared here, below the test step, so a changed version does not
# invalidate its cached layer.
ARG VERSION
# A context that carries .git must not stamp "unknown": that means git is
# missing here or could not read the checkout, and the image could not be
# traced back to its commit.
RUN if [ -d .git ] && [ "$(make version VERSION="$VERSION")" = unknown ]; then \
echo "version is unknown although the build context carries .git" >&2; \
exit 1; \
fi
ARG VERSION=unknown
RUN make build VERSION="$VERSION"
Makefile
+4 -4
View File
@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@
.DEFAULT_GOAL := check
# Version stamped into the binary. Derived from git by script/version;
# override it (`make build VERSION=v1.2.3`) to stamp a given value, which is
# how the Dockerfile passes its build arg in.
# override it (`make build VERSION=v1.2.3`) where git metadata is
# unavailable, which is how the Dockerfile passes its build arg in.
VERSION ?= $(shell script/version)
# An empty override (`make build VERSION=`, or the Dockerfile's `make build
# VERSION="$VERSION"` when no VERSION build arg was given) means unset,
# An empty override (`make build VERSION=`, or a `--build-arg VERSION=`
# landing on the Dockerfile's `make build VERSION="$VERSION"`) means unset,
# exactly as it does in script/version -- stamping "" would leave the binary
# reporting no version and the footer back on its "dev" fallback. `override`
# is required: a plain assignment loses to the command-line definition it
README.md
+174 -223
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ services, durably stores them, and delivers them to configured targets
with retry support, logging, and observability. Category: infrastructure
/ web service. License: MIT.
Each entrypoint is a version 4 UUID served at `/h/{uuid}`, and
Each entrypoint is a version 4 UUID served at `/webhook/{uuid}`, and
that UUID is the entrypoint's only credential. webhooker does not use
shared secrets, HMAC signatures or token headers on the receiver, and
will not add them — read
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
| `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` | How often the retention reaper and archive sweeper run (Go duration, must be positive) | `1h` |
| `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` | Idle session timeout (Go duration) | `24h` |
| `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` | Receiver requests/minute per IP per entrypoint (10x that per IP across the route) | `120` |
| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | CIDRs whose forwarded headers are trusted. A set value replaces the default. If any client can reach webhooker, or the proxy in front of it, from an RFC 1918 source address, set it to the proxy's address alone. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies) | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` (RFC 1918) |
| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | CIDRs whose forwarded headers are trusted (unset: all clients behind a proxy share one rate-limit bucket; a correct login password is never throttled either way) | `""` (none) |
| `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` | CIDRs that delivery targets may reach despite the SSRF blocklist. Read [Allowing egress to your own network](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network) before setting it | `""` (none) |
#### Allowing egress to your own network
@@ -157,22 +157,6 @@ public cloud metadata addresses: currently only `168.63.129.16`, Azure's
WireServer, which serves an Azure VM its credentials. Because it is a
public address, listing it in `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` reopens it.
That is all the default blocklist covers: the IPv4 private and reserved
ranges; of IPv6, only loopback (`::1`), the unspecified address (`::`),
unique local addresses (`fc00::/7`), link-local addresses (`fe80::/10`),
multicast (`ff00::/8`) and documentation space (`2001:db8::/32`); and
certain public addresses. A public address belongs on the default
blocklist only if it hands credentials, user data or bootstrap material
to whatever can reach it, without the caller presenting anything. A
provider's other public addresses are not refused. IBM Cloud, for
example, serves its package mirrors, time servers and object storage on
`161.26.0.0/16`, and the private endpoints of its own cloud services on
`166.8.0.0/14`. Neither range hands out credentials that way: the token
service among those endpoints issues a token only in exchange for
something the caller presents, such as an API key. Reaching these
services can be a legitimate delivery, and every cloud has some, so a
partial list would promise coverage it does not give.
That default is also inconvenient for the thing webhooker is mostly
for: taking a public webhook and forwarding it to something on your own
network. A container on the same Docker network, a box on `10.x`, a
@@ -211,16 +195,16 @@ Two things this setting cannot do:
the list is always an allowlist; an empty list (the default) means
every private and reserved range stays refused. Note that
`0.0.0.0/0` gets you most of the way there anyway, per above.
- **It cannot open link-local, the unspecified addresses, or a cloud
metadata endpoint at a non-public address that discloses credentials
or user data.** A metadata address is on the list below when it is not
a public address and both of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it
cannot collide with anything you run; and reaching it hands out
credentials, user data or bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no
matter what you list, including when you list them outright or list a
supernet such as `0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`.
Treat this as best effort rather than a guarantee — it is a
hand-maintained list and the caveat below the table applies:
- **It cannot open link-local, or a cloud metadata endpoint at a
non-public address that discloses credentials or user data.** An
address is on the list below when it is not a public address and both
of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it cannot collide with
anything you run; and reaching it hands out credentials, user data or
bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no matter what you list,
including when you list them outright or list a supernet such as
`0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`. Treat this as best
effort rather than a guarantee — it is a hand-maintained list and the
caveat below the table applies:
| Blocked unconditionally | What it is |
| ----------------------- | ---------- |
@@ -234,22 +218,14 @@ Two things this setting cannot do:
| `fd00:a9fe:a9fe::1/128` | Linode/Akamai metadata over IPv6 |
| `100.100.100.200/32` | Alibaba Cloud metadata, inside CGNAT |
| `192.0.0.192/32` | Oracle Cloud Classic metadata |
| `0.0.0.0/32` | IPv4 unspecified address, which reaches this host's loopback on Linux |
| `::/128` | IPv6 unspecified address, which reaches this host's loopback on Linux |
| `::a9fe:a9fe/128` | `169.254.169.254` as an IPv4-compatible IPv6 address |
| `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe/128` | `169.254.169.254` behind the NAT64 well-known prefix |
The IPv4-mapped form `::ffff:169.254.169.254` is covered by the
`169.254.0.0/16` entry. Reaching any of these but the two unspecified
addresses is credential or user-data theft rather than delivery to an
internal service. Every entry outside the two link-local blocks is a
single address, so blocking it costs you nothing else on the network
around it.
The unspecified addresses `0.0.0.0` and `::` hand out nothing
themselves, but no host can have either, and on Linux a connection to
one reaches this host's own loopback. They are listed so that the only
way to open loopback is to name it, as `127.0.0.0/8` or `::1`.
`169.254.0.0/16` entry. Reaching any of these is credential or
user-data theft rather than delivery to an internal service. Every
entry outside the two link-local blocks is a single address, so
blocking it costs you nothing else on the network around it.
The six ULA entries, all inside `fd00::/8`, are why this matters in
practice: `fd00::/8` is an ordinary block to allowlist for your own
@@ -398,37 +374,41 @@ unlocked.
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` is a comma-separated list of CIDR blocks (a bare
address such as `192.168.1.7` is accepted and treated as a single
host), for example `192.168.1.7, 2001:db8::5`. It decides whose
`X-Forwarded-For` header the rate limiters believe, so it should cover
the addresses of your reverse proxies.
`X-Forwarded-For` header the rate limiters believe, so it should name
the addresses of your reverse proxies and nothing else.
`X-Forwarded-For` is honoured **only** when the connecting peer is
inside one of these blocks; for every other peer the client identity is
the connection's own address and the header is ignored. Unset (or
empty), the list is the RFC 1918 private ranges: `10.0.0.0/8`,
`172.16.0.0/12` and `192.168.0.0/16`. A set value replaces the default
entirely. A set but unparseable value aborts startup.
the connection's own address and the header is ignored. The default is
the empty list, which trusts nobody — anything else would let any
client pick its own rate limit bucket, minting a fresh one per request
or draining someone else's. Set it to the address of your reverse
proxy, and to nothing wider. A set but unparseable value aborts
startup.
If any client can reach webhooker, or the proxy in front of it, from an
RFC 1918 source address (directly, or through anything that can
rewrite source addresses, such as NAT or a published container port),
set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the proxy's address alone, or every rate
limit, the webhook receiver's included, can be bypassed by those
clients. The address to set is the `remoteIP` field of the
`http request` log line for a request that came through the proxy.
Behind a proxy the list does not cover, every request keys on the
proxy's own address and all clients share a single bucket per limit.
The receiver limits become service-wide ceilings, and the login
endpoint's failure counting collapses onto one key, so a stranger's
wrong passwords throttle every other client's wrong passwords. Set
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` to that proxy's address to restore per-client
buckets.
That default is safe against forged headers, but leaving it unset in
production has a cost you must know about. Production runs behind a
TLS-terminating reverse proxy, so with `TRUSTED_PROXIES` unset every
request keys on the proxy's own address and all clients share a single
bucket per limit. The receiver limits become service-wide ceilings,
and the login endpoint's failure counting collapses onto one key, so a
stranger's wrong passwords throttle every other client's wrong
passwords.
What it cannot do is lock the operator out. The login endpoint
verifies credentials **before** it consults any limit and charges only
failures, so a correct password is never throttled no matter how full
the bucket is. See [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting).
The remedy is to set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to your reverse proxy's
address, which restores per-client buckets. webhooker logs a warning
at startup whenever `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty, in every environment,
because behind a proxy every client shares one bucket in `dev` and
`prod` alike. The warning is informational when nothing proxies to the
process: with no proxy in front, the peer address is the client's own
and the buckets are already per-client. See
[Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting) for what each limit shares.
`X-Real-IP` and `True-Client-IP` are **never** read, from any peer.
Reverse proxies append to `X-Forwarded-For` but forward other client
headers verbatim, so a single-valued header is client-controlled even
@@ -444,10 +424,20 @@ instead, since past such an entry the chain is not the shape assumed
here. The peer address is likewise used when the header is absent or
every hop in it is a trusted proxy.
Your proxy must therefore **append** the peer address to
`X-Forwarded-For` (nginx `$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for`, HAProxy
`option forwardfor`, Caddy and AWS ALB by default), and must append a
bare address with no port.
Two operator requirements follow:
- Your proxy must **append** the peer address to `X-Forwarded-For`
(nginx `$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for`, HAProxy `option forwardfor`,
Caddy and AWS ALB by default), and must append a bare address with
no port.
- List proxy hosts **only**. Any address inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`
chooses its own rate-limit key: its `X-Forwarded-For` is walked, so
it can name a different address on every request to get a fresh
bucket each time, or name another client's address to drain that
client's bucket. Never list a block that also covers clients — a
broad `10.0.0.0/8` on a network where clients live in the same range
makes all three limits, including the unauthenticated webhook
receiver, silently bypassable by every client in the block.
#### Sessions
@@ -746,15 +736,10 @@ repository's `Dockerfile` and runs it. The app needs:
- **Volume:** one host directory mounted at `/var/lib/webhooker`.
- **Environment variables:**
- `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod`
- `TRUSTED_PROXIES`: unset, it is the RFC 1918 ranges. Set it to
your reverse proxy's address alone if that address is outside
those ranges, or if any client can reach webhooker, or the proxy,
from an RFC 1918 source address (directly, or through anything
that can rewrite source addresses, such as NAT or a published
container port). The `remoteIP` field of the `http request` log
line for a request that came through the proxy shows that
address; the health check's own lines show `::1`. See
[Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies).
- `TRUSTED_PROXIES`: your reverse proxy's address on that Docker
network. The `remoteIP` field of the `http request` log line for a
request that came through the proxy shows it; the health check's
own lines show `::1`. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies).
- Leave `BIND_ADDRESS` and `DATA_DIR` unset: the image sets
`BIND_ADDRESS` to `0.0.0.0`, and `DATA_DIR` defaults to
`/var/lib/webhooker`.
@@ -817,16 +802,12 @@ reports.
behind a proxy means the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header. The block below
sets it; without it every request is read as plaintext and cookies
ship without `Secure`. See [Configuration](#configuration).
3. **Make sure `TRUSTED_PROXIES` covers the proxy's address.** For a
proxy it does not cover, every rate limiter keys on the proxy, so
all clients share one bucket per limit. Unset, the list is the RFC
1918 ranges, which do not cover a proxy that reaches the binary
itself over loopback (the binary bound to `127.0.0.1`). With the
image, the address to check is the `remoteIP` field of the
`http request` log line for a request that came through the proxy.
If any client can reach webhooker, or the proxy, from an RFC 1918
source address, set the list to the proxy's address alone. See
[Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies).
3. **Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the proxy's address.** Unset, every rate
limiter keys on the connecting peer, which behind a proxy is the
proxy on every request: all clients collapse into one global bucket
per limit and the receiver's per-IP limits become service-wide
ceilings. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). List the proxy
and nothing else.
4. **Send `Host` as `$http_host`, not `$host`.** `$host` strips the
port. webhooker's Origin/Referer check compares against the host it
was given, so on any port other than 443 `$host` makes every form
@@ -1142,29 +1123,13 @@ build itself.
| Uncommitted changes | the above with a `-dirty` suffix |
| No git metadata | `unknown` |
The image derives it the same way, from the `.git` that the build
context carries, so any `docker build .` of a clone, with no build
arguments, stamps the commit it was built from; a shallow clone of one
branch has no tags and stamps the short SHA. `.dockerignore` must
therefore leave out neither `.git` nor any tracked file, which git in
the build would see as deleted, marking the version `-dirty`. It does
leave `.git/config`, which can hold a remote URL carrying a credential
and which `git describe` does not need, out of a directory context. A
context sent as a tar is not filtered by `.dockerignore`, so it carries
`.git/config` unless its sender leaves it out; for upaas, that is
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas/issues/274. git in the build
reads the checkout whoever owns its files, since a context sent as a tar
archive keeps the sender's owners and git otherwise refuses a checkout
owned by another user. A `VERSION` build arg (`--build-arg VERSION=...`)
takes precedence; `script/docker` (and so `make docker`) passes the one
`script/version` resolves on the host. The image build fails if its
context carries `.git` and the version still comes out `unknown`, which
means git is missing from the build or could not read the checkout.
`unknown` is what a source tarball, or a `docker build` with no `.git`
in its context and no `VERSION` build arg, reports. A build that reports
`unknown` is a build nobody told what it was; it is not a failure, but
it cannot be traced back to a commit.
`unknown` is what a source tarball or a `docker build .` with no
`--build-arg VERSION=...` reports. `.dockerignore` excludes `.git/`, so
the build context carries no git metadata and the image cannot derive
the version itself: `script/docker` (and so `make docker`) resolves it
on the host and passes it in as the `VERSION` build arg. A build that
reports `unknown` is a build nobody told what it was; it is not a
failure, but it cannot be traced back to a commit.
`make version` prints what the current checkout would stamp, and
`make build VERSION=v1.2.3` overrides it. An empty override — from
@@ -1213,7 +1178,7 @@ backups at rest and restrict who can read them.
**The entrypoint UUID is the credential, and it is the only one.**
webhooker mints a version 4 UUID per entrypoint and serves it at
`/h/{uuid}`. Possession of that URL is the authentication:
`/webhook/{uuid}`. Possession of that URL is the authentication:
anyone who holds it can submit events to the entrypoint, and the
receiver verifies nothing else about the sender.
@@ -1395,11 +1360,10 @@ It uses:
- **[go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate)** for
sliding-window rate limiting of the password-change and webhook
receiver endpoints. The bucket is per client IP only when
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` covers the reverse proxy (by default it covers the
RFC 1918 private ranges); otherwise every client behind that proxy
shares one bucket per limit. The login endpoint counts failed
attempts itself instead, so that a correct password is never
throttled (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the reverse proxy; unset, every client
behind that proxy shares one bucket per limit. The login endpoint
counts failed attempts itself instead, so that a correct password is
never throttled (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
- **[Prometheus](https://prometheus.io)** for metrics, served at
`/metrics` behind basic auth
- **[Sentry](https://sentry.io)** for optional error reporting
@@ -1555,7 +1519,7 @@ the full request and creates an Event.
| -------------- | ------- | ----------- |
| `id` | UUID | Primary key |
| `webhook_id` | UUID | Foreign key → Webhook |
| `path` | string | Unique bare UUID, generated at creation. The `/h/` prefix is route only and is not stored: the receiver matches this column against the raw `{uuid}` path segment. It is also the entrypoint's credential; see [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret) |
| `path` | string | Unique bare UUID, generated at creation. The `/webhook/` prefix is route only and is not stored: the receiver matches this column against the raw `{uuid}` path segment. It is also the entrypoint's credential; see [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret) |
| `description` | string | Optional description |
| `active` | boolean | Whether this entrypoint accepts events (default: true) |
@@ -1685,7 +1649,6 @@ data for auditing, for replay, and for resubmission.
| `headers` | JSON | Complete request headers |
| `body` | text | Raw request body |
| `content_type` | string | Content-Type header value |
| `body_bytes` | integer | The body's size in bytes, recorded when the event is stored, on receipt and on resubmit |
| `resubmitted_from_id` | UUID | The event this one was copied from by a resubmit (nullable; empty for an event that arrived on the receiver). Not a foreign key: the source event can be reaped by retention while its copies remain |
**Relations:** Belongs to Webhook. Belongs to Entrypoint. Has many
@@ -1779,11 +1742,10 @@ retries) is individually logged for full observability.
Running counts in each event database, read by the statistics pane at the
top of the webhook page. `EventTotals` is one row:
| Field | Type | Description |
| ---------------- | --------- | ----------- |
| `events` | integer | Events ever stored, resubmitted copies included |
| `events_removed` | integer | Events retention has deleted |
| `last_event_at` | timestamp | When the newest event arrived (nullable; empty before the first); retention leaves it as it is |
| Field | Type | Description |
| ---------------- | ------- | ----------- |
| `events` | integer | Events ever stored, resubmitted copies included |
| `events_removed` | integer | Events retention has deleted |
`TargetTotals` is one row per target, created by the first delivery to it:
@@ -1800,9 +1762,7 @@ Each count changes in the transaction that writes or deletes the rows it
counts. The pane's lifetime events are `events`, and its lifetime
deliveries and failures are `deliveries` and `failed` summed over the
targets; each figure within retention is the same less what retention
removed, so neither needs the rows themselves. Its last event is
`last_event_at`, written in the transaction that stores the event, so it
still shows once retention has removed every event. Its last-10-minutes and
removed, so neither needs the rows themselves. Its last-10-minutes and
last-24-hours figures are counted from the `events` and `deliveries`
indexes over just that window, the deliveries in one query grouped by
target. Its failure percentage for a window is the deliveries that became
@@ -1819,25 +1779,23 @@ tags, so `AutoMigrate` creates them on a fresh database:
| `deliveries` | `status`, `deleted_at`, `finished_at`, `target_id` | Startup recovery, the retry and pending sweeps every 60 seconds and the queue-depth sampler every 30 seconds, which select deliveries by status, and the webhook page's statistics, which count each target's deliveries by status and when they finished |
| `deliveries` | `event_id`, `deleted_at` | The event log, which loads each event's deliveries, and retention, which counts and deletes the deliveries of expired events |
| `delivery_results` | `delivery_id`, `deleted_at` | The event log, which loads the attempts of a page's deliveries, and retention, which deletes the attempts of expired events |
| `events` | `deleted_at`, `created_at` | The webhook page's statistics, which count recent events |
| `events` | `deleted_at`, `created_at` | The webhook page's statistics, which count recent events and find the newest |
| `events` | `created_at` | Retention, which selects expired events by age |
GORM's soft delete adds `deleted_at IS NULL` to these queries; retention
leaves it out. SQLite keeps no statistics on these tables, and without them it
rates the `deleted_at` index, which every live row matches, above an index on
a column matched against several values or compared with a range. So every
index but the last also covers `deleted_at`. It comes second, so that
retention can use the index without it, except in `events`, where the
statistics compare `created_at` with a range (`>=`) and SQLite narrows by a
range only on the last column it uses.
a column matched against several values or compared with `<`. So every index
but the last also covers `deleted_at`. It comes second, so that retention can
use the index without it, except in `events`, where `created_at` is compared
with `<` and SQLite narrows by a `<` only on the last column it uses.
#### Common Fields
Every entity except `Setting`, `EventTotals` and `TargetTotals` includes
these fields from `BaseModel`. `Setting` is a bare key-value row with no
`id`, no timestamps and no soft delete, and the two totals tables hold
counts, plus `last_event_at` in `event_totals`, keyed by a numeric `id`
and by `target_id`:
only counts, keyed by a numeric `id` and by `target_id`:
| Field | Type | Description |
| ------------ | --------- | ----------- |
@@ -1977,7 +1935,7 @@ runtime, though CGO is required at build time due to the transitive
```
External Service
│
│ POST /h/{uuid}
│ POST /webhook/{uuid}
▼
┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ chi Router │────►│ Middleware │────►│ Webhook │
@@ -2203,7 +2161,7 @@ The middleware records three more on the same registry:
Two of those labels are written once per request from bytes the client
chose, so both are bounded to something this service registers:
- `handler` is the chi route pattern — `/h/{uuid}`, never the
- `handler` is the chi route pattern — `/webhook/{uuid}`, never the
concrete path. A request matching no route carries `(unmatched)`,
and no entrypoint UUID ever reaches a label.
- `method` is the request method when the router can route it, and
@@ -2233,7 +2191,7 @@ unpredictable rates, and blanket limits shared with other routes would
cause legitimate deliveries to be dropped.
The receiver instead has its own dedicated abuse limit, scoped to the
`/h/{uuid}` route only and keyed per client IP per request path
`/webhook/{uuid}` route only and keyed per client IP per request path
(`httprate.KeyByEndpoint`): one misbehaving sender is throttled without
affecting other senders of the same entrypoint or the same sender's
other entrypoints. Keying on the path rather than on the entrypoint
@@ -2270,7 +2228,7 @@ log spends. The access log is bounded by neither limit: every request
is recorded once at `INFO`, served or rejected alike.
What the access log does bound is the _content_ of those lines. A 3xx
or 4xx response logs the chi route pattern — `/h/{uuid}`,
or 4xx response logs the chi route pattern — `/webhook/{uuid}`,
`/user/{username}//`, or the literal `(unmatched)` when the request hit
no route at all — in place of the concrete URL. Those are the outcomes
an unauthenticated client can drive for free: 404 and 429 on any
@@ -2304,12 +2262,12 @@ reduces the headers to a fixed allowlist — `Accept`, `Content-Length`,
The same hook rewrites the request URL. The SDK builds it as
`scheme://host/path` from the concrete path, which on the receiver
route is `/h/<uuid>` in full — and that UUID is a write
route is `/webhook/<uuid>` in full — and that UUID is a write
capability, not an identifier: anyone holding it can post events this
service accepts and its targets then deliver. A tracker has its own
retention, access control and deletion policy, so the rule the access
log follows above does not carry across that boundary. What is sent is
the chi route pattern instead: `http://host/h/{uuid}`.
the chi route pattern instead: `http://host/webhook/{uuid}`.
The scheme and the host are kept, and everything else in the URL is
discarded rather than edited, so a future SDK version that starts
@@ -2353,8 +2311,8 @@ fallback is never the concrete path. The path becomes the literal
rewrite cannot parse into a scheme is withheld whole. A transaction
event additionally carries the SDK's own `METHOD /path` name, built
from the concrete path as well; it is rewritten on the same terms, to
`POST /h/{uuid}` where the pattern is known and `POST /(redacted)`
where it is not.
`POST /webhook/{uuid}` where the pattern is known and `POST
/(redacted)` where it is not.
The headers are an allowlist for the same reason the rules above are
unconditional: the SDK's own filter removes four names and passes
@@ -2489,7 +2447,7 @@ logger printed the fully interpolated SQL — parameters and all — to
standard output on every statement that returned an error, including a
plain record-not-found, at a level no operator setting reached. Two of
this service's lookups miss by design on unauthenticated routes: the
entrypoint lookup behind `/h/{uuid}` and the user lookup behind
entrypoint lookup behind `/webhook/{uuid}` and the user lookup behind
the login form, whose path segment and submitted username the client
picks outright. Every
`gorm.Open` in the service now installs the adapter in
@@ -2617,44 +2575,47 @@ the tree is checked out: four checkouts have reported 3,959, 3,961,
client-supplied field was cut, and that the shipped chain's stack
arrived uncut — never the numbers.
Every limiter here — receiver, login, password change, delivery replay
and event resubmit — identifies the client the same way, through one
shared key function: the connection's own address, unless the peer is
inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, in which case the forwarded client address is
used instead. That address becomes a bucket by family: IPv4 keys on
the full address, IPv6 on its `/64` prefix. A routed `/64` is the normal
Every limiter here — receiver, login, and password change — identifies
the client the same way, through one shared key function: the
connection's own address, unless the peer is listed in
`TRUSTED_PROXIES`, in which case the forwarded client address is used
instead. That address becomes a bucket by family: IPv4 keys on the full
address, IPv6 on its `/64` prefix. A routed `/64` is the normal
residential and mobile IPv6 allocation, so keying IPv6 per address would
let one subscriber rotate source addresses and mint a fresh bucket per
request, evading these limits at the network layer without spoofing
anything; the cost is that distinct clients inside one `/64` share a
bucket. IPv4-mapped addresses (`::ffff:1.2.3.4`) key as the IPv4 address
they carry. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). When that variable
does not cover the reverse proxy, a client behind it shares one bucket
with every other client behind the same proxy. Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to
the proxy's address to get per-client limits back. What the shared bucket
they carry. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). Deployed without that
variable set, a client behind a reverse proxy shares one bucket with
every other client behind the same proxy. Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the
proxy's address to get per-client limits back. What the shared bucket
costs is not the same for every limiter, and the two cases pull in
opposite directions:
- For the **receiver** limits it costs throughput, which is the safe
direction to be wrong in: sharing can only make a limit bind sooner,
never let a sender past it. It matters more for the aggregate limit
than for the per-entrypoint one: with every request keyed on the
proxy, the aggregate limit becomes a service-wide ceiling of 1200
requests per minute across all senders and all entrypoints, where the
per-entrypoint limit's capacity still grows with the number of
entrypoints.
than for the per-entrypoint one: with `TRUSTED_PROXIES` unset behind
the reverse proxy a production deployment is required to run behind,
every request keys on the proxy, so the aggregate limit becomes a
service-wide ceiling of 1200 requests per minute across all senders
and all entrypoints, where the per-entrypoint limit's capacity still
grows with the number of entrypoints. Any deployment with more than a
handful of busy entrypoints must set `TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
- For the **login and password-change** limits it costs precision, not
availability. Login failures from every client land in one counter,
so a stranger's wrong passwords make the operator's own wrong
passwords answer `429` sooner; the operator's _correct_ password is
never affected, because it is never counted.
never affected, because it is never counted. Production deployments
should still set `TRUSTED_PROXIES`; webhooker warns at startup
whenever it is empty, in any environment.
#### The login endpoint
The login `POST` is the one endpoint with no pre-emptive limiter in
front of it, and that is deliberate. A limiter that spends budget on
arrival is a lockout wherever clients share one bucket, as they do
behind a reverse proxy that `TRUSTED_PROXIES` does not cover: a
arrival is a lockout in this deployment shape: sharing one bucket, a
stranger sending five POSTs a minute — about 0.08 requests per second,
from anywhere — keeps it permanently full, and the operator has no
second administrative path. So the handler inverts the order:
@@ -2751,10 +2712,8 @@ re-fills both verification slots on its first two requests. The
remedies are to block the source at the reverse proxy, or to
rate-limit `POST /pages/login` there — the one place a limit can be
applied without reintroducing the lockout, because the proxy sees the
real client address. `TRUSTED_PROXIES` does not stop the saturation.
The flood's source is in the proxy's access log: webhooker's own logs
record the proxy's address, not the client's (see
[Deployment behind a reverse proxy](#deployment-behind-a-reverse-proxy)).
real client address. Setting `TRUSTED_PROXIES` does not stop the
saturation, but it makes the source visible in the failure logs.
Finer-grained per-webhook rate limits (configured in the web UI and
enforced in the webhook handler) can layer on top of this env-level
@@ -2766,48 +2725,44 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
| Method | Path | Description |
| ------ | --------------------------- | ----------- |
| `GET` | `/` | Root redirect, 303 (authenticated → `/hooks`, unauthenticated → `/pages/login`) |
| `GET` | `/` | Root redirect, 303 (authenticated → `/sources`, unauthenticated → `/pages/login`) |
| `GET` | `/.well-known/healthcheck` | Health check (JSON: `status`, `now`, `uptimeSeconds`, `uptimeHuman`, `version`, `appname`, `maintenanceMode`) |
| `GET`, `HEAD` | `/s/*` | Static file serving (embedded CSS, JS). `GET` and `HEAD` only — `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, `OPTIONS`, `TRACE` and `CONNECT` are answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: GET, HEAD`. Any other method (such as `PROPFIND`) is refused by chi before it reaches this route, and gets `405` without an `Allow` header. Pinned by `TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead` |
| `POST` | `/h/{uuid}` | Webhook receiver endpoint. `POST` only — every other method is answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: POST`. Rate limited (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
| `POST` | `/webhook/{uuid}` | Webhook receiver endpoint. `POST` only — every other method is answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: POST`. Rate limited (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
#### Authentication Endpoints
| Method | Path | Description |
| ------ | --------------- | ----------- |
| `GET` | `/pages/login` | Login page (not rate limited). Its `next` parameter names the page to return to after login; anything but a path on this site is replaced with `/` |
| `POST` | `/pages/login` | Login form submission. On success, redirects to the form's `next` when it is a path on this site, otherwise to `/`. Credentials are verified before any limit is consulted, so a correct password is never throttled; 5 FAILED attempts per minute per bucket per submitted username, then `429`. `503` if no verification slot frees up within 5s, or immediately if 16 requests are already queued for one (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
| `GET` | `/pages/login` | Login page (not rate limited) |
| `POST` | `/pages/login` | Login form submission. Credentials are verified before any limit is consulted, so a correct password is never throttled; 5 FAILED attempts per minute per bucket per submitted username, then `429`. `503` if no verification slot frees up within 5s, or immediately if 16 requests are already queued for one (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
| `POST` | `/pages/logout` | Logout (destroys session) |
#### Authenticated Endpoints
A logged-out `GET` of any of these is redirected to `/pages/login` with
its path and query as `next` when they fit in 2048 bytes, so logging in
returns to the page that was asked for.
| Method | Path | Description |
| ------ | ------------------------ | ----------- |
| `GET` | `/user/{username}` | User profile page |
| `POST` | `/user/{username}/password` | Change the user's password (5 per minute per bucket, then `429`; `503` if no verification slot frees up within 5s, or immediately if 16 requests are already queued for one) |
| `GET` | `/hooks` | List user's webhooks |
| `GET` | `/hooks/new` | Create webhook form |
| `POST` | `/hooks/new` | Create webhook submission |
| `GET` | `/hook/{id}` | Webhook detail view |
| `GET` | `/hook/{id}/edit` | Edit webhook form |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/edit` | Edit webhook submission |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/delete` | Delete webhook |
| `GET` | `/hook/{id}/events` | Full Event Log |
| `GET` | `/hook/{id}/events/{eventID}/body` | Download an event's full stored body. The log page renders each body only up to its cap, so this is the only route that serves a whole one; it is offered wherever a body is shown truncated |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/deliveries/{deliveryID}/replay` | Replay a finished delivery: creates a new delivery for the same event against the target's current configuration (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/events/{eventID}/resubmit` | Resubmit a stored event: creates a new event copying it and fans that out to every currently active target (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/entrypoints` | Add entrypoint to webhook |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete` | Delete an entrypoint |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle` | Enable or disable an entrypoint |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/targets` | Add target to webhook |
| `GET` | `/hook/{id}/targets/{targetID}/edit` | Edit target form. The one page that renders a target's destination URL and header values in full, rather than masked |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/targets/{targetID}/edit` | Edit target submission |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/targets/{targetID}/delete` | Delete a target |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/targets/{targetID}/toggle` | Enable or disable a target |
| `GET` | `/sources` | List user's webhooks |
| `GET` | `/sources/new` | Create webhook form |
| `POST` | `/sources/new` | Create webhook submission |
| `GET` | `/source/{id}` | Webhook detail view |
| `GET` | `/source/{id}/edit` | Edit webhook form |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/edit` | Edit webhook submission |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/delete` | Delete webhook |
| `GET` | `/source/{id}/logs` | Webhook event logs |
| `GET` | `/source/{id}/logs/{eventID}/body` | Download an event's full stored body. The log page renders each body only up to its cap, so this is the only route that serves a whole one; it is offered wherever a body is shown truncated |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/deliveries/{deliveryID}/replay` | Replay a finished delivery: creates a new delivery for the same event against the target's current configuration (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/events/{eventID}/resubmit` | Resubmit a stored event: creates a new event copying it and fans that out to every currently active target (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints` | Add entrypoint to webhook |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete` | Delete an entrypoint |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle` | Enable or disable an entrypoint |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets` | Add target to webhook |
| `GET` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/edit` | Edit target form. The one page that renders a target's destination URL and header values in full, rather than masked |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/edit` | Edit target submission |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/delete` | Delete a target |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/toggle` | Enable or disable a target |
#### Infrastructure Endpoints
@@ -2960,15 +2915,13 @@ Components are wired via Uber fx in this order:
7. `healthcheck.New` — Health check service
8. `session.New` — Cookie-based session manager (key from database)
9. `handlers.New` — HTTP handlers
10. `metrics.NewRegistry` — The registry `/metrics` serves
11. `metrics.New` — The delivery collectors, registered on that registry
12. `middleware.New` — HTTP middleware
13. `delivery.New` — Event-driven delivery engine
14. `delivery.NewArchiveSweeper` — Periodic pruning of idle archives
15. `delivery.Engine` → `delivery.Notifier` — interface bridge
16. `delivery.Engine` → `delivery.WebhookEvictor` — interface bridge so
10. `middleware.New` — HTTP middleware
11. `delivery.New` — Event-driven delivery engine
12. `delivery.NewArchiveSweeper` — Periodic pruning of idle archives
13. `delivery.Engine` → `delivery.Notifier` — interface bridge
14. `delivery.Engine` → `delivery.WebhookEvictor` — interface bridge so
deleting a webhook releases its archive writer
17. `server.New` — HTTP server and router
15. `server.New` — HTTP server and router
The server starts via `fx.Invoke(func(*server.Server, *delivery.Engine,
*database.RetentionReaper, *delivery.ArchiveSweeper) {})`, which
@@ -3011,14 +2964,8 @@ local record instead of nothing. What that placement gives up is
recovery of a panic in the six entries above it, none of which does
more than set a header or start a timer.
Each admin page route group (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/hooks`,
`/hook/*`) starts with its own **Recoverer** and, if `SENTRY_DSN` is
set, its own **Sentry** error reporting. That Recoverer answers a panic
with the `500` error page in the normal layout; the global one keeps
the plain-text `500` for every other route.
Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/hooks`,
`/hook/*`) apply a **MaxBodySize** middleware that limits
Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/sources`,
`/source/*`) apply a **MaxBodySize** middleware that limits
POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. It is registered ahead of the
CSRF middleware in every one of those route groups, because
gorilla/csrf parses the form; if the cap were installed after it, form
@@ -3042,7 +2989,7 @@ Those same four route groups then apply **CSRF** and **NoCache**
`/pages` applies **RequireAuth**. The rate limiters are per-route
rather than global: **PasswordChangeRateLimit** on
`/user/{username}/password` and **ReceiverRateLimit** on
`/h/{uuid}`. There is deliberately none on `/pages/login` — that
`/webhook/{uuid}`. There is deliberately none on `/pages/login` — that
endpoint counts failures inside the handler, after the credential
check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
@@ -3083,8 +3030,8 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
by middleware that runs before CSRF parses the form
- **CSRF protection** via [gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)
on all state-changing forms (cookie-based double-submit tokens with
HMAC authentication). Applied to `/pages`, `/hooks`, `/hook`, and
`/user` routes. Excluded from `/h` (inbound webhook POSTs) and
HMAC authentication). Applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and
`/user` routes. Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and
`/api` (stateless API). The middleware detects TLS per-request through
`internal/reqtls.IsTLS` — the same predicate the session cookie uses —
to set appropriate cookie security flags and Origin/Referer validation
@@ -3102,8 +3049,7 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
route through a single decision function, so they cannot disagree
about a destination. An operator can permit specific blocks with
[`ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS`](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network); the
guard cannot be switched off, and link-local, the unspecified
addresses `0.0.0.0` and `::`, and a
guard cannot be switched off, and link-local plus a
[pinned set](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network) of known cloud
metadata endpoints — several of which are ULAs outside link-local —
stay blocked whatever is listed, though listing `0.0.0.0/0` or
@@ -3126,9 +3072,10 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
It runs behind session auth, so only a client already holding a
valid session reaches it, and an operator throttled out of changing
a password can still log in. The bucket is per client IP only when
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` covers the reverse proxy; otherwise every client
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the reverse proxy; unset, every client
shares one bucket, which costs precision rather than availability
(see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
(see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)). webhooker warns at startup
whenever `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty
- Prometheus metrics behind basic auth
- Static assets embedded in binary (no filesystem access needed at
runtime)
@@ -3138,8 +3085,7 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
before the app starts; the image's health check; and `docker exec`,
unless given `--user`
- GORM soft deletes on every entity that carries `BaseModel`, which is
all of them but `Setting`, `EventTotals` and `TargetTotals` (data
preserved for audit)
all of them but `Setting` (data preserved for audit)
### Shutdown
@@ -3261,9 +3207,8 @@ version is fixed independently of the compiler's:
rebuilds the binary with `CGO_ENABLED=1` and static linking so it
runs on musl. Both builds go through `make build`, the relink adding
its `-extldflags` via `GO_LDFLAGS`, so neither can drop the `-X` that
stamps the version. The version is the `VERSION` build arg if one is
given, otherwise derived from the `.git` in the context, and the
stage fails if a context with `.git` would stamp `unknown` (see
stamps the version. The version arrives as the `VERSION` build arg,
since the context has no `.git` (see
[Version stamping](#version-stamping)).
3. **Runtime stage** (`alpine:3.21`) — copies the static binary and
`deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh`, creates the `/var/lib/webhooker`
@@ -3295,13 +3240,19 @@ A layer cache lets `docker build .` exit 0 in seconds with the lint and
test stages replayed rather than executed, which would make a green
check meaningless. The `check` workflow therefore writes
`.ci-fingerprint` into the build context before building. Its value is
the hash of the commit being checked, so every commit, docs-only ones
and a squash merge whose tree matches an already-built branch included,
gets a new fingerprint, invalidates the `COPY . .` layer of both check
stages, and really runs `make fmt-check`, `golangci-lint`, `make test`,
and `make build`. A run that reports success ran them.
the hash of the last commit that touched the build context, so:
The module download layer sits above `COPY . .` and stays cached.
- Any commit that changes code (including a squash merge whose tree
matches an already-built branch) gets a new fingerprint, invalidates
the `COPY . .` layer of both check stages, and really runs
`make fmt-check`, `golangci-lint`, `make test`, and `make build`. A
run that reports success ran them.
- A docs-only commit leaves the fingerprint unchanged — `.dockerignore`
excludes `*.md`, `LICENSE` and `.editorconfig` from the context
anyway — so the image replays from cache and costs seconds.
The module download layer sits above `COPY . .` and stays cached either
way.
A separate workflow step, run before the fingerprint is written, covers
a second way the gate lied: Gitea cancels an in-flight run when a newer
TODO.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ point of the branch.
- 2026-03-05 security headers middleware, session regeneration on
login, request body size limits (#41)
- 2026-03-04 tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages
(#32); removed the build-architecture global (#31)
(#32); removed globals.Buildarch (#31)
- 2026-03-04 1.0 MVP merge: Webhook/Entrypoint/Target rename, core
delivery engine with bounded worker pool and circuit breaker,
parallel fan-out, per-webhook event databases, management UI (#16)
cmd/webhooker/main.go
-5
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/resetpw"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
@@ -178,10 +177,6 @@ func newApp() *fx.App {
healthcheck.New,
session.New,
handlers.New,
// The registry /metrics serves, and the delivery
// collectors registered on it.
metrics.NewRegistry,
metrics.New,
middleware.New,
// The one SSRF guard both target-creation validation
// and the delivery dialer consult, so they cannot
go.mod
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ go 1.26.1
require (
github.com/99designs/basicauth-go v0.0.0-20230316000542-bf6f9cbbf0f8
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1
github.com/getsentry/sentry-go v0.25.0
github.com/go-chi/chi v1.5.5
github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.1
@@ -30,6 +29,7 @@ require (
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.2.0 // indirect
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc // indirect
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2 // indirect
github.com/jinzhu/inflection v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/jinzhu/now v1.1.5 // indirect
internal/config/config.go
+64 -27
View File
@@ -75,11 +75,6 @@ const (
// internet-exposed endpoint.
defaultReceiverRateLimit = 120
// defaultTrustedProxies is TRUSTED_PROXIES when it is unset: the
// RFC 1918 private ranges, which a reverse proxy reaching the
// process over a Docker network or a private LAN connects from.
defaultTrustedProxies = "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
// maxPort is the highest valid TCP port number. The lower
// bound (at least 1) is enforced by envPositiveInt.
maxPort = 65535
@@ -177,14 +172,13 @@ type Config struct {
// TrustedProxies is the set of networks whose members are
// allowed to speak for the client with X-Forwarded-For, the
// only forwarded header read. Unless TRUSTED_PROXIES is set it
// is the RFC 1918 private ranges (defaultTrustedProxies); a set
// value replaces them. If any client can reach the process, or
// the proxy in front of it, from an RFC 1918 source address
// (directly, or through anything that can rewrite source
// addresses, such as NAT or a published container port), it
// must be set to the proxy's address alone, or every rate limit
// can be bypassed by those clients.
// only forwarded header read. It is empty unless
// TRUSTED_PROXIES is set, and empty means no peer is
// trusted: forwarded headers are then ignored entirely and
// clients are identified by the connection's own address.
// Members can choose their own rate-limit key, so this must
// name proxy hosts only, never a block that also covers
// clients.
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// AllowedEgressCIDRs is the set of networks a delivery target
@@ -196,11 +190,10 @@ type Config struct {
// otherwise refuse. The guard itself is always on: there is no
// setting that disables SSRF protection, and delivery's
// alwaysBlockedNetworks stays blocked no matter what is listed
// here. That set is link-local, the unspecified addresses
// 0.0.0.0 and ::, and the cloud metadata endpoints outside
// link-local that disclose credentials or user data at a
// provider-fixed, non-public address; it is not exhaustive of
// every cloud's metadata address. See
// here. That set is link-local plus the cloud metadata
// endpoints outside it that disclose credentials or user data
// at a provider-fixed, non-public address; it is not
// exhaustive of every cloud's metadata address. See
// alwaysBlockedNetworks for the authoritative list and the
// criterion it is built from.
AllowedEgressCIDRs []netip.Prefix
@@ -467,15 +460,14 @@ func parseCIDR(entry string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
// envPrefixList returns the value of the named environment variable
// parsed as a comma-separated list of CIDR blocks (bare addresses
// allowed). An unset, empty, or blank value is read as defaultValue
// instead. A set value containing an unparseable entry is a hard
// error naming the key and the bad entry, so startup fails loudly
// rather than silently running with a list the operator did not
// intend.
func envPrefixList(key, defaultValue string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
// allowed). An unset, empty, or blank value yields an empty list. A
// set value containing an unparseable entry is a hard error naming
// the key and the bad entry, so startup fails loudly rather than
// silently running with a list the operator did not intend.
func envPrefixList(key string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key))
if v == "" {
v = defaultValue
return nil, nil
}
var prefixes []netip.Prefix
@@ -689,12 +681,12 @@ func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
return nil, err
}
trustedProxies, err := envPrefixList("TRUSTED_PROXIES", defaultTrustedProxies)
trustedProxies, err := envPrefixList("TRUSTED_PROXIES")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
allowedEgressCIDRs, err := envPrefixList("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS", "")
allowedEgressCIDRs, err := envPrefixList("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -768,6 +760,50 @@ func (c *Config) warnEgressAllowlist(log *slog.Logger) {
)
}
// warnSharedRateLimitBucket logs a startup warning whenever
// TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any environment.
//
// With no trusted proxies every rate limiter keys on the connecting
// peer's address. Whether that is harmless or dangerous depends on
// what is in front of the process, which this code cannot observe:
// with nothing in front, the peer is the client and the limits are
// per-client as intended; behind a reverse proxy the peer is the proxy
// for every request, so all clients share one bucket per limiter.
//
// The login endpoint no longer spends budget on arrival — it verifies
// credentials first and charges only failures — so a shared bucket
// cannot deny the operator a correct password. What it does collapse
// is the failure counting: one client's wrong passwords throttle
// everyone else's wrong passwords, and the receiver's limits become
// service-wide ceilings.
//
// The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT:
// behind a proxy every client shares one bucket in dev and prod alike.
//
// The default of trusting nobody is deliberate — trusting forwarded
// headers from arbitrary peers lets any client choose its own bucket —
// so this warns rather than failing startup or changing the key.
func (c *Config) warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log *slog.Logger) {
if len(c.TrustedProxies) > 0 {
return
}
log.Warn(
"TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty: every rate limit keys on the "+
"connecting peer's address. With nothing proxying to "+
"this process that is the client itself and the limits "+
"are per-client as intended. Behind a reverse proxy the "+
"peer is the proxy on every request, so all clients "+
"share one bucket per limit: the receiver limits become "+
"service-wide ceilings, and one client's failed logins "+
"throttle every other client's failed logins — a "+
"correct password still gets in. If anything proxies to "+
"this process, set TRUSTED_PROXIES to its address.",
"environment", c.Environment,
"trustedProxies", len(c.TrustedProxies),
)
}
// New creates a Config by reading environment variables.
//
//nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused.
@@ -813,6 +849,7 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
"hasMetricsAuth", s.MetricsAuthEnabled(),
)
s.warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log)
s.warnEgressAllowlist(log)
return s, nil
internal/config/config_test.go
+101 -14
View File
@@ -551,11 +551,6 @@ func testReceiverRateLimitSuccess(
}
func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
// Unset, the RFC 1918 private ranges are trusted, so a reverse
// proxy on a Docker network or a private LAN is covered without
// configuration.
defaultProxies := []string{cidrPrivateV4, "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16"}
tests := []struct {
name string
set bool
@@ -564,21 +559,18 @@ func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
expected []string
}{
{
// The default must be "trust nobody": an empty list
// means forwarded headers are ignored, never that
// every peer may speak for the client.
name: caseUnsetUsesDefault,
set: false,
expected: defaultProxies,
expected: []string{},
},
{
name: "blank value uses default",
name: "blank value trusts nothing",
set: true,
value: " ",
expected: defaultProxies,
},
{
name: "set value replaces the default entirely",
set: true,
value: "203.0.113.7",
expected: []string{"203.0.113.7/32"},
expected: []string{},
},
{
name: caseValidValueParsed,
@@ -853,6 +845,101 @@ func TestEgressAllowlistWarning(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning covers the startup warning that
// tells an operator a deployment behind a reverse proxy shares one
// rate-limit bucket between every client, which turns the receiver
// limits into service-wide ceilings and collapses login failure
// counting. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any
// environment, because behind a proxy every client shares one bucket
// in dev and prod alike. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
environment string
trustedProxies string
expectWarning bool
}{
{
name: "prod without trusted proxies warns",
environment: config.EnvironmentProd,
expectWarning: true,
},
{
name: "prod with trusted proxies is quiet",
environment: config.EnvironmentProd,
trustedProxies: cidrPrivateV4,
expectWarning: false,
},
{
name: "dev without trusted proxies warns",
environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
expectWarning: true,
},
{
name: "dev with trusted proxies is quiet",
environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
trustedProxies: cidrPrivateV4,
expectWarning: false,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", tt.environment)
if tt.trustedProxies == "" {
require.NoError(
t, os.Unsetenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES"),
)
} else {
t.Setenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES", tt.trustedProxies)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
log := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(
&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: slog.LevelDebug,
},
))
require.NoError(
t,
config.WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest(log),
)
if !tt.expectWarning {
assert.Empty(t, buf.String())
return
}
logged := buf.String()
assert.Contains(t, logged, `"level":"WARN"`)
assert.Contains(t, logged, "TRUSTED_PROXIES")
assert.Contains(t, logged, "share one bucket")
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "throttle every other client's failed logins",
)
// The warning must not claim a lockout the login
// endpoint no longer permits: credentials are verified
// before any budget is spent.
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "a correct password still gets in",
)
// The text must stay accurate for a developer with
// nothing in front of the process, where an empty
// list costs nothing.
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "nothing proxying to this process",
)
})
}
}
// metricsEnv describes what one subtest below puts in the
// environment for a single METRICS_ variable. A variable that is
// set to the empty string and one that is not set at all are
internal/config/export_test.go
+15
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,21 @@ import "log/slog"
// the external config_test package so each helper can be covered by
// its own table-driven test without weakening the package API.
// WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest loads a Config from the current
// environment and emits its startup warnings to log. The real logger
// writes to stdout, so this lets the warning's firing condition be
// asserted against a handler the test controls.
func WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest(log *slog.Logger) error {
c, err := loadFromEnv()
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log)
return nil
}
// WarnEgressAllowlistForTest loads a Config from the current
// environment and emits its egress-allowlist startup warning to
// log, so a test can assert both that the warning fires only when
internal/database/event_tier_indexes_test.go
+23 -5
View File
@@ -152,7 +152,9 @@ func TestEventTierQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
// TestStatisticsQueriesUseTheirIndexes does the same for the webhook
// page's statistics (readEventStats in the handlers): deliveries in
// progress, each target's deliveries finished since a time, which must
// come from the index alone, and events received since a time.
// come from the index alone, events received since a time, and the
// newest event, which must come straight off an index rather than from
// sorting every event.
func TestStatisticsQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -170,6 +172,7 @@ func TestStatisticsQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
var (
count int64
newest []time.Time
byTarget []struct{ TargetID string }
)
@@ -197,6 +200,12 @@ func TestStatisticsQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
Where("created_at >= ?", since).Count(&count),
"idx_events_deleted_at_created_at "+
"(deleted_at=? AND created_at>?)")
newestEvent := dry.Model(&database.Event{}).
Order("created_at DESC").Limit(1).Pluck("created_at", &newest)
assertPlanUses(t, db, newestEvent,
"idx_events_deleted_at_created_at (deleted_at=?)")
assert.NotContains(t, queryPlan(t, db, newestEvent), "TEMP B-TREE")
}
// assertPlanUses asserts that SQLite's plan for a statement GORM built
@@ -207,6 +216,18 @@ func assertPlanUses(
) {
t.Helper()
plan := queryPlan(t, db, built)
for _, index := range indexes {
assert.Contains(t, plan, index, built.Statement.SQL.String())
}
}
// queryPlan returns SQLite's plan for a statement GORM built in a dry
// run, run with the same SQL and arguments GORM would send.
func queryPlan(t *testing.T, db, built *gorm.DB) string {
t.Helper()
var plan []struct{ Detail string }
require.NoError(t, db.Raw(
@@ -214,8 +235,5 @@ func assertPlanUses(
built.Statement.Vars...,
).Scan(&plan).Error)
for _, index := range indexes {
assert.Contains(t, fmt.Sprint(plan), index,
built.Statement.SQL.String())
}
return fmt.Sprint(plan)
}
internal/database/export_test.go
-12
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"testing"
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
@@ -84,14 +83,3 @@ func (d *Database) ExportSetBannerOut(w io.Writer) {
func DummyPasswordHashForTest() string {
return dummyPasswordHash()
}
// HashAtShippedCostForTest makes HashPassword hash at the shipped
// memory cost until t ends. t must not run in parallel with other
// tests, which would hash at that cost alongside it.
func HashAtShippedCostForTest(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
hashAtShippedCostInTest = true
t.Cleanup(func() { hashAtShippedCostInTest = false })
}
internal/database/model_event.go
-5
View File
@@ -31,11 +31,6 @@ type Event struct {
Body string `gorm:"type:text" json:"body"`
ContentType string `json:"contentType"`
// BodyBytes is the size of Body in bytes, recorded when the event
// is stored so the recent events list can show it without reading
// the body.
BodyBytes int64 `gorm:"not null" json:"bodyBytes"`
// ResubmittedFromID names the event this one was copied from by
// an operator resubmit. It is nil for an event that arrived on
// the receiver, which is every event created before the column
internal/database/model_totals.go
+5 -13
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package database
import (
"fmt"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
@@ -14,17 +13,12 @@ import (
// rows it counts.
// EventTotals is the single row counting a webhook's events: every
// event ever stored, how many of them retention has deleted, and when
// the newest arrived, which retention leaves as it is.
// event ever stored, and how many of them retention has deleted.
type EventTotals struct {
ID int64 `gorm:"primaryKey"`
Events int64 `gorm:"not null"`
EventsRemoved int64 `gorm:"not null"`
// LastEventAt is when the newest event arrived, or nil before the
// first.
LastEventAt *time.Time
}
// TableName names the table AddEventTotals updates.
@@ -52,17 +46,15 @@ func (TargetTotals) TableName() string {
return "target_totals"
}
// AddEventTotals adds each count in add to the webhook's event totals,
// and records add.LastEventAt as when the newest event arrived if it is
// set. Call it on the transaction that writes or deletes the events it
// AddEventTotals adds each count in add to the webhook's event totals.
// Call it on the transaction that writes or deletes the events it
// counts.
func AddEventTotals(tx *gorm.DB, add EventTotals) error {
err := tx.Exec(
`UPDATE event_totals SET
events = events + ?,
events_removed = events_removed + ?,
last_event_at = coalesce(?, last_event_at)`,
add.Events, add.EventsRemoved, add.LastEventAt,
events_removed = events_removed + ?`,
add.Events, add.EventsRemoved,
).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("adding to event totals: %w", err)
internal/database/password.go
+1 -22
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
"math/big"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
)
@@ -64,30 +63,10 @@ func DefaultPasswordConfig() *PasswordConfig {
}
}
// testArgon2Memory is the Argon2id memory cost, in KiB, that a test
// binary hashes with: 1 MB instead of the shipped 64 MB. Every test
// that starts a database hashes the bootstrap admin password, dozens
// of them run in parallel, and under the race detector each 64 MB hash
// holds about 150 MB. VerifyPassword reads the cost from the hash it
// checks, so verification follows.
const testArgon2Memory = 1024
// hashAtShippedCostInTest makes a test binary hash at the shipped
// memory cost. Only TestHashPassword_ShippedParameters sets it.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // set by one test, see above
var hashAtShippedCostInTest bool
// HashPassword generates an Argon2id hash of the password. A binary
// built by go test hashes at testArgon2Memory; one built by go build
// always hashes at the defaults.
// HashPassword generates an Argon2id hash of the password
func HashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
config := DefaultPasswordConfig()
if testing.Testing() && !hashAtShippedCostInTest {
config.Memory = testArgon2Memory
}
// Generate a salt
salt := make([]byte, config.SaltLen)
internal/database/password_test.go
-33
View File
@@ -192,39 +192,6 @@ func TestHashPasswordUniqueness(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestHashPassword_ShippedParameters hashes and verifies through
// HashPassword at the shipped Argon2id parameters. Every other test
// hashes at the lower memory cost a test binary uses, so this is the
// one that keeps production hashing covered. One hash and one
// verification: each costs 64 MB.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // changes the hashing cost for the whole binary
func TestHashPassword_ShippedParameters(t *testing.T) {
database.HashAtShippedCostForTest(t)
password := "correct horse battery staple"
hash, err := database.HashPassword(password)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("hashing with the shipped parameters: %v", err)
}
const shipped = "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=1,p=4$"
if !strings.HasPrefix(hash, shipped) {
t.Errorf("hash = %q, want prefix %q", hash, shipped)
}
valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, hash)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword() error = %v", err)
}
if !valid {
t.Error("VerifyPassword() returned false for correct password")
}
}
// TestVerifyDummyPassword_DoesRealWork covers the anti-enumeration
// path. Login charges an unknown username a verification against a
// dummy hash so that a nonexistent account is not answered in
internal/database/retention.go
+6 -24
View File
@@ -25,12 +25,6 @@ const hoursPerDay = 24
// busy timeout.
const reapBatchSize = 1000
// reapBatchPause is how long retention waits after one batch before
// starting the next. A writer waiting for the write lock checks for it
// again after at most 100 ms, so a longer pause lets it in between two
// batches instead of only after the whole prune.
const reapBatchPause = 200 * time.Millisecond
// RetentionReaperParams holds the fx dependencies for the
// RetentionReaper.
type RetentionReaperParams struct {
@@ -200,15 +194,13 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) sweep(ctx context.Context) {
continue
}
r.reapWebhook(ctx, wh.ID, wh.RetentionDays)
r.reapWebhook(wh.ID, wh.RetentionDays)
}
}
// reapWebhook removes every expired event (and its dependents) from a
// single webhook's database, or as many as it reaches before ctx is
// cancelled.
// single webhook's database.
func (r *RetentionReaper) reapWebhook(
ctx context.Context,
webhookID string,
retentionDays int,
) {
@@ -228,7 +220,7 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) reapWebhook(
return
}
deleted, err := reapExpired(ctx, db, cutoff)
deleted, err := reapExpired(db, cutoff)
if err != nil {
r.log.Error(
"retention sweep: failed to reap expired events",
@@ -282,13 +274,9 @@ func retentionCutoff(
// reapExpired hard-deletes the events older than cutoff, with their
// deliveries and delivery results, reapBatchSize events per
// transaction with reapBatchPause between transactions, until none is
// left. Once ctx is cancelled it returns after the batch in hand,
// leaving the rest to the next sweep, so stopping the app does not
// wait for a long prune. It returns the number of events deleted.
func reapExpired(
ctx context.Context, db *gorm.DB, cutoff time.Time,
) (int64, error) {
// transaction until none is left. It returns the number of events
// deleted.
func reapExpired(db *gorm.DB, cutoff time.Time) (int64, error) {
var total int64
for {
@@ -318,12 +306,6 @@ func reapExpired(
if len(eventIDs) < reapBatchSize {
return total, nil
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return total, nil
case <-time.After(reapBatchPause):
}
}
}
internal/database/totals_test.go
-182
View File
@@ -151,30 +151,6 @@ func seedExpiredEvents(
require.NoError(t, db.CreateInBatches(results, 500).Error)
}
// seedBareEvents stores count events created at the given time, with
// no deliveries.
func seedBareEvents(
t *testing.T,
db *gorm.DB,
webhookID string,
count int,
createdAt time.Time,
) {
t.Helper()
events := make([]database.Event, count)
for i := range events {
events[i] = database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: http.MethodPost,
}
events[i].CreatedAt = createdAt
}
require.NoError(t, db.CreateInBatches(events, 500).Error)
}
// TestRetentionReaper_PrunesMoreThanOneBatch verifies that a prune
// larger than one transaction's batch removes every expired event with
// its deliveries and delivery results, keeps the recent event, and
@@ -250,161 +226,3 @@ func TestRetentionReaper_PrunesMoreThanOneBatch(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, eventTotals, readEventTotals(t, db))
assert.Equal(t, targetTotals, readTargetTotals(t, db))
}
// TestRetentionReaper_WriteDuringPruneSucceeds verifies that a prune
// of several batches lets other writers in between its batches: an
// event stored once the first batch is deleted is stored while expired
// events are still left, not only after the prune has finished.
func TestRetentionReaper_WriteDuringPruneSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Three batches of expired events, with nothing else stored: only
// the number of batches matters here.
expired := 3 * database.ExportReapBatchSize
seedBareEvents(t, db, webhookID, expired,
time.Now().Add(-40*24*time.Hour))
cutoff := time.Now().Add(-30 * 24 * time.Hour)
countExpired := func() int64 {
var count int64
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff).
Count(&count).Error)
return count
}
pruned := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(pruned)
env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
}()
t.Cleanup(func() { <-pruned })
// Every stored event is expired until the write below.
require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
var count int64
err := db.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&count).Error
return err == nil && count < int64(expired)
}, 10*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond)
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: http.MethodPost,
}
require.NoError(t, db.Create(event).Error)
assert.Positive(t, countExpired(),
"the event was stored only after the whole prune")
<-pruned
assert.Zero(t, countExpired())
var stored database.Event
require.NoError(t, db.First(&stored, "id = ?", event.ID).Error)
}
// TestRetentionReaper_StopDuringPruneLeavesTheRest verifies that
// stopping the reaper during a prune of several batches returns
// between two batches, well inside the stop timeout, leaving the
// remaining expired events for the next sweep, and that the totals
// match the rows left.
func TestRetentionReaper_StopDuringPruneLeavesTheRest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Two batches and one more of expired events, a few of them with a
// delivered and a failed delivery for the target totals to count.
// Most carry nothing else, to keep the test quick.
const withDeliveries = 10
expiredAt := time.Now().Add(-40 * 24 * time.Hour)
delivered, failed := uuid.New().String(), uuid.New().String()
seedExpiredEvents(t, db, webhookID, withDeliveries, expiredAt,
delivered, failed)
seedBareEvents(t, db, webhookID,
2*database.ExportReapBatchSize+1-withDeliveries, expiredAt)
n := int64(2*database.ExportReapBatchSize + 1)
require.NoError(t, database.AddEventTotals(db, database.EventTotals{
Events: n,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: delivered, Deliveries: withDeliveries,
Delivered: withDeliveries,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: failed, Deliveries: withDeliveries,
Failed: withDeliveries,
}))
env.reaper.ExportSetInterval(time.Millisecond)
env.reaper.ExportStart()
// Stop once the first batch is deleted. The stop lands in the pause
// after it, or at worst during the second batch, so at least the
// last event is left.
require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
var count int64
err := db.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&count).Error
return err == nil && count < n
}, 10*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond)
// The app's stop timeout.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
require.NoError(t, env.reaper.ExportStop(ctx))
var events int64
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&events).Error)
assert.Positive(t, events, "the stop waited for the whole prune")
eventTotals := readEventTotals(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, events, eventTotals.Events-eventTotals.EventsRemoved)
targetTotals := readTargetTotals(t, db)
require.Len(t, targetTotals, 2)
for target, totals := range targetTotals {
var deliveries, failures int64
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("target_id = ?", target).
Count(&deliveries).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("target_id = ? AND status = ?",
target, database.DeliveryStatusFailed).
Count(&failures).Error)
assert.Equal(t, deliveries,
totals.Deliveries-totals.DeliveriesRemoved, target)
assert.Equal(t, failures, totals.Failed-totals.FailedRemoved,
target)
}
}
internal/delivery/delivery_totals_test.go
-61
View File
@@ -114,64 +114,3 @@ func TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_DeletedDeliveryIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, database.TargetTotals{TargetID: targetID},
targetTotals(t, db, targetID))
}
// TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_FinishedDeliveryIsNotSettledAgain covers a
// delivery settled a second time, as recovery can do when a worker has
// settled it since recovery read it. Neither status writes over the
// first, and the totals do not move.
func TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_FinishedDeliveryIsNotSettledAgain(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
finished := []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
}
for _, first := range finished {
t.Run(string(first), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{}`)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
// The delivery as recovery read it, before the worker
// settled it.
readBefore := d
require.NoError(t, e.ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
db, &d, first,
))
var settled database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, db.First(&settled, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
require.NotNil(t, settled.FinishedAt)
totals := targetTotals(t, db, targetID)
for _, again := range finished {
stale := readBefore
require.NoError(t, e.ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
db, &stale, again,
))
}
var stored database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, db.First(&stored, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
assert.Equal(t, first, stored.Status)
require.NotNil(t, stored.FinishedAt)
assert.True(t, settled.FinishedAt.Equal(*stored.FinishedAt))
assert.Equal(t, totals, targetTotals(t, db, targetID))
})
}
}
internal/delivery/engine.go
+14 -25
View File
@@ -148,7 +148,6 @@ type EngineParams struct {
DBManager *database.WebhookDBManager
Logger *logger.Logger
SSRFGuard *Guard
Metrics *metrics.Set
}
// Engine processes queued deliveries in the background
@@ -168,10 +167,10 @@ type Engine struct {
retryCh chan Task
workers int
// mtr is the delivery metric set. Production wires the one
// registered on the registry /metrics serves; a test can
// substitute a set registered on a registry it holds, so it can
// gather what its own deliveries recorded.
// mtr is the delivery metric set. Production wires the
// process-wide one; a test can substitute a set registered on
// a private registry so its assertions are not disturbed by
// deliveries other tests are making at the same time.
mtr *metrics.Set
// targets maps each target type to its implementation.
@@ -205,7 +204,7 @@ func New(
deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
retryCh: make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
workers: defaultWorkers,
mtr: params.Metrics,
mtr: metrics.Default(),
}
e.initTargets(&http.Client{
@@ -532,11 +531,6 @@ func (e *Engine) processRetryTask(
return
}
// Set before anything below can fail the delivery: the failure is
// added to this target's totals.
d.EventID = task.EventID
d.TargetID = task.TargetID
if d.Status != database.DeliveryStatusRetrying {
e.log.Debug(
"skipping retry for delivery "+
@@ -568,6 +562,8 @@ func (e *Engine) processRetryTask(
}
target := buildTargetFromTask(task)
d.EventID = task.EventID
d.TargetID = task.TargetID
d.Event = event
d.Target = target
@@ -1581,11 +1577,9 @@ func (e *Engine) updateDeliveryStatus(
// writeDeliveryStatus writes a delivery's new status. A delivery that
// becomes delivered or failed also gets the time it finished, and is
// added to its target's delivered or failed total. That write changes
// only a delivery not yet delivered or failed, and the total moves
// only when it changed a row: retention may have deleted the delivery
// while the engine was working on it, and a recovery path may settle
// a delivery that a worker has already settled.
// added to its target's delivered or failed total. It is counted only
// if the row was still there to update: retention may have deleted it
// while the engine was working on it.
func writeDeliveryStatus(
tx *gorm.DB,
d *database.Delivery,
@@ -1595,15 +1589,10 @@ func writeDeliveryStatus(
return tx.Model(d).Update("status", status).Error
}
res := tx.Model(d).
Where("status NOT IN ?", []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
}).
Updates(map[string]any{
"status": status,
"finished_at": time.Now(),
})
res := tx.Model(d).Updates(map[string]any{
"status": status,
"finished_at": time.Now(),
})
if res.Error != nil || res.RowsAffected == 0 {
return res.Error
}
internal/delivery/export_test.go
+10 -10
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
"net/url"
"time"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
@@ -41,6 +40,11 @@ const (
ExportPendingSweepMinAge = pendingSweepMinAge
)
// ExportIsBlockedIP exposes isBlockedIP for testing.
func ExportIsBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return isBlockedIP(ip)
}
// NewTestGuard builds an SSRF Guard from an explicit egress
// allowlist, without going through config. Passing no prefixes
// yields the default guard, which blocks every private/reserved
@@ -66,11 +70,6 @@ func ExportBlockedNetworks() []*net.IPNet {
return blockedNetworks
}
// ExportBlockedPublicNetworks exposes blockedPublicNetworks.
func ExportBlockedPublicNetworks() []*net.IPNet {
return blockedPublicNetworks
}
// ExportIsForwardableHeader exposes isForwardableHeader.
func ExportIsForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
return isForwardableHeader(name)
@@ -400,7 +399,7 @@ func NewTestEngine(
deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
retryCh: make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
workers: workers,
mtr: metrics.New(prometheus.NewRegistry()),
mtr: metrics.Default(),
}
e.initTargets(client)
@@ -415,7 +414,7 @@ func NewTestEngineSmallRetry(
e := &Engine{
log: log,
retryCh: make(chan Task, 1),
mtr: metrics.New(prometheus.NewRegistry()),
mtr: metrics.Default(),
}
e.initTargets(nil)
@@ -438,7 +437,7 @@ func NewTestEngineWithDB(
deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
retryCh: make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
workers: workers,
mtr: metrics.New(prometheus.NewRegistry()),
mtr: metrics.Default(),
}
e.initTargets(client)
@@ -446,7 +445,8 @@ func NewTestEngineWithDB(
}
// ExportSetMetrics substitutes the engine's metric set, so a test can
// assert on collectors registered on a registry it holds.
// assert on collectors registered on a private registry instead of
// the process-wide ones every other test is also moving.
func (e *Engine) ExportSetMetrics(mtr *metrics.Set) {
e.mtr = mtr
}
internal/delivery/metrics_test.go
+3 -2
View File
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ const (
)
// mIsolate gives the setup's engine a metric set registered on a
// registry this test holds, so its exact assertions can gather from
// it.
// private registry. The process-wide collectors are moved by every
// other delivery test running in parallel, so exact assertions are
// only possible against a registry this test owns.
func mIsolate(
t *testing.T, s iSetup,
) *prometheus.Registry {
internal/delivery/ssrf.go
+29 -97
View File
@@ -25,63 +25,36 @@ var (
errNoIPs = errors.New(
"hostname resolved to no IP addresses",
)
// ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP reports an address in the
// default blocklist's private and reserved ranges,
// blockedNetworks.
ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP = errors.New(
"blocked private or reserved address",
)
// errBlockedPublicMetadata reports a public address on the
// default blocklist, one in blockedPublicNetworks.
errBlockedPublicMetadata = errors.New(
"blocked cloud metadata address",
errBlockedIP = errors.New(
"blocked private, reserved or cloud metadata address",
)
errBlockedMetadata = errors.New(
"blocked link-local, cloud instance metadata or " +
"unspecified address: ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS cannot open it",
"blocked link-local or cloud instance metadata " +
"address: ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS cannot open it",
)
errInvalidScheme = errors.New(
"only http and https are allowed",
)
)
// blockedNetworks and blockedPublicNetworks together are the
// default blocklist: the private and reserved IP ranges, plus
// the public cloud metadata addresses, that are blocked to
// prevent SSRF attacks. An operator can permit specific blocks
// out of this set with ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS; see Guard.
//
// blockedNetworks holds the private and reserved IP ranges.
// blockedNetworks is the default blocklist: the private and
// reserved IP ranges, plus the public cloud metadata addresses,
// that are blocked to prevent SSRF attacks. An operator can
// permit specific blocks out of this set with
// ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS; see Guard.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
var blockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
// blockedPublicNetworks holds the default blocklist's public
// addresses, kept apart from blockedNetworks so that they are
// refused as cloud metadata addresses, never as private or
// reserved ones.
//
// A public address belongs on the default blocklist only if it
// hands credentials, user data or bootstrap material to whatever
// can reach it, without the caller presenting anything; it goes
// in this list. A provider's other public addresses are not
// refused, since reaching them can be legitimate and no list of
// them could be complete.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
var blockedPublicNetworks []*net.IPNet
// alwaysBlockedNetworks are the ranges no configuration can
// open: the link-local blocks, the cloud instance metadata
// endpoints that live outside them, and the unspecified
// addresses. Reaching a metadata endpoint is credential or
// user-data theft rather than delivery to an internal service,
// so a supplied CIDR that covers such an address still leaves it
// blocked.
// open: the link-local blocks and the cloud instance metadata
// endpoints that live outside them. Reaching one is credential
// or user-data theft rather than delivery to an internal
// service, so a supplied CIDR that covers such an address still
// leaves it blocked.
//
// Inclusion criterion — an address belongs here only if BOTH
// hold, and every entry below but the unspecified addresses
// satisfies both:
// hold, and every entry below satisfies both:
//
// 1. It is a fixed address assigned by the provider, or a
// range reserved by IANA — never one the operator chose.
@@ -108,18 +81,12 @@ var blockedPublicNetworks []*net.IPNet
// when it clears both halves. Nothing in this list can be
// reopened, so putting a public address here leaves the operator
// no escape hatch at all — the condition ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS
// exists to remove. Default-block it in blockedPublicNetworks
// instead, which an allowlist can override.
// exists to remove. Default-block it in blockedNetworks instead,
// which an allowlist can override.
//
// This is a criterion, not an enumeration of every metadata
// address in existence.
//
// The unspecified addresses 0.0.0.0 and :: fail (2) and are here
// anyway. No host can have either, and on Linux a connection to
// one reaches this host's own loopback, so an allowlist opens
// loopback only by naming it (127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128). Nothing else
// lives at either address, so refusing them costs nothing.
//
// Every entry is either already in blockedNetworks — this list is
// what makes it unconditional — or an alternate encoding of
// 169.254.169.254 that Contains does not match against
@@ -139,49 +106,23 @@ var alwaysBlockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
//nolint:gochecknoinits // init is the idiomatic way to parse CIDRs once at startup
func init() {
blockedNetworks = mustParseCIDRs([]string{
// IPv4 loopback.
"127.0.0.0/8",
// RFC 1918 private network.
"10.0.0.0/8",
// RFC 1918 private network.
"172.16.0.0/12",
// RFC 1918 private network.
"192.168.0.0/16",
// IPv4 link-local.
"169.254.0.0/16",
// "This network", holding the IPv4 unspecified address 0.0.0.0.
"0.0.0.0/8",
// Carrier-grade NAT shared address space.
"100.64.0.0/10",
// IETF protocol assignments.
"192.0.0.0/24",
// IPv4 documentation (TEST-NET-1).
"192.0.2.0/24",
// Benchmarking.
"198.18.0.0/15",
// IPv4 documentation (TEST-NET-2).
"198.51.100.0/24",
// IPv4 documentation (TEST-NET-3).
"203.0.113.0/24",
// IPv4 multicast.
"224.0.0.0/4",
// Reserved, including the broadcast address.
"240.0.0.0/4",
// IPv6 loopback.
"::1/128",
// IPv6 unspecified address.
"::/128",
// IPv6 unique local addresses.
"fc00::/7",
// IPv6 link-local.
"fe80::/10",
// IPv6 multicast.
"ff00::/8",
// IPv6 documentation.
"2001:db8::/32",
})
blockedPublicNetworks = mustParseCIDRs([]string{
// Azure WireServer, a public address that serves VM credentials.
"168.63.129.16/32",
})
@@ -238,14 +179,6 @@ func init() {
// allowlist from opening it.
"192.0.0.192/32",
// The unspecified addresses, each of which reaches this
// host's loopback on Linux.
//
// IPv4 unspecified address, inside the blocked 0.0.0.0/8.
"0.0.0.0/32",
// IPv6 unspecified address.
"::/128",
// 169.254.169.254 as an IPv4-compatible IPv6 address.
"::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// 169.254.169.254 behind the NAT64 well-known prefix.
@@ -285,6 +218,13 @@ func matchesAny(networks []*net.IPNet, ip net.IP) bool {
return false
}
// isBlockedIP checks whether an IP address falls within
// the default blocklist, before any operator allowlist is
// considered.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return matchesAny(blockedNetworks, ip)
}
// Guard makes every SSRF decision in the process.
//
// It holds the operator's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS allowlist and
@@ -382,12 +322,10 @@ func (g *Guard) allows(ip net.IP) bool {
// The order is the policy:
//
// 1. alwaysBlockedNetworks is refused before the allowlist is
// consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local, a
// cloud metadata endpoint at a non-public address, or an
// unspecified address.
// consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local or a
// cloud metadata endpoint at a non-public address.
// 2. The allowlist is consulted next, so a listed private
// network, or a listed public address on the default
// blocklist, becomes reachable.
// network becomes reachable.
// 3. Everything else keeps the default blocklist's answer.
func (g *Guard) checkIP(ip net.IP) error {
if matchesAny(alwaysBlockedNetworks, ip) {
@@ -400,15 +338,9 @@ func (g *Guard) checkIP(ip net.IP) error {
return nil
}
if matchesAny(blockedNetworks, ip) {
if isBlockedIP(ip) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"target IP %s: %w", ip, ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP,
)
}
if matchesAny(blockedPublicNetworks, ip) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"target IP %s: %w", ip, errBlockedPublicMetadata,
"target IP %s: %w", ip, errBlockedIP,
)
}
internal/delivery/ssrf_allowlist_test.go
+2 -101
View File
@@ -23,10 +23,6 @@ const (
metadataIP = "169.254.169.254"
metadataURL = "http://" + metadataIP + "/latest/meta-data/"
// linkLocalIPv4 is the IPv4 link-local block, which holds
// metadataIP.
linkLocalIPv4 = "169.254.0.0/16"
// loopbackHookURL is a target on this host: blocked by
// default, reachable only once an operator allowlists
// loopback.
@@ -241,7 +237,7 @@ func linkLocalRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
},
{
name: "whole link-local block",
allow: linkLocalIPv4,
allow: "169.254.0.0/16",
target: metadataURL,
},
{
@@ -416,9 +412,6 @@ func TestGuardAllowlist_AzureWireServerReopenable(t *testing.T) {
"WireServer must be refused by the default blocklist, "+
"which an allowlist can override",
)
require.NotErrorIs(t, err, delivery.ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP,
"WireServer is public, not private or reserved",
)
assertDialRefused(t, defaultGuard, target)
@@ -503,7 +496,7 @@ func TestAlwaysBlockedNetworks_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
want := []string{
// IPv4 link-local: the 169.254.169.254 metadata
// service on AWS, Azure and others.
linkLocalIPv4,
"169.254.0.0/16",
// IPv6 link-local.
"fe80::/10",
// AWS IPv6 IMDS, inside the ULA space an operator may
@@ -524,10 +517,6 @@ func TestAlwaysBlockedNetworks_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
// Oracle Cloud Classic metadata, inside the blocked
// 192.0.0.0/24.
"192.0.0.192/32",
// The IPv4 and IPv6 unspecified addresses, each of
// which reaches this host's loopback on Linux.
"0.0.0.0/32",
"::/128",
// 169.254.169.254 as an IPv4-compatible IPv6 address.
"::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// 169.254.169.254 behind the NAT64 well-known prefix.
@@ -537,94 +526,6 @@ func TestAlwaysBlockedNetworks_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
}
// TestDefaultBlocklist_PinnedSet pins each list of the default
// blocklist on its own, the private and reserved ranges in
// blockedNetworks and the public addresses in
// blockedPublicNetworks, so moving an entry from one list to the
// other fails it. For the first address of each entry it then
// checks that the default guard refuses it, and that listing the
// entry in ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS opens it unless the unconditional
// set holds that address.
func TestDefaultBlocklist_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// public marks an entry of blockedPublicNetworks; every other
// entry belongs in blockedNetworks.
tests := []struct {
cidr string
public bool
reopenable bool
}{
{cidr: "127.0.0.0/8", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "10.0.0.0/8", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "172.16.0.0/12", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "192.168.0.0/16", reopenable: true},
{cidr: linkLocalIPv4, reopenable: false},
// Its first address, 0.0.0.0, is in the unconditional set.
{cidr: "0.0.0.0/8", reopenable: false},
{cidr: "100.64.0.0/10", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "192.0.0.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "192.0.2.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "198.18.0.0/15", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "198.51.100.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "203.0.113.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "224.0.0.0/4", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "240.0.0.0/4", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "::1/128", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "::/128", reopenable: false},
{cidr: "fc00::/7", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "fe80::/10", reopenable: false},
{cidr: "ff00::/8", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "2001:db8::/32", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "168.63.129.16/32", public: true, reopenable: true},
}
wantPrivate := make([]string, 0, len(tests))
wantPublic := make([]string, 0, len(tests))
for _, tt := range tests {
if tt.public {
wantPublic = append(wantPublic, tt.cidr)
} else {
wantPrivate = append(wantPrivate, tt.cidr)
}
}
gotPrivate := make([]string, 0, len(tests))
for _, n := range delivery.ExportBlockedNetworks() {
gotPrivate = append(gotPrivate, n.String())
}
gotPublic := make([]string, 0, len(tests))
for _, n := range delivery.ExportBlockedPublicNetworks() {
gotPublic = append(gotPublic, n.String())
}
assert.ElementsMatch(t, wantPrivate, gotPrivate, "blockedNetworks")
assert.ElementsMatch(t, wantPublic, gotPublic, "blockedPublicNetworks")
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.cidr, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
prefix := netip.MustParsePrefix(tt.cidr)
ip := net.IP(prefix.Addr().AsSlice())
require.Error(t,
delivery.NewTestGuard().ExportCheckIP(ip),
"the default guard must refuse %s", ip,
)
err := delivery.NewTestGuard(prefix).ExportCheckIP(ip)
if tt.reopenable {
assert.NoError(t, err, "listing %s must open it", tt.cidr)
} else {
assert.Error(t, err, "listing %s must not open it", tt.cidr)
}
})
}
}
// requireLoopback fails the test unless rawURL's host is a
// loopback address, so the allowlist test cannot silently stop
// exercising a blocked range.
internal/delivery/ssrf_test.go
+4 -42
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
func TestGuardCheckIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
func TestIsBlockedIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
@@ -56,14 +56,12 @@ func TestGuardCheckIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
"failed to parse IP %s", tt.ip,
)
refused := delivery.NewTestGuard().ExportCheckIP(ip) != nil
assert.Equal(t,
tt.blocked,
refused,
"default guard refuses %s = %v, want %v",
delivery.ExportIsBlockedIP(ip),
"isBlockedIP(%s) = %v, want %v",
tt.ip,
refused,
delivery.ExportIsBlockedIP(ip),
tt.blocked,
)
})
@@ -101,42 +99,6 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestDefaultGuard_RefusesUnspecifiedMulticastAndDocumentation
// covers the unspecified addresses and the IPv6 multicast and
// documentation ranges: with no allowlist set, each is refused
// both when a target is created and when a delivery dials it.
func TestDefaultGuard_RefusesUnspecifiedMulticastAndDocumentation(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
guard := delivery.NewTestGuard()
targets := []string{
// The unspecified addresses. On Linux a connection to
// either reaches this host's loopback.
"http://0.0.0.0:8080/hook",
"http://[::]:8080/hook",
// IPv6 multicast, all nodes.
"http://[ff02::1]/hook",
// IPv6 documentation.
"http://[2001:db8::1]/hook",
}
for _, target := range targets {
t.Run(target, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
require.Error(t,
guard.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target),
"%s must be refused at target creation", target,
)
assertDialRefused(t, guard, target)
})
}
}
func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
internal/delivery/terminal_state_test.go
-32
View File
@@ -418,38 +418,6 @@ func TestProcessRetryTask_TargetDeleted_MakesNoAttempt(
assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
}
// TestProcessRetryTask_TargetDeleted_CountsFailureOnTarget verifies
// that the failure of a retry abandoned because its target is gone is
// added to that target's own totals, not to a row with no target.
func TestProcessRetryTask_TargetDeleted_CountsFailureOnTarget(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
var hits atomic.Int64
task, targetID := tRetryChainSetup(
t, s, "gone-counted", &hits,
)
require.NoError(t, s.MainDB.Delete(
&database.Target{}, "id = ?", targetID,
).Error)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(
context.Background(), &task,
)
var rows []database.TargetTotals
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.Find(&rows).Error)
assert.Equal(t, []database.TargetTotals{
{TargetID: targetID, Failed: 1},
}, rows)
}
// TestProcessRetryTask_TargetPresent_StillDelivers is the guard's
// mutation check: a liveness check that refused every retry would pass
// the test above and break every retry there is.
internal/gormlog/gormlog.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
// SQL — parameters and all — for every statement that returns an
// error, including gorm.ErrRecordNotFound. Two of this service's
// lookups miss by design on unauthenticated routes: the entrypoint
// lookup on /h/{uuid}, whose path segment the client picks
// lookup on /webhook/{uuid}, whose path segment the client picks
// outright, and the user lookup behind the login form, whose username
// the client picks outright. Under the default logger each of those
// misses printed an unbounded, attacker-chosen string, at no level the
internal/handlers/auth.go
+29 -58
View File
@@ -2,56 +2,19 @@ package handlers
import (
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"unicode"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
)
// loginDestination returns where a successful login sends the
// browser: next when it is a path on this site, otherwise "/", which
// leads to the webhook list.
//
// A browser reads "//host" as another site, reads "\" as "/", and
// drops tabs and newlines before reading at all. So the value must
// start with exactly one "/" and hold no "\" or control character
// anywhere: http.Redirect cleans "/a/../\host" down to "/\host". It
// is checked after percent-decoding, so an encoded form of any of
// these is refused too.
func loginDestination(next string) string {
if len(next) > middleware.MaxNextBytes {
return "/"
}
decoded, err := url.PathUnescape(next)
if err != nil ||
!strings.HasPrefix(decoded, "/") ||
strings.HasPrefix(decoded, "//") ||
strings.Contains(decoded, `\`) ||
strings.ContainsFunc(decoded, unicode.IsControl) {
return "/"
}
return next
}
// HandleLoginPage returns a handler for the login page (GET)
func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginPage() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
next := loginDestination(
r.URL.Query().Get(middleware.NextParam),
)
// Check if already logged in
sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
if err == nil && h.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
http.Redirect( //nolint:gosec // checked by loginDestination
w, r, next, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
@@ -59,7 +22,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginPage() http.HandlerFunc {
// Render login page
data := map[string]any{
tmplKeyError: "",
tmplKeyNext: next,
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "login.html", data)
@@ -74,7 +36,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
@@ -115,13 +77,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
"user_id", user.ID,
)
// The form value is the client's to set, so it is checked
// again here rather than trusted from the rendered page.
http.Redirect( //nolint:gosec // checked by loginDestination
w, r,
loginDestination(r.PostFormValue(middleware.NextParam)),
http.StatusSeeOther,
)
// Redirect to home page
http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
}
@@ -134,9 +91,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderLoginError(
) {
data := map[string]any{
tmplKeyError: msg,
tmplKeyNext: loginDestination(
r.PostFormValue(middleware.NextParam),
),
}
w.WriteHeader(status)
@@ -149,10 +103,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderLoginError(
// The credential check runs BEFORE any rate-limit budget is
// consulted, and only a failed check spends budget. That is what
// keeps the single administrative path reachable: behind the reverse
// proxy this deployment requires, when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not cover
// it, every client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent on arrival
// lets any stranger deny the operator's own correct password
// indefinitely.
// proxy this deployment requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset, every
// client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent on arrival lets any
// stranger deny the operator's own correct password indefinitely.
//
// Verifying first means every login POST costs an Argon2id hash, so
// the work is taken under a bounded number of verification slots.
@@ -212,7 +165,11 @@ func (h *Handlers) authenticateUser(
valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, user.Password)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to verify password", err)
h.log.Error("failed to verify password", "error", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return user, err
}
@@ -284,14 +241,24 @@ func (h *Handlers) createAuthenticatedSession(
) error {
oldSess, err := h.session.Get(r)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get session", err)
h.log.Error("failed to get session", "error", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return err
}
sess, err := h.session.Regenerate(r, w, oldSess)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to regenerate session", err)
h.log.Error(
"failed to regenerate session", "error", err,
)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return err
}
@@ -300,7 +267,11 @@ func (h *Handlers) createAuthenticatedSession(
err = h.session.Save(r, w, sess)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to save session", err)
h.log.Error("failed to save session", "error", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return err
}
internal/handlers/auth_test.go
+6 -202
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ const (
// sharedProxyPeer is the whole point of this file. Production is
// required to run behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy, and
// when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not cover it every client — attacker
// TRUSTED_PROXIES defaults to empty, so every client — attacker
// and operator alike — reaches the process from the proxy's
// address and shares one rate-limit bucket. Both parties in
// these tests therefore use the same RemoteAddr.
@@ -115,11 +115,11 @@ func floodFailures(
// done-criterion of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/150.
//
// The attacker and the operator share one rate-limit bucket, because
// behind the mandated reverse proxy, when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not
// cover it, every client keys on the proxy's address. The attacker
// floods the operator's own username — a single-admin product has a
// predictable one — far past the failure limit. The operator must
// still be able to log in with the correct password.
// behind the mandated reverse proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset every
// client keys on the proxy's address. The attacker floods the
// operator's own username — a single-admin product has a predictable
// one — far past the failure limit. The operator must still be able
// to log in with the correct password.
//
// This fails if credentials stop being verified ahead of the limiter.
func TestLogin_StrangersFloodCannotLockOutTheOperator(t *testing.T) {
@@ -454,202 +454,6 @@ func TestLogin_SuccessCreatesSession(t *testing.T) {
)
}
// TestLogin_ReturnsOnlyToAPathOnThisSite is the security half of
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/384: the page a login
// returns to is client-chosen, so anything that is not a path on this
// site, plain or percent-encoded, must land on "/", the webhook list.
func TestLogin_ReturnsOnlyToAPathOnThisSite(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
seedOperator(t, db)
cases := []struct{ next, want string }{
{"/hook/abc/events?page=2", "/hook/abc/events?page=2"},
{"", "/"},
{"https://evil.example/", "/"},
{"https%3A%2F%2Fevil.example%2F", "/"},
{"//evil.example/", "/"},
{"%2F%2Fevil.example/", "/"},
{"/%2Fevil.example/", "/"},
{`/\evil.example/`, "/"},
{"%2F%5Cevil.example/", "/"},
{"/%5Cevil.example/", "/"},
{`/a/../\evil.example/`, "/"},
{"/\t/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/%09/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/\n/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/%0A/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/\r/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/%0D/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/%00/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/%7F/evil.example/", "/"},
{"%252F%252Fevil.example/", "/"},
{"https%253A%252F%252Fevil.example%252F", "/"},
{"/" + strings.Repeat("a", 4096), "/"},
}
for _, c := range cases {
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("username", operatorUser)
form.Set("password", operatorPassword)
form.Set("next", c.next)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/pages/login",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
)
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
)
req.RemoteAddr = sharedProxyPeer
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleLoginSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, "next %q", c.next)
assert.Equal(
t, c.want, w.Header().Get("Location"), "next %q", c.next,
)
}
}
// TestLogin_WrongPasswordKeepsTheRequestedPage: after a wrong
// password the login page is shown again with the same next, so the
// next attempt still returns to the page that was asked for.
func TestLogin_WrongPasswordKeepsTheRequestedPage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
seedOperator(t, db)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("username", operatorUser)
form.Set("password", "wrong")
form.Set("next", "/hook/abc")
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/pages/login",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
)
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
)
req.RemoteAddr = sharedProxyPeer
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleLoginSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, w.Code)
assert.Contains(
t, w.Body.String(), `name="next" value="/hook/abc"`,
)
}
// loginPageGet renders the login page as a GET with the given next
// value and cookies.
func loginPageGet(
h *handlers.Handlers, next string, cookies []*http.Cookie,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet,
"/pages/login?"+url.Values{"next": {next}}.Encode(), nil,
)
for _, c := range cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleLoginPage().ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
// TestLoginPage_CarriesOnlyAPathOnThisSite covers the login page
// itself: its form carries the requested page only when it is a path
// on this site, and a browser already logged in goes straight there,
// or to "/" when it is not.
func TestLoginPage_CarriesOnlyAPathOnThisSite(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
assert.Contains(
t, loginPageGet(h, "/hook/abc", nil).Body.String(),
`name="next" value="/hook/abc"`,
)
assert.Contains(
t, loginPageGet(h, "//evil.example/", nil).Body.String(),
`name="next" value="/"`,
)
cookies := authenticatedCookies(t, sess, "test-user-id", "testuser")
cases := []struct{ next, want string }{
{"/hook/abc", "/hook/abc"},
{"//evil.example/", "/"},
{`/\evil.example/`, "/"},
}
for _, c := range cases {
w := loginPageGet(h, c.next, cookies)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, "next %q", c.next)
assert.Equal(
t, c.want, w.Header().Get("Location"), "next %q", c.next,
)
}
}
// TestLoginPage_HasNoLinkToItself: the navigation bar on the login
// page offers no link to the login page.
func TestLoginPage_HasNoLinkToItself(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
app := newTestApp(t, &h)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
w := loginPageGet(h, "", nil)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
assert.NotContains(t, w.Body.String(), `href="/pages/login"`)
}
// TestLogin_UsernameAtLimitCanLogIn shows that a username of exactly
// database.MaxUsernameBytes still fits in the session cookie. Past
// what the cookie can carry, a correct login answers 500.
internal/handlers/delivery_replay.go
+10 -8
View File
@@ -105,7 +105,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleDeliveryReplay() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
@@ -122,14 +124,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) replayDelivery(
webhook database.Webhook,
) {
if !h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhook.ID) {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get webhook database", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to get webhook database", err)
return
}
@@ -171,7 +173,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) loadReplaySource(
&original, "id = ?", chi.URLParam(r, "deliveryID"),
).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return nil, false
}
@@ -193,7 +195,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueReplay(
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to count in-flight deliveries", err,
w, "failed to count in-flight deliveries", err,
)
return
@@ -210,7 +212,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueReplay(
err = webhookDB.
First(&event, "id = ?", original.EventID).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to load event for replay", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to load event for replay", err)
return
}
@@ -220,7 +222,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueReplay(
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to create replay delivery", err,
w, "failed to create replay delivery", err,
)
return
@@ -370,7 +372,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) finishReplay(
webhook database.Webhook,
code replayOutcomeCode,
) {
dest := "/hook/" + webhook.ID + "/events?" +
dest := "/source/" + webhook.ID + "/logs?" +
replayOutcomeParam + "=" + string(code)
// The page is read from the form rather than the query string:
internal/handlers/delivery_replay_test.go
+8 -8
View File
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ func postReplay(
t.Helper()
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+webhookID+"/deliveries/"+
"/source/"+webhookID+"/deliveries/"+
deliveryID+"/replay",
authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_AppendsDeliveryAndLeavesOriginal(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?replay=queued",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesDeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?replay=target-deleted",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=target-deleted",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesDeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, missing.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?replay=target-missing",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=target-missing",
missing.Header().Get("Location"),
)
}
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesWhileEarlierReplayInFlight(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, first.Code)
require.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?replay=queued",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=queued",
first.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesWhileEarlierReplayInFlight(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, second.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?replay=in-flight",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=in-flight",
second.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesWhileEarlierReplayInFlight(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, pending.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?replay=not-terminal",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=not-terminal",
pending.Header().Get("Location"),
)
}
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_RendersReplayControlAndBanner(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`action="/hook/`+wh.ID+`/deliveries/`+
`action="/source/`+wh.ID+`/deliveries/`+
original.ID+`/replay"`,
)
assert.Contains(t, body, `method="POST"`)
internal/handlers/error_page_test.go
-53
View File
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"html/template"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
)
// TestErrorPage_RenderFailureKeepsStatus proves that an error page
// which cannot render answers with the status it was reporting, as
// plain text, and is not attempted again: a page whose own render
// fails reaches the error page, and the error page failing as well
// ends there with the 500.
func TestErrorPage_RenderFailureKeepsStatus(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
app := newTestApp(t, &h)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
// .Status is an int, so asking it for a field fails the render.
failing := `{{.Status.Missing}}`
h.AddTemplateForTest("error.html", template.Must(
template.New("error").Parse(failing),
))
h.AddTemplateForTest("failing.html", template.Must(
template.New("failing").Parse(`{{.Data.Missing}}`),
))
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusNotFound).ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "Not Found\n", w.Body.String())
w = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.RenderTemplateForTest(w, req, "failing.html", 0)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "Internal Server Error\n", w.Body.String())
}
internal/handlers/event_body.go
+5 -5
View File
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEventBodyDownload() http.HandlerFunc {
// steered by a client.
eventID, err := uuid.Parse(chi.URLParam(r, "eventID"))
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -103,21 +103,21 @@ func (h *Handlers) serveEventBody(
eventID string,
) {
if !h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhook.ID) {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get webhook database", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to get webhook database", err)
return
}
body, found, err := eventBody(webhookDB, webhook.ID, eventID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to read event body", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to read event body", err)
return
}
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) serveEventBody(
// row and the whole body is served, or it does not and the
// response is a clean 404.
if !found {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
internal/handlers/event_body_test.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ func fetchEventBody(
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+url.PathEscape(sourceID)+
"/events/"+url.PathEscape(eventID)+"/body",
"/source/"+url.PathEscape(sourceID)+
"/logs/"+url.PathEscape(eventID)+"/body",
nil,
)
@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_TruncationMarkerLinksToDownload(
page := renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, big.ID)
assert.Contains(
t, page,
"/hook/"+big.ID+"/events/"+bigEvt.ID+"/body",
"/source/"+big.ID+"/logs/"+bigEvt.ID+"/body",
)
small := seedWebhook(t, db)
@@ -501,6 +501,6 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_TruncationMarkerLinksToDownload(
page = renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, small.ID)
assert.NotContains(
t, page,
"/hook/"+small.ID+"/events/"+smallEvt.ID+"/body",
"/source/"+small.ID+"/logs/"+smallEvt.ID+"/body",
)
}
internal/handlers/event_resubmit.go
+9 -9
View File
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEventResubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
@@ -120,20 +120,20 @@ func (h *Handlers) resubmitEvent(
// alphabet rather than from the request.
eventID, err := uuid.Parse(chi.URLParam(r, "eventID"))
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
if !h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhook.ID) {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get webhook database", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to get webhook database", err)
return
}
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) resubmitEvent(
webhookDB, webhook.ID, eventID.String(),
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to load event to resubmit", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to load event to resubmit", err)
return
}
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) resubmitEvent(
// A miss is a 404 whether the event was reaped, belongs to
// another webhook, or never existed.
if !found {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueResubmit(
// inactive one is skipped rather than refused.
targets, err := h.loadActiveTargets(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to query targets", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to query targets", err)
return
}
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueResubmit(
targets,
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to store resubmitted event", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to store resubmitted event", err)
return
}
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) finishResubmit(
webhook database.Webhook,
code resubmitOutcomeCode,
) {
dest := "/hook/" + webhook.ID + "/events?" +
dest := "/source/" + webhook.ID + "/logs?" +
resubmitOutcomeParam + "=" + string(code)
// The page is read from the form rather than the query string:
internal/handlers/event_resubmit_test.go
+6 -7
View File
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ func postResubmit(
t.Helper()
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+webhookID+"/events/"+eventID+"/resubmit",
"/source/"+webhookID+"/events/"+eventID+"/resubmit",
authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
),
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ func TestHandleEventResubmit_DeliversToTargetCreatedAfterTheEvent(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?resubmit=queued",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?resubmit=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -204,7 +204,6 @@ func assertEventCopy(
assert.Equal(t, original.Method, fresh.Method)
assert.Equal(t, original.Headers, fresh.Headers)
assert.Equal(t, original.Body, fresh.Body)
assert.Equal(t, int64(len(original.Body)), fresh.BodyBytes)
assert.Equal(t, original.ContentType, fresh.ContentType)
assert.Equal(t, original.EntrypointID, fresh.EntrypointID)
assert.Equal(t, original.WebhookID, fresh.WebhookID)
@@ -282,7 +281,7 @@ func TestHandleEventResubmit_IsRepeatable(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?resubmit=queued",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?resubmit=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
"a resubmit must not be refused while an earlier "+
"one is in flight",
@@ -436,7 +435,7 @@ func TestHandleEventResubmit_SkipsInactiveTarget(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?resubmit=queued",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?resubmit=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
"an inactive target is skipped, not an error",
)
@@ -482,7 +481,7 @@ func TestHandleEventResubmit_NoActiveTargetsStillStoresEvent(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?resubmit=no-targets",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?resubmit=no-targets",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -598,7 +597,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_ShowsResubmitProvenance(t *testing.T) {
)
assert.Contains(
t, body,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events/"+original.ID+"/resubmit",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/events/"+original.ID+"/resubmit",
"the log must offer the resubmit action per event",
)
}
internal/handlers/export_test.go
+2 -12
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
package handlers
import (
"context"
"html/template"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
@@ -67,7 +65,7 @@ func (s *Handlers) LoadEventLogViewsForTest(
page int,
) []EventLogView {
views, _, _ := s.loadEventsWithDeliveries(
w, newRequestForTest(), webhook, nil, page,
w, webhook, nil, page,
)
return views
@@ -96,14 +94,6 @@ func FinishedByTargetForTest(
return finishedByTarget(webhookDB, since)
}
// newRequestForTest is the request the helpers here pass on for
// callers that have none: it is used only to render the error page.
func newRequestForTest() *http.Request {
return httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
)
}
// AddTemplateForTest registers a template under a page name so that
// the handlers_test package can drive the render path with a
// template of its own.
@@ -157,5 +147,5 @@ func (s *Handlers) BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(
w http.ResponseWriter,
expiry string,
) (string, error) {
return s.buildDatabaseTargetConfig(w, newRequestForTest(), expiry)
return s.buildDatabaseTargetConfig(w, expiry)
}
internal/handlers/gormlogbound_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ func postWebhook(
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, "/h/x",
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, "/webhook/x",
strings.NewReader("{}"),
)
internal/handlers/handlers.go
+21 -97
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import (
"net/http"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
@@ -29,7 +28,7 @@ const (
// maxBodyShift is the bit shift for 1 MB body limit.
maxBodyShift = 20
// recentEventLimit is the number of recent events to show.
recentEventLimit = 50
recentEventLimit = 20
// paginationPerPage is the number of items per page.
paginationPerPage = 25
@@ -37,9 +36,6 @@ const (
tmplKeyError = "Error"
// tmplKeyWebhook is the template data key for a webhook.
tmplKeyWebhook = "Webhook"
// tmplKeyNext is the template data key for the page to return
// to after login.
tmplKeyNext = "Next"
)
// errInvalidPassword is returned when a password does not match.
@@ -65,8 +61,6 @@ type HandlersParams struct {
Notifier delivery.Notifier
Evictor delivery.WebhookEvictor
SSRFGuard *delivery.Guard
Metrics *metrics.Set
Registry *prometheus.Registry
}
// Handlers provides HTTP handler methods for all application
@@ -132,7 +126,7 @@ func New(
s.mw = params.Middleware
s.notifier = params.Notifier
s.evictor = params.Evictor
s.mtr = params.Metrics
s.mtr = metrics.Default()
s.ssrf = params.SSRFGuard
// Parse all page templates once at startup
@@ -145,7 +139,6 @@ func New(
"source_edit.html": parsePageTemplate("source_edit.html"),
"source_logs.html": parsePageTemplate("source_logs.html"),
"target_edit.html": parsePageTemplate("target_edit.html"),
"error.html": parsePageTemplate("error.html"),
}
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
@@ -157,16 +150,6 @@ func New(
return s, nil
}
// HandleErrorPage returns a handler that answers every request with
// the error page for status. The router uses it for unknown paths, the
// CSRF middleware for a refused form, and each admin page route
// group's recoverer for a panic.
func (s *Handlers) HandleErrorPage(status int) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.renderError(w, r, status)
}
}
func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(
w http.ResponseWriter,
_ *http.Request,
@@ -184,76 +167,15 @@ func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(
}
}
// serverError logs an error and answers with the 500 error page.
// serverError logs an error and sends a 500 response.
func (s *Handlers) serverError(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, msg string, err error,
w http.ResponseWriter, msg string, err error,
) {
s.log.Error(msg, "error", err)
s.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
// renderError answers with status and the error page: the normal
// layout, one fixed line explaining the status, and a link back to the
// webhook list, or to sign-in when nobody is signed in.
//
// It renders the page itself rather than through renderTemplate,
// whose own failure comes here. If the error page cannot render
// either, the answer is the same status in plain text: never a second
// attempt, and never a different status.
func (s *Handlers) renderError(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
status int,
) {
// The page names the signed-in user, and some error pages are
// served outside the routes where NoCache runs.
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
data := s.pageData(r, map[string]any{
"Status": status,
"StatusText": http.StatusText(status),
"Message": errorPageText(status),
})
var buf bytes.Buffer
err := s.templates["error.html"].Execute(&buf, data)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to render error page", "error", err)
http.Error(w, http.StatusText(status), status)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(status)
_, err = buf.WriteTo(w)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to write error page", "error", err)
}
}
// errorPageText is the line the error page shows for status. It is
// fixed per status, so the page tells the reader no more than the
// plain-text answers it replaced did.
func errorPageText(status int) string {
switch status {
case http.StatusBadRequest:
return "The request could not be read."
case http.StatusForbidden:
return "The request was refused. If it came from a form " +
"left open for a long time, reload the page and try " +
"again."
case http.StatusNotFound:
return "There is nothing here. It may have been deleted, " +
"or the address may be wrong."
case http.StatusServiceUnavailable:
return "The server is busy. Please try again in a moment."
default: // http.StatusInternalServerError
return "Something went wrong on the server. Please try " +
"again."
}
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
}
// UserInfo represents user information for templates
@@ -306,17 +228,14 @@ func (s *Handlers) renderTemplate(
"template not found",
"template", pageTemplate,
)
s.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
s.executeTemplate(w, r, tmpl, s.pageData(r, data))
}
// pageData adds the fields the shared layout renders to a page's own
// data.
func (s *Handlers) pageData(r *http.Request, data any) any {
userInfo := s.getUserInfo(r)
csrfToken := middleware.CSRFToken(r)
@@ -330,16 +249,19 @@ func (s *Handlers) pageData(r *http.Request, data any) any {
m["User"] = userInfo
m["CSRFToken"] = csrfToken
m["Version"] = version
s.executeTemplate(w, tmpl, m)
return m
return
}
return templateDataWrapper{
wrapper := templateDataWrapper{
User: userInfo,
CSRFToken: csrfToken,
Version: version,
Data: data,
}
s.executeTemplate(w, tmpl, wrapper)
}
// executeTemplate renders the template into a buffer and writes to
@@ -352,7 +274,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) pageData(r *http.Request, data any) any {
// this reason.
func (s *Handlers) executeTemplate(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
tmpl *template.Template,
data any,
) {
@@ -363,7 +284,10 @@ func (s *Handlers) executeTemplate(
s.log.Error(
"failed to execute template", "error", err,
)
s.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
internal/handlers/handlers_test.go
+3 -10
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
@@ -110,8 +109,6 @@ func newTestApp(
func(r *recordingEvictor) delivery.WebhookEvictor {
return r
},
metrics.NewRegistry,
metrics.New,
middleware.New,
delivery.NewGuard,
handlers.New,
@@ -179,7 +176,7 @@ func TestHandleIndex_Authenticated(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w2.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/hooks", w2.Header().Get("Location"),
t, "/sources", w2.Header().Get("Location"),
)
}
@@ -310,14 +307,10 @@ func TestRenderTemplateMidRenderErrorSendsNoPartialBody(t *testing.T) {
t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code,
"a failed render must report a 500",
)
assert.NotContains(
t, w.Body.String(), partialPageMarker,
assert.Equal(
t, "Internal server error\n", w.Body.String(),
"the response must carry no part of the aborted page",
)
assert.Contains(
t, w.Body.String(), "500 Internal Server Error",
"a failed render must answer with the error page",
)
}
func TestBuildDatabaseTargetConfig_Valid(t *testing.T) {
internal/handlers/index.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,13 +5,13 @@ import (
)
// HandleIndex returns a handler for the root path that redirects
// based on authentication state: authenticated users go to /hooks
// based on authentication state: authenticated users go to /sources
// (the dashboard), unauthenticated users go to the login page.
func (s *Handlers) HandleIndex() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sess, err := s.session.Get(r)
if err == nil && s.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/hooks", http.StatusSeeOther)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/sources", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
internal/handlers/logbound_test.go
+5 -5
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ package handlers_test
// this package reach a value an UNAUTHENTICATED client picks outright
// and of a length it picks outright:
//
// - the unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line on /h/{uuid}, whose
// - the unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line on /webhook/{uuid}, whose
// path segment matched no stored entrypoint and so is bounded by
// nothing;
// - the failed-login DEBUG lines, whose username is a form field.
@@ -190,12 +190,12 @@ func assertNoClientText(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer) {
// route pattern.
func receiverRouter(h *handlers.Handlers) *chi.Mux {
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.Post("/h/{uuid}", h.HandleWebhook())
router.Post("/webhook/{uuid}", h.HandleWebhook())
return router
}
// postReceiver sends one POST at /h/<segment>.
// postReceiver sends one POST at /webhook/<segment>.
//
// RawPath is cleared after parsing so chi routes on the decoded path
// and the handler sees the raw bytes rather than their percent-escaped
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ func postReceiver(
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/h/"+url.PathEscape(segment),
"/webhook/"+url.PathEscape(segment),
strings.NewReader(""),
)
req.URL.RawPath = ""
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ func TestVerificationCapacity_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize(
http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
postLoginAtPath(
t, h,
"/hook/"+url.PathEscape(
"/source/"+url.PathEscape(
oversizedFill(fill),
)+"/login",
),
internal/handlers/metrics.go
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
)
// HandleMetrics returns the Prometheus scrape handler for the
// registry built by metrics.NewRegistry, which the HTTP, delivery, Go
// runtime and process collectors register on. It is what
// promhttp.Handler builds for the global default registry, including
// the promhttp_metric_handler_* series that count scrapes, pointed at
// that registry instead.
func (s *Handlers) HandleMetrics() http.HandlerFunc {
reg := s.params.Registry
return promhttp.InstrumentMetricHandler(
reg, promhttp.HandlerFor(reg, promhttp.HandlerOpts{}),
).ServeHTTP
}
internal/handlers/profile.go
+28 -16
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package handlers
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
@@ -36,14 +37,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandlePasswordChange() http.HandlerFunc {
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
successMessage, errorMessage, handled := h.applyPasswordChange(
r.Context(),
w,
r,
sessionUsername,
// PostFormValue, not FormValue: the credential must
// come from the body, never from the query string.
@@ -65,12 +66,12 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandlePasswordChange() http.HandlerFunc {
// applyPasswordChange verifies the current password and, on success,
// persists a fresh hash for the user, reusing the same helpers that
// bootstrap the admin user. It returns the success and error messages
// to display on the profile page. On an internal failure it writes the
// error page itself and returns handled=false, signalling the caller
// to display on the profile page. On an internal failure it writes a
// 500 response itself and returns handled=false, signalling the caller
// to stop without re-rendering the page.
func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
ctx context.Context,
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
username, currentPassword, newPassword, confirmPassword string,
) (string, string, bool) {
// This endpoint verifies one password and hashes another, at
@@ -78,10 +79,15 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
// endpoint uses. The bound is per hash, not per endpoint: leaving
// this path outside it would leave a hole in it. The slot is held
// across both hashes.
release, ok := h.mw.BeginPasswordVerification(r.Context())
release, ok := h.mw.BeginPasswordVerification(ctx)
if !ok {
h.log.Warn("password verification capacity exhausted")
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
http.Error(
w,
"The server is busy verifying credentials. "+
"Please try again.",
http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -97,7 +103,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
).First(&user).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to load user for password change", err,
w, "failed to load user for password change", err,
)
return "", "", false
@@ -107,7 +113,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
currentPassword, user.Password,
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to verify password", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to verify password", err)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -126,7 +132,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
hashedPassword, err := database.HashPassword(newPassword)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to hash new password", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to hash new password", err)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -135,7 +141,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
"password", hashedPassword,
).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to update password", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to update password", err)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -156,7 +162,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
) (string, string, bool) {
requestedUsername := chi.URLParam(r, "username")
if requestedUsername == "" {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -166,7 +172,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
// unexpected retrieval error.
sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get session", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to get session", err)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -174,7 +180,10 @@ func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
sessionUsername, ok := h.session.GetUsername(sess)
if !ok {
h.log.Error("authenticated session missing username")
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -182,14 +191,17 @@ func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
sessionUserID, ok := h.session.GetUserID(sess)
if !ok {
h.log.Error("authenticated session missing user ID")
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return "", "", false
}
// Only allow users to act on their own profile.
if requestedUsername != sessionUsername {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusForbidden)
http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return "", "", false
}
internal/handlers/profile_test.go
+3 -8
View File
@@ -128,9 +128,7 @@ func TestUserRoute_Unauthenticated_RedirectedByMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
var sess *session.Session
var h *handlers.Handlers
app := newTestApp(t, &log, &cfg, &sess, &h)
app := newTestApp(t, &log, &cfg, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
@@ -141,7 +139,7 @@ func TestUserRoute_Unauthenticated_RedirectedByMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(mw.CSRF(h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusForbidden)))
r.Use(mw.CSRF())
r.Use(mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
handlerReached = true
@@ -162,10 +160,7 @@ func TestUserRoute_Unauthenticated_RedirectedByMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
"handler must not be reached for unauthenticated request",
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next=%2Fuser%2Ftestuser",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// passwordChangeRequest builds a POST request to the password-change
internal/handlers/recent_events.go
-293
View File
@@ -1,293 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"net/http"
"slices"
"strconv"
"time"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// recentEventColumns is the recent events list's projection. It
// leaves out the body, for the reason maxRenderedBodyBytes gives,
// and reads its size from body_bytes, recorded when the event was
// stored.
const recentEventColumns = "id, created_at, method, content_type, " +
"resubmitted_from_id, body_bytes"
// recentAttemptColumns is the part of a recorded attempt the list
// uses. The event log's deliveryResultColumns also reads response
// bodies, which the list does not show.
const recentAttemptColumns = "delivery_id, status_code, created_at"
// RecentEventView is one row of the recent events list on a
// webhook's page.
type RecentEventView struct {
Method string
ContentType string
// ResubmittedFromID names the event this one was copied from,
// empty for an event that arrived on the receiver.
ResubmittedFromID string
// Received is how long ago the event arrived, and ReceivedUTC
// the full timestamp the page shows on hover.
Received string
ReceivedUTC string
// Size is the size of the stored body.
Size string
// ProcessingTime is how long the event's slowest delivery
// took; see processingTime.
ProcessingTime string
// Status is what the webhook's HTTP target answered, and
// StatusClass its colour; see targetStatus. Both are empty
// unless the webhook has exactly one HTTP target.
Status string
StatusClass string
}
// recentEventRow is one row of recentEventColumns.
type recentEventRow struct {
ID string
CreatedAt time.Time
Method string
ContentType string
ResubmittedFromID *string
BodyBytes uint64
}
// recentAttemptRow is one row of recentAttemptColumns. CreatedAt is
// when the attempt's result was recorded, which is when the attempt
// finished.
type recentAttemptRow struct {
DeliveryID string
StatusCode int
CreatedAt time.Time
}
// singleHTTPTargetID returns the ID of the webhook's HTTP target
// when it has exactly one, and "" when it has none or several.
func singleHTTPTargetID(targets []database.Target) string {
id := ""
count := 0
for i := range targets {
if targets[i].Type == database.TargetTypeHTTP {
id = targets[i].ID
count++
}
}
if count != 1 {
return ""
}
return id
}
// loadRecentEvents loads the webhook's recentEventLimit newest
// events for its page, newest first. statusTargetID is the
// webhook's only HTTP target, or "" when the list shows no status.
func loadRecentEvents(
webhookDB *gorm.DB, webhookID, statusTargetID string,
) ([]RecentEventView, error) {
var rows []recentEventRow
err := webhookDB.Model(&database.Event{}).
Select(recentEventColumns).
Where("webhook_id = ?", webhookID).
Order("created_at DESC").
Limit(recentEventLimit).
Find(&rows).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
eventIDs := make([]string, len(rows))
for i := range rows {
eventIDs[i] = rows[i].ID
}
// Oldest first, so an event's last delivery to a target is its
// newest: a replay adds a delivery rather than changing the
// earlier one.
var deliveries []database.Delivery
err = webhookDB.
Select("id, event_id, target_id, status, created_at").
Where("event_id IN ?", eventIDs).
Order("created_at ASC").
Find(&deliveries).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
byEvent := make(map[string][]database.Delivery, len(rows))
deliveryIDs := make([]string, len(deliveries))
for i := range deliveries {
eventID := deliveries[i].EventID
byEvent[eventID] = append(byEvent[eventID], deliveries[i])
deliveryIDs[i] = deliveries[i].ID
}
attempts, err := loadRecentAttempts(webhookDB, deliveryIDs)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
views := make([]RecentEventView, len(rows))
for i := range rows {
views[i] = rows[i].view(
byEvent[rows[i].ID], attempts, statusTargetID,
)
}
return views, nil
}
// loadRecentAttempts loads the recorded attempts of the listed
// events' deliveries, keyed by delivery ID, each delivery's in
// attempt order. The IDs go in chunks for the reason
// deliveryIDChunkSize gives.
func loadRecentAttempts(
webhookDB *gorm.DB, deliveryIDs []string,
) (map[string][]recentAttemptRow, error) {
byDelivery := make(map[string][]recentAttemptRow)
for chunk := range slices.Chunk(deliveryIDs, deliveryIDChunkSize) {
var rows []recentAttemptRow
err := webhookDB.Model(&database.DeliveryResult{}).
Select(recentAttemptColumns).
Where("delivery_id IN ?", chunk).
Order("attempt_num ASC").
Find(&rows).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for i := range rows {
id := rows[i].DeliveryID
byDelivery[id] = append(byDelivery[id], rows[i])
}
}
return byDelivery, nil
}
// view projects a loaded row for rendering. deliveries is the
// event's deliveries, oldest first, and attempts their recorded
// attempts keyed by delivery ID.
func (r *recentEventRow) view(
deliveries []database.Delivery,
attempts map[string][]recentAttemptRow,
statusTargetID string,
) RecentEventView {
v := RecentEventView{
Method: r.Method,
ContentType: r.ContentType,
Received: humanize.Time(r.CreatedAt),
ReceivedUTC: r.CreatedAt.UTC().Format(time.DateTime) + " UTC",
Size: humanize.Bytes(r.BodyBytes),
ProcessingTime: processingTime(deliveries, attempts),
}
if r.ResubmittedFromID != nil {
v.ResubmittedFromID = *r.ResubmittedFromID
}
if statusTargetID != "" {
v.Status, v.StatusClass = targetStatus(
deliveries, attempts, statusTargetID,
)
}
return v
}
// processingTime is how long the event's slowest delivery took,
// from being queued to its last recorded attempt, time spent
// waiting between retries included. A delivery is queued when its
// event is received, or when an operator replays it, so a replay
// is timed from the replay rather than from the event's arrival.
// It is "in progress" while any delivery is pending or retrying,
// and empty for an event with no deliveries.
func processingTime(
deliveries []database.Delivery,
attempts map[string][]recentAttemptRow,
) string {
if len(deliveries) == 0 {
return ""
}
var slowest time.Duration
for i := range deliveries {
if !deliveries[i].Status.Terminal() {
return "in progress"
}
tries := attempts[deliveries[i].ID]
if len(tries) == 0 {
continue
}
last := tries[len(tries)-1].CreatedAt
slowest = max(slowest, last.Sub(deliveries[i].CreatedAt))
}
return slowest.Round(time.Millisecond).String()
}
// targetStatus is what the target answered for the event, and the
// colour to show it in: the HTTP status code of the last attempt of
// the event's newest delivery to the target. Without a code it is
// "no response" when that attempt failed before a response
// arrived, the delivery's status ("pending") before any attempt,
// and "not sent" when the event has no delivery to the target.
func targetStatus(
deliveries []database.Delivery,
attempts map[string][]recentAttemptRow,
targetID string,
) (string, string) {
newest := -1
for i := range deliveries {
if deliveries[i].TargetID == targetID {
newest = i
}
}
if newest < 0 {
return "not sent", "text-gray-400"
}
tries := attempts[deliveries[newest].ID]
if len(tries) == 0 {
return string(deliveries[newest].Status), "text-gray-400"
}
code := tries[len(tries)-1].StatusCode
switch {
case code == 0:
return "no response", "text-red-600"
case code >= http.StatusInternalServerError:
return strconv.Itoa(code), "text-red-600"
case code >= http.StatusBadRequest:
return strconv.Itoa(code), "text-yellow-600"
case code >= http.StatusMultipleChoices:
return strconv.Itoa(code), "text-gray-500"
case code >= http.StatusOK:
return strconv.Itoa(code), "text-green-600"
default:
return strconv.Itoa(code), "text-gray-500"
}
}
internal/handlers/recent_events_test.go
-362
View File
@@ -1,362 +0,0 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// statusTitle marks the status column's cell in a recent events
// row; it is absent from the page when the column is not shown.
const statusTitle = `title="HTTP status from the HTTP target"`
// recentEventsFixture is one started app and a webhook whose
// recent events list a test fills.
type recentEventsFixture struct {
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
webhook *database.Webhook
webhookDB *gorm.DB
}
func newRecentEventsFixture(t *testing.T) *recentEventsFixture {
t.Helper()
f := &recentEventsFixture{}
var dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
app := newTestApp(t, &f.h, &f.sess, &f.db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
f.webhook = seedWebhook(t, f.db)
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(f.webhook.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
f.webhookDB = webhookDB
return f
}
func (f *recentEventsFixture) render(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
return renderSourceDetailPage(t, f.h, f.sess, f.webhook.ID)
}
// event records an event received at receivedAt, with its body's
// size as the receiver records it.
func (f *recentEventsFixture) event(
t *testing.T, contentType, body string, receivedAt time.Time,
) *database.Event {
t.Helper()
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: f.webhook.ID,
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: body,
BodyBytes: int64(len(body)),
ContentType: contentType,
}
event.CreatedAt = receivedAt
require.NoError(t, f.webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(event).Error)
return event
}
// delivery records a delivery of the event to the target, queued
// when the event was received.
func (f *recentEventsFixture) delivery(
t *testing.T,
event *database.Event,
targetID string,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
) *database.Delivery {
t.Helper()
return f.deliveryQueuedAt(
t, event, targetID, status, event.CreatedAt,
)
}
// deliveryQueuedAt records a delivery of the event to the target,
// queued at queuedAt, as a replay is.
func (f *recentEventsFixture) deliveryQueuedAt(
t *testing.T,
event *database.Event,
targetID string,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
queuedAt time.Time,
) *database.Delivery {
t.Helper()
dlv := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: targetID,
Status: status,
}
dlv.CreatedAt = queuedAt
require.NoError(t, f.webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(dlv).Error)
return dlv
}
// attempt records one attempt of the delivery that finished took
// after the delivery was queued, with HTTP status code (0 for no
// response).
func (f *recentEventsFixture) attempt(
t *testing.T, dlv *database.Delivery, code int, took time.Duration,
) {
t.Helper()
result := &database.DeliveryResult{
DeliveryID: dlv.ID,
AttemptNum: 1,
StatusCode: code,
}
result.CreatedAt = dlv.CreatedAt.Add(took)
require.NoError(t, f.webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(result).Error)
}
// statusCell is the status column's cell as the page renders it.
func statusCell(class, text string) string {
return `<span class="font-medium ` + class + `" ` + statusTitle +
`>` + text + `</span>`
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_ShowsFiftyNewestEvents proves the list is
// headed "50 Most Recent Events" and holds the 50 newest events,
// newest first, and not one more.
func TestHandleSourceDetail_ShowsFiftyNewestEvents(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := newRecentEventsFixture(t)
base := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
for i := range 51 {
f.event(
t, fmt.Sprintf("application/x-recent-%02d", i), "{}",
base.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Second),
)
}
body := f.render(t)
assert.Contains(t, body, ">50 Most Recent Events</h2>")
assert.Equal(t, 50, strings.Count(body, `title="Body size"`))
assert.NotContains(t, body, "application/x-recent-00")
assert.Contains(t, body, "application/x-recent-01")
assert.Less(
t,
strings.Index(body, "application/x-recent-50"),
strings.Index(body, "application/x-recent-49"),
)
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_RecentEventColumns proves a row shows its
// time relative with the UTC timestamp on hover, its body size,
// and its processing time once every delivery has finished.
func TestHandleSourceDetail_RecentEventColumns(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := newRecentEventsFixture(t)
logTarget := seedTarget(t, f.db, f.webhook.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
receivedAt := time.Now().Add(-210 * time.Second).
UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
done := f.event(
t, contentTypeJSON, strings.Repeat("x", 2048), receivedAt,
)
f.attempt(
t,
f.delivery(t, done, logTarget.ID, database.DeliveryStatusDelivered),
0, 1500*time.Millisecond,
)
waiting := f.event(t, "text/plain", "{}", receivedAt)
f.delivery(t, waiting, logTarget.ID, database.DeliveryStatusPending)
body := f.render(t)
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`<span title="`+receivedAt.Format(time.DateTime)+
` UTC">3 minutes ago</span>`,
)
assert.Contains(t, body, `<span title="Body size">2.0 kB</span>`)
assert.Contains(t, body, ">1.5s</span>")
assert.Contains(t, body, ">in progress</span>")
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_StatusWithSingleHTTPTarget proves that a
// webhook with exactly one HTTP target shows, colour-coded, what
// that target answered for each event. The log target beside it
// does not count against "exactly one".
func TestHandleSourceDetail_StatusWithSingleHTTPTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := newRecentEventsFixture(t)
target := seedTarget(t, f.db, f.webhook.ID, database.TargetTypeHTTP)
seedTarget(t, f.db, f.webhook.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
now := time.Now()
for _, code := range []int{204, 302, 404, 503, 0} {
dlv := f.delivery(
t, f.event(t, contentTypeJSON, "{}", now), target.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
f.attempt(t, dlv, code, time.Second)
}
f.delivery(
t, f.event(t, contentTypeJSON, "{}", now), target.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
f.event(t, contentTypeJSON, "{}", now)
// A replay is a newer delivery, and its answer is the one shown.
replayed := f.event(t, contentTypeJSON, "{}", now)
f.attempt(t, f.delivery(
t, replayed, target.ID, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
), 502, time.Second)
f.attempt(t, f.deliveryQueuedAt(
t, replayed, target.ID, database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
now.Add(time.Minute),
), 200, time.Second)
body := f.render(t)
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-green-600", "204"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-gray-500", "302"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-yellow-600", "404"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-red-600", "503"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-red-600", "no response"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-gray-400", "pending"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-gray-400", "not sent"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-green-600", "200"))
assert.NotContains(t, body, ">502<")
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_NoStatusWithoutSingleHTTPTarget proves the
// status column is absent when the webhook has no HTTP target or
// more than one.
func TestHandleSourceDetail_NoStatusWithoutSingleHTTPTarget(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
cases := map[string][]database.TargetType{
"none": {database.TargetTypeLog},
"several": {database.TargetTypeHTTP, database.TargetTypeHTTP},
}
for name, types := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := newRecentEventsFixture(t)
event := f.event(t, contentTypeJSON, "{}", time.Now())
for _, tt := range types {
target := seedTarget(t, f.db, f.webhook.ID, tt)
f.attempt(t, f.delivery(
t, event, target.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
), 200, time.Second)
}
body := f.render(t)
assert.Contains(t, body, `title="Body size"`)
assert.NotContains(t, body, statusTitle)
})
}
}
// TestHandleWebhook_RecordsBodySize proves the receiver records the
// body's size in bytes, not characters, with the event it stores.
func TestHandleWebhook_RecordsBodySize(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := newRecentEventsFixture(t)
seedEntrypoint(t, f.db, f.webhook.ID)
// Two bytes per character.
body := strings.Repeat("é", 1024)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, "/h/x",
strings.NewReader(body),
)
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
rctx.URLParams.Add("uuid", "ep-"+f.webhook.ID)
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(
req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx,
))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
f.h.HandleWebhook().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
var stored database.Event
require.NoError(t, f.webhookDB.First(&stored).Error)
assert.Equal(t, int64(2048), stored.BodyBytes)
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_FailedLoadIsAnError proves that when the
// list cannot be loaded the page answers with an error, rather than
// an empty list claiming the webhook has no events.
func TestHandleSourceDetail_FailedLoadIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := newRecentEventsFixture(t)
target := seedTarget(t, f.db, f.webhook.ID, database.TargetTypeHTTP)
f.attempt(t, f.delivery(
t, f.event(t, contentTypeJSON, "{}", time.Now()), target.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
), 200, time.Second)
// The attempts are the list's last query, so its events and
// deliveries have already loaded when it fails.
require.NoError(t, f.webhookDB.Exec(
"DROP TABLE delivery_results",
).Error)
w := serveSourceDetailPage(t, f.h, f.sess, f.webhook.ID)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code)
assert.NotContains(t, w.Body.String(), "No events received yet.")
}
internal/handlers/source_delete_test.go
+9 -9
View File
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_EvictsArchiveWriter(t *testing.T) {
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{paramSourceID: wh.ID},
)
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_KeepsArchiveFile(t *testing.T) {
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{paramSourceID: wh.ID},
)
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_FailedDeleteKeepsEverything(
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{paramSourceID: wh.ID},
)
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_FailedDeleteKeepsEverything(
)
assert.Empty(
t, w.Header().Get("Location"),
"a failed deletion must not redirect to /hooks",
"a failed deletion must not redirect to /sources",
)
assert.Equal(
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_RemovesConfigAndEventDatabase(
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{paramSourceID: wh.ID},
)
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_RemovesConfigAndEventDatabase(
h.HandleSourceDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "/hooks", w.Header().Get("Location"))
assert.Equal(t, "/sources", w.Header().Get("Location"))
assert.Equal(
t, int64(0),
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ func TestHandleTargetDelete_EvictsWhenLastDatabaseTargetGone(
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+tgt.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+tgt.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{
paramSourceID: wh.ID,
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ func TestHandleTargetDelete_KeepsWriterWhenDatabaseTargetRemains(
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+doomed.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+doomed.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{
paramSourceID: wh.ID,
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ func TestHandleTargetDelete_KeepsWriterWhenOtherTypeDeleted(
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+other.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+other.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{
paramSourceID: wh.ID,
internal/handlers/source_detail_baseurl_test.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ func (f *baseURLFixture) entrypointURL(
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+f.webhook,
"/source/"+f.webhook,
nil,
)
req.Host = host
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ func TestSourceDetailBaseURL_ForwardedProtoSpellings(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(
t,
tc.scheme+"://"+host+"/h/"+fixture.path,
tc.scheme+"://"+host+"/webhook/"+fixture.path,
fixture.entrypointURL(
t, host, forwardedProto(tc.header),
),
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ func TestSourceDetailBaseURL_DirectTLSBeatsPlaintextHeader(
assert.Equal(
t,
"https://"+host+"/h/"+fixture.path,
"https://"+host+"/webhook/"+fixture.path,
got,
"a connection this process terminated with TLS "+
"outranks a header claiming plaintext",
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ func TestSourceDetailBaseURL_KeepsHostAuthority(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(
t,
"https://"+host+"/h/"+fixture.path,
"https://"+host+"/webhook/"+fixture.path,
fixture.entrypointURL(
t, host, forwardedProto("HTTPS"),
),
internal/handlers/source_detail_test.go
+4 -19
View File
@@ -62,27 +62,10 @@ func renderSourceDetailPage(
) string {
t.Helper()
w := serveSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, webhookID)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
return w.Body.String()
}
// serveSourceDetailPage runs the real source detail handler for a
// webhook and returns its response, whatever its status.
func serveSourceDetailPage(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sess *session.Session,
webhookID string,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+webhookID,
"/source/"+webhookID,
nil,
)
@@ -104,7 +87,9 @@ func serveSourceDetailPage(
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSourceDetail().ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
return w.Body.String()
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_MasksSlackWebhookURL is the
internal/handlers/source_logs_deleted_target_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func deleteTargetThroughHandler(
t.Helper()
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+webhookID+"/targets/"+targetID+"/delete",
"/source/"+webhookID+"/targets/"+targetID+"/delete",
authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
),
internal/handlers/source_logs_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func renderSourceLogsPageWithQuery(
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+webhookID+"/events"+query,
"/source/"+webhookID+"/logs"+query,
nil,
)
internal/handlers/source_management.go
+81 -78
View File
@@ -149,7 +149,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceList() http.HandlerFunc {
"user_id = ?", userID,
).Order("created_at DESC").Find(&webhooks).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to list webhooks", err)
h.log.Error(
"failed to list webhooks", "error", err,
)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
@@ -243,7 +249,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceCreateSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
@@ -303,7 +311,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) createWebhookWithEntrypoint(
err := h.commitWebhook(webhook)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to create webhook", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to create webhook", err)
return
}
@@ -322,7 +330,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) createWebhookWithEntrypoint(
)
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/hook/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/source/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -380,7 +388,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceDetail() http.HandlerFunc {
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -407,23 +415,16 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderSourceDetail(
"webhook_id = ?", webhook.ID,
).Find(&targets)
var events []RecentEventView
var events []database.Event
if h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhook.ID) {
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get webhook database", err)
return
}
events, err = loadRecentEvents(
webhookDB, webhook.ID, singleHTTPTargetID(targets),
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to load recent events", err)
return
webhookDB, dbErr := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if dbErr == nil {
webhookDB.Where(
"webhook_id = ?", webhook.ID,
).Order("created_at DESC").Limit(
recentEventLimit,
).Find(&events)
}
}
@@ -475,7 +476,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceEdit() http.HandlerFunc {
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -510,7 +511,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceEditSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -519,7 +520,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceEditSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err = r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
@@ -573,13 +576,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyWebhookEdit(
err := h.db.DB().Save(webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to update webhook", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to update webhook", err)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/hook/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/source/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -603,7 +606,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceDelete() http.HandlerFunc {
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -630,7 +633,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteWebhookResources(
// be removed by hand; deleted history cannot be recovered.
err := h.commitWebhookDeletion(&webhook)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to delete webhook", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to delete webhook", err)
return
}
@@ -656,13 +659,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteWebhookResources(
// redirecting as though everything succeeded: the file
// needs removing by hand, and the logged error names it.
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to delete webhook event database", err,
w, "failed to delete webhook event database", err,
)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, "/hooks", http.StatusSeeOther)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/sources", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// commitWebhookDeletion soft-deletes a webhook's entrypoints,
@@ -800,7 +803,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) ownedWebhook(
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return database.Webhook{}, false
}
@@ -822,7 +825,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
// Without the map every delivery renders through a
// zero redactor, so failing the page is the only
// safe answer.
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to load targets", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to load targets", err)
return
}
@@ -830,7 +833,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
page := h.parsePage(r)
evts, total, ok := h.loadEventsWithDeliveries(
w, r, webhook, targets, page,
w, webhook, targets, page,
)
if !ok {
return
@@ -940,7 +943,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) parsePage(r *http.Request) int {
// caller must then render nothing further.
func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhook database.Webhook,
targetMap map[string]eventLogTarget,
page int,
@@ -954,7 +956,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to get webhook database", err,
w, "failed to get webhook database", err,
)
return nil, 0, false
@@ -991,7 +993,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to load delivery attempts", err,
w, "failed to load delivery attempts", err,
)
return nil, 0, false
@@ -1000,7 +1002,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
resubmits, err := resubmitCounts(webhookDB, eventIDs)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to count event resubmissions", err,
w, "failed to count event resubmissions", err,
)
return nil, 0, false
@@ -1223,7 +1225,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -1232,7 +1234,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err = r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
@@ -1248,13 +1252,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
err = h.db.DB().Create(entrypoint).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to create entrypoint", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to create entrypoint", err)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/hook/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/source/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
}
@@ -1279,7 +1283,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -1288,7 +1292,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err = r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
@@ -1308,7 +1314,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) processTargetCreate(
//
// Every field here is read with PostFormValue, not FormValue.
// FormValue falls back to the query string, which would let
// `POST /hook/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/...`
// `POST /source/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/...`
// configure a target from a value the request line carries — and
// the request line, unlike the body, is what logs, proxies,
// Referer headers and error trackers record.
@@ -1359,13 +1365,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) processTargetCreate(
err = h.db.DB().Create(target).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to create target", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to create target", err)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/hook/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/source/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -1423,7 +1429,7 @@ type targetFormInput struct {
//
// Every field is read with PostFormValue, not FormValue. FormValue
// falls back to the query string, which would let
// `POST /hook/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/...`
// `POST /source/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/...`
// configure a target from a value the request line carries — and the
// request line, unlike the body, is what logs, proxies, Referer
// headers and error trackers record. The headers field is under the
@@ -1453,7 +1459,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) buildTargetConfig(
case database.TargetTypeSlack:
return h.buildSlackTargetConfig(w, r, in.URL)
case database.TargetTypeDatabase:
return h.buildDatabaseTargetConfig(w, r, in.Expiry)
return h.buildDatabaseTargetConfig(w, in.Expiry)
case database.TargetTypeLog:
return "", nil
default:
@@ -1503,7 +1509,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) buildHTTPTargetConfig(
return "", err
}
return h.marshalTargetConfig(w, r, delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
return marshalTargetConfig(w, delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
URL: in.URL,
Headers: headers,
Timeout: timeout,
@@ -1525,7 +1531,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) buildSlackTargetConfig(
return "", err
}
return h.marshalTargetConfig(w, r, delivery.SlackTargetConfig{
return marshalTargetConfig(w, delivery.SlackTargetConfig{
WebhookURL: targetURL,
})
}
@@ -1565,23 +1571,11 @@ func (h *Handlers) validateTargetURL(
"url", delivery.MaskURL(targetURL),
"error", err,
)
msg := "Invalid target URL: " + err.Error()
// Only a private or reserved address's refusal says how
// to allow it. Other refusals never do: link-local, the
// unspecified addresses and the other unconditional
// metadata addresses cannot be opened, and the default
// blocklist's public addresses, which listing does open,
// hand out credentials.
if errors.Is(err, delivery.ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP) {
msg += ". Private and reserved addresses are refused " +
"by default; the server's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS " +
"setting allows named networks (see \"Allowing " +
"egress to your own network\" in the README)."
}
http.Error(w, msg, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w,
"Invalid target URL: "+err.Error(),
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return err
}
@@ -1591,14 +1585,16 @@ func (h *Handlers) validateTargetURL(
// marshalTargetConfig serialises a target configuration for storage,
// writing a 500 itself if it cannot.
func (h *Handlers) marshalTargetConfig(
func marshalTargetConfig(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
cfg any,
) (string, error) {
configBytes, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to encode target config", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return "", err
}
@@ -1614,7 +1610,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) marshalTargetConfig(
// expiry yields an empty config (the keep-forever default).
func (h *Handlers) buildDatabaseTargetConfig(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
expiry string,
) (string, error) {
expiry = strings.TrimSpace(expiry)
@@ -1633,8 +1628,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) buildDatabaseTargetConfig(
return "", err
}
return h.marshalTargetConfig(
w, r, map[string]any{"expiry": expiry},
return marshalTargetConfig(
w, map[string]any{"expiry": expiry},
)
}
@@ -1688,7 +1683,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -1698,7 +1693,11 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
childID, webhook.ID,
).Delete(model)
if result.Error != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, errMsg, result.Error)
h.log.Error(errMsg, "error", result.Error)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
@@ -1709,7 +1708,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
http.Redirect(
w, r,
"/hook/"+webhook.ID,
"/source/"+webhook.ID,
http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -1788,21 +1787,25 @@ func (h *Handlers) toggleChildResource(
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
err = toggleFn(webhook.ID, childID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, errMsg, err)
h.log.Error(errMsg, "error", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r,
"/hook/"+webhook.ID,
"/source/"+webhook.ID,
http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
internal/handlers/source_management_test.go
+7 -7
View File
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ func submitCreate(
form.Set("retention_days", *retention)
}
req := formRequest("/hooks/new", cookies, form, nil)
req := formRequest("/sources/new", cookies, form, nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSourceCreateSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceCreate_PrefillsDefaultFromConstant(t *testing.T) {
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.handlers.HandleSourceCreate().ServeHTTP(
w, getRequest(t, "/hooks/new", env.cookies, nil),
w, getRequest(t, "/sources/new", env.cookies, nil),
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_RejectedFormKeepsUserInput(
form.Set("description", description)
form.Set("retention_days", "nonsense")
req := formRequest("/hooks/new", env.cookies, form, nil)
req := formRequest("/sources/new", env.cookies, form, nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.handlers.HandleSourceCreateSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ func submitEdit(
form.Set("retention_days", retention)
req := formRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/edit",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/edit",
env.cookies,
form,
map[string]string{sourceIDParam: wh.ID},
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ func TestSourceEditForm_ForeverWebhookRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
)
req := getRequest(
t, "/hook/"+wh.ID+"/edit", env.cookies,
t, "/source/"+wh.ID+"/edit", env.cookies,
map[string]string{sourceIDParam: wh.ID},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ func TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotTheSentinelNumber(
listW := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.handlers.HandleSourceList().ServeHTTP(
listW, getRequest(t, "/hooks", env.cookies, nil),
listW, getRequest(t, "/sources", env.cookies, nil),
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, listW.Code)
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ func TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotTheSentinelNumber(
env.handlers.HandleSourceDetail().ServeHTTP(
detailW,
getRequest(
t, "/hook/"+wh.ID, env.cookies,
t, "/source/"+wh.ID, env.cookies,
map[string]string{sourceIDParam: wh.ID},
),
)
internal/handlers/target_create_query_test.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -76,11 +76,11 @@ func postTargetCreate(
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.Use(mw.Logging())
router.Post(
"/hook/{sourceID}/targets",
"/source/{sourceID}/targets",
env.handlers.HandleTargetCreate(),
)
target := "/hook/" + webhookID + "/targets"
target := "/source/" + webhookID + "/targets"
if query != "" {
target += "?" + query
}
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ func postTargetCreate(
// regression test for the ingress leak. r.FormValue falls back to the
// query string when a field is absent from the POST body, so
//
// POST /hook/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/services/...
// POST /source/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/services/...
//
// with an empty url field used to create a working target from a value
// carried on the request line — where logs, proxies, Referer headers
internal/handlers/target_edit.go
+7 -5
View File
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ type targetEditView struct {
//
// This page is the one place the full destination URL and header
// values are shown. It is reachable only through the
// /hook/{sourceID} route group, which supplies RequireAuth and
// /source/{sourceID} route group, which supplies RequireAuth and
// NoCache, and only for a target of a webhook the session's user
// owns; masking (delivery.TargetView) is unchanged everywhere else.
func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetEdit() http.HandlerFunc {
@@ -88,7 +88,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetEditSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
@@ -155,13 +157,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyTargetEdit(
err = h.db.DB().Save(target).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to update target", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to update target", err)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/hook/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/source/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -218,7 +220,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) ownedTarget(
chi.URLParam(r, "targetID"), webhook.ID,
).First(&target).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return database.Webhook{}, nil, false
}
internal/handlers/target_edit_test.go
+9 -9
View File
@@ -42,15 +42,15 @@ const (
func targetRouter(env *sourceTestEnv) *chi.Mux {
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.Post(
"/hook/{sourceID}/targets",
"/source/{sourceID}/targets",
env.handlers.HandleTargetCreate(),
)
router.Get(
"/hook/{sourceID}/targets/{targetID}/edit",
"/source/{sourceID}/targets/{targetID}/edit",
env.handlers.HandleTargetEdit(),
)
router.Post(
"/hook/{sourceID}/targets/{targetID}/edit",
"/source/{sourceID}/targets/{targetID}/edit",
env.handlers.HandleTargetEditSubmit(),
)
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ func seedHTTPTarget(
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/targets", form,
"/source/"+webhook.ID+"/targets", form,
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ func submitTargetEdit(
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
return serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/hook/"+webhookID+"/targets/"+targetID+"/edit",
"/source/"+webhookID+"/targets/"+targetID+"/edit",
form,
)
}
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ func TestHandleTargetEdit_PrefillsTheStoredValuesUnmasked(
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit",
"/source/"+webhook.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit",
nil,
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ func assertEditIgnoresQueryString(
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+
"/source/"+webhook.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+
"/edit?url="+url.QueryEscape(editReplacedURL)+
"&headers="+url.QueryEscape(editAuthHeader),
form,
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ func assertTargetOfAnotherWebhook404s(
get := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+mine.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit", nil,
"/source/"+mine.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit", nil,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, get.Code)
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ func assertWebhookOfAnotherUser404s(
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+other.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit", nil,
"/source/"+other.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit", nil,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code)
internal/handlers/target_private_refusal_test.go
-116
View File
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/url"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// privateRefusalHint is the sentence that tells an operator a private
// destination is refused on purpose, and how to allow one.
const privateRefusalHint = "Private and reserved addresses are " +
"refused by default; the server's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS setting " +
"allows named networks (see \"Allowing egress to your own " +
"network\" in the README)."
// TestTargetRefusal_PrivateDestinationSaysHowToAllowIt covers both
// target types that take a URL, on add and on edit.
func TestTargetRefusal_PrivateDestinationSaysHowToAllowIt(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
targetTypes := []database.TargetType{
database.TargetTypeHTTP,
database.TargetTypeSlack,
}
for _, targetType := range targetTypes {
t.Run(string(targetType), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
webhook := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 30)
targetsPath := "/hook/" + webhook.ID + "/targets"
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("name", "private")
form.Set("type", string(targetType))
form.Set("url", editBlockedURL)
added := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost, targetsPath, form,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, added.Code)
assert.Contains(
t, added.Body.String(), privateRefusalHint,
)
form.Set("url", editOriginalURL)
created := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost, targetsPath, form,
)
require.Equal(
t, http.StatusSeeOther, created.Code,
created.Body.String(),
)
targets := targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID)
require.Len(t, targets, 1)
form.Set("url", editBlockedURL)
edited := submitTargetEdit(
env, webhook.ID, targets[0].ID, form,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, edited.Code)
assert.Contains(
t, edited.Body.String(), privateRefusalHint,
)
})
}
}
// TestTargetRefusal_MetadataDestinationDoesNotSayHowToAllowIt: no
// setting opens a link-local address, and Azure's WireServer hands out
// VM credentials, so neither refusal points at the setting.
func TestTargetRefusal_MetadataDestinationDoesNotSayHowToAllowIt(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
metadataURLs := map[string]string{
"link-local": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
"wireserver": "http://168.63.129.16/?comp=versions",
}
for name, metadataURL := range metadataURLs {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
webhook := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 30)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("name", "metadata")
form.Set("type", string(database.TargetTypeHTTP))
form.Set("url", metadataURL)
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/targets", form,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
assert.NotContains(
t, w.Body.String(), privateRefusalHint,
)
})
}
}
internal/handlers/target_retries_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func createWithRetries(
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/targets",
"/source/"+webhook.ID+"/targets",
createRetriesForm(retries),
)
internal/handlers/ui_copy_test.go
+10 -55
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ func renderPage(
}
// TestNavbarUsesWebhookTerminology pins the user-visible navigation
// label to "Webhooks" and its link to the webhook list at /hooks.
// label to "Webhooks". The /sources route is deliberately unchanged, so
// the assertion targets the link text rather than the href.
func TestNavbarUsesWebhookTerminology(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -94,11 +95,15 @@ func TestNavbarUsesWebhookTerminology(t *testing.T) {
t, body, ">Sources<",
"no user-visible element may still be labelled Sources",
)
assert.Contains(t, body, `href="/hooks"`)
assert.Contains(
t, body, `href="/sources"`,
"the /sources route itself must not change",
)
}
// TestEditPageUsesWebhookTerminology pins the edit page's heading and
// its back link to the webhook page at /hook/{id}.
// its back link. The link's href still points at /source/{id}, which is
// intentional: only user-visible copy changes.
func TestEditPageUsesWebhookTerminology(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -125,57 +130,7 @@ func TestEditPageUsesWebhookTerminology(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, body, "Edit Webhook")
assert.NotContains(t, body, ">Sources<")
assert.Contains(t, body, `href="/hook/wh-1"`)
}
// TestEventLogPageIsCalledFullEventLog pins the one name the event log
// page at /hook/{id}/events goes by: both links to it on the webhook
// page, and its own heading, read "Full Event Log".
func TestEventLogPageIsCalledFullEventLog(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
var sess *session.Session
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
// A pointer, as in the handlers: source_detail.html calls
// Webhook.RetentionLabel, a pointer method. Both pages only range
// over their lists, and a list left out renders as empty, so the
// lists are left out.
webhook := &database.Webhook{Name: "wh", RetentionDays: 14}
webhook.ID = testWebhookID
detailBody := renderPage(
t, h, sess, "source_detail.html", map[string]any{
dataKeyWebhook: webhook,
},
)
assert.Contains(
t, detailBody,
`<a href="/hook/wh-1/events" class="btn-secondary">Full Event Log</a>`,
"the button at the top of the webhook page",
)
assert.Contains(
t, detailBody,
`<a href="/hook/wh-1/events" class="btn-text text-sm">Full Event Log</a>`,
"the link under recent events",
)
logBody := renderPage(t, h, sess, "source_logs.html", map[string]any{
dataKeyWebhook: webhook,
"TotalEvents": int64(0),
})
assert.Contains(
t, logBody,
`<h1 class="text-2xl font-medium text-gray-900">Full Event Log</h1>`,
)
assert.Contains(t, body, `href="/source/wh-1"`)
}
// TestCreateFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour pins the create form's
@@ -328,7 +283,7 @@ func TestEntrypointCopyButtonIsProgressiveEnhancement(t *testing.T) {
t, body,
`<code id="entrypoint-url-ep-1"`,
)
assert.Contains(t, body, "https://hooks.example.com/h/abc123")
assert.Contains(t, body, "https://hooks.example.com/webhook/abc123")
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`hidden data-copy-target="entrypoint-url-ep-1"`,
internal/handlers/webhook.go
+5 -21
View File
@@ -88,14 +88,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) processWebhookRequest(
headersJSON, err := json.Marshal(r.Header)
if err != nil {
h.receiverError(w, "failed to serialize headers", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to serialize headers", err)
return
}
targets, err := h.loadActiveTargets(entrypoint.WebhookID)
if err != nil {
h.receiverError(w, "failed to query targets", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to query targets", err)
return
}
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) lookupEntrypoint(
"path = ?", entrypointUUID,
).First(&entrypoint)
if result.Error != nil {
// The receiver is unauthenticated and /h/{uuid}
// The receiver is unauthenticated and /webhook/{uuid}
// matches any single segment, so this value is entirely
// client-chosen on exactly the branch where the lookup
// failed. DEBUG is off by default; the cap is what keeps
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) createAndDeliverEvent(
targets,
)
if err != nil {
h.receiverError(w, "failed to store webhook event", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to store webhook event", err)
return
}
@@ -204,19 +204,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) createAndDeliverEvent(
h.finishWebhookResponse(w, event, entrypoint, tasks)
}
// receiverError logs an error and answers the sender with a plain-text
// 500. The receiver's answers are for programs, so it never sends the
// error page the web UI uses.
func (h *Handlers) receiverError(
w http.ResponseWriter, msg string, err error,
) {
h.log.Error(msg, "error", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
}
// eventSource carries the fields a new event is built from. The
// receiver fills it from the live request; the resubmit handler fills
// it from a stored event. Both then go through createAndFanOut, so an
@@ -243,7 +230,6 @@ func (s eventSource) event() *database.Event {
Method: s.Method,
Headers: s.HeadersJSON,
Body: string(s.Body),
BodyBytes: int64(len(s.Body)),
ContentType: s.ContentType,
ResubmittedFromID: s.ResubmittedFromID,
}
@@ -311,9 +297,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) createAndFanOut(
return nil, nil, err
}
err = database.AddEventTotals(tx, database.EventTotals{
Events: 1, LastEventAt: &event.CreatedAt,
})
err = database.AddEventTotals(tx, database.EventTotals{Events: 1})
if err != nil {
tx.Rollback()
internal/handlers/webhook_stats.go
+18 -6
View File
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ type WebhookStats struct {
// InProgress counts the deliveries still pending or retrying.
InProgress int64
// LastEventAt is when the newest event arrived, or nil when none
// has. Retention does not change it.
// LastEventAt is when the newest stored event arrived, or nil when
// none is stored.
LastEventAt *time.Time
Last10Minutes RecentWindow
@@ -154,6 +154,20 @@ func readEventStats(
return fmt.Errorf("counting deliveries in progress: %w", err)
}
var newest []time.Time
err = db.Model(&database.Event{}).
Order("created_at DESC").
Limit(1).
Pluck("created_at", &newest).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reading newest event time: %w", err)
}
if len(newest) > 0 {
stats.LastEventAt = &newest[0]
}
stats.Last10Minutes, err = readRecentWindow(
db, now.Add(-shortWindow),
)
@@ -168,9 +182,8 @@ func readEventStats(
return err
}
// readTotals fills in the lifetime and within-retention figures, and
// when the last event arrived, from the running totals: the events'
// row, and the targets' rows summed.
// readTotals fills in the lifetime and within-retention figures from
// the running totals: the events' row, and the targets' rows summed.
func readTotals(db *gorm.DB, stats *WebhookStats) error {
var events database.EventTotals
@@ -188,7 +201,6 @@ func readTotals(db *gorm.DB, stats *WebhookStats) error {
stats.Lifetime.Events = events.Events
stats.WithinRetention.Events = events.Events - events.EventsRemoved
stats.LastEventAt = events.LastEventAt
for _, t := range targets {
stats.Lifetime.Deliveries += t.Deliveries
internal/handlers/webhook_stats_test.go
+58 -185
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package handlers_test
import (
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -121,17 +120,13 @@ type statsHistory struct {
first, second string
}
// seedStatsHistory builds the webhook the statistics test checks: 14
// days of retention, twelve entrypoints (one inactive) and six targets
// (four inactive). Ten events arrive through the receiver, and so each
// has a delivery to the two active targets. The oldest event is past
// retention, the next 30 hours old, the next six hours old, the other
// seven just in. Six deliveries are settled as the delivery engine
// would, two of them inside a recent window though their event arrived
// before it. The newest event's delivery to the second target is
// retrying, the rest are left pending, and a replay adds a pending
// delivery to the oldest event. Once retention has removed the oldest
// event, every figure in the pane differs from every other.
// seedStatsHistory builds the webhook the statistics test checks: one
// day of retention, two entrypoints (one inactive) and three targets
// (one inactive). Three events arrive through the receiver, and so
// each has a delivery to the two active targets. The oldest event is
// past retention, the middle one six hours old, the newest just in.
// Their deliveries are settled as the delivery engine would, and a
// replay adds a pending delivery to the oldest event.
func seedStatsHistory(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
@@ -141,14 +136,12 @@ func seedStatsHistory(
) statsHistory {
t.Helper()
wh := &database.Webhook{UserID: deleteTestUserID, Name: "stats", RetentionDays: 14}
wh := &database.Webhook{
UserID: deleteTestUserID, Name: "stats", RetentionDays: 1,
}
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error)
path := statsEntrypoint(t, db, wh.ID, true)
for range 10 {
statsEntrypoint(t, db, wh.ID, true)
}
statsEntrypoint(t, db, wh.ID, false)
first := seedConfiguredTarget(
@@ -156,16 +149,13 @@ func seedStatsHistory(
`{"url":"`+replayTargetURL+`"}`,
)
second := seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
for range 4 {
inactive := seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Model(inactive).
Update("active", false).Error)
}
inactive := seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Model(inactive).
Update("active", false).Error)
router := receiverRouter(h)
for range 10 {
for range 3 {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, postReceiver(t, router, path))
}
@@ -173,44 +163,39 @@ func seedStatsHistory(
require.NoError(t, err)
events := listEvents(t, webhookDB)
require.Len(t, events, 10)
require.Len(t, events, 3)
oldest, yesterday, middle, newest := events[0], events[1], events[2], events[9]
oldest, middle, newest := events[0], events[1], events[2]
now := time.Now()
statsAge(t, webhookDB, oldest.ID, now.Add(-15*24*time.Hour))
statsAge(t, webhookDB, yesterday.ID, now.Add(-30*time.Hour))
statsAge(t, webhookDB, oldest.ID, now.Add(-50*time.Hour))
statsAge(t, webhookDB, middle.ID, now.Add(-6*time.Hour))
oldestFailure := statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, oldest.ID, first.ID)
statsFinish(t, webhookDB, oldestFailure,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-14*24*time.Hour))
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-49*time.Hour))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, yesterday.ID, first.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-29*time.Hour))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, yesterday.ID, second.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-23*time.Hour))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, middle.ID, second.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-5*time.Hour))
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, oldest.ID, second.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, now.Add(-49*time.Hour))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, middle.ID, first.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-5*time.Hour))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, middle.ID, second.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-time.Minute))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, newest.ID, first.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, now.Add(-2*time.Minute))
retrying := statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, newest.ID, second.ID)
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Model(&retrying).
Update("status", database.DeliveryStatusRetrying).Error)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther,
postReplay(t, h, sess, wh.ID, oldestFailure.ID).Code)
return statsHistory{
webhook: wh, webhookDB: webhookDB, newest: newest,
first: first.ID, second: second.ID,
webhook: wh,
webhookDB: webhookDB,
newest: newest,
first: first.ID,
second: second.ID,
}
}
@@ -248,11 +233,8 @@ func statsPrune(
lc.RequireStop()
}
// statsPane returns the text of the statistics pane in a rendered
// webhook page, everything from its heading to the next heading on the
// page, with the markup taken out and each run of space made one
// space. A table then reads header by header and row by row, each
// row's label followed by its figures in column order.
// statsPane returns the statistics pane from a rendered webhook page:
// everything from its heading to the next heading on the page.
func statsPane(t *testing.T, page string) string {
t.Helper()
@@ -260,23 +242,24 @@ func statsPane(t *testing.T, page string) string {
require.True(t, found, "the page has no statistics pane")
pane, _, _ = strings.Cut(pane, "<h2")
pane = regexp.MustCompile(`<[^>]*>`).ReplaceAllString(pane, " ")
return strings.Join(strings.Fields(pane), " ")
return pane
}
// assertStatsTargets checks, for the history seedStatsHistory builds,
// each target's totals and its deliveries finished in the last 24
// hours. The first target has ten deliveries and the replay, the
// second ten; the inactive targets have none and so no row.
// hours. The first target has three deliveries and the replay, the
// second three; the inactive target has none and so no row.
func assertStatsTargets(t *testing.T, hist statsHistory) {
t.Helper()
first, second := hist.first, hist.second
assert.Equal(t, map[string]database.TargetTotals{
first: {TargetID: first, Deliveries: 11, Delivered: 1, Failed: 3},
second: {TargetID: second, Deliveries: 10, Failed: 2},
first: {TargetID: first, Deliveries: 4, Delivered: 1, Failed: 2},
second: {
TargetID: second, Deliveries: 3, Delivered: 1, Failed: 1,
},
}, statsTargetTotals(t, hist.webhookDB))
lastDay, err := handlers.FinishedByTargetForTest(
@@ -285,39 +268,10 @@ func assertStatsTargets(t *testing.T, hist statsHistory) {
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []handlers.TargetFinished{
{TargetID: first, Delivered: 1, Failed: 1},
{TargetID: second, Failed: 2},
{TargetID: second, Failed: 1},
}, lastDay)
}
// assertStatsPaneAfterPrune checks the rendered statistics pane for the
// history seedStatsHistory builds, once retention has removed the
// oldest event: each figure after its label, in its column.
func assertStatsPaneAfterPrune(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sess *session.Session,
hist statsHistory,
) {
t.Helper()
pane := statsPane(t, renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, hist.webhook.ID))
lastEvent := hist.newest.CreatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 UTC")
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Entrypoints 12 (11 active) "+
"Targets 6 (2 active) "+
"Deliveries in progress 13 "+
"Last event "+lastEvent+" "+
"Retention 14 days")
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Lifetime Within retention "+
"Events 10 9 "+
"Deliveries 21 18 "+
"Failures 5 4")
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Last 10 minutes Last 24 hours "+
"Events 7 8 "+
"Failures 1 3 "+
"Failure percentage 50.0% 75.0%")
}
// TestWebhookStats_EveryFigureAcrossRetentionPrune checks every figure
// the statistics pane shows for the history seedStatsHistory builds,
// and each target's totals and recent figures, before and after the
@@ -344,138 +298,58 @@ func TestWebhookStats_EveryFigureAcrossRetentionPrune(t *testing.T) {
stats := h.WebhookStatsForTest(hist.webhook.ID)
require.NotNil(t, stats)
assert.Equal(t, 12, stats.Entrypoints)
assert.Equal(t, 11, stats.ActiveEntrypoints)
assert.Equal(t, 6, stats.Targets)
assert.Equal(t, 2, stats.Entrypoints)
assert.Equal(t, 1, stats.ActiveEntrypoints)
assert.Equal(t, 3, stats.Targets)
assert.Equal(t, 2, stats.ActiveTargets)
assert.Equal(t, handlers.Counts{Events: 10, Deliveries: 21, Failures: 5},
assert.Equal(t, handlers.Counts{Events: 3, Deliveries: 7, Failures: 3},
stats.Lifetime)
assert.Equal(t, stats.Lifetime, stats.WithinRetention)
assert.Equal(t, int64(15), stats.InProgress)
assert.Equal(t, int64(2), stats.InProgress)
require.NotNil(t, stats.LastEventAt)
assert.True(t, hist.newest.CreatedAt.Equal(*stats.LastEventAt))
assert.Equal(t, handlers.RecentWindow{
Events: 7, Delivered: 1, Failed: 1,
Events: 1, Delivered: 1, Failed: 1,
}, stats.Last10Minutes)
assert.Equal(t, handlers.RecentWindow{
Events: 8, Delivered: 1, Failed: 3,
Events: 2, Delivered: 1, Failed: 2,
}, stats.Last24Hours)
assert.Equal(t, "50.0%", stats.Last10Minutes.FailurePercent())
assert.Equal(t, "75.0%", stats.Last24Hours.FailurePercent())
assert.Equal(t, "66.7%", stats.Last24Hours.FailurePercent())
assertStatsTargets(t, hist)
// Retention removes the oldest event with its three deliveries:
// the first target's failed one and the pending replay, and the
// second target's pending one.
// second target's delivered one.
statsPrune(t, db, dbMgr, log, hist.webhookDB)
after := h.WebhookStatsForTest(hist.webhook.ID)
require.NotNil(t, after)
assert.Equal(t, stats.Lifetime, after.Lifetime)
assert.Equal(t, handlers.Counts{Events: 9, Deliveries: 18, Failures: 4},
assert.Equal(t, handlers.Counts{Events: 2, Deliveries: 4, Failures: 2},
after.WithinRetention)
assert.Equal(t, int64(13), after.InProgress)
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), after.InProgress)
assert.Equal(t, stats.LastEventAt, after.LastEventAt)
assert.Equal(t, stats.Last10Minutes, after.Last10Minutes)
assert.Equal(t, stats.Last24Hours, after.Last24Hours)
assert.Equal(t, map[string]database.TargetTotals{
first: {
TargetID: first, Deliveries: 11, Delivered: 1, Failed: 3,
TargetID: first, Deliveries: 4, Delivered: 1, Failed: 2,
DeliveriesRemoved: 2, FailedRemoved: 1,
},
second: {
TargetID: second, Deliveries: 10, Failed: 2,
TargetID: second, Deliveries: 3, Delivered: 1, Failed: 1,
DeliveriesRemoved: 1,
},
}, statsTargetTotals(t, hist.webhookDB))
assertStatsPaneAfterPrune(t, h, sess, hist)
}
// TestWebhookStats_LastEventSurvivesPruningEveryEvent checks that once
// retention has removed every event, the pane still shows when the last
// one arrived rather than "none".
func TestWebhookStats_LastEventSurvivesPruningEveryEvent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
log *logger.Logger
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr, &log)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := &database.Webhook{
UserID: deleteTestUserID, Name: "pruned", RetentionDays: 1,
}
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error)
path := statsEntrypoint(t, db, wh.ID, true)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK,
postReceiver(t, receiverRouter(h), path))
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
events := listEvents(t, webhookDB)
require.Len(t, events, 1)
arrived := events[0].CreatedAt
statsAge(t, webhookDB, events[0].ID, time.Now().Add(-50*time.Hour))
statsPrune(t, db, dbMgr, log, webhookDB)
require.Empty(t, listEvents(t, webhookDB))
stats := h.WebhookStatsForTest(wh.ID)
require.NotNil(t, stats)
require.NotNil(t, stats.LastEventAt)
assert.True(t, arrived.Equal(*stats.LastEventAt))
pane := statsPane(t, renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID))
assert.Contains(t, pane,
"Last event "+arrived.UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 UTC"))
}
// TestWebhookStats_LastEventInUTC checks that the pane shows when the
// last event arrived in UTC, as the event list does, when the time was
// stored in another zone, as it is on a host whose local time is not
// UTC.
func TestWebhookStats_LastEventInUTC(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
arrived := time.Date(2026, time.March, 4, 22, 30, 0, 0,
time.FixedZone("EST", -5*60*60))
require.NoError(t, database.AddEventTotals(webhookDB,
database.EventTotals{Events: 1, LastEventAt: &arrived}))
pane := statsPane(t, renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID))
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Last event 2026-03-05 03:30:00 UTC")
pane := statsPane(t, renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, hist.webhook.ID))
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Within retention")
assert.Contains(t, pane, "50.0%")
assert.Contains(t, pane, "66.7%")
}
// TestWebhookStats_PaneShowsRetentionPeriod checks that the statistics
@@ -513,7 +387,8 @@ func TestWebhookStats_PaneShowsRetentionPeriod(t *testing.T) {
db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error)
pane := statsPane(t, renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID))
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Retention "+tt.want)
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Retention", tt.want)
assert.Contains(t, pane, tt.want)
}
}
@@ -541,9 +416,7 @@ func TestWebhookStats_WebhookWithNoEvents(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, &handlers.WebhookStats{}, h.WebhookStatsForTest(wh.ID))
assert.Equal(t, "—", handlers.RecentWindow{}.FailurePercent())
pane := statsPane(t, renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID))
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Last event none")
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Failure percentage — —")
statsPane(t, renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID))
assert.False(t, dbMgr.DBExists(wh.ID))
}
internal/logfield/logfield_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ func TestTruncate_LeavesShortValuesAlone(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, s := range []string{
"", "GET", "/hook/abc/edit", "Mozilla/5.0 (X11)",
"", "GET", "/source/abc/edit", "Mozilla/5.0 (X11)",
} {
assert.Equal(t, s, logfield.Truncate(s, budget))
}
internal/metrics/metrics.go
+20 -27
View File
@@ -3,18 +3,17 @@
// deliveries are attempted, how they end, how long they take, how
// deep the queues are, and how many circuit breakers are open.
//
// It also builds the registry the authenticated /metrics route
// serves. In production, these collectors, the inbound HTTP metrics
// recorded in internal/middleware, and the Go runtime and process
// collectors all register on that one registry, never on Prometheus's
// global default.
// The inbound HTTP metrics come from the go-http-metrics recorder in
// internal/middleware and land on prometheus.DefaultRegisterer. These
// collectors register there too, so both surfaces are gathered by the
// one promhttp handler mounted on the authenticated /metrics route.
package metrics
import (
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/collectors"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promauto"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
@@ -58,31 +57,25 @@ var knownTargetTypes = []database.TargetType{
database.TargetTypeSlack,
}
// NewRegistry returns the registry /metrics serves, carrying the Go
// runtime and process collectors that Prometheus's global default
// registry carries, so the go_* and process_* series stay in the
// scrape.
// defaultSet is the process-wide metric set, registered on the same
// registry the HTTP middleware and the /metrics handler already use.
// It is built on first use rather than in an init so that a test
// binary that never touches metrics never registers them.
//
// A registry of its own, rather than the global default, is what lets
// two dependency graphs in one process — two tests, say — each
// register their collectors without the second registration
// panicking.
func NewRegistry() *prometheus.Registry {
reg := prometheus.NewRegistry()
reg.MustRegister(
collectors.NewGoCollector(),
collectors.NewProcessCollector(
collectors.ProcessCollectorOpts{},
),
)
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // one process-wide registration, by design
var defaultSet = sync.OnceValue(func() *Set {
return New(prometheus.DefaultRegisterer)
})
return reg
// Default returns the process-wide metric set.
func Default() *Set {
return defaultSet()
}
// Set is one registered group of webhooker's delivery collectors.
// Production builds one on the registry /metrics serves; tests build
// one on a registry of their own so they can gather what their own
// deliveries recorded.
// Production uses the single Default set; tests build their own
// against a private registry so assertions are not disturbed by
// deliveries other tests are making concurrently.
type Set struct {
eventsReceived prometheus.Counter
deliveryAttempts *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -100,7 +93,7 @@ type Set struct {
// New registers a full set of delivery collectors on reg and returns
// it. It panics if reg already holds them, which is the intended
// behaviour for a duplicate registration.
func New(reg *prometheus.Registry) *Set {
func New(reg prometheus.Registerer) *Set {
factory := promauto.With(reg)
s := &Set{
internal/middleware/accesslog_test.go
+8 -8
View File
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ func accessLogRouter(m *middleware.Middleware) *chi.Mux {
)
router.HandleFunc(
"/h/{uuid}",
"/webhook/{uuid}",
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Stands in for the real handler: an unknown entrypoint
// UUID 404s, a known one succeeds.
@@ -271,11 +271,11 @@ func TestAccessLog_InventedReceiverPathsLogRoutePattern(t *testing.T) {
assertFloodIsBounded(
t,
func(i int) string {
return "/h/" + attackerMarker +
return "/webhook/" + attackerMarker +
strings.Repeat("x", i) + "?q=" + attackerMarker
},
http.StatusNotFound,
"/h/{uuid}",
"/webhook/{uuid}",
)
}
@@ -346,10 +346,10 @@ type sizeCase struct {
func lineSizeCases() map[string]sizeCase {
cases := map[string]sizeCase{
"oversized path segment": {
target: "/h/" + attackerMarker +
target: "/webhook/" + attackerMarker +
strings.Repeat("x", oversizedSegmentBytes),
wantStatus: http.StatusNotFound,
wantURL: "/h/{uuid}",
wantURL: "/webhook/{uuid}",
bound: maxLineBytes,
},
// /.well-known/healthcheck answers 200 to anyone and has no
@@ -605,14 +605,14 @@ func TestAccessLog_SuccessKeepsConcretePathAndRedactsQuery(
router := accessLogRouter(m)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, get(t, router, "/h/known?src=ci"),
t, http.StatusOK, get(t, router, "/webhook/known?src=ci"),
)
// The path resolved against a stored entrypoint, so it stays. The
// query never does: see TestAccessLog_UnauthenticatedSuccess...
entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "/h/known?(redacted)", entries[0]["url"])
assert.Equal(t, "/webhook/known?(redacted)", entries[0]["url"])
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), "src=ci")
}
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ func TestAccessLog_RetainsEveryOtherField(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(
t,
http.StatusNotFound,
get(t, router, "/h/"+attackerMarker),
get(t, router, "/webhook/"+attackerMarker),
)
entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
internal/middleware/csrf.go
+4 -6
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ func CSRFToken(r *http.Request) string {
// key to sign a CSRF cookie and validates a masked token submitted via
// the "csrf_token" form field (or the "X-CSRF-Token" header) on
// POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE requests. Requests with an invalid or missing
// token are logged and answered by forbidden, which must write the 403.
// token receive a 403 Forbidden response.
//
// The middleware detects the client-facing transport protocol
// per-request via reqtls.IsTLS, the single TLS predicate the session
@@ -36,14 +36,12 @@ func CSRFToken(r *http.Request) string {
// Two gorilla/csrf instances are maintained — one with Secure cookies
// (for TLS) and one without (for plaintext HTTP) — because the
// csrf.Secure option is set at creation time, not per-request.
func (m *Middleware) CSRF(
forbidden http.Handler,
) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
func (m *Middleware) CSRF() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
csrfErrorHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// CSRF is registered ahead of RequireAuth on every route
// group that uses it, so this WARN is reachable by an
// unauthenticated client: a POST with no token to
// /hook/<any length of any text>/edit lands here. The
// /source/<any length of any text>/edit lands here. The
// method and path are capped against the same budgets as
// the access log. remote_addr is set by net/http from the
// accepted connection rather than by the client, and
@@ -59,7 +57,7 @@ func (m *Middleware) CSRF(
"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
"reason", csrf.FailureReason(r),
)
forbidden.ServeHTTP(w, r)
http.Error(w, "Forbidden - invalid CSRF token", http.StatusForbidden)
})
key := m.session.GetKey()
internal/middleware/csrf_test.go
+9 -15
View File
@@ -18,12 +18,6 @@ import (
// csrfCookieName is the gorilla/csrf cookie name.
const csrfCookieName = "_gorilla_csrf"
// forbidden stands in for the error page the server hands CSRF to
// answer a refused request with.
func forbidden(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
}
// csrfGetToken performs a GET request through the CSRF middleware
// and returns the token and cookies.
func csrfGetToken(
@@ -104,7 +98,7 @@ func TestCSRF_GETSetsToken(t *testing.T) {
var gotToken string
handler := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))(http.HandlerFunc(
handler := m.CSRF()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotToken = middleware.CSRFToken(r)
},
@@ -126,7 +120,7 @@ func TestCSRF_POSTWithValidToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
@@ -158,7 +152,7 @@ func csrfPOSTWithoutTokenTest(
t.Helper()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, env)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
// GET to establish the CSRF cookie
getHandler := csrfMW(http.HandlerFunc(
@@ -215,7 +209,7 @@ func TestCSRF_POSTWithInvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
// GET to establish the CSRF cookie
getHandler := csrfMW(http.HandlerFunc(
@@ -271,7 +265,7 @@ func TestCSRF_GETDoesNotValidate(t *testing.T) {
var called bool
handler := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))(http.HandlerFunc(
handler := m.CSRF()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
called = true
},
@@ -334,7 +328,7 @@ func csrfTookStrictPath(
t.Helper()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, env)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
newReq := func(method string) *http.Request {
r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
@@ -483,7 +477,7 @@ func TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithValidToken(
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentProd)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
@@ -523,7 +517,7 @@ func TestCSRF_ProdMode_BehindProxy_POSTWithValidToken(
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentProd)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
@@ -568,7 +562,7 @@ func TestCSRF_ProdMode_DirectTLS_POSTWithValidToken(
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentProd)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
internal/middleware/export_test.go
+2 -1
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ import (
// MetricsMiddlewareForTest builds the metrics recording middleware
// against a caller-supplied recorder, so a test can gather from its
// own Prometheus registry without building a whole Middleware.
// own Prometheus registry rather than the process-wide default one
// that Middleware.Metrics uses.
func MetricsMiddlewareForTest(
rec httpmetrics.Recorder,
) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
internal/middleware/logbound_test.go
+4 -6
View File
@@ -260,9 +260,7 @@ func logSites() map[string]logSite {
) http.Handler {
t.Helper()
return m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))(
unreachable(t),
)
return m.CSRF()(unreachable(t))
},
send: postNoToken,
wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
@@ -385,7 +383,7 @@ func TestLogLines_ClientChosenPathDoesNotSizeTheLine(t *testing.T) {
t, newHandler,
)
path := "/hook/" +
path := "/source/" +
oversizedPathSegment(fill) + "/edit"
assert.Equal(
@@ -436,7 +434,7 @@ func TestLoginThrottle_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/hook/"+
"/source/"+
oversizedPathSegment(fill)+"/login",
nil,
)
@@ -501,7 +499,7 @@ func TestMaxBodySize_FloodOfOversizePathsDoesNotGrowTheLog(
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
postOversize(
h,
"/hook/"+segment(i)+"/edit",
"/source/"+segment(i)+"/edit",
),
)
}
internal/middleware/loginguard.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ type failureWindow struct {
//
// A limiter that spends budget on arrival cannot protect a
// single-admin product: behind the reverse proxy the deployment
// requires, when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not cover it, every client
// keys on the proxy, so a stranger trickling five POSTs a minute
// keeps the one bucket full and the operator's own correct password
// is answered 429 forever. There is no second administrative path.
// requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset, every client keys on the
// proxy, so a stranger trickling five POSTs a minute keeps the one
// bucket full and the operator's own correct password is answered 429
// forever. There is no second administrative path.
//
// So budget is spent only by a FAILED verification. A correct
// password is never throttled, whatever the counters say, which is
internal/middleware/metrics.go
+9 -8
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
httpmetrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics"
prommetrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics/prometheus"
ghmm "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/middleware"
"github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/middleware/std"
)
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ const unmatchedMethod = unmatchedRoute
//
// The pattern is what bounds the label's domain to the routes the
// service registers. The path does not bound it at all — every byte
// after /h/ is client-chosen, so labelling by path lets any
// after /webhook/ is client-chosen, so labelling by path lets any
// unauthenticated client mint permanent series at will, and publishes
// the entrypoint UUID (the receiver's only credential) in the scrape
// while doing it.
@@ -150,17 +151,17 @@ func (r boundedLabelRecorder) AddInflightRequests(
var _ httpmetrics.Recorder = boundedLabelRecorder{}
// Metrics returns middleware that records Prometheus HTTP metrics
// with the Middleware's one recorder, which New builds on the registry
// the /metrics route serves and NewForTest on a registry of its own.
// Every call reuses that recorder, so any number of routers can
// install it.
// Metrics returns middleware that records Prometheus HTTP metrics on
// the default registry, which is the one the /metrics route gathers.
func (s *Middleware) Metrics() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return metricsMiddleware(s.metricsRecorder)
return metricsMiddleware(
prommetrics.NewRecorder(prommetrics.Config{}),
)
}
// metricsMiddleware builds the recording middleware against a given
// recorder, so tests can gather from a registry of their own.
// recorder, so tests can gather from a registry of their own instead
// of the process-wide default.
func metricsMiddleware(
rec httpmetrics.Recorder,
) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
internal/middleware/metrics_method_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func realMethods() []string {
// dimension varying, so any series growth a probe produces is the
// method label's and nothing else's.
func methodProbePath() string {
return "/h/" + uuid.NewString()
return "/webhook/" + uuid.NewString()
}
// inventedMethods returns n distinct RFC 9110 method tokens that no
internal/middleware/metrics_test.go
+9 -34
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ const (
// receiverRoutePattern is the one handler label every receiver
// request must produce, however the client varies the path.
receiverRoutePattern = "/h/{uuid}"
receiverRoutePattern = "/webhook/{uuid}"
// okRoute is a static route used to pin that the response-writer
// interceptor still reports status and size after the handler id
@@ -57,8 +57,9 @@ const (
// Server.setupWebhookRoutes inside it. That ordering is the whole
// defect, so a test that flattens it would prove nothing.
//
// The recorder writes to a registry of the test's own, so each test
// observes only its own traffic.
// The recorder writes to a registry of the test's own rather than the
// process-wide default one, so each test observes only its own
// traffic.
func metricsTestRouter(
t *testing.T,
receiverLimit int,
@@ -142,13 +143,13 @@ func drivePaths(
return drive(t, h, probes)
}
// receiverPaths returns n distinct /h/ paths, each naming a
// receiverPaths returns n distinct /webhook/ paths, each naming a
// fresh UUID exactly as an unauthenticated flood would.
func receiverPaths(n int) []string {
paths := make([]string, 0, n)
for range n {
paths = append(paths, "/h/"+uuid.NewString())
paths = append(paths, "/webhook/"+uuid.NewString())
}
return paths
@@ -219,7 +220,7 @@ func keys(set map[string]struct{}) []string {
// TestMetrics_DistinctReceiverPathsMintOneLabelSet is the direct
// assertion the issue asks for: N requests to N distinct
// /h/<uuid> paths must produce exactly ONE handler label, the
// /webhook/<uuid> paths must produce exactly ONE handler label, the
// route pattern. Before the fix this produced N of them.
func TestMetrics_DistinctReceiverPathsMintOneLabelSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ func TestMetrics_DistinctReceiverPathsMintOneLabelSet(t *testing.T) {
// The scrape must not republish the UUIDs it was driven with.
// They are the receiver's only credential.
for _, p := range paths {
id := strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/h/")
id := strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/webhook/")
for label := range labels {
assert.NotContains(
t, label, id,
@@ -353,7 +354,7 @@ func TestMetrics_UnmatchedPathsCollapseToTheSentinel(t *testing.T) {
if i%2 == 0 {
paths = append(paths, "/"+id)
} else {
paths = append(paths, "/h/"+id+"/"+id)
paths = append(paths, "/webhook/"+id+"/"+id)
}
}
@@ -454,29 +455,3 @@ func TestMetrics_StatusAndSizeStillRecorded(t *testing.T) {
"the interceptor must still count written bytes",
)
}
// TestMetrics_WorksOnNewForTestMiddleware pins that a Middleware built
// by NewForTest has a recorder of its own: its Metrics() serves a
// request instead of panicking, and a second one does not collide
// with the first.
func TestMetrics_WorksOnNewForTestMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
log := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
cfg := &config.Config{Environment: "prod"}
ok := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(okBody))
})
for range 2 {
h := middleware.NewForTest(log, cfg, nil).Metrics()(ok)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, okRoute, nil,
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
}
}
internal/middleware/middleware.go
+8 -48
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"sync"
"time"
@@ -14,9 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
"github.com/go-chi/cors"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
httpmetrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics"
prommetrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics/prometheus"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
@@ -152,11 +148,10 @@ const (
type MiddlewareParams struct {
fx.In
Logger *logger.Logger
Globals *globals.Globals
Config *config.Config
Session *session.Session
Registry *prometheus.Registry
Logger *logger.Logger
Globals *globals.Globals
Config *config.Config
Session *session.Session
}
// Middleware provides HTTP middleware for logging, CORS, auth, and
@@ -166,14 +161,6 @@ type Middleware struct {
params *MiddlewareParams
session *session.Session
// metricsRecorder records the inbound HTTP metrics. New builds
// it on the registry /metrics serves, NewForTest on a registry
// of its own. Either way it is built once per Middleware and
// Metrics reuses it, because building it registers its
// collectors, and a second registration on the same registry
// panics.
metricsRecorder httpmetrics.Recorder
// loginGuard counts failed credential verifications and bounds
// concurrent password hashing. It is built on first use so that
// every construction path gets one; see guard().
@@ -192,9 +179,6 @@ func New(
s.params = &params
s.log = params.Logger.Get()
s.session = params.Session
s.metricsRecorder = prommetrics.NewRecorder(
prommetrics.Config{Registry: params.Registry},
)
return s, nil
}
@@ -273,7 +257,7 @@ func concreteLogURL(r *http.Request) string {
//
// 3xx and 4xx responses get the chi route pattern instead. Those are
// the outcomes an unauthenticated client drives for free: 404 or 429
// on any invented /h/ path, 303 to the login page on any
// on any invented /webhook/ path, 303 to the login page on any
// invented /user/ path. Logging the concrete URL there lets a flood
// write attacker-chosen text, of attacker-chosen length, into the
// operator's log at one line per request. The pattern comes from the
@@ -382,30 +366,6 @@ func (s *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
}
}
// NextParam is the query parameter on the login redirect, and the
// login form field, that holds the page to return to after login.
const NextParam = "next"
// MaxNextBytes bounds the NextParam value. The login page writes it
// into its form, and every page is rendered into a buffer first, so
// without a bound a request would choose the size of that buffer.
const MaxNextBytes = 2048
// loginURL is the login page RequireAuth redirects to. A GET carries
// its own path and query in NextParam so that logging in returns to
// it, unless they are longer than MaxNextBytes; loginDestination in
// the handlers package checks whether that value is safe to follow.
// Other methods carry nothing, since a redirect cannot repeat them.
func loginURL(r *http.Request) string {
next := r.URL.RequestURI()
if r.Method != http.MethodGet || len(next) > MaxNextBytes {
return "/pages/login"
}
return "/pages/login?" + url.Values{NextParam: {next}}.Encode()
}
// RequireAuth returns middleware that checks for a valid session.
// Unauthenticated users are redirected to the login page.
func (s *Middleware) RequireAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
@@ -421,7 +381,7 @@ func (s *Middleware) RequireAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
"error", err,
)
http.Redirect(
w, r, loginURL(r), http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
)
return
@@ -449,7 +409,7 @@ func (s *Middleware) RequireAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
),
)
http.Redirect(
w, r, loginURL(r), http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
)
return
@@ -600,7 +560,7 @@ func (s *Middleware) MaxBodySize(
// internal/server/routes.go), so an
// unauthenticated client reaches it with a path
// of its own choosing and its own length —
// POST /hook/<8 KB>/edit with an oversize
// POST /source/<8 KB>/edit with an oversize
// declared Content-Length costs nothing to
// send. At WARN, on by default, that is a
// write into the operator's log sized by the
internal/middleware/middleware_test.go
+3 -77
View File
@@ -338,76 +338,6 @@ func TestRequireAuth_NoSession_RedirectsToLogin(t *testing.T) {
"unauthenticated request",
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next=%2Fdashboard", w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
}
// TestRequireAuth_LoginRedirectCarriesOnlyAGet pins what the login
// redirect carries: a GET's path and query, so logging in can return
// there, and nothing for a POST, which a redirect cannot repeat.
func TestRequireAuth_LoginRedirectCarriesOnlyAGet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
handler := m.RequireAuth()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {},
))
get := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet, "/hook/abc/events?page=2", nil,
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, get)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next=%2Fhook%2Fabc%2Fevents%3Fpage%3D2",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
post := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost, "/hook/abc/delete", nil,
)
w = httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, post)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// TestRequireAuth_LoginRedirectLeavesOutALongURL: a GET whose path
// and query are longer than the login page accepts goes to the plain
// login page, so a long URL does not make the redirect long.
func TestRequireAuth_LoginRedirectLeavesOutALongURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
handler := m.RequireAuth()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {},
))
atLimit := "/" + strings.Repeat("a", middleware.MaxNextBytes-1)
get := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, atLimit, nil,
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, get)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next=%2F"+atLimit[1:],
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
get = httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, atLimit+"a", nil,
)
w = httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, get)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
@@ -513,9 +443,7 @@ func TestRequireAuth_UnauthenticatedSession_RedirectsToLogin(
"unauthenticated session",
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next=%2Fdashboard", w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// --- RequireAuth Session Expiry Tests ---
@@ -613,9 +541,7 @@ func TestRequireAuth_IdleExpiredSession_RedirectsToLogin(
"handler should not run for an idle-expired session",
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next=%2Fdashboard", w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"))
assert.Empty(
t, sessionCookies(w),
"an expired session must not be refreshed",
@@ -714,7 +640,7 @@ func TestNoCache_SetsHeaders(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet, "/hooks", nil,
http.MethodGet, "/sources", nil,
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
internal/middleware/ratelimit.go
+5 -4
View File
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ const (
// receiverAggregateMultiplier scales the configured
// per-entrypoint receiver limit into the aggregate limit one
// client IP may spend across the whole /h/* route. Ten
// client IP may spend across the whole /webhook/* route. Ten
// entrypoints' worth lets a single sender address drive several
// entrypoints at their full rate, while still capping what one
// address costs the unauthenticated receiver.
@@ -123,8 +123,9 @@ func bucketKey(addr netip.Addr) string {
return prefix.String()
}
// isTrustedProxy reports whether addr belongs to a network in
// TRUSTED_PROXIES, which by default is the RFC 1918 private ranges.
// isTrustedProxy reports whether addr belongs to a network the
// operator listed in TRUSTED_PROXIES. The list is empty by default,
// so by default nothing is trusted.
func (m *Middleware) isTrustedProxy(addr netip.Addr) bool {
for _, prefix := range m.params.Config.TrustedProxies {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ func (m *Middleware) postRateLimit(
// It is Config.ReceiverRateLimit requests per minute.
//
// That limit alone bounds nothing in aggregate. The route pattern
// /h/{uuid} matches any single segment, so a client that
// /webhook/{uuid} matches any single segment, so a client that
// invents a fresh path per request mints a fresh bucket per request
// and never refills one — and every such request still reaches the
// handler's entrypoint lookup before it 404s. The outer limit is
internal/middleware/ratelimit_test.go
+21 -22
View File
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
// pass.
for i := range limit {
w := receiverPost(
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/h/uuid-a",
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
// The next request over the limit is rejected with a 429
// carrying a Retry-After header.
w := receiverPost(
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/h/uuid-a",
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code)
assert.NotEmpty(
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
// The same IP is not limited on a different entrypoint.
w = receiverPost(
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/h/uuid-b",
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-b",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
// A different IP is not limited on the same entrypoint.
w = receiverPost(
handler, "8.8.8.8:1234", "/h/uuid-a",
handler, "8.8.8.8:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_CountsEveryMethod(t *testing.T) {
const (
limit = 2
ip = "7.7.7.7:1234"
path = "/h/uuid-c"
path = "/webhook/uuid-c"
)
handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
@@ -384,8 +384,8 @@ const (
// trustedProxyCIDR is the proxy network the forwarded-path
// tests configure, and trustedPeer an address inside it. A
// production deployment is required to run behind a reverse
// proxy that TRUSTED_PROXIES covers, either by the default or by
// a set value, so this is the shape the bucketing has to hold in.
// proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES set, so this is the shape the
// bucketing has to hold in.
trustedProxyCIDR = "10.0.0.0/8"
trustedPeer = "10.0.0.1:44444"
)
@@ -426,8 +426,8 @@ func assertSharedBucket(
}
// TestRateLimitKey_SpoofedForwardedFromUntrustedPeer is the test
// this gating exists for: from a peer that is not a trusted
// proxy, a client that rotates a forwarded header on every
// this gating exists for: with no trusted proxies configured (the
// default), a client that rotates a forwarded header on every
// request must stay in one bucket. If forwarded headers were
// trusted unconditionally, each spoofed value would mint a fresh
// bucket and the limit would stop no one.
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsAggregateAcrossInventedPaths(
// none of them shares a per-entrypoint bucket with another.
for i := range aggregate {
w := receiverPost(
handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/h/invented-%d", i),
handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/webhook/invented-%d", i),
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -724,17 +724,17 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsAggregateAcrossInventedPaths(
}
w := receiverPost(
handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/h/invented-%d", aggregate),
handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/webhook/invented-%d", aggregate),
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
"a client must not be able to raise its aggregate rate "+
"against /h/* by varying the path",
"against /webhook/* by varying the path",
)
// The aggregate limit is still per client IP: exhausting one
// address must not throttle another.
w = receiverPost(handler, "6.6.6.7:1234", "/h/invented-0")
w = receiverPost(handler, "6.6.6.7:1234", "/webhook/invented-0")
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
"a different client IP must not be affected",
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_RejectedRequestsCountTowardAggregate(
// limit requests are served; the rest are rejected by the
// per-entrypoint limiter but still count against the aggregate.
for i := range aggregate {
w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/h/exhausted")
w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/webhook/exhausted")
want := http.StatusTooManyRequests
if i < limit {
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_RejectedRequestsCountTowardAggregate(
)
}
w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/h/never-used")
w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/webhook/never-used")
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
"requests rejected per entrypoint must still count "+
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_IgnoresForwardedFromUntrustedPeer(
const (
limit = 3
peer = "203.0.113.10:44444"
path = "/h/uuid-d"
path = "/webhook/uuid-d"
)
handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
@@ -1097,9 +1097,8 @@ func TestPostRateLimit_IPv4IndependentPerAddress(t *testing.T) {
// that arrives from trustedPeer — a configured trusted proxy — and
// names forwarded as its client in X-Forwarded-For. That is the
// production path: a deployment is required to run behind a reverse
// proxy that TRUSTED_PROXIES covers, either by the default or by a
// set value, so the forwarded address, not the peer, is what the
// limiters bucket on there.
// proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES set, so the forwarded address, not the
// peer, is what the limiters bucket on there.
func forwardedKeyFor(
t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware, forwarded string,
) string {
@@ -1179,9 +1178,9 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedIPv6BucketsByPrefix(t *testing.T) {
//
// Every existing test of this fallback uses an IPv4 proxy, where
// bucketKey is the identity function, so replacing the call with
// peer.String() leaves the whole suite green. Only addresses inside
// TRUSTED_PROXIES reach this line and the fallback is fail-closed, so
// this pins behaviour rather than fixing a defect.
// peer.String() leaves the whole suite green. Only operator-listed
// addresses reach this line and the fallback is fail-closed, so this
// pins behaviour rather than fixing a defect.
func TestRateLimitKey_TrustedPeerUnusableForwardedMasksPeer(
t *testing.T,
) {
internal/middleware/recoverer.go
+3 -37
View File
@@ -109,8 +109,7 @@ func (w *recoverResponseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
// Recoverer returns middleware that turns a handler panic into one
// structured ERROR record and a 500, rather than a dropped
// connection. The 500 is page when page is not nil, and plain text
// when it is nil or when page panics before writing anything.
// connection.
//
// It replaces chi's middleware.Recoverer, which does neither on a
// current Go release. chi v1.5.5's pretty-printer scans the stack for
@@ -137,13 +136,9 @@ func (w *recoverResponseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
//
// Unlike http.Error on its own, it deletes any Set-Cookie the handler
// set before panicking, because a request that failed must not hand
// the client a credential. It touches no other header: when page
// answers, every other header the handler set goes out with it, apart
// from any page sets itself; otherwise they are left to http.Error.
// the client a credential; every other header is left to http.Error.
// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/193.
func (s *Middleware) Recoverer(
page http.Handler,
) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(
w http.ResponseWriter,
@@ -176,14 +171,6 @@ func (s *Middleware) Recoverer(
rw.Header().Del("Set-Cookie")
if page != nil {
s.servePage(rw, r, page)
}
if rw.committed {
return
}
http.Error(
rw,
http.StatusText(
@@ -198,27 +185,6 @@ func (s *Middleware) Recoverer(
}
}
// servePage answers with page. A panic in page itself is logged and
// recovered here, so the Recoverer can still send its plain 500.
func (s *Middleware) servePage(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
page http.Handler,
) {
defer func() {
rvr := recover()
if rvr != nil {
s.log.Error("error page panic",
"panic", logfield.Truncate(
fmt.Sprint(rvr), maxPanicValueBytes,
),
)
}
}()
page.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
// logPanic writes the record. Every field it can grow is truncated to
// a fixed budget, so MaxPanicLogLineBytes holds.
//
internal/middleware/recoverer_test.go
+2 -58
View File
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func newRecovererProbe(
// Logging outside so the recovered 500 is the status it records.
router.Use(chimw.RequestID)
router.Use(m.Logging())
router.Use(m.Recoverer(nil))
router.Use(m.Recoverer())
router.Get("/probe", handler)
serverErrors := new(bytes.Buffer)
@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ func TestRecovererKeepsResponseControllerWorking(t *testing.T) {
m, _ := capturingMiddleware(t)
handler := m.Recoverer(nil)(http.HandlerFunc(
handler := m.Recoverer()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("chunk"))
@@ -672,59 +672,3 @@ func TestRecovererKeepsResponseControllerWorking(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, resp.StatusCode)
assert.Equal(t, "chunk", string(body))
}
// TestRecovererAnswersWithThePage covers a recoverer given a page:
// the panic is logged as before, and the 500 is that page.
func TestRecovererAnswersWithThePage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, logs := capturingMiddleware(t)
page := http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("the error page"))
},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
m.Recoverer(page)(http.HandlerFunc(panicProbe)).ServeHTTP(
w, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
),
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "the error page", w.Body.String())
assert.Contains(t, logs.String(), `"msg":"handler panic"`)
assert.Contains(t, logs.String(), panicMarker)
}
// TestRecovererFallsBackWhenThePagePanics covers a page that panics
// before writing anything: both panics are logged, and the client
// still gets the plain 500.
func TestRecovererFallsBackWhenThePagePanics(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, logs := capturingMiddleware(t)
const pagePanic = "QQERRORPAGEPANICQQ"
page := http.HandlerFunc(
func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
panic(pagePanic)
},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
m.Recoverer(page)(http.HandlerFunc(panicProbe)).ServeHTTP(
w, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
),
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "Internal Server Error\n", w.Body.String())
assert.Contains(t, logs.String(), panicMarker)
assert.Contains(t, logs.String(), pagePanic)
}
internal/middleware/testing.go
-8
View File
@@ -3,17 +3,12 @@ package middleware
import (
"log/slog"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
prommetrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics/prometheus"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// NewForTest creates a Middleware with the minimum dependencies
// needed for testing. This bypasses the fx lifecycle.
//
// Its metrics recorder writes to a fresh registry of its own, so
// Metrics() works on it and two of them never collide.
func NewForTest(
log *slog.Logger,
cfg *config.Config,
@@ -25,8 +20,5 @@ func NewForTest(
Config: cfg,
},
session: sess,
metricsRecorder: prommetrics.NewRecorder(
prommetrics.Config{Registry: prometheus.NewRegistry()},
),
}
}
internal/resetpw/resetpw_test.go
+1 -4
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/resetpw"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
@@ -141,7 +140,7 @@ func (n *noopEvictor) EvictWebhook(string) {}
// and the database, exactly as internal/handlers builds them.
//
// One application per test function, not per case: every start that
// finds no account seeds one with an Argon2id hash, and this package's
// finds no account seeds one at 64 MB of Argon2id, and this package's
// budget is not the place to spend that repeatedly.
func newServerApp(
t *testing.T, dir string,
@@ -164,8 +163,6 @@ func newServerApp(
session.New,
func() delivery.Notifier { return &noopNotifier{} },
func() delivery.WebhookEvictor { return &noopEvictor{} },
metrics.NewRegistry,
metrics.New,
middleware.New,
delivery.NewGuard,
handlers.New,
internal/server/error_page_test.go
-222
View File
@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
package server_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"testing"
"github.com/getsentry/sentry-go"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
)
// The link back the error page offers: to the webhook list for a
// signed-in user, to sign-in for anyone else.
const (
backToWebhooks = `<a href="/hooks" class="btn-secondary">` +
`Back to webhooks</a>`
backToSignIn = `<a href="/pages/login" class="btn-primary">` +
`Sign in</a>`
)
// assertErrorPage checks that w is the error page for status, in the
// normal layout, offering link.
func assertErrorPage(
t *testing.T,
w *httptest.ResponseRecorder,
status int,
link string,
) {
t.Helper()
body := w.Body.String()
assert.Equal(t, status, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "text/html; charset=utf-8", w.Header().Get("Content-Type"),
)
assert.Equal(t, "no-store", w.Header().Get("Cache-Control"))
assert.Contains(t, body, `<nav class="app-bar"`)
assert.Contains(
t, body, strconv.Itoa(status)+" "+http.StatusText(status),
)
assert.Contains(t, body, link)
}
func TestErrorPage_DeletedWebhook(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "owner", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "owner")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
require.NoError(t, env.db.DB().Delete(wh).Error)
w := env.get("/hook/"+wh.ID, cookies)
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusNotFound, backToWebhooks)
}
func TestErrorPage_DeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "owner", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "owner")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
tgt := env.seedTarget(t, wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, env.db.DB().Delete(tgt).Error)
w := env.get(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+tgt.ID+"/edit", cookies,
)
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusNotFound, backToWebhooks)
}
func TestErrorPage_UnknownPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "owner", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "owner")
assertErrorPage(
t, env.get("/no-such-page", nil),
http.StatusNotFound, backToSignIn,
)
// Outside every route group there is no form token, so the
// page leaves out the logout form rather than offer one that
// would be refused.
w := env.get("/no-such-page", cookies)
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusNotFound, backToWebhooks)
assert.NotContains(t, w.Body.String(), `action="/pages/logout"`)
// Inside a route group the page has a token, and logout works.
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
w = env.get("/hook/"+wh.ID+"/no-such-page", cookies)
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusNotFound, backToWebhooks)
assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), `action="/pages/logout"`)
}
func TestErrorPage_BadCSRFToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("username", "someone")
form.Set("password", "irrelevant")
form.Set("csrf_token", "not-a-token")
assertErrorPage(
t, env.post("/pages/login", form, nil),
http.StatusForbidden, backToSignIn,
)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "owner", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "owner")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
edit := url.Values{}
edit.Set("name", "renamed")
assertErrorPage(
t, env.post("/hook/"+wh.ID+"/edit", edit, cookies),
http.StatusForbidden, backToWebhooks,
)
}
// TestErrorPage_PanicOnAdminPage sends a panicking handler in an
// admin page route group through the real router, with error
// tracking on: the client gets the 500 error page, and the tracker
// still gets the panic, once. The same panic outside the admin page
// route groups keeps the plain 500.
func TestErrorPage_PanicOnAdminPage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
transport := &captureTransport{}
opts := server.SentryClientOptionsForTest(
"https://public@sentry.invalid/1", "webhooker-test",
)
opts.Transport = transport
client, err := sentry.NewClient(opts)
require.NoError(t, err)
serve := func(router http.Handler, path string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
sentry.SetHubOnContext(
context.Background(),
sentry.NewHub(client, sentry.NewScope()),
),
http.MethodGet, path, nil,
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
w := serve(
server.NewRouterWithPageProbeForTest(
env.log.Get(), env.cfg, env.mw, env.hnd,
true, panicProbeHandler,
),
server.PageProbePattern,
)
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, backToSignIn)
w = serve(
server.NewRouterWithProbeForTest(
env.log.Get(), env.cfg, env.mw, env.hnd,
true, panicProbeHandler,
),
server.ProbePattern,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "Internal Server Error\n", w.Body.String())
require.Len(t, transport.events, 2)
for _, event := range transport.events {
assert.Contains(t, marshalEvent(t, event), panicProbeMarker)
}
}
// TestErrorPage_ReceiverStaysPlain pins that the error page is for
// the web UI only: a sender posting to an entrypoint that does not
// exist still gets the plain-text answer.
func TestErrorPage_ReceiverStaysPlain(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// newTestEnv leaves the receiver rate limit at zero, which
// refuses every request before it reaches the receiver.
env := newTestEnvWithConfig(t, &config.Config{
DataDir: t.TempDir(),
Environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
ReceiverRateLimit: 10,
})
w := env.post(
"/h/0b8f3c1e-7d2a-4e6b-9f15-3a9c2d4e6f70", url.Values{}, nil,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "404 page not found\n", w.Body.String())
}
internal/server/export_test.go
-37
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"net/http"
"github.com/getsentry/sentry-go"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
@@ -102,39 +101,3 @@ func NewRouterWithProbeForTest(
return s.router
}
// PageProbePattern is where NewRouterWithPageProbeForTest serves its
// probe: inside the /pages route group, the admin page group a
// request reaches without signing in.
const PageProbePattern = "/pages/probe"
// NewRouterWithPageProbeForTest is NewRouterWithProbeForTest with the
// probe added to the /pages route group once SetupRoutes has built
// it, so the probe runs behind that group's own middleware exactly as
// the group's real routes do.
func NewRouterWithPageProbeForTest(
log *slog.Logger,
cfg *config.Config,
mw *middleware.Middleware,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sentryEnabled bool,
probe http.HandlerFunc,
) http.Handler {
s := &Server{
log: log,
mw: mw,
h: h,
params: ServerParams{Config: cfg},
}
s.sentryEnabled.Store(sentryEnabled)
s.SetupRoutes()
for _, route := range s.router.Routes() {
pages, ok := route.SubRoutes.(chi.Router)
if ok && route.Pattern == "/pages/*" {
pages.Get("/probe", probe)
}
}
return s.router
}
internal/server/routes.go
+30 -56
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
sentryhttp "github.com/getsentry/sentry-go/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/static"
)
@@ -14,10 +15,9 @@ import (
// bytes) for form POST endpoints. 1 MB is generous for any form
// submission while preventing abuse from oversized payloads.
//
// The four admin page route groups below (/pages, /user/{username},
// /hooks and /hook/{sourceID}) install MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize)
// right after their recoverer and error reporting, ahead of both CSRF
// and RequireAuth. Both orderings are deliberate.
// Every route group below installs MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize) as
// its FIRST middleware, ahead of both CSRF and RequireAuth. Both
// orderings are deliberate.
//
// Ahead of CSRF because gorilla/csrf parses the form. The cap has to
// be installed before anything reads the body, or the parse runs
@@ -46,14 +46,6 @@ const requestTimeout = 60 * time.Second
// server's router.
func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
s.router = chi.NewRouter()
// An unknown path gets the error page. Registered before the
// global middleware, because chi wraps a not-found handler in the
// middleware already on its router, which would then run twice.
// The route groups below wrap it in their own middleware the same
// way; running theirs twice is harmless.
s.router.NotFound(s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusNotFound))
s.setupGlobalMiddleware()
s.setupRoutes()
}
@@ -77,33 +69,23 @@ func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
// Panic recovery, deliberately here rather than first. It has to
// run inside every middleware that observes the response, so the
// 500 it writes is the status the access log records and the
// metrics count, and outside the sentryhttp handler, whose
// metrics count, and outside the sentryhttp handler below, whose
// Repanic option needs something further out to catch what it
// re-raises. chi's own middleware.Recoverer held the first slot
// until it was measured: on a current Go release it crashes
// inside its stack pretty-printer instead of recovering, so the
// connection dropped and the original panic was never reported.
// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/187.
s.recoverPanics(s.router, nil)
}
// recoverPanics installs on r the recoverer, answering a panic with
// page (a plain 500 when page is nil), and inside it the Sentry error
// reporting (if SENTRY_DSN is set). Repanic is true so panics still
// bubble up to the recoverer.
//
// Each admin page route group installs its own, with the error page,
// as its first middleware. A panic there is logged, reported and
// answered inside the group and never reaches the global recoverer,
// which keeps the plain 500 for every other route.
func (s *Server) recoverPanics(r chi.Router, page http.Handler) {
r.Use(s.mw.Recoverer(page))
s.router.Use(s.mw.Recoverer())
// Sentry error reporting (if SENTRY_DSN is set). Repanic is
// true so panics still bubble up to the Recoverer middleware
// registered immediately above.
if s.sentryEnabled.Load() {
sentryHandler := sentryhttp.New(sentryhttp.Options{
Repanic: true,
})
r.Use(sentryHandler.Handle)
s.router.Use(sentryHandler.Handle)
}
}
@@ -148,7 +130,12 @@ func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
if s.params.Config.MetricsAuthEnabled() {
s.router.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.mw.MetricsAuth())
r.Get("/metrics", s.h.HandleMetrics())
r.Get(
"/metrics",
http.HandlerFunc(
promhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP,
),
)
})
}
@@ -160,22 +147,18 @@ func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
s.router.Route("/pages", func(r chi.Router) {
s.recoverPanics(
r, s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusInternalServerError),
)
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF(s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusForbidden)))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
// The login POST carries no pre-emptive rate limiter. Behind
// the reverse proxy production requires, when TRUSTED_PROXIES
// does not cover it, every client shares one bucket, so a
// limiter spent on arrival lets any stranger deny the operator
// the only administrative path. The handler verifies
// credentials first and charges only failures; see
// Handlers.authenticateUser.
// the reverse proxy production requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES
// unset, every client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent
// on arrival lets any stranger deny the operator the only
// administrative path. The handler verifies credentials first
// and charges only failures; see Handlers.authenticateUser.
r.Get("/login", s.h.HandleLoginPage())
r.Post("/login", s.h.HandleLoginSubmit())
@@ -185,13 +168,10 @@ func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
func (s *Server) setupUserRoutes() {
s.router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
s.recoverPanics(
r, s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusInternalServerError),
)
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF(s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusForbidden)))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleProfile())
@@ -202,14 +182,11 @@ func (s *Server) setupUserRoutes() {
}
func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
s.router.Route("/hooks", func(r chi.Router) {
s.recoverPanics(
r, s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusInternalServerError),
)
s.router.Route("/sources", func(r chi.Router) {
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF(s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusForbidden)))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceList())
@@ -217,28 +194,25 @@ func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
r.Post("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreateSubmit())
})
s.router.Route("/hook/{sourceID}", func(r chi.Router) {
s.recoverPanics(
r, s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusInternalServerError),
)
s.router.Route("/source/{sourceID}", func(r chi.Router) {
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF(s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusForbidden)))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceDetail())
r.Get("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEdit())
r.Post("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEditSubmit())
r.Post("/delete", s.h.HandleSourceDelete())
r.Get("/events", s.h.HandleSourceLogs())
r.Get("/logs", s.h.HandleSourceLogs())
// The log page renders each body only up to its cap, so
// this is the only route that serves a whole one. It
// belongs to this group for its RequireAuth and
// NoCache; see HandleEventBodyDownload for the headers
// that keep the bytes it returns inert.
r.Get(
"/events/{eventID}/body",
"/logs/{eventID}/body",
s.h.HandleEventBodyDownload(),
)
// Replay is the one page action that queues outbound work:
@@ -305,7 +279,7 @@ func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
func (s *Server) setupWebhookRoutes() {
s.router.With(s.mw.ReceiverRateLimit()).HandleFunc(
"/h/{uuid}",
"/webhook/{uuid}",
s.h.HandleWebhook(),
)
}
internal/server/routes_test.go
+11 -508
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
@@ -48,8 +47,8 @@ type noopNotifier struct{}
func (n *noopNotifier) Notify([]delivery.Task) {}
// noopEvictor satisfies handlers.New's delivery.WebhookEvictor
// dependency. No test here checks what gets evicted, so it records
// nothing.
// dependency. These tests never delete a webhook, so there is
// nothing to record.
type noopEvictor struct{}
func (e *noopEvictor) EvictWebhook(string) {}
@@ -114,8 +113,6 @@ func newTestEnvWithConfig(
session.New,
func() delivery.Notifier { return &noopNotifier{} },
func() delivery.WebhookEvictor { return &noopEvictor{} },
metrics.NewRegistry,
metrics.New,
middleware.New,
delivery.NewGuard,
handlers.New,
@@ -243,26 +240,6 @@ func (e *testEnv) csrfFrom(
return token, combined
}
// urlFrom renders the page at path and returns the link or form
// action that pattern's one group captures, so a test requests the
// URL the template emitted rather than one it wrote itself.
func (e *testEnv) urlFrom(
t *testing.T,
path, pattern string,
cookies []*http.Cookie,
) string {
t.Helper()
w := e.get(path, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
match := regexp.MustCompile(pattern).
FindStringSubmatch(w.Body.String())
require.Len(t, match, 2, "%s should render %s", path, pattern)
return html.UnescapeString(match[1])
}
// authCookies forges an authenticated session for the given user.
func (e *testEnv) authCookies(
t *testing.T,
@@ -697,50 +674,12 @@ func TestPagesLogin_CookiesFromAnEarlierDatabase(t *testing.T) {
require.NotNil(t, fresh, "login must set a session cookie")
assert.Equal(
t, "/hooks",
t, "/sources",
env.get("/", []*http.Cookie{fresh}).Header().Get("Location"),
"the new session cookie must authenticate",
)
}
// TestPagesLogin_ReturnsToTheRequestedPage is
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/384: a page opened while
// logged out leads to the login page, and logging in from there lands
// on that page, query included.
func TestPagesLogin_ReturnsToTheRequestedPage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
username = "operator"
password = "correct-horse-battery-staple"
)
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, username, password)
asked := "/hook/" + env.seedWebhook(t, userID).ID + "/events?page=2"
bounced := env.get(asked, nil)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, bounced.Code)
loginPage := bounced.Header().Get("Location")
match := regexp.MustCompile(`name="next" value="([^"]*)"`).
FindStringSubmatch(env.get(loginPage, nil).Body.String())
require.Len(t, match, 2, "the login form must carry the page")
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, loginPage, nil)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
form.Set("username", username)
form.Set("password", password)
form.Set("next", html.UnescapeString(match[1]))
w := env.post("/pages/login", form, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, asked, w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// --- /user/{username} group ---
// TestPasswordChange_OversizeBody_RejectedAndPasswordUnchanged
@@ -802,344 +741,7 @@ func TestPasswordChange_UnderLimit_Succeeds(t *testing.T) {
)
}
// --- /hooks group ---
// TestHooks_ListAndNewWebhookForm gets the webhook list through the
// production router, follows both of its links to the new-webhook
// form, then submits the form to the action and with the token the
// page rendered. A mistyped route, link or form action fails here;
// the handler tests cannot catch any of them, because they never
// route a request.
func TestHooks_ListAndNewWebhookForm(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "lister", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "lister")
// The list shows its "Create Webhook" link only while it is empty.
createLink := env.urlFrom(
t, "/hooks", `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>Create Webhook<`, cookies,
)
existing := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
list := env.get("/hooks", cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, list.Code)
assert.Contains(
t, list.Body.String(), `href="/hook/`+existing.ID+`"`,
"the list should link the user's webhook",
)
// The "New Webhook" link has an icon between its href and its text.
newLink := env.urlFrom(
t, "/hooks", `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>(?:\s*<[^>]*>)*\s*New Webhook`,
cookies,
)
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, newLink, cookies)
action := env.urlFrom(t, newLink, `action="(/hooks[^"]*)"`, cookies)
assert.Equal(
t, action,
env.urlFrom(t, createLink, `action="(/hooks[^"]*)"`, cookies),
"both links should open the new-webhook form",
)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
form.Set("name", "created")
w := env.post(action, form, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
var created database.Webhook
require.NoError(t,
env.db.DB().Where("name = ?", "created").First(&created).Error,
)
assert.Equal(
t, "/hook/"+created.ID, w.Header().Get("Location"),
"creating a webhook should redirect to its page",
)
}
// --- /hook/{sourceID} group ---
// TestHook_EditFormAndDelete follows the webhook page's Edit link to
// the edit form and submits it, then deletes the webhook with the
// form on its page, every URL and token taken from the rendered
// pages.
func TestHook_EditFormAndDelete(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "editor", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "editor")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
page := "/hook/" + wh.ID
editPage := env.urlFrom(t, page, `href="(/hook/[^/"]+/edit)"`, cookies)
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, editPage, cookies)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
form.Set("name", "renamed")
w := env.post(
env.urlFrom(t, editPage, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/edit)"`, cookies),
form, cookies,
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, page, w.Header().Get("Location"))
var edited database.Webhook
require.NoError(t, env.db.DB().First(&edited, "id = ?", wh.ID).Error)
assert.Equal(t, "renamed", edited.Name)
form = url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
w = env.post(
env.urlFrom(t, page, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/delete)"`, cookies),
form, cookies,
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "/hooks", w.Header().Get("Location"))
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusNotFound, env.get(page, cookies).Code,
"a deleted webhook's page should be gone",
)
}
// TestHook_EntrypointActions adds, deactivates and deletes an
// entrypoint with the forms on the webhook page, each submitted to
// the action and with the token the page rendered.
func TestHook_EntrypointActions(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "epuser", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "epuser")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
page := "/hook/" + wh.ID
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, page, cookies)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
// submit posts the webhook page's form whose action pattern
// captures, and requires the redirect back to that page.
submit := func(pattern string) {
t.Helper()
w := env.post(env.urlFrom(t, page, pattern, cookies), form, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
require.Equal(t, page, w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
submit(`action="(/hook/[^/"]+/entrypoints)"`)
var added database.Entrypoint
require.NoError(t,
env.db.DB().First(&added, "webhook_id = ?", wh.ID).Error,
)
require.True(t, added.Active)
submit(`action="(/hook/[^/"]+/entrypoints/[^/"]+/toggle)"`)
var toggled database.Entrypoint
require.NoError(t,
env.db.DB().First(&toggled, "id = ?", added.ID).Error,
)
assert.False(t, toggled.Active, "the toggle should deactivate it")
submit(`action="(/hook/[^/"]+/entrypoints/[^/"]+/delete)"`)
var left int64
require.NoError(t, env.db.DB().Model(&database.Entrypoint{}).
Where("webhook_id = ?", wh.ID).Count(&left).Error)
assert.Zero(t, left, "the delete should remove the entrypoint")
}
// TestHook_TargetActions adds a target with the form on the webhook
// page, follows its Edit link to the target edit form and submits
// it, then deactivates and deletes it, every URL and token taken from
// the rendered pages.
func TestHook_TargetActions(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "tgtuser", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "tgtuser")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
page := "/hook/" + wh.ID
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, page, cookies)
// submit posts form, with the token, to the action pattern
// captures on the page at from, and requires the redirect back to
// the webhook page.
submit := func(from, pattern string, form url.Values) {
t.Helper()
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
w := env.post(env.urlFrom(t, from, pattern, cookies), form, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
require.Equal(t, page, w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
submit(page, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets)"`, url.Values{
"name": {"added"},
"type": {string(database.TargetTypeLog)},
})
editPage := env.urlFrom(
t, page, `href="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/edit)"`, cookies,
)
submit(editPage, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/edit)"`,
url.Values{"name": {"renamed"}})
var edited database.Target
require.NoError(t,
env.db.DB().First(&edited, "webhook_id = ?", wh.ID).Error,
)
assert.Equal(t, "renamed", edited.Name)
require.True(t, edited.Active)
submit(page, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/toggle)"`,
url.Values{})
var toggled database.Target
require.NoError(t,
env.db.DB().First(&toggled, "id = ?", edited.ID).Error,
)
assert.False(t, toggled.Active, "the toggle should deactivate it")
submit(page, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/delete)"`,
url.Values{})
var left int64
require.NoError(t, env.db.DB().Model(&database.Target{}).
Where("webhook_id = ?", wh.ID).Count(&left).Error)
assert.Zero(t, left, "the delete should remove the target")
}
// TestHook_ResubmitFromEventLog follows the webhook page's "Full
// Event Log" link, then resubmits a stored event with the form on
// that page, submitted to the action and with the token the page
// rendered.
func TestHook_ResubmitFromEventLog(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "resubmitter", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "resubmitter")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, `{"resubmit":"me"}`)
logsPath := env.urlFrom(
t, "/hook/"+wh.ID, `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>Full Event Log<`, cookies,
)
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, logsPath, cookies)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
w := env.post(
env.urlFrom(t, logsPath, `action="(/hook/[^"]+/resubmit)"`, cookies),
form, cookies,
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, logsPath+"?resubmit=no-targets", w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
webhookDB, err := env.dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
var events int64
require.NoError(t,
webhookDB.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&events).Error,
)
assert.Equal(t, int64(2), events, "the resubmit stores a new event")
}
// TestHook_LinksBetweenPages follows each link to a webhook page that
// the tests above do not: the navbar's "Webhooks" links, the back and
// Cancel links, the list's link to a webhook, the "Full Event Log"
// link beside the recent events, and the event log's page links. Each
// must point where it should, and that page must render.
func TestHook_LinksBetweenPages(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "navigator", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "navigator")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
tgt := env.seedTarget(t, wh.ID)
// The event log shows 25 events a page; one more gives it a second
// page, so it renders its Next and Previous links.
for range 26 {
env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, "paged")
}
list := "/hooks"
newForm := list + "/new"
page := "/hook/" + wh.ID
targetEdit := page + "/targets/" + tgt.ID + "/edit"
events := page + "/events"
back := `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>&larr; Back to `
cancel := `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>Cancel<`
for _, link := range []struct{ from, pattern, want string }{
// The navbar on the profile page: its desktop link, then its
// mobile menu link.
{
"/user/navigator/",
`href="([^"]+)" class="btn-text">Webhooks<`,
list,
},
{
"/user/navigator/",
`href="([^"]+)" class="btn-text w-full[^"]*">Webhooks<`,
list,
},
{list, `href="(/hook/[^"]+)"`, page},
{newForm, back, list},
{newForm, cancel, list},
{page, back, list},
{page, `Recent Events</h2>\s*<a href="([^"]+)"`, events},
{page + "/edit", back, page},
{page + "/edit", cancel, page},
{targetEdit, back, page},
{targetEdit, cancel, page},
{events, back, page},
{events, `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>Next &rarr;<`, events + "?page=2"},
{events + "?page=2", `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>&larr; Previous<`, events + "?page=1"},
} {
got := env.urlFrom(t, link.from, link.pattern, cookies)
assert.Equal(t, link.want, got, "%s: %s", link.from, link.pattern)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, env.get(got, cookies).Code, got)
}
}
// --- /source/{sourceID} group ---
// TestSourceLogs_TruncationLinkDownloadsTheBody walks the whole
// feature the way a user does: render the event log page through
@@ -1167,11 +769,11 @@ func TestSourceLogs_TruncationLinkDownloadsTheBody(t *testing.T) {
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, stored)
page := env.get("/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events", cookies)
page := env.get("/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs", cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, page.Code)
link := regexp.MustCompile(
`href="(/hook/[^"]+/body)"`,
`href="(/source/[^"]+/body)"`,
).FindStringSubmatch(page.Body.String())
require.Len(
t, link, 2,
@@ -1217,7 +819,7 @@ func TestSourceLogsBody_OtherUser404s(t *testing.T) {
const payload = "OWNERS-PAYLOAD-77c1"
evt := env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, payload)
path := "/hook/" + wh.ID + "/events/" + evt.ID + "/body"
path := "/source/" + wh.ID + "/logs/" + evt.ID + "/body"
intruderID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "intruder", "somepassword")
intruder := env.authCookies(t, intruderID, "intruder")
@@ -1228,10 +830,7 @@ func TestSourceLogsBody_OtherUser404s(t *testing.T) {
anon := env.get(path, nil)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, anon.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next="+url.QueryEscape(path),
anon.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", anon.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected walks the replay action
@@ -1254,7 +853,7 @@ func TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected(t *testing.T) {
evt := env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, `{"replay":"me"}`)
dlv := env.seedFailedDelivery(t, wh.ID, evt.ID, tgt.ID)
path := "/hook/" + wh.ID + "/deliveries/" + dlv.ID +
path := "/source/" + wh.ID + "/deliveries/" + dlv.ID +
"/replay"
assert.Equal(
@@ -1280,7 +879,7 @@ func TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected(t *testing.T) {
// The token and the action URL both come out of the rendered
// page, so a typo in either the route pattern or the template
// fails here.
logsPath := "/hook/" + wh.ID + "/events"
logsPath := "/source/" + wh.ID + "/logs"
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, logsPath, cookies)
@@ -1288,7 +887,7 @@ func TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, page.Code)
action := regexp.MustCompile(
`action="(/hook/[^"]+/replay)"`,
`action="(/source/[^"]+/replay)"`,
).FindStringSubmatch(page.Body.String())
require.Len(
t, action, 2,
@@ -1313,59 +912,6 @@ func TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected(t *testing.T) {
)
}
// --- /h/{uuid} receiver ---
// TestReceiver_EntrypointURLIsRateLimited takes the entrypoint URL
// the webhook page shows and posts to it through the production
// router until the receiver rate limit refuses it. The URL has to
// reach the receiver, and the limit has to apply to it.
func TestReceiver_EntrypointURLIsRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const limit = 2
env := newTestEnvWithConfig(t, &config.Config{
DataDir: t.TempDir(),
Environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
ReceiverRateLimit: limit,
})
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "receiver", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "receiver")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
require.NoError(t, env.db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(
&database.Entrypoint{
WebhookID: wh.ID,
Path: "6f1e2a9c-4b7d-4e3a-9c2f-1d8b5a7e3c60",
Active: true,
},
).Error)
page := env.get("/hook/"+wh.ID, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, page.Code)
shown := regexp.MustCompile(`(/h/[^<]+)</code>`).
FindStringSubmatch(page.Body.String())
require.Len(
t, shown, 2, "the webhook page should show the entrypoint URL",
)
for i := range limit {
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK,
env.post(shown[1], url.Values{}, nil).Code,
"request %d should reach the receiver", i,
)
}
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusTooManyRequests,
env.post(shown[1], url.Values{}, nil).Code,
"the receiver rate limit must apply to the entrypoint URL",
)
}
// metricsConfig is a Config differing from the routing default only
// in the two /metrics credentials.
func metricsConfig(
@@ -1481,46 +1027,3 @@ func TestMetricsRouteUnmountedOnHalfSetConfig(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// TestTwoMetricsRoutersInOneProcess pins
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/227: a second
// metrics-enabled router in one process used to panic, because the
// HTTP metrics registered on Prometheus's global default registry.
// Two routers are built over separate dependency graphs and a third
// over the first graph again, and each must still serve the HTTP,
// delivery, Go runtime and process series, and the series counting
// scrapes of /metrics itself.
func TestTwoMetricsRoutersInOneProcess(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
first := newTestEnvWithConfig(
t, metricsConfig(t, metricsUser, metricsAuthValue),
)
second := newTestEnvWithConfig(
t, metricsConfig(t, metricsUser, metricsAuthValue),
)
third := &testEnv{
router: server.NewRouterForTest(
first.log.Get(), first.cfg, first.mw, first.hnd,
),
}
for _, env := range []*testEnv{first, second, third} {
env.get("/", nil)
scrape := env.metricsRequest(metricsUser, metricsAuthValue)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, scrape.Code)
for _, series := range []string{
"http_request_duration_seconds",
"http_response_size_bytes",
"http_requests_inflight",
"webhooker_events_received_total",
"go_goroutines",
"process_start_time_seconds",
"promhttp_metric_handler_requests_total",
} {
assert.Contains(t, scrape.Body.String(), series)
}
}
}
internal/server/sentry.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ func sentryClientOptions(dsn, release string) sentry.ClientOptions {
//
// URL is the third such field. NewRequest builds it as
// scheme://host/path (interfaces.go:183), and on the receiver route
// that path is /h/<uuid> in full — a write capability, not an
// that path is /webhook/<uuid> in full — a write capability, not an
// identifier. It is rebuilt here from the chi route pattern, on every
// route, keeping the scheme and the host.
//
internal/server/sentry_test.go
+7 -7
View File
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ func (c sentryCase) router() http.Handler {
sentryhttp.New(sentryhttp.Options{Repanic: true}).Handle,
)
router.HandleFunc("/pages/login", handler)
router.HandleFunc("/h/{uuid}", handler)
router.HandleFunc("/webhook/{uuid}", handler)
return router
}
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ func sentryLoginRequest(client *sentry.Client) *http.Request {
// concrete path carries the entrypoint capability.
func sentryReceiverRequest(client *sentry.Client) *http.Request {
return sentryRequest(
client, "/h/"+sentryReceiverUUID, "payload=hello",
client, "/webhook/"+sentryReceiverUUID, "payload=hello",
)
}
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ func TestSentryScrub_ReplacesTheCapabilityPathWithTheRoutePattern(
t, marshalEvent(t, event), sentryReceiverUUID,
)
assert.Equal(
t, "http://example.com/h/{uuid}", event.Request.URL,
t, "http://example.com/webhook/{uuid}", event.Request.URL,
)
}
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ func TestSentryScrub_TransactionDispatchIsUnscrubbedWithoutTheHook(
func TestSentryScrub_FallsBackWithoutARoutePattern(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
concrete := "https://example.com/h/" + sentryReceiverUUID
concrete := "https://example.com/webhook/" + sentryReceiverUUID
// A request with no chi routing context on it at all, which is
// what an event captured outside the router would carry.
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ func TestSentryScrub_FallsBackWithoutARoutePattern(t *testing.T) {
event := sentry.NewEvent()
event.Request = &sentry.Request{URL: concrete}
event.Transaction = "POST /h/" +
event.Transaction = "POST /webhook/" +
sentryReceiverUUID
scrubbed := server.ScrubSentryRequestForTest(
@@ -459,9 +459,9 @@ func TestSentryScrub_WithholdsUnparseableValues(t *testing.T) {
event := sentry.NewEvent()
event.Request = &sentry.Request{
URL: "/h/" + sentryReceiverUUID,
URL: "/webhook/" + sentryReceiverUUID,
}
event.Transaction = "/h/" + sentryReceiverUUID
event.Transaction = "/webhook/" + sentryReceiverUUID
scrubbed := server.ScrubSentryRequestForTest(event, nil)
require.NotNil(t, scrubbed)
internal/versionscript/version_script_test.go
+7 -7
View File
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ func TestVersion_EnclosingRepositoryIsNotUsed(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, unknown, runScript(t, inner, nil))
}
// An explicit VERSION, such as the Dockerfile's build arg, wins over
// anything derivable.
// The Docker build has no git metadata, so the version arrives as an
// environment override. It wins over anything derivable.
func TestVersion_EnvironmentOverrideWins(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -128,8 +128,8 @@ func TestVersion_EnvironmentOverrideWins(t *testing.T) {
}
// An empty VERSION is treated as unset rather than stamping an empty
// string: a caller exporting VERSION= must not produce a binary
// reporting "".
// string: the Dockerfile's build arg has a non-empty default, but a
// caller exporting VERSION= must not produce a binary reporting "".
func TestVersion_EmptyOverrideFallsBackToGit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -168,8 +168,8 @@ func TestMakefile_BuildComposesVersionAndExtraFlags(t *testing.T) {
}
// A caller can define VERSION as the empty string -- `make build
// VERSION=`, or the Dockerfile's `make build VERSION="$VERSION"` when no
// VERSION build arg was given. script/version's own guard does not cover
// VERSION=`, or a `--build-arg VERSION=` reaching the Dockerfile's `make
// build VERSION="$VERSION"`. script/version's own guard does not cover
// that: the value never passes through the script. Stamping "" would
// leave the binary reporting no version and the footer on "dev", which
// is the defect this package exists for.
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ func TestDockerfile_BuildsThroughTheMakeTarget(t *testing.T) {
require.NotContains(t, dockerfile, "go build",
"a raw go build bypasses the Makefile's -X flag")
require.Contains(t, dockerfile, "ARG VERSION")
require.Contains(t, dockerfile, "ARG VERSION=")
require.Contains(t, dockerfile,
`make build VERSION="$VERSION" GO_LDFLAGS='-extldflags "-static"'`)
}
script/docker
+3 -3
View File
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
# script/docker: build the Docker image tagged with the project name.
# The tag comes from script/projectname.
#
# The version script/version resolves here goes in as the VERSION build
# arg, which takes precedence over what the build would derive from the
# .git in its context.
# .dockerignore excludes .git/, so the builder stage cannot derive the
# version itself. It is resolved here, where the checkout is, and passed
# in as a build arg; without it the image would stamp itself "unknown".
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
script/test
+1 -11
View File
@@ -22,16 +22,6 @@
# The one figure above 90s is GOMAXPROCS 1, a synthetic core floor rather than
# a condition CI runs under. If a CPU-limited runner ever puts a real run near
# 67s, that is the datum to revisit the org figure with.
#
# -p 4 -parallel 8 keep the run under 2 GB of memory: at most four test
# binaries build or run at once, each with at most eight parallel tests. Under
# -race every test binary and every link costs a few hundred MB, so the
# defaults (one per core) add up to several GB on a many-core host.
#
# No -v: the Docker build cuts each step's log off at 2 MiB, and verbose output
# from the whole suite passes that before a failure is printed. Without it, go
# test prints one result line per package and, for a package that fails,
# everything its tests wrote, application log lines included.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
@@ -39,7 +29,7 @@ ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
"$ROOT/script/assets"
go test -race -p 4 -parallel 8 -timeout 90s ./...
go test -v -race -timeout 90s ./...
}
main "$@"
script/version
+7 -5
View File
@@ -7,16 +7,18 @@
#
# Order of precedence:
#
# 1. $VERSION, if set and non-empty: an explicit value, such as the
# Dockerfile's VERSION build arg.
# 1. $VERSION, if set and non-empty. This is how the value reaches a
# build that cannot derive it: .dockerignore excludes .git/, so the
# builder stage has no git metadata and the Dockerfile takes the
# value as a build arg instead.
# 2. `git describe --tags --always --dirty` against this checkout. At
# a clean tagged commit that is exactly the tag; otherwise it
# carries the short SHA, the commit distance when a tag is
# reachable, and a -dirty suffix for uncommitted changes.
# 3. "unknown", for a tree with no git metadata and no $VERSION -- a
# source tarball, or a `docker build` with no .git in its context
# and no VERSION build arg. That case must not fail the build and
# must not name a tag the tree may not be at, so it names nothing.
# source tarball, or `docker build .` with no --build-arg. That
# case must not fail the build and must not name a tag the tree may
# not be at, so it names nothing.
#
# The git step insists the enclosing repository is this checkout, not
# merely some repository above it: an unpacked tarball sitting inside an
templates/error.html
-15
View File
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{{template "base" .}}
{{define "title"}}{{.StatusText}} - Webhooker{{end}}
{{define "content"}}
<div class="max-w-4xl mx-auto px-6 py-12">
<h1 class="text-2xl font-medium text-gray-900 mb-4">{{.Status}} {{.StatusText}}</h1>
<p class="text-gray-600 mb-6">{{.Message}}</p>
{{if .User}}
<a href="/hooks" class="btn-secondary">Back to webhooks</a>
{{else}}
<a href="/pages/login" class="btn-primary">Sign in</a>
{{end}}
</div>
{{end}}
templates/login.html
-1
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
<form method="POST" action="/pages/login" class="space-y-6">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<input type="hidden" name="next" value="{{.Next}}">
<div class="form-group">
<label for="username" class="label">Username</label>
<input
templates/navbar.html
+6 -10
View File
@@ -6,19 +6,17 @@
</div>
<!-- Mobile menu button -->
{{if .User}}
<button @click="open = !open" class="md:hidden p-2 rounded-md text-gray-500 hover:bg-gray-100">
<svg class="w-6 h-6" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" viewBox="0 0 24 24">
<path x-show="!open" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" stroke-width="2" d="M4 6h16M4 12h16M4 18h16"/>
<path x-show="open" x-cloak stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" stroke-width="2" d="M6 18L18 6M6 6l12 12"/>
</svg>
</button>
{{end}}
<!-- Desktop navigation -->
<div class="hidden md:flex items-center gap-4">
{{if .User}}
<a href="/hooks" class="btn-text">Webhooks</a>
<a href="/sources" class="btn-text">Webhooks</a>
<a href="/user/{{.User.Username}}" class="btn-text">
<svg class="w-5 h-5 mr-1" fill="currentColor" viewBox="0 0 16 16">
<path d="M11 6a3 3 0 1 1-6 0 3 3 0 0 1 6 0z"/>
@@ -26,14 +24,12 @@
</svg>
{{.User.Username}}
</a>
{{/* An error page can be served before a form token is issued,
and a logout without one is refused. */}}
{{if .CSRFToken}}
<form method="POST" action="/pages/logout" class="inline">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="btn-text">Logout</button>
</form>
{{end}}
{{else}}
<a href="/pages/login" class="btn-primary">Login</a>
{{end}}
</div>
</div>
@@ -42,14 +38,14 @@
<div x-show="open" x-cloak x-transition class="md:hidden mt-4 pt-4 border-t border-gray-200">
<div class="flex flex-col gap-2">
{{if .User}}
<a href="/hooks" class="btn-text w-full text-left">Webhooks</a>
<a href="/sources" class="btn-text w-full text-left">Webhooks</a>
<a href="/user/{{.User.Username}}" class="btn-text w-full text-left">Profile</a>
{{if .CSRFToken}}
<form method="POST" action="/pages/logout">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="btn-text w-full text-left">Logout</button>
</form>
{{end}}
{{else}}
<a href="/pages/login" class="btn-primary w-full">Login</a>
{{end}}
</div>
</div>
templates/source_detail.html
+18 -30
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
{{define "content"}}
<div class="max-w-6xl mx-auto px-6 py-8" x-data="{ showAddEntrypoint: false, showAddTarget: false }">
<div class="mb-6">
<a href="/hooks" class="text-sm text-primary-600 hover:text-primary-700">&larr; Back to webhooks</a>
<a href="/sources" class="text-sm text-primary-600 hover:text-primary-700">&larr; Back to webhooks</a>
<div class="flex justify-between items-center mt-2">
<div>
<h1 class="text-2xl font-medium text-gray-900">{{.Webhook.Name}}</h1>
@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@
{{end}}
</div>
<div class="flex gap-2">
<a href="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/events" class="btn-secondary">Full Event Log</a>
<a href="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/edit" class="btn-secondary">Edit</a>
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete this webhook and all its data?')">
<a href="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/logs" class="btn-secondary">Event Log</a>
<a href="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/edit" class="btn-secondary">Edit</a>
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete this webhook and all its data?')">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="btn-danger">Delete</button>
</form>
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
<!-- Add entrypoint form -->
<div x-show="showAddEntrypoint" x-cloak class="p-4 bg-gray-50 border-b border-gray-200">
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints" class="flex gap-2">
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints" class="flex gap-2">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<input type="text" name="description" placeholder="Description (optional)" class="input text-sm flex-1">
<button type="submit" class="btn-primary text-sm">Add</button>
@@ -59,20 +59,20 @@
{{else}}
<span class="badge-error">Inactive</span>
{{end}}
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints/{{.ID}}/toggle" class="inline">
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints/{{.ID}}/toggle" class="inline">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="text-xs text-gray-500 hover:text-primary-600" title="{{if .Active}}Deactivate{{else}}Activate{{end}}">
{{if .Active}}Deactivate{{else}}Activate{{end}}
</button>
</form>
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints/{{.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete this entrypoint?')" class="inline">
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/entrypoints/{{.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete this entrypoint?')" class="inline">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="text-xs text-red-500 hover:text-red-700" title="Delete">Delete</button>
</form>
</div>
</div>
<div class="flex items-start gap-2 mt-1">
<code id="entrypoint-url-{{.ID}}" class="text-xs text-gray-500 break-all block flex-1">{{$.BaseURL}}/h/{{.Path}}</code>
<code id="entrypoint-url-{{.ID}}" class="text-xs text-gray-500 break-all block flex-1">{{$.BaseURL}}/webhook/{{.Path}}</code>
<!-- Hidden until app.js reveals it; without the
script the URL above stays selectable. -->
<button type="button" hidden data-copy-target="entrypoint-url-{{.ID}}" class="text-xs text-gray-500 hover:text-primary-600">Copy</button>
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@
<!-- Add target form -->
<div x-show="showAddTarget" x-cloak class="p-4 bg-gray-50 border-b border-gray-200">
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/targets" x-data="{ targetType: 'http' }" class="space-y-3">
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/targets" x-data="{ targetType: 'http' }" class="space-y-3">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<div class="flex gap-2">
<input type="text" name="name" placeholder="Target name" required class="input text-sm flex-1">
@@ -153,14 +153,14 @@
{{else}}
<span class="badge-error">Inactive</span>
{{end}}
<a href="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/targets/{{.ID}}/edit" class="text-xs text-gray-500 hover:text-primary-600" title="Edit">Edit</a>
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/targets/{{.ID}}/toggle" class="inline">
<a href="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/targets/{{.ID}}/edit" class="text-xs text-gray-500 hover:text-primary-600" title="Edit">Edit</a>
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/targets/{{.ID}}/toggle" class="inline">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="text-xs text-gray-500 hover:text-primary-600" title="{{if .Active}}Deactivate{{else}}Activate{{end}}">
{{if .Active}}Deactivate{{else}}Activate{{end}}
</button>
</form>
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/targets/{{.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete this target?')" class="inline">
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/targets/{{.ID}}/delete" onsubmit="return confirm('Delete this target?')" class="inline">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
<button type="submit" class="text-xs text-red-500 hover:text-red-700" title="Delete">Delete</button>
</form>
@@ -183,30 +183,18 @@
<!-- Recent Events -->
<div class="card mt-6">
<div class="p-4 border-b border-gray-200 flex justify-between items-center">
<h2 class="text-lg font-medium text-gray-900">50 Most Recent Events</h2>
<a href="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/events" class="btn-text text-sm">Full Event Log</a>
<h2 class="text-lg font-medium text-gray-900">Recent Events</h2>
<a href="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/logs" class="btn-text text-sm">View All</a>
</div>
<div class="divide-y divide-gray-100">
{{range .Events}}
<div class="p-4">
<div class="flex flex-wrap items-center justify-between gap-3">
<div class="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-3">
<div class="flex items-center justify-between">
<div class="flex items-center gap-3">
<span class="badge-info">{{.Method}}</span>
<span class="text-sm text-gray-500 break-all">{{.ContentType}}</span>
{{if .ResubmittedFromID}}
<span class="text-xs text-gray-500" title="This event is a copy of {{.ResubmittedFromID}}">resubmitted copy</span>
{{end}}
</div>
<div class="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-3 text-xs text-gray-400">
<span title="Body size">{{.Size}}</span>
{{if .ProcessingTime}}
<span title="Processing time: how long the slowest delivery took, from being queued to its last attempt">{{.ProcessingTime}}</span>
{{end}}
{{if .Status}}
<span class="font-medium {{.StatusClass}}" title="HTTP status from the HTTP target">{{.Status}}</span>
{{end}}
<span title="{{.ReceivedUTC}}">{{.Received}}</span>
<span class="text-sm text-gray-500">{{.ContentType}}</span>
</div>
<span class="text-xs text-gray-400">{{.CreatedAt.Format "2006-01-02 15:04:05 UTC"}}</span>
</div>
</div>
{{else}}
templates/source_edit.html
+3 -3
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
{{define "content"}}
<div class="max-w-2xl mx-auto px-6 py-8">
<div class="mb-6">
<a href="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}" class="text-sm text-primary-600 hover:text-primary-700">&larr; Back to {{.Webhook.Name}}</a>
<a href="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}" class="text-sm text-primary-600 hover:text-primary-700">&larr; Back to {{.Webhook.Name}}</a>
<h1 class="text-2xl font-medium text-gray-900 mt-2">Edit Webhook</h1>
</div>
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
<div class="alert-error">{{.Error}}</div>
{{end}}
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/edit" class="space-y-6">
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/edit" class="space-y-6">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{.CSRFToken}}">
<div class="form-group">
<label for="name" class="label">Name</label>
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
<div class="flex gap-3">
<button type="submit" class="btn-primary">Save Changes</button>
<a href="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}" class="btn-secondary">Cancel</a>
<a href="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}" class="btn-secondary">Cancel</a>
</div>
</form>
</div>
templates/source_logs.html
+8 -8
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
{{template "base" .}}
{{define "title"}}Full Event Log - {{.Webhook.Name}} - Webhooker{{end}}
{{define "title"}}Event Log - {{.Webhook.Name}} - Webhooker{{end}}
{{define "content"}}
<div class="max-w-6xl mx-auto px-6 py-8">
<div class="mb-6">
<a href="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}" class="text-sm text-primary-600 hover:text-primary-700">&larr; Back to {{.Webhook.Name}}</a>
<a href="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}" class="text-sm text-primary-600 hover:text-primary-700">&larr; Back to {{.Webhook.Name}}</a>
<div class="flex justify-between items-center mt-2">
<h1 class="text-2xl font-medium text-gray-900">Full Event Log</h1>
<h1 class="text-2xl font-medium text-gray-900">Event Log</h1>
<span class="text-sm text-gray-500">{{.TotalEvents}} total event{{if ne .TotalEvents 1}}s{{end}}</span>
</div>
</div>
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
{{if .ResubmittedFrom}}Resubmitted from event <span class="font-mono">{{.ResubmittedFromID}}</span>.{{end}}
{{if .ResubmitCount}}Resubmitted as {{.ResubmitCount}} new event{{if ne .ResubmitCount 1}}s{{end}}.{{end}}
</div>
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/events/{{.ID}}/resubmit" class="inline">
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/events/{{.ID}}/resubmit" class="inline">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
<input type="hidden" name="page" value="{{$.Page}}">
<button type="submit" class="text-xs text-primary-600 hover:text-primary-700" title="Submit this event again as a new event, to every currently active target">Resubmit</button>
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
</div>
<pre class="text-xs text-gray-700 overflow-x-auto whitespace-pre-wrap break-all">{{.Body}}</pre>
{{if .BodyTruncated}}
<p class="mt-2 text-xs text-gray-500">Body truncated for display: showing {{.BodyShownBytes}} of {{.BodyBytes}} bytes. The stored body is unchanged &mdash; <a href="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/events/{{.ID}}/body" class="text-primary-600 hover:text-primary-700 underline">download the full body</a>.</p>
<p class="mt-2 text-xs text-gray-500">Body truncated for display: showing {{.BodyShownBytes}} of {{.BodyBytes}} bytes. The stored body is unchanged &mdash; <a href="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/logs/{{.ID}}/body" class="text-primary-600 hover:text-primary-700 underline">download the full body</a>.</p>
{{end}}
{{if .Deliveries}}
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
</div>
<div class="flex items-center gap-3">
{{if .Status.Terminal}}
<form method="POST" action="/hook/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/deliveries/{{.ID}}/replay" class="inline" @click.stop>
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/deliveries/{{.ID}}/replay" class="inline" @click.stop>
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
<input type="hidden" name="page" value="{{$.Page}}">
<button type="submit" class="text-xs text-primary-600 hover:text-primary-700" title="Send this event to the target again">Replay</button>
@@ -139,11 +139,11 @@
{{if or .HasPrev .HasNext}}
<div class="flex justify-center gap-2 mt-6">
{{if .HasPrev}}
<a href="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/events?page={{.PrevPage}}" class="btn-secondary text-sm">&larr; Previous</a>
<a href="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/logs?page={{.PrevPage}}" class="btn-secondary text-sm">&larr; Previous</a>
{{end}}
<span class="inline-flex items-center px-4 py-2 text-sm text-gray-500">Page {{.Page}} of {{.TotalPages}}</span>
{{if .HasNext}}
<a href="/hook/{{.Webhook.ID}}/events?page={{.NextPage}}" class="btn-secondary text-sm">Next &rarr;</a>
<a href="/source/{{.Webhook.ID}}/logs?page={{.NextPage}}" class="btn-secondary text-sm">Next &rarr;</a>
{{end}}
</div>
{{end}}
templates/sources_list.html
+3 -3
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
<div class="max-w-6xl mx-auto px-6 py-8">
<div class="flex justify-between items-center mb-6">
<h1 class="text-2xl font-medium text-gray-900">Webhooks</h1>
<a href="/hooks/new" class="btn-primary">
<a href="/sources/new" class="btn-primary">
<svg class="w-5 h-5 mr-1" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" viewBox="0 0 24 24">
<path stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" stroke-width="2" d="M12 4v16m8-8H4"/>
</svg>
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
{{if .Webhooks}}
<div class="grid gap-4">
{{range .Webhooks}}
<a href="/hook/{{.ID}}" class="card-elevated p-6 block">
<a href="/source/{{.ID}}" class="card-elevated p-6 block">
<div class="flex justify-between items-start">
<div>
<h2 class="text-lg font-medium text-gray-900">{{.Name}}</h2>
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
</svg>
<h2 class="text-lg font-medium text-gray-900 mb-2">No webhooks yet</h2>
<p class="text-gray-500 mb-6">Create your first webhook to start receiving and forwarding events.</p>
<a href="/hooks/new" class="btn-primary">Create Webhook</a>
<a href="/sources/new" class="btn-primary">Create Webhook</a>
</div>
{{end}}
</div>

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