Adding or editing a database target now offers the archive expiry
choices of the new webhook page (never, 1h, 12h, 24h, 30d, 90d, 365d)
in place of a text field. The list is defined once, in
internal/handlers/archive_expiry.go, and all three forms render it. The
edit form starts on the stored expiry; one that is not among the choices
is listed first as its own entry, so saving unchanged keeps it. The
target list shows the expiry in plain units, such as "30 days" or
"12 hours", or "never".
Model: opus-5-5
A slack target's edit page offers Max Retries and the delivery engine honours it, but the target list showed only its masked webhook URL, so setting retries changed nothing visible. The list now shows a slack target's Max Retries line exactly as an http target's, from the one function both use, so the label and the "0 (fire-and-forget)" wording cannot drift apart. The Max Queue Size line stays on http targets only. Tests cover a slack target with retries set, and one with a queue size stored that shows no queue-size line.
Model: opus-5-5
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
The http target's destination URL can itself be a bearer credential, and
the source detail page rendered it in full. Render it through the
existing MaskURL instead, matching the rule already applied to slack
targets.
Independently reviewed: mutation-verified (reverting to the raw value
fails the absence assertions, not merely the masked-form ones), MaskURL
probed against userinfo, query, fragment, port, IPv6 literal and
non-http schemes, and every sibling path that surfaces target data
re-walked and found clean.
Go embeds the request URL in *url.Error, so any transport failure — DNS,
TLS, refused, timeout, SSRF dial block — persisted the full Slack webhook
URL into the per-webhook SQLite database via DeliveryResult.Error. That
field is tagged json:"error,omitempty", so a future REST API would have
served it.
maskURLError rebuilds the error preserving Op and the wrapped cause, so DNS
vs TLS vs timeout still read differently and errors.Is/As and Timeout()
keep working; only path, query and userinfo are dropped. Applied where the
errors are born, which covers both the Slack and HTTP targets. url.Parse
embeds the URL too, so ValidateTargetURL's parse branch gets the same
treatment.
The SSRF rejection log now logs the masked URL, and source_logs.html
receives view types rather than raw rows, so no config blob is reachable
from that template.
MaskURL is now the single masker for the whole tree.
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
The page rendered the stored target config verbatim, exposing the Slack
incoming-webhook URL, which is a bearer credential: anyone holding it can
post to the channel indefinitely, and it cannot be scoped or revoked
per-holder.
Target config now reaches the template only as a TargetView carrying
labelled fields, so no code path can render the raw blob. maskURL keeps
scheme and host and elides the path, and drops query, fragment and
userinfo; every parse failure yields a neutral placeholder rather than
falling back to the stored string. HTTP header values are never rendered,
only a count.
Rendering change only: the stored config format and the delivery path are
unchanged.
sneak
clawbot