fix: only trust proxy headers from RFC1918/loopback sources (closes #44)

realIP() now parses RemoteAddr and checks if the source IP is in
RFC1918 (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16), loopback (127/8), or IPv6
ULA/loopback ranges before trusting X-Real-IP or X-Forwarded-For
headers. Public source IPs have headers ignored (fail closed).

This prevents attackers from spoofing X-Forwarded-For to bypass
the login rate limiter.
This commit is contained in:
clawbot 2026-02-15 22:01:54 -08:00
parent e9bf63d18b
commit b1a6fd5fca
2 changed files with 122 additions and 12 deletions

View File

@ -111,10 +111,53 @@ func ipFromHostPort(hostPort string) string {
return host
}
// realIP extracts the client's real IP address from the request,
// checking proxy headers first (trusted reverse proxy like Traefik),
// then falling back to RemoteAddr.
// trustedProxyNets are RFC1918 and loopback CIDRs whose proxy headers we trust.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level constant nets parsed once
var trustedProxyNets = func() []*net.IPNet {
cidrs := []string{
"10.0.0.0/8",
"172.16.0.0/12",
"192.168.0.0/16",
"127.0.0.0/8",
"::1/128",
"fc00::/7",
}
nets := make([]*net.IPNet, 0, len(cidrs))
for _, cidr := range cidrs {
_, n, _ := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
nets = append(nets, n)
}
return nets
}()
// isTrustedProxy reports whether ip is in an RFC1918, loopback, or ULA range.
func isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP) bool {
for _, n := range trustedProxyNets {
if n.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// realIP extracts the client's real IP address from the request.
// Proxy headers (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For) are only trusted when the
// direct connection originates from an RFC1918/loopback address.
// Otherwise, headers are ignored and RemoteAddr is used (fail closed).
func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
addr := ipFromHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
remoteIP := net.ParseIP(addr)
// Only trust proxy headers from private/loopback sources.
if remoteIP == nil || !isTrustedProxy(remoteIP) {
return addr
}
// 1. X-Real-IP (set by Traefik/nginx)
if ip := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP")); ip != "" {
return ip
@ -130,7 +173,7 @@ func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
}
// 3. Fall back to RemoteAddr
return ipFromHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
return addr
}
// CORS returns CORS middleware.

View File

@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package middleware //nolint:testpackage // tests unexported realIP function
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/http"
"testing"
)
@ -16,54 +17,98 @@ func TestRealIP(t *testing.T) { //nolint:funlen // table-driven test
xff string
want string
}{
// === Trusted proxy (RFC1918 / loopback) — headers ARE honoured ===
{
name: "X-Real-IP takes priority",
name: "trusted: X-Real-IP from 10.x",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:1234",
xRealIP: "203.0.113.5",
xff: "198.51.100.1, 10.0.0.1",
want: "203.0.113.5",
},
{
name: "X-Forwarded-For used when no X-Real-IP",
name: "trusted: XFF from 10.x when no X-Real-IP",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:1234",
xff: "198.51.100.1, 10.0.0.1",
want: "198.51.100.1",
},
{
name: "X-Forwarded-For single IP",
name: "trusted: XFF single IP from 10.x",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:1234",
xff: "203.0.113.10",
want: "203.0.113.10",
},
{
name: "falls back to RemoteAddr",
name: "trusted: falls back to RemoteAddr (192.168.x)",
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.1:5678",
want: "192.168.1.1",
},
{
name: "RemoteAddr without port",
name: "trusted: RemoteAddr without port",
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.1",
want: "192.168.1.1",
},
{
name: "X-Real-IP with whitespace",
name: "trusted: X-Real-IP with whitespace from 10.x",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:1234",
xRealIP: " 203.0.113.5 ",
want: "203.0.113.5",
},
{
name: "X-Forwarded-For with whitespace",
name: "trusted: XFF with whitespace from 10.x",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:1234",
xff: " 198.51.100.1 , 10.0.0.1",
want: "198.51.100.1",
},
{
name: "empty X-Real-IP falls through to XFF",
name: "trusted: empty X-Real-IP falls through to XFF from 10.x",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:1234",
xRealIP: " ",
xff: "198.51.100.1",
want: "198.51.100.1",
},
{
name: "trusted: loopback honours X-Real-IP",
remoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:9999",
xRealIP: "93.184.216.34",
want: "93.184.216.34",
},
{
name: "trusted: 172.16.x honours XFF",
remoteAddr: "172.16.0.1:4321",
xff: "8.8.8.8",
want: "8.8.8.8",
},
// === Untrusted proxy (public IP) — headers IGNORED, use RemoteAddr ===
{
name: "untrusted: X-Real-IP ignored from public IP",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.50:1234",
xRealIP: "10.0.0.1",
want: "203.0.113.50",
},
{
name: "untrusted: XFF ignored from public IP",
remoteAddr: "198.51.100.99:5678",
xff: "10.0.0.1, 192.168.1.1",
want: "198.51.100.99",
},
{
name: "untrusted: both headers ignored from public IP",
remoteAddr: "8.8.8.8:443",
xRealIP: "1.2.3.4",
xff: "5.6.7.8",
want: "8.8.8.8",
},
{
name: "untrusted: no headers, public RemoteAddr",
remoteAddr: "93.184.216.34:8080",
want: "93.184.216.34",
},
{
name: "untrusted: public RemoteAddr without port",
remoteAddr: "93.184.216.34",
want: "93.184.216.34",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
@ -88,3 +133,25 @@ func TestRealIP(t *testing.T) { //nolint:funlen // table-driven test
})
}
}
func TestIsTrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
trusted := []string{"10.0.0.1", "10.255.255.255", "172.16.0.1", "172.31.255.255",
"192.168.0.1", "192.168.255.255", "127.0.0.1", "127.255.255.255", "::1"}
untrusted := []string{"8.8.8.8", "203.0.113.1", "172.32.0.1", "11.0.0.1", "2001:db8::1"}
for _, addr := range trusted {
ip := net.ParseIP(addr)
if !isTrustedProxy(ip) {
t.Errorf("expected %s to be trusted", addr)
}
}
for _, addr := range untrusted {
ip := net.ParseIP(addr)
if isTrustedProxy(ip) {
t.Errorf("expected %s to be untrusted", addr)
}
}
}