The default blocklist covers the IPv4 private and reserved ranges, IPv6 loopback, unique local and link-local addresses, and public addresses that hand credentials to whatever can reach them, without the caller presenting any. A provider's other services on public addresses, such as 161.26.0.0/16 and 166.8.0.0/14, are deliberately not on it: they hand out no credentials that way, reaching them can be legitimate, and every cloud has some, so a partial list would promise coverage it does not give. The README's egress section and the comment above blockedNetworks now state this rule, so nobody infers wider coverage and a future candidate can be accepted or refused against it. No list change. Model: opus-5-5
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@@ -162,6 +162,20 @@ public cloud metadata addresses: currently only `168.63.129.16`, Azure's
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WireServer, which serves an Azure VM its credentials. Because it is a
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public address, listing it in `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` reopens it.
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That is all the default blocklist covers: the IPv4 private and reserved
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ranges; of IPv6, only loopback (`::1`), unique local addresses
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(`fc00::/7`) and link-local addresses (`fe80::/10`); and public
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addresses that hand credentials to whatever can reach them, without the
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caller presenting any. A cloud provider's other services on public
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addresses are not refused. IBM Cloud, for example, serves its DNS
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resolvers, package mirrors, time servers and object storage on
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`161.26.0.0/16`, and the private endpoints of its own cloud services on
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`166.8.0.0/14`. Neither range hands out credentials that way: the token
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service among those endpoints issues a token only in exchange for
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something the caller presents, such as an API key. Reaching these
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services can be a legitimate delivery, and every cloud has some, so a
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partial list would promise coverage it does not give.
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That default is also inconvenient for the thing webhooker is mostly
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for: taking a public webhook and forwarding it to something on your own
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network. A container on the same Docker network, a box on `10.x`, a
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@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ var (
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// permit specific blocks out of this set with
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// ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS; see Guard.
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//
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// A public address belongs here only if it hands credentials to
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// whatever can reach it, without the caller presenting any; a
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// provider's other services on public addresses, such as its DNS
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// resolvers or package mirrors, stay out, since reaching them can
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// be legitimate and no list of them could be complete.
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//
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//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
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var blockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
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