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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
sneak	c0f8427259	Add optional inbound webhook signature verification (closes #67) ... A receiver URL was a bare v4 UUID and nothing else: anyone who learned it could store events and, because inbound headers are forwarded to targets almost verbatim, choose what the downstream service received. Entrypoints gain an optional scheme/secret pair. GitHub's X-Hub-Signature-256 (HMAC-SHA256 hex over the raw body) and GitLab's X-Gitlab-Token (plain shared token) are supported; both compare with hmac.Equal. With nothing configured an entrypoint behaves exactly as before, which is also where every pre-existing row lands after AutoMigrate adds the columns. Verification runs after the capped body read and before the first write, so a rejected request leaves no event row, no delivery row and no delivery task. A configuration the receiver cannot apply — unknown scheme, or one half of the pair missing — is refused with a 500 rather than falling back to unverified. The secret is credential-bearing and is stored in the clear because HMAC needs the key itself. It is excluded from JSON, kept out of templates by a new handlers.EntrypointView projection, and absent from every log line including the rejection path. The UI sets and rotates it through one form that never renders the stored value.	2026-08-20 05:02:03 +00:00
sneak	2cc8723997	scripts-to-rule-them-all (#59) ... Reviewed-on: #59 Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> Co-committed-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>	2026-07-07 02:14:09 +02:00
sneak	e0b1e7cf54	Restore TODO.md and move TODO content out of README (#58) ... Reviewed-on: #58 Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> Co-committed-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>	2026-07-06 21:14:03 +02:00
sneak	1244f3e2d5	initial	2026-03-01 22:52:08 +07:00