Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 35054fe94b Default request limits per hour and per day, sized for API use (closes #176)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
The default request limits now suit programmatic use of an API, such
as an automation fleet on another host, and still catch crawlers:

- per minute: off;
- per hour: 30000, passed by a crawler that keeps up 10 a second;
- per day: 300000, passed by one that keeps up 4 a second.

The byte limits and ban lengths are unchanged. SPEC.md, README.md and
docs/settings.md give the reasons and what counting cannot catch;
docs/gitea.md redoes the Actions runner sums.

Judgement call: the ban alert example in docs/alerts.md now shows the
hour limit, since the minute limit is off by default.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-04 19:50:41 +00:00
clawbot fdabf4974b Health check test uses addresses nothing can connect to (closes #158)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
TestHealthCheck closed the app's server, and later smallwebwaf, and
expected connections to the freed ports to fail. Another test could take
such a port in between, so the connection succeeded and the test failed.

The failing app check now uses the multicast address 224.0.0.1, to which
TCP cannot connect. The failing smallwebwaf check uses port 0, on which
nothing listens. Neither result depends on other processes. The test now
stops smallwebwaf after its last check, so that it exits before the
test's temporary directories are removed. The code under test is
unchanged.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 21:00:16 +01:00
clawbot a9dc59546b New defaults for the request and byte limits (closes #161)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
The request limits and the hour and day byte limits now sit about twice
above what 40 people busy with heavy web apps make together on one
address:

- requests: 6000 a minute, 100,000 an hour, 1,000,000 a day;
- bytes: 20 GiB an hour, 200 GiB a day.

The largest response drops from 5 GiB to 1 GiB. The minute byte limit
of 4 GiB is sized to hold two of the largest responses with their
requests. SPEC.md gives the new reasoning; README.md and the reference
documents give the new figures.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 19:28:09 +01:00
9 changed files with 116 additions and 70 deletions
+9 -5
View File
@@ -17,11 +17,15 @@ reference documents under [`docs/`](docs/) are listed under "Documents" below.
## What it protects against
- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Rate limiting gives each
client 1000 requests a minute, 10,000 an hour and 50,000 a day. Byte limits
give it 10 GiB a minute, 20 GiB an hour and 50 GiB a day. A client over a
limit is refused and banned. The first ban lasts an hour. Each repeat within a
day makes the next ban three times as long. A ban that would last more than
seven days is permanent.
client 30,000 requests an hour and 300,000 a day, with no limit per minute.
That leaves room for programmatic use of an API, such as an automation fleet
on another host. The hour limit catches a crawler that keeps up 10 requests a
second. The day limit catches one that keeps up 4 a second around the clock.
Counting cannot catch a client slower than about 3.5 requests a second; only
the protections below can. Byte limits give each client 4 GiB a minute, 20 GiB
an hour and 200 GiB a day. A client over a limit is refused and banned. The
first ban lasts an hour. Each repeat within a day makes the next ban three
times as long. A ban that would last more than seven days is permanent.
- Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The
default rule file bans such a client for seven days at its first probe. Its
next request during the ban makes the ban permanent. The default rule file
+33 -12
View File
@@ -15,8 +15,9 @@ to them.
all. Every setting has a default chosen for a service facing the internet
in 2026. A setting that needs an alert destination, an account key or a token
stays off until the operator supplies it.
- It limits each client's requests and bytes per minute, hour and day. It bounds
the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
- It limits each client's requests per hour and day, and its bytes per minute,
hour and day. It bounds the size and duration of every request and answer. It
detects attacks.
- It bans abusers: briefly at first, for seven days on a clear sign of attack,
and permanently when they keep at it.
- It looks up each client's AS number and country. It can refuse whole countries
@@ -368,16 +369,33 @@ Conventions:
- `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips the checks step 3 names, for monitoring or the
owner's own networks. `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` bypasses the request and
byte limits only; the error burst, attack detection and bans still apply.
- Many clients share one address (mobile carriers, offices, Tor), and so share
its limits and its bans. `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` and `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`
take known shared addresses out.
- Many people can share one address, as in an office, on a mobile carrier or
through Tor. They are one client, and share its limits and its bans. A known
shared address busier than the limits allow belongs in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` or
`SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
### Request rate limits, per client
Breaking one bans the client, so the defaults sit several times above what one
busy person produces. A browser loading a heavy page makes a few hundred
requests, and a git clone a handful. A machine that talks to the app all day can
still pass the day limit. Its address belongs in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
Breaking one bans the client. The defaults suit programmatic use of an API, such
as an automation fleet on another host, and still stop abusive bots. They count
per hour and per day, so a short burst of requests breaks no limit on its own.
- Per minute: `off`.
- Per hour: 30,000, about 8 requests a second for a whole hour. A crawler that
keeps up 10 a second makes 36,000 an hour, and passes it.
- Per day: 300,000, about 3.5 requests a second around the clock. A crawler that
keeps up 4 a second makes 345,600 a day, and passes it.
A fleet of 20 agents, each making a request every 10 seconds, makes 7,200
requests an hour. Working around the clock, it makes 172,800 a day. Both stay
under the limits.
Counting cannot catch a client slower than these limits. Only the other checks
can catch an abuser that slow. They include the trap paths, the rule files, the
Core Rule Set and the blocklists. An abuser that trips none of them is not
caught. A machine that keeps up more than about 3.5 requests a second all day
passes the day limit, as two busy Actions runners on one address do. Its address
belongs in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
`SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` takes path prefixes out of the count, such as
static assets or health checks; their bytes are not counted either. A prefix is
@@ -390,9 +408,12 @@ matched the same way.
### Byte limits, per client
A response's bytes are counted when it ends (see step 15). So every default sits
above the largest request and answer together, and no single download breaks a
limit.
The hour and day limits sit about twice above what 40 people busy with heavy web
apps move together on one address. Each moves about 256 MiB an hour, for ten
hours a day. A response's bytes are counted when it ends (see step 15). So the
minute limit holds two of the largest responses, with their requests, ending in
the same minute. No single download then breaks a limit. An operator who raises
`SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` raises the byte limits with it.
### Size and time limits
+9 -9
View File
@@ -35,34 +35,34 @@ on one line:
```json
{
"instance": "fsn1app1/gitea",
"time": "2026-10-06T12:00:00.123461Z",
"time": "2026-10-06T12:50:00.123461Z",
"event": "ban",
"client": "203.0.113.9",
"netblock": "203.0.113.9/32",
"asn": "",
"as_name": "",
"country": "",
"reason": "requests per minute over the limit of 1000",
"reason": "requests per hour over the limit of 30000",
"detail": {
"ban_expires": "2026-10-06T13:00:00.123Z",
"ban_expires": "2026-10-06T13:50:00.123Z",
"cause": "limit",
"notes": {
"asn": "",
"as_name": "",
"country": "",
"kind": "requests",
"limit": 1000,
"window": "minute",
"count": 1001,
"limit": 30000,
"window": "hour",
"count": 30001,
"request": {
"time": "2026-10-06T12:00:00.123456789Z",
"time": "2026-10-06T12:50:00.123456789Z",
"method": "GET",
"host": "app.example",
"path": "/owner/repo/commits/branch/main?page=812",
"status": 403,
"user_agent": "scraper/1.0"
},
"requests": 5210,
"requests": 30001,
"refused": 0,
"earlier_bans": {
"limit": 0,
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ on one line:
- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, as known when the alert was
raised. They are empty when GeoJS had not answered yet.
- `reason`: a short sentence, such as
`requests per minute over the limit of 1000` or `listed by a blocklist`.
`requests per hour over the limit of 30000` or `listed by a blocklist`.
- `detail`: what is particular to the event:
- for a ban, its `cause`, `ban_expires` and `notes` (the notes are listed
under `bans.json` in [`state-files.md`](state-files.md));
+11 -8
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,10 @@ checked again when gitea or the Core Rule Set changes version.
- SSH access to gitea does not pass through `smallwebwaf` and is not protected
by it.
- A clone is a response. It fits the defaults of 30 minutes and 5 GiB for all
but the largest repositories and slowest links.
- A clone is a response. It fits the defaults of 30 minutes and 1 GiB unless the
repository is large or the link slow. A repository whose clone is larger than
1 GiB needs `SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` raised, and the byte limits with it
("Byte limits, per client" in `SPEC.md`).
- A push is a request, and so is every other upload:
- a git push;
- an LFS object;
@@ -30,12 +32,13 @@ checked again when gitea or the Core Rule Set changes version.
request limits do most of the work there.
- An Actions runner that reaches gitea through `smallwebwaf` sends requests all
day. One older than version 0.4 (April 2026) asks for work every 2 seconds,
43,200 requests a day, and reports a running job's log and state every second.
So it passes the day limit of 50,000 after about an hour and a quarter of
jobs. It is then banned, the job it is running fails, and each repeat within a
day makes the ban longer. Newer runners ask less often, but a busy one, or
several on one address, can still pass it. Put the runners' addresses in
`SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
43,200 requests a day. While it runs a job, it reports the job's log and state
every second instead, two requests a second. So one runner busy all day sends
172,800 requests, under the request limits. Two such runners on one address,
each busy all day, make 345,600 and pass the day limit of 300,000; one stays
under it. Their address is then banned, their running jobs fail, and each
repeat within a day makes the ban longer. Newer runners ask for work less
often. Put the runners' addresses in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
## What the Core Rule Set lets through
+15 -6
View File
@@ -99,16 +99,25 @@ that take `off`, the `_FILE` form, and what each group does and why.
## Request rate limits, per client
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `1000`), `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `10000`) and `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `50000`): the most
requests a client may make in each window. A count or `off`.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`): the most requests a client may
make in a minute. A count or `off`. It is off by default so that a short burst
of API requests breaks no limit on its own.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `30000`, about 8 a second): the most
requests a client may make in an hour. A count or `off`. The default leaves
room for an automation fleet at work, and catches a crawler that keeps up 10 a
second.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `300000`, about 3.5 a second): the most
requests a client may make in a day. A count or `off`. The default catches a
crawler that keeps up 4 a second around the clock.
- Counting cannot catch a client slower than these limits (see "Request rate
limits, per client" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes exempt from
rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`.
## Byte limits, per client
- `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `10G`), `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `20G`) and `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `50G`): the most
- `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `4G`), `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `20G`) and `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `200G`): the most
bytes counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
- `SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
`response`, `request` or `both`.
@@ -131,7 +140,7 @@ that take `off`, the `_FILE` form, and what each group does and why.
to send its whole answer. A duration or `off`.
- `SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A size
or `off`.
- `SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` (default `5G`): the largest response body. A size
- `SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A size
or `off`.
## Lookup of AS number and country
+6 -6
View File
@@ -502,17 +502,17 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
UpstreamRequestTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT", "60s"),
UpstreamResponseTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT", "30m"),
RequestMaxBytes: env.size("SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES", "100M"),
ResponseMaxBytes: env.size("SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES", "5G"),
ResponseMaxBytes: env.size("SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES", "1G"),
AllowNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS", ""),
RateLimitExemptNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS", ""),
DenyNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_DENY_NETS", ""),
RateLimitPerMinute: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "1000"),
RateLimitPerHour: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "10000"),
RateLimitPerDay: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "50000"),
RateLimitPerMinute: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", off),
RateLimitPerHour: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "30000"),
RateLimitPerDay: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "300000"),
RateLimitExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
BytesLimitPerMinute: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "10G"),
BytesLimitPerMinute: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "4G"),
BytesLimitPerHour: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "20G"),
BytesLimitPerDay: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "50G"),
BytesLimitPerDay: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "200G"),
BytesCount: env.bytesCount("SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT", "both"),
LookupSource: env.lookupSource("SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE", "geojs"),
LookupDBPath: env.value("SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH", ""),
+12 -12
View File
@@ -261,10 +261,10 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
UpstreamRequestTimeout: time.Minute,
UpstreamResponseTimeout: 30 * time.Minute,
RequestMaxBytes: 100 << 20,
ResponseMaxBytes: 5 << 30,
RateLimitPerMinute: 1000,
RateLimitPerHour: 10000,
RateLimitPerDay: 50000,
ResponseMaxBytes: 1 << 30,
RateLimitPerMinute: 0,
RateLimitPerHour: 30000,
RateLimitPerDay: 300000,
BanResponse: 403,
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: 24 * time.Hour,
@@ -284,8 +284,8 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
LookupSource: defaultLookupSource, LookupTimeout: time.Second,
})
wantByteLimitSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
BytesLimitPerMinute: 10 << 30, BytesLimitPerHour: 20 << 30,
BytesLimitPerDay: 50 << 30, BytesCount: "both",
BytesLimitPerMinute: 4 << 30, BytesLimitPerHour: 20 << 30,
BytesLimitPerDay: 200 << 30, BytesCount: "both",
})
if cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != "http://127.0.0.1:8081" {
@@ -2371,17 +2371,17 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
upstreamRequestTimeout: "60s",
upstreamResponseTimeout: "30m",
requestMaxBytes: "100M",
responseMaxBytes: "5G",
responseMaxBytes: "1G",
allowNets: "",
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
denyNets: "",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1000",
rateLimitPerHour: "10000",
rateLimitPerDay: "50000",
rateLimitPerMinute: off,
rateLimitPerHour: "30000",
rateLimitPerDay: "300000",
rateLimitExemptPaths: "",
bytesLimitPerMinute: "10G",
bytesLimitPerMinute: "4G",
bytesLimitPerHour: "20G",
bytesLimitPerDay: "50G",
bytesLimitPerDay: "200G",
bytesCount: "both",
lookupSource: defaultLookupSource,
lookupDBPath: "",
+13 -6
View File
@@ -60,8 +60,19 @@ func TestHealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
}, 0, "")
}
app.Close()
wantHealthCheck(t, env, 1, "unhealthy: connect to the app: ")
// Another test can take a closed server's port at once, so the app's
// address here is a multicast address, to which TCP cannot connect.
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
listenAddr: ":" + port,
upstreamURL: "http://224.0.0.1",
}, 1, "unhealthy: connect to the app: ")
// Listening on port 0 takes any free port, so nothing listens on port 0
// itself.
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{listenAddr: ":0"}, 1,
"unhealthy: ask smallwebwaf: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{listenAddr: "8080"}, 1,
"unhealthy: invalid setting: SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
stop()
@@ -70,10 +81,6 @@ func TestHealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("still running after being told to stop")
}
wantHealthCheck(t, env, 1, "unhealthy: ask smallwebwaf: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{listenAddr: "8080"}, 1,
"unhealthy: invalid setting: SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
}
func TestHealthCheckRefusesAnArgument(t *testing.T) {
+8 -6
View File
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ const (
greeting = "hello from the app"
// placed is the client the tests' lookup databases place.
placed = "203.0.113.9"
// off is the value that switches a setting off.
off = "off"
)
// output collects what smallwebwaf writes on stdout.
@@ -118,7 +120,7 @@ func run(ctx context.Context, env map[string]string, out *output) int {
LookupEnv: func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := env[name]
if !ok && name == "SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE" {
return "off", true
return off, true
}
return value, ok
@@ -502,7 +504,7 @@ func TestRuleFileAddedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
rulesDir: dir,
// The requests sent until the rule takes effect must not break a
// rate limit, whose ban would refuse them too.
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "off",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": off,
}
out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
@@ -1240,13 +1242,13 @@ func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, appURL, dir string) {
"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT": "60s",
"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT": "30m",
"SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES": "100M",
"SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES": "5G",
"SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES": "1G",
"SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS": "",
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
"SWWAF_DENY_NETS": "",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "1000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR": "10000",
rateLimitPerDay: "50000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": off,
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR": "30000",
rateLimitPerDay: "300000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS": "",
"SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES": "",