Rate-limit the public webhook receiver endpoint (closes #64)

The receiver was the one unauthenticated, internet-facing endpoint with no
rate limit, so a misbehaving or hostile sender could flood a webhook
without bound. RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT (default 120/min) now caps it, keyed on
client IP plus entrypoint path so one entrypoint cannot exhaust another's
budget. Over-limit requests get 429 with Retry-After.

The limiter deliberately does not reuse postRateLimit: that helper is
POST-only and keys on IP alone, whereas the receiver must count every
method. A test locks that property in.

Config parsing follows the fail-loudly idiom: a set-but-unparseable or
non-positive value aborts startup rather than falling back to the default.

Known limitation, tracked in #88: the key still trusts forwarded headers
unconditionally, so the limit is evadable by rotating X-Forwarded-For until
trusted-proxy gating lands.

README.md

@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
 | `METRICS_PASSWORD`      | Basic auth password for `/metrics`  | `""`     |
 | `SENTRY_DSN`            | Sentry error reporting DSN          | `""`     |
 | `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`  | Idle session timeout (Go duration)  | `24h`    |
+| `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`   | Receiver requests/minute per IP per entrypoint | `120` |
 
 Sessions are bounded by two independent clocks, and end at whichever
 one runs out first:
@@ -123,7 +124,8 @@ fatal configuration error: webhooker logs the offending variable and
 its value and refuses to start, rather than silently running with a
 substituted default. `PORT=eighty`, `DEBUG=ture`, and
 `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL=1 hour` all abort startup. `PORT` must
-additionally be a number in the range 1–65535.
+additionally be a number in the range 1–65535, and
+`RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` must be at least 1.
 
 Boolean variables (`DEBUG`, `MAINTENANCE_MODE`) accept exactly the
 spellings Go's `strconv.ParseBool` accepts — `1`, `t`, `T`, `TRUE`,
@@ -785,17 +787,24 @@ just delayed until the target is healthy again.
 
 ### Rate Limiting
 
-Global rate limiting middleware (e.g., per-IP throttling applied at the
+Global blanket rate limiting middleware (e.g., a per-IP throttle shared
-router level) **must not** apply to webhook receiver endpoints. Webhook
+with the web UI) **must not** apply to webhook receiver endpoints.
-endpoints receive automated traffic from external services at
+Webhook endpoints receive automated traffic from external services at
-unpredictable rates, and blanket rate limits would cause legitimate
+unpredictable rates, and blanket limits shared with other routes would
-deliveries to be dropped.
+cause legitimate deliveries to be dropped.
 
-Instead, each webhook has its own individually configurable rate limit,
+The receiver instead has its own dedicated abuse limit, scoped to the
-applied within the webhook handler itself. By default, no rate limit is
+`/webhook/{uuid}` route only and keyed per client IP per entrypoint: one
-applied — webhook endpoints accept traffic as fast as it arrives. Rate
+misbehaving sender is throttled without affecting other senders of the
-limits can be configured per-webhook when needed (e.g., to protect
+same entrypoint or the same sender's other entrypoints. The limit is
-against a misbehaving sender).
+`RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` requests per minute (default 120, generous for
+legitimate webhook senders). Requests over the limit receive HTTP 429
+with a `Retry-After` header. A set-but-invalid `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`
+value aborts startup rather than silently falling back to the default.
+
+Finer-grained per-webhook rate limits (configured in the web UI and
+enforced in the webhook handler) can layer on top of this env-level
+abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
 
 ### API Endpoints
 

internal/config/config.go

@@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ const (
 	// authenticated activity before it expires.
 	defaultSessionIdleTimeout = 24 * time.Hour
 
+	// defaultReceiverRateLimit is the default number of requests
+	// per minute each client IP may send to a single webhook
+	// receiver entrypoint. Generous for legitimate webhook
+	// senders while bounding abuse of the one unauthenticated,
+	// internet-exposed endpoint.
+	defaultReceiverRateLimit = 120
+
 	// maxPort is the highest valid TCP port number. The lower
 	// bound (at least 1) is enforced by envPositiveInt.
 	maxPort = 65535
@@ -79,6 +86,10 @@ type Config struct {
 	// which a session expires. Non-positive disables idle expiry.
 	SessionIdleTimeout time.Duration
 
+	// ReceiverRateLimit is the number of requests per minute each
+	// client IP may send to a single webhook receiver entrypoint.
+	ReceiverRateLimit int
+
 	params *ConfigParams
 	log    *slog.Logger
 }
@@ -263,6 +274,14 @@ func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
+	receiverRateLimit, err := envPositiveInt(
+		"RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT",
+		defaultReceiverRateLimit,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
 	return &Config{
 		DataDir:                envString("DATA_DIR"),
 		Debug:                  debug,
@@ -274,6 +293,7 @@ func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
 		SentryDSN:              envString("SENTRY_DSN"),
 		RetentionSweepInterval: retentionSweepInterval,
 		SessionIdleTimeout:     sessionIdleTimeout,
+		ReceiverRateLimit:      receiverRateLimit,
 	}, nil
 }
 
@@ -314,6 +334,7 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
 		"maintenanceMode", s.MaintenanceMode,
 		"dataDir", s.DataDir,
 		"retentionSweepInterval", s.RetentionSweepInterval.String(),
+		"receiverRateLimit", s.ReceiverRateLimit,
 		"hasSentryDSN", s.SentryDSN != "",
 		"hasMetricsAuth",
 		s.MetricsUsername != "" && s.MetricsPassword != "",

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -14,6 +14,14 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
 
+// Shared subtest names for the env-parsing tables below, which all
+// exercise the same three cases against different variables.
+const (
+	caseUnsetUsesDefault = "unset uses default"
+	caseValidValueParsed = "valid value is parsed"
+	caseUnparseableFails = "unparseable value fails startup"
+)
+
 func TestEnvironmentConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		name        string
@@ -130,18 +138,18 @@ func TestRetentionSweepInterval(t *testing.T) {
 		expected    time.Duration
 	}{
 		{
-			name:     "unset uses default",
+			name:     caseUnsetUsesDefault,
 			set:      false,
 			expected: time.Hour,
 		},
 		{
-			name:     "valid value is parsed",
+			name:     caseValidValueParsed,
 			set:      true,
 			value:    "15m",
 			expected: 15 * time.Minute,
 		},
 		{
-			name:        "unparseable value fails startup",
+			name:        caseUnparseableFails,
 			set:         true,
 			value:       "not-a-duration",
 			expectError: true,
@@ -172,7 +180,7 @@ func TestRetentionSweepInterval(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // expectStartupError asserts that fx refuses to build the app,
-// which is what a set-but-unparseable duration must cause.
+// which is what a set-but-invalid environment value must cause.
 func expectStartupError(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Helper()
 
@@ -226,18 +234,18 @@ func TestSessionIdleTimeout(t *testing.T) {
 		expected    time.Duration
 	}{
 		{
-			name:     "unset uses default",
+			name:     caseUnsetUsesDefault,
 			set:      false,
 			expected: 24 * time.Hour,
 		},
 		{
-			name:     "valid value is parsed",
+			name:     caseValidValueParsed,
 			set:      true,
 			value:    "30m",
 			expected: 30 * time.Minute,
 		},
 		{
-			name:        "unparseable value fails startup",
+			name:        caseUnparseableFails,
 			set:         true,
 			value:       "not-a-duration",
 			expectError: true,
@@ -336,3 +344,91 @@ func TestDefaultDataDir(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestReceiverRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		set         bool
+		value       string
+		expectError bool
+		expected    int
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     caseUnsetUsesDefault,
+			set:      false,
+			expected: 120,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     caseValidValueParsed,
+			set:      true,
+			value:    "30",
+			expected: 30,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        caseUnparseableFails,
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "not-a-number",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "zero fails startup",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "0",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "negative fails startup",
+			set:         true,
+			value:       "-5",
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
+			// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
+			t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
+
+			if tt.set {
+				t.Setenv("RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT", tt.value)
+			} else {
+				require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(
+					"RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT",
+				))
+			}
+
+			if tt.expectError {
+				expectStartupError(t)
+			} else {
+				testReceiverRateLimitSuccess(t, tt.expected)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func testReceiverRateLimitSuccess(
+	t *testing.T,
+	expected int,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var cfg *config.Config
+
+	app := fxtest.New(
+		t,
+		fx.Provide(
+			globals.New,
+			logger.New,
+			config.New,
+		),
+		fx.Populate(&cfg),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, app.Err())
+
+	app.RequireStart()
+
+	defer app.RequireStop()
+
+	assert.Equal(t, expected, cfg.ReceiverRateLimit)
+}

internal/middleware/ratelimit.go

@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ const (
 	// passwordChangeRateInterval is the time window for the
 	// password change rate limit.
 	passwordChangeRateInterval = 1 * time.Minute
+
+	// receiverRateInterval is the time window for the webhook
+	// receiver rate limit. The configured limit is expressed in
+	// requests per minute.
+	receiverRateInterval = 1 * time.Minute
 )
 
 // LoginRateLimit returns middleware that enforces per-IP rate
@@ -105,3 +110,37 @@ func (m *Middleware) postRateLimit(
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+// ReceiverRateLimit returns middleware that rate-limits the
+// public webhook receiver endpoint per client IP per request
+// path (the path contains the entrypoint UUID, so each sender
+// is limited per entrypoint without affecting other senders or
+// other entrypoints). The limit is Config.ReceiverRateLimit
+// requests per minute. Requests over the limit receive a 429;
+// httprate adds the Retry-After header (RFC 6585). IP
+// extraction honours X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, and
+// True-Client-IP headers for reverse-proxy setups.
+func (m *Middleware) ReceiverRateLimit() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return httprate.Limit(
+		m.params.Config.ReceiverRateLimit,
+		receiverRateInterval,
+		httprate.WithKeyFuncs(
+			httprate.KeyByRealIP,
+			httprate.KeyByEndpoint,
+		),
+		httprate.WithLimitHandler(http.HandlerFunc(
+			func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+				m.log.Warn(
+					"webhook receiver rate limit exceeded",
+					"path", r.URL.Path,
+				)
+				http.Error(
+					w,
+					"Too many requests. "+
+						"Please slow down.",
+					http.StatusTooManyRequests,
+				)
+			},
+		)),
+	)
+}

internal/middleware/ratelimit_test.go

@@ -2,8 +2,10 @@ package middleware_test
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -179,3 +181,133 @@ func TestLoginRateLimit_IndependentPerIP(t *testing.T) {
 		"different IP should not be affected",
 	)
 }
+
+// receiverLimitedHandler builds a ReceiverRateLimit-wrapped
+// handler with the given per-minute limit.
+func receiverLimitedHandler(
+	t *testing.T, limit int,
+) http.Handler {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	log := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
+		os.Stderr,
+		&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
+	))
+
+	m := middleware.NewForTest(
+		log,
+		&config.Config{ReceiverRateLimit: limit},
+		nil,
+	)
+
+	return m.ReceiverRateLimit()(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		},
+	))
+}
+
+// receiverPost sends one POST to the handler from the given IP
+// and path and returns the recorder.
+func receiverPost(
+	handler http.Handler, ip, path string,
+) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost, path, nil,
+	)
+	req.RemoteAddr = ip
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	return w
+}
+
+func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const limit = 3
+
+	handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
+
+	// The first limit requests from one IP to one entrypoint
+	// pass.
+	for i := range limit {
+		w := receiverPost(
+			handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
+		)
+		assert.Equal(
+			t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+			"request %d should pass", i,
+		)
+	}
+
+	// The next request over the limit is rejected with a 429
+	// carrying a Retry-After header.
+	w := receiverPost(
+		handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code)
+	assert.NotEmpty(
+		t, w.Header().Get("Retry-After"),
+		"429 must carry a Retry-After header",
+	)
+
+	// The same IP is not limited on a different entrypoint.
+	w = receiverPost(
+		handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-b",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+		"a different entrypoint must not be affected",
+	)
+
+	// A different IP is not limited on the same entrypoint.
+	w = receiverPost(
+		handler, "8.8.8.8:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+		"a different client IP must not be affected",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestReceiverRateLimit_CountsEveryMethod proves the receiver
+// limit counts non-POST requests too: a GET shares the bucket
+// with a POST and is itself rejected once over the limit.
+func TestReceiverRateLimit_CountsEveryMethod(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const (
+		limit = 2
+		ip    = "7.7.7.7:1234"
+		path  = "/webhook/uuid-c"
+	)
+
+	handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
+
+	get := func() *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+			context.Background(), http.MethodGet, path, nil,
+		)
+		req.RemoteAddr = ip
+
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+		return w
+	}
+
+	// One POST plus one GET fill the bucket, so the GET must
+	// have been counted.
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusOK, receiverPost(handler, ip, path).Code,
+	)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, get().Code)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, get().Code,
+		"a GET over the limit must be rate-limited",
+	)
+}

internal/server/routes.go

@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
 }
 
 func (s *Server) setupWebhookRoutes() {
-	s.router.HandleFunc(
+	s.router.With(s.mw.ReceiverRateLimit()).HandleFunc(
 		"/webhook/{uuid}",
 		s.h.HandleWebhook(),
 	)