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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
sneak	1dd0729ce8	Gate forwarded-header trust behind trusted-proxy config (closes #88) ... Every rate limiter keyed on httprate.KeyByRealIP, which believes True-Client-IP, X-Real-IP and the first X-Forwarded-For entry from any peer. A client could therefore mint a fresh bucket per request by rotating a spoofed header, or drain another client's bucket by claiming its address, which left the receiver, login and password change limits with no value against a deliberate attacker. The receiver, login and password change limiters now share one key function: the connection's own address, unless the direct peer is inside a network listed in the new TRUSTED_PROXIES CIDR list, in which case the forwarded client address is used. The list is empty by default, so nothing is trusted until an operator names their proxy; a set-but-unparseable value aborts startup, matching the handling of the other parsed variables. Within a trusted request X-Forwarded-For is walked right to left and the first hop that is not itself a trusted proxy wins, so client-prepended entries cannot be selected. Also folds in two cleanups from the same review: the 429 responder shared by all three limiters is extracted, and the RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT error-path tests now assert that the failure names the variable and wraps ErrNonPositiveValue rather than only that some error occurred.	2026-08-11 13:02:55 +00:00
sneak	2cc8723997	scripts-to-rule-them-all (#59) ... Reviewed-on: #59 Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> Co-committed-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>	2026-07-07 02:14:09 +02:00
sneak	e0b1e7cf54	Restore TODO.md and move TODO content out of README (#58) ... Reviewed-on: #58 Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> Co-committed-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>	2026-07-06 21:14:03 +02:00
sneak	1244f3e2d5	initial	2026-03-01 22:52:08 +07:00