Add asn= and prefix= tags from a routewatch instance (closes #204 )

SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL names the instance. The new heuristic routewatch_tags asks it in the background about each client and tags the request. Answers are kept in memory for an hour. A request without tags gives the reason in routewatch_tags_missing, and it is never delayed or refused. Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-09 03:01:14 +00:00
55 changed files with 429 additions and 789 deletions
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
 - R1: rate limits per minute, per hour and per day
 - R2: netblocks that bypass rate limiting
 - R3: alerts on attacks through webhook, Slack or ntfy
- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests made or bytes transferred per minute or
+- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests or bytes per minute or hour, for given IPs
-  hour, for given IPs or netblocks, crossing a threshold
+  or netblocks, crossing a threshold
 - R5: temporary blocks for abusers, permanent bans for repeat offenders
 - R6: one or more RBLs or IP reputation APIs
 - R7: AS number lookup
@@ -24,19 +24,14 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
 ## Verdict
-Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8, which asks for limits
+Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8 (scaling limits by AS
-scaled by AS number or country. None meets R4's alerts on bytes transferred. The
+number or country) or the bytes half of R4 at all, and the tools that come
-tools that come closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML
+closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML or a web UI.
-or a web UI. The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar;
+The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar; `SPEC.md` in this
-`SPEC.md` in this directory begins that spec.
+directory begins that spec. It reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field as
-
+libraries and data sources (Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set for attack
-The sidecar reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field instead of
+detection, DNSBLs, AbuseIPDB, optionally a CrowdSec decision feed) instead of
-reimplementing them. It takes these as libraries and data sources:
+reimplementing them.
 - Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set, for attack detection
 - DNSBLs
 - AbuseIPDB
 - optionally, a CrowdSec decision feed
 Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
@@ -50,16 +45,13 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
      external blacklist URLs, optional CrowdSec), R7 partly (AS number used for
      blacklist and whitelist decisions), R9 (ModSecurity with the Core Rule
      Set, or Coraza plugin), env-var settings.
-    - Fails:
+    - Fails: R8 (AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a
-        - R8: AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a limit.
+      limit), R4 (no volume or byte threshold alerts in the free edition;
-        - R4: no alerts on request-count or byte thresholds in the free edition;
+      reporting is a paid feature), R5 escalation, and R10 in spirit: since 1.6
-          reporting is a paid feature.
+      it needs a `bunkerweb` container plus a `bw-scheduler` container and a
-        - R5: no escalation for repeat offenders.
+      database, or the all-in-one image that bundles nginx, scheduler, UI and
-        - R10: since 1.6 it is not one plain sidecar. It needs a `bunkerweb`
+      Redis in one container. It is designed to be the front door for many
-          container, a `bw-scheduler` container and a database, or the
+      sites, not a per-app sidecar. AGPL-3.0.
          all-in-one image that bundles nginx, the scheduler, the UI and Redis.
    - It is designed as the proxy in front of many sites, not as a sidecar for
      one app. AGPL-3.0.
    - Unverified: whether several rates (minute, hour, day) can be stacked on
      the same URL pattern; the documented design is one rate per URL pattern.
 - CrowdSec is the strongest detection and ban engine, but it is not a proxy.
@@ -74,20 +66,16 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
      listed AS numbers is possible, but each is a hand-written YAML scenario,
      it reacts after the fact by banning, and it is not an inline limiter that
      answers 429.
-    - Fails:
+    - Fails: R10 (needs the security engine container with persistent state, log
-        - R10, because it needs:
+      acquisition from traefik, a bouncer such as the traefik plugin, and YAML
-            - the security engine container with persistent state
+      for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications), bytes half of R4.
            - log acquisition from traefik
            - a bouncer such as the traefik plugin
            - YAML for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications
        - R4's alerts on bytes.
 - CrowdSec plus traefik's own `rateLimit` middleware is the best combination
  with no new code. It gives inline limiting (one window per middleware, keyed
  by IP, with `sourceCriterion` exclusions), bans with escalation, alerts and
-  reputation lookups. It still fails R8, R4's alerts on bytes, and R10 entirely:
+  reputation. It still fails R8, the bytes half of R4, R1's three stacked
-  the configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not
+  windows only by chaining three middlewares per router, and R10 entirely: the
-  in one sidecar's environment. It meets R1's three windows only by chaining
+  configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not in
-  three middlewares per router.
+  one sidecar's environment.
 ## Candidate by candidate
@@ -99,10 +87,10 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
      cached, streamed decision list (recommended), standalone against the
      central API, or AppSec only. Supports captcha remediation.
    - Covers: R5, R6, R9, R3 and R7 through the engine (see Verdict).
-    - Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4's alerts on bytes.
+    - Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4 bytes.
    - Configuration: traefik static config to load the plugin, dynamic config or
      labels for the middleware, CrowdSec YAML for everything else.
-    - Sidecar fit: no. It runs inside traefik and needs a separate engine
+    - Sidecar fit: no. It lives inside traefik, plus a separate engine
      container.
    - Maturity: widely used (about 900 stars, listed in the traefik plugin
      catalog, documented by CrowdSec itself), actively maintained. Traefik
@@ -127,7 +115,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
    - What it is: nginx-derived (Tengine) reverse proxy with a proprietary
      semantic detection engine and a web console. About 22,000 stars.
    - Covers: R9 well, basic per-IP rate limiting with block duration, bot
-      challenge, authentication in front of the app.
+      challenge, authentication gate.
    - Misses: R8, R7, R4; R1 has one window per rule. Country blocking, alert
      messages, syslog forwarding and the better reputation database are paid
      (Lite about 10 USD per month, Pro about 100 USD per month); the free
@@ -140,7 +128,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 - Coraza (`corazawaf/coraza`) and Coraza-based proxies
    - What it is: a Go library that implements the ModSecurity rule language and
      runs the OWASP Core Rule Set. OWASP project, actively maintained, the
-      successor to ModSecurity, which is now in maintenance only.
+      successor path now that ModSecurity is in maintenance only.
    - Packagings: `coraza-caddy` (Caddy module), `coraza-spoa` (HAProxy),
      `coraza-proxy-wasm` (Envoy), a traefik WASM plugin, and
      `coreruleset/coraza-crs-docker` (Caddy plus Coraza plus the Core Rule Set,
@@ -154,7 +142,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 - ModSecurity Core Rule Set containers (`owasp/modsecurity-crs`)
    - What it is: official images of Apache or nginx with ModSecurity and the
      Core Rule Set, as a reverse proxy configured by env vars (`BACKEND`,
-      paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images contain
+      paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images carry
      ModSecurity 2.9.x on Apache and Core Rule Set 4.x.
    - Covers: R9, and R10 (single container, env vars, one backend).
    - Misses: R1 to R8.
@@ -164,8 +152,8 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 - Anubis (`TecharoHQ/anubis`), 1.27 current
    - What it is: a single-binary reverse proxy that makes browsers solve a
      proof-of-work challenge before passing them to `TARGET`. Aimed at
-      scrapers, which are likely a large share of the unwanted traffic on a
+      scrapers, which is likely a large share of unwanted traffic on a public
-      public code forge.
+      code forge.
    - Covers: R10 well (one container, env vars for listener, target,
      difficulty, cookies). Policy rules can match on path, user agent, headers,
      IP ranges, and with the vendor's hosted data service also AS number and
@@ -192,13 +180,13 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
      temporary ban, no escalation, state lost on traefik restart) and R2
      (allowlist). Nothing else.
    - `juitde/traefik-plugin-fail2ban`, fail2ban connector plugins, GeoBlock
-      plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): each adds
+      plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): same
-      one small feature, is configured in traefik and keeps its state in memory.
+      shape, each one small feature, configured in traefik, state in memory.
    - Sidecar fit: no; they live inside traefik.
 - Traefik built-in middlewares
    - `rateLimit` (one average-and-burst window per middleware, optional Redis
      in traefik 3.x), `inFlightReq`, `ipAllowList`. No bans, alerts, reputation
-      lookups or AS number lookups.
+      or AS number awareness.
 - caddy-waf (`fabriziosalmi/caddy-waf`), 0.4.x
    - What it is: a Caddy module with regex rules and anomaly scoring, per-IP
      and per-path rate limiting with one configurable window, IP and DNS
@@ -210,12 +198,12 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 - open-appsec (Check Point)
    - Machine-learning WAF agent attached to nginx, Kong, Envoy or similar, with
      a declarative policy file or the vendor's cloud console. Covers R9 only;
-      rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. It attaches to an
+      rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. Not a sidecar in the
-      existing proxy, so it is not the sidecar R10 asks for.
+      required sense.
 - iocaine
    - Serves generated garbage pages to clients the fronting proxy classifies as
-      scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope, and only of
+      scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope except as a
-      passing interest for scraper traffic.
+      curiosity for scraper traffic.
 - Pangolin
    - A tunnelled access platform that bundles traefik and optionally CrowdSec.
      Replaces the ingress rather than adding a sidecar; out of scope.
@@ -226,17 +214,17 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
  Everyone else offers one window per rule or none.
 - R2 bypass netblocks: BunkerWeb, CrowdSec, traefik, fail2ban plugins.
 - R3 alerts: CrowdSec (best), BunkerWeb (denied requests only), SafeLine (paid).
- R4 alerts on request counts and bytes: none. CrowdSec can approximate alerts
+- R4 volume and byte anomalies: none. CrowdSec can approximate request-count
-  on request counts with a custom scenario; no surveyed tool alerts on bytes.
+  anomalies with a custom scenario; nothing handles bytes.
- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb's ban is either one
+- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb has fixed or permanent,
-  fixed length or permanent, and does not change with a client's history.
+  not both by history.
 - R6 reputation: CrowdSec, BunkerWeb, go-away, caddy-waf (static lists).
 - R7 AS number lookup: CrowdSec (enrichment), BunkerWeb and caddy-waf (allow or
  deny), Anubis (hosted service).
 - R8 biased thresholds: none.
 - R9 attack detection: Coraza or ModSecurity with the Core Rule Set (open,
-  standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps Coraza
+  standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps the
-  or ModSecurity).
+  first).
 - R10 env-var sidecar: `owasp/modsecurity-crs`, `coraza-crs-docker`, Anubis.
  None of these covers anything beyond its one job.
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ without an answer in time, `rproxy` passes the request to the app.
 It protects against:
 - Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Each client gets a limit on
-  requests and on body bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults
+  requests and on bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults leave
-  leave room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that
+  room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that keeps up
-  keeps up one request every 2 seconds. A client that breaks a limit is banned:
+  one request every 2 seconds. A client over a limit is refused and banned: for
-  for a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently
+  a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently when
-  when it keeps at it.
+  it keeps at it.
 - Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The
  default rule file bans such a client at its first probe, and its next request
  during the ban makes the ban permanent. Your own rules, or a list of trap
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ does.
  the request have `"action":"forward"`.
 - To see a refusal without banning yourself, run `discriminator` with
  `SWW_MODE=observe` and ask for `/.env`. The request reaches the app.
-  `discriminator`'s log lines have `"would_action":"temporarily_banned"` and
+  `discriminator`'s log lines have `"would_action":"banned"` and
  `"rule_ids":["env-file"]`. A ban you get in `enforce` mode is lifted as
  "Clients and bans" below describes.
 - With `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` set, this answers with the metrics, from a host on
@@ -210,10 +210,6 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
  percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100. A path prefix starts with `/`.
 - `off` switches a limit, a threshold or a timeout off where the table says a
  setting takes it.
 - The byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count only body bytes: the
  app's response bodies, the visitors' request bodies, or both, as
  `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent over
  a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
 - An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
  variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged
  on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`.
@@ -221,7 +217,7 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
 Every setting the code reads, with its default:
 | Variable                                 | Default                                                                        | What it does                                                                                                                                                      |
-| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | `SWW_COMMAND`                            | `rproxy`                                                                       | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`.                                                                           |
 | `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND`                       | required                                                                       | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`.                                                                                                       |
 | `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`                      | `http://127.0.0.1:8081`                                                        | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more.                                                                                               |
@@ -230,8 +226,8 @@ Every setting the code reads, with its default:
 | `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`                        | `2000`                                                                         | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds.                                                              |
 | `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`               | `allow`                                                                        | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`.          |
 | `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE`                  | `100M`                                                                         | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`.                                                                                        |
-| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE`                 | `1G`                                                                           | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started.                                                                                                                        |
+| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE`                 | `1G`                                                                           | The largest response body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `502`, or cut off once it has started.                                                       |
-| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`               | `60000`                                                                        | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app.                                                                                           |
+| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`               | `60000`                                                                        | How long the visitor may take to send its request line and headers, and then the whole request to reach the app, in milliseconds or `off`.                        |
 | `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS`              | `1800000`                                                                      | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`.                                        |
 | `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR`                        | `:8080`                                                                        | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty.                                                                                                         |
 | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`                      | the container's host name                                                      | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`.                                                         |
@@ -240,24 +236,24 @@ Every setting the code reads, with its default:
 | `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`                | `20000`                                                                        | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first.                                                                 |
 | `SWW_MAX_BANS`                           | `5000`                                                                         | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count.                                                                                  |
 | `SWW_ALLOW_NETS`                         | empty                                                                          | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring.                                                                                                |
-| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`             | empty                                                                          | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits.                                                                                                                                                                                      |
+| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`             | empty                                                                          | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse.                                                                                     |
 | `SWW_DENY_NETS`                          | empty                                                                          | Netblocks whose clients are refused.                                                                                                                              |
-| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`              | `120`                                                                          | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client.                                                                                                                                             |
+| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`              | `120`                                                                          | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it.                                                                              |
-| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`                | `1500`                                                                         | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client.                                                                                                                                              |
+| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`                | `1500`                                                                         | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it.                                                                               |
-| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY`                 | `6000`                                                                         | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client.                                                                                                                                                |
+| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY`                 | `6000`                                                                         | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it.                                                                                 |
-| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS`            | empty                                                                          | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`.                                                                                                                                                                                |
+| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS`            | empty                                                                          | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`.                                                            |
-| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`             | `off`                                                                          | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends.         |
+| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`             | `off`                                                                          | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it.                           |
-| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`               | `50G`                                                                          | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends.          |
+| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`               | `50G`                                                                          | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`.                                                                                         |
-| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY`                | `100G`                                                                         | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends.            |
+| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY`                | `100G`                                                                         | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`.                                                                                           |
-| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT`                        | `both`                                                                         | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
+| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT`                        | `both`                                                                         | Which body bytes the byte limits count: `response`, `request` or `both`.                                                                                          |
-| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`              | `30`                                                                           | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client.                                                                                                              |
+| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`              | `30`                                                                           | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it.                              |
 | `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`                       | `403`                                                                          | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection.                                                                            |
 | `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION`                 | `1h`                                                                           | The ban for a first broken limit.                                                                                                                                 |
-| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW`            | `24h`                                                                          | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long.                                                                                                                                               |
+| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW`            | `24h`                                                                          | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long.                                                               |
 | `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION`                   | `7d`                                                                           | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead.                                                                                     |
 | `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION`                | `7d`                                                                           | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path.                                                                                            |
 | `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX`                | `32`                                                                           | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32.                                                                                   |
-| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE`                      | `geojs`                                                                        | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`.                                                                                                                                               |
+| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE`                      | `geojs`                                                                        | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs`, a web service, `file`, or `off`.                                                                    |
 | `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH`                     | empty                                                                          | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`.                                                                              |
 | `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`                     | `800ms`                                                                        | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take.                                   |
 | `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`                 | `false`                                                                        | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`.                                                                |
@@ -316,27 +312,27 @@ Every setting the code reads, with its default:
 | `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR`                 | `60`                                                                           | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`.                                                                 |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count.                                                                                         |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`   | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count.                                                                                          |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`    | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                                         |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`    | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in a minute, a size.                                                                                  |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR`      | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                                          |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR`      | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in an hour, a size.                                                                                   |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`    | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count.                                                                       |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`      | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count.                                                                        |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`       | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                       |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`       | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size.                                                                         |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR`         | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                        |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR`         | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size.                                                                          |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX`              | `24`                                                                           | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32.                                               |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX`              | `48`                                                                           | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128.                                              |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`    | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count.                                                                                      |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`      | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count.                                                                                       |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`       | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                                      |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`       | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size.                                                                                        |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR`         | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                                       |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR`         | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size.                                                                                         |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`  | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count.                                                                                   |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`    | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count.                                                                                    |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`     | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                                  |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`     | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size.                                                                                    |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR`       | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                                   |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR`       | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size.                                                                                     |
 | `SWW_WATCH_NETS`                         | empty                                                                          | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`.                                     |
 | `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`          | `off`                                                                          | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count.                                                                                 |
 | `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`            | `off`                                                                          | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count.                                                                                  |
-| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`             | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                                 |
+| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`             | `off`                                                                          | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size.                                                                                   |
-| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR`               | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                                  |
+| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR`               | `off`                                                                          | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size.                                                                                    |
 [`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
 full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
@@ -532,9 +528,8 @@ of the request reaches the app.
 17. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
 18. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `discriminator` a report with the status
-    and the body bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts
+    and the bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts the
-    the bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names toward the byte limits, bans the client if
+    bytes toward the byte limits and adds the request to the client's history.
    they take it past one, and adds the request to the client's history.
 A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a Core
 Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has false
@@ -633,8 +628,8 @@ is set aside as `<name>.bad`, and never stops the running process (see
 - `internal/discriminator`: `discriminator`'s server, which runs the checks and
  answers its own endpoints.
 - `internal/ratelimit`, `internal/bans`, `internal/rules`, `internal/waf`,
-  `internal/lookup`, `internal/reputation`, `internal/routewatch`,
+  `internal/lookup`, `internal/reputation`, `internal/anomaly` and
-  `internal/anomaly` and `internal/alerts`: one check or source each.
+  `internal/alerts`: one check or source each.
 - `internal/state`, `internal/requestlog`, `internal/remotelog` and
  `internal/metrics`: the state files, the log lines, the syslog sender and the
  metrics.
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ to them.
  key or a token stays off until the operator supplies it.
 - It keeps a site answering while the part that decides is down, slow or
  restarting (see "Without an answer from `discriminator`").
- It limits each client's requests and body bytes per minute, hour and day. It
+- It limits each client's requests and bytes per minute, hour and day. It bounds
-  bounds the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
+  the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
 - It bans abusers: briefly at first, for seven days on a clear sign of attack,
  and permanently when they keep at it.
 - It looks up each client's AS number and country. It can refuse whole countries
@@ -87,8 +87,6 @@ to them.
      database.
    - `internal/reputation`: fetches the lists, asks the DNS blocklists and
      AbuseIPDB in the background, and keeps their answers.
    - `internal/routewatch`: asks a routewatch instance about clients in the
      background, and keeps its answers.
    - `internal/anomaly`: the anomaly counters and their alerts.
    - `internal/alerts`: holds back repeats and alerts past the hourly limit,
      and sends the rest to the webhook, Slack and ntfy, each from a queue of
@@ -158,8 +156,8 @@ request log's `heuristic` field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and
   up to `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, only when one of these needs it:
    - the country list;
    - a biased threshold;
-    - `SWW_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming an `asn=` or `country=`
+    - `SWW_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming a `country=` tag, or an
-      tag;
+      `asn=` tag while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is unset;
    - `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`.
    A request that ends before the answer comes is logged without it.
@@ -196,12 +194,11 @@ request log's `heuristic` field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and
    sent is removed.
 18. After the visitor's answer has ended, `rproxy` sends the report (see "The
    report"). `discriminator` then counts:
-    - For a request it allowed, the body bytes of the response, of the request
+    - For a request it allowed, the response bytes, the request bytes or both
-      or of both are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. For
+      are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. For a
-      a WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client
+      WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client whose
-      whose total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit
+      total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit and
-      and is banned (`byte_limits`). The request that broke it has already been
+      is banned (`byte_limits`). The response in progress is not cut off.
      passed on whole; nothing is cut off.
    - For a request it allowed, the client's history and the anomaly counters
      are updated, and the alert thresholds are evaluated.
@@ -264,8 +261,7 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
      clear sign of attack bans it permanently at once.
 - A broken limit, one of:
    - a request over a rate limit;
-    - the bytes counted for a request and its response taking the client's total
+    - a response that takes the client's byte total past a byte limit;
      past a byte limit;
    - more than `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` refusals within a minute.
    The bans for a broken limit:
@@ -321,13 +317,6 @@ ban is dropped alike. A scanner whose ban was dropped that way is refused and
 banned again by its next probe. A ban whose cause is `admin` is never dropped
 and does not count toward `SWW_MAX_BANS`, so such bans can never fill the table.
 A request refused under a ban that runs out is logged with the action
 `temporarily_banned`. Under a permanent ban the action is `permanently_banned`.
 A request refused for a clear sign of attack or a CrowdSec decision takes the
 action for the ban it made. A request that makes a ban permanent is logged as
 `permanently_banned`. A request over a rate limit is logged as
 `client_is_rate_limited`, whichever ban it makes.
 ## Settings
 `docs/settings.md` lists every setting with its default and the values it takes,
@@ -461,15 +450,10 @@ the same way.
 ### Byte limits, per client
-The byte limits count body bytes: the app's response bodies, the visitors'
+By default there is no minute limit, so a client can download in a burst at full
-request bodies, or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted.
+speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB and the day limit to 100 GiB. They
-What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app
+allow several downloads of a few GiB each. A response's bytes are counted when
-sent as response bytes. The bytes counted for a request and its response are
+it ends (see step 18).
 added to the client's total once the response has ended (see step 18). So the
 request that takes a client past a limit is passed on whole, and the ban refuses
 the client's requests from then on. By default there is no minute limit, so a
 client can download in a burst at full speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB
 and the day limit to 100 GiB. They allow several downloads of a few GiB each.
 ### Lookup of AS number and country
@@ -569,11 +553,9 @@ Each tag and where it comes from:
  (`routewatch_tags`), while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set:
    - The tag `prefix=` holds the netblock the client's address is announced in,
      such as `prefix=192.0.2.0/24`.
-    - An `asn=` tag has the same spelling as the lookup's. When routewatch and
+    - An `asn=` tag has the same spelling as the lookup's. A request carries it
-      the lookup give the same AS number, a request has one `asn=` tag. When
+      once, and carries both when the two sources disagree.
-      they differ, it has both.
+    - These tags come before `deny_nets`, so a line that check refused has them.
    - They are added before `deny_nets`, so the log line of a request it refused
      has them.
    - `discriminator` asks routewatch in the background and never waits for it.
      An answer is kept for 1 hour, in memory only.
    - After a query fails, routewatch is not asked for 1 minute.
@@ -587,10 +569,9 @@ lower case, except a country code, which is in capitals. `SWW_TAG_DENY` and
 Two settings act on tags:
- `SWW_TAG_DENY` lists tags whose requests are refused with the action
+- `SWW_TAG_DENY` lists tags whose requests are refused with the action `denied`
-  `client_denied` (`tag_deny`). The check runs twice: just before the rate
+  (`tag_deny`). The check runs twice: just before the rate limits, and again
-  limits, and again after the Core Rule Set, so that `exploitsignature` can
+  after the Core Rule Set, so that `exploitsignature` can refuse too.
  refuse too.
 - `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` lists tags with a percentage from 1 to 99. Their
  clients get that percentage of every request and byte limit. The lowest
  percentage among a client's tags applies. `exploitsignature` cannot be listed,
@@ -598,9 +579,7 @@ Two settings act on tags:
 The tag settings are empty by default, for the same reason as the country list.
 The lookup waits for GeoJS when either names an `asn=` or `country=` tag. A
-setting that names one stops the start while `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` is `off`. The
+setting that names one stops the start while `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` is `off`.
 exception is an `asn=` tag while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set, since routewatch
 gives that tag.
 ### Biased thresholds
@@ -989,8 +968,7 @@ which the metrics show. They reveal a widely distributed scraper, thousands of
 addresses at low rates each, which the per-client limits do not see. A low
 percentage for its `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` is the response.
- Requests and body bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted per
+- Requests and bytes are counted per minute and per hour, for each of:
  minute and per hour, for each of:
    - a client;
    - the surrounding netblock;
    - an AS number;
@@ -1300,9 +1278,9 @@ short.
 ### Answering in time
 `rproxy` stops waiting for `discriminator` after `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, by default 2
-seconds, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. The longest a question
+seconds, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. So at the defaults,
-waits on an outside source is `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800 milliseconds,
+`discriminator` answers a request well within that time, whatever the request
-well within that time.
+and whatever its outside sources do.
 GeoJS is the only outside source a question can wait on. A question waits only
 when step 6 says so, and for at most `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800
@@ -1346,9 +1324,9 @@ over either one:
  `Transfer-Encoding` do not count. `X-Request-ID` and `X-Forwarded-Proto` do.
 Real clients never reach these limits. The answer is `deny` with `431`, and the
-log line's action is `request_header_too_large`. The refusal makes no ban and is
+log line's action is `too_large`. The refusal makes no ban and is no offence.
-no offence. The rate limits count the request as usual, so a client that keeps
+The rate limits count the request as usual, so a client that keeps sending such
-sending such requests breaks a limit.
+requests breaks a limit.
 The limits apply on every path and in every `SWW_WAF_MODE`. A client in
 `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` skips them, as it skips the Core Rule Set. In `observe` mode
@@ -1398,9 +1376,9 @@ answer.
 For a request it holds, `discriminator` writes the request's last log line (see
 "The log"). For a request it allowed, it first:
- counts the body bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, toward the client's byte limits
+- counts the bytes as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says, toward the client's byte limits at
-  at the percentages it gave that request;
+  the percentages it gave that request;
- bans a client whose total passes a byte limit;
+- bans a client that passes a byte limit;
 - adds the request with its status to the client's history, the anomaly counters
  and the metrics.
@@ -5,9 +5,6 @@ What `GET /_sww/metrics` answers with, at `discriminator`'s own address.
 keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
 `honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
 Every `sww_*request_bytes_total` and `sww_*response_bytes_total` series counts
 body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says.
 ## Traffic
 - `sww_requests_total`, `sww_request_bytes_total` and
@@ -96,15 +96,13 @@ Every one of these lines has:
 - `action`: what was done:
    - `forward`: answered `allow`, so that `rproxy` passes it to the app;
-    - `client_denied`: refused for `SWW_DENY_NETS`, for a reputation source with
+    - `denied`: refused for `SWW_DENY_NETS`, for a reputation source with the
-      the action `deny`, or for a tag in `SWW_TAG_DENY`;
+      action `deny`, or for a tag in `SWW_TAG_DENY`;
-    - `temporarily_banned`: refused under a ban that runs out, or for a `ban`
+    - `banned`: refused under a ban, or for a `ban` rule, a trap path or a
-      rule, a trap path or a CrowdSec decision that made such a ban;
+      CrowdSec decision, each of which bans the client;
-    - `permanently_banned`: refused under a ban that never runs out, including a
+    - `country_denied`, `rate_limited`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`:
-      ban this request made or made permanent;
+      refused by that check;
-    - `country_denied`, `client_is_rate_limited`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and
+    - `too_large`: over a header limit;
      `waf_blocked`: refused by that check;
    - `request_header_too_large`: over a header limit;
    - `admin`: answered at one of `discriminator`'s own endpoints, or `404` for
      a path under `/_sww/`.
 - `would_action`: in `observe` mode, what `enforce` mode would have done with a
@@ -147,22 +145,20 @@ Every one of these lines has:
  included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It
  holds:
    - `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
-    - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: the body bytes
+    - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: bytes.
      `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, in that window.
    A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
-    [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes counted for an allowed request and its
+    [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes of an allowed request are counted when
-    response are added when its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the
+    its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the bytes are without this
-    three byte totals leave them out.
+    request's.
 - `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
    - `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
    - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
    - `error_burst`.
-    When the bytes counted for a request and its response break a limit, the
+    A request whose bytes broke a limit was passed on whole, so its `action`
-    request has been passed on whole, so its `action` stays `forward`. Only its
+    stays `forward`. Only its `report` line gives that limit.
    `report` line gives that limit.
 - `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
  refused.
@@ -98,8 +98,6 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
 ## Request rate limits, per client
 The request past one of these limits is refused, and the client is banned.
 - `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
  client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
  person opening two pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files each.
@@ -122,22 +120,11 @@ The request past one of these limits is refused, and the client is banned.
 ## Byte limits, per client
 These count body bytes, never headers. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
 counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. The bytes
 counted for a request and its response are added to the client's total once the
 response has ended. The request that takes a client's total past a limit is not
 cut off; the client is banned.
 - `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
  (default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes
-  counted for a client in each window, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says
+  counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
-  which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that
+- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
-  passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response
+  `response`, `request` or `both`.
  ends.
 - `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte anomaly
  thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the
  visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
  counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
 ## Lookup of AS number and country
@@ -145,8 +132,8 @@ cut off; the client is banned.
  the start while a setting that needs a lookup is set:
    - `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES`;
    - `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`;
-    - `SWW_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming a `country=` tag, or an
+    - `SWW_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming an `asn=` or `country=`
-      `asn=` tag while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is unset;
+      tag;
    - the two byte percentage lists and `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`;
    - `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` below `100`;
    - an anomaly threshold per AS number.
@@ -187,11 +174,10 @@ Every request gets tags from what `discriminator` knows of its client. See
  it.
 - `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` (default unset): the `http` or `https` URL of a
-  routewatch instance. [routewatch](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/routewatch) is a
+  routewatch instance. `discriminator` asks it about each client, in the
-  service that gives an address's announced netblock and origin AS.
+  background, and adds the tags `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>` from its
-  `discriminator` asks it about each client, in the background, and adds the
+  answer. While it is unset, nothing asks routewatch and no request gets a
-  tags `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>` from its answer. While it is
+  `prefix=` tag.
  unset, nothing asks routewatch and no request gets a `prefix=` tag.
 `SWW_TAG_DENY` and `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` accept tags in either case. A tag
 that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
@@ -255,9 +241,8 @@ the request first.
  a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
  such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
  yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may get
+- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client in
-  in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
+  a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
  `off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
 ## Ban lengths, response and scope
@@ -334,10 +319,9 @@ the request first.
 ## Anomaly thresholds
-Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most body bytes
+Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most bytes counted in
-counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names.
+a minute and in an hour. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by
-Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by default. The four
+default. The four thresholds per client are:
 thresholds per client are:
 - `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
 - `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
@@ -61,11 +61,10 @@ since it was first seen:
 - the first and last time seen;
 - the AS number, AS name and country last looked up, and when;
 - total requests, and how many were forwarded and how many refused;
- body bytes of its requests, and of the responses it was sent;
+- bytes in each direction;
 - responses by status class;
- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and
+- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`. A file
-  `waf_blocked`. A file may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which
+  may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which nothing adds to.
  nothing adds to.
 ## `lookups.json`
@@ -341,48 +341,3 @@ func TestLiftLiftsEveryActiveBanCoveringTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	wantChanged(t, ledger, false)
 }
 func TestPermanentBanOnAWiderNetblockIsReturnedOverATemporaryBan(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	client := netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9")
 	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
 	// The temporary ban is made first, so that its netblock is looked at first.
 	ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), midnight(), bans.Notes{})
 	ledger.BanForAdmin(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24"), midnight(), time.Time{},
 		"for good")
 	wantPermanentBan(t, ledger, client, midnight().Add(time.Minute))
 }
 func TestOlderPermanentBanIsReturnedOverANewerTemporaryBan(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
 	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
 	ledger.BanForAdmin(netblock, midnight(), time.Time{}, "for good")
 	ledger.BanForAdmin(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), midnight().Add(time.Hour),
 		"for an hour")
 	wantPermanentBan(t, ledger, netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(2*time.Minute))
 }
 // wantPermanentBan checks that Find and Check return a permanent ban for
 // client at now.
 func wantPermanentBan(
 	t *testing.T, ledger *bans.Ledger, client netip.Addr, now time.Time,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 	for name, look := range map[string]func(netip.Addr, time.Time) (bans.Ban, bool, bool){
 		"Find":  ledger.Find,
 		"Check": ledger.Check,
 	} {
 		ban, banned, _ := look(client, now)
 		if !banned || !ban.Permanent() {
 			t.Errorf("%s returned %+v and banned %v, want a permanent ban", name, ban, banned)
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -274,27 +274,16 @@ func (l *Ledger) Find(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) (Ban, bool, bool) {
 // activeBan returns the ban in bans, a netblock's bans oldest first, that
 // is active at now, or nil when none is. If several are, it returns the
-// newest permanent one, or the newest when none is permanent. Every ban is
+// one that started last. Every ban is looked at, since a ban an admin adds
-// looked at, since a ban an admin adds to bans.json can start before the
+// to bans.json can start before the netblock's others and outlast them.
 // netblock's others and outlast them.
 func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
 	var newest *Ban
 	for i := len(bans) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
-		if !bans[i].ActiveAt(now) {
+		if bans[i].ActiveAt(now) {
 			continue
 		}
 		if bans[i].Permanent() {
 			return &bans[i]
 		}
 		if newest == nil {
 			newest = &bans[i]
 		}
 	}
-	return newest
+	return nil
 }
 // BanForLimit bans netblock at now for a broken limit, with notes, and
@@ -754,16 +743,13 @@ func (l *Ledger) markChanged() {
 }
 // active returns the ban active at now on a netblock client is in, or
-// nil. If several netblocks have one, it returns a permanent ban when
+// nil.
 // there is one.
 func (l *Ledger) active(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) *Ban {
 	lengths := l.v6Lengths
 	if client.Is4() {
 		lengths = l.v4Lengths
 	}
 	var first *Ban
 	for _, length := range lengths {
 		bans, found := l.netblocks.Get(netip.PrefixFrom(client, length).Masked())
 		if !found {
@@ -771,20 +757,12 @@ func (l *Ledger) active(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) *Ban {
 		}
 		ban := activeBan(*bans, now)
-		if ban == nil {
+		if ban != nil {
 			continue
 		}
 		if ban.Permanent() {
 			return ban
 		}
 		if first == nil {
 			first = ban
 		}
 	}
-	return first
+	return nil
 }
 // covering returns the bans of each netblock held that client is in,
@@ -466,9 +466,6 @@ var (
 	errNotLAPIURL = errors.New(
 		"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
 			"such as http://172.17.0.1:8080")
 	errNotRouteWatchURL = errors.New(
 		"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
 			"such as https://routewatch.example")
 	errNeedsLAPIKey  = errors.New("the engine answers no request without it")
 	errLAPIKeyUnused = errors.New("it is sent only to the engine at that URL")
 	errAnotherList   = errors.New(
@@ -534,7 +531,7 @@ func FromEnvironment(
 		TagLists:             env.tagLists("SWW_TAG_LISTS"),
 		TagDeny:              env.tags("SWW_TAG_DENY"),
 		TagLimitPercent:      env.tagPercents("SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"),
-		RouteWatchURL:        env.routeWatchURL("SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL"),
+		RouteWatchURL:        env.listURL("SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL"),
 		ASNBytesPercent:      env.percents("SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT", ParseASN),
 		CountryBytesPercent:  env.percents("SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT", parseCountry),
 		UnknownLimitPercent:  env.percent("SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT", "100"),
@@ -1030,22 +1027,6 @@ func (e *environment) crowdSecDecisionsURL(name string) string {
 	return lapi.JoinPath("v1", "decisions").String()
 }
 // routeWatchURL reads the setting that is the URL of a routewatch instance,
 // "" while it is unset or empty.
 func (e *environment) routeWatchURL(name string) string {
 	value := e.value(name, "")
 	if value == "" {
 		return ""
 	}
 	instance, err := url.Parse(value)
 	if err != nil || !isHTTPURL(instance) {
 		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotRouteWatchURL))
 	}
 	return value
 }
 // lookupSource reads the setting that is where clients are looked up:
 // geojs, file, or off.
 func (e *environment) lookupSource(name, defaultValue string) string {
@@ -1217,7 +1198,7 @@ func requestCanGetTag(cfg *Config, tag string) bool {
 }
 // TagsNeedLookup reports whether SWW_TAG_DENY or SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT
-// names an asn= or country= tag.
+// names an asn= or country= tag, which only the lookup can give a request.
 func (c *Config) TagsNeedLookup() bool {
 	return slices.ContainsFunc(c.TagDeny, isLookupTag) || tagLimitNeedsLookups(c)
 }
@@ -1450,15 +1450,6 @@ func TestRouteWatchURLAndPrefixTags(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Errorf("%v gave the error %v, want one naming %s", stopped.env, err, stopped.name)
 		}
 	}
 	badURL := environment{routeWatchURL: "ftp://routewatch.example"}
 	_, err := config.FromEnvironment(badURL.lookupEnv)
 	want := routeWatchURL + `: "ftp://routewatch.example" is not an http or https URL ` +
 		"without a user or a fragment, such as https://routewatch.example"
 	if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
 		t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
 	}
 }
 func TestTagThatNoRequestCanGetIsToldApartFromOneItCan(t *testing.T) {
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func (abuseIPDB) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	}
 	return &verdict{
-		action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+		action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
 		figures: map[string]any{
 			figureScore: score, "min_score": rq.h.config.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
 		},
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
 	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, banOtherClient,
 		http.StatusOK), want)
-	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(expires) {
 		t.Errorf("the ban ends at %s, want %s", line.BanExpires, expires)
 	}
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
 	// limit of two a minute, and bans it.
 	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	// Asked about by its address in IPv6 form too.
 	for _, addr := range []string{otherClient, "::ffff:" + otherClient} {
@@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ func TestBanForABrokenLimitRaisesABanAlertWithItsNotes(t *testing.T) {
 	start := clk.Now()
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
 	ban := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)[0]
 	// A request refused under the ban raises no other alert.
 	clk.advance(time.Minute)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantAlerts(t, queue, banAlert(alerts.EventBan, start, client, bans.Ban{
 		Netblock: netblock, Cause: bans.CauseLimit,
@@ -62,24 +62,22 @@ func TestAttackBanRaisesABanAlertThenAPermanentBanAlert(t *testing.T) {
 	// The probe bans the client for seven days, and its next request makes
 	// the ban permanent. The request after that changes nothing.
-	s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	attackBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)[0]
 	clk.advance(time.Minute)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	permanentBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)[0]
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	// Another client's probe after its first ban has run out without a
 	// request makes a permanent ban at once.
-	s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
+	s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	clk.advance(7 * 24 * time.Hour)
-	s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
+	s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
 	otherBans := server.Ledger.Bans(other)
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ func TestEveryRequestIsCountedWhateverIsDoneWithIt(t *testing.T) {
 		{allowed, "/", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{exempt, "/", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{client, "/static/app.js", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-		{denied, "/", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
+		{denied, "/", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
 	} {
 		for range 3 {
 			s.request(sent.from, sent.path, sent.status, sent.action)
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func TestSixteenThousandCookiesAreRefusedWellWithinTheTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
-	wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
+	wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
 	if line.DurationWAF != nil {
 		t.Errorf("the Core Rule Set read the request, for %f ms", *line.DurationWAF)
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
 			if tc.refused {
 				wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
-				wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
+				wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
 				return
 			}
@@ -219,10 +219,9 @@ func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsUnread(t *testing.T) {
 	wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
 	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
-	if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge ||
+	if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionTooLarge || line.DurationWAF != nil {
 		line.DurationWAF != nil {
 		t.Errorf("would_action %q and duration_waf %v, want %q and none",
-			line.WouldAction, line.DurationWAF, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
+			line.WouldAction, line.DurationWAF, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
 	}
 }
@@ -241,7 +240,7 @@ func TestRequestsOverTheHeaderLimitsCountTowardTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	wantDisposition(t, ask(), http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 	lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
-	wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 }
 func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeAfterTheTrapPathsAndTheRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
@@ -250,8 +249,8 @@ func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeAfterTheTrapPathsAndTheRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name, path, action string
 	}{
-		{"a trap path", "/wp-login.php", requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned},
+		{"a trap path", "/wp-login.php", requestlog.ActionBanned},
-		{"a block rule", "/blocked", requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule},
+		{"a block rule", "/blocked", requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
@@ -281,7 +280,7 @@ func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
-	wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
+	wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
 	if line.LimitPercent != nil {
 		t.Errorf("limit percentage %d, want none", *line.LimitPercent)
@@ -305,8 +304,7 @@ func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(t *testing.T
 	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
 	wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
-	wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden,
+	wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 		requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
 }
 func TestObserveModeWaitsForGeoJSForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
@@ -414,37 +412,33 @@ func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
 	}{
 		{
 			name: "SWW_DENY_NETS", env: map[string]string{denyNets: client},
-			prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+			prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
 		},
 		{
 			name:    "a ban",
-			prepare: banClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
+			prepare: banClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
 		},
 		{
 			name: "the rate limits", env: map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"},
-			prepare: countClient, status: forbidden,
+			prepare: countClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
 			action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
 		},
 		{
 			name:    "the rate limits, with a biased threshold",
 			env:     map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1", unknownLimitPercent: "50"},
-			prepare: countClient, status: forbidden,
+			prepare: countClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
 			action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
 		},
 		{
 			name: "a blocklist", env: map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL},
-			prepare: listClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+			prepare: listClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
 		},
 		{
 			name:    "the CrowdSec decision list",
 			env:     map[string]string{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey},
-			prepare: decideOnClient, status: forbidden,
+			prepare: decideOnClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
 		},
 		{
 			name: "the header limits", cookie: cookies(cookieLimit + 1),
-			prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: tooLarge,
+			prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: tooLarge, action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
 			action: requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge,
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -50,23 +50,13 @@ func (activeBan) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 	}
 	return &verdict{
-		action: banAction(ban.Permanent()),
+		action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
 		figures: map[string]any{
 			figureNetblock: ban.Netblock.String(), "ban_expires": rq.line.BanExpires,
 		},
 	}
 }
 // banAction is the action of a request refused under a ban or for making one:
 // permanent says the ban never runs out.
 func banAction(permanent bool) string {
 	if permanent {
 		return requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned
 	}
 	return requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned
 }
 // limitFigures are the figures of a heuristic that broke hit, a limit: its
 // window, the count and the limit.
 func limitFigures(hit ratelimit.Hit) map[string]any {
@@ -161,11 +151,11 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
 // attack, which notes name: the ban rule that matched, or the trap path
 // asked for. It fills in the rest of the notes. In observe mode it makes
 // no ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that
-// alert would be sent. It returns the action for that ban.
+// alert would be sent.
-func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) string {
+func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
 	netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
 	if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack) {
-		return banAction(rq.h.ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack))
+		return
 	}
 	notes.ASN = rq.line.ASN
@@ -181,7 +171,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) string {
 			rq.alertBan(ban)
 		}
-		return banAction(ban.Permanent())
+		return
 	}
 	ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, now, notes)
@@ -190,18 +180,16 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) string {
 	if made {
 		rq.alertBan(ban)
 	}
 	return banAction(ban.Permanent())
 }
 // banForCrowdSec bans the client's netblock at now until decision,
 // CrowdSec's decision on the client, ends. In observe mode it makes no
 // ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that alert
-// would be sent. It returns the action for that ban.
+// would be sent.
-func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) string {
+func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
 	netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
 	if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
-		return banAction(rq.h.ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec))
+		return
 	}
 	notes := bans.Notes{
@@ -220,7 +208,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) s
 			rq.alertBan(ban)
 		}
-		return banAction(ban.Permanent())
+		return
 	}
 	ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, now, decision.Expires,
@@ -230,8 +218,6 @@ func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) s
 	if made {
 		rq.alertBan(ban)
 	}
 	return banAction(ban.Permanent())
 }
 // wouldAlertBan reports whether the alert for a ban on netblock for cause
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	// client for an hour, the default.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit ||
 		line.BanExpires != expires {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, offence %q and ban_expires %q, "+
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	// Every request while the ban lasts is refused.
 	clk.advance(time.Hour - time.Second)
-	line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != expires || line.Offence != "" || line.LimitHit != "" {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, offence %q and limit_hit %q, "+
 			"want %s and neither of the others", line.BanExpires, line.Offence,
@@ -78,9 +78,7 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
 	breakLimit := func() string {
 		s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-		line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+		return s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited).BanExpires
 		return line.BanExpires
 	}
 	wantExpires := func(got string, length time.Duration) {
 		t.Helper()
@@ -113,7 +111,7 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	clk.advance(365 * 24 * time.Hour)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
@@ -125,10 +123,10 @@ func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
 	// client for an hour.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	for range 3 {
-		s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+		s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	}
 	// Later the same day the client has its whole allowance again: the
@@ -137,7 +135,7 @@ func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	banned := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
 	if len(banned) != 2 || banned[0].Notes.Refused != 3 {
@@ -192,10 +190,10 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 			s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", env)
 			s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+			s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 			for _, sent := range tc.refused {
-				s.get(sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+				s.get(sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 			}
 			for _, sent := range tc.let {
@@ -218,9 +216,9 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
 	// fromDE's ban covers otherClient, which is refused unasked about.
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-	line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	if line.Country != "" {
 		t.Errorf("log line has country %q, want none", line.Country)
 	}
@@ -239,9 +237,9 @@ func TestRefusalUnderABanNamesItsHeuristicNetblockAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
 	expires := requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour))
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-	line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "active_ban",
 		`{"netblock": "`+clientsNet+`", "ban_expires": "`+expires+`"}`)
 }
@@ -277,11 +275,11 @@ func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
 			s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, env)
-			s.get(denied, tc.status, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+			s.get(denied, tc.status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
-			s.get(fromKP, tc.status, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+			s.get(fromKP, tc.status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 			s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+			s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-			s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+			s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -299,9 +297,9 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.request(fromDE, "/repo/commits?page=2",
-		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32")
 	want := bans.Ban{
@@ -344,7 +342,7 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
 	// The next ban counts this one among the earlier.
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	got = ledger.Bans(netblock)
 	if len(got) != 2 || got[1].Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
@@ -362,12 +360,12 @@ func TestMaxBansDropsTheBanOfTheNetblockSeenLongestAgo(t *testing.T) {
 	// One ban is held, so otherClient's ban drops client's.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 // clock is the time a test sets, by which sww counts requests and
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
 			}{
 				{http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 				{http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-				{http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
+				{http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
 			} {
 				line := s.get(tc.from, sent.status, sent.action)
 				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ func TestZeroPercentIsAZeroAllowance(t *testing.T) {
 	// The first request breaks the limit, and bans the client; the log line
 	// gives the 0.
-	line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	if line.fields["limit_percent"] != float64(0) ||
 		line.fields["limit_percent_setting"] != unknownLimitPercent {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_percent %v from %v, want 0 from %s",
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ func TestZeroPercentIsAZeroAllowance(t *testing.T) {
 			unknownLimitPercent)
 	}
-	s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
 			// A quarter of 4 requests a minute: the second breaks the limit.
 			s.get(tc.from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			line := s.get(tc.from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+			line := s.get(tc.from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 			wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
 				tc.want)
 		})
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ func TestUnknownLimitPercentGivesEveryClientWithoutACountryItsPercentage(t *test
 	for _, from := range []string{unplaced, "10.0.0.8"} {
 		s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 		s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-		s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+		s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	}
 	// One in a country has the whole limit.
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownLimitPercent(t *testing.T) {
 		serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodGet, http.NoBody)
 		line := out.requestLine(t)
-		wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+		wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 		wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
 			"0 from "+unknownLimitPercent)
 	})
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ func TestBanForALoweredLimitGivesThePercentageInItsNotesAndItsAlert(t *testing.T
 			// A quarter of 12 requests a minute is 3: the fourth breaks it.
 			"a rate limit",
 			map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "12", tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter},
-			3, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
+			3, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
 			"requests per minute over the limit of 3", "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
 		},
 		{
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func (blocklists) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	}
 	return &verdict{
-		action:  requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+		action:  requestlog.ActionDenied,
 		figures: map[string]any{"lists": listedBy},
 	}
 }
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ package discriminator
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // byteLimits counts the request's bytes, as countedBytes gives them, for the
@@ -37,5 +39,5 @@ func (byteLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict
 	rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.out.status)
-	return &verdict{figures: limitFigures(hit)}
+	return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBanned, figures: limitFigures(hit)}
 }
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
 					line.BanExpires, tc.window, expires)
 			}
-			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 			wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{`+
 				`instance="`+alertInstance+`",kind="bytes",window="`+tc.window+`"}`, 1)
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ func TestResponseOverAByteLimitByItselfIsPassedOnWhole(t *testing.T) {
 			len(got.body), got.err, line.LimitHit, answerBytes, minuteBytes)
 	}
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 func TestBytesOfAnAnswerThatBreaksOffAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ func TestBytesOfAnAnswerThatBreaksOffAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
 			answerBytes, minuteBytes, expires)
 	}
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
 					line.LimitHit, line.Counts.MinuteBytes, minuteBytes, tc.counted)
 			}
-			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ func TestBytesCountSaysWhichBytesCount(t *testing.T) {
 				}
 			}
-			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLeavesOutTheBytesOfARequestEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T)
 	// counted, and the byte limit is not broken. Its line gives the bytes
 	// counted before it.
 	line := s.upload()
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Counts.MinuteBytes != bodyBytes+answerBytes {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and minute_bytes %v, want minute and %d",
@@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ func TestDetectedAttackIsRefusedByTagDenyLast(t *testing.T) {
 		wafMode: detect, tagDeny: "exploitsignature",
 	})
-	line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
+	line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 		requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "exploitsignature"}`)
 }
@@ -196,7 +195,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
 	// A request a rule file refuses is not inspected.
 	line = s.request(otherClient, "/blocked?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
+		requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
 	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
 	// With SWW_WAF_MODE off, no request is.
@@ -404,7 +403,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T)
 			line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
 	}
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	want := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, WAFBlocked: 3}
 	if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
@@ -30,9 +30,10 @@ func (crowdSec) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 	rq.addTag(config.CrowdSecTag)
 	rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
 		"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
 	rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision)
 	return &verdict{
-		action: rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision),
+		action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
 		figures: map[string]any{
 			"scenario": decision.Scenario,
 			"expires":  requestlog.FormatTime(decision.Expires),
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testi
 	expires := requestlog.FormatTime(fetched.Add(4 * time.Hour))
 	// Its first request is refused, and bans it until the decision ends.
-	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
 	if line.BanExpires != expires {
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testi
 	// ban, and once it has ended the client is let through.
 	clk.advance(4*time.Hour - time.Second)
-	line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantReputation(t, line)
 	if line.BanExpires != expires {
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ func TestCrowdSecBanNamesItsHeuristicScenarioAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
 		`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
 		`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
-	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "crowdsec", `{"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", `+
 		`"expires": "`+requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(4*time.Hour))+`"}`)
 	wantTags(t, line, "crowdsec")
@@ -129,9 +129,9 @@ func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(t *testing.T
 	// Just before its end, the decision bans a client in the netblock, and
 	// one on an IPv6 address bans the address's group, the /64.
 	clk.advance(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
-	s.get("198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get("198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-	s.get("2001:db8::9", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get("2001:db8::9", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-	s.get("2001:db8::5", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get("2001:db8::5", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	// Once it has ended, it bans no other client, and the bans it made end
 	// with it.
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsAndAlertsTheBan(
 		`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
 	line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
 	if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ func (denyNets) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	for _, netblock := range rq.h.config.DenyNets {
 		if netblock.Contains(rq.client) {
 			return &verdict{
-				action:  requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+				action:  requestlog.ActionDenied,
 				figures: map[string]any{figureNetblock: netblock.String()},
 			}
 		}
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ func TestQuestionDeniedGetsTheBanResponse(t *testing.T) {
 			got := s.ask(client, "/")
 			wantDisposition(t, got, status, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 			wantBody(t, got, http.StatusText(status)+"\n")
-			wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), status, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+			wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -655,8 +655,8 @@ func TestBanResponseCloseIsAnAnswerOfItsOwn(t *testing.T) {
 	wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionClose)
 	wantBody(t, got, "")
 	// The visitor is sent nothing.
-	wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), 0, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
-	wantMetric(t, s.metrics(), `sww_requests_total{action="client_denied",instance="`+
+	wantMetric(t, s.metrics(), `sww_requests_total{action="denied",instance="`+
 		alertInstance+`",status_class="none"}`, 1)
 }
@@ -671,12 +671,12 @@ func TestBlockRuleIsDeniedWith403AndABanRuleWithTheBanResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	got := s.ask(client, "/blocked")
 	wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 	wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
+		requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
 	got = s.ask(client, "/.env")
 	wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusTooManyRequests, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 	wantLine(t, s.out.requestLines(t, 2)[1], http.StatusTooManyRequests,
-		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+		requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 func TestQuestionUnderTheOwnPrefixIsDeniedWith404AfterTheChecks(t *testing.T) {
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ func TestObserveModeAllowsAndLogsWhatEnforceModeWouldHaveDone(t *testing.T) {
 	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
 	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 }
 func TestObserveModeRefusalAnsweredAllowCountsForTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
@@ -894,7 +894,7 @@ func TestDeniedRequestIsFinishedAtItsDecision(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("history is %+v, want the refused request alone", history)
 	}
-	const series = `sww_requests_total{action="client_is_rate_limited",instance="` +
+	const series = `sww_requests_total{action="rate_limited",instance="` +
 		alertInstance + `",status_class="4xx"}`
 	wantMetric(t, s.metrics(), series, 1)
@@ -1298,11 +1298,11 @@ func TestEveryDeniedRequestsReportGetsItsLastLine(t *testing.T) {
 	}{
 		{
 			"deny", map[string]string{denyNets: client}, "/", http.StatusForbidden,
-			requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+			requestlog.ActionDenied,
 		},
 		{
 			"close", map[string]string{denyNets: client, banResponse: banResponseClose}, "/",
-			0, requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+			0, requestlog.ActionDenied,
 		},
 		{"own prefix", nil, discriminator.HealthPath, http.StatusNotFound,
 			requestlog.ActionAdmin},
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ func (dnsbl) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	}
 	return &verdict{
-		action:  requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+		action:  requestlog.ActionDenied,
 		figures: map[string]any{"zones": listedBy},
 	}
 }
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ func (headerLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict
 	}
 	return &verdict{
-		action: requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge,
+		action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
 		figures: map[string]any{
 			"fields": fields, "fields_limit": maxHeaderFields,
 			"cookies": cookies, "cookies_limit": maxCookies,
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	clk.advance(time.Second)
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	clk.advance(time.Second)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	want := ratelimit.History{
 		FirstSeen: start,
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func TestEveryClientIsLookedUpWithoutWaitingWhileNoSettingNeedsIt(t *testing.T)
 	// comes too. None waits for GeoJS.
 	for _, line := range []logLine{
 		s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
-		s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited),
+		s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited),
 		s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
 	} {
 		got := asnAndCountry{line.ASN, line.ASName, line.Country}
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ func TestASNumberAndNameInTheLogLineTheHistoryTheBanNotesAndTheAlert(t *testing.
 	for _, line := range []logLine{
 		s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
-		s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited),
+		s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited),
 	} {
 		if got := (asnAndCountry{line.ASN, line.ASName, line.Country}); got != want {
 			t.Errorf("log line has %+v, want %+v", got, want)
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ func TestClientsAreLookedUpInTheLookupDatabaseAndGeoJSIsNotAsked(t *testing.T) {
 		want asnAndCountry
 	}{
 		{s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward), de},
-		{s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited), de},
+		{s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited), de},
 		{
 			s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied),
 			asnAndCountry{asnKP, asNameKP, "KP"},
@@ -125,15 +125,15 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
-	s.get(denied, 0, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	s.get(denied, 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	// A first broken limit bans for an hour.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	metrics := s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`sww_requests_total{action="client_denied",instance="app",status_class="none"}`, 1)
+		`sww_requests_total{action="denied",instance="app",status_class="none"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
 		`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
 	// A limit broken again right after would ban for three hours, longer
 	// than SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	metrics = s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
@@ -15,93 +14,6 @@ import (
 // observe is the value of SWW_MODE for observe mode.
 const observe = "observe"
 func TestBanActionSaysWhetherTheBanRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const trapPath = "/wp-login.php"
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name  string
 		cause string
 		// endsIn is how long after the request the ban ends: negative for a
 		// ban that has ended, and zero for a permanent ban.
 		endsIn time.Duration
 		path   string
 		want   string
 	}{
 		{
 			"temporary ban", bans.CauseAdmin, time.Hour, "/",
 			requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
 		},
 		{"permanent ban", bans.CauseAdmin, 0, "/", requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned},
 		{
 			"request that makes a ban permanent", bans.CauseAttack, time.Hour, "/",
 			requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned,
 		},
 		{
 			"trap path after an attack ban ended", bans.CauseAttack, -time.Hour,
 			trapPath, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned,
 		},
 		{
 			"first trap path after another ban ended", bans.CauseAdmin, -time.Hour,
 			trapPath, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
 		},
 	} {
 		for _, modeValue := range []string{"enforce", observe} {
 			t.Run(tc.name+" in "+modeValue, func(t *testing.T) {
 				t.Parallel()
 				s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 					trapPaths: trapPathList, mode: modeValue,
 				})
 				ban := bans.Ban{
 					Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
 					Start:    clk.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour),
 					Cause:    tc.cause,
 				}
 				if tc.endsIn != 0 {
 					ban.Expires = clk.Now().Add(tc.endsIn)
 				}
 				server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{ban})
 				if modeValue == observe {
 					line := s.request(client, tc.path, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 					wantWouldAction(t, line, tc.want)
 					return
 				}
 				s.request(client, tc.path, http.StatusForbidden, tc.want)
 			})
 		}
 	}
 }
 func TestObserveModeNamesAPermanentBanWhoseAlertWouldBeSent(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
 		trapPaths: trapPathList, mode: observe,
 	})
 	server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{
 		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
 		Start:    clk.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour),
 		Expires:  clk.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
 		Cause:    bans.CauseAttack,
 	}})
 	line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
 	waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
 	if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventPermanentBan {
 		t.Errorf("alerts waiting are %+v, want one %s", waiting, alerts.EventPermanentBan)
 	}
 }
 func TestObserveModeNamesTheHeuristicThatWouldHaveRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -110,7 +22,7 @@ func TestObserveModeNamesTheHeuristicThatWouldHaveRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+client+`/32"}`)
 }
@@ -157,10 +69,10 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 			s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 			for _, sent := range []struct{ from, refusal string }{
-				{denied, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
+				{denied, requestlog.ActionDenied},
-				{banned, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned},
+				{banned, requestlog.ActionBanned},
-				{fromKP, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
+				{fromKP, requestlog.ActionDenied},
-				{fromDE, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
+				{fromDE, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
 			} {
 				if !tc.observe {
 					line := s.get(sent.from, http.StatusForbidden, sent.refusal)
@@ -198,7 +110,7 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
 	for range 2 {
 		line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 		if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit ||
 			line.BanExpires != "" {
@@ -211,7 +123,7 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
 	// The ban read from bans.json refuses nothing, and so counts no
 	// refusal in its notes, but is kept.
 	line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(kept.Expires) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s", line.BanExpires,
@@ -42,9 +42,7 @@ func (rateLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict
 	rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.h.config.BanResponse)
-	return &verdict{
+	return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited, figures: limitFigures(hit)}
 		action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited, figures: limitFigures(hit),
 	}
 }
 // overAWholeRateLimit reports whether the heuristic rate_limits will refuse the
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 		if sent.want == http.StatusOK {
 			wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 		} else {
-			wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+			wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 			if line.LimitHit != minute {
 				t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want minute", line.LimitHit)
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusalNamesItsHeuristicWindowCountAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rate_limits", `{"window": "minute", "count": 2, "limit": 1}`)
 }
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
 		status int
 		action string
 	}{
-		{rateLimitPerMinute, "1", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
+		{rateLimitPerMinute, "1", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
 		{bytesLimitPerMinute, byteLimit, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -160,17 +160,14 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	// A path outside every prefix is counted: /assets is not under
 	// /assets/, and breaks the limit.
-	s.request(client, "/assets", http.StatusForbidden,
+	s.request(client, "/assets", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 		requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
 	// A ban, SWW_DENY_NETS and SWW_TAG_DENY still refuse a path under a
 	// prefix.
-	s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden,
+	s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.request(denied, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	s.request(denied, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden,
 		requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
 	s.request(fromKP, "/assets/app.js",
-		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 }
 func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
@@ -214,7 +211,7 @@ func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
 			// Counted, the second request breaks the limit of one request
 			// a minute.
 			s.request(client, sent, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			s.request(client, sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+			s.request(client, sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func (refusalLimit) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdic
 		return nil
 	}
-	if !rq.attack && !rq.blockedByBlockRule && !rq.wafBlocked {
+	if !rq.attack && !rq.ruleBlocked && !rq.wafBlocked {
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -42,13 +42,13 @@ func (refusalLimit) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdic
 	status := rq.out.status
 	switch rq.line.WouldAction {
-	case requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
+	case requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
 		status = http.StatusForbidden
-	case requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned:
+	case requestlog.ActionBanned:
 		status = cfg.BanResponse
 	}
 	rq.banForLimit(now, hit, status)
-	return &verdict{figures: limitFigures(hit)}
+	return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBanned, figures: limitFigures(hit)}
 }
@@ -37,10 +37,9 @@ func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
 	switch r {
 	case blockRule:
 		return s.request(from, blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden,
-			requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
+			requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
 	case banRule:
-		return s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden,
+		return s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 			requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	}
 	s.t.Fatalf("no request for the refusal %d", r)
@@ -72,20 +71,9 @@ func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
 		name string
 		// refusals are four, one over the threshold of three.
 		refusals []refused
 		// nextAction is the action of the client's next request: the next
 		// request after a ban for a ban rule makes it permanent.
 		nextAction string
 	}{
-		{
+		{"block rule", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, blockRule}},
-			"block rule",
+		{"a ban rule last", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, banRule}},
 			[]refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, blockRule},
 			requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
 		},
 		{
 			"a ban rule last",
 			[]refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, banRule},
 			requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned,
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
@@ -113,7 +101,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
 					"and limit", line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
 			}
-			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, tc.nextAction)
+			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -181,7 +169,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
 	}
-	wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, BlockedByBlockRule: 3}
+	wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, RuleBlocked: 3}
 	if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != wantOffences {
 		t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, wantOffences)
 	}
@@ -191,7 +179,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
 		`kind="refusals",window="minute"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_block_rule"}`, 3)
+		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
 }
@@ -310,7 +298,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstCountsEachClientTheChecksApplyTo(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want error_burst", line.LimitHit)
 	}
-	s.get(exempt, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(exempt, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 func TestErrorBurstBanSetsTheRefusalsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
@@ -353,7 +341,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 	for range 2 {
 		line := s.request(otherClient, blockedPath, http.StatusOK,
 			requestlog.ActionForward)
-		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		if line.LimitHit != "" {
 			t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
@@ -365,7 +353,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 	s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	line := s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
 	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst || line.BanExpires != "" {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, want error_burst "+
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ const (
 func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionClientDenied
+	forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		action string
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 		{
 			// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
 			limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
-			[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
+			[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
 			"50 from " + blocklistAction,
 		},
 		{
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ func TestReputationRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndWhatListedTheClient(t *testing.T)
 			s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, tc.env)
 			tc.load(t, server)
-			line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+			line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 			wantHeuristic(t, line, tc.heuristic, tc.figures)
 		})
 	}
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientABlocklistDeniesAndAlertsIt(t *testing.T) {
 	loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {fromDE}})
 	line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	wantReputation(t, line, dropURL)
 	waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ const (
 func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionClientDenied
+	forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		action string
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
 		{
 			// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
 			limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
-			[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
+			[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
 			"50 from " + reputationAction,
 		},
 		{
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ func TestDNSBLZonesComeAfterTheBlocklistsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
 	// The blocklist refuses fromKP before its verdict is looked at, and
 	// fromDE, in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted
 	// for the zone, nor alerted, nor asked about.
-	wantReputation(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
+	wantReputation(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
 		dropURL)
 	wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientADNSBLZoneDeniesAndAlertsIt(t *testing.T) {
 	loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {dnsblZone}})
 	line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	wantReputation(t, line, dnsblZone)
 	waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
@@ -741,8 +741,8 @@ func TestOnlyAClientThatHasCommittedAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDB(t *testing.T
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward)
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward)
 	s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, forward)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)
 	// Once the ban has ended, fromDE's first request has it checked in the
@@ -781,7 +781,7 @@ func TestIPv6ClientCostsOneAbuseIPDBCheckWhicheverOfItsAddressesSends(t *testing
 		s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusOK, forward)
 	}
-	s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)
 	// Once the ban has ended, which set its counters back to zero, a
@@ -814,20 +814,20 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
 		want   ratelimit.Offences
 	}{
 		{
-			"a block rule", blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden,
+			"a block rule", blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked,
-			requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, ratelimit.Offences{BlockedByBlockRule: 1},
+			ratelimit.Offences{RuleBlocked: 1},
 		},
 		{
 			"the Core Rule Set", sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
 			requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1},
 		},
 		{
-			"a ban rule", probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
+			"a ban rule", probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
 			ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
 		},
 		{
-			"a trap path", "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden,
+			"a trap path", "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
-			requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned, ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
+			ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
 func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionClientDenied
+	forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		action string
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *test
 		{
 			// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
 			limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
-			[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
+			[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
 			"50 from " + reputationAction,
 		},
 		{
@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ func TestWithoutAnAbuseIPDBKeyNoClientIsCheckedNorAScoreUsed(t *testing.T) {
 	// fromDE's score is not used, and once it has committed an offence it
 	// is not checked either.
 	wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)
 	wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
 	wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)
@@ -996,10 +996,10 @@ func TestBanNotesNameEachReputationSourceThatListedTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	}{
 		{"for a broken rate limit", func(s *sender, from string) {
 			s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+			s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 		}},
 		{"for a clear sign of attack", func(s *sender, from string) {
-			s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+			s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		}},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -54,10 +54,10 @@ type decision struct {
 	counted                    bool
 	limitPercent, bytesPercent percentage
 	// attack is true for a request that matched a ban rule or asked for a
-	// trap path, blockedByBlockRule for one a block rule refused, and
+	// trap path, ruleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and wafBlocked for
-	// wafBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence its
+	// one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence its client's history
-	// client's history counts.
+	// counts.
-	attack, blockedByBlockRule, wafBlocked bool
+	attack, ruleBlocked, wafBlocked bool
 	// reputation is the reputation sources that list the client, for the
 	// notes of a ban the request makes.
 	reputation []bans.ReputationHit
@@ -187,10 +187,9 @@ func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
 		rq.line.WouldAction = action
 		return nil
-	case action == requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule ||
+	case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked || action == requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
 		action == requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
 		return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
-	case action == requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge:
+	case action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge:
 		return &refusal{status: http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge, action: action}
 	default:
 		return rq.banResponse(action)
@@ -311,7 +310,7 @@ func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
 		ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes,
 		BrokeLimit:    rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
 		Attack:        rq.attack,
-		BlockedByBlockRule: rq.blockedByBlockRule,
+		RuleBlocked:   rq.ruleBlocked,
 		WAFBlocked:    rq.wafBlocked,
 	}
@@ -112,25 +112,11 @@ func TestRouteWatchTagsAreOnALineDenyNetsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromKP, 32)
-	line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+fromKP+`/32"}`)
 	wantTags(t, line, "asn=64511", "prefix="+prefixKP)
 }
 func TestRouteWithoutAnOriginASGivesOnlyThePrefixTag(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{fromDE: {prefixDE, 0}})
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url,
 	})
 	waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromDE, 32)
 	wantTags(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
 		"prefix="+prefixDE)
 }
 func TestUnsetRouteWatchChangesNothing(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -222,7 +208,7 @@ func TestTagDenyRefusesOnARouteWatchPrefix(t *testing.T) {
 	waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromKP, 32)
 	waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromDE, 32)
-	wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
+	wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
 		"tag_deny", `{"tag": "prefix=`+prefixKP+`"}`)
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 }
@@ -241,5 +227,5 @@ func TestTagLimitPercentWorksWithAnIPv6Prefix(t *testing.T) {
 	// Half of two is one: the second request breaks the limit.
 	line := s.get(fromV6, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantTags(t, line, "asn=64496", "prefix="+prefixV6)
-	s.get(fromV6, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromV6, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 }
@@ -16,10 +16,9 @@ import (
 // ruleFiles checks the request against the rules of the rule files at now,
 // notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, adds the tag
 // exploitsignature when it matches any, and refuses the request
-// when the last rule it matches refuses it: with ActionBlockedByBlockRule for a
+// when the last rule it matches refuses it: with ActionRuleBlocked for a block
-// block rule, and for a ban rule with the action for the ban it makes. A ban
+// rule, and ActionBanned for a ban rule. A ban rule bans the client's netblock
-// rule bans the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack, or in observe
+// for a clear sign of attack, or in observe mode raises the alert for the ban
 // mode raises the alert for the ban
 // it would have made. Either rule's match is noted as an offence, for the
 // client's history. Its figures are the rule's id and action.
 type ruleFiles struct{}
@@ -46,16 +45,14 @@ func (ruleFiles) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 	switch last.Action {
 	case rules.ActionBlock:
-		rq.blockedByBlockRule = true
+		rq.ruleBlocked = true
-		return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, figures: figures}
+		return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked, figures: figures}
 	case rules.ActionBan:
 		rq.attack = true
 		rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target})
-		return &verdict{
+		return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBanned, figures: figures}
 			action:  rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target}),
 			figures: figures,
 		}
 	default:
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -37,14 +37,13 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
 	// A block rule refuses with 403, whatever SWW_BAN_RESPONSE is, and
 	// bans no one.
 	line = s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
+		requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "blocked")
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	// A ban rule refuses with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, and bans the client for
 	// seven days, the default.
-	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusTooManyRequests,
+	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "probe")
 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
 	// against the rules, and makes the ban permanent.
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)
-	line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
+	line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line)
 	if line.BanExpires != permanent {
@@ -91,7 +90,7 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	clk.advance(365 * 24 * time.Hour)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 func TestEachRuleActionAddsTheExploitSignatureTag(t *testing.T) {
@@ -104,7 +103,7 @@ func TestEachRuleActionAddsTheExploitSignatureTag(t *testing.T) {
 	wantTags(t, s.request(client, "/noted", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
 		"exploitsignature")
 	wantTags(t, s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule), "exploitsignature")
+		requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked), "exploitsignature")
 	wantTags(t, s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
 }
@@ -116,11 +115,10 @@ func TestRuleRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndTheRule(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	line := s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
+		requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", `{"rule_id": "blocked", "rule_action": "block"}`)
-	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
+	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", `{"rule_id": "probe", "rule_action": "ban"}`)
 }
@@ -133,8 +131,7 @@ func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	// The first probe bans for SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION.
-	line := s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
+	line := s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour)) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want an hour on", line.BanExpires)
 	}
@@ -144,8 +141,7 @@ func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
+	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != permanent {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
 	}
@@ -173,8 +169,7 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
 	// A probe over the rate limit breaks the limit before any rule sees
 	// it.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
+	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 		requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line)
 	limitBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
@@ -184,7 +179,7 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
 	// A client the rate limits do not apply to is still checked.
 	s.get(exempt, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.request(exempt, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.request(exempt, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -196,11 +191,11 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	line := s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "blocked")
 	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "probe")
 	if line.BanExpires != "" {
@@ -224,10 +219,9 @@ func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
 		metricsToken: token,
 	})
-	s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
+	s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
-		requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
+	s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-	s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
 	metrics := s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
@@ -235,10 +229,10 @@ func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_rule_matches_total{action="ban",instance="app",rule_id="probe"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rules_loaded{instance="app"}`, 2)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="blocked_by_block_rule",`+
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="rule_blocked",`+
 		`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_block_rule"}`, 1)
+		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="attack"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="attack",instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 0)
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ func TestRequestFromAllowNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
+		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
 	})
 }
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
 	line := out.endedLine(t)
-	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	if len(asked()) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, want nothing", asked())
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{denyNets: clientsNet})
-	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+clientsNet+`"}`)
 }
@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ func TestRequestRefusedByDenyNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
 	// listedAddr's refused requests are not counted, so the first request
 	// from unlistedAddr is within the limit of one a minute.
 	wantAnswers(t, addr, out, []sentRequest{
-		{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
+		{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
-		{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
+		{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
 		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
+		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
 	})
 }
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptNetsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
+		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
-		{fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
+		{fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
 	})
 }
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ func (tagDeny) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	for _, tag := range rq.line.Tags {
 		if slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TagDeny, tag) {
 			return &verdict{
-				action:  requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+				action:  requestlog.ActionDenied,
 				figures: map[string]any{"tag": tag},
 			}
 		}
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ func TestTagDenyRefusesALookupTagAndNamesTheTag(t *testing.T) {
 	// in capitals.
 	s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{tagDeny: "Country=kp"})
-	line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "country=KP"}`)
 	wantTags(t, line, "asn=64511", "country=KP")
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ func TestTagDenyRefusesAnASNTag(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{tagDeny: "asn=64511"})
-	wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
+	wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
 		"tag_deny", `{"tag": "asn=64511"}`)
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 }
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ func TestTagDenyRefusesAListTagBeforeTheRateLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
 	// Each is refused for its tag: none is counted to break the limit of one.
 	for range 3 {
-		wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
+		wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
 			"tag_deny", `{"tag": "torexit"}`)
 	}
 }
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ func TestTagDenyRefusesAMixedCaseZoneByItsLowerCaseTag(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {mixedCaseZone}})
-	wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
+	wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
 		"tag_deny", `{"tag": "dnsbl=`+dnsblZone+`"}`)
 }
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ func TestTagDenyRefusesAnExploitSignatureOfARuleThatOnlyLogs(t *testing.T) {
 		rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"), tagDeny: "exploitsignature",
 	})
-	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "exploitsignature"}`)
 	wantTags(t, line, "exploitsignature")
 }
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ func TestTagLimitPercentLowersALimitTheLowestWinning(t *testing.T) {
 	// A quarter of 4 requests a minute: the second breaks the limit.
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
 		"25 from "+tagLimitPercent)
 }
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ func TestTagListsTagARequestRefusedBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromDE, fromKP}})
-	line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	if line.Heuristic != "deny_nets" {
 		t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q, want deny_nets", line.Heuristic)
 	}
@@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ func TestTagListsTagARequestRefusedBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
 	// The second request breaks the limit of one a minute, which bans the client.
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-	line = s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	line = s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	if line.Heuristic != "active_ban" {
 		t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q, want active_ban", line.Heuristic)
 	}
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
@@ -29,9 +30,10 @@ func (trapPaths) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 	}
 	rq.attack = true
 	rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{TrapPath: path})
 	return &verdict{
-		action:  rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{TrapPath: path}),
+		action:  requestlog.ActionBanned,
 		figures: map[string]any{"path": path},
 	}
 }
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
 	// The query is not part of the path.
 	line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x", http.StatusTooManyRequests,
-		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+		requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line)
 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	// The next request is refused under the ban, and makes it permanent.
-	line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
+	line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != permanent {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
 	}
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ func TestTrapPathRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndPath(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{trapPaths: trapPathList})
 	line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x", http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+		requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "trap_paths", `{"path": "/wp-login.php"}`)
 }
@@ -100,8 +100,7 @@ func TestTrapPathMatchesThePathDecodedOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	// %2577 decodes once to %77, not to w.
 	s.request(otherClient, "/%2577p-login.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.request(client, "/%77p-login.php", http.StatusForbidden,
+	s.request(client, "/%77p-login.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	// The ban's notes give the path as the client sent it.
 	got := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
@@ -118,8 +117,7 @@ func TestTrapPathsNeedNoRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
 		"SWW_RULES_ENABLED": "false",
 	})
-	s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden,
+	s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 }
 func TestObserveModeLogsWhatATrapPathWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -131,7 +129,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatATrapPathWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	line := s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	// No ban was made.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) Offences(r ratelimit.Request) {
 	for kind, committed := range map[string]bool{
 		"limit":        r.BrokeLimit,
 		"attack":       r.Attack,
-		"blocked_by_block_rule": r.BlockedByBlockRule,
+		"rule_blocked": r.RuleBlocked,
 		"waf_blocked":  r.WAFBlocked,
 	} {
 		if committed {
@@ -122,11 +122,11 @@ type Responses struct {
 type Offences struct {
 	// Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
 	// error burst, Attack those that were a clear sign of attack, a match
-	// of a ban rule or a request for a trap path, BlockedByBlockRule those a
+	// of a ban rule or a request for a trap path, RuleBlocked those a block
-	// block rule refused, and WAFBlocked those the Core Rule Set refused.
+	// rule refused, and WAFBlocked those the Core Rule Set refused.
 	Limit       int64 `json:"limit"`
 	Attack      int64 `json:"attack"`
-	BlockedByBlockRule int64 `json:"blocked_by_block_rule"`
+	RuleBlocked int64 `json:"rule_blocked"`
 	WAFBlocked  int64 `json:"waf_blocked"`
 	// TokenRefused is what a clients.json written by an earlier version gives,
 	// which must still load. Nothing adds to it.
@@ -147,11 +147,11 @@ type Request struct {
 	ResponseBytes int64
 	// BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit, a byte
 	// limit or the error burst, Attack for one that matched a ban rule or
-	// asked for a trap path, BlockedByBlockRule for one a block rule refused,
+	// asked for a trap path, RuleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and
-	// and WAFBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused.
+	// WAFBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused.
 	BrokeLimit  bool
 	Attack      bool
-	BlockedByBlockRule bool
+	RuleBlocked bool
 	WAFBlocked  bool
 }
@@ -323,8 +323,8 @@ func (l *Limiter) AddToHistory(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, r Request) {
 		h.Offences.Attack++
 	}
-	if r.BlockedByBlockRule {
+	if r.RuleBlocked {
-		h.Offences.BlockedByBlockRule++
+		h.Offences.RuleBlocked++
 	}
 	if r.WAFBlocked {
@@ -20,37 +20,32 @@ const (
 	// the app.
 	ActionForward = "forward"
-	// ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge is a request over the header limits.
+	// ActionTooLarge is a request over the header limits.
-	ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge = "request_header_too_large"
+	ActionTooLarge = "too_large"
-	// ActionClientIsRateLimited is a request refused because it took its
+	// ActionRateLimited is a request refused because it took its client
-	// client over a rate limit, which bans the client.
+	// over a rate limit, which bans the client.
-	ActionClientIsRateLimited = "client_is_rate_limited"
+	ActionRateLimited = "rate_limited"
-	// ActionTemporarilyBanned is a request refused because a ban that runs
+	// ActionBanned is a request refused because a ban covers its client,
-	// out covers its client, or because it matched a ban rule, asked for a
+	// or because it matched a ban rule, asked for a trap path or the
-	// trap path or the CrowdSec decision list lists its client, and so made
+	// CrowdSec decision list lists its client, each of which bans the
-	// such a ban.
+	// client.
-	ActionTemporarilyBanned = "temporarily_banned"
+	ActionBanned = "banned"
-	// ActionPermanentlyBanned is a request refused because a ban that never
+	// ActionRuleBlocked is a request refused because it matched a block
-	// runs out covers its client, or because the request made such a ban or
+	// rule.
-	// made its client's ban permanent.
+	ActionRuleBlocked = "rule_blocked"
 	ActionPermanentlyBanned = "permanently_banned"
 	// ActionBlockedByBlockRule is a request refused because it matched a
 	// block rule.
 	ActionBlockedByBlockRule = "blocked_by_block_rule"
 	// ActionWAFBlocked is a request refused because the Core Rule Set
 	// scored it at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
 	ActionWAFBlocked = "waf_blocked"
-	// ActionClientDenied is a request refused because its client is in
+	// ActionDenied is a request refused because its client is in
 	// SWW_DENY_NETS, in a blocklist while SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny,
 	// or listed by a DNSBL zone, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, while
 	// SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny, or that carries a tag in SWW_TAG_DENY.
-	ActionClientDenied = "client_denied"
+	ActionDenied = "denied"
 	// ActionCountryDenied is a request refused because its client's country
 	// is not in SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
@@ -139,10 +134,10 @@ type Line struct {
 	// The decision.
 	Action string `json:"action"`
 	// WouldAction is, in observe mode, the action enforce mode would have
-	// taken with a request it would have refused: ActionClientDenied,
+	// taken with a request it would have refused: ActionDenied,
-	// ActionTemporarilyBanned, ActionPermanentlyBanned, ActionCountryDenied,
+	// ActionBanned, ActionCountryDenied, ActionRateLimited,
-	// ActionClientIsRateLimited, ActionBlockedByBlockRule, ActionWAFBlocked,
+	// ActionRuleBlocked, ActionWAFBlocked, or, in discriminator, ActionTooLarge
-	// or, in discriminator, ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge for the header limits.
+	// for the header limits.
 	WouldAction string `json:"would_action,omitempty"`
 	// Heuristic is the name of the heuristic that refused the request, in
 	// observe mode too, and HeuristicFigures are the figures it acted on, by
@@ -25,9 +25,8 @@ const (
 	// failureKept is how long routewatch is not asked again after a query
 	// fails, so that a dead routewatch is not asked on every request.
 	failureKept = time.Minute
-	// queryTimeout is how long one query may take. routewatch answers only
+	// queryTimeout is how long one query may take.
-	// after a reverse DNS lookup it allows 2 seconds, so this is longer.
+	queryTimeout = 2 * time.Second
 	queryTimeout = 5 * time.Second
 	// maxAnswers is how many answers are kept. Past it, the one that came
 	// longest ago is dropped.
 	maxAnswers = 100000
@@ -21,10 +21,7 @@ const (
 	routedAnswer = `{"status":"ok","data":{"results":[` +
 		`{"ip":"192.0.2.1","netblock":"192.0.2.0/24","asn":64496}]}}`
 	noRouteAnswer = `{"status":"ok","data":{"results":[{"ip":"192.0.2.1"}]}}`
-	// slowAnswer is longer than routewatch allows a reverse DNS lookup.
+	waitLimit     = 5 * time.Second
 	slowAnswer = 2500 * time.Millisecond
 	// waitLimit is longer than the Client allows a query.
 	waitLimit = 10 * time.Second
 )
 // clock is a time the tests move by hand.
@@ -52,7 +49,6 @@ func (c *clock) advance(by time.Duration) {
 // the process log.
 type fixture struct {
 	t       *testing.T
 	server  *httptest.Server
 	client  *routewatch.Client
 	clk     *clock
 	queries *atomic.Int32
@@ -91,16 +87,16 @@ func newFixture(t *testing.T, standIn http.HandlerFunc) *fixture {
 		log:     &syncBuffer{},
 	}
-	f.server = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
 		func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			f.queries.Add(1)
 			f.path.Store(r.URL.Path)
 			standIn(w, r)
 		}))
-	t.Cleanup(f.server.Close)
+	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
 	f.client = routewatch.New(routewatch.Params{
-		URL: f.server.URL + "/", Now: f.clk.Now,
+		URL: server.URL + "/", Now: f.clk.Now,
 		ProcessLog: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(f.log, nil)),
 	})
@@ -141,26 +137,6 @@ func (f *fixture) waitFor(why routewatch.Missing) routewatch.Route {
 	}
 }
 // wantFailureLoggedWithoutTheClient waits for the process log to name a failed
 // query, and checks that it does not name the client.
 func (f *fixture) wantFailureLoggedWithoutTheClient() {
 	f.t.Helper()
 	// The failure is noted before it is logged.
 	deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
 	for !strings.Contains(f.log.String(), "asking routewatch failed") {
 		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
 			f.t.Fatalf("process log %q names no failure", f.log.String())
 		}
 		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
 	}
 	if strings.Contains(f.log.String(), clientAddr) {
 		f.t.Errorf("process log %q names the client", f.log.String())
 	}
 }
 func TestRouteGivesRoutewatchsAnswerAndAsksByAddress(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -182,25 +158,6 @@ func TestRouteGivesRoutewatchsAnswerAndAsksByAddress(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestAnswerAfterASlowReverseDNSLookupIsKept(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	f := newFixture(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 		time.Sleep(slowAnswer)
 		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(routedAnswer))
 	})
 	f.route()
 	route := f.waitFor("")
 	want := routewatch.Route{Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24"), ASN: 64496}
 	if route != want {
 		t.Errorf("route %+v, want %+v", route, want)
 	}
 }
 func TestAddressWithoutARouteIsKeptAsNoRoute(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -234,23 +191,24 @@ func TestAnswerRoutewatchCannotBeTakenFromFails(t *testing.T) {
 			f.route()
 			f.waitFor(routewatch.RequestFailed)
-			f.wantFailureLoggedWithoutTheClient()
+
 			// The failure is noted before it is logged.
 			deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
 			for !strings.Contains(f.log.String(), "asking routewatch failed") {
 				if time.Now().After(deadline) {
 					t.Fatalf("process log %q names no failure", f.log.String())
 				}
 				time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
 			}
 			if strings.Contains(f.log.String(), clientAddr) {
 				t.Errorf("process log %q names the client", f.log.String())
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestRefusedConnectionFailsTheQueryAndTheLogOmitsTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	f := newFixture(t, answering(routedAnswer))
 	f.server.Close()
 	f.route()
 	f.waitFor(routewatch.RequestFailed)
 	f.wantFailureLoggedWithoutTheClient()
 }
 func TestFailureIsKeptForAMinuteSoRoutewatchIsNotAskedPerRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -295,7 +253,6 @@ func TestHangingRoutewatchNeverDelaysAndFailsTheQuery(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	f.waitFor(routewatch.RequestFailed)
 	f.wantFailureLoggedWithoutTheClient()
 }
 func TestRepeatedRequestsMakeOneQueryAndTheAnswerExpires(t *testing.T) {
@@ -373,13 +373,13 @@ func TestStateKeptAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
 	out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
 		wantRefused(t, url)
 	})
-	out.line(t, "action", "client_is_rate_limited")
+	out.line(t, "action", "rate_limited")
 	// After another, the ban still refuses it.
 	out = runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
 		wantRefused(t, url)
 	})
-	out.line(t, "action", "temporarily_banned")
+	out.line(t, "action", "banned")
 }
 func TestBanRefusesItsNetblockAfterARestartWithAnotherScope(t *testing.T) {
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ func TestRuleFileAddedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
 			time.Sleep(pollInterval)
 		}
 	})
-	out.line(t, "action", "blocked_by_block_rule")
+	out.line(t, "action", "rule_blocked")
 }
 func TestRuleFileThatDoesNotParseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ func TestBlocklistTriesAndCopiesKeptInReputationJSONAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T)
 			time.Sleep(pollInterval)
 		}
 	})
-	wantDeniedByList(t, out.line(t, "action", "client_denied"), dropURL)
+	wantDeniedByList(t, out.line(t, "action", "denied"), dropURL)
 	if fetches := torFetches.Load(); fetches != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("tor.txt fetched %d times, want once, before the restart", fetches)
@@ -843,8 +843,7 @@ func wantDeniedByList(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, listURL string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	reputation, _ := line["reputation"].([]any)
-	if line["action"] != "client_denied" || len(reputation) != 1 ||
+	if line["action"] != "denied" || len(reputation) != 1 || reputation[0] != listURL {
 		reputation[0] != listURL {
 		t.Errorf("request log line %v, want one denied for %s", line, listURL)
 	}
 }
@@ -187,16 +187,15 @@ main() {
    echo "example-app: rproxy passes a request to the app and its answer back"
    refused || fail "a second request in a minute was not refused"
-    wait_for "discriminator logged no ban" \
+    wait_for "discriminator logged no ban" logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"rate_limited"'
        logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"client_is_rate_limited"'
    echo "example-app: a second request in a minute bans the client"
    refused_from 203.0.113.9 /.env || fail "a probe for /.env was not refused"
    wait_for "discriminator logged no ban for the probe" \
-        logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"temporarily_banned"' '"rule_ids":["env-file"]'
+        logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"banned"' '"rule_ids":["env-file"]'
    refused_from 203.0.113.9 / || fail "the client of the probe was let through"
    wait_for "the client's next request did not make its ban permanent" \
-        logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"permanently_banned"' '"ban_expires":"permanent"'
+        logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"ban_expires":"permanent"'
    echo "example-app: a probe for /.env bans the client, its next request for good"
    docker exec "$DISCRIMINATOR" sv stop sww >/dev/null ||
@@ -233,7 +232,7 @@ main() {
    start_app
    refused || fail "the new discriminator container let the banned client through"
    wait_for "discriminator logged no request refused under the ban" \
-        logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"temporarily_banned"'
+        logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"banned"'
    echo "example-app: a new discriminator container on the same volume keeps the ban"
    docker rm --force "$DISCRIMINATOR" >/dev/null