4884581fc5861a7f367b305e4366ad83ace5cad0
8 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4884581fc5 |
Bound every slog line against client-chosen text (closes #176)
All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 2m53s
MaxBodySize logged r.URL.Path untruncated at WARN, and routes.go registers it ahead of RequireAuth, so an unauthenticated POST /source/<8 KB>/edit with an oversize declared Content-Length wrote attacker-chosen text of attacker-chosen length into the operator's log, for the cost of a request with no body. The 2,560-byte per-line budget from #146 did not reach it: that budget lives in the access log's field capping and this is a separate slog call. The capping mechanism moves out of internal/middleware into internal/logfield so there is one budget and one implementation rather than a second ad-hoc truncation. Truncate and EncodedBytes are unchanged; the access log now spends logfield.MaxBytes where it spent maxLogFieldBytes. The sweep the issue asked for found five more call sites of the same shape, all reachable unauthenticated, all now capped: the CSRF 403 (also registered ahead of RequireAuth), the rate limiters' 429 (the per-entrypoint receiver limiter is unauthenticated), RequireAuth's own DEBUG line, the unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line on the receiver, and the failed-login DEBUG lines. DEBUG being off by default is not a bound: an operator turning it on to diagnose a flood must not thereby hand the flood an unbounded write. Every other slog call in the tree was read and judged; the PR body lists all of them, including the ones left alone and why. MaxBodySize stays ahead of RequireAuth. An oversize body should be refused before the request buys a cookie decrypt and a session load, and rejecting first is what keeps an unauthenticated flood from choosing how much session work the process does. The ordering and what it costs are now written at the registration, on maxFormBodySize. MaxAccessLogLineBytes is restated as the ceiling on every slog line carrying text an UNAUTHENTICATED client supplies, not just the access log's: each of these lines carries strictly fewer client-supplied fields than the access log does, so none can be wider. That is asserted per line under both handlers rather than argued. The claim is qualified rather than universal because three kinds of writer are outside it, and the README and the constant now name all three: lines carrying an authenticated operator's own input, which are not truncated at all (the webhook name on "webhook created" reaches 600 KB on one line from a 100 KB form field, measured; the SSRF-rejection url and the target_name lines are the same shape) and are left uncapped deliberately, since truncating the operator's own configuration echoed back costs debuggability against no adversary; the log delivery target, which exists to emit the whole event; and GORM's default logger, which prints the interpolated SQL to stdout on a record-not-found and is unbounded on the receiver and login lookups. That last one is a real defect this audit turned up and is filed separately as #178, not fixed here. Tests drive 8 KB of client-chosen text at all six sites, through both handlers internal/logger can install and through each character they escape — including a bare C0 control, which costs six bytes on the line against the one it cost to send and is the case a raw-byte budget breaks on first. Each holds the encoded line to the ceiling, holds the whole flood's output to what that ceiling allows, and asserts the markers at the far end of the input are absent, so a value that merely happened to be short cannot pass. The two login lines past the username lookup, capped for uniformity rather than need, are pinned too. internal/logfield gains a test that measures the per-rune charge against what the handlers really emit over roughly 3,000 code points on each, so an undercharged rune fails a test instead of quietly falsifying the ceiling. Verified by mutation: reverting the MaxBodySize cap alone fails 28 subtests with a 16,583-byte line against the 2,560 ceiling; reverting the other five fails 70; uncapping the two login lines past the lookup fails 2; budgeting raw bytes instead of encoded ones fails 23 across three packages. |
|||
| d51cd0fd29 |
Enforce the body size limit before CSRF parses the form (closes #90)
Some checks failed
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
CSRF ran before MaxBodySize, so the CSRF middleware parsed the form body
before any cap applied and an oversized request was read in full before
being rejected. MaxBodySize is now the first middleware in all four route
groups that parse forms, ahead of CSRF and RequireAuth.
An oversize request therefore gets 413 without the handler running and
without state changing, including the password-change route.
Note the ordering trade: an unauthenticated client now receives 413 rather
than an auth redirect on /user/{username}/password.
|
|||
| c2cd2c440b |
Add inactivity-based session timeout (closes #66) (#105)
All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 4s
Sessions now carry a server-enforced idle deadline (SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT, default 24h) alongside the 7-day absolute cap, refreshed on authenticated activity. Activity never extends the absolute cap. |
|||
| 734606b7af |
Update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 with canonical config (#86)
All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 3s
Bumps golangci-lint from v2.11.3 to v2.12.2 and adopts the canonical lint config. ## Version pins - `Dockerfile`: `golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2` Debian image, pinned by digest, dated `2026-08-07` - `script/bootstrap`: `GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION=2.12.2` with updated sha256 pins for the `linux-amd64` and `linux-arm64` release archives ## Config `.golangci.yml` replaced with the canonical config. The previous file kept `lll`/`funlen`/`cyclop`/`dupl` settings under the top-level `linters-settings` key, which the v2 schema ignores; the canonical config nests them under `linters.settings`, so those thresholds now actually apply. The unsupported `issues.exclude-use-default` key was dropped. ## Lint fixes (32 findings) - `lll` (7): wrapped or shortened over-length lines (struct tag comments moved above fields, test logger construction split, `session.NewForTest` signature wrapped, shortened a `#nosec` comment) - `goconst` (17): replaced repeated `"POST"`/`"PUT"` literals with `http.MethodPost`/`http.MethodPut`, added shared test constants for `webhooker-test`/`test`/`application/json`, and added `tmplKeyError`/`tmplKeyWebhook` constants for template data keys in `internal/handlers` - `dupl` (8): merged `buildHTTPTargetConfig` and `buildSlackTargetConfig` into a parameterized `buildURLTargetConfig`; removed the duplicate `iWebhookDB` test helper in favor of `testWebhookDB`; extracted shared helpers in middleware and session tests No `//nolint` directives were added and behavior is unchanged. `make check` (fmt-check, tests, lint) passes. Note: golangci-lint v2.12 deprecates the `gomodguard` linter in favor of `gomodguard_v2`; the canonical config change for that is left for a future coordinated update. Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> Reviewed-on: #86 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
|||
| 8ea7f76540 |
Add NoCache middleware for authenticated pages (closes #61) (#75)
All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 6s
Adds a `NoCache()` middleware that sets `Cache-Control: no-store` and `Pragma: no-cache`, and wires it onto the dynamic app route groups (`/pages`, `/user/{username}`, `/sources`, `/source/{sourceID}`) adjacent to their existing `CSRF()` call. The static `/s` mount, `/metrics`, `/webhook/{uuid}`, and `/.well-known/healthcheck` are intentionally left untouched (static assets are safe to cache; the others are not authenticated pages).
A middleware unit test asserts both headers are set.
Closes #61
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #75
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
|
|||
| afe88c601a |
refactor: use pinned golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 5s
Closes [issue #50](#50) ## Summary Refactors the Dockerfile to use a separate lint stage with a pinned golangci-lint Docker image, following the pattern used by [sneak/pixa](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/pixa). This replaces the previous approach of installing golangci-lint via curl in the builder stage. ## Changes ### Dockerfile - **New `lint` stage** using `golangci/golangci-lint:v2.11.3` (Debian-based, pinned by sha256 digest) as a separate build stage - **Builder stage** depends on lint via `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null` — build won't proceed unless linting passes - **Go bumped** from 1.24 to 1.26.1 (`golang:1.26.1-bookworm`, pinned by sha256) - **golangci-lint bumped** from v1.64.8 to v2.11.3 - All three Docker images (golangci-lint, golang, alpine) pinned by sha256 digest - Debian-based golangci-lint image used (not Alpine) because mattn/go-sqlite3 CGO does not compile on musl (off64_t) ### Linter Config (.golangci.yml) - Migrated from v1 to v2 format (`version: "2"` added) - Removed linters no longer available in v2: `gofmt` (handled by `make fmt-check`), `gosimple` (merged into `staticcheck`), `typecheck` (always-on in v2) - Same set of linters enabled — no rules weakened ### Code Fixes (all lint issues from v2 upgrade) - Added package comments to all packages - Added doc comments to all exported types, functions, and methods - Fixed unchecked errors flagged by `errcheck` (sqlDB.Close, os.Setenv in tests, resp.Body.Close, fmt.Fprint) - Fixed unused parameters flagged by `revive` (renamed to `_`) - Fixed `gosec` G120 warnings: added `http.MaxBytesReader` before `r.ParseForm()` calls - Fixed `staticcheck` QF1012: replaced `WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(...))` with `fmt.Fprintf` - Fixed `staticcheck` QF1003: converted if/else chain to tagged switch - Renamed `DeliveryTask` → `Task` to avoid package stutter (`delivery.Task` instead of `delivery.DeliveryTask`) - Renamed shadowed builtin `max` parameter to `upperBound` in `cryptoRandInt` - Used `t.Setenv` instead of `os.Setenv` in tests (auto-restores) ### README.md - Updated version requirements: Go 1.26+, golangci-lint v2.11+ - Updated Dockerfile description in project structure ## Verification `docker build .` passes cleanly — formatting check, linting, all tests, and build all succeed. Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #55 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
|||
| 60786c5019 |
feat: add CSRF protection, SSRF prevention, and login rate limiting (#42)
All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 4s
## Security Hardening This PR implements three security hardening issues: ### CSRF Protection (closes #35) - Session-based CSRF tokens with cryptographically random 256-bit generation - Constant-time token comparison to prevent timing attacks - CSRF middleware applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and `/user` routes - Hidden `csrf_token` field added to all 12+ POST forms in templates - Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and `/api` (stateless API) ### SSRF Prevention (closes #36) - `ValidateTargetURL()` blocks private/reserved IP ranges at target creation time - Blocked ranges: `127.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `::1`, `fc00::/7`, `fe80::/10`, plus multicast, reserved, test-net, and CGN ranges - SSRF-safe HTTP transport with custom `DialContext` in the delivery engine for defense-in-depth (prevents DNS rebinding attacks) - Only `http` and `https` schemes allowed ### Login Rate Limiting (closes #37) - Per-IP rate limiter using `golang.org/x/time/rate` - 5 attempts per minute per IP on `POST /pages/login` - GET requests (form rendering) pass through unaffected - Automatic cleanup of stale per-IP limiter entries every 5 minutes - `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` header support for reverse proxies ### Files Changed **New files:** - `internal/middleware/csrf.go` + tests — CSRF middleware - `internal/middleware/ratelimit.go` + tests — Login rate limiter - `internal/delivery/ssrf.go` + tests — SSRF validation + safe transport **Modified files:** - `internal/server/routes.go` — Wire CSRF and rate limit middleware - `internal/handlers/handlers.go` — Inject CSRF token into template data - `internal/handlers/source_management.go` — SSRF validation on target creation - `internal/delivery/engine.go` — SSRF-safe HTTP transport for production - All form templates — Added hidden `csrf_token` fields - `README.md` — Updated Security section and TODO checklist `docker build .` passes (lint + tests + build). Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org> Reviewed-on: #42 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
|||
| 289f479772 |
test: add tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages (#32)
Some checks failed
check / check (push) Has been cancelled
## Summary Add comprehensive test coverage for three previously-untested packages, addressing [issue #28](#28). ## Coverage Improvements | Package | Before | After | |---------|--------|-------| | `internal/delivery` | 37.1% | 74.5% | | `internal/middleware` | 0.0% | 70.2% | | `internal/session` | 0.0% | 51.5% | ## What's Tested ### delivery (37% → 75%) - `processNewTask` with inline and large (DB-fetched) bodies - `processRetryTask` success, skip non-retrying, large body fetch - Worker lifecycle start/stop, retry channel processing - `processDelivery` unknown target type handling - `recoverPendingDeliveries`, `recoverWebhookDeliveries`, `recoverInFlight` - HTTP delivery with custom headers, timeout, invalid config - `Notify` batching ### middleware (0% → 70%) - Logging middleware status code capture and pass-through - `LoggingResponseWriter` delegation - CORS dev mode (allow-all) and prod mode (no-op) - `RequireAuth` redirect for unauthenticated, pass-through for authenticated - `MetricsAuth` basic auth validation - `ipFromHostPort` helper ### session (0% → 52%) - `Get`/`Save` round-trip with real cookie store - `SetUser`, `GetUserID`, `GetUsername`, `IsAuthenticated` - `ClearUser` removes all keys - `Destroy` invalidates session (MaxAge -1) - Session persistence across requests - Edge cases: overwrite user, wrong type, constants ## Test Helpers Added - `database.NewTestDatabase` / `NewTestWebhookDBManager` — cross-package test helpers for delivery integration tests - `session.NewForTest` — creates session manager without fx lifecycle for middleware tests ## Notes - No production code modified - All tests use `httptest`, SQLite in-memory, and real cookie stores — no external network calls - Full test suite completes in ~3.5s within the 30s timeout - `docker build .` passes (lint + test + build) closes #28 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #32 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
