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2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
50a49e8d4e Mark superseded commits honestly instead of skipped (closes #152)
All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 2m52s
Gitea cancels an in-flight run when a newer commit lands on the same
branch and records the cancellation as `failure` / "Has been
cancelled". The workflow rewrote that to `skipped`, but Gitea's
Combine() folds `skipped` into `success`, so the combined-status API
returned green for a commit nothing had ever tested. Rewrite it to
`failure` / "Superseded by a newer commit; never tested" instead:
red-but-honest, and never `pending`, which would block the commit
forever.

Re-running the superseded commit would have been better still, but is
not reachable on this Gitea (1.25.4): its API exposes no rerun
endpoint, workflow dispatch takes a ref rather than a SHA, and every
replay would be a full uncached build with no bound on how many pile
up behind a burst of merges.

The step also stops hardcoding its status context: the logic moves into
script/ci-mark-superseded, which derives the context from the workflow
name, job id and event, and fails loudly when no status on the commit
being built carries that context, so renaming the workflow or the job
cannot silently disable the rewrite. The derivation is not byte-exact
with Gitea's own rule -- Gitea uses the job's display `name:` where the
runner exports the job id -- so adding a `name:` to the job turns every
push red rather than quietly doing nothing; the script header says so,
because that loud failure is the point. That is item 2 of
#147; item 1 there is
untouched.

Nothing about the walk may fail quietly, since the script exists to
stop CI lying quietly. An ANCESTOR_LIMIT that is set but not a positive
integer aborts instead of passing an unusable value to git and
discarding the error; the root-commit case is detected explicitly so
every other rev-list failure aborts too; and per-ancestor status reads
carry the same `--retry 3 --max-time 30` as the head-commit read and
abort on failure rather than losing curl's exit status through a pipe.

Tests drive the script against a fake Gitea covering the cancelled,
laundered-skipped, genuinely-failed, passing and renamed cases, an
unparseable ANCESTOR_LIMIT and an ancestor whose status read answers
HTTP 500, so jq joins the builder image to run them.
2026-08-17 21:54:12 +00:00
c3b6623be1 Bucket IPv6 rate-limit keys by /64 (closes #125)
All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 3m5s
Rate-limit keys were per-address, i.e. per /128 for IPv6. A routed /64
is the normal residential and mobile allocation, so a client rotated
source addresses inside its own prefix and minted a fresh bucket per
request — evading every limiter at the network layer, with no spoofing
and nothing to detect. #88 closed the header half of this control; this
is the network half.

IPv6 now keys on the /64, IPv4 on the full address, via stdlib
net/netip. IPv4-mapped form is unmapped rather than masked, so clients
behind a mapping proxy do not collapse into one bucket.

Independently reviewed twice. The first round found the trusted-proxy
forwarded path — the one carrying production traffic — had no coverage
at all, so a silent revert there was undetectable; that is now pinned.
The reviewer confirmed both branches are independently mutation-tested:
reverting either the direct-peer return or the forwarded return alone
fails only that branch's tests. The 18-site test-constant refactor was
verified byte-identical against next, with no pre-existing assertion
changed.

Known remaining coverage gap, judged not a defect: the fallback when the
peer is trusted but the forwarded address does not parse has no test.
Only operator-controlled addresses inside TRUSTED_PROXIES reach it, they
already share the proxy's single bucket, and masking there can only
merge operator proxies — fail-closed, nothing attacker-controlled.
2026-08-17 23:52:15 +02:00
10 changed files with 1168 additions and 54 deletions

View File

@@ -13,39 +13,19 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2 2024-10-23
with:
# The fingerprint step below needs history to find the last commit
# that touched the Docker build context.
# that touched the Docker build context, and the superseded-status
# step needs it to walk ancestors (it aborts on a shallow clone).
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Neutralize superseded run statuses
- name: Mark superseded run statuses
# Gitea cancels the in-flight run when another commit is pushed to the
# same branch and records the cancellation as `failure`, so a commit
# that was never tested reads red. The cancellation is unconditional
# server-side for push events and cannot be disabled from a workflow
# file, so the superseding run rewrites those statuses to `skipped`.
# Only the exact cancellation status is touched; a real failure is
# left alone.
# that was never tested reads as a test result. The script rewrites
# those statuses to say what happened. See its header for why the
# state stays `failure` and not `skipped`.
env:
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -eu
api="${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}"
ctx='check / check (push)'
for sha in $(git rev-list --max-count=20 "${GITHUB_SHA}^" || true); do
latest="$(curl -sf "${api}/commits/${sha}/status" | jq -r \
--arg c "$ctx" \
'[.statuses[] | select(.context == $c)][0] // empty
| "\(.status)|\(.description)"')" || continue
[ "$latest" = 'failure|Has been cancelled' ] || continue
curl -sf -X POST "${api}/statuses/${sha}" \
-H "Authorization: token ${GITEA_TOKEN}" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "$(jq -nc --arg c "$ctx" '{
context: $c,
state: "skipped",
description: "Superseded by a newer commit; never tested"
}')" >/dev/null
echo "neutralized superseded status on ${sha}"
done
run: script/ci-mark-superseded
- name: Fingerprint the build context
# `.dockerignore` keeps docs out of the build context, so a docs-only

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ FROM golang:1.26.1-bookworm@sha256:4465644228bc2857a954b092167e12aa59c006a349228
# Depend on lint stage passing
COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make curl ca-certificates && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# jq is a runtime dependency of script/ci-mark-superseded, which the test
# suite executes.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make curl ca-certificates jq && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /build

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@@ -282,6 +282,8 @@ are inline commands with no script behind them. We provide:
- `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged via `script/projectname`
- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: `docker build .` (the Dockerfile
runs the checks, so a green build implies a green repo)
- `script/ci-mark-superseded` — CI helper: mark the commits whose run a
newer push cancelled (see [CI gate honesty](#ci-gate-honesty))
- `script/precommit` — pre-commit checks (`go mod tidy` guard, then
`script/check`)
- `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook that
@@ -1001,7 +1003,14 @@ Every limiter here — receiver, login, and password change — identifies
the client the same way, through one shared key function: the
connection's own address, unless the peer is listed in
`TRUSTED_PROXIES`, in which case the forwarded client address is used
instead. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). Deployed without that
instead. That address becomes a bucket by family: IPv4 keys on the full
address, IPv6 on its `/64` prefix. A routed `/64` is the normal
residential and mobile IPv6 allocation, so keying IPv6 per address would
let one subscriber rotate source addresses and mint a fresh bucket per
request, evading these limits at the network layer without spoofing
anything; the cost is that distinct clients inside one `/64` share a
bucket. IPv4-mapped addresses (`::ffff:1.2.3.4`) key as the IPv4 address
they carry. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). Deployed without that
variable set, a client behind a reverse proxy shares one bucket with
every other client behind the same proxy. Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the
proxy's address to get per-client limits back. What the shared bucket
@@ -1366,11 +1375,32 @@ way.
A separate workflow step, run before the fingerprint is written, covers
a second way the gate lied: Gitea cancels an in-flight run when a newer
commit lands on the same branch and records that cancellation as a
`failure` status, marking a commit red that was never tested.
Cancellation is unconditional server-side for
push events, so the superseding run rewrites the exact
`Has been cancelled` status to `skipped`. Genuine failures are never
touched.
`failure` status, so a commit nothing ever tested reads as a test
result. Cancellation is unconditional server-side for push events, so
the superseding run calls `script/ci-mark-superseded`, which rewrites
that exact status to `failure` /
`Superseded by a newer commit; never tested`.
The state stays `failure` on purpose: Gitea's combined status folds
`skipped` into `success`, so marking a never-tested commit `skipped`
made the status API report green for it, indistinguishable from a commit
that passed. Reading a commit's status on this repo therefore goes:
- `success` / `Successful in ...` — the checks ran and passed.
- `failure` / `Failing after ...` — the checks ran and failed.
- `failure` / `Superseded by a newer commit; never tested` — the run was
cancelled, by a newer push or by hand, and nothing was verified about
this commit. Test the commit itself before concluding anything about
it.
Genuine failures and successes are never touched, and no status is left
`pending`, which would block the commit indefinitely. The step derives
its context string from the workflow name, the job **id** and the event.
That is deliberately not byte-identical to Gitea's own rule, which uses
the job's display `name:` where the runner exports the id, so giving the
job a `name:` — or renaming the workflow — makes the derived context
stop matching. The step fails loudly when no status on the commit
carries that context, so no rename can silently disable the rewrite.
## TODO

2
go.mod
View File

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ require (
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4
go.uber.org/fx v1.20.1
golang.org/x/crypto v0.38.0
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
gorm.io/driver/sqlite v1.5.4
gorm.io/gorm v1.25.5
modernc.org/sqlite v1.28.0
@@ -52,7 +53,6 @@ require (
golang.org/x/text v0.25.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.21.1-0.20240508182429-e35e4ccd0d2d // indirect
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.31.0 // indirect
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
lukechampine.com/uint128 v1.2.0 // indirect
modernc.org/cc/v3 v3.40.0 // indirect
modernc.org/ccgo/v3 v3.16.13 // indirect

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
package ciscript_test
import (
"maps"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
)
const (
// supersededDesc is the description script/ci-mark-superseded
// writes, and the one an earlier revision of it wrote alongside a
// `skipped` state.
supersededDesc = "Superseded by a newer commit; never tested"
// liveContext is the commit-status context Gitea uses for this
// repository's runs, as seen in its API. The script derives it from
// the workflow and job names rather than hardcoding it; the
// derivation is checked against this value below.
liveContext = "check / check (push)"
scriptPath = "../../script/ci-mark-superseded"
workflow = "../../.gitea/workflows/check.yml"
// failure is the only state that neither folds into a combined
// `success` (as `skipped` does) nor blocks the commit forever (as
// `pending` does).
failure = "failure"
)
// repo is a throwaway git history: parent is the commit a run would be
// cancelled on, head the commit that superseded it.
type repo struct {
dir string
head string
parent string
}
// scriptEnv is the run identity the Gitea runner exports and the script
// builds its context string from.
type scriptEnv struct {
workflow string
job string
event string
}
func defaultEnv() scriptEnv {
return scriptEnv{workflow: "check", job: "check", event: "push"}
}
func cancelled() commitStatus {
return commitStatus{
Context: liveContext,
Status: failure,
Description: "Has been cancelled",
}
}
func running() commitStatus {
return commitStatus{
Context: liveContext,
Status: "pending",
Description: "Has started running",
}
}
func TestMarkSuperseded(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := map[string]struct {
parent commitStatus
wantMark bool
}{
"a cancelled run is marked": {
parent: cancelled(),
wantMark: true,
},
"a laundered skipped status is marked": {
parent: commitStatus{
Context: liveContext,
Status: "skipped",
Description: supersededDesc,
},
wantMark: true,
},
"a genuine failure is left alone": {
parent: commitStatus{
Context: liveContext,
Status: failure,
Description: "Failing after 3m1s",
},
wantMark: false,
},
"a passing run is left alone": {
parent: commitStatus{
Context: liveContext,
Status: "success",
Description: "Successful in 2m52s",
},
wantMark: false,
},
"another context is left alone": {
parent: commitStatus{
Context: "other / other (push)",
Status: failure,
Description: "Has been cancelled",
},
wantMark: false,
},
}
for name, tc := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
history := newRepo(t)
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, tc.parent)
out, err := runScript(t, history, api, defaultEnv())
require.NoError(t, err, out)
posted := fake.postedFor(history.parent)
if !tc.wantMark {
require.Empty(t, posted)
return
}
require.Equal(t, []postedStatus{{
Context: liveContext,
// Not `skipped`: Gitea's combined status folds
// that into `success`, which is what made a
// never-tested commit read green.
State: failure,
Description: supersededDesc,
}}, posted)
})
}
}
// A second run must not rewrite what the first one wrote, or every
// later push would post a duplicate status.
func TestMarkSupersededIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
history := newRepo(t)
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, cancelled())
for range 2 {
out, err := runScript(t, history, api, defaultEnv())
require.NoError(t, err, out)
}
require.Len(t, fake.postedFor(history.parent), 1)
}
// Renaming the workflow or the job changes the context string Gitea
// uses. The script must say so instead of quietly matching nothing.
func TestMarkSupersededRejectsAnUnknownContext(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
history := newRepo(t)
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, cancelled())
env := defaultEnv()
env.job = "renamed"
out, err := runScript(t, history, api, env)
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, out, "renamed")
require.Contains(t, out, liveContext)
require.Empty(t, fake.postedFor(history.parent))
}
// ANCESTOR_LIMIT is a documented knob. A value that is set but unusable
// must abort: handing it to git and discarding the exit status left the
// walk empty and the step green, marking nothing.
func TestMarkSupersededRejectsAnUnparseableAncestorLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
history := newRepo(t)
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, cancelled())
out, err := runScript(
t, history, api, defaultEnv(), "ANCESTOR_LIMIT=twenty",
)
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, out, "ANCESTOR_LIMIT")
require.Contains(t, out, "twenty")
require.Empty(t, fake.postedFor(history.parent))
}
// A status read that fails is not the same as a commit with nothing to
// do. Losing curl's exit status through a pipe made the two identical
// and left a laundered commit laundered with no signal.
func TestMarkSupersededFailsOnAnUnreadableAncestorStatus(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
history := newRepo(t)
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, cancelled())
fake.failStatusRead(history.parent)
out, err := runScript(t, history, api, defaultEnv())
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, out, history.parent)
require.Contains(t, out, "cannot read commit statuses")
require.Empty(t, fake.postedFor(history.parent))
}
// The derived context must equal the one Gitea actually uses, which is
// built from the same workflow and job names.
func TestDerivedContextMatchesGitea(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
name, job := workflowIdentity(t)
history := newRepo(t)
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, cancelled())
out, err := runScript(t, history, api, scriptEnv{
workflow: name,
job: job,
event: "push",
})
require.NoError(t, err, out)
posted := fake.postedFor(history.parent)
require.Len(t, posted, 1)
require.Equal(t, liveContext, posted[0].Context)
}
// workflowIdentity reads the workflow name and its single job id out of
// the checked-in workflow file.
func workflowIdentity(t *testing.T) (string, string) {
t.Helper()
raw, err := os.ReadFile(workflow)
require.NoError(t, err)
var parsed struct {
Name string `yaml:"name"`
Jobs map[string]any `yaml:"jobs"`
}
require.NoError(t, yaml.Unmarshal(raw, &parsed))
jobs := slices.Collect(maps.Keys(parsed.Jobs))
require.Len(t, jobs, 1)
return parsed.Name, jobs[0]
}
func runScript(
t *testing.T, history repo, api string, env scriptEnv,
extra ...string,
) (string, error) {
t.Helper()
script, err := filepath.Abs(scriptPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
//nolint:gosec // fixed argv, repo-local script under test
cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), "sh", script)
cmd.Dir = history.dir
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
"GITHUB_API_URL="+api,
"GITHUB_REPOSITORY=sneak/webhooker",
"GITHUB_SHA="+history.head,
"GITHUB_WORKFLOW="+env.workflow,
"GITHUB_JOB="+env.job,
"GITHUB_EVENT_NAME="+env.event,
"GITEA_TOKEN=test-token",
)
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, extra...)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
return string(out), err
}
func newRepo(t *testing.T) repo {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
git := func(args ...string) string {
//nolint:gosec // fixed argv, arguments are test constants
cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), "git", args...)
cmd.Dir = dir
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
require.NoError(t, err, string(out))
return strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
}
commit := func(message string) string {
git(
"-c", "user.email=ci@example.invalid",
"-c", "user.name=ci",
"-c", "commit.gpgsign=false",
"commit", "-q", "--allow-empty", "-m", message,
)
return git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
}
git("init", "-q", "-b", "main")
parent := commit("parent")
head := commit("head")
return repo{dir: dir, head: head, parent: parent}
}
func requireTools(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
for _, tool := range []string{"sh", "git", "curl", "jq"} {
_, err := exec.LookPath(tool)
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("%s is not installed: %v", tool, err)
}
}
}

5
internal/ciscript/doc.go Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
// Package ciscript holds the tests for the repository's CI shell
// scripts in script/. It carries no runtime code: the scripts run on
// the CI runner, not inside the binary, but their behaviour still has
// to be verified by the test suite.
package ciscript

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
package ciscript_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync"
"testing"
)
// commitStatus is the part of an entry in Gitea's combined-status
// response that script/ci-mark-superseded reads.
type commitStatus struct {
Context string `json:"context"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Description string `json:"description"`
}
// postedStatus is the part of a create-status request body the script
// writes.
type postedStatus struct {
Context string `json:"context"`
State string `json:"state"`
Description string `json:"description"`
}
// fakeGitea serves the two endpoints the script talks to. Like Gitea,
// the newest status for a context replaces the previous one, so a
// second run of the script sees what the first one wrote.
type fakeGitea struct {
mu sync.Mutex
statuses map[string][]commitStatus
posted map[string][]postedStatus
// failRead is a commit whose combined-status read answers HTTP
// 500, standing in for a status API that is down.
failRead string
}
// newFakeGitea returns the fake and the base URL to hand the script as
// GITHUB_API_URL.
func newFakeGitea(t *testing.T) (*fakeGitea, string) {
t.Helper()
fake := &fakeGitea{
mu: sync.Mutex{},
statuses: map[string][]commitStatus{},
posted: map[string][]postedStatus{},
failRead: "",
}
srv := httptest.NewServer(fake.routes())
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
return fake, srv.URL
}
func (f *fakeGitea) routes() http.Handler {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc(
"GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/commits/{sha}/status",
f.handleCombined,
)
mux.HandleFunc(
"POST /repos/{owner}/{repo}/statuses/{sha}",
f.handleCreate,
)
return mux
}
func (f *fakeGitea) handleCombined(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
sha := r.PathValue("sha")
if f.failRead != "" && f.failRead == sha {
http.Error(w, "boom", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
body := struct {
Statuses []commitStatus `json:"statuses"`
}{Statuses: f.statuses[sha]}
payload, err := json.Marshal(body)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write(payload)
}
func (f *fakeGitea) handleCreate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var got postedStatus
err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&got)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
sha := r.PathValue("sha")
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.posted[sha] = append(f.posted[sha], got)
f.replaceLocked(sha, commitStatus{
Context: got.Context,
Status: got.State,
Description: got.Description,
})
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
}
// failStatusRead makes the combined-status read for one commit answer
// HTTP 500.
func (f *fakeGitea) failStatusRead(sha string) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.failRead = sha
}
// setStatus gives a commit its latest status for a context.
func (f *fakeGitea) setStatus(sha string, status commitStatus) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.replaceLocked(sha, status)
}
// postedFor returns the statuses the script created for a commit.
func (f *fakeGitea) postedFor(sha string) []postedStatus {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return append([]postedStatus(nil), f.posted[sha]...)
}
// replaceLocked requires f.mu.
func (f *fakeGitea) replaceLocked(sha string, status commitStatus) {
for i, existing := range f.statuses[sha] {
if existing.Context == status.Context {
f.statuses[sha][i] = status
return
}
}
f.statuses[sha] = append(f.statuses[sha], status)
}

View File

@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@ const (
// bound every request pays a walk proportional to whatever the
// client sent.
maxForwardedHops = 64
// ipv6BucketBits is the prefix length IPv6 clients are bucketed
// on. A routed /64 is the normal residential and mobile
// allocation, so it is the unit an attacker gets addresses in
// and therefore the unit worth limiting.
ipv6BucketBits = 64
)
// normalizeAddr strips the IPv4-in-IPv6 wrapper and any zone from
@@ -56,6 +62,40 @@ func normalizeAddr(addr netip.Addr) netip.Addr {
return addr.Unmap().WithZone("")
}
// bucketKey is the rate-limit bucket identity of a client address.
// IPv4 keys on the full address; IPv6 keys on its /64 prefix,
// because keying IPv6 per /128 lets one ordinary subscriber rotate
// source addresses inside its own routed /64 and mint a fresh bucket
// per request — evading every limiter here at the network layer,
// with no spoofing and nothing to detect.
//
// An IPv4-mapped address (::ffff:1.2.3.4) is keyed as the IPv4
// address it carries, never masked to a /64: mapped form all shares
// the ::ffff:0:0/96 prefix, so masking would collapse every IPv4
// client reaching a proxy that emits it into one bucket. Callers
// pass addresses through normalizeAddr, which already unmaps; the
// unmap here keeps the property true of the key function itself.
//
// The two families cannot collide: an IPv4 key is a bare dotted
// quad, and an IPv6 key always carries a "/64" suffix.
func bucketKey(addr netip.Addr) string {
addr = addr.Unmap()
if addr.Is4() {
return addr.String()
}
// Prefix errors only on a negative bit count, on over 32 bits
// for an IPv4 address, or on over 128 for IPv6. The count here
// is the constant 64 and the IPv4 case returned above, so the
// error is unreachable. (The zero Addr does not error either: it
// yields the zero Prefix. Neither call site can produce one,
// since both parse the address first.)
prefix, _ := addr.Prefix(ipv6BucketBits)
return prefix.String()
}
// isTrustedProxy reports whether addr belongs to a network the
// operator listed in TRUSTED_PROXIES. The list is empty by default,
// so by default nothing is trusted.
@@ -143,6 +183,9 @@ func (m *Middleware) forwardedClientAddr(
// another client's bucket, by picking an X-Forwarded-For value —
// which makes every limit here decorative against a deliberate
// attacker.
//
// The address that identifies the client is then reduced to a bucket
// by bucketKey: full address for IPv4, /64 prefix for IPv6.
func (m *Middleware) rateLimitKey(r *http.Request) (string, error) {
return m.clientKey(r), nil
}
@@ -152,23 +195,25 @@ func (m *Middleware) clientKey(r *http.Request) string {
peer, err := netip.ParseAddr(ipFromHostPort(r.RemoteAddr))
if err != nil {
// Not an address we can reason about; key on the raw
// value, the most specific identity left. On a
// Unix-socket listener every peer carries the same
// RemoteAddr and so shares one bucket, which is the
// fail-closed direction.
// value, the most specific identity left. Distinct
// RemoteAddr values stay in distinct buckets, so this
// path cannot silently collapse unrelated clients
// together. On a Unix-socket listener every peer
// carries the same RemoteAddr and so shares one bucket,
// which is the fail-closed direction.
return r.RemoteAddr
}
peer = normalizeAddr(peer)
if !m.isTrustedProxy(peer) {
return peer.String()
return bucketKey(peer)
}
if addr, ok := m.forwardedClientAddr(r); ok {
return addr.String()
return bucketKey(addr)
}
return peer.String()
return bucketKey(peer)
}
// tooManyRequests returns the 429 handler used by the login,

View File

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
)
@@ -370,6 +371,30 @@ const (
headerXFF = "X-Forwarded-For"
headerReal = "X-Real-IP"
headerTrue = "True-Client-IP"
// clientIPv4 is the sample IPv4 client address these tests key
// on, both directly and in IPv4-mapped form. clientIPv4Alt is
// its neighbour, used to show the two do not share a bucket.
clientIPv4 = "198.51.100.7"
clientIPv4Alt = "198.51.100.8"
// clientIPv6 and clientIPv6Same are two addresses inside one
// routed /64, so both must key on clientBucketV6.
// clientIPv6Other is a different allocation and must key on
// clientOtherBucketV6.
clientIPv6 = "2001:db8:1:2:3:4:5:6"
clientIPv6Same = "2001:db8:1:2:aaaa:bbbb:cccc:dddd"
clientIPv6Other = "2001:db8:1:3::1"
clientBucketV6 = "2001:db8:1:2::/64"
clientOtherBucketV6 = "2001:db8:1:3::/64"
// trustedProxyCIDR is the proxy network the forwarded-path
// tests configure, and trustedPeer an address inside it. A
// production deployment is required to run behind a reverse
// proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES set, so this is the shape the
// bucketing has to hold in.
trustedProxyCIDR = "10.0.0.0/8"
trustedPeer = "10.0.0.1:44444"
)
// assertSharedBucket drives the login limiter from peer with the
@@ -458,8 +483,8 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_SingleValuedHeadersIgnoredFromTrustedPeer(
t.Parallel()
assertSharedBucket(
t, trustedProxies("10.0.0.0/8"),
"10.0.0.1:44444",
t, trustedProxies(trustedProxyCIDR),
trustedPeer,
func(i int) map[string]string {
return map[string]string{
header: fmt.Sprintf(
@@ -495,8 +520,8 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_MalformedRightmostHopFallsBackToPeer(
t.Parallel()
assertSharedBucket(
t, trustedProxies("10.0.0.0/8"),
"10.0.0.1:44444",
t, trustedProxies(trustedProxyCIDR),
trustedPeer,
func(i int) map[string]string {
return map[string]string{
headerXFF: fmt.Sprintf(
@@ -522,13 +547,13 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedHonouredFromTrustedPeer(
t.Parallel()
m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{
TrustedProxies: trustedProxies("10.0.0.0/8"),
TrustedProxies: trustedProxies(trustedProxyCIDR),
})
handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
const peer = "10.0.0.1:44444"
const peer = trustedPeer
first := map[string]string{headerXFF: "198.51.100.7"}
first := map[string]string{headerXFF: clientIPv4}
for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
postWithHeaders(handler, peer, loginPath, first)
@@ -542,7 +567,7 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedHonouredFromTrustedPeer(
w = postWithHeaders(
handler, peer, loginPath,
map[string]string{headerXFF: "198.51.100.8"},
map[string]string{headerXFF: clientIPv4Alt},
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -559,7 +584,7 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_ChainWalkSkipsClientPrepended(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertSharedBucket(
t, trustedProxies("10.0.0.0/8"), "10.0.0.1:44444",
t, trustedProxies(trustedProxyCIDR), trustedPeer,
func(i int) map[string]string {
return map[string]string{
headerXFF: fmt.Sprintf(
@@ -594,7 +619,7 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_LongChainCapsWalkAndFallsBackToPeer(
start := time.Now()
assertSharedBucket(
t, trustedProxies("10.0.0.0/8"), "10.0.0.1:44444",
t, trustedProxies(trustedProxyCIDR), trustedPeer,
func(i int) map[string]string {
return map[string]string{
headerXFF: fmt.Sprintf("9.9.9.%d%s", i+1, padding),
@@ -633,13 +658,13 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_LongChainAllocationIsBounded(t *testing.T) {
)
m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{
TrustedProxies: trustedProxies("10.0.0.0/8"),
TrustedProxies: trustedProxies(trustedProxyCIDR),
})
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, loginPath, nil,
)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:44444"
req.RemoteAddr = trustedPeer
req.Header.Set(
headerXFF, "9.9.9.9"+strings.Repeat(", 10.0.0.2", hops),
)
@@ -835,3 +860,369 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_IgnoresForwardedFromUntrustedPeer(
"not mint a fresh receiver bucket",
)
}
// clientKeyFor returns the bucket key m computes for a request whose
// direct peer is remoteAddr and which carries no forwarded headers.
func clientKeyFor(
t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware, remoteAddr string,
) string {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, loginPath, nil,
)
req.RemoteAddr = remoteAddr
return middleware.ClientKeyForTest(m, req)
}
// TestRateLimitKey_IPv6BucketsByPrefix pins the key function's
// address-family behaviour. IPv6 clients must bucket by /64 — a
// routed /64 is the normal residential and mobile allocation, so
// per-/128 keying lets one subscriber rotate source addresses and
// mint a fresh bucket per request — while IPv4 keeps keying on the
// full address and IPv4-mapped form is keyed as the IPv4 address it
// carries.
func TestRateLimitKey_IPv6BucketsByPrefix(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{})
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
peer string
want string
about string
}{{
name: "ipv6",
peer: "[" + clientIPv6 + "]:44444",
want: clientBucketV6,
about: "an IPv6 peer must key on its /64",
}, {
name: "ipv6-other-in-same-64",
peer: "[" + clientIPv6Same + "]:1",
want: clientBucketV6,
about: "another address in the same /64 must key the same",
}, {
name: "ipv6-different-64",
peer: "[" + clientIPv6Other + "]:44444",
want: clientOtherBucketV6,
about: "a different /64 must key differently",
}, {
name: "ipv4",
peer: clientIPv4 + ":44444",
want: clientIPv4,
about: "IPv4 must keep keying on the full address",
}, {
name: "ipv4-neighbour",
peer: clientIPv4Alt + ":44444",
want: clientIPv4Alt,
about: "adjacent IPv4 addresses must not share a bucket",
}, {
name: "ipv4-mapped",
peer: "[::ffff:" + clientIPv4 + "]:44444",
want: clientIPv4,
about: "IPv4-mapped form must key as the IPv4 address, " +
"not be masked to a /64: mapped addresses all share " +
"::ffff:0:0/96, so masking would collapse every IPv4 " +
"client behind a mapping proxy into one bucket",
}} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.Equal(
t, tc.want, clientKeyFor(t, m, tc.peer), tc.about,
)
})
}
}
// TestRateLimitKey_FamiliesDoNotCollide pins the structure the
// no-collision property rests on, rather than one sample pair: every
// IPv4 key is a bare address and every IPv6 key is a /64 in CIDR
// form, so the two name spaces are disjoint by shape. Dropping the
// masking strips the suffix that guarantees it, which is why this
// asserts the form of each key and not just that two of them differ.
func TestRateLimitKey_FamiliesDoNotCollide(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Restated here rather than imported from the package under
// test, so that changing the production bucket width fails this
// test instead of silently moving with it.
const wantBits = 64
m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{})
v4Keys := map[string]bool{}
for _, peer := range []string{
clientIPv4 + ":44444",
clientIPv4Alt + ":44444",
"[::ffff:" + clientIPv4 + "]:44444",
} {
key := clientKeyFor(t, m, peer)
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(key)
require.NoError(
t, err, "%s: an IPv4 key must be a bare address", peer,
)
assert.True(
t, addr.Is4(),
"%s: an IPv4 key must be a dotted quad, got %q", peer, key,
)
v4Keys[key] = true
}
for _, peer := range []string{
"[" + clientIPv6 + "]:44444",
"[" + clientIPv6Same + "]:44444",
"[" + clientIPv6Other + "]:44444",
"[2001:db8::" + clientIPv4 + "]:44444",
} {
key := clientKeyFor(t, m, peer)
prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(key)
require.NoError(
t, err, "%s: an IPv6 key must be a CIDR prefix", peer,
)
assert.Equal(
t, wantBits, prefix.Bits(),
"%s: an IPv6 key must name a /64", peer,
)
assert.False(
t, v4Keys[key],
"%s: an IPv6 key must never equal an IPv4 key", peer,
)
}
}
// TestRateLimitKey_UnparseablePeerKeepsDistinctBuckets covers the
// fallback path. A RemoteAddr that is not an address must not panic,
// and must not drop unrelated clients into one shared bucket by
// accident: the raw value is the most specific identity left, so
// distinct values stay in distinct buckets.
func TestRateLimitKey_UnparseablePeerKeepsDistinctBuckets(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{})
first := clientKeyFor(t, m, "not-an-address")
second := clientKeyFor(t, m, "also-not-an-address:1234")
assert.NotEmpty(t, first)
assert.NotEqual(
t, first, second,
"unparseable peers must not collapse into one bucket",
)
}
// TestLoginRateLimit_IPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64 is the behavioural
// half, and the regression test for the bypass itself: a client that
// rotates source addresses inside its own routed /64 must stay in one
// bucket. Reverting the masking makes this test fail, because each
// rotated address would mint a fresh bucket and nothing would be
// rejected.
func TestLoginRateLimit_IPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{})
handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
for i := range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
w := postWithHeaders(
handler,
fmt.Sprintf("[2001:db8:1:2::%d]:44444", i+1),
loginPath, nil,
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, "request %d should pass", i,
)
}
w := postWithHeaders(
handler, "[2001:db8:1:2::ffff]:44444", loginPath, nil,
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
"rotating source addresses inside one routed /64 must not "+
"mint fresh buckets",
)
}
// TestLoginRateLimit_IPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64 is the other side
// of the trade: bucketing by /64 must not merge separate allocations,
// so a client in a different /64 keeps its own limit.
func TestLoginRateLimit_IPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{})
handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst + 1 {
postWithHeaders(
handler, "[2001:db8:1:2::1]:44444", loginPath, nil,
)
}
w := postWithHeaders(
handler, "[2001:db8:1:3::1]:44444", loginPath, nil,
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
"a different /64 must have its own bucket",
)
}
// TestLoginRateLimit_IPv4IndependentPerAddress guards against the
// masking leaking into IPv4: two addresses one apart must still hold
// separate buckets.
func TestLoginRateLimit_IPv4IndependentPerAddress(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{})
handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst + 1 {
postWithHeaders(
handler, clientIPv4+":44444", loginPath, nil,
)
}
w := postWithHeaders(
handler, clientIPv4Alt+":44444", loginPath, nil,
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
"a second IPv4 address must have its own bucket",
)
}
// forwardedKeyFor returns the bucket key m computes for a request
// that arrives from trustedPeer — a configured trusted proxy — and
// names forwarded as its client in X-Forwarded-For. That is the
// production path: a deployment is required to run behind a reverse
// proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES set, so the forwarded address, not the
// peer, is what the limiters bucket on there.
func forwardedKeyFor(
t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware, forwarded string,
) string {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, loginPath, nil,
)
req.RemoteAddr = trustedPeer
req.Header.Set(headerXFF, forwarded)
return middleware.ClientKeyForTest(m, req)
}
// TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedIPv6BucketsByPrefix pins the /64
// bucketing on the trusted-proxy branch. The direct-peer tests above
// cannot reach it, so without this the masking could be reverted for
// forwarded clients alone — the only shape a production deployment
// runs in — and the rest of the suite would stay green.
func TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedIPv6BucketsByPrefix(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{
TrustedProxies: trustedProxies(trustedProxyCIDR),
})
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
forwarded string
want string
about string
}{{
name: "ipv6",
forwarded: clientIPv6,
want: clientBucketV6,
about: "a forwarded IPv6 client must key on its /64",
}, {
name: "ipv6-other-in-same-64",
forwarded: clientIPv6Same,
want: clientBucketV6,
about: "another forwarded address in the same /64 must " +
"key the same",
}, {
name: "ipv6-different-64",
forwarded: clientIPv6Other,
want: clientOtherBucketV6,
about: "a forwarded address in another /64 must differ",
}, {
name: "ipv4",
forwarded: clientIPv4,
want: clientIPv4,
about: "a forwarded IPv4 client must key on the address",
}, {
name: "ipv4-mapped",
forwarded: "::ffff:" + clientIPv4,
want: clientIPv4,
about: "a proxy that forwards IPv4-mapped form must key as " +
"the IPv4 address it carries, not be masked to a /64: " +
"mapped addresses all share ::ffff:0:0/96",
}} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.Equal(
t, tc.want,
forwardedKeyFor(t, m, tc.forwarded), tc.about,
)
})
}
}
// TestLoginRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64 is the
// behavioural half on the production path: behind a trusted proxy, a
// client rotating source addresses inside its own routed /64 must
// stay in one bucket.
func TestLoginRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
assertSharedBucket(
t, trustedProxies(trustedProxyCIDR), trustedPeer,
func(i int) map[string]string {
return map[string]string{
headerXFF: fmt.Sprintf("2001:db8:1:2::%d", i+1),
}
},
"rotating forwarded source addresses inside one routed /64 "+
"must not mint fresh buckets",
)
}
// TestLoginRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64 is the
// other side of that trade on the same path: bucketing by /64 must
// not merge two allocations reaching the proxy.
func TestLoginRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{
TrustedProxies: trustedProxies(trustedProxyCIDR),
})
handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
spent := map[string]string{headerXFF: clientIPv6}
for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst + 1 {
postWithHeaders(handler, trustedPeer, loginPath, spent)
}
w := postWithHeaders(
handler, trustedPeer, loginPath,
map[string]string{headerXFF: clientIPv6Other},
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
"a forwarded client in a different /64 must have its own "+
"bucket",
)
}

150
script/ci-mark-superseded Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/ci-mark-superseded: record an honest status on commits whose CI
# run Gitea cancelled because a newer commit landed on the same branch.
# Gitea writes `failure` / "Has been cancelled" for such a run, which
# reads as a test result on a commit nothing ever tested. Cancellation is
# unconditional server-side for push events, so the superseding run
# rewrites those statuses to `failure` with a description that says the
# commit was never tested. `skipped` cannot be used: Gitea's combined
# status folds `skipped` into `success`, so a never-tested commit would
# report green. Genuine failures and successes are never touched.
#
# Called by the Gitea Actions workflow, which supplies GITHUB_API_URL,
# GITHUB_REPOSITORY, GITHUB_SHA, GITHUB_WORKFLOW, GITHUB_JOB,
# GITHUB_EVENT_NAME and GITEA_TOKEN. ANCESTOR_LIMIT (default 20) caps how
# far back the walk looks; a value that is set but not a positive integer
# aborts rather than silently disabling the walk.
set -eu
SUPERSEDED_DESC='Superseded by a newer commit; never tested'
# Gitea builds the commit-status context as
# "<workflow name> / <job name> (<event>)", so derive it rather than
# hardcoding the result.
#
# The derivation is deliberately not byte-exact with Gitea's own rule and
# must not be "fixed" into a silent fallback. Gitea uses the job's `name:`
# (falling back to the job id) and the workflow's `name:` (falling back to
# the workflow filename), while the runner exports GITHUB_JOB as the job
# *id* and GITHUB_WORKFLOW as the parsed workflow `name:`. So giving the
# job a display `name:`, or dropping the workflow's `name:`, makes the
# derived context stop matching --- and require_own_context below then
# turns every push red with a message. That loud failure is the point
# (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/147 item 2); guessing at a
# fallback would restore the silent no-op it replaced.
context() {
printf '%s / %s (%s)' \
"$GITHUB_WORKFLOW" "$GITHUB_JOB" "$GITHUB_EVENT_NAME"
}
# ANCESTOR_LIMIT is a documented knob, so a value that is set but
# unusable must fail loudly instead of defaulting
# (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/80). Passing it straight to
# git would print `fatal: not an integer` into a discarded exit status
# and mark nothing.
ancestor_limit() {
# `-` and not `:-`: an explicitly empty value is set-but-unusable
# config, so it aborts like any other bad value rather than silently
# running at the default.
_limit="${ANCESTOR_LIMIT-20}"
case "$_limit" in
'' | *[!0-9]* | 0*)
echo "ANCESTOR_LIMIT must be a positive integer," \
"got '${_limit}'" >&2
return 1
;;
esac
printf '%s' "$_limit"
}
# The status Gitea created for this very job proves which context string
# it uses. If the derived one is missing, the workflow or the job was
# renamed and the match below would silently stop firing, restoring the
# false-red bug with no signal. Fail loudly instead.
require_own_context() {
if ! _body="$(curl -sf --retry 3 --retry-delay 2 --max-time 30 \
"${1}/commits/${GITHUB_SHA}/status")"; then
echo "cannot read commit statuses for ${GITHUB_SHA}" >&2
return 1
fi
_found="$(printf '%s' "$_body" | jq -r '(.statuses // [])[].context')"
if printf '%s\n' "$_found" | grep -qxF "$2"; then
return 0
fi
echo "no commit status with context '${2}' on ${GITHUB_SHA}:" >&2
echo "workflow or job renamed? contexts present:" >&2
printf '%s\n' "$_found" >&2
return 1
}
# Latest status for our context on a commit, as "state|description".
# The read is retried and bounded, and a read that still fails aborts the
# step: a laundered commit that cannot be read is not the same as one
# with nothing to do, and piping curl into jq would discard the
# difference.
status_of() {
if ! _sbody="$(curl -sf --retry 3 --retry-delay 2 --max-time 30 \
"${1}/commits/${2}/status")"; then
echo "cannot read commit statuses for ${2}" >&2
return 1
fi
printf '%s' "$_sbody" | jq -r --arg c "$3" \
'[(.statuses // [])[] | select(.context == $c)][0] // empty
| "\(.status)|\(.description)"'
}
mark_superseded() {
curl -sf -X POST "${1}/statuses/${2}" \
-H "Authorization: token ${GITEA_TOKEN}" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "$(jq -nc --arg c "$3" --arg d "$SUPERSEDED_DESC" \
'{context: $c, state: "failure", description: $d}')" \
>/dev/null
}
main() {
_api="${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}"
_ctx="$(context)"
_limit="$(ancestor_limit)"
require_own_context "$_api" "$_ctx"
# A shallow clone cannot resolve the parent, so it looks exactly like
# a root commit to rev-parse below and would exit 0 having walked
# nothing (or, at depth > 1, only the ancestors that happen to be
# present). The workflow checks out with `fetch-depth: 0`; verify
# that here rather than depend on it silently.
if [ "$(git rev-parse --is-shallow-repository)" = 'true' ]; then
echo "shallow repository: the ancestor walk needs full history" >&2
return 1
fi
# A root commit legitimately has no ancestors and is not an error;
# every other rev-list failure (an unknown SHA) must abort, so the
# walk itself carries no `|| true`.
if ! git rev-parse -q --verify "${GITHUB_SHA}^" >/dev/null; then
echo "no ancestor of ${GITHUB_SHA} to check"
return 0
fi
_walk="$(git rev-list --max-count="$_limit" "${GITHUB_SHA}^")"
for _sha in $_walk; do
_latest="$(status_of "$_api" "$_sha" "$_ctx")"
# A run that was cancelled, or one an earlier revision of this
# script laundered into `skipped`. Anything else stands.
case "$_latest" in
'failure|Has been cancelled' | "skipped|${SUPERSEDED_DESC}") ;;
*) continue ;;
esac
mark_superseded "$_api" "$_sha" "$_ctx"
echo "marked superseded: ${_sha}"
done
}
main "$@"