Fix six README sentences (closes #565)

Rewrite the six sentences the documents check failed, each checked
against the code. The Sign-in limits section now opens with its rule.
The recovery routine's sentences say it resumes a delivery: it queues a
pending one at once, but gives a retrying one the rest of its wait.

Model: opus-5-5

.dockerignore

@@ -72,10 +72,8 @@
 **/*.sublime-*
 
 # This repository's own host-built artifacts: the binary `make build`
-# writes, and the Alpine.js file `make assets` extracts from 3p/ (the
-# build extracts its own).
+# writes.
 /bin
-/static/js/alpine.min.js
 
 # SQLite databases, which hold the session key and webhook payloads, at
 # any depth.

.gitignore

@@ -77,7 +77,3 @@ data/
 # Temporary files
 tmp/
 temp/
-
-# Alpine.js, extracted by `make assets` from its tarball in 3p/, which is
-# what is committed.
-/static/js/alpine.min.js

.prettierignore

@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 node_modules/
 yarn.lock
+static/js/alpine.min.js

Dockerfile

@@ -92,10 +92,6 @@ COPY . .
 # fmt-check` is the markdown-check stage above.
 RUN if [ -n "$(gofmt -s -l .)" ]; then echo "gofmt needed on:"; gofmt -s -l .; exit 1; fi
 
-# static/static.go embeds the Alpine.js file this extracts from 3p/; without
-# it the static package does not compile and cannot be linted.
-RUN script/assets
-
 # The golangci-lint steps run with --network=none. `golangci-lint config
 # verify` is documented as fetching its JSON schema over HTTPS; this pinned
 # image resolves the schema without any network, and --network=none enforces
@@ -130,9 +126,6 @@ RUN go mod download
 
 COPY . .
 
-# static/static.go embeds the Alpine.js file this extracts from 3p/.
-RUN script/assets
-
 # -timeout applies to each package on its own, so 90s has only to clear the
 # slowest one. -p 4 -parallel 8 keep the run under 2 GB of memory: at most
 # four test binaries build or run at once, each with at most eight parallel
@@ -211,10 +204,8 @@ RUN version="$(make version VERSION="$VERSION")"; \
         esac; \
     fi
 
-# Builds through the Makefile's build target, which runs script/assets
-# (Alpine.js, extracted from its tarball in 3p/) first. The target builds
-# with cgo off, so the binary is statically linked and runs on the Alpine
-# runtime image below as it is.
+# The Makefile's build target builds with cgo off, so the binary is
+# statically linked and runs on the Alpine runtime image below.
 RUN make build VERSION="$VERSION"
 
 # Runtime stage

Dockerfile.browser

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ COPY . .
 # The test binary embeds the templates and static files, so the browser
 # stage needs nothing else. It is built with cgo off and -p 4 keeps the
 # compile's memory down, both as in the test phase of Dockerfile.
-RUN make assets && CGO_ENABLED=0 go test -c -p 4 -tags browser -o /browser.test ./internal/server
+RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go test -c -p 4 -tags browser -o /browser.test ./internal/server
 
 # chromedp/headless-shell:151.0.7922.109 (Debian trixie), 2026-08-11. The
 # browser is on PATH as headless-shell, where the test's browser library

Makefile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.PHONY: bootstrap setup assets test test-browser lint fmt fmt-check check build run dev deps docker clean hooks css css-check version
+.PHONY: bootstrap setup test test-browser lint fmt fmt-check check build run dev deps docker clean hooks css css-check version
 
 # Default target
 .DEFAULT_GOAL := check
@@ -22,9 +22,6 @@ bootstrap:
 setup:
 	@script/setup
 
-assets:
-	@script/assets
-
 test:
 	@script/test
 
@@ -47,13 +44,13 @@ check:
 # REPO_POLICIES.md does: the binary carries no build paths, symbol table or
 # debug information, and on Linux, the image's included, it is statically
 # linked.
-build: assets
+build:
 	CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags '-s -w -X main.version=$(VERSION)' -o bin/webhooker ./cmd/webhooker
 
 run: build
 	./bin/webhooker
 
-dev: assets
+dev:
 	go run ./cmd/webhooker
 
 deps:

README.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # webhooker
 
-webhooker is an MIT-licensed web service, written in [Go](https://golang.org) by
-[@sneak](https://sneak.berlin), that receives the HTTP requests other services
-send when something happens and forwards them to your own systems.
+webhooker is an MIT-licensed [Go](https://golang.org) web service by
+[@sneak](https://sneak.berlin) that receives the HTTP requests other services
+send and forwards them to your own systems.
 
 Many services send an HTTP request to a URL you give them when something
 happens: a code push, a payment, a new ticket. webhooker receives those
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ Five words name the moving parts.
   it. The UUID is a random 36-character identifier, and it is the only thing
   that authorises a sender.
 - A **target** is a place events are delivered to. There are four kinds: an HTTP
-  URL, a Slack or Mattermost message-posting URL, an archive file, and the
-  application log.
+  URL, the message-posting URL of a chat service (Slack or Mattermost), an
+  archive file, and the application log.
 - An **event** is one stored request: its method, query string, headers and
   body.
 - A **delivery** is one event paired with one target. It records every attempt.
@@ -39,15 +39,15 @@ Five words name the moving parts.
 The part of webhooker that answers requests to `/h/{uuid}` is the receiver. It
 stores the event and one pending delivery per active target, then answers `200`.
 
-Delivery is at least once, not exactly once. If a delivery reaches the target
-but webhooker cannot record that outcome, it sends the delivery again later. A
-delivery in flight when the service stops is also sent again at the next start.
-webhooker adds no delivery identifier of its own to the request, so make your
-targets tolerate a duplicate.
+Delivery is at least once, not exactly once. A delivery can reach its target
+more than once. If a delivery reaches the target but webhooker cannot record
+that outcome, it sends the delivery again later. A delivery in flight when the
+service stops is also sent again at the next start. webhooker adds no delivery
+identifier of its own to the request, so make your targets tolerate a duplicate.
 
 ## Getting Started
 
-You need the Go version named in `go.mod`, and Docker for the checks.
+You need the Go version named in `go.mod`.
 
 ```bash
 git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker.git
@@ -57,7 +57,8 @@ DATA_DIR=../webhooker-data make dev
 ```
 
 `DATA_DIR` is where webhooker keeps its databases. It defaults to
-`/var/lib/webhooker`, so point it at a directory you can write to.
+`/var/lib/webhooker`, so point it at a directory you can write to. `make build`
+writes the program to `bin/webhooker`. Running that file starts webhooker.
 
 The first start creates the `admin` account and prints its password once, in a
 ruled box on standard output:
@@ -87,6 +88,9 @@ docker run -d \
   webhooker
 ```
 
+The first-boot password goes to the container's log. Read it with `docker logs`
+and the container's name.
+
 In production, put a reverse proxy in front of webhooker: a server that accepts
 the public connections and passes them on. Read
 [Behind a reverse proxy](#behind-a-reverse-proxy) first.
@@ -99,12 +103,12 @@ sooner after 24 hours without use, unless `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` says otherwise.
 
 ### Webhooks
 
-**New Webhook** on the webhook list at `/hooks` asks for **Name**, an optional
+On the webhook list at `/hooks`, **New Webhook** asks for **Name**, an optional
 **Description** and **Retention (days)**. Events older than the retention period
 are deleted, along with their deliveries. The default is 30 days. `0` keeps
-events forever. The form also has an **HTTP target URL** field and an
-**Archive** checkbox; each creates that target with the webhook. Every new
-webhook gets one entrypoint, described as `Default entrypoint`.
+events forever. Filling in **HTTP target URL** creates an `http` target with the
+webhook. Ticking **Archive** creates an archive target. Every new webhook gets
+one entrypoint, described as `Default entrypoint`.
 
 ### Entrypoint URLs
 
@@ -120,7 +124,7 @@ deactivated entrypoint answers `410 Gone`. A deleted or unknown one answers
 
 ### Targets
 
-**Add** under **Targets** asks for the type first, then that type's settings.
+Under **Targets**, **Add** asks for the type first, then that type's settings.
 
 - An `http` target posts each event to a URL, with optional **Headers** and a
   **Timeout**.
@@ -135,6 +139,8 @@ deactivated entrypoint answers `410 Gone`. A deleted or unknown one answers
 `http` and `slack` targets also take **Delivery attempts**: how many times each
 delivery is tried in all. The default is 1. The most is 20. A target's type
 cannot be changed. Deleting an archive target leaves its files on disk.
+**Deactivate** and **Activate** on the webhook page switch a target off and on,
+and new events skip a target that is off.
 
 ### Events
 
@@ -144,11 +150,11 @@ body** link. **Full Event Log** shows the 50 newest events with their deliveries
 and every attempt. **Failed** and **Pending** narrow it to events with a failed
 delivery, or with one still pending or retrying.
 
-**Replay** sits beside each finished delivery. It creates a new delivery of the
-same event to the same target, with the target's settings as they stand now.
-**Resubmit** sits beside each event. It stores a copy of the event as a new
-event and delivers it to every target that is active now. Both actions are
-limited to 30 per minute per client.
+A finished delivery has a **Replay** button while its target exists. **Replay**
+creates a new delivery of the same event to the same target, with the target's
+settings as they stand now. **Resubmit** sits beside each event. It stores a
+copy of the event as a new event and delivers it to every target that is active
+now. Both actions are limited to 30 per minute per client.
 
 ### Profile and settings
 
@@ -171,45 +177,51 @@ Do not set `BIND_ADDRESS` to an empty value in a container. An empty value means
 unset, and unset falls back to `127.0.0.1`, so the container answers nothing on
 its published port.
 
-The app runs as user `webhooker`. The image's start-up script,
-`deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh`, gives `DATA_DIR` and its contents to that user
+The app runs as user `webhooker`. The image's start-up script is
+`deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh`. It gives `DATA_DIR` and its contents to that user
 before the app starts. So a host directory can be mounted as it is. webhooker
-creates every SQLite file with mode `0600`.
+creates every SQLite file readable and writable by that user alone (mode
+`0600`).
 
 ### Running under upaas
 
-[upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas), a deployment tool, builds the image
-from this repository's `Dockerfile` and runs it. Add no port mapping, because
-upaas publishes every mapped port on all interfaces of the host. Put the app on
-your reverse proxy's Docker network instead, and mount one host directory at
-`/var/lib/webhooker`.
+[upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) is a deployment tool. It builds the
+image from this repository's `Dockerfile` and runs it. Add no port mapping,
+because upaas publishes every mapped port on all interfaces of the host. Put the
+app on your reverse proxy's Docker network instead, and mount one host directory
+at `/var/lib/webhooker`. The first-boot password goes to the container's log.
+Read it with `docker logs` and the name upaas gave the container.
 
 ### Behind a reverse proxy
 
 webhooker speaks plain HTTP. It does not handle TLS, the encryption behind
 HTTPS: it holds no certificate and accepts no HTTPS connections. The reverse
-proxy holds the certificate and reaches webhooker over a private address. On a
-bare host that is loopback, the address only this host can reach. For the image
-it is the Docker bridge.
+proxy holds the certificate and reaches webhooker over a private address. A bare
+host is a host without Docker. On a bare host the private address is loopback
+(`127.0.0.1`), which only this host can reach. For the image it is the Docker
+bridge, the private network Docker puts containers on.
 
 Four things must be right.
 
 1. **Keep the app port private.** Only the proxy may reach it: `127.0.0.1` on a
    bare host, or a port published to `127.0.0.1` for the image.
 2. **Send `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`.** This header tells webhooker the request
-   arrived over TLS. It decides the `Secure` flag on cookies, and whether a form
-   submission must carry a matching `Origin` or `Referer`. webhooker reads it
-   from any connecting machine, so the proxy must overwrite whatever the client
-   sent.
+   arrived over TLS. It decides the `Secure` flag on cookies, the flag that
+   makes a browser send them only over HTTPS. It also decides whether a form
+   submission must carry a matching `Origin` or `Referer` header. A browser
+   sends those two headers to say which site or page a request came from.
+   webhooker reads `X-Forwarded-Proto` from any connecting machine, so the proxy
+   must overwrite whatever the client sent.
 3. **Cover the proxy in `TRUSTED_PROXIES`.** Otherwise every client shares one
-   rate-limit bucket, the count a limit keeps per client. The default list
-   covers the Docker bridge address, such as `172.17.0.1`, that the image sees a
-   proxy at. It does not cover loopback, so on a bare host set
-   `TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1`.
-4. **Pass on the client's `Host` header with its port.** webhooker checks a
-   form's `Origin` against the `Host` header it receives. A `Host` without the
-   port makes every form submission fail with `403` on any port other than 443.
-   In nginx that means `$http_host`, not `$host`.
+   rate-limit bucket, the count a limit keeps per client. A proxy on the host
+   reaches the container from the Docker bridge address, such as `172.17.0.1`.
+   The default list covers it. The list does not cover loopback, so on a bare
+   host set `TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1`.
+4. **Pass on the client's `Host` header with its port.** `Host` is the header
+   that names the site the client asked for. webhooker checks a form's `Origin`
+   against the `Host` header it receives. A `Host` without the port makes every
+   form submission fail with `403` on any port other than `443`. For the nginx
+   reverse proxy that means `$http_host`, not `$host`.
 
 Protect the proxy's access log: its request paths hold the entrypoint UUIDs.
 
@@ -233,14 +245,19 @@ server {
 }
 ```
 
-The block matches webhooker's 1 MB body cap and its 60 second request timeout.
+The block matches webhooker's 1 MB body cap. Its `proxy_read_timeout` is longer
+than webhooker's 60 second request timeout, so webhooker's own `504` reaches the
+client first.
 
 ### HSTS
 
 HSTS is a response header that tells browsers to use HTTPS only for this
 hostname and every name under it, for `max-age` seconds. Every response carries
 it unless `HSTS_MAX_AGE` is `0`. A browser keeps the rule until `max-age` runs
-out, so serve webhooker on a hostname you will keep on HTTPS.
+out, so serve webhooker on a hostname you will keep on HTTPS. The header always
+carries `preload`. On a whole domain such as `example.com`, that lets the domain
+be added to the HTTPS-only list that browsers ship with. That listing is hard to
+undo.
 
 ## Recovering a lost admin password
 
@@ -252,10 +269,11 @@ the server does and refuses while a running instance holds it.
 DATA_DIR=/var/lib/webhooker webhooker resetpw -generate admin
 ```
 
-Without `-generate`, the new password is read from standard input. It must be at
-least 8 characters. It is never taken as a command-line argument, because other
-accounts on the host can read those. The command creates nothing: a missing
-`DATA_DIR`, a missing `webhooker.db` or an unknown username is an error.
+`-generate` makes up a random password and prints it. Without `-generate`, the
+new password is read from standard input. It must be at least 8 bytes long. It
+is never taken as a command-line argument, because other accounts on the host
+can read those. The command creates nothing: a missing `DATA_DIR`, a missing
+`webhooker.db` or an unknown username is an error.
 
 In a container, run the binary at `/app/webhooker` with the stopped container's
 volume mounted:
@@ -269,18 +287,19 @@ docker run --rm -v /path/to/data:/var/lib/webhooker \
 
 All state lives in `DATA_DIR`. Back up the whole directory. It holds:
 
-- the main database, `webhooker.db`: the session key, the `admin` account's
-  password hash, and the webhooks, entrypoints and targets;
+- the main database, `webhooker.db`: the session key (which signs the session
+  cookies), the `admin` account's password hash, and the webhooks, entrypoints
+  and targets;
 - one event database per webhook, `events-{webhook_uuid}.db`: its events,
   deliveries and attempts;
 - the files of each archive target;
 - the lock file, `webhooker.lock`, which is always empty.
 
-Every database runs in WAL mode. WAL is SQLite's write-ahead log: finished
+Every database runs in WAL mode. WAL is SQLite's write-ahead log. Finished
 writes land in a `-wal` file beside the database before they reach the `.db`
-itself, and a `-shm` file beside it indexes that log. A copy of the `.db`
-without its `-wal` is missing data. A clean shutdown removes the `-wal` and
-`-shm` files; a crash leaves them, and they must be carried with the `.db`. Keep
+itself. A `-shm` file beside it indexes that log. A copy of the `.db` without
+its `-wal` is missing data. A clean shutdown removes the `-wal` and `-shm`
+files; a crash leaves them, and they must be carried with the `.db`. Keep
 `DATA_DIR` on a local disk: WAL mode is not reliable on network filesystems, and
 webhooker does not check for one.
 
@@ -296,7 +315,7 @@ done
 ```
 
 Each file is captured at its own instant. A webhook created during the backup
-can be in the copy of `webhooker.db` with no event database in the backup; a
+can be in the copy of `webhooker.db` with no event database in the backup. A
 restore then creates that event database empty.
 
 To restore, stop the service and put back every file together, with any `-wal`
@@ -314,11 +333,11 @@ plain text. Protect it accordingly.
 
 ### The entrypoint URL is the credential
 
-Each entrypoint is a random version 4 UUID served at `/h/{uuid}`. Holding that
-URL is what authorises a sender. The receiver checks nothing else: no shared
-secret, no HMAC signature (a hash of the body made with a shared key), no token
-header. Signature headers a sender adds anyway are stored and forwarded as
-ordinary headers.
+Each entrypoint is a random UUID served at `/h/{uuid}`. Holding that URL is what
+authorises a sender. The receiver checks nothing else: no shared secret, no HMAC
+signature (a hash of the body made with a shared key), no token header. If a
+sender adds signature headers anyway, they are stored and forwarded as ordinary
+headers.
 
 Keep the URL out of tickets, chat and screenshots. webhooker's own log never
 writes it. The reverse proxy's access log does hold it, in the request path.
@@ -327,33 +346,37 @@ writes it. The reverse proxy's access log does hold it, in the request path.
 
 - Passwords are hashed with Argon2id, a slow password hashing function.
 - Session cookies are signed, `HttpOnly` (hidden from page scripts) and
-  `SameSite=Lax` (not sent with cross-site form posts). They carry `Secure` when
-  the request carries `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`.
+  `SameSite=Lax` (not sent with cross-site form posts). They carry `Secure`
+  (sent only over HTTPS) when the request carries `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`.
 - Every form is protected against cross-site request forgery (CSRF). CSRF is
   when another site makes your browser submit a form here. Each form carries a
   token tied to a cookie, and a submission's `Origin` must name this host.
 - Form bodies are capped at 1 MB.
 - Every response carries these headers:
-    - `Strict-Transport-Security`, unless `HSTS_MAX_AGE` is `0`;
-    - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`;
-    - `X-Frame-Options: DENY`;
-    - a Content-Security-Policy (CSP), the header that tells the browser where
-      scripts and styles may come from, set to
-      `default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'`;
-    - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`;
-    - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()`.
+    - `Strict-Transport-Security`, the HSTS header, unless `HSTS_MAX_AGE` is
+      `0`;
+    - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, which stops the browser guessing a
+      file's type;
+    - `X-Frame-Options: DENY`, which stops other sites showing these pages in a
+      frame;
+    - `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'`,
+      which tells the browser where scripts and styles may come from;
+    - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`, which tells another
+      site only which site a visitor came from, not which page;
+    - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()`, which
+      denies the pages the camera, microphone and location.
 - `/metrics` sits behind HTTP basic authentication, a username and password sent
   with each request.
 
 ### Sign-in limits
 
-The password is checked first, and only a failed sign-in is counted. A correct
-password is never answered `429`. Failures are counted per client and submitted
-username. From the fifth failure within a minute, each failure is answered
-`429`. At most two password checks run at once; a request that gets no turn
-within 5 seconds is answered `503`. So those two checks, not the failure count,
-bound how fast passwords can be guessed. Choose a long random admin password, or
-rate-limit `POST /pages/login` at the reverse proxy.
+From the fifth failure within a minute, each failure is answered `429`. Only
+failures are counted. A correct password is never answered `429`. Failures are
+counted per client and submitted username. At most two password checks run at
+once; a request that gets no turn within 5 seconds is answered `503`. So
+guessing speed is bounded by the limit of two checks at a time, not by the
+failure count. Choose a long random `admin` password, or rate-limit
+`POST /pages/login` at the reverse proxy.
 
 ### Delivery destinations
 
@@ -361,8 +384,9 @@ A delivery target could be used to make webhooker send requests into the network
 it sits in and read the answers back. This is called server-side request forgery
 (SSRF). webhooker refuses it with the SSRF guard.
 
-Every target URL must use `http` or `https` and resolve to a public address. The
-SSRF guard refuses these ranges:
+Every target URL must use `http` or `https`. By default its hostname must also
+point at a public address, one reachable from the internet. The SSRF guard
+refuses these ranges:
 
 - loopback, `127.0.0.0/8` and `::1`;
 - the RFC 1918 private ranges, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12` and
@@ -370,17 +394,20 @@ SSRF guard refuses these ranges:
 - link-local space, which is valid only on one network segment;
 - carrier-grade NAT space, which internet providers use inside their own
   networks;
-- multicast, the IPv6 unique local range, and the other reserved ranges.
+- multicast, the addresses that reach a group of hosts at once;
+- the IPv6 unique local range, `fc00::/7`, the private space of IPv6;
+- the other reserved ranges.
 
 The SSRF guard runs when a target is saved and again when each delivery
-connects, so a hostname that changes its address later is still checked.
+connects. So a hostname that changes its address later is still checked.
 Redirects are followed up to ten hops, and each hop is checked. A hop to another
-host or port, or from `https` to `http`, carries none of the configured or
-forwarded headers, so a redirect cannot pass a credential to another host.
+host or port, or from `https` to `http`, drops every configured or forwarded
+header except `Content-Type`, which names the body's format. So a redirect
+cannot pass a credential to another host.
 
 Egress means the connections webhooker opens outward to deliver.
-[`ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS`](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network) opens named
-networks to it.
+[`ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS`](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network) lets deliveries
+reach networks you name.
 
 ### What the logs contain
 
@@ -394,8 +421,9 @@ The `admin` password is printed in the clear on the first boot and by
 query string, headers and body.
 
 When `SENTRY_DSN` is set, error reports go to Sentry, an error reporting
-service. A report carries no query string, body or cookies, and the route
-pattern (the route as registered, such as `/h/{uuid}`) in place of the path.
+service. A report carries no query string, body or cookies. It carries the route
+pattern in place of the path. A route pattern is the path with its variable part
+left as a name, such as `/h/{uuid}`.
 
 ## Design
 
@@ -404,21 +432,23 @@ sends them on in the background, and SQLite holds everything in between.
 
 The receiver stores the event and one pending delivery per active target in one
 database write, then queues the deliveries. Background workers run them and
-record each attempt. At start and then every minute, a recovery routine queues
-again any delivery left `pending` or `retrying`, so a stop or a crash loses no
-delivery.
+record each attempt. At start, a recovery routine resumes every delivery left
+`pending` or `retrying`. It then runs every minute. Each run resumes every
+`retrying` delivery that the engine is not already handling. It also resumes a
+`pending` delivery that has sat untouched for 15 minutes. So a stop or a crash
+loses no delivery.
 
 The main database holds configuration. Each webhook has its own event database,
 so writes for one webhook never wait on another webhook's database. The program
-starts in `cmd/webhooker/main.go`, and its packages are under `internal/`. The
-pages' HTML, CSS and JavaScript are embedded in the binary.
+starts in `cmd/webhooker/main.go`, and its logic is under `internal/`. The
+`static` and `templates` packages embed the pages' HTML, CSS and JavaScript in
+the binary.
 
 ## Configuration reference
 
-All configuration comes from environment variables. For development, variables
-can also go in a `.env` file in the working directory. A variable set in the
-real environment wins over the file. A `.env` file that cannot be parsed aborts
-startup.
+All configuration comes from environment variables. Variables can also go in a
+`.env` file in the working directory. A variable set in the real environment
+wins over the file. A `.env` file that cannot be parsed aborts startup.
 
 A variable that is unset or empty takes its default. A variable that is set but
 cannot be parsed aborts startup with a message naming it. A Go duration is a
@@ -427,16 +457,20 @@ number with a unit, such as `30s`, `15m` or `24h`.
 ### `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT`
 
 `dev` or `prod`. Default `prod`. This controls one thing: CORS, the headers that
-let a page on another site call this one from a browser. In `dev`, every origin
-is allowed. In `prod`, no CORS headers are sent.
+let a page on another site call this one from a browser. An origin is a site as
+a browser names it: scheme, host and port. In `dev`, every origin is allowed. In
+`prod`, no CORS headers are sent.
 
 ### `PORT`
 
-The TCP port the listener binds. Default `8080`.
+The port webhooker listens on. Default `8080`. Docker marks the image's
+container healthy by a check every 30 seconds. The check requests port `8080`
+whatever `PORT` says, so a container started with another `PORT` reports
+unhealthy.
 
 ### `BIND_ADDRESS`
 
-The IP address the listener binds. Default `127.0.0.1`. The Docker image sets
+The IP address webhooker listens on. Default `127.0.0.1`. The Docker image sets
 `0.0.0.0`. It must be an IP address literal: `localhost` and a value with a port
 are refused. `0.0.0.0` listens on IPv4 only; `::` listens on IPv6 and IPv4.
 
@@ -445,17 +479,17 @@ are refused. `0.0.0.0` listens on IPv4 only; `::` listens on IPv6 and IPv4.
 The directory for every SQLite database and the lock file. Default
 `/var/lib/webhooker`. It is created if it is missing.
 
-Exactly one webhooker process may use a `DATA_DIR` at a time; two would both run
-the recovery routine and send every pending delivery twice. At startup the
-process locks `{DATA_DIR}/webhooker.lock` with `flock`, the kernel's file lock,
-and a second process pointed at the same directory exits with a message naming
-it.
+Exactly one webhooker process may use a `DATA_DIR` at a time. Two would both run
+the recovery routine and could send one delivery twice. At startup the process
+locks `{DATA_DIR}/webhooker.lock` with `flock`, the kernel's file lock. A second
+process pointed at the same directory exits with a message that names the
+directory and the lock file.
 
 ### `DEBUG`
 
 `true` or `false`. Default `false`. It accepts the spellings Go's
 `strconv.ParseBool` accepts; `yes` and `on` are refused. `DEBUG=true` lowers the
-log level to `DEBUG`, which adds every SQL statement, with `?` in place of each
+log level to `DEBUG`, which adds SQL statements, with `?` in place of each
 value, and other diagnostic lines.
 
 ### `METRICS_USERNAME` and `METRICS_PASSWORD`
@@ -504,11 +538,11 @@ private ranges. A set value replaces the default.
 
 The list decides whose `X-Forwarded-For` header is believed. `X-Forwarded-For`
 is the header a proxy uses to pass on the address of the client it is serving.
-It is read only when the connecting machine is inside the list. `X-Real-IP` and
-`True-Client-IP` are never read. If any client can reach webhooker, or the proxy
-in front of it, from a private address, set the list to the proxy's address
-alone. Otherwise those clients can choose their own `X-Forwarded-For` and bypass
-every rate limit.
+It is read only when the connecting machine is inside the list. webhooker never
+reads `X-Real-IP` or `True-Client-IP`, two other headers with the same job. Some
+clients may reach webhooker, or the proxy in front of it, from a private
+address. If so, set the list to the proxy's address alone. Otherwise those
+clients can choose their own `X-Forwarded-For` and bypass every rate limit.
 
 ### Allowing egress to your own network
 
@@ -517,13 +551,15 @@ that delivery targets may reach although the SSRF guard refuses them by default.
 Default empty. Example: `10.0.0.0/8, 172.17.0.0/16`. When the list is set,
 startup logs it at `WARN`.
 
-Anyone with the admin account can make webhooker send requests to every network
-you list, and read the responses in the event log. List the smallest blocks that
-cover your destinations, and never `0.0.0.0/0` or `::/0`.
+Anyone with the `admin` account can make webhooker send requests to every
+network you list, and read the responses in **Full Event Log**. List the
+smallest networks that cover your destinations, and never `0.0.0.0/0` or `::/0`.
 
 These addresses stay blocked whatever you list. They are link-local space, the
-unspecified addresses, and cloud metadata endpoints, the addresses a cloud gives
-each virtual machine for its own credentials:
+unspecified addresses and cloud metadata endpoints. The unspecified addresses
+are `0.0.0.0` and `::`, which name no host. A cloud metadata endpoint is the
+address a cloud gives each virtual machine for its own credentials. The blocked
+addresses are:
 
 - `169.254.0.0/16` and `fe80::/10`;
 - `fd00:ec2::254/128` and `fd00:ec2::23/128`;
@@ -536,25 +572,25 @@ each virtual machine for its own credentials:
 - `0.0.0.0/32` and `::/128`;
 - `::a9fe:a9fe/128` and `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe/128`.
 
-This list is not every cloud's metadata address. If yours is not here, do not
-list the block that contains it. Azure's public `168.63.129.16` is refused by
-default but is reopened by a list that covers it.
+Some clouds' metadata addresses are not on this list. If yours is not here, do
+not list the network that contains it. Azure's public metadata address,
+`168.63.129.16`, is refused by default but is reopened by a list that covers it.
 
 ## Delivery reference
 
-An `http` target posts the event body to its URL with the event's `Content-Type`
-and headers, then the target's configured **Headers**, which replace event
-headers of the same name. Every `http` and `slack` request carries
-`User-Agent: webhooker/{version}`, replacing the sender's `User-Agent` and any
-configured one. A `2xx` response is a success. The first 4 KiB of the response
-body is stored with the attempt. **Timeout** is at most 300 seconds, and blank
-means the 30 second default. **Pass the query string on to this target** appends
-the event's query string to the URL.
+An `http` target posts the event body to its URL. The request carries the
+event's `Content-Type` and headers. The target's configured **Headers** are
+added next and replace event headers of the same name. Every `http` and `slack`
+request carries `User-Agent: webhooker/{version}`. `User-Agent` is the header
+that names the sending program. The **Headers** field refuses `User-Agent`. A
+response with a status from `200` to `299` is a success. The first 4 KiB of the
+response body is stored with the attempt. **Timeout** is at most 300 seconds,
+and blank means the 30 second default. **Pass the query string on to this
+target** appends the event's query string to the URL.
 
 A `slack` target posts a message that describes the event and shows its body in
-a code block, cut at 3500 bytes. An archive target, whose stored type is
-`database`, appends the event as a row to its own SQLite file. A `log` target
-writes the event as one `INFO` line.
+a code block, cut at 3500 bytes. An archive target appends the event as a row to
+its own SQLite file. A `log` target writes the event as one `INFO` line.
 
 **Delivery attempts** is from 1 to 20. A failed attempt marks the delivery
 `retrying` and schedules the next attempt; the wait doubles each time, starting
@@ -572,11 +608,12 @@ paused.
 An archive target writes to
 `archive-{webhook_name}-{target_name}-{target_uuid}.db` in `DATA_DIR`, the two
 names made safe for a file name. A rotation of `monthly`, `daily` or `hourly`
-starts a new file for each period, in UTC, with the period before `.db`, such as
-`-2026-10-01.db`. Rows older than the expiry are deleted on each write and by
-the archive sweep. Renaming the webhook or the target renames the files.
-**Download** on the webhook page returns the target's whole archive as one
-gzipped JSON file.
+starts a new file for each period. Periods follow UTC, the universal time that
+ignores local time zones. The period goes before `.db`, such as
+`-2026-10-01.db`. Rows older than the expiry are deleted each time a file is
+opened and by the archive sweep. Renaming the webhook or the target renames the
+files. **Download** on the webhook page returns the target's whole archive as
+one JSON file compressed with gzip.
 
 ## HTTP routes reference
 
@@ -587,6 +624,8 @@ gzipped JSON file.
     - an unknown UUID gets `404`;
     - a deactivated entrypoint gets `410`;
     - a body over 1 MB gets `413`;
+    - a body that cannot be read in full gets `400`, for example one still
+      arriving after the server's 10 second read limit;
     - a failure to store the event gets `500`;
     - a stored event gets `200` with `{"status":"ok"}`.
 - `GET /pages/login` shows the sign-in form, `POST /pages/login` signs in, and
@@ -600,9 +639,9 @@ gzipped JSON file.
 ## Metrics reference
 
 `/metrics` serves these metrics for Prometheus, the monitoring system, plus the
-Go runtime and process metrics the Prometheus library provides. Each delivery
-metric carries one label, `target_type`, which is `http`, `slack`, `database`,
-`log` or `unknown`.
+Go runtime and process metrics the Prometheus library provides. A label is a
+name and value attached to a metric. Each delivery metric carries one label,
+`target_type`, which is `http`, `slack`, `database`, `log` or `unknown`.
 
 - `webhooker_events_received_total` and `webhooker_events_resubmitted_total`,
   two counters (totals that only grow) with no label;
@@ -616,17 +655,17 @@ metric carries one label, `target_type`, which is `http`, `slack`, `database`,
   (current values) sampled every 30 seconds;
 - `webhooker_circuit_breakers_open`.
 
-Two inbound HTTP metrics, `http_request_duration_seconds` and
-`http_response_size_bytes`, carry the route pattern as their `handler` label,
-never the real path. A third, `http_requests_inflight`, counts all routes
-together.
+`http_request_duration_seconds` and `http_response_size_bytes` measure inbound
+requests. Their `handler` label is the route pattern, never the real path.
+`http_requests_inflight` counts all routes together.
 
 ## Development
 
 You need the Go version named in `go.mod`, and Docker. The tests, the linters,
-prettier and the stylesheet build run in Docker, at versions pinned (fixed to
-one exact release) in the `Dockerfile`, `package.json` and `yarn.lock`. `gofmt`
-and `goimports` run on the host.
+`prettier` and the stylesheet build run in Docker. Their versions are pinned
+(fixed to one exact release) in the `Dockerfile`, `package.json` and
+`yarn.lock`. `gofmt` runs on the host. `goimports` runs on the host too, when it
+is installed. `script/bootstrap` does not install it.
 
 ```bash
 make bootstrap    # Install git, make, Go and the Go modules
@@ -639,25 +678,27 @@ make build        # Build bin/webhooker, version-stamped
 make docker       # Build the Docker image
 ```
 
-Each `make` target except `build`, `run`, `dev`, `deps` and `clean` runs a
-script in `script/`, listed under [Entrypoints](#entrypoints). Every
-`docker build` in `script/` passes `--no-cache`, so a check that passes has
-really run.
+Most `make` targets run a script in `script/`, listed under
+[Entrypoints](#entrypoints). `build`, `run`, `dev`, `deps` and `clean` run their
+own commands. Every `docker build` in `script/` passes `--no-cache`, so a check
+that passes has really run.
 
 The binary's version comes from `script/version`: `git describe` on the
 checkout, or `VERSION` when that is set. It is shown at
 `/.well-known/healthcheck` and in the page footer.
 
-The pages use one third-party script, Alpine.js, in its CSP build
-`@alpinejs/csp`, which runs under a Content-Security-Policy that forbids `eval`.
-The npm registry is where JavaScript packages are published. The package file in
-`3p/` is byte for byte the one it publishes.
+The pages use one third-party script, Alpine.js. They load `@alpinejs/csp`, the
+version of it that works when the Content-Security-Policy forbids running text
+as code. The npm registry is where JavaScript packages are published.
+`static/js/alpine.min.js` is committed byte for byte as the npm registry
+publishes it.
 
-A browser test in `internal/server` loads the pages in a headless browser, one
-without a window, under the real Content-Security-Policy. `make test` leaves it
-out; run `make test-browser` after changing `templates/` or `static/js/`.
-`static/css/tailwind.css` is generated by Tailwind and committed; `make check`
-fails when it is out of date, and `make css` regenerates it.
+A headless browser is a browser without a window. A browser test in
+`internal/server` loads the pages in one under the real Content-Security-Policy.
+`make test` leaves it out; run `make test-browser` after changing `templates/`
+or `static/js/`. `static/css/tailwind.css` is generated by Tailwind, a CSS
+generator. The file is committed. `make check` fails when it is out of date, and
+`make css` regenerates it.
 
 ## Entrypoints
 
@@ -670,26 +711,25 @@ application are under [Entrypoint URLs](#entrypoint-urls).
 - `script/bootstrap` installs git, make, Go and the Go modules.
 - `script/setup` runs `script/bootstrap`, then `script/install-precommit`.
 - `script/projectname` prints `webhooker`.
-- `script/assets` extracts Alpine.js from `3p/` to `static/js/alpine.min.js`.
 - `script/test` runs the tests in Docker.
 - `script/test-browser` runs the browser test in Docker.
 - `script/lint` runs `gofmt`, `golangci-lint` and ESLint in Docker.
-- `script/fmt` formats the Go code with `gofmt` and `goimports` on the host, and
-  the Markdown with prettier in Docker.
-- `script/fmt-check` fails when `gofmt` or prettier would change a file. It does
-  not run `goimports`, and it writes nothing.
+- `script/fmt` formats the Go code with `gofmt` on the host and the Markdown
+  with `prettier` in Docker. It also runs `goimports` when that is installed.
+- `script/fmt-check` fails when `gofmt` or `prettier` would change a file. It
+  does not run `goimports`, and it writes nothing.
 - `script/css` regenerates `static/css/tailwind.css` in Docker.
 - `script/css-check` fails when `static/css/tailwind.css` is out of date.
 - `script/check` runs `script/test`, `script/lint`, `script/fmt-check` and
   `script/css-check`.
 - `script/version` prints the version to stamp into the binary.
 - `script/docker` builds the image tagged `webhooker`.
-- `script/cibuild` is what CI, the check run on every push, runs:
+- CI is the check that runs on every push. It runs `script/cibuild`:
   `script/bootstrap`, `script/check`, then the image build.
 - `script/precommit` checks that `go mod tidy` changes nothing, then runs
   `script/check`.
-- `script/install-precommit` installs the git pre-commit hook that runs
-  `script/precommit`.
+- `script/install-precommit` installs the git hook that runs `script/precommit`
+  before each commit.
 
 ## TODO
 

TODO.md

@@ -1,72 +1,77 @@
 # Workflow
 
-One issue per unit of work, one branch and one PR per issue:
+One issue per unit of work, and one branch and one PR per issue:
 
-- ensure a tracked issue exists with a definition of done
-- branch from `next` (never from `main`)
-- do the work; open a PR based on `next` (never on `main`)
-- pass an independent review, then the manager squash-merges into `next`
-- push; nothing stays local-only
+- make sure a tracked issue exists with a definition of done
+- branch from `next`, never from `main`
+- do the work and push the branch
+- open a PR with base `next`, never `main`
+- pass an independent review
+- the repository manager squash-merges it into `next`
 
-`next` is the branch for the next milestone and must stay green and mergeable to
-`main` without notice. One `next` -> `main` PR accumulates the milestone;
-releases are cut from `main` separately.
+The repository manager is the role that merges each issue's PR into `next`.
+Nothing stays local-only: every commit is pushed.
 
-The tracker (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues) is the record of what
-is done and what is under way. This file keeps no list of either.
+`next` is the branch for the next milestone. It must stay green and mergeable
+into `main` at all times. A milestone's work reaches `main` through one PR from
+`next`. The owner, @sneak, merges that PR. Cutting a release from `main` is a
+separate step after that.
+
+The tracker (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues) records what is done
+and what is under way. This file keeps no list of either.
 
 # Status
 
 What is still open for 1.0.0 is in its milestone
-(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/milestone/9). `v1.0.0` is not tagged, and
-only @sneak tags it.
+(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/milestone/9). `v1.0.0` is not tagged. Only
+@sneak tags it.
 
-Delivery is at-least-once by design, not by accident: a send whose result row
-does not land is attempted again, so a receiver can see a duplicate. That is
-deliberate — the alternative is a silent lost delivery — and the README says so
-under Rationale. It is not a defect to re-file.
+Delivery is at least once by design. When webhooker cannot record the outcome of
+a delivery, it sends that delivery again. The target can then receive the same
+event twice. The alternative is a lost delivery that nothing reports. The README
+says so. Such a duplicate is not a defect to re-file.
 
 # Next Step
 
 @sneak runs webhooker in limited production, then tags `v1.0.0`. Merging `next`
-into `main` is a separate act from tagging and waits on neither of those: `next`
-is kept mergeable at all times, which is the point of the branch.
+into `main` is a separate act. It waits on neither the production run nor the
+tag.
 
 # Future Steps
 
-- Per-webhook rate limits, set in the web UI and enforced in the receiver
-  handler, on top of the receiver's existing limits, which `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`
-  sets for the whole server (see Rate Limiting in the README)
-- API key authentication for programmatic access (the `APIKey` model exists, but
-  nothing creates a key and no middleware checks one)
-- REST API v1
-    - CRUD for webhooks, entrypoints, targets
+- Per-webhook rate limits, set in the web UI and enforced at the entrypoint.
+  Today `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` is the only rate-limit setting. It is how many
+  requests per minute one client address may send to one entrypoint. The same
+  address is also capped at ten times that across all entrypoints together.
+- API key authentication for programmatic access. The `APIKey` model and its
+  `api_keys` table exist. Nothing creates a key and nothing checks one.
+- REST API v1. `/api/v1` is mounted with no routes today.
+    - CRUD for webhooks, entrypoints and targets
     - event viewing and filtering endpoints
     - event redelivery endpoint
     - OpenAPI specification
 - Analytics in the web UI: response times summarised per webhook or per target,
-  and figures for all webhooks together. The webhook page already shows event,
-  delivery and failure counts and failure percentages, the target list counts
-  each target's deliveries, the event log and each event's page show every
-  attempt's duration, and `/metrics` carries server-wide counts and delivery
-  durations
-- A remember-me option at login. Every session already survives a browser
-  restart: it lasts up to 7 days, and ends sooner after `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`
-  (default 24 hours) without activity
-- Password reset flow for a forgotten password over the web. The authenticated
-  password _change_ flow already landed, and a lost password is recoverable from
-  the console with `webhooker resetpw`
-  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/208)
+  and figures for all webhooks together. Today the webhook page shows event,
+  delivery and failure counts and failure percentages. The target list counts
+  each target's deliveries. The event log shows every attempt's duration.
+  `/metrics` carries server-wide counts and delivery durations.
+- A remember-me option at login. Today every session survives a browser restart.
+  It lasts up to 7 days. It ends sooner after `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` (default 24
+  hours) without use.
+- Password reset over the web for a forgotten password. Today a signed-in user
+  can change their password. A lost password is reset from the command line with
+  `webhooker resetpw` (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/208).
 - Later, nice to have
     - email delivery target type
     - SNS and S3 delivery targets
-    - data transformations (e.g. a configurable Slack message format; the Slack
-      target sends one fixed format today)
-    - JSONL file delivery with periodic S3 upload (the `database` target already
-      archives events to SQLite files, rotated hourly, daily or monthly if set,
-      and the webhook page offers them as one gzipped JSON download)
+    - data transformations, such as a configurable Slack message format. The
+      Slack target sends one fixed format today.
+    - JSONL file delivery with periodic S3 upload. Today an archive target
+      writes events to SQLite files. An archive target can rotate those files
+      hourly, daily or monthly. The webhook page offers them as one gzipped JSON
+      download.
     - webhook event search, and filtering beyond the event log's failed and
       pending views
-    - multi-user with role-based access control (each webhook already belongs to
-      one account, but there is only the account made at first boot and no way
-      to add another)
+    - multi-user with role-based access control. Today each webhook belongs to
+      one account. Only the account made at first boot exists. There is no way
+      to add another.

eslint.config.mjs

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 // REPO_POLICIES.md states that a linter can check: const for everything,
 // let only for a variable that is reassigned, never var.
 export default [
-    // Alpine.js, extracted from 3p/ by make assets; not ours to lint.
+    // Alpine.js, committed as published; not ours to lint.
     { ignores: ["static/js/alpine.min.js"] },
     {
         // The pages load static/js/app.js as a classic script, not a module.

internal/server/static_assets_test.go

@@ -13,9 +13,6 @@ import (
 
 // TestBaseTemplateScriptsAreServed walks every /s/ script the base
 // template loads on each page and fetches it through the real router.
-// Alpine.js is extracted from its tarball in 3p/ at build time, so the
-// file is not in the tree: this is the check that the page still gets
-// the JavaScript it asks for.
 func TestBaseTemplateScriptsAreServed(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 

script/assets

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# script/assets: extract Alpine.js from its npm package tarball, committed
-# in 3p/, to static/js/alpine.min.js, where go:embed reads it. The package
-# is @alpinejs/csp, Alpine's build for pages whose Content-Security-Policy
-# forbids eval. The extracted file is not committed. make build, make dev
-# and the Dockerfile's lint, test and build stages run this first.
-set -eu
-
-ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
-
-main() {
-    cd "$ROOT"
-    tar -xzOf 3p/alpinejs-csp-3.14.9.tgz package/dist/cdn.min.js \
-        >static/js/alpine.min.js
-}
-
-main "$@"

static/static.go

@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ import (
 )
 
 // Static holds the CSS and JavaScript files the web UI's pages load. They
-// are named one by one so that a missing js/alpine.min.js, which make
-// assets extracts and git does not track, fails the build instead of
-// leaving the pages without Alpine.js.
+// are named one by one, so a missing file fails the build instead of
+// leaving the pages without it.
+//
+// js/alpine.min.js is Alpine.js, committed unchanged. It is
+// package/dist/cdn.min.js from the npm package @alpinejs/csp 3.14.9.
 //
 //go:embed css/tailwind.css css/style.css js/app.js js/alpine.min.js
 var Static embed.FS