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@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ Together, `rproxy` and `waf` protect against:
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- give the clients of chosen networks and countries a fraction of every
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- give the clients of chosen networks and countries a fraction of every
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limit, so that they are banned sooner;
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limit, so that they are banned sooner;
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- refuse or limit clients on a blocklist, a DNS blocklist, or with a high
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- refuse or limit clients on a blocklist, a DNS blocklist, or with a high
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AbuseIPDB score.
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AbuseIPDB score;
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- ban the clients on AbuseIPDB's blacklist before they send a request.
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For the operator, it:
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For the operator, it:
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@@ -294,123 +295,126 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
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Every setting the code reads, with its default:
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Every setting the code reads, with its default:
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| Variable | Default | What it does |
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| Variable | Default | What it does |
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| ------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| --------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `waf`. |
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| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `waf`. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `waf`'s URL, such as `http://waf:8080`. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `waf`'s URL, such as `http://waf:8080`. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `waf`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `waf`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `waf` gives no answer in time, and while the circuit breaker for asks to `waf` is open: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `waf` gives no answer in time, and while the circuit breaker for asks to `waf` is open: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
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| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `waf` listens; leave the host part empty. |
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| `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `waf` listens; leave the host part empty. |
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| `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `waf` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `host1/waf`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `waf` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `host1/waf`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
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| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
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| `SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
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| `SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
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| `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
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| `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
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| `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `waf` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
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| `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `waf` keeps for broken limits and attacks; bans an admin made and bans for AbuseIPDB's blacklist do not count. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
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| `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
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| `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
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| `SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
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| `SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
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| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
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| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
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| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
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| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
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| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
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| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
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| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `800` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, in milliseconds. The request to GeoJS goes on, and a later answer is kept. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `800` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, in milliseconds. The request to GeoJS goes on, and a later answer is kept. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `true`, or `false` while the lookup source is `off` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `true`, or `false` while the lookup source is `off` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
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| `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
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| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
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| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` | unset | The URL of a routewatch instance, which gives each client's `asn=` and `prefix=` tags. Unset, nothing asks routewatch. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` | unset | The URL of a routewatch instance, which gives each client's `asn=` and `prefix=` tags. Unset, nothing asks routewatch. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
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| `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
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| `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
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| `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
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| `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
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| `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
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| `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
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| `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
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| `SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
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| `SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `8K`; `off` reads none. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `8K`; `off` reads none. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
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| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
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| `SWW_WAF_APPS` | unset | The apps each hostname serves, such as `git.example.com:gitea;blog.example.com:wordpress`; only those apps' fixes apply there. "Attack detection" lists the apps. Listing `forgejo` brings gitea's fixes too. Unset, every app's fixes apply to every hostname. |
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| `SWW_WAF_APPS` | unset | The apps each hostname serves, such as `git.example.com:gitea;blog.example.com:wordpress`; only those apps' fixes apply there. "Attack detection" lists the apps. Listing `forgejo` brings gitea's fixes too. Unset, every app's fixes apply to every hostname. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
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| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account. Set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background, and the clients on AbuseIPDB's blacklist are banned. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take, in milliseconds. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take, in milliseconds. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD` | `90` | The least AbuseIPDB score, from 25 to 100, at which a client on its blacklist is banned. Do not set it below 50 to 75: lower scores list ordinary visitors. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_BANS_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS` | `60` | How often AbuseIPDB's blacklist is fetched again, in minutes. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state and cache file is written. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS` | `30` | How long a client on AbuseIPDB's blacklist is banned, in days. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR` | `/var/cache/sww` | The directory of the cache files, an absolute path. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `waf`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_BANS_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state and cache file is written. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `waf` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR` | `/var/cache/sww` | The directory of the cache files, an absolute path. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `waf`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER_LINES` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `waf` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER_LINES` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_BUSIEST_COUNTRIES_AND_ASNS` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_BUSIEST_COUNTRIES_AND_ASNS` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for one client in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for one client in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for one client in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for one client in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. Those thresholds only send alerts. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. Those thresholds only send alerts. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. Those thresholds only send alerts. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. Those thresholds only send alerts. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. Those thresholds only send alerts. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. Those thresholds only send alerts. |
|
||||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
|
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Sends one alert to the alert destinations when more bytes than this are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count. No client is banned, rate limited or blocked. |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
|
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
|
||||||
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
|
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
|
||||||
@@ -420,8 +424,8 @@ full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
|
|||||||
Each example is a complete `compose.yaml`. `smallwebwaf` is the tag
|
Each example is a complete `compose.yaml`. `smallwebwaf` is the tag
|
||||||
`make docker` gives the image; on another host, use the name you pushed it
|
`make docker` gives the image; on another host, use the name you pushed it
|
||||||
under, by digest. Docker Compose puts the services on a private network of its
|
under, by digest. Docker Compose puts the services on a private network of its
|
||||||
own, where each reaches the others by service name. Each example publishes
|
own, where each reaches the others by service name. Each example but "On the
|
||||||
`rproxy`'s port on the host, for trying it out.
|
open internet" publishes `rproxy`'s port on the host, for trying it out.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Smallest setup
|
### Smallest setup
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -453,6 +457,142 @@ volumes:
|
|||||||
waf-state:
|
waf-state:
|
||||||
```
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### On the open internet
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
One gitea at `git.example.com`, with traefik in front of `rproxy`. traefik gets
|
||||||
|
the certificate from Let's Encrypt and is the only service with published ports.
|
||||||
|
`waf` sets what most sites set. More `waf` settings follow, commented out, each
|
||||||
|
with what it does and when to set it.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```yaml
|
||||||
|
services:
|
||||||
|
traefik:
|
||||||
|
# traefik v3.7.19, 2026-11-13
|
||||||
|
image: traefik@sha256:a6c0194dda77bcb804824580f36fa7edc56e315b1acfe933366c8b52844a78a4
|
||||||
|
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||||
|
command:
|
||||||
|
- --providers.docker=true
|
||||||
|
- --providers.docker.exposedByDefault=false
|
||||||
|
- --entryPoints.web.address=:80
|
||||||
|
- --entryPoints.websecure.address=:443
|
||||||
|
# Redirect plain HTTP to HTTPS.
|
||||||
|
- --entryPoints.web.http.redirections.entryPoint.to=websecure
|
||||||
|
- --entryPoints.web.http.redirections.entryPoint.scheme=https
|
||||||
|
# A Let's Encrypt certificate for each site, by the TLS-ALPN
|
||||||
|
# challenge on port 443.
|
||||||
|
- --entryPoints.websecure.http.tls.certResolver=le
|
||||||
|
- --certificatesResolvers.le.acme.email=hostmaster@example.com
|
||||||
|
- --certificatesResolvers.le.acme.storage=/letsencrypt/acme.json
|
||||||
|
- --certificatesResolvers.le.acme.tlsChallenge=true
|
||||||
|
# Give a request 10 minutes to arrive, rather than 1, for the
|
||||||
|
# large git pushes the rproxy lines below accept.
|
||||||
|
# - --entryPoints.websecure.transport.respondingTimeouts.readTimeout=600s
|
||||||
|
ports:
|
||||||
|
- "80:80"
|
||||||
|
- "443:443"
|
||||||
|
volumes:
|
||||||
|
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
|
||||||
|
- acme:/letsencrypt
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
app:
|
||||||
|
# Your app: here a gitea, which listens on port 3000.
|
||||||
|
image: registry.example/app@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
|
||||||
|
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
rproxy:
|
||||||
|
image: smallwebwaf
|
||||||
|
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||||
|
environment:
|
||||||
|
SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND: http://waf:8080
|
||||||
|
SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:3000
|
||||||
|
# Accept git pushes up to 1 GiB, rather than 100 MiB, sent in
|
||||||
|
# up to 10 minutes, rather than 1, with traefik's readTimeout
|
||||||
|
# line above.
|
||||||
|
# SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE: 1G
|
||||||
|
# SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS: "600000"
|
||||||
|
labels:
|
||||||
|
- traefik.enable=true
|
||||||
|
- traefik.http.routers.git.rule=Host(`git.example.com`)
|
||||||
|
- traefik.http.routers.git.entryPoints=websecure
|
||||||
|
- traefik.http.services.git.loadBalancer.server.port=8080
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
waf:
|
||||||
|
image: smallwebwaf
|
||||||
|
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||||
|
environment:
|
||||||
|
SWW_COMMAND: waf
|
||||||
|
# The name in every log line, alert and metric. The default,
|
||||||
|
# the container's host name, is a random id under Compose.
|
||||||
|
SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME: host1/waf
|
||||||
|
# The app each hostname serves. Only that app's fixes to the
|
||||||
|
# Core Rule Set apply there.
|
||||||
|
SWW_WAF_APPS: git.example.com:gitea
|
||||||
|
# Monitoring skips every check.
|
||||||
|
SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS: 192.0.2.10
|
||||||
|
# The office and the CI runner, which would exceed the rate
|
||||||
|
# limits, are never rate limited.
|
||||||
|
SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS: 203.0.113.0/24,198.51.100.7
|
||||||
|
# WordPress paths, which only scanners ask a gitea for. One
|
||||||
|
# request for one bans the client.
|
||||||
|
SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS: /wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php
|
||||||
|
# Spamhaus's list of netblocks hijacked or leased by
|
||||||
|
# criminals. Their clients are refused.
|
||||||
|
SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS: https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt
|
||||||
|
# The token for the ban endpoints, to lift a ban without
|
||||||
|
# editing bans.json.
|
||||||
|
SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/sww/tokens/admin
|
||||||
|
# Alerts, such as one for each ban, to an ntfy topic.
|
||||||
|
SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL: https://ntfy.example.com/smallwebwaf
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Refuse nothing and ban no one, for the first days. Each log
|
||||||
|
# line says what enforce mode would have done.
|
||||||
|
# SWW_WAF_MODE: observe
|
||||||
|
# The access token for an ntfy topic that is not public.
|
||||||
|
# SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/sww/tokens/ntfy
|
||||||
|
# The token for /_sww/metrics, for Prometheus. Unset, the
|
||||||
|
# metrics are off.
|
||||||
|
# SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/sww/tokens/metrics
|
||||||
|
# 600 requests an hour rather than 1500, to ban slower
|
||||||
|
# scrapers. A fast human reader can reach it too.
|
||||||
|
# SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR: "600"
|
||||||
|
# A quarter of every limit for clients in two hosting
|
||||||
|
# networks, where scrapers run rather than people.
|
||||||
|
# SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT: asn=14061:25,asn=16276:25
|
||||||
|
# For a site only for people in a few countries. Clients
|
||||||
|
# elsewhere are refused, and so are any the lookup cannot place.
|
||||||
|
# SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES: de,at,ch
|
||||||
|
# Close a refused request's connection rather than answer
|
||||||
|
# 403. traefik then answers 502, so a scraper cannot tell a
|
||||||
|
# ban from a broken site.
|
||||||
|
# SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE: close
|
||||||
|
# A copy of every log line to a syslog server.
|
||||||
|
# SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL: syslog+tls://logs.example.com:6514
|
||||||
|
volumes:
|
||||||
|
- waf-state:/var/lib/sww
|
||||||
|
- /srv/sww/tokens:/etc/sww/tokens:ro
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
volumes:
|
||||||
|
acme:
|
||||||
|
waf-state:
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Change these before the first start:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- `git.example.com`, in the router rule and in `SWW_WAF_APPS`;
|
||||||
|
- the email address for Let's Encrypt;
|
||||||
|
- the ntfy topic's URL;
|
||||||
|
- the app's image and port;
|
||||||
|
- the netblocks, which are documentation addresses.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Make the admin token file first, as for any token file:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```sh
|
||||||
|
mkdir -p /srv/sww/tokens
|
||||||
|
openssl rand -hex 32 > /srv/sww/tokens/admin
|
||||||
|
chown 65532:65532 /srv/sww/tokens/admin
|
||||||
|
chmod 0400 /srv/sww/tokens/admin
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Custom per-address limits
|
### Custom per-address limits
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
For a site with no API:
|
For a site with no API:
|
||||||
@@ -630,8 +770,10 @@ status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
|
|||||||
- A client is one IPv4 address or one IPv6 netblock of
|
- A client is one IPv4 address or one IPv6 netblock of
|
||||||
`SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX`, since one abuser usually controls a whole /64.
|
`SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX`, since one abuser usually controls a whole /64.
|
||||||
- Each limit is counted over a sliding window with a few integers per client.
|
- Each limit is counted over a sliding window with a few integers per client.
|
||||||
The table of clients and the table of bans each have a bound
|
The table of clients and the bans for limits and attacks each have a bound
|
||||||
(`SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`), so memory is bounded too.
|
(`SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`). The bans for AbuseIPDB's
|
||||||
|
blacklist are bounded by the clients it listed over the last
|
||||||
|
`SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS` days. So memory is bounded too.
|
||||||
- A ban refuses every request from its netblock until it ends. Requests refused
|
- A ban refuses every request from its netblock until it ends. Requests refused
|
||||||
under a ban count toward no limit. A permanent ban ends only when an admin
|
under a ban count toward no limit. A permanent ban ends only when an admin
|
||||||
lifts it.
|
lifts it.
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -94,7 +94,8 @@ never as a time.
|
|||||||
to count and report failures.
|
to count and report failures.
|
||||||
- `internal/lookup`: looks clients up in the lookup database.
|
- `internal/lookup`: looks clients up in the lookup database.
|
||||||
- `internal/reputation`: fetches the lists, asks the DNS blocklists and
|
- `internal/reputation`: fetches the lists, asks the DNS blocklists and
|
||||||
AbuseIPDB in the background, and keeps their answers.
|
AbuseIPDB in the background, and keeps their answers. It also fetches
|
||||||
|
AbuseIPDB's blacklist, which `internal/waf` bans.
|
||||||
- `internal/routewatch`: asks a routewatch instance about clients in the
|
- `internal/routewatch`: asks a routewatch instance about clients in the
|
||||||
background, and keeps its answers.
|
background, and keeps its answers.
|
||||||
- `internal/anomaly`: the anomaly counters and their alerts.
|
- `internal/anomaly`: the anomaly counters and their alerts.
|
||||||
@@ -240,13 +241,15 @@ apply.
|
|||||||
load.
|
load.
|
||||||
- Memory is bounded. When the table of clients holds
|
- Memory is bounded. When the table of clients holds
|
||||||
`SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, the least recently seen client is dropped
|
`SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, the least recently seen client is dropped
|
||||||
first, with its history. The bans are bounded by `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` (see
|
first, with its history. The bans for broken limits and clear signs of attack
|
||||||
"Bans"). The GeoJS answers, the reputation verdicts and scores, the DNS
|
are bounded by `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` (see "Bans"). Those for AbuseIPDB's
|
||||||
queries under way and the anomaly counters have fixed bounds, listed under
|
blacklist are bounded by the clients it listed over the last
|
||||||
"Fixed limits" in `docs/settings.md`. Past its bound, the GeoJS answer or
|
`SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS` days (see "Reputation"). The GeoJS answers, the
|
||||||
anomaly counter used longest ago goes first, and the verdict or score fetched
|
reputation verdicts and scores, the DNS queries under way and the anomaly
|
||||||
longest ago. Past the bound on DNS queries under way, a zone is asked at the
|
counters have fixed bounds, listed under "Fixed limits" in `docs/settings.md`.
|
||||||
client's next request.
|
Past its bound, the GeoJS answer or anomaly counter used longest ago goes
|
||||||
|
first, and the verdict or score fetched longest ago. Past the bound on DNS
|
||||||
|
queries under way, a zone is asked at the client's next request.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Bans
|
## Bans
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -301,6 +304,9 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
|
|||||||
Once it ends, only new requests can break a limit again. The client's
|
Once it ends, only new requests can break a limit again. The client's
|
||||||
history keeps its totals.
|
history keeps its totals.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A client on AbuseIPDB's blacklist is banned before it sends a request, with the
|
||||||
|
cause `abuseipdb` (see "Reputation").
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
A Core Rule Set match refuses only the request it matched, with `403` and
|
A Core Rule Set match refuses only the request it matched, with `403` and
|
||||||
without a ban, because the Core Rule Set has false positives. A `block` rule
|
without a ban, because the Core Rule Set has false positives. A `block` rule
|
||||||
does the same. Those refusals count toward the refusal limit, so a client that
|
does the same. Those refusals count toward the refusal limit, so a client that
|
||||||
@@ -327,11 +333,12 @@ does not count toward a longer ban; it refuses nothing. Deleting its entry from
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
A permanent ban does not run out. It ends when an admin lifts it, or when `waf`
|
A permanent ban does not run out. It ends when an admin lifts it, or when `waf`
|
||||||
drops it from a full table, as below. When `waf` holds `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` bans
|
drops it from a full table, as below. When `waf` holds `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` bans
|
||||||
of its own, it drops the earliest ban of one netblock: the netblock that has
|
for broken limits and clear signs of attack, it drops the earliest such ban of
|
||||||
gone longest without a request. A past, active or permanent ban is dropped
|
one netblock: the netblock that has gone longest without a request. A past,
|
||||||
alike. A scanner whose ban was dropped that way is refused and banned again by
|
active or permanent ban is dropped alike. A scanner whose ban was dropped that
|
||||||
its next probe. A ban whose cause is `admin` is never dropped and does not count
|
way is refused and banned again by its next probe. Bans whose cause is `admin`
|
||||||
toward `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`, so such bans can never fill the table.
|
or `abuseipdb` do not count toward `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` and are never dropped to
|
||||||
|
make room, so they can never push out the others.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
A request refused under a ban that runs out is logged with the action
|
A request refused under a ban that runs out is logged with the action
|
||||||
`temporarily_banned`. Under a permanent ban the action is `permanently_banned`.
|
`temporarily_banned`. Under a permanent ban the action is `permanently_banned`.
|
||||||
@@ -2038,6 +2045,26 @@ host, sharing one address, would often fetch too close together.
|
|||||||
- AbuseIPDB answers other than `200`;
|
- AbuseIPDB answers other than `200`;
|
||||||
- the answer gives no score;
|
- the answer gives no score;
|
||||||
- no answer comes within `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS`.
|
- no answer comes within `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS`.
|
||||||
|
- While `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` is set, AbuseIPDB's blacklist is fetched at the
|
||||||
|
start and every `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS` minutes
|
||||||
|
(default `60`). It lists the clients AbuseIPDB scores at
|
||||||
|
`SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD` (default `90`) or more. The blacklist itself is
|
||||||
|
not kept.
|
||||||
|
- Each client on it is banned for `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS` days (default
|
||||||
|
`30`), with the cause `abuseipdb`. The ban covers the client's netblock,
|
||||||
|
as any ban does.
|
||||||
|
- A netblock that already has an active ban is left as it is. So is one
|
||||||
|
whose `abuseipdb` ban an admin lifted, until that ban would have ended.
|
||||||
|
- An `abuseipdb` ban that has ended is forgotten at the next of these:
|
||||||
|
- a fetch of the blacklist in `enforce` mode;
|
||||||
|
- a read of `bans.json`, at the start or after an admin's edit.
|
||||||
|
- In `observe` mode the blacklist makes no ban.
|
||||||
|
- The threshold takes 25 to 100. It should not be set below 50 to 75, since
|
||||||
|
lower scores list ordinary visitors. AbuseIPDB serves free accounts the
|
||||||
|
blacklist at the threshold 100, whatever is asked for.
|
||||||
|
- AbuseIPDB limits the fetches of the blacklist a day: 5 for a free account.
|
||||||
|
A fetch over the limit fails, and is logged and alerted. The default
|
||||||
|
refresh fetches it 24 times a day.
|
||||||
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits, is
|
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits, is
|
||||||
`limit:25` by default. Such verdicts are less certain than a blocklist, so a
|
`limit:25` by default. Such verdicts are less certain than a blocklist, so a
|
||||||
listed client gets a quarter of every request and byte limit rather than a
|
listed client gets a quarter of every request and byte limit rather than a
|
||||||
@@ -2052,9 +2079,10 @@ host, sharing one address, would often fetch too close together.
|
|||||||
- Alerts go to a webhook as JSON, and to Slack and ntfy as formatted messages.
|
- Alerts go to a webhook as JSON, and to Slack and ntfy as formatted messages.
|
||||||
`docs/alerts.md` lists the events, the JSON object and the messages.
|
`docs/alerts.md` lists the events, the JSON object and the messages.
|
||||||
`SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` chooses which of the seven event types are sent; the
|
`SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` chooses which of the seven event types are sent; the
|
||||||
hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. The bans an admin makes raise no
|
hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. The bans an admin makes, and the
|
||||||
alert. In `observe` mode, a request that would have made a ban still raises
|
bans for AbuseIPDB's blacklist, raise no alert. In `observe` mode, a request
|
||||||
the ban's alert, with `mode` set to `observe` in its `detail`.
|
that would have made a ban still raises the ban's alert, with `mode` set to
|
||||||
|
`observe` in its `detail`.
|
||||||
- A repeat is an alert with the same event, and the same netblock, source, file
|
- A repeat is an alert with the same event, and the same netblock, source, file
|
||||||
or anomaly scope, as one sent less than `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` before. An
|
or anomaly scope, as one sent less than `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` before. An
|
||||||
anomaly scope is one of the things counted under "Anomaly thresholds". A
|
anomaly scope is one of the things counted under "Anomaly thresholds". A
|
||||||
@@ -2202,7 +2230,7 @@ lists the files, what each holds, and their sizes.
|
|||||||
these stop the process with a message naming the file and position:
|
these stop the process with a message naming the file and position:
|
||||||
- a file that does not parse, or has an unknown `version`;
|
- a file that does not parse, or has an unknown `version`;
|
||||||
- an entry without a field it needs;
|
- an entry without a field it needs;
|
||||||
- a ban whose cause is not one of the four;
|
- a ban whose cause is not `limit`, `attack`, `admin` or `abuseipdb`;
|
||||||
- a ban whose `expires` is not after its `start`.
|
- a ban whose `expires` is not after its `start`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Starting with empty state would silently forgive every repeat offender.
|
Starting with empty state would silently forgive every repeat offender.
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+3
-2
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ back or dropped.
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
## Events
|
## Events
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- `ban`: a ban `waf` made.
|
- `ban`: a ban `waf` made for a broken limit or a clear sign of attack.
|
||||||
- `permanent_ban`: a permanent ban it made, or an existing ban made permanent by
|
- `permanent_ban`: a permanent ban it made, or an existing ban made permanent by
|
||||||
a request.
|
a request.
|
||||||
- `core_rule_set_match`: the Core Rule Set scored a request at or over the
|
- `core_rule_set_match`: the Core Rule Set scored a request at or over the
|
||||||
@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ on one line:
|
|||||||
"earlier_bans": {
|
"earlier_bans": {
|
||||||
"limit": 0,
|
"limit": 0,
|
||||||
"attack": 0,
|
"attack": 0,
|
||||||
"admin": 0
|
"admin": 0,
|
||||||
|
"abuseipdb": 0
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
},
|
},
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+9
-2
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
|
|||||||
client's group, from 32 to 128.
|
client's group, from 32 to 128.
|
||||||
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` (default `20000`): the most clients kept, a
|
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` (default `20000`): the most clients kept, a
|
||||||
whole number above zero.
|
whole number above zero.
|
||||||
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): how many of its own bans `waf` keeps, a
|
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): the most bans `waf` keeps for broken
|
||||||
whole number above zero.
|
limits and attacks, a whole number above zero.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Tokens
|
## Tokens
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -338,6 +338,13 @@ tag that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
|
|||||||
or AbuseIPDB's score is used. A duration.
|
or AbuseIPDB's score is used. A duration.
|
||||||
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long a query to a
|
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long a query to a
|
||||||
zone or a check with AbuseIPDB may take. A time in milliseconds.
|
zone or a check with AbuseIPDB may take. A time in milliseconds.
|
||||||
|
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD` (default `90`): the least abuse confidence score
|
||||||
|
of the clients on AbuseIPDB's blacklist, a whole number from 25 to 100. It
|
||||||
|
should not be set below 50 to 75, since lower scores list ordinary visitors.
|
||||||
|
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS` (default `60`): how often
|
||||||
|
the blacklist is fetched again, in minutes. A whole number above zero.
|
||||||
|
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS` (default `30`): how long the ban of a client on
|
||||||
|
the blacklist lasts, in days. A whole number above zero.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Alerting
|
## Alerting
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+19
-5
@@ -21,11 +21,22 @@ top-level `version` of 1.
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
## `bans.json`
|
## `bans.json`
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Active and past bans: every ban an admin made, and up to `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` of
|
Active and past bans:
|
||||||
those `waf` made. Per entry:
|
|
||||||
|
- every ban an admin made;
|
||||||
|
- up to `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` of those `waf` made for a broken limit or an attack;
|
||||||
|
- the bans for AbuseIPDB's blacklist.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A ban for AbuseIPDB's blacklist that has ended is forgotten at the next of
|
||||||
|
these:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- a fetch of the blacklist in `enforce` mode;
|
||||||
|
- a read of `bans.json`, at the start or after an admin's edit.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Per entry:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- `netblock`, `start` and `expires` (`null` for a permanent ban);
|
- `netblock`, `start` and `expires` (`null` for a permanent ban);
|
||||||
- `cause`: `attack`, `limit` or `admin`;
|
- `cause`: `attack`, `limit`, `admin` or `abuseipdb`;
|
||||||
- `reason`: a short reason;
|
- `reason`: a short reason;
|
||||||
- `lifted`: when an admin lifted it, if one did;
|
- `lifted`: when an admin lifted it, if one did;
|
||||||
- `notes`: the notes below.
|
- `notes`: the notes below.
|
||||||
@@ -60,7 +71,8 @@ ban. The notes:
|
|||||||
- for a clear sign of attack, `rule_id` and `target`, or `trap_path`;
|
- for a clear sign of attack, `rule_id` and `target`, or `trap_path`;
|
||||||
- `reputation`: the sources the client was on, each with its `source` and, for
|
- `reputation`: the sources the client was on, each with its `source` and, for
|
||||||
AbuseIPDB, its `score`;
|
AbuseIPDB, its `score`;
|
||||||
- `request`: the request that caused the ban, each text cut to 256 bytes:
|
- `request`: the request that caused the ban, each text cut to 256 bytes, and
|
||||||
|
empty for a ban for AbuseIPDB's blacklist:
|
||||||
- `time`, `method` and `host`;
|
- `time`, `method` and `host`;
|
||||||
- `path`, with its query string;
|
- `path`, with its query string;
|
||||||
- `status` and `user_agent`;
|
- `status` and `user_agent`;
|
||||||
@@ -151,7 +163,9 @@ A cache file. routewatch's answers from the last hour, one per line:
|
|||||||
- `bans.json`: about 1.2 KiB per ban, at most about 2.5 KiB, so about 6 MiB at
|
- `bans.json`: about 1.2 KiB per ban, at most about 2.5 KiB, so about 6 MiB at
|
||||||
the default `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`. Written every 15 minutes, a full file comes to
|
the default `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`. Written every 15 minutes, a full file comes to
|
||||||
about 600 MiB of writes a day, and a hundred new bans a day add about 600 MiB
|
about 600 MiB of writes a day, and a hundred new bans a day add about 600 MiB
|
||||||
more.
|
more. A ban for AbuseIPDB's blacklist takes about 1 KiB. A free account's
|
||||||
|
blacklist lists 10,000 clients, so it adds at least 10 MiB, and 1 GiB of
|
||||||
|
writes a day.
|
||||||
- `lookups.json`: about 150 bytes per answer, under 1.5 GiB of writes a day when
|
- `lookups.json`: about 150 bytes per answer, under 1.5 GiB of writes a day when
|
||||||
full.
|
full.
|
||||||
- `routewatch.json`: about 120 bytes per answer, at most about 12 MiB.
|
- `routewatch.json`: about 120 bytes per answer, at most about 12 MiB.
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
|
|||||||
|
package bans_test
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import (
|
||||||
|
"net/netip"
|
||||||
|
"testing"
|
||||||
|
"time"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestBlacklistedNetblockIsBannedUntilTheGivenEnd(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
|
||||||
|
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||||
|
now := midnight()
|
||||||
|
expires := now.Add(30 * day)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(
|
||||||
|
now, expires, map[netip.Prefix]int64{netblock: 95},
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
if made != 1 || ledger.Made(bans.CauseAbuseIPDB) != 1 {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("made %d bans, %d counted, want 1 and 1",
|
||||||
|
made, ledger.Made(bans.CauseAbuseIPDB))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ban, banned, madePermanent := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), now)
|
||||||
|
if !banned || madePermanent || !ban.Expires.Equal(expires) ||
|
||||||
|
ban.Cause != bans.CauseAbuseIPDB ||
|
||||||
|
ban.Reason != "on AbuseIPDB's blacklist with a score of 95" ||
|
||||||
|
len(ban.Notes.Reputation) != 1 ||
|
||||||
|
ban.Notes.Reputation[0].Source != "abuseipdb" ||
|
||||||
|
*ban.Notes.Reputation[0].Score != 95 {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf(
|
||||||
|
"ban %+v, banned %t, made permanent %t, want the blacklist's "+
|
||||||
|
"ban until %s",
|
||||||
|
ban,
|
||||||
|
banned,
|
||||||
|
madePermanent,
|
||||||
|
expires,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if _, banned, _ := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), expires); banned {
|
||||||
|
t.Error("the ban refuses a request at its end")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestBlacklistLeavesANetblockWithAnActiveBanAsItIs(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
|
||||||
|
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||||
|
now := midnight()
|
||||||
|
scores := map[netip.Prefix]int64{netblock: 100}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
limitBan, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, bans.Notes{})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(now, now.Add(30*day), scores); made != 0 {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("made %d bans over a ban for a limit, want none", made)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Once that ban has ended the netblock is banned, and the blacklist
|
||||||
|
// fetched again makes no second ban while the first lasts.
|
||||||
|
later := limitBan.Expires
|
||||||
|
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(later, later.Add(30*day), scores); made != 1 {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("made %d bans after the ban for a limit, want 1", made)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
later = later.Add(time.Hour)
|
||||||
|
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(later, later.Add(30*day), scores); made != 0 {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("made %d bans while the blacklist's lasts, want none", made)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{netblock: 2})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if got := ledger.Bans(netblock)[1].Notes.EarlierBans; got != (bans.EarlierBans{
|
||||||
|
Limit: 1,
|
||||||
|
}) {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("earlier bans %+v, want 1 for a limit", got)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestLiftedBlacklistBanHoldsUntilItsEnd(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
|
||||||
|
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||||
|
now := midnight()
|
||||||
|
expires := now.Add(30 * day)
|
||||||
|
scores := map[netip.Prefix]int64{netblock: 100}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(now, expires, scores)
|
||||||
|
ledger.Lift(netblock.Addr(), now)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The admin lifted it: the blacklist fetched again until its end bans
|
||||||
|
// nothing.
|
||||||
|
later := expires.Add(-time.Hour)
|
||||||
|
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(later, later.Add(30*day), scores); made != 0 {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("made %d bans before the lifted ban's end, want none", made)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// From its end on, the blacklist bans the netblock again, and the
|
||||||
|
// lifted ban, ended, is forgotten.
|
||||||
|
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(expires, expires.Add(30*day), scores); made != 1 {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("made %d bans at the lifted ban's end, want 1", made)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{netblock: 1})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestEndedBlacklistBansAreForgottenAtTheNextFetch(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
|
||||||
|
listed := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||||
|
limited := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
|
||||||
|
now := midnight()
|
||||||
|
expires := now.Add(30 * day)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(now, expires, map[netip.Prefix]int64{listed: 100})
|
||||||
|
ledger.BanForLimit(limited, now, bans.Notes{})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// listed is off the blacklist when it is fetched after the ban's end.
|
||||||
|
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(expires, expires.Add(30*day), nil); made != 0 {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("made %d bans for an empty blacklist, want none", made)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{listed: 0, limited: 1})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestBlacklistBansDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
params := defaultParams()
|
||||||
|
params.MaxBans = 1
|
||||||
|
ledger := bans.New(params)
|
||||||
|
limited := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
|
||||||
|
attacker := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
|
||||||
|
now := midnight()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
scores := map[netip.Prefix]int64{}
|
||||||
|
for i := range 3 {
|
||||||
|
scores[netip.PrefixFrom(netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{198, 51, 100, byte(i)}), 32)] = 100
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ledger.BanForLimit(limited, now, bans.Notes{})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if made := ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(now, now.Add(30*day), scores); made != 3 {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("made %d bans for 3 netblocks, want 3", made)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{limited: 1})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The ban for an attack takes the place of the one for a limit, and no
|
||||||
|
// blacklist ban goes.
|
||||||
|
ledger.BanForAttack(attacker, now, bans.Notes{})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
want := map[netip.Prefix]int{limited: 0, attacker: 1}
|
||||||
|
for netblock := range scores {
|
||||||
|
want[netblock] = 1
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
wantBans(t, ledger, want)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
+161
-34
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
|||||||
// Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans sww makes on the
|
// Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans sww makes on the
|
||||||
// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit, a byte limit or the refusal
|
// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit, a byte limit or the refusal
|
||||||
// limit or show a clear sign of attack, and those an admin makes, with their
|
// limit or show a clear sign of attack, or are on AbuseIPDB's blacklist, and
|
||||||
// notes, as the "Bans" section of SPEC.md describes. The bans are kept in
|
// those an admin makes, with their notes, as the "Bans" section of SPEC.md
|
||||||
// memory, and written to bans.json and read from it by the state package.
|
// describes. The bans are kept in memory, and written to bans.json and read
|
||||||
|
// from it by the state package.
|
||||||
package bans
|
package bans
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
import (
|
||||||
@@ -26,6 +27,9 @@ const (
|
|||||||
// CauseAdmin is a ban an admin made, or one sww made that an
|
// CauseAdmin is a ban an admin made, or one sww made that an
|
||||||
// admin keeps. It is never dropped.
|
// admin keeps. It is never dropped.
|
||||||
CauseAdmin = "admin"
|
CauseAdmin = "admin"
|
||||||
|
// CauseAbuseIPDB is a ban sww made for a client on AbuseIPDB's
|
||||||
|
// blacklist. It is forgotten once it has ended.
|
||||||
|
CauseAbuseIPDB = "abuseipdb"
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// repeatFactor is how many times as long as the netblock's last ban a ban
|
// repeatFactor is how many times as long as the netblock's last ban a ban
|
||||||
@@ -50,10 +54,11 @@ type Params struct {
|
|||||||
// AttackBanDuration is how long a first ban for a clear sign of attack
|
// AttackBanDuration is how long a first ban for a clear sign of attack
|
||||||
// lasts.
|
// lasts.
|
||||||
AttackBanDuration time.Duration
|
AttackBanDuration time.Duration
|
||||||
// MaxBans is the most bans held whose cause is not CauseAdmin, at
|
// MaxBans is the most bans held whose cause is CauseLimit or
|
||||||
// least one. Past it, the earliest such ban of the netblock that has
|
// CauseAttack, at least one. Past it, the earliest such ban of the
|
||||||
// gone longest without a request is dropped. Bans whose cause is
|
// netblock that has gone longest without a request is dropped. Bans
|
||||||
// CauseAdmin are held besides, and never dropped.
|
// whose cause is CauseAdmin or CauseAbuseIPDB are held besides, and
|
||||||
|
// never dropped this way.
|
||||||
MaxBans int
|
MaxBans int
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -63,10 +68,11 @@ type Ban struct {
|
|||||||
Start time.Time
|
Start time.Time
|
||||||
// Expires is when the ban ends, zero for a permanent ban.
|
// Expires is when the ban ends, zero for a permanent ban.
|
||||||
Expires time.Time
|
Expires time.Time
|
||||||
// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack or CauseAdmin.
|
// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack, CauseAdmin or CauseAbuseIPDB.
|
||||||
Cause string
|
Cause string
|
||||||
// Reason is a short text: for a ban sww made, the limit broken or
|
// Reason is a short text: for a ban sww made, the limit broken, the
|
||||||
// the rule that matched; for an admin's, what the admin wrote.
|
// rule that matched or AbuseIPDB's score; for an admin's, what the
|
||||||
|
// admin wrote.
|
||||||
Reason string
|
Reason string
|
||||||
// Lifted is when an admin lifted the ban, zero while no admin has. A
|
// Lifted is when an admin lifted the ban, zero while no admin has. A
|
||||||
// lifted ban refuses nothing, and does not make the netblock's next
|
// lifted ban refuses nothing, and does not make the netblock's next
|
||||||
@@ -127,7 +133,8 @@ type Notes struct {
|
|||||||
// log's reputation names them. It is left out when none did.
|
// log's reputation names them. It is left out when none did.
|
||||||
Reputation []ReputationHit `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
|
Reputation []ReputationHit `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
|
||||||
// Request is the request that broke the limit, or whose bytes broke
|
// Request is the request that broke the limit, or whose bytes broke
|
||||||
// it, or that was the clear sign of attack.
|
// it, or that was the clear sign of attack. A ban for AbuseIPDB's
|
||||||
|
// blacklist has none, and leaves it zero.
|
||||||
Request Request `json:"request"`
|
Request Request `json:"request"`
|
||||||
// Requests is how many requests the netblock has sent since it was
|
// Requests is how many requests the netblock has sent since it was
|
||||||
// first seen, and Refused how many of them the ban has refused so
|
// first seen, and Refused how many of them the ban has refused so
|
||||||
@@ -150,9 +157,10 @@ type ReputationHit struct {
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
// EarlierBans counts a netblock's bans before a ban, by cause.
|
// EarlierBans counts a netblock's bans before a ban, by cause.
|
||||||
type EarlierBans struct {
|
type EarlierBans struct {
|
||||||
Limit int `json:"limit"`
|
Limit int `json:"limit"`
|
||||||
Attack int `json:"attack"`
|
Attack int `json:"attack"`
|
||||||
Admin int `json:"admin"`
|
Admin int `json:"admin"`
|
||||||
|
AbuseIPDB int `json:"abuseipdb"`
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Request is a request in a ban's notes. Each text is cut to 256 bytes.
|
// Request is a request in a ban's notes. Each text is cut to 256 bytes.
|
||||||
@@ -180,8 +188,8 @@ type Ledger struct {
|
|||||||
// netblocks holds each banned netblock's bans, oldest first. Check and
|
// netblocks holds each banned netblock's bans, oldest first. Check and
|
||||||
// Find make each netblock they find the most recently seen.
|
// Find make each netblock they find the most recently seen.
|
||||||
netblocks *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, *[]Ban]
|
netblocks *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, *[]Ban]
|
||||||
// held is how many bans netblocks holds whose cause is not CauseAdmin,
|
// held is how many bans netblocks holds whose cause is CauseLimit or
|
||||||
// at most params.MaxBans.
|
// CauseAttack, at most params.MaxBans.
|
||||||
held int
|
held int
|
||||||
// made is how many bans have been made since the start, by cause: by
|
// made is how many bans have been made since the start, by cause: by
|
||||||
// the ledger, and by an admin, through BanForAdmin or in an edit of
|
// the ledger, and by an admin, through BanForAdmin or in an edit of
|
||||||
@@ -198,8 +206,9 @@ type Ledger struct {
|
|||||||
// New returns a Ledger with no ban yet.
|
// New returns a Ledger with no ban yet.
|
||||||
func New(params Params) *Ledger {
|
func New(params Params) *Ledger {
|
||||||
// The ledger drops bans itself, and never those whose cause is
|
// The ledger drops bans itself, and never those whose cause is
|
||||||
// CauseAdmin, however many there are, so the LRU has no limit of its
|
// CauseAdmin or CauseAbuseIPDB to make room, however many there are, so
|
||||||
// own: it keeps the netblocks in the order they were last seen.
|
// the LRU has no limit of its own: it keeps the netblocks in the order
|
||||||
|
// they were last seen.
|
||||||
netblocks, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, *[]Ban](
|
netblocks, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, *[]Ban](
|
||||||
math.MaxInt,
|
math.MaxInt,
|
||||||
nil,
|
nil,
|
||||||
@@ -429,6 +438,88 @@ func (l *Ledger) BanForAdmin(
|
|||||||
return ban
|
return ban
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// BanForAbuseIPDB bans each netblock in scores at now until expires, and
|
||||||
|
// returns how many bans it made. scores are the netblocks of the clients
|
||||||
|
// on AbuseIPDB's blacklist, each with the highest score of its clients.
|
||||||
|
// A netblock is left as it is while a ban on it is active, or while a ban
|
||||||
|
// for the blacklist that an admin lifted has not reached its end: the
|
||||||
|
// admin's lift holds that long. Each ban whose cause is CauseAbuseIPDB
|
||||||
|
// and that has ended is forgotten first, so that the bans held for the
|
||||||
|
// blacklist are those of the clients listed within one ban's length.
|
||||||
|
func (l *Ledger) BanForAbuseIPDB(
|
||||||
|
now, expires time.Time, scores map[netip.Prefix]int64,
|
||||||
|
) int {
|
||||||
|
l.mu.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer l.mu.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
changed := l.forgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans(now)
|
||||||
|
made := 0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for netblock, score := range scores {
|
||||||
|
netblock = netblock.Masked()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var notes Notes
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if held, found := l.netblocks.Peek(netblock); found {
|
||||||
|
if activeBan(*held, now) != nil ||
|
||||||
|
liftedAbuseIPDBBan(*held, now) {
|
||||||
|
continue
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
notes.EarlierBans = earlierBans(*held)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The source is named as the request log names AbuseIPDB.
|
||||||
|
notes.Reputation = []ReputationHit{
|
||||||
|
{Source: CauseAbuseIPDB, Score: &score},
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
l.add(Ban{
|
||||||
|
Netblock: netblock,
|
||||||
|
Start: now,
|
||||||
|
Expires: expires,
|
||||||
|
Cause: CauseAbuseIPDB,
|
||||||
|
Reason: fmt.Sprintf(
|
||||||
|
"on AbuseIPDB's blacklist with a score of %d", score,
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
Notes: notes,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
made++
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
l.made[CauseAbuseIPDB] += made
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if changed || made > 0 {
|
||||||
|
l.markChanged()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return made
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ForgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans forgets the bans whose cause is CauseAbuseIPDB
|
||||||
|
// and that have ended at now, as BanForAbuseIPDB does first. The state
|
||||||
|
// package calls it each time it reads bans.json, so that these bans are
|
||||||
|
// also forgotten while no fetch of the blacklist reaches the ledger.
|
||||||
|
func (l *Ledger) ForgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans(now time.Time) {
|
||||||
|
l.mu.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer l.mu.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if l.forgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans(now) {
|
||||||
|
l.markChanged()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// liftedAbuseIPDBBan reports whether bans, a netblock's, hold a ban whose
|
||||||
|
// cause is CauseAbuseIPDB that an admin lifted, and whose end is not
|
||||||
|
// reached at now.
|
||||||
|
func liftedAbuseIPDBBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) bool {
|
||||||
|
return slices.ContainsFunc(bans, func(ban Ban) bool {
|
||||||
|
return ban.Cause == CauseAbuseIPDB && !ban.Lifted.IsZero() &&
|
||||||
|
(ban.Permanent() || now.Before(ban.Expires))
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Lift lifts, at now, every ban active then on a netblock client is in,
|
// Lift lifts, at now, every ban active then on a netblock client is in,
|
||||||
// as an admin does, and returns those bans. A lifted ban is kept, refuses
|
// as an admin does, and returns those bans. A lifted ban is kept, refuses
|
||||||
// nothing, and does not make the netblock's next ban longer.
|
// nothing, and does not make the netblock's next ban longer.
|
||||||
@@ -515,9 +606,9 @@ func (l *Ledger) AddLookup(
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Made returns how many bans for cause have been made since the start:
|
// Made returns how many bans for cause have been made since the start:
|
||||||
// for CauseLimit and CauseAttack, by the ledger; for CauseAdmin, by an
|
// for CauseLimit, CauseAttack and CauseAbuseIPDB, by the ledger; for
|
||||||
// admin, with BanForAdmin or in an edit of bans.json, as LoadEdit counts
|
// CauseAdmin, by an admin, with BanForAdmin or in an edit of bans.json, as
|
||||||
// them. The bans read from bans.json at the start are not among them.
|
// LoadEdit counts them. The bans read from bans.json at the start are not among them.
|
||||||
func (l *Ledger) Made(cause string) int {
|
func (l *Ledger) Made(cause string) int {
|
||||||
l.mu.Lock()
|
l.mu.Lock()
|
||||||
defer l.mu.Unlock()
|
defer l.mu.Unlock()
|
||||||
@@ -574,8 +665,8 @@ func (l *Ledger) Snapshot() []Ban {
|
|||||||
// seen. A ban without a cause is an admin's, and gets CauseAdmin. Each
|
// seen. A ban without a cause is an admin's, and gets CauseAdmin. Each
|
||||||
// netblock is masked to its length, so that 203.0.113.9/24 is
|
// netblock is masked to its length, so that 203.0.113.9/24 is
|
||||||
// 203.0.113.0/24, and each text in the notes is cut to 256 bytes. Past
|
// 203.0.113.0/24, and each text in the notes is cut to 256 bytes. Past
|
||||||
// MaxBans the earliest bans whose cause is not CauseAdmin are dropped, as
|
// MaxBans the earliest bans that count toward it are dropped, as when they
|
||||||
// when they are made.
|
// are made.
|
||||||
func (l *Ledger) Load(bans []Ban) {
|
func (l *Ledger) Load(bans []Ban) {
|
||||||
l.mu.Lock()
|
l.mu.Lock()
|
||||||
defer l.mu.Unlock()
|
defer l.mu.Unlock()
|
||||||
@@ -639,6 +730,35 @@ func (l *Ledger) holds(netblock netip.Prefix, start time.Time) bool {
|
|||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// forgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans forgets each ban whose cause is CauseAbuseIPDB
|
||||||
|
// and whose end is reached at now, lifted or not, and each netblock left
|
||||||
|
// without a ban. It reports whether it forgot one.
|
||||||
|
func (l *Ledger) forgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans(now time.Time) bool {
|
||||||
|
forgot := false
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for _, netblock := range l.netblocks.Keys() {
|
||||||
|
bans, _ := l.netblocks.Peek(netblock)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
kept := slices.DeleteFunc(*bans, func(ban Ban) bool {
|
||||||
|
return ban.Cause == CauseAbuseIPDB && !ban.Permanent() &&
|
||||||
|
!now.Before(ban.Expires)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
if len(kept) == len(*bans) {
|
||||||
|
continue
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
forgot = true
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if len(kept) == 0 {
|
||||||
|
l.netblocks.Remove(netblock)
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
*bans = kept
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return forgot
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// ban bans netblock at now for cause, CauseLimit or CauseAttack, with
|
// ban bans netblock at now for cause, CauseLimit or CauseAttack, with
|
||||||
// reason and notes, as BanForLimit and BanForAttack describe, and returns
|
// reason and notes, as BanForLimit and BanForAttack describe, and returns
|
||||||
// the ban, and whether it made it. Unless keep is true, the ban is not
|
// the ban, and whether it made it. Unless keep is true, the ban is not
|
||||||
@@ -714,13 +834,16 @@ func earlierBans(held []Ban) EarlierBans {
|
|||||||
fromHere.Attack++
|
fromHere.Attack++
|
||||||
case CauseAdmin:
|
case CauseAdmin:
|
||||||
fromHere.Admin++
|
fromHere.Admin++
|
||||||
|
case CauseAbuseIPDB:
|
||||||
|
fromHere.AbuseIPDB++
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
notes := ban.Notes.EarlierBans
|
notes := ban.Notes.EarlierBans
|
||||||
count := EarlierBans{
|
count := EarlierBans{
|
||||||
Limit: notes.Limit + fromHere.Limit,
|
Limit: notes.Limit + fromHere.Limit,
|
||||||
Attack: notes.Attack + fromHere.Attack,
|
Attack: notes.Attack + fromHere.Attack,
|
||||||
Admin: notes.Admin + fromHere.Admin,
|
Admin: notes.Admin + fromHere.Admin,
|
||||||
|
AbuseIPDB: notes.AbuseIPDB + fromHere.AbuseIPDB,
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Of counts that name as many bans, the earlier ban's is taken: it
|
// Of counts that name as many bans, the earlier ban's is taken: it
|
||||||
@@ -735,7 +858,7 @@ func earlierBans(held []Ban) EarlierBans {
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
// total returns how many bans e counts, of all causes.
|
// total returns how many bans e counts, of all causes.
|
||||||
func (e EarlierBans) total() int {
|
func (e EarlierBans) total() int {
|
||||||
return e.Limit + e.Attack + e.Admin
|
return e.Limit + e.Attack + e.Admin + e.AbuseIPDB
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// markChanged has Changed receive a value, unless one is waiting already.
|
// markChanged has Changed receive a value, unless one is waiting already.
|
||||||
@@ -806,9 +929,9 @@ func (l *Ledger) covering(client netip.Addr) []*[]Ban {
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
// add adds ban to its netblock's bans, after the last, and makes its
|
// add adds ban to its netblock's bans, after the last, and makes its
|
||||||
// netblock the most recently seen. With MaxBans held, it drops one first,
|
// netblock the most recently seen. With MaxBans held, it drops one first,
|
||||||
// unless ban's cause is CauseAdmin, which does not count toward MaxBans.
|
// unless ban does not count toward MaxBans.
|
||||||
func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
|
func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
|
||||||
counted := ban.Cause != CauseAdmin
|
counted := countsTowardMaxBans(ban)
|
||||||
if counted && l.held == l.params.MaxBans {
|
if counted && l.held == l.params.MaxBans {
|
||||||
l.dropOne()
|
l.dropOne()
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -889,7 +1012,13 @@ func (l *Ledger) attackExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
|
|||||||
return now.Add(l.params.AttackBanDuration)
|
return now.Add(l.params.AttackBanDuration)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// dropOne drops the earliest ban whose cause is not CauseAdmin of the
|
// countsTowardMaxBans reports whether ban counts toward MaxBans: its cause
|
||||||
|
// is CauseLimit or CauseAttack.
|
||||||
|
func countsTowardMaxBans(ban Ban) bool {
|
||||||
|
return ban.Cause == CauseLimit || ban.Cause == CauseAttack
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// dropOne drops the earliest ban that counts toward MaxBans of the
|
||||||
// netblock that has gone longest without a request, of those that hold
|
// netblock that has gone longest without a request, of those that hold
|
||||||
// such a ban, and the netblock with it if that was its only ban. It is
|
// such a ban, and the netblock with it if that was its only ban. It is
|
||||||
// called with at least one such ban held. It looks at each netblock once
|
// called with at least one such ban held. It looks at each netblock once
|
||||||
@@ -898,11 +1027,9 @@ func (l *Ledger) dropOne() {
|
|||||||
for range l.netblocks.Len() {
|
for range l.netblocks.Len() {
|
||||||
netblock, bans, _ := l.netblocks.GetOldest()
|
netblock, bans, _ := l.netblocks.GetOldest()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
i := slices.IndexFunc(*bans, func(ban Ban) bool {
|
i := slices.IndexFunc(*bans, countsTowardMaxBans)
|
||||||
return ban.Cause != CauseAdmin
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
if i < 0 {
|
if i < 0 {
|
||||||
// Its bans are all an admin's, and never dropped. Get makes
|
// None of its bans is dropped to make room. Get makes
|
||||||
// it the most recently seen, so that the next netblock is
|
// it the most recently seen, so that the next netblock is
|
||||||
// looked at; when it was seen matters only for dropping a
|
// looked at; when it was seen matters only for dropping a
|
||||||
// ban, and a ban added to it makes it the most recently seen
|
// ban, and a ban added to it makes it the most recently seen
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -158,6 +158,14 @@ type WAF struct {
|
|||||||
DNSBLAbuseIPDBLimitPercent int64
|
DNSBLAbuseIPDBLimitPercent int64
|
||||||
IPReputationCacheTTL time.Duration
|
IPReputationCacheTTL time.Duration
|
||||||
DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout time.Duration
|
DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout time.Duration
|
||||||
|
// While AbuseIPDBKey is set, AbuseIPDB's blacklist of the clients it
|
||||||
|
// scores AbuseIPDBThreshold or more (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD), from
|
||||||
|
// 25 to 100, is fetched at the start and every AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh
|
||||||
|
// (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS). Each client on it
|
||||||
|
// is banned for AbuseIPDBBanDuration (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS).
|
||||||
|
AbuseIPDBThreshold int64
|
||||||
|
AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh time.Duration
|
||||||
|
AbuseIPDBBanDuration time.Duration
|
||||||
// BanResponse is the status a refused client is answered with, 403
|
// BanResponse is the status a refused client is answered with, 403
|
||||||
// or 429, or 0 to close the connection without an answer
|
// or 429, or 0 to close the connection without an answer
|
||||||
// (SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE). It answers a banned client, a request that
|
// (SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE). It answers a banned client, a request that
|
||||||
@@ -330,6 +338,9 @@ const (
|
|||||||
// netblock a provider is usually given: a shorter one would make one
|
// netblock a provider is usually given: a shorter one would make one
|
||||||
// client of the customers of several providers.
|
// client of the customers of several providers.
|
||||||
minIPv6GroupPrefix = 32
|
minIPv6GroupPrefix = 32
|
||||||
|
// minAbuseIPDBThreshold is the lowest score AbuseIPDB's blacklist can
|
||||||
|
// be cut at.
|
||||||
|
minAbuseIPDBThreshold = 25
|
||||||
// minTokenLength is the fewest characters a token may have.
|
// minTokenLength is the fewest characters a token may have.
|
||||||
minTokenLength = 32
|
minTokenLength = 32
|
||||||
// maxParanoiaLevel is the Core Rule Set's highest paranoia level.
|
// maxParanoiaLevel is the Core Rule Set's highest paranoia level.
|
||||||
@@ -446,6 +457,13 @@ var (
|
|||||||
errNotPercent = errors.New(
|
errNotPercent = errors.New(
|
||||||
"is not a percentage, a whole number from 0 to 100",
|
"is not a percentage, a whole number from 0 to 100",
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
|
errNotAbuseIPDBThreshold = errors.New(
|
||||||
|
"is not a whole number from 25 to 100, the scores AbuseIPDB's " +
|
||||||
|
"blacklist can be cut at",
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
errNotWholeUnits = errors.New(
|
||||||
|
"is not a whole number above zero, such as 30, that fits a duration",
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
errListedTwice = errors.New("is listed twice")
|
errListedTwice = errors.New("is listed twice")
|
||||||
errNotListURL = errors.New(
|
errNotListURL = errors.New(
|
||||||
"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
|
"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
|
||||||
@@ -587,6 +605,20 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
|
|||||||
"SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS",
|
"SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS",
|
||||||
"2000",
|
"2000",
|
||||||
),
|
),
|
||||||
|
AbuseIPDBThreshold: env.abuseIPDBThreshold(
|
||||||
|
"SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD",
|
||||||
|
"90",
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh: env.wholeUnits(
|
||||||
|
"SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS",
|
||||||
|
"60",
|
||||||
|
time.Minute,
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
AbuseIPDBBanDuration: env.wholeUnits(
|
||||||
|
"SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS",
|
||||||
|
"30",
|
||||||
|
day,
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
BanResponse: env.banResponse("SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE", "403"),
|
BanResponse: env.banResponse("SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE", "403"),
|
||||||
LimitBanDuration: env.durationNotOff(
|
LimitBanDuration: env.durationNotOff(
|
||||||
"SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION",
|
"SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION",
|
||||||
@@ -957,6 +989,35 @@ func (e *environment) percent(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
|
|||||||
return percent
|
return percent
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// abuseIPDBThreshold reads the setting that is the least score of the
|
||||||
|
// clients on AbuseIPDB's blacklist: a whole number from 25 to 100, the
|
||||||
|
// range AbuseIPDB takes.
|
||||||
|
func (e *environment) abuseIPDBThreshold(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
|
||||||
|
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
threshold, err := strconv.ParseInt(value, 10, 64)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil || threshold < minAbuseIPDBThreshold || threshold > 100 {
|
||||||
|
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotAbuseIPDBThreshold))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return threshold
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// wholeUnits reads a setting that is a whole number above zero of unit,
|
||||||
|
// such as minutes or days, and returns it as a duration.
|
||||||
|
func (e *environment) wholeUnits(
|
||||||
|
name, defaultValue string, unit time.Duration,
|
||||||
|
) time.Duration {
|
||||||
|
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
n, err := strconv.ParseInt(value, 10, 64)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil || n <= 0 || n > math.MaxInt64/int64(unit) {
|
||||||
|
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotWholeUnits))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return time.Duration(n) * unit
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// listURL reads a setting that is the URL a list is fetched from, "" while
|
// listURL reads a setting that is the URL a list is fetched from, "" while
|
||||||
// it is unset or empty.
|
// it is unset or empty.
|
||||||
func (e *environment) listURL(name string) string {
|
func (e *environment) listURL(name string) string {
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ const (
|
|||||||
abuseIPDBKey = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
|
abuseIPDBKey = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
|
||||||
abuseIPDBMinScore = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE"
|
abuseIPDBMinScore = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE"
|
||||||
abuseIPDBDailyBudget = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET"
|
abuseIPDBDailyBudget = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET"
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDBThreshold = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD"
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS"
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDBBanDays = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS"
|
||||||
dnsblAbuseIPDBAction = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION"
|
dnsblAbuseIPDBAction = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION"
|
||||||
ipReputationCacheTTL = "SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL"
|
ipReputationCacheTTL = "SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL"
|
||||||
dnsblAbuseIPDBTimeout = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS"
|
dnsblAbuseIPDBTimeout = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS"
|
||||||
@@ -2399,6 +2402,75 @@ func TestAbuseIPDBSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestAbuseIPDBBlacklistSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
cfg := wafFromEnvironment(t, environment{})
|
||||||
|
if cfg.AbuseIPDBThreshold != 90 ||
|
||||||
|
cfg.AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh != time.Hour ||
|
||||||
|
cfg.AbuseIPDBBanDuration != 30*24*time.Hour {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf(
|
||||||
|
"by default, the threshold %d, the refresh %s and the ban %s, "+
|
||||||
|
"want 90, 1h and 720h",
|
||||||
|
cfg.AbuseIPDBThreshold,
|
||||||
|
cfg.AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh,
|
||||||
|
cfg.AbuseIPDBBanDuration,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
cfg = wafFromEnvironment(t, environment{
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDBThreshold: "25", abuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh: "1440",
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDBBanDays: "1",
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
if cfg.AbuseIPDBThreshold != 25 ||
|
||||||
|
cfg.AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh != 24*time.Hour ||
|
||||||
|
cfg.AbuseIPDBBanDuration != 24*time.Hour {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf(
|
||||||
|
"set, the threshold %d, the refresh %s and the ban %s, "+
|
||||||
|
"want 25, 24h and 24h",
|
||||||
|
cfg.AbuseIPDBThreshold,
|
||||||
|
cfg.AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh,
|
||||||
|
cfg.AbuseIPDBBanDuration,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestInvalidAbuseIPDBBlacklistSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(
|
||||||
|
t *testing.T,
|
||||||
|
) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const (
|
||||||
|
notThreshold = " is not a whole number from 25 to 100, the scores " +
|
||||||
|
"AbuseIPDB's blacklist can be cut at"
|
||||||
|
notWhole = " is not a whole number above zero, such as 30, that fits " +
|
||||||
|
"a duration"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value, want string }{
|
||||||
|
{abuseIPDBThreshold, "24", `"24"` + notThreshold},
|
||||||
|
{abuseIPDBThreshold, "101", `"101"` + notThreshold},
|
||||||
|
{abuseIPDBThreshold, off, `"off"` + notThreshold},
|
||||||
|
{abuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh, "0", `"0"` + notWhole},
|
||||||
|
{abuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh, "1h", `"1h"` + notWhole},
|
||||||
|
{abuseIPDBBanDays, "-1", `"-1"` + notWhole},
|
||||||
|
{abuseIPDBBanDays, "200000", `"200000"` + notWhole},
|
||||||
|
} {
|
||||||
|
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_, err := config.WAFFromEnvironment(
|
||||||
|
environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper(),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
|
||||||
|
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestInvalidAbuseIPDBSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(
|
func TestInvalidAbuseIPDBSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(
|
||||||
t *testing.T,
|
t *testing.T,
|
||||||
) {
|
) {
|
||||||
@@ -2951,6 +3023,9 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
abuseIPDBKey: "",
|
abuseIPDBKey: "",
|
||||||
abuseIPDBMinScore: "75",
|
abuseIPDBMinScore: "75",
|
||||||
abuseIPDBDailyBudget: "900",
|
abuseIPDBDailyBudget: "900",
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDBThreshold: "90",
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh: "60",
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDBBanDays: "30",
|
||||||
dnsblAbuseIPDBAction: "limit:25",
|
dnsblAbuseIPDBAction: "limit:25",
|
||||||
ipReputationCacheTTL: defaultIPReputationCacheTTL,
|
ipReputationCacheTTL: defaultIPReputationCacheTTL,
|
||||||
dnsblAbuseIPDBTimeout: "2000",
|
dnsblAbuseIPDBTimeout: "2000",
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
|
|||||||
ledger *bans.Ledger, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, now func() time.Time,
|
ledger *bans.Ledger, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, now func() time.Time,
|
||||||
) {
|
) {
|
||||||
for _, cause := range []string{
|
for _, cause := range []string{
|
||||||
bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin,
|
bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin, bans.CauseAbuseIPDB,
|
||||||
} {
|
} {
|
||||||
m.registry.MustRegister(
|
m.registry.MustRegister(
|
||||||
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
|
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
|
|||||||
"net/netip"
|
"net/netip"
|
||||||
"net/url"
|
"net/url"
|
||||||
"slices"
|
"slices"
|
||||||
|
"strconv"
|
||||||
"sync"
|
"sync"
|
||||||
"time"
|
"time"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -23,6 +24,9 @@ const (
|
|||||||
// AbuseIPDBURL is where clients are checked: the check endpoint of
|
// AbuseIPDBURL is where clients are checked: the check endpoint of
|
||||||
// AbuseIPDB's API.
|
// AbuseIPDB's API.
|
||||||
AbuseIPDBURL = "https://api.abuseipdb.com/api/v2/check"
|
AbuseIPDBURL = "https://api.abuseipdb.com/api/v2/check"
|
||||||
|
// AbuseIPDBBlacklistURL is where AbuseIPDB's blacklist is fetched from:
|
||||||
|
// the blacklist endpoint of AbuseIPDB's API.
|
||||||
|
AbuseIPDBBlacklistURL = "https://api.abuseipdb.com/api/v2/blacklist"
|
||||||
// AbuseIPDBSource is how the request log, the alerts and the metrics
|
// AbuseIPDBSource is how the request log, the alerts and the metrics
|
||||||
// name AbuseIPDB.
|
// name AbuseIPDB.
|
||||||
AbuseIPDBSource = "abuseipdb"
|
AbuseIPDBSource = "abuseipdb"
|
||||||
@@ -32,6 +36,8 @@ const (
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
var (
|
var (
|
||||||
errNoScore = errors.New("the answer gives no abuseConfidenceScore")
|
errNoScore = errors.New("the answer gives no abuseConfidenceScore")
|
||||||
|
errNoBlacklist = errors.New("the answer gives no data")
|
||||||
|
errNotAddress = errors.New("is not an address")
|
||||||
errBudgetUsedUp = errors.New(
|
errBudgetUsedUp = errors.New(
|
||||||
"checks spent; none is made until the day ends at 00:00 UTC")
|
"checks spent; none is made until the day ends at 00:00 UTC")
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
@@ -53,6 +59,13 @@ type ChecksSpent struct {
|
|||||||
Spent int
|
Spent int
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// BlacklistEntry is a client on AbuseIPDB's blacklist: its address and its
|
||||||
|
// abuse confidence score.
|
||||||
|
type BlacklistEntry struct {
|
||||||
|
Addr netip.Addr
|
||||||
|
Score int64
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// AbuseIPDBParams are what NewAbuseIPDB needs.
|
// AbuseIPDBParams are what NewAbuseIPDB needs.
|
||||||
type AbuseIPDBParams struct {
|
type AbuseIPDBParams struct {
|
||||||
// URL is where clients are checked, normally AbuseIPDBURL, with Key,
|
// URL is where clients are checked, normally AbuseIPDBURL, with Key,
|
||||||
@@ -69,10 +82,19 @@ type AbuseIPDBParams struct {
|
|||||||
// take (SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS).
|
// take (SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS).
|
||||||
CacheTTL time.Duration
|
CacheTTL time.Duration
|
||||||
Timeout time.Duration
|
Timeout time.Duration
|
||||||
|
// BlacklistURL is where the blacklist is fetched from, normally
|
||||||
|
// AbuseIPDBBlacklistURL, with the clients scored Threshold or more
|
||||||
|
// (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD), every BlacklistRefresh
|
||||||
|
// (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS). Blacklisted
|
||||||
|
// receives the clients on each blacklist fetched.
|
||||||
|
BlacklistURL string
|
||||||
|
Threshold int64
|
||||||
|
BlacklistRefresh time.Duration
|
||||||
|
Blacklisted func([]BlacklistEntry)
|
||||||
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
|
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
|
||||||
Now func() time.Time
|
Now func() time.Time
|
||||||
// ProcessLog receives each check that fails, and why, and the day's
|
// ProcessLog receives each check or fetch of the blacklist that fails,
|
||||||
// budget used up.
|
// and why, and the day's budget used up.
|
||||||
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
|
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
|
||||||
// Alerts receive a source_failure alert for each.
|
// Alerts receive a source_failure alert for each.
|
||||||
Alerts *alerts.Queue
|
Alerts *alerts.Queue
|
||||||
@@ -256,6 +278,40 @@ func (a *AbuseIPDB) LoadChecksSpent(checks ChecksSpent) {
|
|||||||
a.day, a.spent = checks.Day, checks.Spent
|
a.day, a.spent = checks.Day, checks.Spent
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// RunBlacklist fetches AbuseIPDB's blacklist at once, and again every
|
||||||
|
// BlacklistRefresh, until ctx is done, and gives the clients on each copy
|
||||||
|
// fetched to Blacklisted. While Key is unset it does nothing. A fetch that
|
||||||
|
// fails is logged and raised as a source_failure alert, unless it was cut
|
||||||
|
// off as ctx ended.
|
||||||
|
func (a *AbuseIPDB) RunBlacklist(ctx context.Context) {
|
||||||
|
if a.params.Key == "" {
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for {
|
||||||
|
listed, err := a.fetchBlacklist(ctx)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
switch {
|
||||||
|
case ctx.Err() != nil:
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
case err != nil:
|
||||||
|
a.alert("fetching AbuseIPDB's blacklist failed", err)
|
||||||
|
default:
|
||||||
|
a.params.Blacklisted(listed)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
timer := time.NewTimer(a.params.BlacklistRefresh)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
select {
|
||||||
|
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||||
|
timer.Stop()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
case <-timer.C:
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// check checks client with AbuseIPDB by addr, one of its addresses, keeps
|
// check checks client with AbuseIPDB by addr, one of its addresses, keeps
|
||||||
// the score as client's, and notes the check as no longer under way. A
|
// the score as client's, and notes the check as no longer under way. A
|
||||||
// check that fails gives no score: it is counted, logged and raised as a
|
// check that fails gives no score: it is counted, logged and raised as a
|
||||||
@@ -344,6 +400,94 @@ func (a *AbuseIPDB) ask(
|
|||||||
return *answer.Data.AbuseConfidenceScore, nil
|
return *answer.Data.AbuseConfidenceScore, nil
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// fetchBlacklist fetches the clients on AbuseIPDB's blacklist scored
|
||||||
|
// Threshold or more, sending the key in the header Key. An answer other
|
||||||
|
// than 200, one longer than maxListBytes or without the list, an entry
|
||||||
|
// whose address does not read, and none within fetchTimeout, fail.
|
||||||
|
func (a *AbuseIPDB) fetchBlacklist(
|
||||||
|
ctx context.Context,
|
||||||
|
) ([]BlacklistEntry, error) {
|
||||||
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, fetchTimeout)
|
||||||
|
defer cancel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
query := url.Values{
|
||||||
|
"confidenceMinimum": {strconv.FormatInt(a.params.Threshold, 10)},
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet,
|
||||||
|
a.params.BlacklistURL+"?"+query.Encode(), http.NoBody)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
req.Header.Set("Key", a.params.Key)
|
||||||
|
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
res, err := a.httpClient.Do(req)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("fetch the blacklist: %w", errors.Unwrap(err))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
defer func() {
|
||||||
|
_ = res.Body.Close()
|
||||||
|
}()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
|
||||||
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w %s", errStatus, res.Status)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxListBytes+1))
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read the blacklist: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if len(body) > maxListBytes {
|
||||||
|
return nil, errTooLong
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return parseBlacklist(body)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// parseBlacklist reads body, AbuseIPDB's answer with its blacklist.
|
||||||
|
func parseBlacklist(body []byte) ([]BlacklistEntry, error) {
|
||||||
|
var answer struct {
|
||||||
|
Data *[]struct {
|
||||||
|
IPAddress string `json:"ipAddress"`
|
||||||
|
AbuseConfidenceScore int64 `json:"abuseConfidenceScore"`
|
||||||
|
} `json:"data"`
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
err := json.Unmarshal(body, &answer)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read the blacklist: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if answer.Data == nil {
|
||||||
|
return nil, errNoBlacklist
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
listed := make([]BlacklistEntry, 0, len(*answer.Data))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for i, entry := range *answer.Data {
|
||||||
|
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(entry.IPAddress)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil || addr.Zone() != "" {
|
||||||
|
// The error leaves out what the entry holds, as it does a
|
||||||
|
// client's address.
|
||||||
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
|
||||||
|
"entry %d's ipAddress %w",
|
||||||
|
i+1,
|
||||||
|
errNotAddress,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
listed = append(listed, BlacklistEntry{
|
||||||
|
Addr: addr.Unmap(), Score: entry.AbuseConfidenceScore,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return listed, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// alert raises a source_failure alert from AbuseIPDB with reason and err,
|
// alert raises a source_failure alert from AbuseIPDB with reason and err,
|
||||||
// and logs them.
|
// and logs them.
|
||||||
func (a *AbuseIPDB) alert(reason string, err error) {
|
func (a *AbuseIPDB) alert(reason string, err error) {
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
|
|||||||
|
package reputation_test
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import (
|
||||||
|
"context"
|
||||||
|
"fmt"
|
||||||
|
"io"
|
||||||
|
"net/http"
|
||||||
|
"net/netip"
|
||||||
|
"slices"
|
||||||
|
"strings"
|
||||||
|
"sync"
|
||||||
|
"testing"
|
||||||
|
"testing/synctest"
|
||||||
|
"time"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||||
|
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The tests of the blacklist run in synctest bubbles, as those of the
|
||||||
|
// checks do, with AbuseIPDB a stand-in reached without the network.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// blacklistURL is where the tests fetch the blacklist from.
|
||||||
|
const blacklistURL = "https://abuseipdb.example/api/v2/blacklist"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestBlacklistIsFetchedAtOnceAndEveryRefresh(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDB := &blacklistStandIn{body: `{"meta":{},"data":[` +
|
||||||
|
`{"ipAddress":"203.0.113.9","abuseConfidenceScore":100},` +
|
||||||
|
`{"ipAddress":"::ffff:198.51.100.7","abuseConfidenceScore":95},` +
|
||||||
|
`{"ipAddress":"2001:db8::9","abuseConfidenceScore":90}]}`}
|
||||||
|
got := runBlacklist(t, abuseIPDB, key, newQueue())
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
want := []reputation.BlacklistEntry{
|
||||||
|
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"), Score: 100},
|
||||||
|
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr("198.51.100.7"), Score: 95},
|
||||||
|
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr("2001:db8::9"), Score: 90},
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
synctest.Wait()
|
||||||
|
got.want(t, want)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
time.Sleep(time.Hour - time.Nanosecond)
|
||||||
|
synctest.Wait()
|
||||||
|
got.want(t, want)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
|
||||||
|
synctest.Wait()
|
||||||
|
got.want(t, want, want)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Each fetch asks for the clients scored 90 or more, with the key
|
||||||
|
// in the header Key alone.
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDB.mu.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer abuseIPDB.mu.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for _, req := range abuseIPDB.asked {
|
||||||
|
if req.URL.String() != blacklistURL+"?confidenceMinimum=90" ||
|
||||||
|
req.Header.Get("Key") != key {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf(
|
||||||
|
"asked %s with the key %q, want %s?confidenceMinimum=90 "+
|
||||||
|
"with %q",
|
||||||
|
req.URL,
|
||||||
|
req.Header.Get("Key"),
|
||||||
|
blacklistURL,
|
||||||
|
key,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestFailedBlacklistFetchIsAlertedAndTriedAgainAtTheNextRefresh(
|
||||||
|
t *testing.T,
|
||||||
|
) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, body, error string }{
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
"a refusal", "",
|
||||||
|
"the server answered 429 Too Many Requests",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
"an answer without the list", `{"errors":[]}`,
|
||||||
|
"the answer gives no data",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
"an entry that is not an address",
|
||||||
|
`{"data":[{"ipAddress":"203.0.113.9"},{"ipAddress":"example"}]}`,
|
||||||
|
"entry 2's ipAddress is not an address",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
} {
|
||||||
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDB := &blacklistStandIn{body: tc.body}
|
||||||
|
if tc.body == "" {
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDB.status = http.StatusTooManyRequests
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
queue := newQueue()
|
||||||
|
got := runBlacklist(t, abuseIPDB, key, queue)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
synctest.Wait()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
got.want(t)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
alerted := waiting(queue)
|
||||||
|
if len(alerted) != 1 ||
|
||||||
|
alerted[0].Event != alerts.EventSourceFailure ||
|
||||||
|
alerted[0].Reason != "fetching AbuseIPDB's blacklist failed" ||
|
||||||
|
alerted[0].Detail["source"] != reputation.AbuseIPDBSource ||
|
||||||
|
alerted[0].Detail["error"] != tc.error {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf(
|
||||||
|
"alerts %+v, want the failure %q",
|
||||||
|
alerted,
|
||||||
|
tc.error,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDB.answer(`{"data":[]}`)
|
||||||
|
time.Sleep(time.Hour)
|
||||||
|
synctest.Wait()
|
||||||
|
got.want(t, []reputation.BlacklistEntry{})
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestBlacklistIsNotFetchedWithoutAKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDB := &blacklistStandIn{body: `{"data":[]}`}
|
||||||
|
got := runBlacklist(t, abuseIPDB, "", newQueue())
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
time.Sleep(time.Hour)
|
||||||
|
synctest.Wait()
|
||||||
|
got.want(t)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if len(abuseIPDB.asked) != 0 {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("fetched the blacklist %d times, want none",
|
||||||
|
len(abuseIPDB.asked))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// blacklistStandIn is a stand-in for AbuseIPDB that answers each fetch of
|
||||||
|
// the blacklist with status, 200 when it is zero, and body, and keeps the
|
||||||
|
// requests.
|
||||||
|
type blacklistStandIn struct {
|
||||||
|
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||||
|
status int
|
||||||
|
body string
|
||||||
|
asked []*http.Request
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// RoundTrip has the stand-in answer req, in place of the network.
|
||||||
|
func (s *blacklistStandIn) RoundTrip(
|
||||||
|
req *http.Request,
|
||||||
|
) (*http.Response, error) {
|
||||||
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||||
|
s.asked = append(s.asked, req)
|
||||||
|
status, body := s.status, s.body
|
||||||
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if status == 0 {
|
||||||
|
status = http.StatusOK
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return &http.Response{
|
||||||
|
StatusCode: status,
|
||||||
|
Status: fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", status, http.StatusText(status)),
|
||||||
|
Header: http.Header{},
|
||||||
|
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
|
||||||
|
Request: req,
|
||||||
|
}, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// answer has the stand-in answer each fetch with 200 and body.
|
||||||
|
func (s *blacklistStandIn) answer(body string) {
|
||||||
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
s.status, s.body = 0, body
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// blacklisted holds the clients on each blacklist given to Blacklisted.
|
||||||
|
type blacklisted struct {
|
||||||
|
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||||
|
fetched [][]reputation.BlacklistEntry
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// want checks the clients on each blacklist given so far.
|
||||||
|
func (b *blacklisted) want(
|
||||||
|
t *testing.T,
|
||||||
|
want ...[]reputation.BlacklistEntry,
|
||||||
|
) {
|
||||||
|
t.Helper()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
b.mu.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer b.mu.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if !slices.EqualFunc(b.fetched, want, slices.Equal) {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("blacklists %v, want %v", b.fetched, want)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// runBlacklist runs RunBlacklist, until the test ends, with the key
|
||||||
|
// accountKey, the threshold 90 and a refresh of an hour, fetching from
|
||||||
|
// abuseIPDB and raising alerts into queue, and returns what it gives
|
||||||
|
// Blacklisted.
|
||||||
|
func runBlacklist(
|
||||||
|
t *testing.T, abuseIPDB *blacklistStandIn, accountKey string,
|
||||||
|
queue *alerts.Queue,
|
||||||
|
) *blacklisted {
|
||||||
|
t.Helper()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
got := &blacklisted{}
|
||||||
|
p := abuseIPDBParams()
|
||||||
|
p.Key = accountKey
|
||||||
|
p.BlacklistURL = blacklistURL
|
||||||
|
p.Threshold = 90
|
||||||
|
p.BlacklistRefresh = time.Hour
|
||||||
|
p.Alerts = queue
|
||||||
|
p.Blacklisted = func(listed []reputation.BlacklistEntry) {
|
||||||
|
got.mu.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer got.mu.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
got.fetched = append(got.fetched, listed)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
checker := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(p)
|
||||||
|
checker.SetTransport(abuseIPDB)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
|
||||||
|
done := make(chan struct{})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
go func() {
|
||||||
|
checker.RunBlacklist(ctx)
|
||||||
|
close(done)
|
||||||
|
}()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
||||||
|
cancel()
|
||||||
|
<-done
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return got
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
|
|||||||
// SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES about clients, and keeps their verdicts, and checks
|
// SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES about clients, and keeps their verdicts, and checks
|
||||||
// clients with AbuseIPDB, and keeps their scores and the checks spent
|
// clients with AbuseIPDB, and keeps their scores and the checks spent
|
||||||
// today. The state package writes all of these to files and reads them
|
// today. The state package writes all of these to files and reads them
|
||||||
// from there, so that a restart keeps them too.
|
// from there, so that a restart keeps them too. Last, it fetches
|
||||||
|
// AbuseIPDB's blacklist, which it does not keep.
|
||||||
package reputation
|
package reputation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
import (
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -324,7 +324,8 @@ func greet(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
// startRProxy starts rproxy with waf at backend and the app at appURL, and
|
// startRProxy starts rproxy with waf at backend and the app at appURL, and
|
||||||
// the settings in env on top of the defaults. It returns where rproxy listens
|
// the settings in env on top of the defaults. It returns where rproxy listens
|
||||||
// and what it writes.
|
// and what it writes. SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS is a minute unless env
|
||||||
|
// sets it, so that a busy host cannot make rproxy drop a question or a report.
|
||||||
func startRProxy(
|
func startRProxy(
|
||||||
t *testing.T, backend, appURL string, env map[string]string,
|
t *testing.T, backend, appURL string, env map[string]string,
|
||||||
) (string, *output) {
|
) (string, *output) {
|
||||||
@@ -357,6 +358,7 @@ func startServerLogging(
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
settings := map[string]string{
|
settings := map[string]string{
|
||||||
"SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND": backend, "SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
|
"SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND": backend, "SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
|
||||||
|
wafBackendTimeout: "60000",
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
maps.Copy(settings, env)
|
maps.Copy(settings, env)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ var (
|
|||||||
errVersion = errors.New("unknown version")
|
errVersion = errors.New("unknown version")
|
||||||
// errMissing is for an entry without a field it needs.
|
// errMissing is for an entry without a field it needs.
|
||||||
errMissing = errors.New("has no")
|
errMissing = errors.New("has no")
|
||||||
errCause = errors.New("is not limit, attack or admin")
|
errCause = errors.New("is not limit, attack, admin or abuseipdb")
|
||||||
errExpires = errors.New("is not after its start")
|
errExpires = errors.New("is not after its start")
|
||||||
errDestination = errors.New("is not webhook, slack or ntfy")
|
errDestination = errors.New("is not webhook, slack or ntfy")
|
||||||
errScope = errors.New(
|
errScope = errors.New(
|
||||||
@@ -638,6 +638,8 @@ func (f *Files) takeInState(
|
|||||||
f.params.Ledger.Load(held)
|
f.params.Ledger.Load(held)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
f.params.Ledger.ForgetEndedAbuseIPDBBans(f.params.Now())
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
entries = len(held)
|
entries = len(held)
|
||||||
case clientsJSON:
|
case clientsJSON:
|
||||||
var file clientsFile
|
var file clientsFile
|
||||||
@@ -967,7 +969,7 @@ func (e BanEntry) ban() bans.Ban {
|
|||||||
// each expires is read again as written. An expires not after the start
|
// each expires is read again as written. An expires not after the start
|
||||||
// is refused too, since the netblock's next ban for a broken limit, three
|
// is refused too, since the netblock's next ban for a broken limit, three
|
||||||
// times as long as this one, would then refuse nothing; and so is a cause
|
// times as long as this one, would then refuse nothing; and so is a cause
|
||||||
// other than limit, attack or admin, most likely misspelt.
|
// other than limit, attack, admin or abuseipdb, most likely misspelt.
|
||||||
func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
|
func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
|
||||||
var written struct {
|
var written struct {
|
||||||
Bans []struct {
|
Bans []struct {
|
||||||
@@ -991,7 +993,8 @@ func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
|
|||||||
case entry.Expires != nil && !entry.Expires.After(entry.Start):
|
case entry.Expires != nil && !entry.Expires.After(entry.Start):
|
||||||
return fmt.Errorf("entry %d's expires %w", i+1, errExpires)
|
return fmt.Errorf("entry %d's expires %w", i+1, errExpires)
|
||||||
case entry.Cause != "" && entry.Cause != bans.CauseLimit &&
|
case entry.Cause != "" && entry.Cause != bans.CauseLimit &&
|
||||||
entry.Cause != bans.CauseAttack && entry.Cause != bans.CauseAdmin:
|
entry.Cause != bans.CauseAttack && entry.Cause != bans.CauseAdmin &&
|
||||||
|
entry.Cause != bans.CauseAbuseIPDB:
|
||||||
return fmt.Errorf(
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
||||||
"entry %d's cause %q %w",
|
"entry %d's cause %q %w",
|
||||||
i+1,
|
i+1,
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ const permanentBansJSON = `{
|
|||||||
"earlier_bans": {
|
"earlier_bans": {
|
||||||
"limit": 3,
|
"limit": 3,
|
||||||
"attack": 1,
|
"attack": 1,
|
||||||
"admin": 1
|
"admin": 1,
|
||||||
|
"abuseipdb": 0
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -1190,7 +1191,7 @@ func TestBanWithAnotherCauseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
`"expires": "2026-10-06T04:00:00Z", "cause": "limit"}, `+
|
`"expires": "2026-10-06T04:00:00Z", "cause": "limit"}, `+
|
||||||
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.12/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
|
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.12/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
|
||||||
`"expires": null, "cause": "atack"}]}`,
|
`"expires": null, "cause": "atack"}]}`,
|
||||||
`: entry 4's cause "atack" is not limit, attack or admin`)
|
`: entry 4's cause "atack" is not limit, attack, admin or abuseipdb`)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestBanThatDoesNotEndAfterItsStartStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
|
func TestBanThatDoesNotEndAfterItsStartStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
@@ -2090,6 +2091,39 @@ func TestLiftedBanReadAtTheStart(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
wantLiftedBanKept(t, load(t, params), dir, params.Ledger)
|
wantLiftedBanKept(t, load(t, params), dir, params.Ledger)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestEndedAbuseIPDBBanForgottenWhenBansJSONIsReadAtTheStart(
|
||||||
|
t *testing.T,
|
||||||
|
) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ended := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
|
||||||
|
lasting := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
|
||||||
|
limited := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.11/32")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// At midnight, the start's time, the first ban has ended and the second
|
||||||
|
// lasts. The third has ended too, but is for a limit.
|
||||||
|
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||||
|
edit(t, dir, bansJSON, `{"version": 1, "bans": [`+
|
||||||
|
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.9/32", "start": "2026-09-06T00:00:00Z", `+
|
||||||
|
`"expires": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", "cause": "abuseipdb"}, `+
|
||||||
|
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.10/32", "start": "2026-09-07T00:00:00Z", `+
|
||||||
|
`"expires": "2026-10-07T00:00:00Z", "cause": "abuseipdb"}, `+
|
||||||
|
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.11/32", "start": "2026-10-05T00:00:00Z", `+
|
||||||
|
`"expires": "2026-10-05T01:00:00Z", "cause": "limit"}]}`)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
params := newParams(dir)
|
||||||
|
load(t, params)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for netblock, want := range map[netip.Prefix]int{
|
||||||
|
ended: 0, lasting: 1, limited: 1,
|
||||||
|
} {
|
||||||
|
if got := len(params.Ledger.Bans(netblock)); got != want {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %d bans on %s, want %d",
|
||||||
|
got, netblock, want)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestBanLiftedByAnEditWhileRunning(t *testing.T) {
|
func TestBanLiftedByAnEditWhileRunning(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -552,7 +552,9 @@ func TestAStatusWAFDoesNotTakeIsReportedAs599(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
// startRProxyProcess runs `sww rproxy` in a process of its own, with the
|
// startRProxyProcess runs `sww rproxy` in a process of its own, with the
|
||||||
// settings in env, each as NAME=value. It returns where rproxy listens and a
|
// settings in env, each as NAME=value. It returns where rproxy listens and a
|
||||||
// function that sends rproxy SIGTERM and fails the test unless it exits with
|
// function that sends rproxy SIGTERM and fails the test unless it exits with
|
||||||
// status 0 within waitLimit.
|
// status 0 within waitLimit. It waits a minute for waf's answers unless env
|
||||||
|
// sets SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS, so that a busy host cannot make it
|
||||||
|
// drop a question.
|
||||||
func startRProxyProcess(t *testing.T, env ...string) (string, func()) {
|
func startRProxyProcess(t *testing.T, env ...string) (string, func()) {
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
t.Helper()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -568,7 +570,8 @@ func startRProxyProcess(t *testing.T, env ...string) (string, func()) {
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
|
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
|
||||||
commandForMain+"=rproxy",
|
commandForMain+"=rproxy",
|
||||||
"SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR="+localhost+":0")
|
"SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR="+localhost+":0",
|
||||||
|
wafBackendTimeout+"=60000")
|
||||||
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, env...)
|
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, env...)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
exited := startProcess(t, cmd)
|
exited := startProcess(t, cmd)
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+27
-12
@@ -288,21 +288,36 @@ func newDNSBL(
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// newAbuseIPDB returns what checks clients with AbuseIPDB while
|
// newAbuseIPDB returns what checks clients with AbuseIPDB while
|
||||||
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, none checked yet.
|
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, none checked yet. Until waf stops, it
|
||||||
|
// fetches AbuseIPDB's blacklist as it is due, and bans the clients on it in
|
||||||
|
// ledger, as waf.BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist says.
|
||||||
func newAbuseIPDB(
|
func newAbuseIPDB(
|
||||||
cfg *config.WAF, processLog *slog.Logger, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
|
lc fx.Lifecycle, cfg *config.WAF, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||||
|
alertQueue *alerts.Queue, ledger *bans.Ledger,
|
||||||
) *reputation.AbuseIPDB {
|
) *reputation.AbuseIPDB {
|
||||||
return reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
|
abuseIPDB := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
|
||||||
URL: reputation.AbuseIPDBURL,
|
URL: reputation.AbuseIPDBURL,
|
||||||
Key: cfg.AbuseIPDBKey,
|
Key: cfg.AbuseIPDBKey,
|
||||||
MinScore: cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
|
MinScore: cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
|
||||||
DailyBudget: cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget,
|
DailyBudget: cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget,
|
||||||
CacheTTL: cfg.IPReputationCacheTTL,
|
CacheTTL: cfg.IPReputationCacheTTL,
|
||||||
Timeout: cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout,
|
Timeout: cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout,
|
||||||
Now: utcNow,
|
BlacklistURL: reputation.AbuseIPDBBlacklistURL,
|
||||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
Threshold: cfg.AbuseIPDBThreshold,
|
||||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
BlacklistRefresh: cfg.AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh,
|
||||||
|
Blacklisted: func(listed []reputation.BlacklistEntry) {
|
||||||
|
waf.BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist(
|
||||||
|
cfg, ledger, processLog, utcNow(), listed,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
Now: utcNow,
|
||||||
|
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||||
|
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
lc.Append(background(abuseIPDB.RunBlacklist))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return abuseIPDB
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// newRouteWatch returns what asks routewatch about clients, or nil while
|
// newRouteWatch returns what asks routewatch about clients, or nil while
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ func TestMainRunsWAF(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), binary)
|
cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), binary)
|
||||||
cmd.Stdout = out
|
cmd.Stdout = out
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The Core Rule Set is off. Main keeps waf's own limit for its checks,
|
||||||
|
// and on a busy host the Core Rule Set's inspection can pass it.
|
||||||
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
|
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
|
||||||
"TZ="+zone,
|
"TZ="+zone,
|
||||||
commandForMain+"="+wafCommand,
|
commandForMain+"="+wafCommand,
|
||||||
@@ -97,7 +99,8 @@ func TestMainRunsWAF(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
stateDir+"="+dir,
|
stateDir+"="+dir,
|
||||||
cacheDir+"="+dir,
|
cacheDir+"="+dir,
|
||||||
ruleFilesDir+"="+t.TempDir(),
|
ruleFilesDir+"="+t.TempDir(),
|
||||||
lookupSource+"=off")
|
lookupSource+"=off",
|
||||||
|
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE=off")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
exited := startProcess(t, cmd)
|
exited := startProcess(t, cmd)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
|
|||||||
|
package waf
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The bans for AbuseIPDB's blacklist. They read SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS and
|
||||||
|
// SWW_WAF_MODE; the blacklist is fetched by the reputation package.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import (
|
||||||
|
"log/slog"
|
||||||
|
"net/netip"
|
||||||
|
"time"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||||
|
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
|
||||||
|
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist bans in ledger the netblock of each client on
|
||||||
|
// AbuseIPDB's blacklist, listed, for SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS from now, as
|
||||||
|
// the ledger's BanForAbuseIPDB describes. It logs to processLog how many
|
||||||
|
// clients were listed and how many bans were made. Clients in one netblock
|
||||||
|
// make one ban, with the highest of their scores. In observe mode it makes
|
||||||
|
// no ban.
|
||||||
|
func BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist(
|
||||||
|
cfg *config.WAF, ledger *bans.Ledger, processLog *slog.Logger,
|
||||||
|
now time.Time, listed []reputation.BlacklistEntry,
|
||||||
|
) {
|
||||||
|
scores := make(map[netip.Prefix]int64, len(listed))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for _, client := range listed {
|
||||||
|
netblock := banNetblock(cfg, client.Addr)
|
||||||
|
scores[netblock] = max(scores[netblock], client.Score)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
made := 0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if !cfg.Observe {
|
||||||
|
made = ledger.BanForAbuseIPDB(
|
||||||
|
now, now.Add(cfg.AbuseIPDBBanDuration), scores,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
processLog.Info(
|
||||||
|
"fetched AbuseIPDB's blacklist",
|
||||||
|
"clients", len(listed),
|
||||||
|
"bans_made", made,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
|
|||||||
|
package waf_test
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import (
|
||||||
|
"context"
|
||||||
|
"net/http"
|
||||||
|
"net/netip"
|
||||||
|
"testing"
|
||||||
|
"time"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
|
||||||
|
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||||
|
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// abuseIPDBBanDays is the setting of how long a ban for AbuseIPDB's
|
||||||
|
// blacklist lasts, in days.
|
||||||
|
const abuseIPDBBanDays = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestClientOnTheFetchedAbuseIPDBBlacklistIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
|
||||||
|
stopped := make(chan struct{})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
go func() {
|
||||||
|
server.AbuseIPDB.RunBlacklist(ctx)
|
||||||
|
close(stopped)
|
||||||
|
}()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
||||||
|
cancel()
|
||||||
|
<-stopped
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
waitUntil(func() bool {
|
||||||
|
active, _ := server.Ledger.Count(clk.Now())
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return active == 1
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
|
||||||
|
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestClientsOnTheAbuseIPDBBlacklistAreBannedForTheBanDays(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
|
||||||
|
abuseIPDBBanDays: "2", banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Two clients in one netblock make one ban, with the higher score.
|
||||||
|
server.BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist([]reputation.BlacklistEntry{
|
||||||
|
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr(client), Score: 95},
|
||||||
|
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr(otherClient), Score: 100},
|
||||||
|
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr("2001:db8:5::1"), Score: 90},
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(clientsNet))
|
||||||
|
if len(held) != 1 || held[0].Cause != bans.CauseAbuseIPDB ||
|
||||||
|
*held[0].Notes.Reputation[0].Score != 100 {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("bans on %s %+v, want one for the blacklist, with 100",
|
||||||
|
clientsNet, held)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Every client of a banned netblock is refused, the IPv6 address's /64
|
||||||
|
// included.
|
||||||
|
for _, from := range []string{"203.0.113.200", "2001:db8:5::ffff:1"} {
|
||||||
|
s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
s.get("2001:db8:5:1::1", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
clk.advance(2 * 24 * time.Hour)
|
||||||
|
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestAbuseIPDBBlacklistMakesNoBanInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
s, clk, server := startWithClock(
|
||||||
|
t,
|
||||||
|
"",
|
||||||
|
map[string]string{mode: "observe"},
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
server.BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist([]reputation.BlacklistEntry{
|
||||||
|
{Addr: netip.MustParseAddr(client), Score: 100},
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if active, _ := server.Ledger.Count(clk.Now()); active != 0 {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("%d bans active, want none", active)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -1,4 +1,13 @@
|
|||||||
package waf
|
package waf
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// BesideLookupTimeLimit is besideLookupTimeLimit.
|
// BesideLookupTimeLimit is besideLookupTimeLimit.
|
||||||
const BesideLookupTimeLimit = besideLookupTimeLimit
|
const BesideLookupTimeLimit = besideLookupTimeLimit
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist does on s what a fetch of AbuseIPDB's blacklist with
|
||||||
|
// the clients on listed does.
|
||||||
|
func (s *Server) BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist(listed []reputation.BlacklistEntry) {
|
||||||
|
h := s.Handler.(*handler) //nolint:forcetypeassert // New makes it one
|
||||||
|
BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist(h.config, h.ledger, h.processLog, h.now(), listed)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
|||||||
// Package waf is the server the waf command runs. It answers
|
// Package waf is the server the waf command runs. It answers
|
||||||
// rproxy's questions, takes rproxy's reports and answers its own endpoints, and
|
// rproxy's questions, takes rproxy's reports and answers its own endpoints, and
|
||||||
// writes a log line for each.
|
// writes a log line for each. It also bans the clients on AbuseIPDB's
|
||||||
|
// blacklist each time the reputation package fetches it.
|
||||||
package waf
|
package waf
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
import (
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+22
-12
@@ -431,7 +431,8 @@ func startRProxy(
|
|||||||
// With no geojsURL, there is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and
|
// With no geojsURL, there is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and
|
||||||
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup
|
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup
|
||||||
// database SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
|
// database SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
|
||||||
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY.
|
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY, and its blacklist is
|
||||||
|
// fetched from abuseIPDBBlacklistURL.
|
||||||
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off unless env sets it, so that only the tests of the
|
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off unless env sets it, so that only the tests of the
|
||||||
// Core Rule Set have their requests inspected by it.
|
// Core Rule Set have their requests inspected by it.
|
||||||
func newWAF(
|
func newWAF(
|
||||||
@@ -575,8 +576,9 @@ func addCounters(params *waf.Params) {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// addOutsideSources adds to params the lists fetched from URLs, the DNSBL
|
// addOutsideSources adds to params the lists fetched from URLs, the DNSBL
|
||||||
// zones' verdicts, AbuseIPDB's scores from abuseIPDBCheckURL, routewatch's
|
// zones' verdicts, AbuseIPDB's scores from abuseIPDBCheckURL and its
|
||||||
// answers while its setting is set, and GeoJS at geojsURL, as sww builds
|
// blacklist from abuseIPDBBlacklistURL, routewatch's answers while its
|
||||||
|
// setting is set, and GeoJS at geojsURL, as sww builds
|
||||||
// them from params' settings and the parts addCounters added. The metrics
|
// them from params' settings and the parts addCounters added. The metrics
|
||||||
// read the lists, the zones' verdicts, and AbuseIPDB's while its key is set.
|
// read the lists, the zones' verdicts, and AbuseIPDB's while its key is set.
|
||||||
func addOutsideSources(
|
func addOutsideSources(
|
||||||
@@ -605,15 +607,23 @@ func addOutsideSources(
|
|||||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
params.AbuseIPDB = reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
|
params.AbuseIPDB = reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
|
||||||
URL: abuseIPDBCheckURL,
|
URL: abuseIPDBCheckURL,
|
||||||
Key: cfg.AbuseIPDBKey,
|
Key: cfg.AbuseIPDBKey,
|
||||||
MinScore: cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
|
MinScore: cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
|
||||||
DailyBudget: cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget,
|
DailyBudget: cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget,
|
||||||
CacheTTL: cfg.IPReputationCacheTTL,
|
CacheTTL: cfg.IPReputationCacheTTL,
|
||||||
Timeout: cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout,
|
Timeout: cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout,
|
||||||
Now: params.Now,
|
BlacklistURL: abuseIPDBBlacklistURL,
|
||||||
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
Threshold: cfg.AbuseIPDBThreshold,
|
||||||
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
BlacklistRefresh: cfg.AbuseIPDBBlacklistRefresh,
|
||||||
|
Blacklisted: func(listed []reputation.BlacklistEntry) {
|
||||||
|
waf.BanAbuseIPDBBlacklist(
|
||||||
|
cfg, ledger, processLog, params.Now(), listed,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
Now: params.Now,
|
||||||
|
ProcessLog: processLog,
|
||||||
|
Alerts: alertQueue,
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if cfg.RouteWatchURL != "" {
|
if cfg.RouteWatchURL != "" {
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -822,22 +822,39 @@ const abuseipdb = reputation.AbuseIPDBSource
|
|||||||
// through which AbuseIPDB is asked.
|
// through which AbuseIPDB is asked.
|
||||||
const abuseIPDBURL = "abuseipdb://stand-in/api/v2/check"
|
const abuseIPDBURL = "abuseipdb://stand-in/api/v2/check"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// abuseIPDBBlacklistURL is where newWAF has AbuseIPDB's blacklist fetched
|
||||||
|
// from: at abuseIPDBStandIn too.
|
||||||
|
const abuseIPDBBlacklistURL = "abuseipdb://stand-in/api/v2/blacklist"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// abuseIPDBStandIn is a stand-in for AbuseIPDB that gives every client the
|
// abuseIPDBStandIn is a stand-in for AbuseIPDB that gives every client the
|
||||||
// score 100, at once and without the network.
|
// score 100, at once and without the network. Its blacklist lists client
|
||||||
|
// alone, with the score 100, to a fetch with accountKey that asks for the
|
||||||
|
// clients scored 90 or more, the default threshold; it refuses any other
|
||||||
|
// fetch of it with 400.
|
||||||
type abuseIPDBStandIn struct{}
|
type abuseIPDBStandIn struct{}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// RoundTrip answers req with the score 100.
|
// RoundTrip answers req with the score 100, or with the blacklist.
|
||||||
func (abuseIPDBStandIn) RoundTrip(
|
func (abuseIPDBStandIn) RoundTrip(
|
||||||
req *http.Request,
|
req *http.Request,
|
||||||
) (*http.Response, error) {
|
) (*http.Response, error) {
|
||||||
|
status, body := http.StatusOK, `{"data":{"abuseConfidenceScore":100}}`
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if req.URL.Path == "/api/v2/blacklist" {
|
||||||
|
body = `{"data":[{"ipAddress":"` + client +
|
||||||
|
`","abuseConfidenceScore":100}]}`
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if req.Header.Get("Key") != accountKey ||
|
||||||
|
req.URL.RawQuery != "confidenceMinimum=90" {
|
||||||
|
status, body = http.StatusBadRequest, `{"errors":[]}`
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return &http.Response{
|
return &http.Response{
|
||||||
StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
|
StatusCode: status,
|
||||||
Status: "200 OK",
|
Status: fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", status, http.StatusText(status)),
|
||||||
Header: http.Header{},
|
Header: http.Header{},
|
||||||
Body: io.NopCloser(
|
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
|
||||||
strings.NewReader(`{"data":{"abuseConfidenceScore":100}}`),
|
Request: req,
|
||||||
),
|
|
||||||
Request: req,
|
|
||||||
}, nil
|
}, nil
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user