The CSRF middleware previously tied its PlaintextHTTPRequest wrapping
and cookie Secure flag to the IsDev() environment check. This meant
production mode always assumed HTTPS, which broke login in two common
deployment scenarios:
1. Production behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy: gorilla/csrf
assumed HTTPS but r.TLS was nil, causing Origin/Referer scheme
mismatches and 'referer not supplied' errors.
2. Production over direct HTTP (testing/development with prod config):
the Secure cookie flag prevented the browser from sending the CSRF
cookie back on POST, causing 'CSRF token invalid' errors.
The fix detects the actual transport protocol per-request using r.TLS
(direct TLS) and the X-Forwarded-Proto header (reverse proxy). Two
gorilla/csrf instances are maintained — one with Secure cookies for TLS
and one without for plaintext — since the csrf.Secure option is set at
creation time. Both instances share the same signing key, so cookies
are interchangeable between them.
Behavior after fix:
- Direct TLS: Secure cookies, strict Origin/Referer checks
- Behind TLS proxy (X-Forwarded-Proto: https): same as direct TLS
- Plaintext HTTP: non-Secure cookies, relaxed Origin/Referer checks
(csrf.PlaintextHTTPRequest), token validation still enforced
Closes#53
## Summary
This PR implements three security hardening measures:
### Security Headers Middleware (closes #34)
Adds a `SecurityHeaders()` middleware applied globally to all routes. Every response now includes:
- `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload`
- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
- `X-Frame-Options: DENY`
- `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`
- `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`
- `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()`
### Session Fixation Prevention (closes #38)
Adds a `Regenerate()` method to the session manager that destroys the old session and creates a new one with a fresh ID, copying all session values. Called after successful login to prevent session fixation attacks.
### Request Body Size Limits (closes #39)
Adds a `MaxBodySize()` middleware using `http.MaxBytesReader` to limit POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. Applied to all form endpoints (`/pages`, `/sources`, `/source/*`).
## Files Changed
- `internal/middleware/middleware.go` — Added `SecurityHeaders()` and `MaxBodySize()` middleware
- `internal/session/session.go` — Added `Regenerate()` method for session fixation prevention
- `internal/handlers/auth.go` — Updated login handler to regenerate session after authentication
- `internal/server/routes.go` — Added SecurityHeaders globally, MaxBodySize to form route groups
- `README.md` — Documented new middleware in stack, updated Security section, moved items to completed TODO
closes #34, closes #38, closes #39
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #41
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
In dev mode, keep the wildcard origin for local testing convenience.
In production, skip CORS headers entirely since the web UI is
server-rendered and cross-origin requests are not expected.
Add RequireAuth middleware that checks for a valid session and
redirects unauthenticated users to /pages/login. Applied to all
/sources and /source/{sourceID} routes. The middleware uses the
existing session package for authentication checks.
closes #9
## Summary
This PR brings the webhooker repo into full REPO_POLICIES compliance, addressing both [issue #1](#1) and [issue #2](#2).
## Changes
### New files
- **`cmd/webhooker/main.go`** — The missing application entry point. Uses Uber fx to wire together all internal packages (config, database, logger, server, handlers, middleware, healthcheck, globals, session). Minimal glue code.
- **`REPO_POLICIES.md`** — Fetched from authoritative source (`sneak/prompts`)
- **`.editorconfig`** — Fetched from authoritative source
- **`.dockerignore`** — Sensible Go project exclusions
- **`.gitea/workflows/check.yml`** — CI workflow that runs `docker build .` on push to any branch (Gitea Actions format, actions/checkout pinned by sha256)
- **`configs/config.yaml.example`** — Moved from root `config.yaml`
### Modified files
- **`Makefile`** — Complete rewrite with all REPO_POLICIES required targets: `test`, `lint`, `fmt`, `fmt-check`, `check`, `build`, `hooks`, `docker`, `clean`, plus `dev`, `run`, `deps`
- **`Dockerfile`** — Complete rewrite:
- Builder: `golang:1.24` (Debian-based, pinned by `sha256:d2d2bc1c84f7...`). Debian needed because `gorm.io/driver/sqlite` pulls `mattn/go-sqlite3` (CGO) which fails on Alpine musl.
- golangci-lint v1.64.8 installed from GitHub release archive with sha256 verification (v1.x because `.golangci.yml` uses v1 config format)
- Runs `make check` (fmt-check + lint + test + build) as build step
- Final stage: `alpine:3.21` (pinned by `sha256:c3f8e73fdb79...`) with non-root user, healthcheck, port 8080
- **`README.md`** — Rewritten with all required REPO_POLICIES sections: description line with name/purpose/category/license/author, Getting Started, Rationale, Design, TODO (integrated from TODO.md), License, Author
- **`.gitignore`** — Fixed `webhooker` pattern to `/webhooker` (was blocking `cmd/webhooker/`), added `config.yaml` to prevent committing runtime config with secrets
- **`static/static.go`** — Removed `vendor` from embed directive (directory was empty/missing)
- **`internal/database/database_test.go`** — Fixed to use in-memory config via `afero.MemMapFs` instead of depending on `config.yaml` on disk. Test is now properly isolated.
- **`go.mod`/`go.sum`** — `go mod tidy`
### Removed files
- **`TODO.md`** — Content integrated into README.md TODO section
- **`config.yaml`** — Moved to `configs/config.yaml.example`
## Verification
- `docker build .` passes (lint ✅, test ✅, build ✅)
- All existing tests pass with no modifications to assertions or test logic
- `.golangci.yml` untouched
closes #1
closes #2
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #6
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
