MaxBodySize logged r.URL.Path untruncated at WARN, and routes.go
registers it ahead of RequireAuth, so an unauthenticated
POST /source/<8 KB>/edit with an oversize declared Content-Length wrote
attacker-chosen text of attacker-chosen length into the operator's log,
for the cost of a request with no body. The 2,560-byte per-line budget
from #146 did not reach it: that budget lives in the access log's field
capping and this is a separate slog call.
The capping mechanism moves out of internal/middleware into
internal/logfield so there is one budget and one implementation rather
than a second ad-hoc truncation. Truncate and EncodedBytes are
unchanged; the access log now spends logfield.MaxBytes where it spent
maxLogFieldBytes.
The sweep the issue asked for found five more call sites of the same
shape, all reachable unauthenticated, all now capped: the CSRF 403
(also registered ahead of RequireAuth), the rate limiters' 429 (the
per-entrypoint receiver limiter is unauthenticated), RequireAuth's own
DEBUG line, the unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line on the receiver, and the
failed-login DEBUG lines. DEBUG being off by default is not a bound: an
operator turning it on to diagnose a flood must not thereby hand the
flood an unbounded write. Every other slog call in the tree was read
and judged; the PR body lists all of them, including the ones left
alone and why.
MaxBodySize stays ahead of RequireAuth. An oversize body should be
refused before the request buys a cookie decrypt and a session load,
and rejecting first is what keeps an unauthenticated flood from
choosing how much session work the process does. The ordering and what
it costs are now written at the registration, on maxFormBodySize.
MaxAccessLogLineBytes is restated as the ceiling on every slog line
carrying text an UNAUTHENTICATED client supplies, not just the access
log's: each of these lines carries strictly fewer client-supplied
fields than the access log does, so none can be wider. That is asserted
per line under both handlers rather than argued. The claim is qualified
rather than universal because three kinds of writer are outside it, and
the README and the constant now name all three: lines carrying an
authenticated operator's own input, which are not truncated at all (the
webhook name on "webhook created" reaches 600 KB on one line from a
100 KB form field, measured; the SSRF-rejection url and the target_name
lines are the same shape) and are left uncapped deliberately, since
truncating the operator's own configuration echoed back costs
debuggability against no adversary; the log delivery target, which
exists to emit the whole event; and GORM's default logger, which prints
the interpolated SQL to stdout on a record-not-found and is unbounded
on the receiver and login lookups. That last one is a real defect this
audit turned up and is filed separately as #178, not fixed here.
Tests drive 8 KB of client-chosen text at all six sites, through both
handlers internal/logger can install and through each character they
escape — including a bare C0 control, which costs six bytes on the line
against the one it cost to send and is the case a raw-byte budget
breaks on first. Each holds the encoded line to the ceiling, holds the
whole flood's output to what that ceiling allows, and asserts the
markers at the far end of the input are absent, so a value that merely
happened to be short cannot pass. The two login lines past the username
lookup, capped for uniformity rather than need, are pinned too.
internal/logfield gains a test that measures the per-rune charge
against what the handlers really emit over roughly 3,000 code points on
each, so an undercharged rune fails a test instead of quietly
falsifying the ceiling.
Verified by mutation: reverting the MaxBodySize cap alone fails 28
subtests with a 16,583-byte line against the 2,560 ceiling; reverting
the other five fails 70; uncapping the two login lines past the lookup
fails 2; budgeting raw bytes instead of encoded ones fails 23 across
three packages.
r.FormValue falls back to the query string, so
POST /source/{id}/targets?url=<secret> created a working target from a
value carried on the request line — where proxy logs, browser history
and Referer all record it. Every form read is now r.PostFormValue,
including the login password and both password-change fields, which had
the same defect in a more acute form.
The Sentry leg needed more than the query string. sentryhttp attaches
the whole request to the scope, and ApplyToEvent copies the teed body
into Request.Data with no SendDefaultPII guard — so reading every field
from the body only pointed every credential this change protects at the
one field the first revision did not scrub. Body and query are now
redacted, Cookies and Env cleared, and Headers reduced to an allowlist,
because the SDK's own filter removes four names and would otherwise ship
X-Csrf-Token and the shared secrets senders put on the receiver route.
Also adds json:"-" to Target.Config, APIKey.Key and Setting.Value —
TargetView is the masking barrier for the HTML path only, and the first
handler to marshal a model would serialise a bearer token or the session
encryption key.
Independently reviewed three times. The second review found the Data
leak and proved it with a scratch module; the third disproved the
PR's own claim that BeforeSend gets no request, so the README now
records that redacting unconditionally is a deliberate choice rather
than a limitation — which is what makes #179 cheap to fix.
In the shipped default, any stranger denied the operator the only
administrative path at 5 requests per minute: TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty,
the README requires a reverse proxy, so every login POST shared one
bucket keyed on the proxy.
Credentials are now verified first and only a FAILED attempt spends
budget, so a correct password is never throttled. Failures are counted
per (client bucket, submitted username), bounded. Concurrent Argon2id
verifications are capped at two, and the queue for them at 16 — because
verifying first lets an attacker force a 64 MB hash per request, and
bounding the wait alone bounds nothing.
The issue's own recommendation was insufficient and is rejected here:
keying by username stops an attacker locking out a DIFFERENT account,
but this is a single-admin product with a predictable bootstrap
username, so flooding the operator's own name still locks them out.
This is speculative — it implements a corrected recommendation ahead of
the owner's ruling so the decision can be made by merging or reverting.
Three things are disclosed rather than glossed: online guessing rises
from 5/min to roughly 27/s, because the 429 is a label on the response
and not a gate in front of the hash; the residual exposure is a loss of
login AVAILABILITY, not latency, and a determined flood still denies
login while it runs, at ~400x the cost and clearing the moment it
stops; and the endpoint should be provisioned for ~400 MB resident, not
the 203 MB of live commitment it itemises.
Independently reviewed four times. Reviewers disproved the suspected
FIFO starvation by measurement, then caught two successive memory
bounds the code did not have — the second by parking waiters and
reading the heap rather than checking the arithmetic.
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
CSRF ran before MaxBodySize, so the CSRF middleware parsed the form body
before any cap applied and an oversized request was read in full before
being rejected. MaxBodySize is now the first middleware in all four route
groups that parse forms, ahead of CSRF and RequireAuth.
An oversize request therefore gets 413 without the handler running and
without state changing, including the password-change route.
Note the ordering trade: an unauthenticated client now receives 413 rather
than an auth redirect on /user/{username}/password.
Bumps golangci-lint from v2.11.3 to v2.12.2 and adopts the canonical lint config.
## Version pins
- `Dockerfile`: `golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2` Debian image, pinned by digest, dated `2026-08-07`
- `script/bootstrap`: `GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION=2.12.2` with updated sha256 pins for the `linux-amd64` and `linux-arm64` release archives
## Config
`.golangci.yml` replaced with the canonical config. The previous file kept `lll`/`funlen`/`cyclop`/`dupl` settings under the top-level `linters-settings` key, which the v2 schema ignores; the canonical config nests them under `linters.settings`, so those thresholds now actually apply. The unsupported `issues.exclude-use-default` key was dropped.
## Lint fixes (32 findings)
- `lll` (7): wrapped or shortened over-length lines (struct tag comments moved above fields, test logger construction split, `session.NewForTest` signature wrapped, shortened a `#nosec` comment)
- `goconst` (17): replaced repeated `"POST"`/`"PUT"` literals with `http.MethodPost`/`http.MethodPut`, added shared test constants for `webhooker-test`/`test`/`application/json`, and added `tmplKeyError`/`tmplKeyWebhook` constants for template data keys in `internal/handlers`
- `dupl` (8): merged `buildHTTPTargetConfig` and `buildSlackTargetConfig` into a parameterized `buildURLTargetConfig`; removed the duplicate `iWebhookDB` test helper in favor of `testWebhookDB`; extracted shared helpers in middleware and session tests
No `//nolint` directives were added and behavior is unchanged. `make check` (fmt-check, tests, lint) passes.
Note: golangci-lint v2.12 deprecates the `gomodguard` linter in favor of `gomodguard_v2`; the canonical config change for that is left for a future coordinated update.
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #86
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Closes [issue #50](#50)
## Summary
Refactors the Dockerfile to use a separate lint stage with a pinned golangci-lint Docker image, following the pattern used by [sneak/pixa](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/pixa). This replaces the previous approach of installing golangci-lint via curl in the builder stage.
## Changes
### Dockerfile
- **New `lint` stage** using `golangci/golangci-lint:v2.11.3` (Debian-based, pinned by sha256 digest) as a separate build stage
- **Builder stage** depends on lint via `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null` — build won't proceed unless linting passes
- **Go bumped** from 1.24 to 1.26.1 (`golang:1.26.1-bookworm`, pinned by sha256)
- **golangci-lint bumped** from v1.64.8 to v2.11.3
- All three Docker images (golangci-lint, golang, alpine) pinned by sha256 digest
- Debian-based golangci-lint image used (not Alpine) because mattn/go-sqlite3 CGO does not compile on musl (off64_t)
### Linter Config (.golangci.yml)
- Migrated from v1 to v2 format (`version: "2"` added)
- Removed linters no longer available in v2: `gofmt` (handled by `make fmt-check`), `gosimple` (merged into `staticcheck`), `typecheck` (always-on in v2)
- Same set of linters enabled — no rules weakened
### Code Fixes (all lint issues from v2 upgrade)
- Added package comments to all packages
- Added doc comments to all exported types, functions, and methods
- Fixed unchecked errors flagged by `errcheck` (sqlDB.Close, os.Setenv in tests, resp.Body.Close, fmt.Fprint)
- Fixed unused parameters flagged by `revive` (renamed to `_`)
- Fixed `gosec` G120 warnings: added `http.MaxBytesReader` before `r.ParseForm()` calls
- Fixed `staticcheck` QF1012: replaced `WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(...))` with `fmt.Fprintf`
- Fixed `staticcheck` QF1003: converted if/else chain to tagged switch
- Renamed `DeliveryTask` → `Task` to avoid package stutter (`delivery.Task` instead of `delivery.DeliveryTask`)
- Renamed shadowed builtin `max` parameter to `upperBound` in `cryptoRandInt`
- Used `t.Setenv` instead of `os.Setenv` in tests (auto-restores)
### README.md
- Updated version requirements: Go 1.26+, golangci-lint v2.11+
- Updated Dockerfile description in project structure
## Verification
`docker build .` passes cleanly — formatting check, linting, all tests, and build all succeed.
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #55
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
## Summary
This PR implements three security hardening measures:
### Security Headers Middleware (closes #34)
Adds a `SecurityHeaders()` middleware applied globally to all routes. Every response now includes:
- `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload`
- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
- `X-Frame-Options: DENY`
- `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`
- `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`
- `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()`
### Session Fixation Prevention (closes #38)
Adds a `Regenerate()` method to the session manager that destroys the old session and creates a new one with a fresh ID, copying all session values. Called after successful login to prevent session fixation attacks.
### Request Body Size Limits (closes #39)
Adds a `MaxBodySize()` middleware using `http.MaxBytesReader` to limit POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. Applied to all form endpoints (`/pages`, `/sources`, `/source/*`).
## Files Changed
- `internal/middleware/middleware.go` — Added `SecurityHeaders()` and `MaxBodySize()` middleware
- `internal/session/session.go` — Added `Regenerate()` method for session fixation prevention
- `internal/handlers/auth.go` — Updated login handler to regenerate session after authentication
- `internal/server/routes.go` — Added SecurityHeaders globally, MaxBodySize to form route groups
- `README.md` — Documented new middleware in stack, updated Security section, moved items to completed TODO
closes #34, closes #38, closes #39
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #41
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Templates are now embedded using //go:embed and parsed once at startup
with template.Must(template.ParseFS(...)). This avoids re-parsing
template files from disk on every request and removes the dependency
on template files being present at runtime.
closes #7
## Summary
This PR brings the webhooker repo into full REPO_POLICIES compliance, addressing both [issue #1](#1) and [issue #2](#2).
## Changes
### New files
- **`cmd/webhooker/main.go`** — The missing application entry point. Uses Uber fx to wire together all internal packages (config, database, logger, server, handlers, middleware, healthcheck, globals, session). Minimal glue code.
- **`REPO_POLICIES.md`** — Fetched from authoritative source (`sneak/prompts`)
- **`.editorconfig`** — Fetched from authoritative source
- **`.dockerignore`** — Sensible Go project exclusions
- **`.gitea/workflows/check.yml`** — CI workflow that runs `docker build .` on push to any branch (Gitea Actions format, actions/checkout pinned by sha256)
- **`configs/config.yaml.example`** — Moved from root `config.yaml`
### Modified files
- **`Makefile`** — Complete rewrite with all REPO_POLICIES required targets: `test`, `lint`, `fmt`, `fmt-check`, `check`, `build`, `hooks`, `docker`, `clean`, plus `dev`, `run`, `deps`
- **`Dockerfile`** — Complete rewrite:
- Builder: `golang:1.24` (Debian-based, pinned by `sha256:d2d2bc1c84f7...`). Debian needed because `gorm.io/driver/sqlite` pulls `mattn/go-sqlite3` (CGO) which fails on Alpine musl.
- golangci-lint v1.64.8 installed from GitHub release archive with sha256 verification (v1.x because `.golangci.yml` uses v1 config format)
- Runs `make check` (fmt-check + lint + test + build) as build step
- Final stage: `alpine:3.21` (pinned by `sha256:c3f8e73fdb79...`) with non-root user, healthcheck, port 8080
- **`README.md`** — Rewritten with all required REPO_POLICIES sections: description line with name/purpose/category/license/author, Getting Started, Rationale, Design, TODO (integrated from TODO.md), License, Author
- **`.gitignore`** — Fixed `webhooker` pattern to `/webhooker` (was blocking `cmd/webhooker/`), added `config.yaml` to prevent committing runtime config with secrets
- **`static/static.go`** — Removed `vendor` from embed directive (directory was empty/missing)
- **`internal/database/database_test.go`** — Fixed to use in-memory config via `afero.MemMapFs` instead of depending on `config.yaml` on disk. Test is now properly isolated.
- **`go.mod`/`go.sum`** — `go mod tidy`
### Removed files
- **`TODO.md`** — Content integrated into README.md TODO section
- **`config.yaml`** — Moved to `configs/config.yaml.example`
## Verification
- `docker build .` passes (lint ✅, test ✅, build ✅)
- All existing tests pass with no modifications to assertions or test logic
- `.golangci.yml` untouched
closes #1
closes #2
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #6
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
