`smallwebwaf` with no command now prints the commands and exits with status 2.
The image runs rproxy, or servewaf with SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf. The
passing-on code, its settings and its log fields and metric go. internal/proxy
keeps the checks, answers, reports and own endpoints; its tests run through the
real rproxy. The documents describe the pair.
Judgement call: clients.json keeps token_refused, since state files refuse unknown fields.
Deviation: script/gitea-requests sets SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS, to label requests.
Partially verified: make example-app and make gitea-requests never built the image, as Ubuntu's snapshot service answered 5xx.
Model: opus-5-5
`smallwebwaf rproxy` reads the first 64 KiB of each body, asks servewaf over
HTTP/1.1, and passes what servewaf allows to the app within its limits. Any
other answer goes to the visitor as servewaf gave it. SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION
decides only when servewaf cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or
does not answer within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. A method SPEC.md does not list gets 405.
Duplication: internal/rproxy copies passing-on code from internal/proxy until
#172 removes the originals.
Rule suppressed: gosec G704 and G705; gosec at
internal/smallwebwaf/rproxy_test.go:431; tagliatelle at
internal/requestlog/requestlog.go:203; paralleltest on one test.
Judgement call: an answer over 1 MiB, or with a status below 200, gets 502.
Judgement call: every target not starting with one / gets 400.
Model: opus-5-5
A question waits on GeoJS at most 800ms, the new default of
SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT. In enforce mode it does not wait at all when it is
over the header limits, on a fetched blocklist with deny, on the CrowdSec
decision list, or over a whole rate limit. Not waiting never lowers a
client's limit. Just before the Core Rule Set, servewaf refuses more than
50 cookies or 100 header fields with 431.
Shared default changed: SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT also applies to smallwebwaf
with no command.
Judgement call: SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT stays 2s, since no request waits
on the DNS blocklists or AbuseIPDB.
Model: opus-5-5
`smallwebwaf servewaf` runs today's checks on the visitor's request each
question carries, answers rproxy, and passes nothing to an app. rproxy reports
every request servewaf answered. A report counts an allowed request's bytes and
writes servewaf's second log line. The table holds a copy of what a report
needs, never the request, so a report cannot reach a request being handled.
Judgement call: a question's body is read before any check; over 64 KiB gets 400.
Judgement call: a report's bytes and durations have ceilings, so they cannot overflow.
Judgement call: a `close` disposition for SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE=close.
Model: opus-5-5
The default request limits now suit programmatic use of an API, such
as an automation fleet on another host, and still catch abusive bots:
- per minute: 500, room for a fleet's busiest minute and a few first
visits with an empty cache, and passed within seconds by a client
firing as fast as it can;
- per hour: 20000, passed by a client that keeps up 6 a second;
- per day: 300000, passed by a scraper that keeps up 4 a second.
The byte limits and ban lengths are unchanged. SPEC.md, README.md and
docs/settings.md give the reasons; docs/gitea.md redoes the Actions
runner sums.
Judgement call: the docs/alerts.md ban example shows the minute limit.
Model: opus-5-5
TestHealthCheck closed the app's server, and later smallwebwaf, and
expected connections to the freed ports to fail. Another test could take
such a port in between, so the connection succeeded and the test failed.
The failing app check now uses the multicast address 224.0.0.1, to which
TCP cannot connect. The failing smallwebwaf check uses port 0, on which
nothing listens. Neither result depends on other processes. The test now
stops smallwebwaf after its last check, so that it exits before the
test's temporary directories are removed. The code under test is
unchanged.
Model: opus-5-5
The request limits and the hour and day byte limits now sit about twice
above what 40 people busy with heavy web apps make together on one
address:
- requests: 6000 a minute, 100,000 an hour, 1,000,000 a day;
- bytes: 20 GiB an hour, 200 GiB a day.
The largest response drops from 5 GiB to 1 GiB. The minute byte limit
of 4 GiB is sized to hold two of the largest responses with their
requests. SPEC.md gives the new reasoning; README.md and the reference
documents give the new figures.
Model: opus-5-5