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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  clawbotandsneak
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8ea7f76540 |
Add NoCache middleware for authenticated pages (closes #61) (#75)
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Adds a `NoCache()` middleware that sets `Cache-Control: no-store` and `Pragma: no-cache`, and wires it onto the dynamic app route groups (`/pages`, `/user/{username}`, `/sources`, `/source/{sourceID}`) adjacent to their existing `CSRF()` call. The static `/s` mount, `/metrics`, `/webhook/{uuid}`, and `/.well-known/healthcheck` are intentionally left untouched (static assets are safe to cache; the others are not authenticated pages).
A middleware unit test asserts both headers are set.
Closes #61
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #75
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
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 clawbotandclawbot
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afe88c601a |
refactor: use pinned golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
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Closes [issue #50](#50) ## Summary Refactors the Dockerfile to use a separate lint stage with a pinned golangci-lint Docker image, following the pattern used by [sneak/pixa](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/pixa). This replaces the previous approach of installing golangci-lint via curl in the builder stage. ## Changes ### Dockerfile - **New `lint` stage** using `golangci/golangci-lint:v2.11.3` (Debian-based, pinned by sha256 digest) as a separate build stage - **Builder stage** depends on lint via `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null` — build won't proceed unless linting passes - **Go bumped** from 1.24 to 1.26.1 (`golang:1.26.1-bookworm`, pinned by sha256) - **golangci-lint bumped** from v1.64.8 to v2.11.3 - All three Docker images (golangci-lint, golang, alpine) pinned by sha256 digest - Debian-based golangci-lint image used (not Alpine) because mattn/go-sqlite3 CGO does not compile on musl (off64_t) ### Linter Config (.golangci.yml) - Migrated from v1 to v2 format (`version: "2"` added) - Removed linters no longer available in v2: `gofmt` (handled by `make fmt-check`), `gosimple` (merged into `staticcheck`), `typecheck` (always-on in v2) - Same set of linters enabled — no rules weakened ### Code Fixes (all lint issues from v2 upgrade) - Added package comments to all packages - Added doc comments to all exported types, functions, and methods - Fixed unchecked errors flagged by `errcheck` (sqlDB.Close, os.Setenv in tests, resp.Body.Close, fmt.Fprint) - Fixed unused parameters flagged by `revive` (renamed to `_`) - Fixed `gosec` G120 warnings: added `http.MaxBytesReader` before `r.ParseForm()` calls - Fixed `staticcheck` QF1012: replaced `WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(...))` with `fmt.Fprintf` - Fixed `staticcheck` QF1003: converted if/else chain to tagged switch - Renamed `DeliveryTask` → `Task` to avoid package stutter (`delivery.Task` instead of `delivery.DeliveryTask`) - Renamed shadowed builtin `max` parameter to `upperBound` in `cryptoRandInt` - Used `t.Setenv` instead of `os.Setenv` in tests (auto-restores) ### README.md - Updated version requirements: Go 1.26+, golangci-lint v2.11+ - Updated Dockerfile description in project structure ## Verification `docker build .` passes cleanly — formatting check, linting, all tests, and build all succeed. Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #55 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotanduser
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d771fe14df |
fix: detect TLS per-request in CSRF middleware to fix login (#54)
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## Problem After the security hardening in PR #42, login fails with `Forbidden - invalid CSRF token` in production deployments. The CSRF middleware tied its `PlaintextHTTPRequest` wrapping and cookie `Secure` flag to the `IsDev()` environment check. This meant production mode always assumed HTTPS via gorilla/csrf's strict mode, which broke login in common deployment scenarios: 1. **Production behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy**: gorilla/csrf assumed HTTPS but `r.TLS` was nil (the Go server receives HTTP from the proxy). Origin/Referer scheme mismatches caused `referer not supplied` or `origin invalid` errors. 2. **Production over direct HTTP** (testing/staging with prod config): the `Secure` cookie flag prevented the browser from sending the CSRF cookie back over HTTP, causing `CSRF token invalid` errors. ## Root Cause gorilla/csrf v1.7.3 defaults to HTTPS-strict mode unless `PlaintextHTTPRequest()` is called. In strict mode it: - Forces `requestURL.Scheme = "https"` for Origin/Referer comparisons - Requires a `Referer` header on POST and rejects `http://` Referer schemes - The `csrf.Secure(true)` option makes the browser refuse to send the CSRF cookie over HTTP The old code only called `PlaintextHTTPRequest()` in dev mode, leaving prod mode permanently stuck in HTTPS-strict mode regardless of the actual transport. ## Fix Detect the actual transport protocol **per-request** using: - `r.TLS != nil` — direct TLS connection to the Go server - `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` header — TLS-terminating reverse proxy Two gorilla/csrf middleware instances are maintained (one with `Secure: true`, one with `Secure: false`) since `csrf.Secure()` is a creation-time option. Both use the same signing key, so cookies are interchangeable. | Scenario | Cookie Secure | Origin/Referer Mode | |---|---|---| | Direct TLS (`r.TLS != nil`) | ✅ Secure | Strict (HTTPS scheme) | | Behind TLS proxy (`X-Forwarded-Proto: https`) | ✅ Secure | Strict (HTTPS scheme) | | Plaintext HTTP | ❌ Non-Secure | Relaxed (PlaintextHTTPRequest) | CSRF token validation (cookie + form double-submit) is always enforced regardless of mode. ## Testing - Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode over plaintext HTTP - Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_BehindProxy_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode behind TLS proxy - Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_DirectTLS_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode with direct TLS - Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithoutToken` — token still required - Added `TestIsClientTLS_*` — TLS detection unit tests - All existing CSRF tests pass unchanged - `docker build .` passes (includes `make check`) - Manual verification: built and ran the container in both `dev` and `prod` modes, confirmed login succeeds in both Closes #53 Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #54 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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60786c5019 |
feat: add CSRF protection, SSRF prevention, and login rate limiting (#42)
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## Security Hardening This PR implements three security hardening issues: ### CSRF Protection (closes #35) - Session-based CSRF tokens with cryptographically random 256-bit generation - Constant-time token comparison to prevent timing attacks - CSRF middleware applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and `/user` routes - Hidden `csrf_token` field added to all 12+ POST forms in templates - Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and `/api` (stateless API) ### SSRF Prevention (closes #36) - `ValidateTargetURL()` blocks private/reserved IP ranges at target creation time - Blocked ranges: `127.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `::1`, `fc00::/7`, `fe80::/10`, plus multicast, reserved, test-net, and CGN ranges - SSRF-safe HTTP transport with custom `DialContext` in the delivery engine for defense-in-depth (prevents DNS rebinding attacks) - Only `http` and `https` schemes allowed ### Login Rate Limiting (closes #37) - Per-IP rate limiter using `golang.org/x/time/rate` - 5 attempts per minute per IP on `POST /pages/login` - GET requests (form rendering) pass through unaffected - Automatic cleanup of stale per-IP limiter entries every 5 minutes - `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` header support for reverse proxies ### Files Changed **New files:** - `internal/middleware/csrf.go` + tests — CSRF middleware - `internal/middleware/ratelimit.go` + tests — Login rate limiter - `internal/delivery/ssrf.go` + tests — SSRF validation + safe transport **Modified files:** - `internal/server/routes.go` — Wire CSRF and rate limit middleware - `internal/handlers/handlers.go` — Inject CSRF token into template data - `internal/handlers/source_management.go` — SSRF validation on target creation - `internal/delivery/engine.go` — SSRF-safe HTTP transport for production - All form templates — Added hidden `csrf_token` fields - `README.md` — Updated Security section and TODO checklist `docker build .` passes (lint + tests + build). Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org> Reviewed-on: #42 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandclawbot
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1fbcf96581 |
security: add headers middleware, session regeneration, and body size limits (#41)
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## Summary This PR implements three security hardening measures: ### Security Headers Middleware (closes #34) Adds a `SecurityHeaders()` middleware applied globally to all routes. Every response now includes: - `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload` - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` - `X-Frame-Options: DENY` - `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'` - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()` ### Session Fixation Prevention (closes #38) Adds a `Regenerate()` method to the session manager that destroys the old session and creates a new one with a fresh ID, copying all session values. Called after successful login to prevent session fixation attacks. ### Request Body Size Limits (closes #39) Adds a `MaxBodySize()` middleware using `http.MaxBytesReader` to limit POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. Applied to all form endpoints (`/pages`, `/sources`, `/source/*`). ## Files Changed - `internal/middleware/middleware.go` — Added `SecurityHeaders()` and `MaxBodySize()` middleware - `internal/session/session.go` — Added `Regenerate()` method for session fixation prevention - `internal/handlers/auth.go` — Updated login handler to regenerate session after authentication - `internal/server/routes.go` — Added SecurityHeaders globally, MaxBodySize to form route groups - `README.md` — Documented new middleware in stack, updated Security section, moved items to completed TODO closes #34, closes #38, closes #39 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #41 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandclawbot
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289f479772 |
test: add tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages (#32)
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## Summary Add comprehensive test coverage for three previously-untested packages, addressing [issue #28](#28). ## Coverage Improvements | Package | Before | After | |---------|--------|-------| | `internal/delivery` | 37.1% | 74.5% | | `internal/middleware` | 0.0% | 70.2% | | `internal/session` | 0.0% | 51.5% | ## What's Tested ### delivery (37% → 75%) - `processNewTask` with inline and large (DB-fetched) bodies - `processRetryTask` success, skip non-retrying, large body fetch - Worker lifecycle start/stop, retry channel processing - `processDelivery` unknown target type handling - `recoverPendingDeliveries`, `recoverWebhookDeliveries`, `recoverInFlight` - HTTP delivery with custom headers, timeout, invalid config - `Notify` batching ### middleware (0% → 70%) - Logging middleware status code capture and pass-through - `LoggingResponseWriter` delegation - CORS dev mode (allow-all) and prod mode (no-op) - `RequireAuth` redirect for unauthenticated, pass-through for authenticated - `MetricsAuth` basic auth validation - `ipFromHostPort` helper ### session (0% → 52%) - `Get`/`Save` round-trip with real cookie store - `SetUser`, `GetUserID`, `GetUsername`, `IsAuthenticated` - `ClearUser` removes all keys - `Destroy` invalidates session (MaxAge -1) - Session persistence across requests - Edge cases: overwrite user, wrong type, constants ## Test Helpers Added - `database.NewTestDatabase` / `NewTestWebhookDBManager` — cross-package test helpers for delivery integration tests - `session.NewForTest` — creates session manager without fx lifecycle for middleware tests ## Notes - No production code modified - All tests use `httptest`, SQLite in-memory, and real cookie stores — no external network calls - Full test suite completes in ~3.5s within the 30s timeout - `docker build .` passes (lint + test + build) closes #28 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #32 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbot
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45228d9e99 |
fix: restrict CORS to same-origin (closes #23)
In dev mode, keep the wildcard origin for local testing convenience. In production, skip CORS headers entirely since the web UI is server-rendered and cross-origin requests are not expected. |
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clawbot
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7d13c9da17 |
feat: add auth middleware for protected routes
Add RequireAuth middleware that checks for a valid session and
redirects unauthenticated users to /pages/login. Applied to all
/sources and /source/{sourceID} routes. The middleware uses the
existing session package for authentication checks.
closes #9
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clawbotandclawbot
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f9a9569015 |
feat: bring repo up to REPO_POLICIES standards (#6)
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## Summary This PR brings the webhooker repo into full REPO_POLICIES compliance, addressing both [issue #1](#1) and [issue #2](#2). ## Changes ### New files - **`cmd/webhooker/main.go`** — The missing application entry point. Uses Uber fx to wire together all internal packages (config, database, logger, server, handlers, middleware, healthcheck, globals, session). Minimal glue code. - **`REPO_POLICIES.md`** — Fetched from authoritative source (`sneak/prompts`) - **`.editorconfig`** — Fetched from authoritative source - **`.dockerignore`** — Sensible Go project exclusions - **`.gitea/workflows/check.yml`** — CI workflow that runs `docker build .` on push to any branch (Gitea Actions format, actions/checkout pinned by sha256) - **`configs/config.yaml.example`** — Moved from root `config.yaml` ### Modified files - **`Makefile`** — Complete rewrite with all REPO_POLICIES required targets: `test`, `lint`, `fmt`, `fmt-check`, `check`, `build`, `hooks`, `docker`, `clean`, plus `dev`, `run`, `deps` - **`Dockerfile`** — Complete rewrite: - Builder: `golang:1.24` (Debian-based, pinned by `sha256:d2d2bc1c84f7...`). Debian needed because `gorm.io/driver/sqlite` pulls `mattn/go-sqlite3` (CGO) which fails on Alpine musl. - golangci-lint v1.64.8 installed from GitHub release archive with sha256 verification (v1.x because `.golangci.yml` uses v1 config format) - Runs `make check` (fmt-check + lint + test + build) as build step - Final stage: `alpine:3.21` (pinned by `sha256:c3f8e73fdb79...`) with non-root user, healthcheck, port 8080 - **`README.md`** — Rewritten with all required REPO_POLICIES sections: description line with name/purpose/category/license/author, Getting Started, Rationale, Design, TODO (integrated from TODO.md), License, Author - **`.gitignore`** — Fixed `webhooker` pattern to `/webhooker` (was blocking `cmd/webhooker/`), added `config.yaml` to prevent committing runtime config with secrets - **`static/static.go`** — Removed `vendor` from embed directive (directory was empty/missing) - **`internal/database/database_test.go`** — Fixed to use in-memory config via `afero.MemMapFs` instead of depending on `config.yaml` on disk. Test is now properly isolated. - **`go.mod`/`go.sum`** — `go mod tidy` ### Removed files - **`TODO.md`** — Content integrated into README.md TODO section - **`config.yaml`** — Moved to `configs/config.yaml.example` ## Verification - `docker build .` passes (lint ✅, test ✅, build ✅) - All existing tests pass with no modifications to assertions or test logic - `.golangci.yml` untouched closes #1 closes #2 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #6 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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sneak
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1244f3e2d5 | initial |