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clawbot cc50b04f2a Request tags, with refusing and limits per tag (closes #175)
check / check (push) Failing after 1m24s
Details 
Each request gets sorted tags from the lookup, new address lists, the
reputation sources and the rule matches, logged as `tags`. New settings:
`SWW_TAG_LISTS`, `SWW_TAG_DENY`, `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT`. They replace
`SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT`, `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` and
`SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES`. New heuristics `tag_lists` and `tag_deny`; the
latter runs before the rate limits and again after the Core Rule Set.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-11-09 01:15:05 +00:00
11 changed files with 226 additions and 363 deletions
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EVALUATION.md
+44 -56
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
- R1: rate limits per minute, per hour and per day - R1: rate limits per minute, per hour and per day
- R2: netblocks that bypass rate limiting - R2: netblocks that bypass rate limiting
- R3: alerts on attacks through webhook, Slack or ntfy - R3: alerts on attacks through webhook, Slack or ntfy
- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests made or bytes transferred per minute or - R4: alerts on anomalies: requests or bytes per minute or hour, for given IPs
hour, for given IPs or netblocks, crossing a threshold or netblocks, crossing a threshold
- R5: temporary blocks for abusers, permanent bans for repeat offenders - R5: temporary blocks for abusers, permanent bans for repeat offenders
- R6: one or more RBLs or IP reputation APIs - R6: one or more RBLs or IP reputation APIs
- R7: AS number lookup - R7: AS number lookup
@@ -24,19 +24,14 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
## Verdict ## Verdict
Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8, which asks for limits Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8 (scaling limits by AS
scaled by AS number or country. None meets R4's alerts on bytes transferred. The number or country) or the bytes half of R4 at all, and the tools that come
tools that come closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML or a web UI.
or a web UI. The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar; The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar; `SPEC.md` in this
`SPEC.md` in this directory begins that spec. directory begins that spec. It reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field as
libraries and data sources (Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set for attack
The sidecar reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field instead of detection, DNSBLs, AbuseIPDB, optionally a CrowdSec decision feed) instead of
reimplementing them. It takes these as libraries and data sources: reimplementing them.
- Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set, for attack detection
- DNSBLs
- AbuseIPDB
- optionally, a CrowdSec decision feed
Closest existing options, and why each still falls short: Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
@@ -50,16 +45,13 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
external blacklist URLs, optional CrowdSec), R7 partly (AS number used for external blacklist URLs, optional CrowdSec), R7 partly (AS number used for
blacklist and whitelist decisions), R9 (ModSecurity with the Core Rule blacklist and whitelist decisions), R9 (ModSecurity with the Core Rule
Set, or Coraza plugin), env-var settings. Set, or Coraza plugin), env-var settings.
- Fails: - Fails: R8 (AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a
- R8: AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a limit. limit), R4 (no volume or byte threshold alerts in the free edition;
- R4: no alerts on request-count or byte thresholds in the free edition; reporting is a paid feature), R5 escalation, and R10 in spirit: since 1.6
reporting is a paid feature. it needs a `bunkerweb` container plus a `bw-scheduler` container and a
- R5: no escalation for repeat offenders. database, or the all-in-one image that bundles nginx, scheduler, UI and
- R10: since 1.6 it is not one plain sidecar. It needs a `bunkerweb` Redis in one container. It is designed to be the front door for many
container, a `bw-scheduler` container and a database, or the sites, not a per-app sidecar. AGPL-3.0.
all-in-one image that bundles nginx, the scheduler, the UI and Redis.
- It is designed as the proxy in front of many sites, not as a sidecar for
one app. AGPL-3.0.
- Unverified: whether several rates (minute, hour, day) can be stacked on - Unverified: whether several rates (minute, hour, day) can be stacked on
the same URL pattern; the documented design is one rate per URL pattern. the same URL pattern; the documented design is one rate per URL pattern.
- CrowdSec is the strongest detection and ban engine, but it is not a proxy. - CrowdSec is the strongest detection and ban engine, but it is not a proxy.
@@ -74,20 +66,16 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
listed AS numbers is possible, but each is a hand-written YAML scenario, listed AS numbers is possible, but each is a hand-written YAML scenario,
it reacts after the fact by banning, and it is not an inline limiter that it reacts after the fact by banning, and it is not an inline limiter that
answers 429. answers 429.
- Fails: - Fails: R10 (needs the security engine container with persistent state, log
- R10, because it needs: acquisition from traefik, a bouncer such as the traefik plugin, and YAML
- the security engine container with persistent state for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications), bytes half of R4.
- log acquisition from traefik
- a bouncer such as the traefik plugin
- YAML for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications
- R4's alerts on bytes.
- CrowdSec plus traefik's own `rateLimit` middleware is the best combination - CrowdSec plus traefik's own `rateLimit` middleware is the best combination
with no new code. It gives inline limiting (one window per middleware, keyed with no new code. It gives inline limiting (one window per middleware, keyed
by IP, with `sourceCriterion` exclusions), bans with escalation, alerts and by IP, with `sourceCriterion` exclusions), bans with escalation, alerts and
reputation lookups. It still fails R8, R4's alerts on bytes, and R10 entirely: reputation. It still fails R8, the bytes half of R4, R1's three stacked
the configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not windows only by chaining three middlewares per router, and R10 entirely: the
in one sidecar's environment. It meets R1's three windows only by chaining configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not in
three middlewares per router. one sidecar's environment.
## Candidate by candidate ## Candidate by candidate
@@ -99,10 +87,10 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
cached, streamed decision list (recommended), standalone against the cached, streamed decision list (recommended), standalone against the
central API, or AppSec only. Supports captcha remediation. central API, or AppSec only. Supports captcha remediation.
- Covers: R5, R6, R9, R3 and R7 through the engine (see Verdict). - Covers: R5, R6, R9, R3 and R7 through the engine (see Verdict).
- Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4's alerts on bytes. - Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4 bytes.
- Configuration: traefik static config to load the plugin, dynamic config or - Configuration: traefik static config to load the plugin, dynamic config or
labels for the middleware, CrowdSec YAML for everything else. labels for the middleware, CrowdSec YAML for everything else.
- Sidecar fit: no. It runs inside traefik and needs a separate engine - Sidecar fit: no. It lives inside traefik, plus a separate engine
container. container.
- Maturity: widely used (about 900 stars, listed in the traefik plugin - Maturity: widely used (about 900 stars, listed in the traefik plugin
catalog, documented by CrowdSec itself), actively maintained. Traefik catalog, documented by CrowdSec itself), actively maintained. Traefik
@@ -127,7 +115,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- What it is: nginx-derived (Tengine) reverse proxy with a proprietary - What it is: nginx-derived (Tengine) reverse proxy with a proprietary
semantic detection engine and a web console. About 22,000 stars. semantic detection engine and a web console. About 22,000 stars.
- Covers: R9 well, basic per-IP rate limiting with block duration, bot - Covers: R9 well, basic per-IP rate limiting with block duration, bot
challenge, authentication in front of the app. challenge, authentication gate.
- Misses: R8, R7, R4; R1 has one window per rule. Country blocking, alert - Misses: R8, R7, R4; R1 has one window per rule. Country blocking, alert
messages, syslog forwarding and the better reputation database are paid messages, syslog forwarding and the better reputation database are paid
(Lite about 10 USD per month, Pro about 100 USD per month); the free (Lite about 10 USD per month, Pro about 100 USD per month); the free
@@ -140,7 +128,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- Coraza (`corazawaf/coraza`) and Coraza-based proxies - Coraza (`corazawaf/coraza`) and Coraza-based proxies
- What it is: a Go library that implements the ModSecurity rule language and - What it is: a Go library that implements the ModSecurity rule language and
runs the OWASP Core Rule Set. OWASP project, actively maintained, the runs the OWASP Core Rule Set. OWASP project, actively maintained, the
successor to ModSecurity, which is now in maintenance only. successor path now that ModSecurity is in maintenance only.
- Packagings: `coraza-caddy` (Caddy module), `coraza-spoa` (HAProxy), - Packagings: `coraza-caddy` (Caddy module), `coraza-spoa` (HAProxy),
`coraza-proxy-wasm` (Envoy), a traefik WASM plugin, and `coraza-proxy-wasm` (Envoy), a traefik WASM plugin, and
`coreruleset/coraza-crs-docker` (Caddy plus Coraza plus the Core Rule Set, `coreruleset/coraza-crs-docker` (Caddy plus Coraza plus the Core Rule Set,
@@ -154,7 +142,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- ModSecurity Core Rule Set containers (`owasp/modsecurity-crs`) - ModSecurity Core Rule Set containers (`owasp/modsecurity-crs`)
- What it is: official images of Apache or nginx with ModSecurity and the - What it is: official images of Apache or nginx with ModSecurity and the
Core Rule Set, as a reverse proxy configured by env vars (`BACKEND`, Core Rule Set, as a reverse proxy configured by env vars (`BACKEND`,
paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images contain paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images carry
ModSecurity 2.9.x on Apache and Core Rule Set 4.x. ModSecurity 2.9.x on Apache and Core Rule Set 4.x.
- Covers: R9, and R10 (single container, env vars, one backend). - Covers: R9, and R10 (single container, env vars, one backend).
- Misses: R1 to R8. - Misses: R1 to R8.
@@ -164,8 +152,8 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- Anubis (`TecharoHQ/anubis`), 1.27 current - Anubis (`TecharoHQ/anubis`), 1.27 current
- What it is: a single-binary reverse proxy that makes browsers solve a - What it is: a single-binary reverse proxy that makes browsers solve a
proof-of-work challenge before passing them to `TARGET`. Aimed at proof-of-work challenge before passing them to `TARGET`. Aimed at
scrapers, which are likely a large share of the unwanted traffic on a scrapers, which is likely a large share of unwanted traffic on a public
public code forge. code forge.
- Covers: R10 well (one container, env vars for listener, target, - Covers: R10 well (one container, env vars for listener, target,
difficulty, cookies). Policy rules can match on path, user agent, headers, difficulty, cookies). Policy rules can match on path, user agent, headers,
IP ranges, and with the vendor's hosted data service also AS number and IP ranges, and with the vendor's hosted data service also AS number and
@@ -192,13 +180,13 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
temporary ban, no escalation, state lost on traefik restart) and R2 temporary ban, no escalation, state lost on traefik restart) and R2
(allowlist). Nothing else. (allowlist). Nothing else.
- `juitde/traefik-plugin-fail2ban`, fail2ban connector plugins, GeoBlock - `juitde/traefik-plugin-fail2ban`, fail2ban connector plugins, GeoBlock
plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): each adds plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): same
one small feature, is configured in traefik and keeps its state in memory. shape, each one small feature, configured in traefik, state in memory.
- Sidecar fit: no; they live inside traefik. - Sidecar fit: no; they live inside traefik.
- Traefik built-in middlewares - Traefik built-in middlewares
- `rateLimit` (one average-and-burst window per middleware, optional Redis - `rateLimit` (one average-and-burst window per middleware, optional Redis
in traefik 3.x), `inFlightReq`, `ipAllowList`. No bans, alerts, reputation in traefik 3.x), `inFlightReq`, `ipAllowList`. No bans, alerts, reputation
lookups or AS number lookups. or AS number awareness.
- caddy-waf (`fabriziosalmi/caddy-waf`), 0.4.x - caddy-waf (`fabriziosalmi/caddy-waf`), 0.4.x
- What it is: a Caddy module with regex rules and anomaly scoring, per-IP - What it is: a Caddy module with regex rules and anomaly scoring, per-IP
and per-path rate limiting with one configurable window, IP and DNS and per-path rate limiting with one configurable window, IP and DNS
@@ -210,12 +198,12 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- open-appsec (Check Point) - open-appsec (Check Point)
- Machine-learning WAF agent attached to nginx, Kong, Envoy or similar, with - Machine-learning WAF agent attached to nginx, Kong, Envoy or similar, with
a declarative policy file or the vendor's cloud console. Covers R9 only; a declarative policy file or the vendor's cloud console. Covers R9 only;
rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. It attaches to an rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. Not a sidecar in the
existing proxy, so it is not the sidecar R10 asks for. required sense.
- iocaine - iocaine
- Serves generated garbage pages to clients the fronting proxy classifies as - Serves generated garbage pages to clients the fronting proxy classifies as
scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope, and only of scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope except as a
passing interest for scraper traffic. curiosity for scraper traffic.
- Pangolin - Pangolin
- A tunnelled access platform that bundles traefik and optionally CrowdSec. - A tunnelled access platform that bundles traefik and optionally CrowdSec.
Replaces the ingress rather than adding a sidecar; out of scope. Replaces the ingress rather than adding a sidecar; out of scope.
@@ -226,17 +214,17 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
Everyone else offers one window per rule or none. Everyone else offers one window per rule or none.
- R2 bypass netblocks: BunkerWeb, CrowdSec, traefik, fail2ban plugins. - R2 bypass netblocks: BunkerWeb, CrowdSec, traefik, fail2ban plugins.
- R3 alerts: CrowdSec (best), BunkerWeb (denied requests only), SafeLine (paid). - R3 alerts: CrowdSec (best), BunkerWeb (denied requests only), SafeLine (paid).
- R4 alerts on request counts and bytes: none. CrowdSec can approximate alerts - R4 volume and byte anomalies: none. CrowdSec can approximate request-count
on request counts with a custom scenario; no surveyed tool alerts on bytes. anomalies with a custom scenario; nothing handles bytes.
- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb's ban is either one - R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb has fixed or permanent,
fixed length or permanent, and does not change with a client's history. not both by history.
- R6 reputation: CrowdSec, BunkerWeb, go-away, caddy-waf (static lists). - R6 reputation: CrowdSec, BunkerWeb, go-away, caddy-waf (static lists).
- R7 AS number lookup: CrowdSec (enrichment), BunkerWeb and caddy-waf (allow or - R7 AS number lookup: CrowdSec (enrichment), BunkerWeb and caddy-waf (allow or
deny), Anubis (hosted service). deny), Anubis (hosted service).
- R8 biased thresholds: none. - R8 biased thresholds: none.
- R9 attack detection: Coraza or ModSecurity with the Core Rule Set (open, - R9 attack detection: Coraza or ModSecurity with the Core Rule Set (open,
standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps Coraza standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps the
or ModSecurity). first).
- R10 env-var sidecar: `owasp/modsecurity-crs`, `coraza-crs-docker`, Anubis. - R10 env-var sidecar: `owasp/modsecurity-crs`, `coraza-crs-docker`, Anubis.
None of these covers anything beyond its one job. None of these covers anything beyond its one job.
README.md
+123 -128
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@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ without an answer in time, `rproxy` passes the request to the app.
It protects against: It protects against:
- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Each client gets a limit on - Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Each client gets a limit on
requests and on body bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults requests and on bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults leave
leave room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that keeps up
keeps up one request every 2 seconds. A client that breaks a limit is banned: one request every 2 seconds. A client over a limit is refused and banned: for
for a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently when
when it keeps at it. it keeps at it.
- Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The - Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The
default rule file bans such a client at its first probe, and its next request default rule file bans such a client at its first probe, and its next request
during the ban makes the ban permanent. Your own rules, or a list of trap during the ban makes the ban permanent. Your own rules, or a list of trap
@@ -210,132 +210,128 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100. A path prefix starts with `/`. percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100. A path prefix starts with `/`.
- `off` switches a limit, a threshold or a timeout off where the table says a - `off` switches a limit, a threshold or a timeout off where the table says a
setting takes it. setting takes it.
- The byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count only body bytes: the
app's response bodies, the visitors' request bodies, or both, as
`SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent over
a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
- An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the - An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged
on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`. on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`.
Every setting the code reads, with its default: Every setting the code reads, with its default:
| Variable | Default | What it does | | Variable | Default | What it does |
| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. | | `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. | | `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. | | `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. | | `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. | | `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. | | `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. | | `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. | | `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. | | `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `502`, or cut off once it has started. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. | | `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | How long the visitor may take to send its request line and headers, and then the whole request to reach the app, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. | | `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. | | `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. | | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. | | `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. | | `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. | | `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. | | `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. | | `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. | | `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse. |
| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. | | `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. | | `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. | | `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. | | `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. | | `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. | | `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. | | `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. | | `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. | | `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | Which body bytes the byte limits count: `response`, `request` or `both`. |
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. | | `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. | | `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. | | `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. | | `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. | | `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. | | `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. | | `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. | | `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs`, a web service, `file`, or `off`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. | | `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. | | `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. | | `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. | | `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWW_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. | | `SWW_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
| `SWW_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. | | `SWW_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
| `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. | | `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. | | `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. | | `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. | | `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). | | `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. | | `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. | | `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. | | `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. | | `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. | | `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. | | `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. | | `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. | | `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. | | `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. | | `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. | | `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. | | `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. | | `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. | | `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. | | `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. | | `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. | | `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. | | `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. | | `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. | | `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. | | `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. | | `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. | | `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. | | `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. | | `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. | | `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. | | `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. | | `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. | | `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. | | `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. | | `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. | | `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. | | `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. | | `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. | | `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. | | `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. | | `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. | | `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. | | `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. | | `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. | | `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. | | `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. | | `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. | | `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. | | `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. | | `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. | | `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. | | `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. | | `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. | | `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in [`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings. full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
@@ -531,9 +527,8 @@ of the request reaches the app.
17. The request is passed to the app, streaming. 17. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
18. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `discriminator` a report with the status 18. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `discriminator` a report with the status
and the body bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts and the bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts the
the bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names toward the byte limits, bans the client if bytes toward the byte limits and adds the request to the client's history.
they take it past one, and adds the request to the client's history.
A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a Core A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a Core
Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has false Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has false
SPEC.md
+19 -27
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ to them.
key or a token stays off until the operator supplies it. key or a token stays off until the operator supplies it.
- It keeps a site answering while the part that decides is down, slow or - It keeps a site answering while the part that decides is down, slow or
restarting (see "Without an answer from `discriminator`"). restarting (see "Without an answer from `discriminator`").
- It limits each client's requests and body bytes per minute, hour and day. It - It limits each client's requests and bytes per minute, hour and day. It bounds
bounds the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks. the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
- It bans abusers: briefly at first, for seven days on a clear sign of attack, - It bans abusers: briefly at first, for seven days on a clear sign of attack,
and permanently when they keep at it. and permanently when they keep at it.
- It looks up each client's AS number and country. It can refuse whole countries - It looks up each client's AS number and country. It can refuse whole countries
@@ -192,12 +192,11 @@ request log's `heuristic` field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and
sent is removed. sent is removed.
18. After the visitor's answer has ended, `rproxy` sends the report (see "The 18. After the visitor's answer has ended, `rproxy` sends the report (see "The
report"). `discriminator` then counts: report"). `discriminator` then counts:
- For a request it allowed, the body bytes of the response, of the request - For a request it allowed, the response bytes, the request bytes or both
or of both are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. For are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. For a
a WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client whose
whose total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit and
and is banned (`byte_limits`). The request that broke it has already been is banned (`byte_limits`). The response in progress is not cut off.
passed on whole; nothing is cut off.
- For a request it allowed, the client's history and the anomaly counters - For a request it allowed, the client's history and the anomaly counters
are updated, and the alert thresholds are evaluated. are updated, and the alert thresholds are evaluated.
@@ -260,8 +259,7 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
clear sign of attack bans it permanently at once. clear sign of attack bans it permanently at once.
- A broken limit, one of: - A broken limit, one of:
- a request over a rate limit; - a request over a rate limit;
- the bytes counted for a request and its response taking the client's total - a response that takes the client's byte total past a byte limit;
past a byte limit;
- more than `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` refusals within a minute. - more than `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` refusals within a minute.
The bans for a broken limit: The bans for a broken limit:
@@ -450,15 +448,10 @@ the same way.
### Byte limits, per client ### Byte limits, per client
The byte limits count body bytes: the app's response bodies, the visitors' By default there is no minute limit, so a client can download in a burst at full
request bodies, or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB and the day limit to 100 GiB. They
What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app allow several downloads of a few GiB each. A response's bytes are counted when
sent as response bytes. The bytes counted for a request and its response are it ends (see step 18).
added to the client's total once the response has ended (see step 18). So the
request that takes a client past a limit is passed on whole, and the ban refuses
the client's requests from then on. By default there is no minute limit, so a
client can download in a burst at full speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB
and the day limit to 100 GiB. They allow several downloads of a few GiB each.
### Lookup of AS number and country ### Lookup of AS number and country
@@ -960,8 +953,7 @@ which the metrics show. They reveal a widely distributed scraper, thousands of
addresses at low rates each, which the per-client limits do not see. A low addresses at low rates each, which the per-client limits do not see. A low
percentage for its `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` is the response. percentage for its `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` is the response.
- Requests and body bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted per - Requests and bytes are counted per minute and per hour, for each of:
minute and per hour, for each of:
- a client; - a client;
- the surrounding netblock; - the surrounding netblock;
- an AS number; - an AS number;
@@ -1271,9 +1263,9 @@ short.
### Answering in time ### Answering in time
`rproxy` stops waiting for `discriminator` after `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, by default 2 `rproxy` stops waiting for `discriminator` after `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, by default 2
seconds, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. The longest a question seconds, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. So at the defaults,
waits on an outside source is `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800 milliseconds, `discriminator` answers a request well within that time, whatever the request
well within that time. and whatever its outside sources do.
GeoJS is the only outside source a question can wait on. A question waits only GeoJS is the only outside source a question can wait on. A question waits only
when step 6 says so, and for at most `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800 when step 6 says so, and for at most `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800
@@ -1369,9 +1361,9 @@ answer.
For a request it holds, `discriminator` writes the request's last log line (see For a request it holds, `discriminator` writes the request's last log line (see
"The log"). For a request it allowed, it first: "The log"). For a request it allowed, it first:
- counts the body bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, toward the client's byte limits - counts the bytes as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says, toward the client's byte limits at
at the percentages it gave that request; the percentages it gave that request;
- bans a client whose total passes a byte limit; - bans a client that passes a byte limit;
- adds the request with its status to the client's history, the anomaly counters - adds the request with its status to the client's history, the anomaly counters
and the metrics. and the metrics.
docs/metrics.md
-3
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,6 @@ What `GET /_sww/metrics` answers with, at `discriminator`'s own address.
keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
`honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics. `honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
Every `sww_*request_bytes_total` and `sww_*response_bytes_total` series counts
body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says.
## Traffic ## Traffic
- `sww_requests_total`, `sww_request_bytes_total` and - `sww_requests_total`, `sww_request_bytes_total` and
docs/request-log.md
+6 -8
View File
@@ -145,22 +145,20 @@ Every one of these lines has:
included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It
holds: holds:
- `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests; - `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: the body bytes - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: bytes.
`SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, in that window.
A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes counted for an allowed request and its [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes of an allowed request are counted when
response are added when its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the bytes are without this
three byte totals leave them out. request's.
- `limit_hit`: the limit broken: - `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
- `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit; - `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit; - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
- `error_burst`. - `error_burst`.
When the bytes counted for a request and its response break a limit, the A request whose bytes broke a limit was passed on whole, so its `action`
request has been passed on whole, so its `action` stays `forward`. Only its stays `forward`. Only its `report` line gives that limit.
`report` line gives that limit.
- `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that - `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
refused. refused.
docs/settings.md
+10 -27
View File
@@ -94,12 +94,10 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are - `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are
exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits.
- `SWW_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are refused (see step - `SWW_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are refused (see step
4 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). 3 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## Request rate limits, per client ## Request rate limits, per client
The request past one of these limits is refused, and the client is banned.
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a - `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
person opening two pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files each. person opening two pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files each.
@@ -122,22 +120,11 @@ The request past one of these limits is refused, and the client is banned.
## Byte limits, per client ## Byte limits, per client
These count body bytes, never headers. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. The bytes
counted for a request and its response are added to the client's total once the
response has ended. The request that takes a client's total past a limit is not
cut off; the client is banned.
- `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` - `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes (default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes
counted for a client in each window, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that - `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response `response`, `request` or `both`.
ends.
- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte anomaly
thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the
visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
## Lookup of AS number and country ## Lookup of AS number and country
@@ -194,9 +181,7 @@ that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
- a `dnsbl=` tag of a zone in `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES`, in lower case, with a key - a `dnsbl=` tag of a zone in `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES`, in lower case, with a key
masked as the `reputation` field shows it; masked as the `reputation` field shows it;
- `abuseipdb`, while `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` is set; - `abuseipdb`, while `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` is set;
- `exploitsignature`, in `SWW_TAG_DENY` only, while `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` is - `exploitsignature`, in `SWW_TAG_DENY` only.
`true`, or while neither `SWW_WAF_MODE` nor `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` is
`off`.
`crowdsec` stops the start in both settings, because a CrowdSec decision refuses `crowdsec` stops the start in both settings, because a CrowdSec decision refuses
the request first. the request first.
@@ -246,9 +231,8 @@ the request first.
a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads, a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
yet. It has no `_FILE` form. yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may get - `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client in
in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
`off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
## Ban lengths, response and scope ## Ban lengths, response and scope
@@ -325,10 +309,9 @@ the request first.
## Anomaly thresholds ## Anomaly thresholds
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most body bytes Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most bytes counted in
counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names. a minute and in an hour. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by
Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by default. The four default. The four thresholds per client are:
thresholds per client are:
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`; - `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`; - `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
docs/state-files.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ since it was first seen:
- the first and last time seen; - the first and last time seen;
- the AS number, AS name and country last looked up, and when; - the AS number, AS name and country last looked up, and when;
- total requests, and how many were forwarded and how many refused; - total requests, and how many were forwarded and how many refused;
- body bytes of its requests, and of the responses it was sent; - bytes in each direction;
- responses by status class; - responses by status class;
- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`. A file - offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`. A file
may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which nothing adds to. may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which nothing adds to.
internal/config/config.go
+10 -22
View File
@@ -483,8 +483,7 @@ var (
errNoRequestGetsTag = errors.New( errNoRequestGetsTag = errors.New(
"is a tag no request can get: it is not a name in SWW_TAG_LISTS, an " + "is a tag no request can get: it is not a name in SWW_TAG_LISTS, an " +
"asn= or country= tag, a dnsbl= tag of a zone in SWW_DNSBL_ZONES, " + "asn= or country= tag, a dnsbl= tag of a zone in SWW_DNSBL_ZONES, " +
"abuseipdb with SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY set, or exploitsignature with " + "or abuseipdb with SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY set")
"rule files or the Core Rule Set on")
) )
// FromEnvironment reads the settings with lookupEnv, normally // FromEnvironment reads the settings with lookupEnv, normally
@@ -1157,16 +1156,11 @@ func checkTag(cfg *Config, tag string) error {
// requestCanGetTag reports whether anything cfg sets up can give a request tag. // requestCanGetTag reports whether anything cfg sets up can give a request tag.
func requestCanGetTag(cfg *Config, tag string) bool { func requestCanGetTag(cfg *Config, tag string) bool {
isListName := func(list TagList) bool { return list.Name == tag } isListName := func(list TagList) bool { return list.Name == tag }
if isLookupTag(tag) || slices.ContainsFunc(cfg.TagLists, isListName) { if isLookupTag(tag) || tag == ExploitSignatureTag ||
slices.ContainsFunc(cfg.TagLists, isListName) {
return true return true
} }
if tag == ExploitSignatureTag {
coreRuleSetOn := cfg.WAFMode != WAFModeOff && cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold != 0
return cfg.RulesEnabled || coreRuleSetOn
}
if tag == AbuseIPDBTag { if tag == AbuseIPDBTag {
return cfg.AbuseIPDBKey != "" return cfg.AbuseIPDBKey != ""
} }
@@ -1970,13 +1964,11 @@ func parseTagLists(value string) ([]TagList, error) {
} }
// parseTags reads a comma-separated list of tags, which parseTag reads. A // parseTags reads a comma-separated list of tags, which parseTag reads. A
// tag listed twice is an error, which shows the tag as MaskZoneKey does. // tag listed twice is an error.
func parseTags(value string) ([]string, error) { func parseTags(value string) ([]string, error) {
items, err := parseList(value) items, err := parseList(value)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
// parseList's error, for an empty item, shows the whole value, keys return nil, err
// included.
return nil, errEmptyItem
} }
tags := make([]string, 0, len(items)) tags := make([]string, 0, len(items))
@@ -1988,7 +1980,7 @@ func parseTags(value string) ([]string, error) {
} }
if slices.Contains(tags, tag) { if slices.Contains(tags, tag) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", MaskZoneKey(item), errListedTwice) return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item, errListedTwice)
} }
tags = append(tags, tag) tags = append(tags, tag)
@@ -2033,9 +2025,7 @@ func parseTag(value string) (string, error) {
func parseTagPercents(value string) (map[string]int64, error) { func parseTagPercents(value string) (map[string]int64, error) {
items, err := parseList(value) items, err := parseList(value)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
// parseList's error, for an empty item, shows the whole value, keys return nil, err
// included.
return nil, errEmptyItem
} }
percents := make(map[string]int64, len(items)) percents := make(map[string]int64, len(items))
@@ -2043,7 +2033,7 @@ func parseTagPercents(value string) (map[string]int64, error) {
for _, item := range items { for _, item := range items {
colon := strings.LastIndex(item, ":") colon := strings.LastIndex(item, ":")
if colon <= 0 { if colon <= 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", MaskZoneKey(item), errNotTagPercentItem) return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item, errNotTagPercentItem)
} }
tag, err := parseTag(item[:colon]) tag, err := parseTag(item[:colon])
@@ -2053,7 +2043,7 @@ func parseTagPercents(value string) (map[string]int64, error) {
percent, err := strconv.ParseInt(item[colon+1:], 10, 64) percent, err := strconv.ParseInt(item[colon+1:], 10, 64)
if err != nil || percent < 1 || percent > 99 { if err != nil || percent < 1 || percent > 99 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", MaskZoneKey(item[colon+1:]), errNotTagPercent) return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item[colon+1:], errNotTagPercent)
} }
if tag == ExploitSignatureTag { if tag == ExploitSignatureTag {
@@ -2061,9 +2051,7 @@ func parseTagPercents(value string) (map[string]int64, error) {
} }
if _, listed := percents[tag]; listed { if _, listed := percents[tag]; listed {
// tag, since item[:colon] may end in a space, which MaskZoneKey return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item[:colon], errListedTwice)
// would not mask.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", MaskZoneKey(tag), errListedTwice)
} }
percents[tag] = percent percents[tag] = percent
internal/config/config_test.go
+12 -74
View File
@@ -208,9 +208,6 @@ const off = "off"
// enabled is true, as a setting's value. // enabled is true, as a setting's value.
const enabled = "true" const enabled = "true"
// disabled is false, as a setting's value.
const disabled = "false"
// defaultLookupSource is the default of SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE, and // defaultLookupSource is the default of SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE, and
// fileSource the source that is the lookup database. // fileSource the source that is the lookup database.
const ( const (
@@ -348,7 +345,7 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
metricsToken: token, metricsToken: token,
metricsTopN: "10", metricsTopN: "10",
rulesDir: "/srv/waf-rules", rulesDir: "/srv/waf-rules",
rulesEnabled: disabled, rulesEnabled: "false",
}) })
wantSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{ wantSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
@@ -1102,7 +1099,7 @@ func TestInstanceNameNotUTF8StopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestCodeInAllowedCountriesAndTagDenyStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) { func TestCodeOnBothCountryListsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{ _, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
@@ -1110,7 +1107,7 @@ func TestCodeInAllowedCountriesAndTagDenyStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
allowedCountries: "de,RU", allowedCountries: "de,RU",
}.lookupEnv) }.lookupEnv)
if err == nil { if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ru in SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES and SWW_TAG_DENY was accepted") t.Fatal("ru on both country lists was accepted")
} }
if !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), allowedCountries+": ") || if !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), allowedCountries+": ") ||
@@ -1360,11 +1357,10 @@ func TestInvalidAnomalySettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
// torExitTag, zenTag and exploitTag are tags these tests name. // torExitTag and zenTag are tags these tests name.
const ( const (
torExitTag = "torexit" torExitTag = "torexit"
zenTag = "dnsbl=zen.example" zenTag = "dnsbl=zen.example"
exploitTag = "exploitsignature"
) )
func TestTagSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) { func TestTagSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1436,15 +1432,7 @@ func TestTagThatNoRequestCanGetIsToldApartFromOneItCan(t *testing.T) {
{"crowdsec, though a list has its name", environment{ {"crowdsec, though a list has its name", environment{
tagLists: "crowdsec=https://example.com/c.txt", tagDeny: "crowdsec", tagLists: "crowdsec=https://example.com/c.txt", tagDeny: "crowdsec",
}, `"crowdsec" cannot be used`}, }, `"crowdsec" cannot be used`},
{exploitTag, environment{tagDeny: exploitTag}, ""}, {"exploitsignature", environment{tagDeny: "exploitsignature"}, ""},
{
exploitTag + " with rule files off",
environment{tagDeny: exploitTag, rulesEnabled: disabled}, "",
},
{
exploitTag + " with the Core Rule Set off",
environment{tagDeny: exploitTag, wafMode: off}, "",
},
} { } {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
@@ -1463,39 +1451,6 @@ func TestTagThatNoRequestCanGetIsToldApartFromOneItCan(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestErrorOfATagSettingLeavesOutAZoneKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
tag = "dnsbl=" + spamhaus
emptyItem = "has an empty item in its list"
twice = `"` + spamhausMasked + `" is listed twice`
)
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value, want string }{
{tagDeny, tag + "," + tag, twice},
{tagDeny, tag + ",,", emptyItem},
{
tagLimitPercent, tag,
`"` + spamhausMasked + `" is not a tag, : and a percentage, ` +
"such as vpn:50 or asn=14061:25",
},
{
tagLimitPercent, "50:" + tag,
`"` + spamhausMasked + `" is not a percentage from 1 to 99`,
},
{tagLimitPercent, tag + ":50," + tag + " :25", twice},
{tagLimitPercent, tag + ":50,,", emptyItem},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("%s=%s gave the error %v, want %s", tc.name, tc.value, err, want)
}
}
}
func TestTagListURLFetchedAsAnotherListStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) { func TestTagListURLFetchedAsAnotherListStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
@@ -2186,12 +2141,14 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{countryBytesPercent, "cn"}, {countryBytesPercent, "cn:"}, {countryBytesPercent, "cn"}, {countryBytesPercent, "cn:"},
{countryBytesPercent, "cn:25:50"}, {countryBytesPercent, "china:25"}, {countryBytesPercent, "cn:25:50"}, {countryBytesPercent, "china:25"},
{tagDeny, "a,,b"}, {tagDeny, "country=nk"}, {tagDeny, "asn=abc"}, {tagDeny, "a,,b"}, {tagDeny, "country=nk"}, {tagDeny, "asn=abc"},
{tagDeny, "asn="}, {tagDeny, "torexit,TOREXIT"}, {tagDeny, "torexti"}, {tagDeny, "asn="}, {tagDeny, "torexit,TOREXIT"},
{tagDeny, zenTag}, {tagDeny, "abuseipdb"}, {tagDeny, "crowdsec"}, {tagDeny, "torexti"}, {tagDeny, zenTag},
{tagDeny, "abuseipdb"}, {tagDeny, "crowdsec"},
{tagLimitPercent, "torexti:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "dnsbl=zen.example:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "torexti:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "dnsbl=zen.example:50"},
{tagLimitPercent, "abuseipdb:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "crowdsec:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "abuseipdb:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "crowdsec:50"},
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn :50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn"}, {tagLimitPercent, ":50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn :50"},
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn:"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:0"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:100"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn"}, {tagLimitPercent, ":50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:"},
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn:0"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:100"},
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn:1.5"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:50,VPN:25"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:1.5"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:50,VPN:25"},
{tagLimitPercent, "exploitsignature:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "asn=abc:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "exploitsignature:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "asn=abc:50"},
{tagLists, torExitTag}, {tagLists, "=https://example.com/a.txt"}, {tagLists, torExitTag}, {tagLists, "=https://example.com/a.txt"},
@@ -2210,25 +2167,6 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{logLevel, "INFO"}, {logLevel, "warning"}, {logLevel, "trace"}, {logLevel, ""}, {logLevel, "INFO"}, {logLevel, "warning"}, {logLevel, "trace"}, {logLevel, ""},
{rulesEnabled, "yes"}, {rulesEnabled, "True"}, {rulesEnabled, "yes"}, {rulesEnabled, "True"},
}) })
wantExploitTagStopsTheStartWithRulesAndCoreRuleSetOff(t)
}
// wantExploitTagStopsTheStartWithRulesAndCoreRuleSetOff checks that with rule
// files off, and either setting turning off the Core Rule Set, the tag
// exploitsignature in SWW_TAG_DENY stops the start.
func wantExploitTagStopsTheStartWithRulesAndCoreRuleSetOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
for _, name := range []string{wafMode, wafAnomalyThreshold} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
tagDeny: exploitTag, rulesEnabled: disabled, name: off,
}.lookupEnv)
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), tagDeny+": ") {
t.Errorf("%s=off with rule files off gave the error %v, want one naming %s",
name, err, tagDeny)
}
}
} }
func TestInvalidBanOrStateValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) { func TestInvalidBanOrStateValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
@@ -2483,7 +2421,7 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
lookupSource: defaultLookupSource, lookupSource: defaultLookupSource,
lookupDBPath: "", lookupDBPath: "",
lookupTimeout: "800ms", lookupTimeout: "800ms",
addLookupHeaders: disabled, addLookupHeaders: "false",
allowedCountries: "", allowedCountries: "",
tagLists: "", tagLists: "",
tagDeny: "", tagDeny: "",
internal/discriminator/reputation_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ func TestReputationRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndWhatListedTheClient(t *testing.T)
} }
} }
func TestBlocklistsComeAfterAllowedCountriesAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) { func TestBlocklistsComeAfterTheCountryListsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
s, server, queue := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{ s, server, queue := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
internal/discriminator/tagdeny_test.go
-16
View File
@@ -46,22 +46,6 @@ func TestTagDenyRefusesAListTagBeforeTheRateLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestTagDenyRefusesAMixedCaseZoneByItsLowerCaseTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const mixedCaseZone = "DNSBL.example"
// The zone's tag is in lower case, however SWW_DNSBL_ZONES writes it.
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
dnsblZones: mixedCaseZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver,
reputationAction: actionLog, tagDeny: "dnsbl=" + dnsblZone,
})
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {mixedCaseZone}})
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
"tag_deny", `{"tag": "dnsbl=`+dnsblZone+`"}`)
}
func TestTagDenyRefusesAnExploitSignatureOfARuleThatOnlyLogs(t *testing.T) { func TestTagDenyRefusesAnExploitSignatureOfARuleThatOnlyLogs(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()