Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 3699f37b76 Refuse [::], 0.0.0.0, IPv6 multicast and documentation space (closes #341)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
On Linux a connection to the unspecified address [::] or 0.0.0.0
reaches the host's own loopback, and the SSRF guard let [::] through.
Both unspecified addresses now sit in alwaysBlockedNetworks, so an
allowlist reaches loopback only through an entry that covers a
loopback address, never through one that covers only 0.0.0.0 or ::;
::/128 joins the default blocklist beside 0.0.0.0/8. IPv6 multicast
(ff00::/8) and documentation space (2001:db8::/32) are refused by
default. Every default blocklist entry gets a one-line comment, and the
README, the rules above each list, the two pinning tests and the
allowlist refusal test follow.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-02 08:15:55 +00:00
21 changed files with 400 additions and 418 deletions
+41 -28
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@@ -158,19 +158,20 @@ WireServer, which serves an Azure VM its credentials. Because it is a
public address, listing it in `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` reopens it.
That is all the default blocklist covers: the IPv4 private and reserved
ranges; of IPv6, only loopback (`::1`), unique local addresses
(`fc00::/7`) and link-local addresses (`fe80::/10`); and certain public
addresses. A public address belongs on the default blocklist only if it
hands credentials, user data or bootstrap material to whatever can reach
it, without the caller presenting anything. A provider's other public
addresses are not refused. IBM Cloud, for example, serves its package
mirrors, time servers and object storage on `161.26.0.0/16`, and the
private endpoints of its own cloud services on `166.8.0.0/14`. Neither
range hands out credentials that way: the token service among those
endpoints issues a token only in exchange for something the caller
presents, such as an API key. Reaching these services can be a
legitimate delivery, and every cloud has some, so a partial list would
promise coverage it does not give.
ranges; of IPv6, only loopback (`::1`), the unspecified address (`::`),
unique local addresses (`fc00::/7`), link-local addresses (`fe80::/10`),
multicast (`ff00::/8`) and documentation space (`2001:db8::/32`); and
certain public addresses. A public address belongs on the default
blocklist only if it hands credentials, user data or bootstrap material
to whatever can reach it, without the caller presenting anything. A
provider's other public addresses are not refused. IBM Cloud, for
example, serves its package mirrors, time servers and object storage on
`161.26.0.0/16`, and the private endpoints of its own cloud services on
`166.8.0.0/14`. Neither range hands out credentials that way: the token
service among those endpoints issues a token only in exchange for
something the caller presents, such as an API key. Reaching these
services can be a legitimate delivery, and every cloud has some, so a
partial list would promise coverage it does not give.
That default is also inconvenient for the thing webhooker is mostly
for: taking a public webhook and forwarding it to something on your own
@@ -210,16 +211,16 @@ Two things this setting cannot do:
the list is always an allowlist; an empty list (the default) means
every private and reserved range stays refused. Note that
`0.0.0.0/0` gets you most of the way there anyway, per above.
- **It cannot open link-local, or a cloud metadata endpoint at a
non-public address that discloses credentials or user data.** An
address is on the list below when it is not a public address and both
of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it cannot collide with
anything you run; and reaching it hands out credentials, user data or
bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no matter what you list,
including when you list them outright or list a supernet such as
`0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`. Treat this as best
effort rather than a guarantee — it is a hand-maintained list and the
caveat below the table applies:
- **It cannot open link-local, the unspecified addresses, or a cloud
metadata endpoint at a non-public address that discloses credentials
or user data.** A metadata address is on the list below when it is not
a public address and both of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it
cannot collide with anything you run; and reaching it hands out
credentials, user data or bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no
matter what you list, including when you list them outright or list a
supernet such as `0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`.
Treat this as best effort rather than a guarantee — it is a
hand-maintained list and the caveat below the table applies:
| Blocked unconditionally | What it is |
| ----------------------- | ---------- |
@@ -233,14 +234,25 @@ Two things this setting cannot do:
| `fd00:a9fe:a9fe::1/128` | Linode/Akamai metadata over IPv6 |
| `100.100.100.200/32` | Alibaba Cloud metadata, inside CGNAT |
| `192.0.0.192/32` | Oracle Cloud Classic metadata |
| `0.0.0.0/32` | IPv4 unspecified address, which reaches this host's loopback on Linux |
| `::/128` | IPv6 unspecified address, which reaches this host's loopback on Linux |
| `::a9fe:a9fe/128` | `169.254.169.254` as an IPv4-compatible IPv6 address |
| `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe/128` | `169.254.169.254` behind the NAT64 well-known prefix |
The IPv4-mapped form `::ffff:169.254.169.254` is covered by the
`169.254.0.0/16` entry. Reaching any of these is credential or
user-data theft rather than delivery to an internal service. Every
entry outside the two link-local blocks is a single address, so
blocking it costs you nothing else on the network around it.
`169.254.0.0/16` entry. Reaching any of these but the two unspecified
addresses is credential or user-data theft rather than delivery to an
internal service. Every entry outside the two link-local blocks is a
single address, so blocking it costs you nothing else on the network
around it.
The unspecified addresses `0.0.0.0` and `::` hand out nothing
themselves, but no host can have either, and on Linux a connection to
one reaches this host's own loopback. They are listed so that an
allowlist reaches loopback only through an entry that covers a loopback
address, such as `127.0.0.0/8`, `::1` or `0.0.0.0/0`, never through one
that covers only `0.0.0.0` or `::`; `0.0.0.0/8`, for example, does not
open loopback.
The six ULA entries, all inside `fd00::/8`, are why this matters in
practice: `fd00::/8` is an ordinary block to allowlist for your own
@@ -3093,7 +3105,8 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
route through a single decision function, so they cannot disagree
about a destination. An operator can permit specific blocks with
[`ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS`](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network); the
guard cannot be switched off, and link-local plus a
guard cannot be switched off, and link-local, the unspecified
addresses `0.0.0.0` and `::`, and a
[pinned set](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network) of known cloud
metadata endpoints — several of which are ULAs outside link-local —
stay blocked whatever is listed, though listing `0.0.0.0/0` or
+5 -4
View File
@@ -196,10 +196,11 @@ type Config struct {
// otherwise refuse. The guard itself is always on: there is no
// setting that disables SSRF protection, and delivery's
// alwaysBlockedNetworks stays blocked no matter what is listed
// here. That set is link-local plus the cloud metadata
// endpoints outside it that disclose credentials or user data
// at a provider-fixed, non-public address; it is not
// exhaustive of every cloud's metadata address. See
// here. That set is link-local, the unspecified addresses
// 0.0.0.0 and ::, and the cloud metadata endpoints outside
// link-local that disclose credentials or user data at a
// provider-fixed, non-public address; it is not exhaustive of
// every cloud's metadata address. See
// alwaysBlockedNetworks for the authoritative list and the
// criterion it is built from.
AllowedEgressCIDRs []netip.Prefix
+53 -10
View File
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ var (
"blocked cloud metadata address",
)
errBlockedMetadata = errors.New(
"blocked link-local or cloud instance metadata " +
"address: ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS cannot open it",
"blocked link-local, cloud instance metadata or " +
"unspecified address: ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS cannot open it",
)
errInvalidScheme = errors.New(
"only http and https are allowed",
@@ -72,14 +72,16 @@ var blockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
var blockedPublicNetworks []*net.IPNet
// alwaysBlockedNetworks are the ranges no configuration can
// open: the link-local blocks and the cloud instance metadata
// endpoints that live outside them. Reaching one is credential
// or user-data theft rather than delivery to an internal
// service, so a supplied CIDR that covers such an address still
// leaves it blocked.
// open: the link-local blocks, the cloud instance metadata
// endpoints that live outside them, and the unspecified
// addresses. Reaching a metadata endpoint is credential or
// user-data theft rather than delivery to an internal service,
// so a supplied CIDR that covers such an address still leaves it
// blocked.
//
// Inclusion criterion — an address belongs here only if BOTH
// hold, and every entry below satisfies both:
// hold, and every entry below but the unspecified addresses
// satisfies both:
//
// 1. It is a fixed address assigned by the provider, or a
// range reserved by IANA — never one the operator chose.
@@ -112,6 +114,15 @@ var blockedPublicNetworks []*net.IPNet
// This is a criterion, not an enumeration of every metadata
// address in existence.
//
// The unspecified addresses 0.0.0.0 and :: fail (2) and are here
// anyway. No host can have either, and on Linux a connection to
// one reaches this host's own loopback. Listing them means an
// allowlist reaches loopback only through an entry that covers a
// loopback address (127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128, 0.0.0.0/0), never
// through one that covers only 0.0.0.0 or :: (0.0.0.0/8, for
// example). Nothing else lives at either address, so refusing
// them costs nothing.
//
// Every entry is either already in blockedNetworks — this list is
// what makes it unconditional — or an alternate encoding of
// 169.254.169.254 that Contains does not match against
@@ -131,23 +142,46 @@ var alwaysBlockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
//nolint:gochecknoinits // init is the idiomatic way to parse CIDRs once at startup
func init() {
blockedNetworks = mustParseCIDRs([]string{
// IPv4 loopback.
"127.0.0.0/8",
// RFC 1918 private network.
"10.0.0.0/8",
// RFC 1918 private network.
"172.16.0.0/12",
// RFC 1918 private network.
"192.168.0.0/16",
// IPv4 link-local.
"169.254.0.0/16",
// "This network", holding the IPv4 unspecified address 0.0.0.0.
"0.0.0.0/8",
// Carrier-grade NAT shared address space.
"100.64.0.0/10",
// IETF protocol assignments.
"192.0.0.0/24",
// IPv4 documentation (TEST-NET-1).
"192.0.2.0/24",
// Benchmarking.
"198.18.0.0/15",
// IPv4 documentation (TEST-NET-2).
"198.51.100.0/24",
// IPv4 documentation (TEST-NET-3).
"203.0.113.0/24",
// IPv4 multicast.
"224.0.0.0/4",
// Reserved, including the broadcast address.
"240.0.0.0/4",
// IPv6 loopback.
"::1/128",
// IPv6 unspecified address.
"::/128",
// IPv6 unique local addresses.
"fc00::/7",
// IPv6 link-local.
"fe80::/10",
// IPv6 multicast.
"ff00::/8",
// IPv6 documentation.
"2001:db8::/32",
})
blockedPublicNetworks = mustParseCIDRs([]string{
@@ -207,6 +241,14 @@ func init() {
// allowlist from opening it.
"192.0.0.192/32",
// The unspecified addresses, each of which reaches this
// host's loopback on Linux.
//
// IPv4 unspecified address, inside the blocked 0.0.0.0/8.
"0.0.0.0/32",
// IPv6 unspecified address.
"::/128",
// 169.254.169.254 as an IPv4-compatible IPv6 address.
"::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// 169.254.169.254 behind the NAT64 well-known prefix.
@@ -343,8 +385,9 @@ func (g *Guard) allows(ip net.IP) bool {
// The order is the policy:
//
// 1. alwaysBlockedNetworks is refused before the allowlist is
// consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local or a
// cloud metadata endpoint at a non-public address.
// consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local, a
// cloud metadata endpoint at a non-public address, or an
// unspecified address.
// 2. The allowlist is consulted next, so a listed private
// network, or a listed public address on the default
// blocklist, becomes reachable.
+39 -11
View File
@@ -168,12 +168,13 @@ func TestGuardAllowlist_UnlistedPrivateStillRefused(t *testing.T) {
// TestGuardAllowlist_MetadataAlwaysRefused is the load-bearing
// case: cloud instance metadata endpoints are credential theft
// rather than delivery to an internal service, so no allowlist
// reaches one. Every guard below names a CIDR that covers its
// target — including 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0, and the ordinary ULA and
// CGNAT blocks an operator would really list — and the address
// must stay refused anyway, on both the validation and the
// delivery path.
// rather than delivery to an internal service, and the
// unspecified addresses 0.0.0.0 and :: reach this host's loopback
// on Linux, so no allowlist reaches any of them. Every guard
// below names a CIDR that covers its target — including
// 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0, and the ordinary ULA and CGNAT blocks an
// operator would really list — and the address must stay
// refused anyway, on both the validation and the delivery path.
func TestGuardAllowlist_MetadataAlwaysRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -219,15 +220,17 @@ type metadataAlwaysRefusedCase struct {
}
// metadataAlwaysRefusedCases enumerates every unconditionally
// blocked address together with an allowlist entry that would
// otherwise reach it. Split by family of address only to stay
// under the function-length limit.
// blocked address (link-local, the cloud metadata endpoints and
// the unspecified addresses) together with an allowlist entry
// that would otherwise reach it. Split by family of address only
// to stay under the function-length limit.
func metadataAlwaysRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
cases := linkLocalRefusedCases()
cases = append(cases, ulaMetadataRefusedCases()...)
cases = append(cases, ipv4MetadataRefusedCases()...)
cases = append(cases, encodedMetadataRefusedCases()...)
return append(cases, encodedMetadataRefusedCases()...)
return append(cases, unspecifiedRefusedCases()...)
}
// linkLocalRefusedCases covers the link-local blocks, including
@@ -367,6 +370,23 @@ func encodedMetadataRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
}
}
// unspecifiedRefusedCases covers the unspecified addresses, each
// of which reaches this host's loopback on Linux.
func unspecifiedRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
return []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase{
{
name: "IPv4 unspecified address under 0.0.0.0/0",
allow: allowAllIPv4,
target: "http://0.0.0.0:8080/hook",
},
{
name: "IPv6 unspecified address under ::/0",
allow: allowAllIPv6,
target: "http://[::]:8080/hook",
},
}
}
// TestGuardAllowlist_PublicUnaffected asserts the allowlist does
// not narrow anything: public addresses were reachable before it
// existed and stay reachable, whether or not a list is set.
@@ -524,6 +544,10 @@ func TestAlwaysBlockedNetworks_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
// Oracle Cloud Classic metadata, inside the blocked
// 192.0.0.0/24.
"192.0.0.192/32",
// The IPv4 and IPv6 unspecified addresses, each of
// which reaches this host's loopback on Linux.
"0.0.0.0/32",
"::/128",
// 169.254.169.254 as an IPv4-compatible IPv6 address.
"::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// 169.254.169.254 behind the NAT64 well-known prefix.
@@ -556,7 +580,8 @@ func TestDefaultBlocklist_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
{cidr: "172.16.0.0/12", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "192.168.0.0/16", reopenable: true},
{cidr: linkLocalIPv4, reopenable: false},
{cidr: "0.0.0.0/8", reopenable: true},
// Its first address, 0.0.0.0, is in the unconditional set.
{cidr: "0.0.0.0/8", reopenable: false},
{cidr: "100.64.0.0/10", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "192.0.0.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "192.0.2.0/24", reopenable: true},
@@ -566,8 +591,11 @@ func TestDefaultBlocklist_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
{cidr: "224.0.0.0/4", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "240.0.0.0/4", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "::1/128", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "::/128", reopenable: false},
{cidr: "fc00::/7", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "fe80::/10", reopenable: false},
{cidr: "ff00::/8", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "2001:db8::/32", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "168.63.129.16/32", public: true, reopenable: true},
}
+36
View File
@@ -101,6 +101,42 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestDefaultGuard_RefusesUnspecifiedMulticastAndDocumentation
// covers the unspecified addresses and the IPv6 multicast and
// documentation ranges: with no allowlist set, each is refused
// both when a target is created and when a delivery dials it.
func TestDefaultGuard_RefusesUnspecifiedMulticastAndDocumentation(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
guard := delivery.NewTestGuard()
targets := []string{
// The unspecified addresses. On Linux a connection to
// either reaches this host's loopback.
"http://0.0.0.0:8080/hook",
"http://[::]:8080/hook",
// IPv6 multicast, all nodes.
"http://[ff02::1]/hook",
// IPv6 documentation.
"http://[2001:db8::1]/hook",
}
for _, target := range targets {
t.Run(target, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
require.Error(t,
guard.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target),
"%s must be refused at target creation", target,
)
assertDialRefused(t, guard, target)
})
}
}
func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+2 -4
View File
@@ -333,9 +333,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLogout() http.HandlerFunc {
)
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/pages/login", signedOut),
http.StatusSeeOther,
)
// Redirect to login page
http.Redirect(w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
}
+55 -19
View File
@@ -11,37 +11,72 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// The outcomes of a replay POST, as the notice codes its redirect
// carries. noticeFor holds the line each one shows.
// replayOutcomeParam is the query parameter the replay POST redirects
// with and the event log page reads its banner from.
const replayOutcomeParam = "replay"
// replayOutcomeCode is the outcome of a replay POST. The redirect
// carries one of these fixed codes rather than a message, so nothing a
// client submits can reach the rendered page through it.
type replayOutcomeCode string
const (
// replayQueued reports that a new delivery was created and handed
// to the delivery engine.
replayQueued noticeCode = "replay-queued"
replayQueued replayOutcomeCode = "queued"
// replayTargetDeleted reports a target that once existed and has
// since been deleted. Deletes are soft and deliveries carry no
// foreign key to the target row, so the history survives its
// target and this is the ordinary case for an old event.
replayTargetDeleted noticeCode = "replay-target-deleted"
replayTargetDeleted replayOutcomeCode = "target-deleted"
// replayTargetMissing reports a target id that names no row at
// all, deleted or otherwise.
replayTargetMissing noticeCode = "replay-target-missing"
replayTargetMissing replayOutcomeCode = "target-missing"
// replayTargetInactive reports a target the operator has
// deactivated. A deactivated target receives no new deliveries, so
// a replay to it would be a delivery they switched off.
replayTargetInactive noticeCode = "replay-target-inactive"
replayTargetInactive replayOutcomeCode = "target-inactive"
// replayNotTerminal reports a delivery the engine has not finished
// with.
replayNotTerminal noticeCode = "replay-not-terminal"
replayNotTerminal replayOutcomeCode = "not-terminal"
// replayInFlight reports that an earlier replay of this event to
// this target is still running.
replayInFlight noticeCode = "replay-in-flight"
replayInFlight replayOutcomeCode = "in-flight"
)
// replayOutcome returns the banner the event log page shows for an
// outcome code, and whether the replay was queued. An unrecognised
// code yields no banner.
func replayOutcome(code string) (string, bool) {
switch replayOutcomeCode(code) {
case replayQueued:
return "Replay queued: a new delivery was created against " +
"the target's current configuration.", true
case replayTargetDeleted:
return "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for has " +
"been deleted. Recreate the target, then replay.", false
case replayTargetMissing:
return "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for no " +
"longer exists.", false
case replayTargetInactive:
return "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for is " +
"deactivated. Activate it, then replay.", false
case replayNotTerminal:
return "Not replayed: this delivery has not finished yet.",
false
case replayInFlight:
return "Not replayed: a delivery of this event to this " +
"target is already in flight.", false
default:
return "", false
}
}
// HandleDeliveryReplay re-sends a finished delivery's event to its
// target.
//
@@ -105,14 +140,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) replayDelivery(
}
if !original.Status.Terminal() {
redirectToEventLog(w, r, webhook, replayNotTerminal)
h.finishReplay(w, r, webhook, replayNotTerminal)
return
}
target, code := h.replayTarget(webhook.ID, original.TargetID)
if target == nil {
redirectToEventLog(w, r, webhook, code)
h.finishReplay(w, r, webhook, code)
return
}
@@ -165,7 +200,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueReplay(
}
if inFlight > 0 {
redirectToEventLog(w, r, webhook, replayInFlight)
h.finishReplay(w, r, webhook, replayInFlight)
return
}
@@ -203,7 +238,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueReplay(
"delivery_id", task.DeliveryID,
)
redirectToEventLog(w, r, webhook, replayQueued)
h.finishReplay(w, r, webhook, replayQueued)
}
// replayTarget loads the delivery's target as it stands now.
@@ -216,7 +251,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueReplay(
// with the returned code saying why.
func (h *Handlers) replayTarget(
webhookID, targetID string,
) (*database.Target, noticeCode) {
) (*database.Target, replayOutcomeCode) {
var target database.Target
err := h.db.DB().Unscoped().Where(
@@ -326,16 +361,17 @@ func replayBody(body string) *string {
return &body
}
// redirectToEventLog redirects a replay or resubmit back to the event
// log it was triggered from, carrying the outcome as its notice and
// the page number the form submitted.
func redirectToEventLog(
// finishReplay redirects back to the event log the replay was
// triggered from, carrying the outcome code the page turns into a
// banner and the page number the form submitted.
func (h *Handlers) finishReplay(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhook database.Webhook,
code noticeCode,
code replayOutcomeCode,
) {
dest := withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/events", code)
dest := "/hook/" + webhook.ID + "/events?" +
replayOutcomeParam + "=" + string(code)
// The page is read from the form rather than the query string:
// this is a POST, and its query string is what logs and Referer
+8 -8
View File
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_AppendsDeliveryAndLeavesOriginal(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=replay-queued",
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?replay=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesDeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=replay-target-deleted",
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?replay=target-deleted",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesDeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, missing.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=replay-target-missing",
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?replay=target-missing",
missing.Header().Get("Location"),
)
}
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesWhileEarlierReplayInFlight(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, first.Code)
require.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=replay-queued",
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?replay=queued",
first.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesWhileEarlierReplayInFlight(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, second.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=replay-in-flight",
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?replay=in-flight",
second.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesWhileEarlierReplayInFlight(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, pending.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=replay-not-terminal",
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?replay=not-terminal",
pending.Header().Get("Location"),
)
}
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_RendersReplayControlAndBanner(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, body, ">Replay<")
refused := renderSourceLogsPageWithQuery(
t, h, sess, wh.ID, "?notice=replay-target-deleted",
t, h, sess, wh.ID, "?replay=target-deleted",
)
assert.Contains(t, refused, "alert-error")
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_RendersReplayControlAndBanner(t *testing.T) {
// An outcome code nobody issued renders no banner at all.
unknown := renderSourceLogsPageWithQuery(
t, h, sess, wh.ID, "?notice=made-up",
t, h, sess, wh.ID, "?replay=made-up",
)
assert.NotContains(t, unknown, "alert-error")
+54 -5
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package handlers
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/google/uuid"
@@ -10,19 +11,43 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// The outcomes of a resubmit POST, as the notice codes its redirect
// carries. noticeFor holds the line each one shows.
// resubmitOutcomeParam is the query parameter the resubmit POST
// redirects with and the event log page reads its banner from.
const resubmitOutcomeParam = "resubmit"
// resubmitOutcomeCode is the outcome of a resubmit POST. The redirect
// carries one of these fixed codes rather than a message, so nothing a
// client submits can reach the rendered page through it.
type resubmitOutcomeCode string
const (
// resubmitQueued reports that a new event was stored and its
// deliveries handed to the delivery engine.
resubmitQueued noticeCode = "resubmit-queued"
resubmitQueued resubmitOutcomeCode = "queued"
// resubmitNoTargets reports a source with no active targets. The
// new event is stored either way, exactly as a received event
// with no targets is.
resubmitNoTargets noticeCode = "resubmit-no-targets"
resubmitNoTargets resubmitOutcomeCode = "no-targets"
)
// resubmitOutcome returns the banner the event log page shows for an
// outcome code, and whether the resubmit was queued. An unrecognised
// code yields no banner.
func resubmitOutcome(code string) (string, bool) {
switch resubmitOutcomeCode(code) {
case resubmitQueued:
return "Resubmitted: a new event was created from the stored " +
"one and queued to every active target.", true
case resubmitNoTargets:
return "Resubmitted: a new event was created, but this " +
"source has no active targets, so nothing was queued.",
true
default:
return "", false
}
}
// resubmitSource is the stored event a resubmit copies. Its body is
// read as bytes rather than as a string so the copy is byte-identical
// to what was received, whatever the payload's encoding.
@@ -220,5 +245,29 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueResubmit(
code = resubmitNoTargets
}
redirectToEventLog(w, r, webhook, code)
h.finishResubmit(w, r, webhook, code)
}
// finishResubmit redirects back to the event log the resubmit was
// triggered from, carrying the outcome code the page turns into a
// banner and the page number the form submitted.
func (h *Handlers) finishResubmit(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhook database.Webhook,
code resubmitOutcomeCode,
) {
dest := "/hook/" + webhook.ID + "/events?" +
resubmitOutcomeParam + "=" + string(code)
// The page is read from the form rather than the query string:
// this is a POST, and its query string is what logs and Referer
// headers record.
if page := pageOrFirst(
r.PostFormValue("page"),
); page > 1 {
dest += "&page=" + strconv.Itoa(page)
}
http.Redirect(w, r, dest, http.StatusSeeOther)
}
+4 -4
View File
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ func TestHandleEventResubmit_DeliversToTargetCreatedAfterTheEvent(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=resubmit-queued",
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?resubmit=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ func TestHandleEventResubmit_IsRepeatable(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=resubmit-queued",
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?resubmit=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
"a resubmit must not be refused while an earlier "+
"one is in flight",
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ func TestHandleEventResubmit_SkipsInactiveTarget(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=resubmit-queued",
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?resubmit=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
"an inactive target is skipped, not an error",
)
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ func TestHandleEventResubmit_NoActiveTargetsStillStoresEvent(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=resubmit-no-targets",
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?resubmit=no-targets",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
+8 -17
View File
@@ -97,10 +97,10 @@ type Handlers struct {
// parsePageTemplate parses a page-specific template set from the
// embedded FS. Each page template is combined with the shared
// base, htmlheader, navbar and notice templates, and with any further
// files the page includes. The page file must be listed first so that
// its root action ({{template "base" .}}) becomes the template set's
// entry point.
// base, htmlheader, and navbar templates, and with any further files
// the page includes. The page file must be listed first so that its
// root action ({{template "base" .}}) becomes the template set's entry
// point.
func parsePageTemplate(
pageFile string, included ...string,
) *template.Template {
@@ -109,7 +109,6 @@ func parsePageTemplate(
"base.html",
"htmlheader.html",
"navbar.html",
"notice.html",
}, included...)
return template.Must(
@@ -210,13 +209,11 @@ func (s *Handlers) renderError(
// served outside the routes where NoCache runs.
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
// No notice: one would say an action worked above a page saying
// the request failed.
data := s.pageData(r, map[string]any{
"Status": status,
"StatusText": http.StatusText(status),
"Message": errorPageText(status),
}, nil)
})
var buf bytes.Buffer
@@ -270,7 +267,6 @@ type templateDataWrapper struct {
User *UserInfo
CSRFToken string
Version string
Notice *notice
Data any
}
@@ -315,15 +311,12 @@ func (s *Handlers) renderTemplate(
return
}
s.executeTemplate(w, r, tmpl, s.pageData(r, data, noticeFor(r)))
s.executeTemplate(w, r, tmpl, s.pageData(r, data))
}
// pageData adds the fields the shared layout renders to a page's own
// data. The layout shows the notice, when there is one, above the
// page.
func (s *Handlers) pageData(
r *http.Request, data any, pageNotice *notice,
) any {
// data.
func (s *Handlers) pageData(r *http.Request, data any) any {
userInfo := s.getUserInfo(r)
csrfToken := middleware.CSRFToken(r)
@@ -337,7 +330,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) pageData(
m["User"] = userInfo
m["CSRFToken"] = csrfToken
m["Version"] = version
m["Notice"] = pageNotice
return m
}
@@ -346,7 +338,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) pageData(
User: userInfo,
CSRFToken: csrfToken,
Version: version,
Notice: pageNotice,
Data: data,
}
}
-109
View File
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import "net/http"
// noticeParam is the query parameter an action's redirect carries its
// notice code in.
const noticeParam = "notice"
// noticeCode names one of the fixed lines noticeFor knows. An action
// redirects with the code rather than the line, so nothing a client
// puts in the URL reaches the page: a code noticeFor does not know
// shows nothing.
type noticeCode string
// The codes of the actions on the webhook pages and of signing out.
// Replay's codes, with the reasons a replay can be refused, and
// resubmit's codes are defined beside those actions.
const (
webhookCreated noticeCode = "webhook-created"
webhookSaved noticeCode = "webhook-saved"
webhookDeleted noticeCode = "webhook-deleted"
entrypointAdded noticeCode = "entrypoint-added"
entrypointDeleted noticeCode = "entrypoint-deleted"
entrypointActivated noticeCode = "entrypoint-activated"
entrypointDeactivated noticeCode = "entrypoint-deactivated"
targetAdded noticeCode = "target-added"
targetSaved noticeCode = "target-saved"
targetDeleted noticeCode = "target-deleted"
targetActivated noticeCode = "target-activated"
targetDeactivated noticeCode = "target-deactivated"
signedOut noticeCode = "signed-out"
)
// notice is the line templates/notice.html shows above a page to say
// what an action did.
type notice struct {
Text string
// Failed shows the line as an error: the action was refused.
Failed bool
}
// noticeFor returns the notice the request's URL names, or nil when it
// names none or an unknown code.
func noticeFor(r *http.Request) *notice {
n, ok := map[noticeCode]notice{
webhookCreated: {Text: "Webhook created."},
webhookSaved: {Text: "Webhook saved."},
webhookDeleted: {Text: "Webhook deleted."},
entrypointAdded: {Text: "Entrypoint added."},
entrypointDeleted: {Text: "Entrypoint deleted."},
entrypointActivated: {Text: "Entrypoint activated."},
entrypointDeactivated: {Text: "Entrypoint deactivated."},
targetAdded: {Text: "Target added."},
targetSaved: {Text: "Target saved."},
targetDeleted: {Text: "Target deleted."},
targetActivated: {Text: "Target activated."},
targetDeactivated: {Text: "Target deactivated."},
signedOut: {Text: "Signed out."},
replayQueued: {
Text: "Replay queued: a new delivery was created " +
"against the target's current configuration.",
},
replayTargetDeleted: {
Text: "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for " +
"has been deleted. Recreate the target, then replay.",
Failed: true,
},
replayTargetMissing: {
Text: "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for " +
"no longer exists.",
Failed: true,
},
replayTargetInactive: {
Text: "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for " +
"is deactivated. Activate it, then replay.",
Failed: true,
},
replayNotTerminal: {
Text: "Not replayed: this delivery has not finished yet.",
Failed: true,
},
replayInFlight: {
Text: "Not replayed: a delivery of this event to this " +
"target is already in flight.",
Failed: true,
},
resubmitQueued: {
Text: "Resubmitted: a new event was created from the " +
"stored one and queued to every active target.",
},
resubmitNoTargets: {
Text: "Resubmitted: a new event was created, but this " +
"source has no active targets, so nothing was queued.",
},
}[noticeCode(r.URL.Query().Get(noticeParam))]
if !ok {
return nil
}
return &n
}
// withNotice returns path with code added as its notice.
func withNotice(path string, code noticeCode) string {
return path + "?" + noticeParam + "=" + string(code)
}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -411,9 +411,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_RemovesConfigAndEventDatabase(
h.HandleSourceDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/hooks?notice=webhook-deleted", w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(t, "/hooks", w.Header().Get("Location"))
assert.Equal(
t, int64(0),
+46 -50
View File
@@ -322,8 +322,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) createWebhookWithEntrypoint(
)
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, webhookCreated),
http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/hook/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -580,8 +579,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyWebhookEdit(
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, webhookSaved),
http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/hook/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -664,9 +662,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteWebhookResources(
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/hooks", webhookDeleted), http.StatusSeeOther,
)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/hooks", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// commitWebhookDeletion soft-deletes a webhook's entrypoints,
@@ -845,16 +841,31 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
totalPages++
}
// The banner a replay or resubmit POST redirected back
// with. The message comes from a fixed set keyed by the
// outcome code, never from the query string itself.
replayMsg, replayOK := replayOutcome(
r.URL.Query().Get(replayOutcomeParam),
)
resubmitMsg, resubmitOK := resubmitOutcome(
r.URL.Query().Get(resubmitOutcomeParam),
)
data := map[string]any{
tmplKeyWebhook: &webhook,
"Events": evts,
"Page": page,
"TotalPages": totalPages,
"TotalEvents": total,
"HasPrev": page > 1,
"HasNext": page < totalPages,
"PrevPage": page - 1,
"NextPage": page + 1,
tmplKeyWebhook: &webhook,
"Events": evts,
"ReplayMessage": replayMsg,
"ReplayQueued": replayOK,
"ResubmitMessage": resubmitMsg,
"ResubmitQueued": resubmitOK,
"Page": page,
"TotalPages": totalPages,
"TotalEvents": total,
"HasPrev": page > 1,
"HasNext": page < totalPages,
"PrevPage": page - 1,
"NextPage": page + 1,
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "source_logs.html", data)
@@ -1243,8 +1254,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, entrypointAdded),
http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/hook/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
}
@@ -1355,8 +1365,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) processTargetCreate(
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, targetAdded),
http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/hook/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -1560,10 +1569,11 @@ func (h *Handlers) validateTargetURL(
msg := "Invalid target URL: " + err.Error()
// Only a private or reserved address's refusal says how
// to allow it. Metadata refusals never do: link-local and
// the other unconditional metadata addresses cannot be
// opened, and the default blocklist's public addresses,
// which listing does open, hand out credentials.
// to allow it. Other refusals never do: link-local, the
// unspecified addresses and the other unconditional
// metadata addresses cannot be opened, and the default
// blocklist's public addresses, which listing does open,
// hand out credentials.
if errors.Is(err, delivery.ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP) {
msg += ". Private and reserved addresses are refused " +
"by default; the server's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS " +
@@ -1634,7 +1644,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointDelete() http.HandlerFunc {
"entrypointID", &database.Entrypoint{},
"failed to delete entrypoint",
nil,
entrypointDeleted,
)
}
@@ -1647,21 +1656,18 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetDelete() http.HandlerFunc {
"targetID", &database.Target{},
"failed to delete target",
h.evictArchiveWriterIfUnused,
targetDeleted,
)
}
// deleteChildResource returns a handler that deletes a child
// resource (entrypoint or target) belonging to a webhook. The
// optional afterDelete hook runs with the webhook's id once the
// delete has succeeded, before the redirect, which carries done as
// its notice.
// delete has succeeded, before the redirect.
func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
idParam string,
model any,
errMsg string,
afterDelete func(webhookID string),
done noticeCode,
) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := h.getUserID(r)
@@ -1703,7 +1709,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
http.Redirect(
w, r,
withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, done),
"/hook/"+webhook.ID,
http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -1714,7 +1720,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointToggle() http.HandlerFunc {
return h.toggleChildResource(
"entrypointID",
func(webhookID, childID string) (bool, error) {
func(webhookID, childID string) error {
var ep database.Entrypoint
err := h.db.DB().Where(
@@ -1722,15 +1728,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointToggle() http.HandlerFunc {
childID, webhookID,
).First(&ep).Error
if err != nil {
return false, err
return err
}
ep.Active = !ep.Active
return ep.Active, h.db.DB().Save(&ep).Error
return h.db.DB().Save(&ep).Error
},
"failed to toggle entrypoint",
entrypointActivated, entrypointDeactivated,
)
}
@@ -1738,7 +1743,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointToggle() http.HandlerFunc {
func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetToggle() http.HandlerFunc {
return h.toggleChildResource(
"targetID",
func(webhookID, childID string) (bool, error) {
func(webhookID, childID string) error {
var tgt database.Target
err := h.db.DB().Where(
@@ -1746,27 +1751,23 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetToggle() http.HandlerFunc {
childID, webhookID,
).First(&tgt).Error
if err != nil {
return false, err
return err
}
tgt.Active = !tgt.Active
return tgt.Active, h.db.DB().Save(&tgt).Error
return h.db.DB().Save(&tgt).Error
},
"failed to toggle target",
targetActivated, targetDeactivated,
)
}
// toggleChildResource returns a handler that toggles the active
// state of a child resource belonging to a webhook. toggleFn returns
// the new state, and the redirect carries activated or deactivated as
// its notice to match.
// state of a child resource belonging to a webhook.
func (h *Handlers) toggleChildResource(
idParam string,
toggleFn func(webhookID, childID string) (bool, error),
toggleFn func(webhookID, childID string) error,
errMsg string,
activated, deactivated noticeCode,
) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := h.getUserID(r)
@@ -1792,21 +1793,16 @@ func (h *Handlers) toggleChildResource(
return
}
active, err := toggleFn(webhook.ID, childID)
err = toggleFn(webhook.ID, childID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, errMsg, err)
return
}
done := deactivated
if active {
done = activated
}
http.Redirect(
w, r,
withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, done),
"/hook/"+webhook.ID,
http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
+1 -2
View File
@@ -161,8 +161,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyTargetEdit(
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, targetSaved),
http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/hook/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
-16
View File
@@ -83,22 +83,6 @@ func TestErrorPage_DeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusNotFound, backToWebhooks)
}
// TestErrorPage_ShowsNoNotice pins that a notice code in the URL of a
// page that fails is not shown above the error.
func TestErrorPage_ShowsNoNotice(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "owner", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "owner")
w := env.get("/hook/no-such-webhook?notice=webhook-saved", cookies)
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusNotFound, backToWebhooks)
assert.NotContains(t, w.Body.String(), "Webhook saved.")
}
func TestErrorPage_UnknownPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+34 -86
View File
@@ -263,24 +263,6 @@ func (e *testEnv) urlFrom(
return html.UnescapeString(match[1])
}
// requireNotice requires w to redirect to dest carrying the notice
// code, then renders that page and requires it to show text.
func (e *testEnv) requireNotice(
t *testing.T,
w *httptest.ResponseRecorder,
dest, code, text string,
cookies []*http.Cookie,
) {
t.Helper()
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
require.Equal(t, dest+"?notice="+code, w.Header().Get("Location"))
page := e.get(w.Header().Get("Location"), cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, page.Code)
assert.Contains(t, page.Body.String(), text)
}
// authCookies forges an authenticated session for the given user.
func (e *testEnv) authCookies(
t *testing.T,
@@ -759,31 +741,6 @@ func TestPagesLogin_ReturnsToTheRequestedPage(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, asked, w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// TestPagesLogout_SaysSignedOut signs out with the navbar's form and
// lands on the sign-in page, which says so.
func TestPagesLogout_SaysSignedOut(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "leaver", "somepassword")
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(
t, "/hooks", env.authCookies(t, userID, "leaver"),
)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
w := env.post(
env.urlFrom(t, "/hooks", `action="(/pages/logout)"`, cookies),
form, cookies,
)
// The sign-in page is requested without the session cookie, which
// the logout told the browser to delete.
env.requireNotice(t, w, "/pages/login", "signed-out", "Signed out.", nil)
}
// --- /user/{username} group ---
// TestPasswordChange_OversizeBody_RejectedAndPasswordUnchanged
@@ -901,9 +858,9 @@ func TestHooks_ListAndNewWebhookForm(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t,
env.db.DB().Where("name = ?", "created").First(&created).Error,
)
env.requireNotice(
t, w, "/hook/"+created.ID, "webhook-created", "Webhook created.",
cookies,
assert.Equal(
t, "/hook/"+created.ID, w.Header().Get("Location"),
"creating a webhook should redirect to its page",
)
}
@@ -934,7 +891,8 @@ func TestHook_EditFormAndDelete(t *testing.T) {
env.urlFrom(t, editPage, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/edit)"`, cookies),
form, cookies,
)
env.requireNotice(t, w, page, "webhook-saved", "Webhook saved.", cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, page, w.Header().Get("Location"))
var edited database.Webhook
@@ -948,17 +906,16 @@ func TestHook_EditFormAndDelete(t *testing.T) {
env.urlFrom(t, page, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/delete)"`, cookies),
form, cookies,
)
env.requireNotice(
t, w, "/hooks", "webhook-deleted", "Webhook deleted.", cookies,
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "/hooks", w.Header().Get("Location"))
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusNotFound, env.get(page, cookies).Code,
"a deleted webhook's page should be gone",
)
}
// TestHook_EntrypointActions adds, deactivates, activates and deletes
// an entrypoint with the forms on the webhook page, each submitted to
// TestHook_EntrypointActions adds, deactivates and deletes an
// entrypoint with the forms on the webhook page, each submitted to
// the action and with the token the page rendered.
func TestHook_EntrypointActions(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -976,19 +933,16 @@ func TestHook_EntrypointActions(t *testing.T) {
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
// submit posts the webhook page's form whose action pattern
// captures, and requires the redirect back to that page with the
// notice code, and the page to show text.
submit := func(pattern, code, text string) {
// captures, and requires the redirect back to that page.
submit := func(pattern string) {
t.Helper()
w := env.post(env.urlFrom(t, page, pattern, cookies), form, cookies)
env.requireNotice(t, w, page, code, text, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
require.Equal(t, page, w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
toggle := `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/entrypoints/[^/"]+/toggle)"`
submit(`action="(/hook/[^/"]+/entrypoints)"`,
"entrypoint-added", "Entrypoint added.")
submit(`action="(/hook/[^/"]+/entrypoints)"`)
var added database.Entrypoint
@@ -997,7 +951,7 @@ func TestHook_EntrypointActions(t *testing.T) {
)
require.True(t, added.Active)
submit(toggle, "entrypoint-deactivated", "Entrypoint deactivated.")
submit(`action="(/hook/[^/"]+/entrypoints/[^/"]+/toggle)"`)
var toggled database.Entrypoint
@@ -1006,10 +960,7 @@ func TestHook_EntrypointActions(t *testing.T) {
)
assert.False(t, toggled.Active, "the toggle should deactivate it")
submit(toggle, "entrypoint-activated", "Entrypoint activated.")
submit(`action="(/hook/[^/"]+/entrypoints/[^/"]+/delete)"`,
"entrypoint-deleted", "Entrypoint deleted.")
submit(`action="(/hook/[^/"]+/entrypoints/[^/"]+/delete)"`)
var left int64
@@ -1020,8 +971,8 @@ func TestHook_EntrypointActions(t *testing.T) {
// TestHook_TargetActions adds a target with the form on the webhook
// page, follows its Edit link to the target edit form and submits
// it, then deactivates, activates and deletes it, every URL and token
// taken from the rendered pages.
// it, then deactivates and deletes it, every URL and token taken from
// the rendered pages.
func TestHook_TargetActions(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -1036,29 +987,27 @@ func TestHook_TargetActions(t *testing.T) {
// submit posts form, with the token, to the action pattern
// captures on the page at from, and requires the redirect back to
// the webhook page with the notice code, and that page to show
// text.
submit := func(from, pattern string, form url.Values, code, text string) {
// the webhook page.
submit := func(from, pattern string, form url.Values) {
t.Helper()
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
w := env.post(env.urlFrom(t, from, pattern, cookies), form, cookies)
env.requireNotice(t, w, page, code, text, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
require.Equal(t, page, w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
toggle := `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/toggle)"`
submit(page, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets)"`, url.Values{
"name": {"added"},
"type": {string(database.TargetTypeLog)},
}, "target-added", "Target added.")
})
editPage := env.urlFrom(
t, page, `href="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/edit)"`, cookies,
)
submit(editPage, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/edit)"`,
url.Values{"name": {"renamed"}}, "target-saved", "Target saved.")
url.Values{"name": {"renamed"}})
var edited database.Target
@@ -1068,8 +1017,8 @@ func TestHook_TargetActions(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, "renamed", edited.Name)
require.True(t, edited.Active)
submit(page, toggle, url.Values{},
"target-deactivated", "Target deactivated.")
submit(page, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/toggle)"`,
url.Values{})
var toggled database.Target
@@ -1078,11 +1027,8 @@ func TestHook_TargetActions(t *testing.T) {
)
assert.False(t, toggled.Active, "the toggle should deactivate it")
submit(page, toggle, url.Values{},
"target-activated", "Target activated.")
submit(page, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/delete)"`,
url.Values{}, "target-deleted", "Target deleted.")
url.Values{})
var left int64
@@ -1118,9 +1064,9 @@ func TestHook_ResubmitFromEventLog(t *testing.T) {
env.urlFrom(t, logsPath, `action="(/hook/[^"]+/resubmit)"`, cookies),
form, cookies,
)
env.requireNotice(
t, w, logsPath, "resubmit-no-targets",
"this source has no active targets", cookies,
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, logsPath+"?resubmit=no-targets", w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
webhookDB, err := env.dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
@@ -1356,8 +1302,10 @@ func TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected(t *testing.T) {
html.UnescapeString(action[1]), form, cookies,
)
env.requireNotice(
t, w, logsPath, "replay-queued", "Replay queued:", cookies,
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, logsPath+"?replay=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(
t, int64(2), env.countDeliveries(t, wh.ID),
+5 -34
View File
@@ -28,12 +28,10 @@
# -race every test binary and every link costs a few hundred MB, so the
# defaults (one per core) add up to several GB on a many-core host.
#
# The first run has no -v: go test then prints one result line per package,
# with its coverage, and for a package that fails, everything its tests wrote,
# application log lines included. Verbose output from the whole suite passes
# the 2 MiB at which the Docker build cuts off each step's log, so on a failure
# only the tests that failed run again, with -v. The script exits 1 after that
# rerun whatever its result: the first run already showed the suite is broken.
# No -v: the Docker build cuts each step's log off at 2 MiB, and verbose output
# from the whole suite passes that before a failure is printed. Without it, go
# test prints one result line per package and, for a package that fails,
# everything its tests wrote, application log lines included.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
@@ -41,34 +39,7 @@ ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
"$ROOT/script/assets"
log="$(mktemp -t webhooker-test.XXXXXXXX)"
rcfile="$(mktemp -t webhooker-test-rc.XXXXXXXX)"
trap 'rm -f "$log" "$rcfile"' EXIT INT TERM
# The pipeline's status is tee's, and POSIX sh has no pipefail, so go
# test's status travels via a file. Output still streams live.
{
go test -race -cover -p 4 -parallel 8 -timeout 90s ./... 2>&1 \
&& echo 0 >"$rcfile" || echo $? >"$rcfile"
} | tee "$log"
if [ "$(cat "$rcfile")" -eq 0 ]; then
return
fi
# go test reports a failed test as a line starting "--- FAIL: TestName"
# (a failed subtest's line is indented, and reruns with its parent), and
# a failed package as "FAIL<tab>package/path<tab>...". A failure that
# names no test, such as a build error or a timeout, is already shown in
# full above, so there is nothing to rerun.
tests="$(awk '/^--- FAIL: / { print $3 }' "$log" | paste -s -d '|' -)"
packages="$(awk '/^FAIL\t/ { print $2 }' "$log")"
if [ -n "$tests" ]; then
echo "--- Rerunning the failed tests with -v for details ---"
go test -race -v -p 4 -parallel 8 -timeout 90s \
-run "^($tests)\$" $packages || true
fi
exit 1
go test -race -p 4 -parallel 8 -timeout 90s ./...
}
main "$@"
-1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
<body class="bg-gray-50 min-h-screen flex flex-col">
<div class="flex-grow">
{{template "navbar" .}}
{{template "notice" .}}
{{block "content" .}}{{end}}
</div>
{{template "footer" .}}
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
{{define "notice"}}
{{with .Notice}}
<div class="max-w-6xl mx-auto px-6 pt-4">
<div class="{{if .Failed}}alert-error{{else}}alert-success{{end}}">{{.Text}}</div>
</div>
{{end}}
{{end}}
+8
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,14 @@
</div>
</div>
{{if .ReplayMessage}}
<div class="{{if .ReplayQueued}}alert-success{{else}}alert-error{{end}}">{{.ReplayMessage}}</div>
{{end}}
{{if .ResubmitMessage}}
<div class="{{if .ResubmitQueued}}alert-success{{else}}alert-error{{end}}">{{.ResubmitMessage}}</div>
{{end}}
<div class="card">
<div class="divide-y divide-gray-100">
{{range .Events}}