sneak/smallwebwaf
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues 12 Pull Requests 3 Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Compare commits

base: sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-198-crs-exclusions
Branches Tags
sneak/smallwebwaf:main sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-198-crs-exclusions sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-195-heuristic-modules sneak/smallwebwaf:next sneak/smallwebwaf:readme-rewrite-155
sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc2 sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc1
..
compare: sneak/smallwebwaf:ed6ba53747e7866764426570a3a6cb7dcb30aeab
Branches Tags
sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-198-crs-exclusions sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-195-heuristic-modules sneak/smallwebwaf:main sneak/smallwebwaf:next sneak/smallwebwaf:readme-rewrite-155
sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc2 sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc1
1 Commits
issue-198-crs-exclusions .. ed6ba53747
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak ed6ba53747 servewaf answers rproxy's question about each request and takes its report (closes #170)
check / check (push) Successful in 4m27s
Details 
`smallwebwaf servewaf` runs today's checks on the visitor's request a
question carries and answers allow, deny or close, instead of passing it
to an app. rproxy's report then counts the bytes toward the byte limits
and adds the request to the client's history. SPEC.md gives the exact
question, answer and report, which rproxy follows. `smallwebwaf` with no
command is unchanged.

Judgement call: a third disposition, close, since closing the question's
connection would read as servewaf down and let the request through.
Judgement call: allow can answer a new request id, since a visitor behind
a trusted proxy can choose its own.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-11-04 19:41:12 +00:00
98 changed files with 7043 additions and 14046 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
Dockerfile
+30 -10
View File
@@ -117,9 +117,8 @@ RUN git checkout --quiet --detach b4b2c785308b1ce785b6155c7fe5f16879080193 \
&& CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /usr/local/bin/runsvinit .
# The image, described under "Deployment" in SPEC.md. It runs rproxy unless
# SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND says servewaf, and an app's Dockerfile can build FROM it.
# It is the last stage, so a plain `docker build .` builds it.
# The image an app's Dockerfile builds FROM, described under "Deployment"
# in SPEC.md. It is the last stage, so a plain `docker build .` builds it.
#
# ubuntu 26.04, 2026-09-27
FROM ubuntu@sha256:f144425ff09be612d6d9ad965196e9cdc23dae1f42110a8a11a3e9a8198759f7
@@ -133,11 +132,32 @@ RUN mkdir /etc/sysusers.d \
&& echo 'u _runit-log - "runit svlogd user" /nonexistent /sbin/nologin' \
> /etc/sysusers.d/runit.conf
# ca-certificates, nix-bin and runit, from Ubuntu's archive. apt fetches
# them over plain HTTP and checks each one against the archive's signed
# package lists, so no CA certificates are needed.
RUN apt-get update \
# ca-certificates, nix-bin and runit, from Ubuntu's archive as it was at
# the snapshot moment, which is never earlier than the Ubuntu image above.
# apt checks every package against the snapshot's InRelease files, and
# this step checks those against the hashes named here, which are those
# of the amd64 archive: other architectures use Ubuntu's ports archive.
# apt also fetches the live archive's InRelease files, which change daily
# and which the install does not use. The snapshot service is HTTPS only
# and this image has no CA certificates yet, so this step uses the Go
# image's. The snapshot service answers 503 at times; apt retries a
# failed download, waiting twice as long before each retry, and this
# step gives it five retries, about half a minute in all, where its
# default of three gives up after seven seconds.
RUN --mount=type=bind,from=builder,source=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt,target=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
apt-get update --snapshot 20261001T000000Z \
-o Acquire::https::CaInfo=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
-o Acquire::Retries=5 \
&& printf '%s\n' \
'45f95ce276cdba3e41870516a130e03c58b8b7a79e9546b0efe9e526d255740c snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute_InRelease' \
'802e675dd9de4c7f3916434a95e7c1d8eec0e82886622d7805ab19a2c6fe0365 snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-updates_InRelease' \
'64b3353f0bd4970b4f7271962245bcea9ff24d4cc7bea16b433f8a60e42ca3dd snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-backports_InRelease' \
'1d5041572116a8b23aabf79ac7439ad8af83d57ad3fb0f9aa0d4523ec10c5908 snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-security_InRelease' \
| (cd /var/lib/apt/lists && sha256sum --check --strict) \
&& DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install --yes --no-install-recommends \
--snapshot 20261001T000000Z \
-o Acquire::https::CaInfo=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
-o Acquire::Retries=5 \
ca-certificates nix-bin runit \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
@@ -177,11 +197,11 @@ RUN groupadd --system --gid 65532 smallwebwaf \
# The state files' directory, SWWAF_STATE_DIR by default, where a volume
# is mounted to keep them across deploys. The run script gives it to the
# smallwebwaf user at each start of servewaf.
# smallwebwaf user at each start.
RUN mkdir /var/lib/smallwebwaf
# The default rule file, in SWWAF_RULES_DIR by default, where a Dockerfile
# built FROM this image can copy rule files of its own beside it.
# The default rule file, in SWWAF_RULES_DIR by default, where an app's
# Dockerfile can copy rule files of its own beside it.
COPY share/rules.d/00-default.rules /etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/00-default.rules
# runsvinit starts runit's runsvdir on /etc/service, where Ubuntu's sv
Makefile
+2 -6
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
.PHONY: bootstrap setup test lint fmt fmt-check tidy check docker hooks build \
run example-app gitea-requests gitea-setup
run example-app gitea-requests
# Makefile targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
# per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
# of README.md). tidy writes go.mod and go.sum as `go mod tidy` does,
# which test checks. build and run are for working on the code by hand;
# example-app checks the image with an app built on it; gitea-requests
# reports the gitea requests the Core Rule Set refuses at the defaults;
# gitea-setup checks the setup in deploy/gitea.
# reports the gitea requests the Core Rule Set refuses at the defaults.
bootstrap:
@script/bootstrap
@@ -50,6 +49,3 @@ example-app:
gitea-requests:
@script/gitea-requests
gitea-setup:
@script/gitea-setup
README.md
+222 -657
View File
@@ -1,48 +1,42 @@
# smallwebwaf
`smallwebwaf` is an MIT-licensed web application firewall, written in Go by
[@sneak](https://sneak.berlin), for self-hosted web apps. It refuses the
requests of scrapers, scanners and other abusers before they reach an app.
## What it does
[@sneak](https://sneak.berlin), for one self-hosted web app. It runs inside the
app's own container, in front of the app. It refuses the requests of scrapers,
scanners and other abusers before they reach the app.
A web application firewall reads each request on its way to a web app and
refuses the ones that look like abuse. `smallwebwaf` is one binary, shipped in
one image, with two commands that do this together:
refuses the ones that look like abuse. `smallwebwaf` is also a reverse proxy: it
accepts requests on the app's behalf, passes them to the app, and passes the
app's answers back.
- `smallwebwaf rproxy` is a small reverse proxy in front of one app. traefik
routes to it. It asks `servewaf` about each request, passes the allowed ones
to the app, and passes the app's answers back. It keeps nothing and never
touches disk.
- `smallwebwaf servewaf` decides. It runs the checks and keeps the bans, the
counters and each client's history. One `servewaf` serves many sites: a client
banned through one site is refused on all of them, and its requests on all of
them count toward one set of limits.
It needs no setting. Every setting has a default chosen for a service on the
open internet. [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) says how `smallwebwaf` behaves and why. The
reference documents under [`docs/`](docs/) are listed under "Documents" below.
The site keeps answering while `servewaf` is down, slow or restarting: without
an answer in time, `rproxy` passes the request to the app.
## What it protects against
It protects against:
- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Each client gets a limit on
requests and on bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults leave
room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that keeps up
one request every 2 seconds. A client over a limit is refused and banned: for
a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently when
it keeps at it.
- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Rate limiting gives each
client 6000 requests a minute, 100,000 an hour and 1,000,000 a day. Byte
limits give it 4 GiB a minute, 20 GiB an hour and 200 GiB a day. A client over
a limit is refused and banned. The first ban lasts an hour. Each repeat within
a day makes the next ban three times as long. A ban that would last more than
seven days is permanent.
- Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The
default rule file bans such a client at its first probe, and its next request
during the ban makes the ban permanent. Your own rules, or a list of trap
paths, ban probes for other apps, such as a WordPress login, the same way.
default rule file bans such a client for seven days at its first probe. Its
next request during the ban makes the ban permanent. The default rule file
does not cover probes for other apps, such as a WordPress login. A `ban` rule
of your own, or an entry in `SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS`, bans those the same way.
- Attacks carried in a request's URL or headers, such as SQL injection and path
traversal. The OWASP Core Rule Set, a published set of rules that recognise
common web attacks, runs on every request through Coraza, a Go engine. A
request the rules take for an attack is refused.
traversal. The OWASP Core Rule Set is a published set of rules that recognise
common web attacks. Coraza, a Go engine, runs those rules (see "Attack
detection" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)). A request the rules take for an attack is
refused.
- Abuse from networks and countries you do not want. You can:
- refuse whole netblocks and countries;
- give the clients of chosen networks and countries a fraction of every
limit, so that they are banned sooner;
- refuse or limit clients on a blocklist, a DNS blocklist, or with a high
- refuse or limit clients on a blocklist or a DNS blocklist, or with a high
AbuseIPDB score;
- ban clients named by your own CrowdSec engine.
- Slow and oversized requests. Every request and every answer has a time limit
@@ -50,26 +44,29 @@ It protects against:
For the operator, it:
- logs each request as JSON lines, saying what it did and why;
- sends alerts to a webhook, Slack or ntfy;
- serves Prometheus metrics;
- writes one JSON log line for every request, saying what it did and why (see
[`docs/request-log.md`](docs/request-log.md));
- sends alerts to a webhook, Slack or ntfy (see
[`docs/alerts.md`](docs/alerts.md));
- serves Prometheus metrics (see [`docs/metrics.md`](docs/metrics.md));
- keeps its bans, counters and history in JSON files you can read and edit, so
that a restart loses nothing and a ban can be lifted with an editor.
that a restart loses nothing and a ban can be lifted with an editor (see
[`docs/state-files.md`](docs/state-files.md)).
Not built, and not planned:
- TLS and routing by host name. Both stay with traefik, the reverse proxy in
front of `rproxy`.
- TLS and routing for several apps. Both stay with traefik, the reverse proxy in
front of the container.
- Browser challenges such as captchas.
- A web console, or a configuration file.
- A web console.
- Defence against floods large enough to fill the host's network link.
## Getting started
### The image
No image is published. Build it from a clone. `make docker` runs the tests and
the linter, then builds the image, tagged `smallwebwaf`.
Build the image from a clone. `make docker` runs the tests and the linter, then
builds the image, tagged `smallwebwaf`. It builds for amd64, on an amd64 host
only: the `Dockerfile` checks Ubuntu's package lists against the hashes of the
amd64 archive.
```sh
git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf.git
@@ -77,44 +74,14 @@ cd smallwebwaf
make docker
```
Push the image to a registry your hosts pull from, and name it there by digest.
The image runs `rproxy` by default. To run `servewaf` from the same image, set
the container's `SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND` to `servewaf`. The image's health check
follows the command: in `rproxy`'s container it passes once `rproxy` answers and
the app accepts connections, whether or not `servewaf` answers; in `servewaf`'s
container, once `servewaf` answers.
### The usual setup: three containers
The usual setup is three containers on one private network:
- the app;
- `rproxy`, in front of the app, which traefik routes to: `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND`
names `servewaf` and `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` names the app;
- `servewaf`, with `SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf` and a volume at
`/var/lib/smallwebwaf` for its state files.
Point traefik's labels at port 8080 of `rproxy`
(`traefik.http.services.<name>.loadbalancer.server.port=8080`). Publish no port
of the app or of `servewaf`. Anything on that network can reach the app around
`rproxy`, and can ask `servewaf` questions, so the network holds only what you
trust. Each further app adds its own container and its own `rproxy`, whose
`SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` names the same `servewaf`. The "Smallest setup" and "In front
of gitea" examples below show this shape.
### `rproxy` in the app's container
An app's image can instead be built on the `smallwebwaf` image, so that `rproxy`
runs beside the app in one container. `servewaf` still runs in a container of
its own. The app's `Dockerfile` starts `FROM` the `smallwebwaf` image, named by
digest, and adds:
Push the image to a registry your hosts pull from. Then build the app's own
image on it. The app's `Dockerfile` starts `FROM` the `smallwebwaf` image, named
by digest, and adds:
- the app's binary;
- the packages the app needs, from the nixpkgs in the image;
- a user for the app;
- a `run` script that starts the app listening on `127.0.0.1:8081`, the default
of `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`.
- a `run` script that starts the app listening on `127.0.0.1:8081`.
```dockerfile
# The smallwebwaf image, pinned by digest.
@@ -149,572 +116,117 @@ main "$@"
```
Leave `ENTRYPOINT` and `USER` out of the app's `Dockerfile`. The image's own
entrypoint starts `rproxy` and the app side by side, each as its own user. Run
the app's image with `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` set. `deploy/example-app` is such an
app, and the "`rproxy` beside the app" example below runs one.
entrypoint starts `smallwebwaf` and the app side by side, each as its own user.
The app sees the headers traefik sent, with traefik's address added to
`X-Forwarded-For`, from a TCP peer that is `rproxy`. So the app must trust
`rproxy`'s address for forwarded headers. In a container of its own, `rproxy` is
on the private network, which the usual default of a trusted-proxy setting
covers. Beside the app, its address is `127.0.0.1` or `::1`, which the private
ranges leave out, so the app's own setting must name them too, as `app.run`
does.
### Checking that it works
- `docker inspect --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' <container>` says
`healthy` for each container of `smallwebwaf`.
- A log line with `"msg":"starting"` gives the version, the address and every
setting in effect, with secrets masked.
- A request to the site through traefik gets the app's answer.
`https://<site>/_smallwebwaf/healthz` answers `ok`. `servewaf`'s log lines
about the request have `"action":"forward"`.
- To see a refusal without banning yourself, run `servewaf` with
`SWWAF_MODE=observe` and ask for `/.env`. The request reaches the app.
`servewaf`'s log lines have `"would_action":"banned"` and
`"rule_ids":["env-file"]`. A ban you get in `enforce` mode is lifted as
"Clients and bans" below describes.
- With `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` set, this answers with the metrics, from a host on
`servewaf`'s network:
`curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://servewaf:8080/_smallwebwaf/metrics`.
- `make example-app` builds the image and an app on it, runs them, and checks
the whole exchange (see "Entrypoints").
## Configuration
Every setting is an environment variable, read once at start; changing one means
restarting the container. `rproxy` reads only the `SWRP_` settings, and
`servewaf` only the `SWWAF_` ones. Every setting but `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` has a
default, chosen for a service on the open internet. A setting that needs an
account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
- Any `SWWAF_` setting can be given as a file instead, for secrets and long
lists: `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE` names the file that holds `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN`.
The file's contents are the value, less one newline at the end. Setting both
forms stops the start. `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` and
`SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` already name a file, so they have no
`_FILE` form. No `SWRP_` setting has one, since `rproxy` never touches disk.
- A duration is Go's syntax, with `d` for days: `90s`, `15m`, `24h`, `7d`.
- A size is a number of bytes with an optional `K`, `M` or `G`, in powers of
1024: `512K`, `100M`, `5G`.
- A count is a whole number of requests, such as `1000`.
- A time in milliseconds is a whole number above zero, such as `2000`.
- A list is comma separated. A list set to an empty value is an empty list, and
replaces the default.
- A netblock is an address and a prefix length, such as `10.0.0.0/8`; a bare
address stands for itself alone. A country is a two-letter code in either
case, such as `de`. An AS number is `AS` and the number, such as `AS64496`. A
percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100. A path prefix starts with `/`.
- `off` switches a limit, a threshold or a timeout off where the table says a
setting takes it.
- An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged
on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`.
Every setting the code reads, with its default:
| Variable | Default | What it does |
| ------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `servewaf`. |
| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `servewaf`'s URL, such as `http://servewaf:8080`. |
| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `servewaf`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `servewaf` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `502`, or cut off once it has started. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | How long the visitor may take to send its request line and headers, and then the whole request to reach the app, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `servewaf` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `servewaf` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/servewaf`. |
| `SWWAF_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `servewaf` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse. |
| `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it. |
| `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`. |
| `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`. |
| `SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | Which body bytes the byte limits count: `response`, `request` or `both`. |
| `SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs`, a web service, `file`, or `off`. |
| `SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
| `SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES` | empty | Countries whose clients are refused, such as `cn,ru`. |
| `SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | AS numbers whose clients get a percentage of every request and byte limit, such as `AS14061:50,AS16276:25`. |
| `SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | The same by country, such as `cn:25`. |
| `SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT`. |
| `SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT`. |
| `SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; where it and `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` both give a percentage, the lower applies. |
| `SWWAF_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWWAF_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only; `deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf` is gitea's. |
| `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
| `SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
| `SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
| `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/smallwebwaf` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `servewaf`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `servewaf` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_smallwebwaf/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWWAF_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWWAF_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWWAF_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWWAF_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWWAF_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWWAF_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
## docker-compose examples
Each example is a complete `compose.yaml`. `smallwebwaf` is the tag
`make docker` gives the image; on another host, use the name you pushed it
under, by digest. Docker Compose puts the services on a private network of its
own, where each reaches the others by service name. Only "In front of gitea"
uses traefik. The other three publish `rproxy`'s port on the host, for trying it
out.
### Smallest setup
One app, `rproxy` in front of it, and `servewaf` with a volume for its state
files, every setting at its default.
```yaml
services:
app:
# Your app, which listens on port 8081.
image: registry.example/app@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
rproxy:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://servewaf:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:8081
ports:
- "8080:8080"
servewaf:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: servewaf
volumes:
- servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf
volumes:
servewaf-state:
```
### Custom per-address limits
For a site with no API:
- tighter limits for everyone;
- no limits for the office and the automation host;
- no checks for monitoring;
- a refused netblock;
- a smaller share of the limits for two hosting networks and one country;
- trap paths;
- `429` for a refused client.
```yaml
services:
app:
image: registry.example/app@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
rproxy:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://servewaf:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:8081
ports:
- "8080:8080"
servewaf:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: servewaf
# Monitoring skips every check.
SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS: 192.0.2.10
# The office and the automation host are never rate limited.
SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS: 203.0.113.0/24,198.51.100.7
# A netblock that sends nothing wanted.
SWWAF_DENY_NETS: 198.51.100.128/25
# Tighter limits for everyone else: a small static site.
SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE: "60"
SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR: "600"
SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY: "3000"
# Hosting networks and one country get a share of those limits.
SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT: AS14061:50,AS16276:25
SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT: cn:25
# Paths only scanners ask for; one request bans the client.
SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS: /wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php
# Answer a refused client with 429 rather than 403.
SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE: "429"
SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION: 30m
volumes:
- servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf
volumes:
servewaf-state:
```
### In front of gitea
gitea behind traefik, set up for a code forge:
- the upload limits raised, in size and in time;
- the response size limit raised, for clones over 1 GiB;
- the Actions runners exempt from counting;
- the default request and byte limits kept.
`traefik` is the network traefik is on, made outside this file.
```yaml
services:
gitea:
# gitea 1.27.3, 2026-08-29
image: gitea/gitea@sha256:87a67ee09d3ae0d1df5fda5dcda3e2a1f9236a45b0a59025d6e00e46adc43bef
environment:
GITEA__server__ROOT_URL: https://git.example/
# The host and the port of the SSH clone URLs gitea shows.
GITEA__server__SSH_DOMAIN: git.example
GITEA__server__SSH_PORT: "2222"
# gitea's TCP peer is rproxy, on the private network.
GITEA__security__REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES: 10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16
volumes:
- gitea-data:/data
networks:
- site
ports:
# SSH does not pass through smallwebwaf.
- "2222:22"
rproxy:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://servewaf:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://gitea:3000
# Pushes, LFS objects and image layers over 100 MiB, or slower
# than a minute, are cut off at the defaults.
SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE: 2G
SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS: "600000"
# A clone larger than 1 GiB is cut off at the default.
SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE: 4G
networks:
- site
- traefik
labels:
traefik.enable: "true"
# rproxy is on two networks; traefik reaches it on this one.
traefik.docker.network: traefik
traefik.http.routers.git.rule: Host(`git.example`)
traefik.http.routers.git.entrypoints: websecure
traefik.http.routers.git.tls.certresolver: letsencrypt
traefik.http.services.git.loadbalancer.server.port: "8080"
servewaf:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: servewaf
SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME: fsn1/servewaf
# The Actions runners ask for work all day; never count them.
SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS: 10.0.4.0/24
# gitea never serves these; a request for one bans the client.
SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS: /wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php,/wp-admin/
volumes:
- servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf
networks:
- site
networks:
site:
traefik:
external: true
volumes:
gitea-data:
servewaf-state:
```
`deploy/gitea` holds a complete setup of gitea, traefik included, as a Docker
Compose file. [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md) explains it, and records what the
defaults do in front of gitea, request by request.
### `rproxy` beside the app
The app is built on the `smallwebwaf` image, with `rproxy` inside its container.
`app/` holds the `Dockerfile` and `app.run` from "`rproxy` in the app's
container". `rproxy` answers `503` to every request while `servewaf` is down,
and `servewaf`:
- observes before it enforces;
- looks addresses up in a local database rather than GeoJS;
- sends alerts to ntfy;
- reads its ntfy token from a file.
```yaml
services:
app:
# A Dockerfile built FROM the smallwebwaf image, with rproxy inside.
build: ./app
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://servewaf:8080
# Answer 503 rather than pass a request on while servewaf is down.
SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION: deny
ports:
- "8080:8080"
servewaf:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: servewaf
SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME: fsn1/servewaf
# Refuse nothing yet; log what enforce mode would have done.
SWWAF_MODE: observe
# Look addresses up in a local IPinfo Lite database, never GeoJS.
SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE: file
SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH: /var/lib/ipinfo/ipinfo_lite.mmdb
# Alerts to an ntfy topic, with its token read from a file.
SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL: https://ntfy.example/smallwebwaf
SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/smallwebwaf/tokens/ntfy
SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS: ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,source_failure,file_error
volumes:
- servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf
- /srv/ipinfo:/var/lib/ipinfo:ro
- /srv/smallwebwaf/tokens:/etc/smallwebwaf/tokens:ro
volumes:
servewaf-state:
```
The database is mounted by its directory, not by file, so that a replaced
database is seen. A token file belongs to uid 65532, the `smallwebwaf` user,
with mode `0400`. This one holds an access token the ntfy server issued, which
`ntfy token add <user>` prints there:
Deploy the app's image as you deploy any app. Point traefik's labels at port
8080 (`traefik.http.services.<name>.loadbalancer.server.port=8080`). Mount a
volume at `/var/lib/smallwebwaf`, so that bans and history survive a deploy. For
example, with no setting:
```sh
mkdir -p /srv/smallwebwaf/tokens
# <token> is the access token that ntfy printed.
echo '<token>' > /srv/smallwebwaf/tokens/ntfy
chown 65532:65532 /srv/smallwebwaf/tokens/ntfy
chmod 0400 /srv/smallwebwaf/tokens/ntfy
docker run --detach --name app \
--volume app-smallwebwaf:/var/lib/smallwebwaf \
<registry>/app@sha256:<digest>
```
## Design
With no setting, the address of every new visitor is sent to GeoJS, a web
service, to find its country and network. `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=off` sends
nothing. `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`, with `SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` naming a
database file on your own host, looks addresses up in that file (see "Lookup of
AS number and country" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)).
How it works inside. [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) gives every rule in full, and why.
`deploy/example-app` is such an app. `make example-app` builds it and checks it
(see "Checking that it works" below). To run `smallwebwaf` outside the image
while working on it, see "Entrypoints" below.
### What happens to a request
## What happens to a request
A request goes through these steps, in this order. Once `servewaf` refuses a
request, the steps after that are skipped, apart from the report, and nothing of
the request reaches the app.
`rproxy` takes the first two:
`smallwebwaf` handles each request in fifteen steps, in this order. Once a step
refuses a request, the steps after it are skipped, apart from step 15, and
nothing of the request reaches the app. "What happens to a request" in
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) gives each step in full, under the same numbers.
1. The health check, `GET /_smallwebwaf/healthz`, is answered at once.
2. The visitor's address is worked out from `X-Forwarded-For`, believed only
from `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES`. `rproxy` sends `servewaf` the request as the
visitor sent it, with the first 64 KiB of its body.
`servewaf` takes the checks:
2. The client is identified.
3. The static lists, `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` and `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`.
4. The bans.
5. The lookup of the client's AS number and country.
6. The country lists.
7. The reputation sources.
8. The client's limit percentage, from its AS number, its country or a
reputation hit.
8. The client's limit percentage.
9. The rate limits.
10. The trap paths.
11. The rule files.
12. The header limits, and then the Core Rule Set.
13. A path under `/_smallwebwaf/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees
that prefix.
12. The Core Rule Set.
13. `smallwebwaf`'s own endpoints, under `/_smallwebwaf/`.
14. The request is passed to the app.
15. After the answer: the byte limits, the error burst and the client's history.
`rproxy` takes the rest, with `servewaf` counting at the end:
A refused visitor is answered with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE`, `403` by default (see
"Ban lengths, response and scope" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)). A `block` rule or a
Core Rule Set match answers `403`. A missing or wrong token gets `401`. A
request over a size or time limit gets the status for that limit, such as `413`
for a body too large (see "Size and time limits" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)).
14. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
15. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `servewaf` a report with the status and the
bytes each way. For an allowed request, `servewaf` counts the bytes toward
the byte limits and adds the request to the client's history.
## Settings you are likely to touch
A refused visitor is answered with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a
Core Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has
false positives; such refusals count toward `SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`
instead. A request over the header limits of step 12 is answered `431`, and bans
nobody either. `rproxy` itself answers `405` to a method it does not pass on,
and the status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
Each setting is an environment variable of the app's container, such as
`docker run -e SWWAF_MODE=observe ...`, read at start.
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) lists every setting, its default and the
values it takes. The ones most deployments touch:
### Clients and bans
- `SWWAF_MODE=observe`: `smallwebwaf` makes no ban of its own, and refuses a
request only for a size or time limit or a missing or wrong token. A request
it would have refused is passed to the app, and its log line says what
`enforce` mode would have done. For trying a configuration before enforcing
it.
- `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`: netblocks you trust, such as your monitoring. Their
clients are refused only for a size or time limit or a missing or wrong token.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`: netblocks exempt from rate limiting and the
byte limits, such as a machine that talks to the app all day.
- `SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS`: paths only scanners ask for, such as
`/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php` in front of a code forge. A request for one bans
the client.
- `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES`: Core Rule Set rule ids to switch off when a rule
refuses your app's ordinary requests. The log line names the rules a request
matched. Keep the six default ids in a list you give (see
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md)).
- `SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES`, `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` and
`SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT`: raise them for an app that takes uploads
over 100 MiB or slower than 60 seconds.
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE`: `geojs` (the default), `file` or `off`, as above.
- `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` and `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN`: switch on the ban endpoints and
the metrics. Give them as files to keep them from the app.
- `SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL`, `SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` or
`SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL`: where alerts go.
- `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME`: the name in every log line, alert and metric, such as
`fsn1app1/gitea`.
- A client is one IPv4 address or one IPv6 netblock of
`SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX`, since one abuser usually controls a whole /64.
- Each limit is counted over a sliding window with a few integers per client.
The table of clients and the table of bans each have a bound
(`SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, `SWWAF_MAX_BANS`), so memory is bounded too.
- A ban refuses every request from its netblock until it ends. Requests refused
under a ban count toward no limit. A permanent ban ends only when an admin
lifts it.
- Every ban carries notes: the client's AS number and country, the limit it
broke or the rule it matched, the request that caused it, and its earlier
bans. An admin adds, keeps or lifts a ban by editing `bans.json` or through
the ban endpoints (see [`docs/admin-endpoints.md`](docs/admin-endpoints.md)).
## Checking that it works
### Attack detection
- The Core Rule Set reads the method, the URL with its query string, and the
headers of every request, and no body unless `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` is set. In
front of a code forge, bodies carry what people write and publish, which the
rules take for attacks.
- `smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set in seven ways so that it lets ordinary
requests to a code forge through, such as git over HTTP and sign-in through
Git Credential Manager. No setting undoes them; "Attack detection" in
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists them.
- `SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` switches single rules off for an app's
own fields or paths. gitea's exclusions, in
`deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf`, let its searches, file names and branch
names through.
- Rule files are plain text, one rule to a line, edited by hand and read again
while `servewaf` runs. The image ships one file of probes no real visitor
sends (see [`docs/rules.md`](docs/rules.md)).
### State files
`servewaf` keeps everything in memory, and the five JSON files in
`SWWAF_STATE_DIR` hold a copy: `bans.json`, `clients.json`, `lookups.json`,
`reputation.json` and `alerts.json`. Each is written whole, to a temporary file
renamed over the real one, so a crash leaves a complete file. `servewaf` notices
a file edited on disk and takes the edit in; an edit that does not parse is set
aside as `<name>.bad`, and never stops the running process (see
[`docs/state-files.md`](docs/state-files.md)).
### The image and its processes
- The image is built on Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, pinned by digest. Its Ubuntu packages
come from Ubuntu's archive, and nixpkgs is fixed at one release. An app's
`Dockerfile` installs a package with `nix-env -iA nixpkgs.<name>` and gets the
same package each time it is built (see [`docs/image.md`](docs/image.md)).
- runit, a service supervisor, runs `smallwebwaf` as the `smallwebwaf` user (uid
and gid 65532) and starts it again when it exits. The `run` script of
`servewaf` gives the state directory to the `smallwebwaf` user at each start,
so a volume needs no change of owner.
- `rproxy` and `servewaf` use no token between them. `servewaf`'s own endpoints,
under `/_smallwebwaf/`, are for your admin tools and your metrics collector,
at its own address on the private network; nothing routes the internet there.
- `docker stop` gives requests in progress five seconds to finish. With `rproxy`
in the app's container, the app must keep answering for five seconds after
`SIGTERM` for that to help them.
- Only faults found at start stop a process: an invalid setting, a rule file or
state file that does not parse, a lookup database that cannot be read, or an
address it cannot listen on. Once running, a failing lookup service,
reputation source or alert destination never takes `servewaf` down.
### Packages
- `cmd/smallwebwaf`: the binary, which only calls `internal/smallwebwaf`.
- `internal/smallwebwaf`: the process, as the command it is given, and the
health check.
- `internal/config`: reads the settings, the one place they are read.
- `internal/rproxy`: the reverse proxy in front of one app.
- `internal/servewaf`: `servewaf`'s server, which runs the checks and answers
its own endpoints.
- `internal/ratelimit`, `internal/bans`, `internal/rules`, `internal/waf`,
`internal/lookup`, `internal/reputation`, `internal/anomaly` and
`internal/alerts`: one check or source each.
- `internal/state`, `internal/requestlog`, `internal/remotelog` and
`internal/metrics`: the state files, the log lines, the syslog sender and the
metrics.
## Rationale
Small self-hosted sites receive a great deal of traffic nobody asked for:
- scrapers that ignore `robots.txt` and crawl every commit of every repository
on a public git server;
- scanners walking through lists of WordPress and `.env` paths;
- credential-guessing bots.
Most of it comes from a small number of hosting networks and countries. A
single-person operation has no abuse desk and no CDN contract. It needs
something small that can be put in front of its services and left alone.
The existing tools each solve part of this. Rule-based firewalls catch attack
payloads but do not limit request rates. Rate limiters count requests but cannot
tell a residential visitor from a rented server farm. The products that do most
of it want a database and a web console. None of them can say "clients from
these networks are banned after half as many requests as anyone else".
[`EVALUATION.md`](EVALUATION.md) goes through the candidates one by one.
- `docker inspect --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' <container>` says
`healthy` once `smallwebwaf` answers and the app accepts connections. A log
line with `"msg":"starting"` gives the version, the address and every setting
in effect, with secrets masked.
- A request to the site through traefik gets the app's answer, and its log line
has `"action":"forward"`. `https://<site>/_smallwebwaf/healthz` answers `ok`.
- To see a refusal without banning yourself, run the container with
`SWWAF_MODE=observe` and ask for `/.env`. The request reaches the app. Its log
line has `"would_action":"banned"` and `"rule_ids":["env-file"]`. In `enforce`
mode the same request bans your address for seven days, and your next request
makes the ban permanent. Lift the ban by editing `bans.json` (see "Bans" in
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)).
- With `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` set,
`curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://<site>/_smallwebwaf/metrics`
answers with the metrics.
- `make example-app` builds the image and the example app on it, runs the app,
and checks it. It needs network access. It checks:
- the health check;
- a request forwarded to the app;
- a ban for a broken limit, and a ban for a probe made permanent;
- orderly stops with `sv stop` and `docker stop`;
- bans surviving a new container on the same volume;
- a setting given as a file.
## Entrypoints
@@ -754,45 +266,98 @@ on the host.
- `script/install-precommit`: installs that hook. `make hooks`.
- `script/build`: builds `bin/smallwebwaf` with the Go on your host.
`make build`.
- `script/run`: builds `bin/smallwebwaf` and runs `servewaf` and `rproxy` on the
host, with the settings in your environment. `make run`. Unless your settings
say otherwise:
- `rproxy` listens on port 8080, in front of an app at
`http://127.0.0.1:8081`;
- `servewaf` listens on port 8090;
- its state files go in `bin/state`;
- its rule files are those of `share/rules.d`.
- `script/example-app`: builds the image and the example app
(`deploy/example-app`) on it, runs the app with `rproxy` in its container and
`servewaf` in another, and checks them. Then it removes the containers, the
network, the volumes and the images. Needs network access. `make example-app`.
It checks:
- the health checks;
- a request passed to the app;
- a ban for a broken limit, and a ban for a probe made permanent;
- that only `servewaf`'s container changes the state directory's owner;
- with `servewaf` stopped, the app still answering through `rproxy`;
- with `servewaf` started again, bans applying again;
- orderly stops with `sv stop` and `docker stop`;
- bans surviving a new container on the same volume;
- a setting given as a file.
- `script/gitea-requests`: builds the image and runs gitea 1.27.3 behind
`rproxy` and `servewaf`, three containers on one network. Every setting is at
its default, but for those that join the containers and
`SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS`, which adds the header that labels each request.
It sends through them a sample of gitea's ordinary use and the requests the
Core Rule Set is known to refuse, and prints what `servewaf` did with each.
Needs network access, and a docker daemon that pushes to a registry on
`localhost` over plain HTTP. `make gitea-requests`.
- `script/gitea-setup`: builds the image, brings up the setup in `deploy/gitea`,
and checks it as [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md) describes. Then it removes
the containers, the network, the volumes and the image it built. Needs network
access. `make gitea-setup`.
- `script/run`: builds `bin/smallwebwaf` and runs it with the settings in your
environment, listening on port 8080 in front of an app at
`SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL`. Its state files go in `bin/state` and its rule files are
those of `share/rules.d`, unless `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` and `SWWAF_RULES_DIR` say
otherwise. `make run`.
- `script/example-app`: builds the image and the example app on it, runs it with
a volume, and checks it as "Checking that it works" above describes. Then it
removes the containers, volumes and images. Needs network access.
`make example-app`.
- `script/gitea-requests`: builds the image and runs gitea 1.27.3 behind it at
the defaults. It sends through it a sample of gitea's ordinary use and the
requests the Core Rule Set is known to refuse, and prints what `smallwebwaf`
did with each. Needs network access, and a docker daemon that pushes to a
registry on `localhost` over plain HTTP. [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md)
records the results. `make gitea-requests`.
## Rationale
Small self-hosted sites receive a great deal of traffic nobody asked for:
- scrapers that ignore `robots.txt` and crawl every commit of every repository
on a public git server;
- scanners walking through lists of WordPress and `.env` paths;
- credential-guessing bots.
Most of it comes from a small number of hosting networks and countries. A
single-person operation has no abuse desk and no CDN contract. It needs
something small that can be put in front of one service and left alone.
The existing tools each solve part of this. Rule-based firewalls catch attack
payloads but do not limit request rates. Rate limiters count requests but cannot
tell a residential visitor from a rented server farm. The products that do most
of it want several containers, a database and a web console. None of them can
say "clients from these networks are banned after half as many requests as
anyone else". That is the useful thing to say when nearly all abuse comes from a
known list of AS numbers. [`EVALUATION.md`](EVALUATION.md) goes through the
candidates one by one.
`smallwebwaf` fills that gap with:
- per-client limits that ban;
- lower limits for the networks and countries abuse comes from;
- bans that grow with repetition;
- a log that is easy to search and ship;
- one binary in the app's own container, with no database and no required
setting.
## Design
The `smallwebwaf` image is built on Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, pinned by digest, with
nixpkgs fixed at one release. An app's `Dockerfile` installs a package with
`nix-env -iA nixpkgs.<name>` and gets the same package each time it is built.
[`docs/image.md`](docs/image.md) lists what the image holds and how each part is
pinned.
- runit, a service supervisor, runs `smallwebwaf` and the app side by side, each
as its own user, and starts either again when it exits. The app cannot touch
the state files or the process of `smallwebwaf`.
- `smallwebwaf` listens on port 8080 and passes requests to the app on
`127.0.0.1:8081`. The app listens on `127.0.0.1` only, so nothing reaches it
except through `smallwebwaf`. `smallwebwaf`'s own endpoints are under
`/_smallwebwaf/`, on the same port.
- The app sees the headers traefik sent, with traefik's address added to
`X-Forwarded-For`, from a TCP peer on `127.0.0.1`. So the app must trust
`127.0.0.1` and `::1` for forwarded headers, besides the private address
ranges.
- Both processes start with the container's environment variables, so every
setting of `smallwebwaf` starts with `SWWAF_`, and the app can read a token
given as one. A token given as a file that only the `smallwebwaf` user can
read is out of its reach (see "Settings given as files" in
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md)).
- The state files live in `/var/lib/smallwebwaf`. A volume mounted there keeps
them across a deploy.
- `smallwebwaf servewaf` runs the same checks for the sites that ask it about
each request, and passes nothing to an app (see "`servewaf`" in
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)).
- `docker stop` stops both processes at once. `smallwebwaf` gives the requests
in progress five seconds to finish, so the app must keep answering for five
seconds after `SIGTERM`.
"Deployment" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) has the rest: the health check, what
happens when a process stops, moving `smallwebwaf` to another port, and the
forwarded headers. "Architecture" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists the packages and
what each does.
## TODO
- Planned, as "Planned, not built" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) describes: sending
the log over RELP.
- Planned, as "Planned, not built" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) describes:
- `smallwebwaf rproxy`, the reverse proxy in front of each app that asks
`smallwebwaf servewaf` about each request;
- sharing bans between the instances of several apps;
- sending the log over RELP.
## Documents
@@ -800,7 +365,8 @@ on the host.
- [`EVALUATION.md`](EVALUATION.md): what already exists, what each tool covers
and misses, and why none was adopted.
- [`REPO_POLICIES.md`](REPO_POLICIES.md): the policies this repository follows.
- [`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md): every setting and the values it takes.
- [`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md): every setting, its default and the
values it takes.
- [`docs/rules.md`](docs/rules.md): the rule file format and the default file.
- [`docs/admin-endpoints.md`](docs/admin-endpoints.md): the endpoints under
`/_smallwebwaf/`, with examples.
@@ -811,8 +377,7 @@ on the host.
- [`docs/state-files.md`](docs/state-files.md): the state files and what each
holds.
- [`docs/image.md`](docs/image.md): what the image holds and how it is pinned.
- [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md): `smallwebwaf` in front of gitea: the setup
in `deploy/gitea`, and what the defaults do there.
- [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md): `smallwebwaf` in front of gitea.
## License
SPEC.md
+437 -831
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
cmd/smallwebwaf/main.go
+3 -5
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
// Command smallwebwaf is a web application firewall. `smallwebwaf rproxy` is
// the reverse proxy in front of one app, which asks servewaf about each request.
// `smallwebwaf servewaf` decides, for many sites, and keeps what lasts.
// `smallwebwaf healthcheck` is the container's health check. Everything it does
// is in internal/smallwebwaf.
// Command smallwebwaf is a web application firewall for one app: it runs
// between traefik and the app, and passes requests through within its
// limits. Everything it does is in internal/smallwebwaf.
package main
import (
deploy/gitea/compose.yaml
-136
View File
@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
# Gitea behind traefik, with rproxy and servewaf in front of it.
# docs/gitea.md says what each setting here does and why. Before starting it:
# - set SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE to the smallwebwaf image, named by digest;
# - replace git.example.org with the site's host name;
# - replace each 10.99.0 with the first three numbers of a /24 subnet that
# no other network on the host uses. The /24 must lie inside 10.0.0.0/8,
# 172.16.0.0/12 or 192.168.0.0/16, because rproxy believes
# X-Forwarded-For only from those by default. Replace each fd10:99 with
# the first two hextets of an unused /64 subnet whose third and fourth
# hextets are 0, as in fd10:99::/64;
# - set GITEA_SECRET_KEY to the output of
# `docker run --rm <gitea's image below> gitea generate secret SECRET_KEY`,
# once per install, and keep it.
# Then run `docker compose up --detach` in this directory.
# script/gitea-setup checks this setup.
name: gitea
x-logging: &logging
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: 10m
max-file: "5"
services:
traefik:
# traefik v3.7.17, 2026-11-03
image: traefik@sha256:68ae5fe5b64ca166704b746a9e8afcd385e36b3f569a5691401bf652d57b3748
# traefik replaces the X-Forwarded-For header a visitor sends. Keep it
# so: otherwise a visitor could name an address on the shared network,
# and skip servewaf's checks.
command:
- --providers.docker.exposedbydefault=false
- --entrypoints.web.address=:80
- --entrypoints.web.http.redirections.entrypoint.to=websecure
- --entrypoints.websecure.address=:443
# Until a certificate resolver is added here, as for your other
# sites, traefik answers with a certificate it made itself.
- --entrypoints.websecure.http.tls=true
# traefik's own limit of 60 seconds for a whole request would cut
# off an upload long before rproxy's limit of 30 minutes.
- --entrypoints.websecure.transport.respondingTimeouts.readTimeout=30m
ports:
- 80:80
- 443:443
volumes:
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
networks:
shared:
# Containers on the shared network find traefik under the
# site's name, and so reach it from their own address.
aliases:
- git.example.org
restart: unless-stopped
gitea:
# gitea 1.27.3, 2026-08-29
image: gitea/gitea@sha256:87a67ee09d3ae0d1df5fda5dcda3e2a1f9236a45b0a59025d6e00e46adc43bef
environment:
GITEA__server__ROOT_URL: https://git.example.org/
# Gitea starts at its defaults, with SQLite, instead of showing its
# install page to whoever opens it first.
GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK: "true"
GITEA__security__SECRET_KEY: ${GITEA_SECRET_KEY:?set GITEA_SECRET_KEY, see docs/gitea.md}
# Accounts are made with `gitea admin user create`.
GITEA__service__DISABLE_REGISTRATION: "true"
# rproxy's addresses. Gitea then takes each visitor's address from
# the X-Real-Ip header traefik sets and rproxy passes on.
GITEA__security__REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES: 10.99.0.2,fd10:99::2
volumes:
- gitea-data:/data
networks:
- shared
restart: unless-stopped
rproxy:
image: ${SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE:?set SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE to the smallwebwaf image}
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://servewaf:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://gitea:3000
# Pushes, LFS objects, packages and release attachments of up to
# 2 GiB, sent in up to 30 minutes.
SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE: 2G
SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS: "1800000"
# 15 minutes for a clone or a download, half the default.
SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS: "900000"
labels:
traefik.enable: "true"
traefik.http.routers.gitea.rule: Host(`git.example.org`)
traefik.http.routers.gitea.entrypoints: websecure
traefik.http.services.gitea.loadbalancer.server.port: "8080"
networks:
shared:
ipv4_address: 10.99.0.2
ipv6_address: fd10:99::2
logging: *logging
restart: unless-stopped
servewaf:
image: ${SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE:?set SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE to the smallwebwaf image}
environment:
SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: servewaf
# The containers on the shared network skip the checks. Add the
# address of an automation fleet on another host here too; without
# that, it is counted like any client.
SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS: 10.99.0.128/25,fd10:99:0:0:8000::/65
# The Core Rule Set's exclusions for Gitea's searches, file names
# and branch names.
SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: /etc/smallwebwaf/crs-exclusions.conf
volumes:
- servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf
- ./crs-exclusions.conf:/etc/smallwebwaf/crs-exclusions.conf:ro
networks:
- shared
logging: *logging
restart: unless-stopped
networks:
# The network traefik and Gitea share. Its containers get addresses in the
# upper half of each subnet, which servewaf lets skip the checks. Each
# subnet's gateway, the host's own address on it, stays out of that half:
# requests docker passes on from a published port can come from it.
shared:
enable_ipv6: true
ipam:
config:
- subnet: 10.99.0.0/24
ip_range: 10.99.0.128/25
gateway: 10.99.0.1
- subnet: fd10:99::/64
ip_range: fd10:99:0:0:8000::/65
gateway: fd10:99::1
volumes:
gitea-data:
servewaf-state:
deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf
-150
View File
@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
# The Core Rule Set's exclusions for Gitea, which servewaf loads from
# SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE. servewaf loads this file before the Core
# Rule Set's rules, so it holds only exclusions made while a request is checked:
# SecAction and SecRule lines with ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById or
# ctl:ruleRemoveById. Each switches one rule off for the Gitea fields or paths
# where it refused ordinary Gitea requests. A SecAction applies on every path, a
# SecRule on the paths it matches. Gitea sends these in the query string:
# - q: the text of every search;
# - file, path, template, body and redirect_to: a file name, alone or in
# JSON or a link;
# - name, tag, rule_name and refSubUrl: a branch or tag name.
# docs/gitea.md says how to add an exclusion.
# Searches.
# 930110: a search for ../
SecAction "id:10001,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930110;ARGS:q"
# 931100: a search for http://127.0.0.1:8080
SecAction "id:10002,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931100;ARGS:q"
# 932140: a search for if (a == b) {
SecAction "id:10003,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932140;ARGS:q"
# 932235: a search for `make check`
SecAction "id:10004,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:q"
# 932250: a search for ls -la
SecAction "id:10005,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:q"
# 932380: a search for `whoami`
SecAction "id:10006,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:q"
# 933100: a search for <?php echo
SecAction "id:10007,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=933100;ARGS:q"
# 933130: a search for $_GET[
SecAction "id:10008,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=933130;ARGS:q"
# 933135: a search for ${VAR}
SecAction "id:10009,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=933135;ARGS:q"
# 934110: a search for http://127.0.0.1:8080
SecAction "id:10010,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934110;ARGS:q"
# 941100: a search for <script>
SecAction "id:10011,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941100;ARGS:q"
# 941110: a search for <script>, or a page opened from its results
SecAction "id:10012,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941110;ARGS:q,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941110;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# 941120: a page opened from the results of a search for onClick={
SecAction "id:10013,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941120;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# 941160: a search for <img src=, or a page opened from its results
SecAction "id:10014,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941160;ARGS:q,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941160;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# 941390: a search for fetch(
SecAction "id:10015,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941390;ARGS:q"
# 942100: a search for SELECT * FROM users WHERE, or a page opened from the
# results of a search for LIKE '%foo%'
SecAction "id:10016,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;ARGS:q,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# 942190: a search for union select
SecAction "id:10017,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942190;ARGS:q"
# 942230: a search for if (a == b) {
SecAction "id:10018,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942230;ARGS:q"
# 944100: a search for java.lang.Runtime, or a page opened from its results
SecAction "id:10019,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944100;ARGS:q,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944100;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# Searches, and file, branch and tag names.
# 930120: a search for package.json, or the commit graph of .gitignore
SecAction "id:10020,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|template|body|refsuburl|name|tag|rule_name)$/"
# 932160: a search for /bin/sh, or the API's contents of bin/docker-entrypoint
SecAction "id:10021,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|template|body|refsuburl|name|tag|rule_name)$/"
# 932260: a search for python3, or deleting the branch docker-build
SecAction "id:10022,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|template|body|refsuburl|name|tag|rule_name)$/"
# Searches, and file names in the query string.
# 932120: a search for Invoke-WebRequest, or the commits of install-script.sh
SecAction "id:10023,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 932130: a search for $(pwd), or an issue opened from the template [draft].md
SecAction "id:10024,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932130;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 934100: a search for process.env, or the commits of process.env.d.ts
SecAction "id:10025,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 934130: a search for __proto__, or the commits of __proto__.json
SecAction "id:10026,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934130;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 941130: the commits of index.xhtml
SecAction "id:10027,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;\
ARGS:/^(?:file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 941180: a search for document.cookie, or the commits of document.write.js
SecAction "id:10028,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941180;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 942140: a search for information_schema, or the commits of
# information_schema.sql
SecAction "id:10029,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942140;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 944110: a search for java.lang.Runtime, or the commits of Runtime.java
SecAction "id:10030,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944110;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 944130: a search for java.lang.Runtime, the commits of java.lang.String.md,
# or any page opened from that file's page, which names it in the Referer
SecAction "id:10031,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# File names in the path of a file's page, raw file, blame, history and edit
# page, and of the API's calls for its contents.
# 920500: the page of notes.txt~
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:api/v1/repos/)?[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:src|raw|media|blame|commits|_edit|_delete|contents)/" \
"id:10032,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920500;REQUEST_FILENAME"
# 934100: the page of process.env.d.ts
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:api/v1/repos/)?[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:src|raw|media|blame|commits|_edit|_delete|contents)/" \
"id:10033,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;REQUEST_FILENAME"
# 941130: the page of docs/a b.xhtml
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:api/v1/repos/)?[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:src|raw|media|blame|commits|_edit|_delete|contents)/" \
"id:10034,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;REQUEST_FILENAME"
# 944130: the page of java.lang.String.md
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:api/v1/repos/)?[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:src|raw|media|blame|commits|_edit|_delete|contents)/" \
"id:10035,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;REQUEST_FILENAME"
# The file name, in name, of an attachment uploaded through the API to a
# release, an issue or a comment.
# 932120: the attachment install-script.sh
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10036,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:name"
# 934100: the attachment process.env.d.ts
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10037,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;ARGS:name"
# 934130: the attachment __proto__.json
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10038,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934130;ARGS:name"
# 941130: the attachment index.xhtml
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10039,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;ARGS:name"
# 941180: the attachment document.write.js
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10040,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941180;ARGS:name"
# 942140: the attachment information_schema.sql
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10041,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942140;ARGS:name"
# 944130: the attachment java.lang.String.md
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10042,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;ARGS:name"
# The header Content-Range of an artifact upload.
# 920450: an artifact upload from actions/upload-artifact@v3
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/actions_pipeline/_apis/pipelines/workflows/[0-9]+/artifacts/[^/]+/upload$" \
"id:10043,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920450;REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES:Content-Range"
docs/admin-endpoints.md
+13 -24
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
# Admin endpoints
The endpoints under `/_smallwebwaf/`, what each takes and what each answers.
`smallwebwaf servewaf` answers them at its own address, on the private network.
"Admin endpoints" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how their tokens work.
"Admin endpoints" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says which checks they go through
and how their tokens work. `smallwebwaf servewaf` answers them at its own
address, without those checks (see "`servewaf`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `GET /_smallwebwaf/healthz`: `200` and `ok`, to anyone.
- `GET /_smallwebwaf/metrics`: the metrics, for `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` (see
@@ -20,41 +21,29 @@ The endpoints under `/_smallwebwaf/`, what each takes and what each answers.
- one that names an IPv4-mapped netblock, or an address with a zone.
- `DELETE /_smallwebwaf/bans/<client>`: lifts every active ban covering the
address `<client>`. It answers `404` when none is active.
- `GET /_smallwebwaf/clients/<ip>`: what `servewaf` knows of the client. Under
`client`, its counters and history as `clients.json` holds them, or `null`
when `clients.json` does not hold it. Under `bans`, every ban covering the
address, with its notes.
- `POST /_smallwebwaf/report`: takes `rproxy`'s report, without a token. It
answers `204`, or `400` to a body that is no report (see "The report" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
No check runs on these requests. A missing or wrong token is answered `401`. An
endpoint whose token is unset answers `404`, as does any other path.
`smallwebwaf rproxy` answers only the health check of these, at its own address.
It asks `servewaf` about any other request under `/_smallwebwaf/`. One that
passes the checks is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that prefix (see
"`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `GET /_smallwebwaf/clients/<ip>`: what `smallwebwaf` knows of the client.
Under `client`, its counters and history as `clients.json` holds them, or
`null` when `clients.json` does not hold it. Under `bans`, every ban covering
the address, with its notes.
## Examples
With `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` set, the token in `$TOKEN`, and `servewaf` reached as
`servewaf:8080` on its network:
With `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` set, and the token in `$TOKEN`:
```sh
# Every ban.
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://servewaf:8080/_smallwebwaf/bans
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://app.example/_smallwebwaf/bans
# Ban 203.0.113.0/24 for seven days.
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
--json '{"netblock": "203.0.113.0/24", "duration": "7d", "reason": "probes for logins"}' \
http://servewaf:8080/_smallwebwaf/bans
https://app.example/_smallwebwaf/bans
# Lift the bans on 203.0.113.9.
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -X DELETE \
http://servewaf:8080/_smallwebwaf/bans/203.0.113.9
https://app.example/_smallwebwaf/bans/203.0.113.9
# What servewaf knows of 203.0.113.9.
# What smallwebwaf knows of 203.0.113.9.
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
http://servewaf:8080/_smallwebwaf/clients/203.0.113.9
https://app.example/_smallwebwaf/clients/203.0.113.9
```
docs/alerts.md
+15 -16
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ back or dropped.
## Events
- `ban`: a ban `servewaf` made.
- `ban`: a ban `smallwebwaf` made.
- `permanent_ban`: a permanent ban it made, or an existing ban made permanent by
a request.
- `waf_block`: the Core Rule Set scored a request at or over the threshold. The
@@ -34,36 +34,35 @@ on one line:
```json
{
"instance": "fsn1/servewaf",
"time": "2026-10-06T12:00:50.123461Z",
"instance": "fsn1app1/gitea",
"time": "2026-10-06T12:00:00.123461Z",
"event": "ban",
"host": "app.example",
"client": "203.0.113.9",
"netblock": "203.0.113.9/32",
"asn": "",
"as_name": "",
"country": "",
"reason": "requests per minute over the limit of 500",
"reason": "requests per minute over the limit of 6000",
"detail": {
"ban_expires": "2026-10-06T13:00:50.123Z",
"ban_expires": "2026-10-06T13:00:00.123Z",
"cause": "limit",
"notes": {
"asn": "",
"as_name": "",
"country": "",
"kind": "requests",
"limit": 500,
"limit": 6000,
"window": "minute",
"count": 501,
"count": 6001,
"request": {
"time": "2026-10-06T12:00:50.123456789Z",
"time": "2026-10-06T12:00:00.123456789Z",
"method": "GET",
"host": "app.example",
"path": "/owner/repo/commits/branch/main?page=501",
"path": "/owner/repo/commits/branch/main?page=812",
"status": 403,
"user_agent": "scraper/1.0"
},
"requests": 501,
"requests": 8210,
"refused": 0,
"earlier_bans": {
"limit": 0,
@@ -79,9 +78,9 @@ on one line:
- `instance`: `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME`. `time`: when the alert was raised. `event`:
one of the events above.
- `host`: the site of the request that raised the alert, since one `servewaf`
serves many sites. It is left out of `source_failure`, `file_error` and
`summary`.
- `host`: the site of the request that raised the alert. Only `servewaf` sends
this field, since it serves many sites, and not for `source_failure`,
`file_error` and `summary`.
- `client`: the address whose request raised the alert. Empty for
`source_failure`, `file_error` and `summary`.
- `netblock`: empty for `source_failure`, `file_error` and `summary`; otherwise
@@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ on one line:
- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, as known when the alert was
raised. They are empty when GeoJS had not answered yet.
- `reason`: a short sentence, such as
`requests per minute over the limit of 500` or `listed by a blocklist`.
`requests per minute over the limit of 6000` or `listed by a blocklist`.
- `detail`: what is particular to the event:
- for a ban, its `cause`, `ban_expires` and `notes` (the notes are listed
under `bans.json` in [`state-files.md`](state-files.md));
@@ -111,7 +110,7 @@ on one line:
## Slack and ntfy
Slack and ntfy get a message with a title and a text. The title is the instance
and the event, such as `fsn1/servewaf: ban`. The text is the `reason`, then one
and the event, such as `fsn1app1/gitea: ban`. The text is the `reason`, then one
line for each of these that the alert has:
- the host, the client, the netblock and the country;
docs/gitea.md
+176 -164
View File
@@ -1,206 +1,218 @@
# smallwebwaf in front of gitea
`deploy/gitea/compose.yaml` runs gitea behind traefik, with `rproxy` and
`servewaf` in front of it. This document says what that setup sets and why, and
what the defaults would do without it. [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how
`smallwebwaf` behaves.
These notes record what `smallwebwaf` does in front of gitea at the default
settings. They are observations, not requirements; the requirements are in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md). `script/gitea-requests` runs gitea behind the image and
sends through it a sample of gitea's ordinary use and the requests named below.
It reports each request the Core Rule Set refuses, so that these notes can be
checked again when gitea or the Core Rule Set changes version.
## The setup
## What the defaults cover
Four containers share one Docker network, the shared network:
- SSH access to gitea does not pass through `smallwebwaf` and is not protected
by it.
- A clone is a response. It fits the defaults of 30 minutes and 1 GiB unless the
repository is large or the link slow. A repository whose clone is larger than
1 GiB needs `SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` raised, and the byte limits with it
("Byte limits, per client" in `SPEC.md`).
- A push is a request, and so is every other upload:
- a git push;
- an LFS object;
- a container image layer;
- a package file;
- a release attachment.
- traefik, which routes the site's HTTPS requests to `rproxy`, and redirects
plain HTTP to HTTPS;
- `rproxy`, in front of gitea;
- gitea 1.27.3, as its image comes;
- `servewaf`, with a volume for its state files, and with
`deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf` mounted read-only.
At the defaults, an upload larger than 100 MiB or taking more than 60
seconds is cut off ("Size and time limits" in `SPEC.md`). A gitea that takes
large uploads needs `SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES`,
`SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` and `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` raised
to fit.
To start it:
- Archive download and blame or history pages are what scrapers hammer. The
request limits do most of the work there.
- An Actions runner that reaches gitea through `smallwebwaf` sends requests all
day. One older than version 0.4 (April 2026) asks for work every 2 seconds,
43,200 requests a day. While it runs a job, it reports the job's log and state
every second instead, two requests a second. So one runner busy all day sends
172,800 requests, under the request limits. Six such runners on one address,
each busy all day, pass the day limit of 1,000,000 within two days; five stay
under it. Their address is then banned, their running jobs fail, and each
repeat within a day makes the ban longer. Newer runners ask for work less
often. Put the runners' addresses in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
1. In `deploy/gitea/compose.yaml`, replace `git.example.org` with the site's
host name.
2. Replace each `10.99.0` with the first three numbers of a `/24` subnet that no
other network on the host uses. The `/24` must lie inside `10.0.0.0/8`,
`172.16.0.0/12` or `192.168.0.0/16`, because `rproxy` believes
`X-Forwarded-For` only from those by default. Replace each `fd10:99` with the
first two hextets of an unused `/64` subnet whose third and fourth hextets
are 0, as in `fd10:99::/64`.
3. Set `SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE` to the `smallwebwaf` image, named by digest.
4. Set `GITEA_SECRET_KEY` to the output of
`docker run --rm <gitea's image> gitea generate secret SECRET_KEY`, with
gitea's image as `deploy/gitea/compose.yaml` names it. Do this once per
install, and keep the key.
5. Run `docker compose up --detach` in `deploy/gitea`, with
`crs-exclusions.conf` beside `compose.yaml`.
6. Make gitea's first user with `gitea admin user create`, in gitea's container,
as the user `git`.
## What the Core Rule Set lets through
Sign-up is off: accounts are made with `gitea admin user create`. gitea starts
at its defaults, with SQLite. traefik answers with a certificate it made itself
until you add a certificate resolver, as for your other sites. SSH to gitea does
not pass through `smallwebwaf`; publish gitea's SSH port yourself if you use it.
At the defaults, the Core Rule Set lets gitea's ordinary use through, apart from
the refusals in the next section:
`make gitea-setup` checks the setup. It builds the image, brings the setup up
under a name of its own, and checks:
- browsing and views of files in a repository, with their history, blame and the
file tree;
- diffs, including their hidden lines and large files, and pull request review;
- git's clone, fetch and push over HTTP;
- signing in, including the return to the page a visitor came from, and sign-in
with Git Credential Manager, git-credential-oauth or tea;
- the API's calls for a file and its commits;
- pushing and pulling container images and packages;
- Actions runners, and artifacts uploaded with `actions/upload-artifact@v4`;
- posting issues, pull requests, comments, wiki pages and files saved in the web
editor, code included, since no body is read;
- the page gitea shows after a change, with its message naming what was done.
- that a page load, a push and a clone sent through traefik pass through
`rproxy`, and that `servewaf` checks them;
- that gitea logs the visitor's address, not `rproxy`'s;
- that a request from a container on the shared network skips the checks;
- that the Core Rule Set refuses none of the ordinary gitea requests in
`internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt`, sent by a signed-in user;
- that it refuses none of the API calls with JSON bodies;
- that it refuses no fetch;
- that it refuses SQL injection, path traversal and script injection in a query
string;
- that with `servewaf` stopped, gitea still answers through `rproxy`.
## What the Core Rule Set still refuses
## Uploads and downloads
Each refusal answers only that request ("Bans" in `SPEC.md` says what it counts
toward). The request log names the rule in `waf_rule_ids`, which
`SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` can switch off.
An upload is a request:
### A query string that reads as an attack
- a git push;
- an LFS object;
- a container image layer;
- a package file;
- a release attachment.
Most often this is a search. A search term is a query parameter, which the Core
Rule Set checks against its lists of system files and commands (see the fourth
change under "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A release attachment uploaded
through the API as `docker-compose.yml` is refused the same way. Examples:
The setup lets an upload of up to 2 GiB, sent in up to 30 minutes, through:
- a name on those lists, such as `package.json`, `.gitignore` or
`docker-compose.yml`;
- text that starts with a command name, such as `python3` or `ssh key`, or has
one right after a `/` in its first word, such as `feat/docker-support`;
- a shell command with its options or a system path (`ls -la`, `sed -i`,
`/bin/sh`), or a command in backticks;
- script code (`fetch(`, `${VAR}`, `process.env`), HTML (`<img src=`) or an SQL
statement (`SELECT * FROM users WHERE`);
- a URL naming an IP address or `localhost`.
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` is `2G`. At the default, an upload over 100 MiB is cut
off.
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` is `1800000`, 30 minutes. At the default, an upload
that takes over 60 seconds is cut off.
- traefik's `readTimeout` is 30 minutes. traefik's own default of 60 seconds for
a whole request would cut off an upload first.
### A branch, tag or file name that starts with a command name
A clone or a download is a response:
The Core Rule Set's list of commands (932260) holds names such as `docker-`,
`python3`, `ansible`, `base64` and `whoami`. A query parameter holding a branch,
tag or file name that starts with one is refused. So is one that has such a name
right after a `/`, such as `feat/docker-support`, `fix/docker-build` or
`renovate/docker-build-push-action-6.x`. gitea's own pages send the name in a
query parameter that 930120, 932160 and 932260 still check:
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` is `900000`, 15 minutes, half the default. A clone
or download that takes longer is cut off.
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` stays at its default, 1 GiB. A repository whose clone
is larger needs it raised.
- `refSubUrl`, the branch or tag of a directory listing. A listing sends it when
it asks for its entries' last commits in a second request. It does so whenever
gitea takes more than a second to work them out;
- `name`, when a branch is deleted or restored on the branches page;
- `tag`, when a release is started from a tag;
- `template`, the file of an issue template, when an issue is opened from it;
- `rule_name`, when a branch protection rule is opened for editing in the
repository's settings or has just been saved.
The byte limits stay at their defaults: no minute limit, 50 GiB an hour and 100
GiB a day.
What a visitor sees, for a branch named `docker-build`:
## The checks
- A directory listing that makes that second request leaves those last commits
out and shows an error.
- The branches page shows an error instead of deleting or restoring the branch.
- A release started from such a tag gets the `403` answer of `smallwebwaf` in
place of its form. So does an issue opened from such a template, and such a
rule opened for editing.
- Saving such a rule stores it. gitea then returns to the branch settings page,
which gets the `403` answer, so the save looks as if it failed.
The Core Rule Set runs in `block` mode, the default, with gitea's exclusions
(see "The Core Rule Set's exclusions" below).
### A file name in a query parameter that trips the code rules
Every other check stays at its default. A client may make 120 requests a minute,
1,500 an hour and 6,000 a day. Archive downloads and blame and history pages are
what scrapers hammer, and these limits do most of the work there.
The Core Rule Set's rules for Java, script, PowerShell and SQL find what they
look for in some file names. This holds too in the ten query parameters that
930120, 932160 and 932260 do not check (see the fourth change under "Attack
detection" in `SPEC.md`). Examples:
## The shared network
- `runtime` in OpenJDK's `src/java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java`
(944110);
- a Java class, as in `java.lang.String.md` (944130);
- `document.write.js` (941180);
- `process.env.d.ts` (934100);
- `__proto__` (934130);
- the PowerShell command `Install-Script`, as in `install-script.sh` (932120);
- a database's name, as in PostgreSQL's `information_schema.sql` (942140).
Containers on the shared network skip `servewaf`'s checks:
For such a file, these requests are refused:
- The shared network's subnets are `10.99.0.0/24` and `fd10:99::/64`. Docker
gives its containers addresses in the upper half of each, `10.99.0.128/25` and
`fd10:99:0:0:8000::/65`, which `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` names.
- traefik is known on the shared network by the site's host name. So a container
there that asks for the site reaches traefik from its own address. An
automation fleet in such a container skips the checks.
- Each subnet's gateway, `10.99.0.1` and `fd10:99::1`, is the host's own address
on it. Requests docker passes on from a published port can come from the
gateway, so the gateways are left out of `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`. The network has
IPv6, so a visitor over IPv6 reaches traefik from its own address, and
`servewaf` checks it as itself.
- A container on the shared network that asks for the site at the host's public
address arrives from the gateway. It is checked like any visitor.
- A fleet on another host can have its address added to `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`.
Without that, it is counted like any client.
- traefik replaces the `X-Forwarded-For` a visitor sends, by default. Keep it
so: otherwise a visitor could name an address on the shared network, and skip
the checks.
- Anything on the shared network can reach gitea and `servewaf` around `rproxy`.
Put only containers you trust on it.
- the API's list of its commits (`path`);
- the API's call for the contents of files that names it in its query (`body`);
- the commit graph of that file alone (`file`);
- the hidden lines of its diff (`path`), which stay hidden;
- the sign-in page, for a visitor who opens a page of the file that needs
signing in, such as its edit page (`redirect_to`). The visitor can still sign
in by opening the sign-in page itself.
## gitea's settings
### A path
- `REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` names `rproxy`'s fixed addresses, `10.99.0.2`
and `fd10:99::2`. gitea then takes each visitor's address from the `X-Real-Ip`
header, which traefik sets and `rproxy` passes on. Without it, gitea logs
every visitor as `rproxy`.
- `INSTALL_LOCK` is `true`, as "The setup" above says.
- A file name ending in `~`, or an `.xhtml` file whose path holds a space.
- A path that holds what the Core Rule Set takes for a Java class (944130), as
`java.lang.String.md` and
`META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory` do.
- A path that holds what it takes for Node.js code (934100), as
`process.env.d.ts` does.
- A path with a directory named `...` (930100, 930110), such as `.../notes.txt`.
## Methods
For such a file, these are refused:
`rproxy` passes on only these methods: `GET`, `HEAD`, `POST`, `OPTIONS`, `PUT`,
`DELETE`, `PATCH` and `QUERY`. gitea 1.27.3 needs no other. Its routes use:
- the page of the file;
- its raw file;
- its history and its blame;
- its edit page.
- pages and the API: `GET`, `HEAD`, `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH` and `DELETE`;
- git's push, clone and fetch over HTTP: `GET`, `POST` and `OPTIONS`;
- LFS: `GET`, `POST` and `PUT`;
- the container registry and the other package registries: `GET`, `HEAD`,
`POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH` and `DELETE`;
- Actions runners: `POST`.
The directory that holds it lists it, and a clone carries it.
## The log
### A container image push that reuses a layer
`rproxy` and `servewaf` write each query string to the log whole. A token sent
in the query string, as `?token=`, is then in the log. Send it in the
`Authorization` header instead.
A push can reuse a layer of an image docker has pushed to that gitea before.
docker then asks gitea to take the layer from that image, naming it in the query
parameter `from`, which 932260 checks. The request is refused when the image's
owner starts with an entry on the list of commands. It is refused too when the
image's name after the owner starts with one. Examples are `owner/python3-app`,
`owner/docker-base`, and any image of an owner named `ansible` or `docker-team`.
## Actions runners
What happens next depends on docker's image store. A docker that keeps its
images in containerd's image store fails the push, and fails each new try the
same way. A new install of Docker Engine 29 does this. A docker that keeps them
in its own older image store uploads the layer instead. The push then succeeds
after one refusal for each layer it reuses, and each of those refusals counts
toward the error burst ("Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
A runner on the shared network skips the checks. One on another host is counted
like any client. A runner older than version 0.4 (April 2026) asks for work
every 2 seconds, 1,800 requests an hour. While it runs a job, it reports the
job's log and state every second instead, two requests a second.
### Artifact uploads from `actions/upload-artifact@v3`
So one idle runner makes 1,800 requests an hour, more than the hour limit of
1,500. A busy one, at two requests a second, passes the minute limit of 120
within two minutes. Its address is then banned, its running jobs fail, and each
repeat within a day makes the ban longer. Newer runners ask for work less often.
Put the runners' addresses in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
This action sends the header `Content-Range`, which the Core Rule Set refuses
(920450). The action sends two files at a time, does not retry a `403`, and
sends no further file once one is refused. So an upload is refused once or
twice, however many files it holds, and the step fails. One upload does not ban
the runner. The error burst ("Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`) bans it after more
than 30 such refusals from its address in a minute, as when many jobs upload at
once. `actions/upload-artifact@v4` does not send the header.
## The Core Rule Set's exclusions
## What body inspection refuses
`deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf` switches single Core Rule Set rules off where
they refused ordinary gitea requests. `servewaf` loads it from
`SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE`, before the Core Rule Set's rules. Each
exclusion covers one rule, in these places only:
With `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` set, the Core Rule Set reads request bodies too. In
front of gitea it then refuses these, until their rule ids, named in the request
log, are added to `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES`:
- `q`, the text of every search;
- the query parameters that hold a file name: `file`, `path`, `template`, `body`
and `redirect_to`;
- the query parameters that hold a branch or tag name: `name`, `tag`,
`rule_name` and `refSubUrl`;
- `Referer`, on a page opened from search results or from a file's page;
- the path of a file's page, raw file, blame, history and edit page, and of the
API's call for its contents;
- `name`, the file name of an attachment uploaded through the API;
- the header `Content-Range` of an Actions artifact upload.
- issue and comment text, wiki pages and files saved in the web editor that hold
shell commands or code (932125, 932235, 932250 and others);
- package descriptions that show code;
- PyPI uploads (922130);
- attachments named like `debug.log` or `config.yml` (932180).
gitea reads these as text to search for, as names in a repository, or, for
`Content-Range`, as the part of a file an upload carries. It never runs them as
SQL, a command or a page's script. So an attack that only the excluded rules
would catch there reaches gitea and does nothing. Every other field and path
keeps every rule.
## What `script/gitea-requests` sends
To add an exclusion for a request the Core Rule Set refuses:
Of the requests above, the script sends:
1. Find the request in `servewaf`'s log. Its line gives the path and query, and
names the rules in `waf_rule_ids`.
2. For each rule, add a line with `ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById` for the field it
matched. For a field on every path, copy one of the file's `SecAction` lines.
For some paths only, copy one of its `SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME` lines. Give
it a new id. An id from 900000 to 900999 stops the start.
3. Above it, write a one-line comment naming the request it refused.
4. Add the request to `internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt`, and run
`make check`.
5. Restart `servewaf`.
- for each file named under "A file name in a query parameter that trips the
code rules", the API's list of its commits;
- for `Runtime.java` alone, the commit graph of that file, the hidden lines of
its diff, and the API's call for the contents of files that names it;
- the sign-in page for a visitor who opens the edit page of `document.write.js`;
- the pages of `java.lang.String.md`,
`META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory`, `process.env.d.ts`
and `.../notes.txt`;
- one container image push that reuses a layer, which it does not try again.
The Core Rule Set still refuses the page of a file in a directory named `...`,
which reads as path traversal.
It does not send the raw file, history, blame or edit page of those four files,
or the pages of the directories `META-INF/services` and `...`. It also sends a
short sample of gitea's ordinary use:
With `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` set, it also refuses issue text, comments, wiki
pages and files saved in the web editor that hold shell commands or code.
`make gitea-requests` runs gitea behind `rproxy` and `servewaf` at the defaults,
without these exclusions. It reports each request the Core Rule Set refuses
there.
- signing in;
- pages of files and commits, and a diff;
- the API;
- a push, and clone and fetch over HTTP;
- two container image pushes.
docs/image.md
+9 -8
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
# What the image holds
The contents of the `smallwebwaf` image, and how each part is pinned. The image
runs `rproxy` by default, or `servewaf` with `SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf`.
The contents of the `smallwebwaf` image, and how each part is pinned.
"Deployment" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says why each part is there and why it
is pinned that way.
## Contents
- Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, pinned by digest.
- `ca-certificates`, `nix-bin` and `runit` from Ubuntu's archive.
- `ca-certificates`, `nix-bin` and `runit` from Ubuntu, from the snapshot of its
archive at `20261001T000000Z`.
- Nix, with nixpkgs `nixos-26.05.11045.774debe7a0d1` set up for root as
`nixpkgs`. No Nix daemon; `build-users-group =` in `/etc/nix/nix.conf`. Root's
Nix profile, `/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin`, last on the `PATH`.
@@ -18,15 +18,16 @@ is pinned that way.
- The `smallwebwaf` binary, and the user `smallwebwaf` (uid and gid 65532).
- The service directory `/etc/service/smallwebwaf`, with the `run` script
`share/smallwebwaf.run`.
- `/var/lib/smallwebwaf` for `servewaf`'s state files, and
`/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d` with the default rule file
`share/rules.d/00-default.rules`.
- `/var/lib/smallwebwaf` for the state files, and `/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d`
with the default rule file `share/rules.d/00-default.rules`.
- `EXPOSE 8080`, and the `HEALTHCHECK` that runs `smallwebwaf healthcheck`.
## Pins
- Ubuntu's packages are not pinned: they come from the live archive, whose
packages change with every update.
- Ubuntu's packages: the snapshot service, `--snapshot 20261001T000000Z` on both
`apt-get update` and `apt-get install`. The SHA-256 hash of each of the
snapshot's `InRelease` files is named in the `Dockerfile` and checked after
`apt-get update`. The hashes are the amd64 archive's.
- nixpkgs: the release file `nixexprs.tar.xz` of
`nixos-26.05.11045.774debe7a0d1` on `releases.nixos.org`, named with its
SHA-256 hash.
docs/metrics.md
+10 -17
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
# The metrics
What `GET /_smallwebwaf/metrics` answers with, at `servewaf`'s own address.
"Metrics endpoint" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) describes the endpoint. Prometheus
keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
`honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
What `GET /_smallwebwaf/metrics` answers with. "Metrics endpoint" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) describes the endpoint. Prometheus keeps the `instance`
label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets `honor_labels: true`.
`smallwebwaf servewaf` counts a denied request at its decision. It counts an
allowed request when its report comes, with the status, bytes and times the
report gives. A report itself is not counted, and neither is a request whose
report never comes.
## Traffic
@@ -12,13 +16,13 @@ keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
`action`;
- `smallwebwaf_request_duration_seconds` and
`smallwebwaf_upstream_duration_seconds`, as histograms;
- `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight`: the questions and requests to its own
endpoints that `servewaf` is handling.
- `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight`.
## Limits and bans
- `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total`, by `window` and by `kind` (`requests`,
`bytes` or `refusals`);
- `smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total`, by `limit`, the setting passed;
- `smallwebwaf_offences_total`, by `kind`;
- `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total`, by `cause`;
- `smallwebwaf_active_bans` and `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans`.
@@ -80,14 +84,3 @@ By `file`:
`smallwebwaf_alerts_failed_total`, `smallwebwaf_alerts_suppressed_total` and
`smallwebwaf_alerts_dropped_total`;
- Go's own `go_` metrics and the process's `process_` metrics.
## When a request is counted
`servewaf` counts a denied request at its decision, and a request to its own
endpoints when it is answered. It counts an allowed request when its report
comes, with the status, bytes and times the report gives. These are not counted:
- a report itself;
- an allowed request whose report never comes;
- a question refused with `400`;
- a question whose body stopped arriving.
docs/request-log.md
+68 -122
View File
@@ -1,37 +1,18 @@
# The request log's fields
The fields of the JSON objects `rproxy` and `servewaf` write about each request.
"Request log" and "The log" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) say when a line is
written and how the log is sent to a syslog server. A field that does not apply
to a request is left out.
The fields of the JSON object `smallwebwaf` writes for each request. "Request
log" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says when a line is written and how the log is
sent to a syslog server. A field that does not apply to a request is left out.
## `servewaf`'s lines
`smallwebwaf servewaf` writes two lines for each question it answers, joined by
`request_id`. The field `servewaf_line` says which of the two a line is:
- `decision`: the line it writes once it has answered the question;
- `report`: the line it writes when `rproxy`'s report comes, with everything
known. The repetition is intended.
A request to its own endpoints writes one line, without `servewaf_line`. A
report writes no line but the `report` line of the request it names.
These questions write no line:
- a question refused with `400` (see "The question" under "`servewaf`" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md));
- a question whose body stopped arriving, which gets no answer.
A `report` line:
## Example
```
{"type":"request","servewaf_line":"report","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"fsn1/servewaf","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","asn":"AS64496","as_name":"Example Net","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40,"minute_bytes":5120,"hour_bytes":61440,"day_bytes":204800},"waf_score":0,"duration_total":3.217,"duration_checks":0.041,"duration_waf":0.029,"duration_upstream_total":3.104}
{"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"fsn1app1/gitea","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","asn":"AS64496","as_name":"Example Net","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"response_content_type":"text/html; charset=utf-8","upstream_status":200,"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40,"minute_bytes":5120,"hour_bytes":61440,"day_bytes":204800},"duration_total":3.217,"duration_checks":0.041,"duration_upstream_connect":0.052,"duration_upstream_first_byte":2.874,"duration_upstream_total":3.104}
```
### Every line
## Every line
Every one of these lines has:
Every line has:
- `type`: `request` (the process's own messages have `process`);
- the standard web log fields;
@@ -39,38 +20,21 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`;
- `action` and `duration_total`.
### Standard web log fields
## Standard web log fields
- `time`: when `servewaf` had read the question's body, RFC 3339 with
milliseconds, in UTC. The `report` line gives the same time as the `decision`
line.
- `instance`: `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME`.
- `client_ip`: the visitor's address, as `rproxy` worked it out.
- `method`, `path` and `query`: the visitor's request.
- `scheme`: how the visitor reached `rproxy` or the trusted proxy in front of
it.
- `host`: the site the visitor asked for.
- `protocol`: the question's own, `HTTP/1.1`.
- `status`:
- on the `decision` line, what `servewaf` answered: `200` for `allow`, the
status of `deny`, or `0` for `close`, as the visitor is then sent nothing;
- on the `report` line, what the visitor got, `0` if nothing.
- `request_bytes`:
- on the `decision` line, how much of the question's body the Core Rule Set
read;
- on the `report` line, the bytes of the visitor's body that `rproxy` read,
with what a WebSocket carried from the visitor.
- `response_bytes`:
- on the `decision` line, the body of `servewaf`'s answer;
- on the `report` line, the bytes of the answer's body, with what a
WebSocket carried from the app.
- `time`: when the request arrived, RFC 3339 with milliseconds, in UTC;
- `instance`: `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME`;
- `client_ip`, `method`, `scheme`, `host`, `path`, `query`, `protocol`;
- `status`: what the client was sent, `0` if nothing;
- `request_bytes` and `response_bytes`: body bytes each way;
- `referer` and `user_agent`.
### Request detail
## Request detail
- `request_id`: the id `rproxy` made for the request when it arrived.
- `peer_ip`: the address of `rproxy`'s TCP peer, normally traefik.
- `forwarded_for`: the `X-Forwarded-For` header the visitor's request came with.
- `request_id`: the `X-Request-ID` a trusted proxy sent, or a new random one of
26 letters and digits.
- `peer_ip`: the TCP peer, normally traefik.
- `forwarded_for`: the `X-Forwarded-For` header as received.
- `client_group`: the client as rate limiting counts it, an IPv4 address as a
/32 or an IPv6 group.
- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, as looked up. Each is empty
@@ -78,32 +42,34 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- lookups are off;
- the client is not looked up;
- the source cannot place the client;
- GeoJS had not answered by the time `servewaf` answered.
- `content_type`: the visitor's `Content-Type`.
- `content_length`: the body length the visitor announced.
- GeoJS had not answered by the time the request went on.
- `content_type` and `content_length`: the request's own.
- `request_headers`: the headers listed in `SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS`, by name
in lower case.
- `has_authorization` and `has_cookie`: true when the request had those headers.
Their values are never logged.
- `websocket`: true when the app switched the connection to another protocol.
### Response detail
## Response detail
- `response_content_type`: the type of `servewaf`'s own answer.
- `aborted`: true when `rproxy` went away before the answer.
- `upstream_status`: what the app answered. It differs from `status` when
`smallwebwaf` answered itself.
- `response_content_type`, `cache_control` and `location`: the answer's headers.
- `aborted`: true when the client went away early.
### Decision
## Decision
- `action`: what was done:
- `forward`: answered `allow`, so that `rproxy` passes it to the app;
- `forward`: passed to the app;
- `denied`: refused for `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, or for a reputation source with
the action `deny`;
- `banned`: refused under a ban, or for a `ban` rule, a trap path or a
CrowdSec decision, each of which bans the client;
- `country_denied`, `rate_limited`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`:
refused by that check;
- `too_large`: over a header limit;
- `admin`: answered at one of `servewaf`'s own endpoints, or `404` for a
path under `/_smallwebwaf/`.
- `too_large` and `timed_out`: a size or time limit was passed;
- `upstream_error`: the app could not be reached, or its answer broke off;
- `admin`: answered at one of `smallwebwaf`'s own endpoints.
- `would_action`: in `observe` mode, what `enforce` mode would have done with a
request it would have refused. `action` then names what was done, normally
`forward`.
@@ -117,9 +83,7 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: bytes.
A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes of an allowed request are counted when
its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the bytes are without this
request's.
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
- `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
@@ -127,7 +91,7 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- `error_burst`.
A request whose bytes broke a limit was passed on whole, so its `action`
stays `forward`. Only its `report` line gives that limit.
stays `forward`.
- `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
refused.
@@ -142,65 +106,47 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- `ban_expires`: when the client's ban ends, for a request that made one or was
refused under one: a time, or `permanent`.
### Timings
## Timings
All in milliseconds:
- `duration_total`:
- on the `decision` line, from `servewaf` having read the question's body to
the line;
- on the `report` line, from `rproxy` having read the request's headers to
the end of the answer.
- `duration_checks`: to the end of the checks;
- `duration_total`: from the request's headers being read to its log line;
- `duration_checks`: to the end of the checks, before forwarding;
- `duration_waf`: the part of that the Core Rule Set took;
- `duration_upstream_total`: on the `report` line of an allowed request, from
the hand-over to the app to the end of the answer.
- `duration_upstream_connect`: from the hand-over to the app until there was a
connection;
- `duration_upstream_first_byte`: until the first byte of the answer;
- `duration_upstream_total`: until the end of the answer.
### Requests to its own endpoints
## `servewaf`'s line
The line of a request to `servewaf`'s own endpoints has these fields, with these
meanings where they differ:
`smallwebwaf servewaf` writes one line for each question, once it has answered
it, and one for each request to its own endpoints but a report. A report writes
no line. A question's line has the fields above, with these meanings where they
differ:
- `client_ip` and `peer_ip`: the request's TCP peer.
- `request_id`: a new random one of 26 letters and digits.
- `scheme`: `http`.
- `time`: when the request's headers had been read.
- `request_bytes`: the bytes read of a ban to add, and otherwise `0`.
- `action`: `admin`.
- `duration_total`: from the request's headers being read to the line.
- `client_ip`: `X-Smallwebwaf-Client`.
- `peer_ip`: `X-Smallwebwaf-Peer`.
- `host`: the site the visitor asked for.
- `protocol`: the question's own, `HTTP/1.1`.
- `content_length`: `X-Smallwebwaf-Content-Length`.
- `request_id`: the id `servewaf` answers with on `allow`.
- `status`: what `servewaf` answered: `200` for `allow`, the status of `deny`,
or `0` for `close`, as the visitor is then sent nothing.
- `request_bytes`: how much of the question's body the Core Rule Set read.
- `response_bytes`: the body of `servewaf`'s answer.
- `action`: `forward` for `allow`, and `admin` for the `404` for a path under
`/_smallwebwaf/`.
- `aborted`: true when `rproxy` went away before the answer.
- `duration_total`: from the question's headers being read to the line.
## `rproxy`'s line
The line leaves out `upstream_status`, `websocket` and the
`duration_upstream_...` fields, since `servewaf` passes nothing to the app.
`rproxy` holds the visitor's status, the body bytes and the times of the app's
answer. The request id joins the two.
`smallwebwaf rproxy` writes one short line for each request. `request_id` joins
it to `servewaf`'s two. It has these fields and no others:
- `type`: `request`.
- `time`: when the request arrived, RFC 3339 with milliseconds, in UTC.
- `request_id`: the id `rproxy` made for the request when it arrived.
- `client_ip`: the visitor's address.
- `host` and `method`.
- `path` and `query`: as the visitor sent them.
- `status`: what the visitor got, `0` if nothing.
- `request_bytes`: the bytes of the visitor's body that `rproxy` read, with what
a WebSocket carried from the visitor.
- `response_bytes`: the bytes of the answer's body, with what a WebSocket
carried from the app.
- `duration_request`: milliseconds from the request's headers being read until
the app had been sent the whole request, or the answer started if that was
sooner. It includes the wait for `servewaf`.
- `duration_response`: milliseconds from then until the end of the answer.
- `disposition`: what was done with the request: `allow`, `deny` or `close`. It
is `servewaf`'s answer, or the value of `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`. It is left
out when:
- `servewaf` was not asked, as for the health check;
- the visitor went away while `servewaf` was being asked;
- `servewaf`'s answer had no valid `X-Smallwebwaf-Disposition`;
- `rproxy` could not pass on `servewaf`'s answer, and answered `502`.
- `default_disposition`: `true` when `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` gave
`disposition`, and otherwise left out.
For example:
```
{"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","host":"app.example","method":"GET","path":"/","query":"","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"duration_request":1.204,"duration_response":3.104,"disposition":"allow"}
```
The bytes of an allowed request are counted when its report comes, after its
line. So `counts` holds the client's bytes without this request's. A report that
breaks a byte limit writes a process message instead of `limit_hit` on the line:
`a report's bytes broke a byte limit`, with `request_id`, `client_ip`, `host`,
`limit_hit` and `ban_expires`.
docs/rules.md
+2 -7
View File
@@ -54,19 +54,14 @@ empty-agent user_agent log ^$
## A file of your own
`servewaf` reads the rule files in its own container. Rules of your own go in a
file named to sort after the default, such as `50-gitea.rules`:
An app's `Dockerfile` adds rules of its own in a file named to sort after the
default, such as `50-gitea.rules`:
```
# 50-gitea.rules: WordPress probes, which gitea never serves
wp-probe path ban (?i)^/(wp-login\.php|xmlrpc\.php|wp-admin/)
```
A `Dockerfile` built on the `smallwebwaf` image, for `servewaf` to run from,
adds it:
```dockerfile
COPY 50-gitea.rules /etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/50-gitea.rules
```
Or mount it there. A `path` rule applies on every site behind that `servewaf`.
docs/settings.md
+60 -124
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,22 @@ Every setting, its default and the values it takes, in the groups of "Settings"
in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md). That section gives the conventions, the settings
that take `off`, the `_FILE` form, and what each group does and why.
The settings that start with `SWWAF_` are `servewaf`'s. Those that start with
`SWRP_` are `rproxy`'s, and are under "`rproxy`" below. `SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND`
chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## `servewaf`
`smallwebwaf servewaf` uses every setting here but these, which it ignores:
- `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL` and `SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES`;
- the five timeouts under "Size and time limits";
- `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES`, `SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` and
`SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES`.
An invalid value of one of these still stops the start, and the line of settings
at start still shows them.
`SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` puts the headers on the answer to `rproxy`, not on a
request to an app. `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` has an effect up to 64 KiB less one
byte, whatever its value. A question carries no more of a body than 64 KiB (see
"`servewaf`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## Forms of values
@@ -28,22 +41,26 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Core
- `SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `servewaf` listens: `:` and a
- `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL` (default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`): the app. An `http` or
`https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
- `SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `smallwebwaf` listens: `:` and a
port, such as `:9000`. Leave the host out (see "Ports" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME` (default: the container's host name): the `instance`
name in each line `servewaf` logs, and in each alert and metric, such as
`fsn1/servewaf`. Valid UTF-8. No control character while
`SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` is set. 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a
space while `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set and `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` is
not.
name in every log line, alert and metric, such as `fsn1app1/gitea`. Valid
UTF-8. No control character while `SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` is set. 1 to 48
printable ASCII characters without a space while `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set
and `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` is not.
- `SWWAF_MODE` (default `enforce`): `enforce` or `observe`.
- `SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (default `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`):
the netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` is believed. Set but empty, it trusts
nothing.
- `SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` (default `64`): the prefix length of an IPv6
client's group, from 32 to 128.
- `SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` (default `20000`): the most clients kept, a whole
number above zero.
- `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): how many of its own bans `servewaf` keeps,
a whole number above zero.
- `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): how many of its own bans `smallwebwaf`
keeps, a whole number above zero.
## Tokens
@@ -63,7 +80,7 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Logging
- `SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL` (default `info`): the least severe of `servewaf`'s own
- `SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL` (default `info`): the least severe of `smallwebwaf`'s own
messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` (default
`accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range`): the
@@ -99,35 +116,41 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Request rate limits, per client
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
person opening two gitea pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files
each.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `1500`): the most requests a client may
make in an hour. A count or `off`. It is the main limit against scrapers. A
person reading code in gitea for an hour, a page every 20 seconds, makes
about 900. A scraper making one request every 2 seconds makes 1,800 an hour,
more than the limit.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `6000`): the most requests a client may
make in a day. A count or `off`. The default is four hours at the hour limit.
A scraper making one request every 10 seconds makes 8,640 a day, more than the
limit.
- An Actions runner asks gitea for work all day and can pass the limits. Put the
runners' addresses in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`. Do the same for a
network where many people share one address, such as an office.
- Counting cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits (see "Request
rate limits, per client" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `6000`), `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `100000`) and `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `1000000`): the
most requests a client may make in each window. A count or `off`.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes exempt from
rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`.
## Byte limits, per client
- `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `50G`) and `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most
- `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `4G`), `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `20G`) and `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `200G`): the most
bytes counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
- `SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
`response`, `request` or `both`.
## Size and time limits
- `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` (default `60s`): how long a client may take to
send its request line and headers, and then, from the end of the headers, its
body. A duration or `off`.
- `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES` (default `32K`): the largest request
line and headers. A size over `4K`; never `off`.
- `SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT` (default `120s`): how long a kept-open connection
may wait for its next request before it is closed. A duration or `off`.
- `SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` (default `30m`): how long the answer may take
to reach the client, from the end of the request to the last byte. A duration
or `off`.
- `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` (default `60s`): how long connecting to the
app and sending it the whole request may take. A duration or `off`.
- `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` (default `30m`): how long the app may take
to send its whole answer. A duration or `off`.
- `SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A size
or `off`.
- `SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A size
or `off`.
## Lookup of AS number and country
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` (default `geojs`): `geojs`, `file` or `off`. `off` stops
@@ -139,12 +162,11 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
- an anomaly threshold per AS number.
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` (default empty): the IPinfo Lite database file, in its
`.mmdb` form, for `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`.
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` (default `800ms`): how long a request waits for its
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` (default `1s`): how long a request waits for its
client's first answer from GeoJS, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. A
duration; never `off`.
- `SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `false`): `true` has `rproxy` pass the app
the client's AS number in `X-Client-ASN` and its country in
`X-Client-Country`.
- `SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `false`): `true` passes the app the
client's AS number in `X-Client-ASN` and its country in `X-Client-Country`.
## Country lists
@@ -189,16 +211,7 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
- `SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes the Core Rule Set does
not inspect.
- `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` (default `off`): `off`, or how much of a request body
the Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `64K`. A question carries no more
of a body than 64 KiB, and the Core Rule Set reads at most 64 KiB less one
byte of it, whatever the value (see "The answer" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` (default unset): a file of Core Rule Set
exclusions, written as Coraza directives. It is loaded before the Core Rule
Set's rules, so it holds only `SecAction` and `SecRule` lines that exclude
with `ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById` or `ctl:ruleRemoveById`. A file that cannot be
read or does not parse stops the start, whatever `SWWAF_WAF_MODE` is. So does
a file that names a number from 900000 to 900999 outside a comment, alone or
in a range. It has no `_FILE` form.
the Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `1G`.
- `SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client
in a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
@@ -319,7 +332,6 @@ Then mount its directory into the container read-only, and name the file:
```sh
docker run \
-v /srv/app/tokens:/etc/smallwebwaf/tokens:ro \
-e SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf \
-e SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE=/etc/smallwebwaf/tokens/metrics \
...
```
@@ -333,80 +345,4 @@ A few limits are fixed rather than settings:
- at most 1,000 DNS blocklist queries are under way at once;
- at most 20,000 anomaly counters are kept;
- each alert destination's queue holds at most 1,000 alerts;
- `servewaf` holds at most 10,000 answered requests awaiting their reports;
- `servewaf` refuses a request with more than 50 cookies or more than 100 header
fields (see "Answering in time" under "`servewaf`" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md));
- `rproxy` takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB, and closes a
kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds;
- `rproxy` reads at most 1 MiB of the body of `servewaf`'s answer, and answers
`502` to a longer one.
## `servewaf`'s answer and `rproxy`'s wait
`SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` is the longest a question waits on an outside source.
Keep it well under `rproxy`'s `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, as the default is. No question
waits for `SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT`, since the DNS blocklists and AbuseIPDB are
asked in the background (see "Answering in time" under "`servewaf`" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## `rproxy`
`smallwebwaf rproxy` reads the settings below and no others. They are read once
at start, and an invalid value stops the start. None can be given as a file,
since `rproxy` never touches disk. "`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says
what they do.
A time here is a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as `2000`.
- `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` (required, no default): `servewaf`'s URL. An `http` or
`https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more. `rproxy`
speaks HTTP/1.1 to it.
- `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long `rproxy` waits for `servewaf`'s
answer, to a question and to a report. A time; never `off`.
- `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` (default `allow`): what is done with a request when
`servewaf` cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer
within `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`. `allow` passes it to the app, and `deny` answers
`503`. It does not apply to an answer `servewaf` gives, such as an error.
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A size or
`off`.
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A size or
`off`.
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` (default `60000`): how long the visitor may take to
send its request line and headers. It then also bounds, from the end of the
headers, the time until the app has been sent the whole request. A time or
`off`.
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` (default `1800000`): how long the answer may take,
from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor. A time or
`off`.
- `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `rproxy` listens, such as `:9000`.
- `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` (default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`): the app. An `http` or
`https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
- `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (default `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`):
the netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` is believed. Set but empty, it trusts
nothing. A client outside these netblocks cannot claim another address. Where
other containers reach `rproxy` directly, or visitors on a private network
reach traefik, they can name another address in the header. Narrowing the
setting to traefik's own network closes that gap.
## The image's command
`SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND` (default `rproxy`) chooses what the image runs and what
its health check checks: `rproxy` or `servewaf` (see "Deployment" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). It cannot be given as a file.
## Where earlier settings went
Nothing reads these names any more:
- `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL` is `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`.
- `SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES` is `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
- `SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` is `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE`.
- `SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` is `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE`.
- `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` and `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` are
`SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
- `SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` and `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` are
`SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
- `SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT` and `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES` have
no setting. `rproxy` closes a kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds, and
takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB.
- `servewaf` holds at most 10,000 allowed requests awaiting their reports.
docs/state-files.md
+3 -3
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Each has a top-level `version` of 1.
## `bans.json`
Active and past bans: every ban an admin made, and up to `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` of
those `servewaf` made. Per entry:
those `smallwebwaf` made. Per entry:
- `netblock`, `start` and `expires` (`null` for a permanent ban);
- `cause`: `attack`, `limit`, `admin` or `crowdsec`;
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ since it was first seen:
- total requests, and how many were forwarded and how many refused;
- bytes in each direction;
- responses by status class;
- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`. A file
may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which nothing adds to.
- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `rule_blocked`, `waf_blocked` and
`token_refused`.
## `lookups.json`
internal/config/config.go
+129 -93
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
// Package config reads smallwebwaf's settings, and is the one place they are
// read. Every setting is an environment variable. The settings of `smallwebwaf
// servewaf` start with SWWAF_, every one of them has a default, and most can be
// given as a file instead. Those of `smallwebwaf rproxy` start with SWRP_. Each
// of them but SWRP_WAF_BACKEND has a default, and none can be given as a file,
// since rproxy never touches disk. SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND chooses which of the two
// the image runs.
// Package config reads smallwebwaf's settings. Every setting is an
// environment variable whose name starts with SWWAF_, or a file such a
// variable names, every setting has a default, and this package is the
// one place they are read.
package config
import (
@@ -31,11 +28,13 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
)
// Config is the settings of `smallwebwaf servewaf`. A time or size limit of
// zero is off.
// Config is smallwebwaf's settings. A timeout, size or rate limit of zero
// is off.
type Config struct {
// ListenAddr is where servewaf listens (SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR).
// ListenAddr is where smallwebwaf listens (SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR).
ListenAddr string
// UpstreamURL is the app (SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL).
UpstreamURL *url.URL
// InstanceName is the name every log line and alert gives as instance,
// and every metric carries as its label instance (SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME),
// by default the host's name, which docker sets to the first 12
@@ -44,14 +43,42 @@ type Config struct {
// Observe is true in observe mode, when SWWAF_MODE is observe rather
// than enforce: a request that SWWAF_DENY_NETS, a ban, the country
// lists, a rate limit, a rule or the Core Rule Set would refuse is
// allowed instead, and no ban is made.
// passed to the app instead, and no ban is made.
Observe bool
// TrustedProxies are the netblocks whose X-Forwarded-For is
// believed (SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// IPv6GroupPrefix is the length of the IPv6 netblock that is one client
// (SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX), from 32 to 128.
IPv6GroupPrefix int
// MaxTrackedClients is the most clients the table of clients holds, in
// memory and in clients.json (SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS).
MaxTrackedClients int
// ClientRequestTimeout bounds reading the whole request from the
// client (SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT).
ClientRequestTimeout time.Duration
// ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes is the largest request line and headers
// a client may send (SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES). It is
// never off, and always more than 4K.
ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes int64
// ClientIdleTimeout bounds how long a kept-open client connection
// may wait for its next request (SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT).
ClientIdleTimeout time.Duration
// ClientResponseTimeout bounds writing the whole response to the
// client (SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT).
ClientResponseTimeout time.Duration
// UpstreamRequestTimeout bounds connecting to the app and writing
// the whole request to it (SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT).
UpstreamRequestTimeout time.Duration
// UpstreamResponseTimeout bounds reading the whole response from
// the app (SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT).
UpstreamResponseTimeout time.Duration
// RequestMaxBytes is the largest request body
// (SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES).
RequestMaxBytes int64
// ResponseMaxBytes is the largest response body
// (SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES).
ResponseMaxBytes int64
// AllowNets are the netblocks whose clients skip every check
// (SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS). RateLimitExemptNets are those whose clients the
// rate limits neither count nor refuse (SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS).
@@ -221,21 +248,19 @@ type Config struct {
// WAFExemptPaths the path prefixes it does not inspect
// (SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS), and WAFBodyLimit the most of a request body
// it reads (SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
// CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile is the path of the file of its exclusions
// (SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE), "" while there is none.
WAFMode string
WAFParanoiaLevel int
WAFAnomalyThreshold int
WAFDisabledRules []int
WAFExemptPaths []string
WAFBodyLimit int64
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile string
WAFMode string
WAFParanoiaLevel int
WAFAnomalyThreshold int
WAFDisabledRules []int
WAFExemptPaths []string
WAFBodyLimit int64
// TrapPaths are the paths a request for which is a clear sign of
// attack (SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS), each starting with / and without a ?.
TrapPaths []string
// ErrorBurstThreshold is the most requests of a client within a minute
// that servewaf may refuse after a rule file or Core Rule Set match; one
// more breaks a limit (SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD). 0 is off.
// that smallwebwaf may refuse after a rule file or Core Rule Set match
// or for a missing or wrong token; one more breaks a limit
// (SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD). 0 is off.
ErrorBurstThreshold int64
// LogRemoteURL is where every line on stdout is also sent
// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL), nil while it is unset and nothing is sent.
@@ -338,8 +363,8 @@ const (
// masked is what the log shows for a token that is set, and in place of
// a secret in another setting.
masked = "********"
// defaultListenAddr is the default of SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR and
// SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR, and defaultUpstreamURL that of SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL.
// defaultListenAddr and defaultUpstreamURL are the defaults of
// SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR and SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL.
defaultListenAddr = ":8080"
defaultUpstreamURL = "http://127.0.0.1:8081"
)
@@ -367,14 +392,13 @@ var (
errHeaderTakenOut = errors.New(
"is taken out of every request by Go's HTTP server, so it can never " +
"be logged")
errOnBothLists = errors.New("is in SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES too")
errNotLookupSource = errors.New("is not geojs, file or off")
errNeedsLookups = errors.New("it needs each client looked up")
errNeedsDBPath = errors.New("it names the file to look clients up in")
errDBPathUnused = errors.New("only file reads it")
errOver64K = errors.New(
"is more than 64K, the most servewaf gets of a body")
errNotCommand = errors.New("is not rproxy or servewaf")
errOnBothLists = errors.New("is in SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES too")
errNotLookupSource = errors.New("is not geojs, file or off")
errNeedsLookups = errors.New("it needs each client looked up")
errNeedsDBPath = errors.New("it names the file to look clients up in")
errDBPathUnused = errors.New("only file reads it")
errNotOver4K = errors.New("is not a size of more than 4K, such as 32K")
errOver1G = errors.New("is more than 1G, the most Coraza reads")
errNotDurationAboveZero = errors.New(
"is not a duration above zero, such as 1h or 7d")
errNotNumberAboveZero = errors.New(
@@ -463,27 +487,38 @@ var (
func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: lookupEnv}
cfg := &Config{
ListenAddr: env.address("SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR"),
ListenAddr: env.address("SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR", defaultListenAddr),
UpstreamURL: env.appURL("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL),
InstanceName: env.instanceName(),
Observe: env.observe("SWWAF_MODE", "enforce"),
TrustedProxies: env.netblocks("SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
IPv6GroupPrefix: env.ipv6GroupPrefix("SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX", "64"),
MaxTrackedClients: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS", "20000"),
AllowNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS", ""),
RateLimitExemptNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS", ""),
DenyNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_DENY_NETS", ""),
RateLimitPerMinute: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "120"),
RateLimitPerHour: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "1500"),
RateLimitPerDay: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "6000"),
RateLimitExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
BytesLimitPerMinute: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "off"),
BytesLimitPerHour: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "50G"),
BytesLimitPerDay: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "100G"),
BytesCount: env.bytesCount("SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT", "both"),
LookupSource: env.lookupSource("SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE", "geojs"),
LookupDBPath: env.value("SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH", ""),
LookupTimeout: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT", "800ms"),
AddLookupHeaders: env.boolean("SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS", "false"),
DeniedCountries: env.countries("SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES", ""),
ClientRequestTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT", "60s"),
ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes: env.headerSize(
"SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES", "32K"),
ClientIdleTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT", "120s"),
ClientResponseTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT", "30m"),
UpstreamRequestTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT", "60s"),
UpstreamResponseTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT", "30m"),
RequestMaxBytes: env.size("SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES", "100M"),
ResponseMaxBytes: env.size("SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES", "1G"),
AllowNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS", ""),
RateLimitExemptNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS", ""),
DenyNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_DENY_NETS", ""),
RateLimitPerMinute: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "6000"),
RateLimitPerHour: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "100000"),
RateLimitPerDay: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "1000000"),
RateLimitExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
BytesLimitPerMinute: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "4G"),
BytesLimitPerHour: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "20G"),
BytesLimitPerDay: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "200G"),
BytesCount: env.bytesCount("SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT", "both"),
LookupSource: env.lookupSource("SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE", "geojs"),
LookupDBPath: env.value("SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH", ""),
LookupTimeout: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT", "1s"),
AddLookupHeaders: env.boolean("SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS", "false"),
DeniedCountries: env.countries("SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES", ""),
ExclusivelyAllowedCountries: env.countries(
"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES", ""),
ASNLimitPercent: env.percents("SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT", ParseASN),
@@ -526,10 +561,8 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
WAFAnomalyThreshold: env.numberOrOff("SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD", "5"),
WAFDisabledRules: env.ruleIDs("SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES",
"920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140"),
WAFExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
WAFBodyLimit: env.wafBodyLimit("SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT", off),
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile: env.filePath(
"SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"),
WAFExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
WAFBodyLimit: env.wafBodyLimit("SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT", off),
TrapPaths: env.trapPaths("SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS"),
ErrorBurstThreshold: env.count("SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD", "30"),
LogRemoteURL: env.logRemoteURL("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"),
@@ -577,30 +610,22 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
return cfg, nil
}
// Command reads only SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND, the command the image runs and its
// health check checks: rproxy when it is unset or empty, or servewaf. It cannot
// be given as a file. Any other value is an error that names the setting.
func Command(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (string, error) {
command, _ := lookupEnv("SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND")
switch command {
case "", "rproxy":
return "rproxy", nil
case "servewaf":
return command, nil
default:
return "", fmt.Errorf("SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: %q %w", command, errNotCommand)
}
}
// ServeWAFListenAddr reads only SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR, which may be given as a
// file, as FromEnvironment does. The health check in servewaf's container needs
// no other setting, so it reads no other, nor a file that another names.
func ServeWAFListenAddr(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (string, error) {
// ListenAddrAndUpstreamURL reads only SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR and
// SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL, either of which may be given as a file, as
// FromEnvironment does. The health check needs no other setting, so it
// reads no other, nor a file that another names.
func ListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(
lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
) (string, *url.URL, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: lookupEnv}
listenAddr := env.address("SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR")
listenAddr := env.address("SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR", defaultListenAddr)
upstreamURL := env.appURL("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL)
return listenAddr, env.err
if env.err != nil {
return "", nil, env.err
}
return listenAddr, upstreamURL, nil
}
// InstanceName reads only SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME, which may be given as a
@@ -682,10 +707,9 @@ func (e *environment) check(name string, err error) {
}
}
// address reads a setting that is an address to listen on, by default
// defaultListenAddr.
func (e *environment) address(name string) string {
address, err := parseListenAddr(e.value(name, defaultListenAddr))
// address reads a setting that is an address to listen on.
func (e *environment) address(name, defaultValue string) string {
address, err := parseListenAddr(e.value(name, defaultValue))
e.check(name, err)
return address
@@ -753,6 +777,15 @@ func (e *environment) wafBodyLimit(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
return limit
}
// headerSize reads the setting that is the largest request line and
// headers.
func (e *environment) headerSize(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
size, err := parseHeaderSize(e.value(name, defaultValue))
e.check(name, err)
return size
}
// count reads a setting that is a number of requests.
func (e *environment) count(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
count, err := parseCount(e.value(name, defaultValue))
@@ -1194,16 +1227,6 @@ func (e *environment) logRemoteURL(name string) *url.URL {
return remote
}
// filePath reads a setting that is the path of a file, "" while it is
// unset. Its value names a file already, so, unlike the other settings,
// it has no _FILE form. Whoever uses the file reads it.
func (e *environment) filePath(name string) string {
path, _ := e.lookupEnv(name)
e.settings = append(e.settings, slog.String(name, path))
return path
}
// certificates reads a setting that is the path of a file of PEM
// certificates. Unset or empty, it is nil. Its value names a file
// already, so, unlike the other settings, it has no _FILE form.
@@ -1409,17 +1432,30 @@ func parseSize(value string) (int64, error) {
return n * unit, nil
}
// parseHeaderSize reads the largest request line and headers: a size as
// parseSize reads it, but more than 4K and never off. Go's server reads 4K
// past the limit it is given before it refuses, so proxy.New gives it this
// size less 4K, which must leave a limit.
func parseHeaderSize(value string) (int64, error) {
size, err := parseSize(value)
if err != nil || size <= 4*kibibyte {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotOver4K)
}
return size, nil
}
// parseWAFBodyLimit reads the most of a request body the Core Rule Set
// reads: a size as parseSize reads it, or off, but at most 64K, since servewaf
// gets no more of a body than that.
// reads: a size as parseSize reads it, or off, but at most 1G, since
// Coraza, which runs the Core Rule Set, refuses to load with more.
func parseWAFBodyLimit(value string) (int64, error) {
limit, err := parseSize(value)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if limit > 64*kibibyte {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errOver64K)
if limit > gibibyte {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errOver1G)
}
return limit, nil
internal/config/config_test.go
+381 -272
View File
@@ -23,89 +23,98 @@ import (
// The settings, by name.
const (
listenAddr = "SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR"
mode = "SWWAF_MODE"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWWAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerHour = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
bytesLimitPerHour = "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
bytesLimitPerDay = "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
bytesCount = "SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT"
lookupSource = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
deniedCountries = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
allowedCountries = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
asnLimitPercent = "SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
countryLimitPercent = "SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnBytesPercent = "SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
countryBytesPercent = "SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
unknownLimitPercent = "SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnLimitPercentURL = "SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"
blocklistURLs = "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS"
blocklistRefresh = "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH"
blocklistAction = "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
dnsblZones = "SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES"
dnsblResolver = "SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
abuseIPDBKey = "SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
abuseIPDBMinScore = "SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE"
abuseIPDBDailyBudget = "SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET"
reputationAction = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"
reputationCacheTTL = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL"
reputationTimeout = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT"
crowdSecURL = "SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
banResponse = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
attackBanDuration = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWWAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
stateDir = "SWWAF_STATE_DIR"
stateWriteDelay = "SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY"
stateCounterInterval = "SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
adminToken = "SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsToken = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsTopN = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
instanceName = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
logLevel = "SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL"
rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
rulesEnabled = "SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED"
wafMode = "SWWAF_WAF_MODE"
wafParanoiaLevel = "SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL"
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
exclusionsFile = "SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"
trapPaths = "SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS"
errorBurstThreshold = "SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
logRemoteURL = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
logRemoteTLSCAFile = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"
logRemoteBuffer = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER"
logRemoteFacility = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY"
logRemoteAppName = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME"
alertWebhookURL = "SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertWebhookHeaders = "SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS"
alertSlackWebhookURL = "SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertNtfyURL = "SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL"
alertNtfyToken = "SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
alertEvents = "SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS"
alertCooldown = "SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN"
alertMaxPerHour = "SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
watchNets = "SWWAF_WATCH_NETS"
listenAddr = "SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR"
upstreamURL = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL"
mode = "SWWAF_MODE"
trustedProxies = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
clientRequestTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
clientHeaderMaxBytes = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES"
clientIdleTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT"
clientResponseTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
upstreamRequestTimeout = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
upstreamResponseTimeout = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
requestMaxBytes = "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES"
responseMaxBytes = "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES"
allowNets = "SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWWAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerHour = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
bytesLimitPerHour = "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
bytesLimitPerDay = "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
bytesCount = "SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT"
lookupSource = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
deniedCountries = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
allowedCountries = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
asnLimitPercent = "SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
countryLimitPercent = "SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnBytesPercent = "SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
countryBytesPercent = "SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
unknownLimitPercent = "SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnLimitPercentURL = "SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"
blocklistURLs = "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS"
blocklistRefresh = "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH"
blocklistAction = "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
dnsblZones = "SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES"
dnsblResolver = "SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
abuseIPDBKey = "SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
abuseIPDBMinScore = "SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE"
abuseIPDBDailyBudget = "SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET"
reputationAction = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"
reputationCacheTTL = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL"
reputationTimeout = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT"
crowdSecURL = "SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
banResponse = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
attackBanDuration = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWWAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
stateDir = "SWWAF_STATE_DIR"
stateWriteDelay = "SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY"
stateCounterInterval = "SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
adminToken = "SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsToken = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsTopN = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
instanceName = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
logLevel = "SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL"
rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
rulesEnabled = "SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED"
wafMode = "SWWAF_WAF_MODE"
wafParanoiaLevel = "SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL"
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
trapPaths = "SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS"
errorBurstThreshold = "SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
logRemoteURL = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
logRemoteTLSCAFile = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"
logRemoteBuffer = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER"
logRemoteFacility = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY"
logRemoteAppName = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME"
alertWebhookURL = "SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertWebhookHeaders = "SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS"
alertSlackWebhookURL = "SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertNtfyURL = "SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL"
alertNtfyToken = "SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
alertEvents = "SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS"
alertCooldown = "SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN"
alertMaxPerHour = "SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
watchNets = "SWWAF_WATCH_NETS"
)
// The anomaly thresholds: each of the prefixes below, which name a scope,
@@ -243,34 +252,48 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{})
wantSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
ListenAddr: ":8080",
Observe: false,
RateLimitPerMinute: 120,
RateLimitPerHour: 1500,
RateLimitPerDay: 6000,
BanResponse: 403,
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
AttackBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBans: 5000,
BanScopeV4Prefix: 32,
StateDir: "/var/lib/smallwebwaf",
StateWriteDelay: 10 * time.Second,
StateCounterInterval: 15 * time.Minute,
MetricsToken: "",
MetricsTopN: 50,
RulesDir: "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d",
RulesEnabled: true,
ListenAddr: ":8080",
Observe: false,
ClientRequestTimeout: time.Minute,
ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes: 32 << 10,
ClientIdleTimeout: 2 * time.Minute,
ClientResponseTimeout: 30 * time.Minute,
UpstreamRequestTimeout: time.Minute,
UpstreamResponseTimeout: 30 * time.Minute,
RequestMaxBytes: 100 << 20,
ResponseMaxBytes: 1 << 30,
RateLimitPerMinute: 6000,
RateLimitPerHour: 100000,
RateLimitPerDay: 1000000,
BanResponse: 403,
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
AttackBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBans: 5000,
BanScopeV4Prefix: 32,
StateDir: "/var/lib/smallwebwaf",
StateWriteDelay: 10 * time.Second,
StateCounterInterval: 15 * time.Minute,
MetricsToken: "",
MetricsTopN: 50,
RulesDir: "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d",
RulesEnabled: true,
})
wantLookupSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
LookupSource: defaultLookupSource, LookupTimeout: 800 * time.Millisecond,
LookupSource: defaultLookupSource, LookupTimeout: time.Second,
})
wantByteLimitSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
BytesLimitPerMinute: 0, BytesLimitPerHour: 50 << 30,
BytesLimitPerDay: 100 << 30, BytesCount: "both",
BytesLimitPerMinute: 4 << 30, BytesLimitPerHour: 20 << 30,
BytesLimitPerDay: 200 << 30, BytesCount: "both",
})
if cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != "http://127.0.0.1:8081" {
t.Errorf("%s is %s", upstreamURL, cfg.UpstreamURL)
}
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.TrustedProxies,
"10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16")
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.AllowNets)
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets)
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.DenyNets)
@@ -299,17 +322,12 @@ func TestNoSingleRequestBreaksAByteLimitAtTheDefaults(t *testing.T) {
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{})
rproxy, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
// The largest request body and the largest response, both counted.
largest := rproxy.MaxRequestSize + rproxy.MaxResponseSize
largest := cfg.RequestMaxBytes + cfg.ResponseMaxBytes
for _, limit := range []int64{
cfg.BytesLimitPerMinute, cfg.BytesLimitPerHour, cfg.BytesLimitPerDay,
} {
if limit != 0 && largest > limit { // 0 is off
if largest > limit {
t.Errorf("a request of %d bytes breaks the byte limit of %d", largest, limit)
}
}
@@ -319,54 +337,77 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{
listenAddr: "127.0.0.1:9000",
mode: "observe",
allowNets: "192.0.2.7",
rateLimitExemptNets: "2001:db8::/48, 10.9.8.7",
denyNets: "198.51.100.0/24",
rateLimitPerMinute: "60",
rateLimitPerHour: "600",
rateLimitPerDay: "6000",
deniedCountries: "cn, RU,kp,Xk",
allowedCountries: "de",
banResponse: "429",
limitBanDuration: "15m",
limitBanRepeatWindow: "2d",
maxBanDuration: "30d",
attackBanDuration: "1d",
maxBans: "100",
banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
stateDir: "/srv/waf-state",
stateWriteDelay: "500ms",
stateCounterInterval: "1h",
metricsToken: token,
metricsTopN: "10",
rulesDir: "/srv/waf-rules",
rulesEnabled: "false",
listenAddr: "127.0.0.1:9000",
upstreamURL: "https://app.internal:8443/",
mode: "observe",
trustedProxies: " 192.0.2.1, 10.1.2.3/8 ,2001:db8::/32",
clientRequestTimeout: "90s",
clientHeaderMaxBytes: "8K",
clientIdleTimeout: "5m",
clientResponseTimeout: "7d",
upstreamRequestTimeout: "1h30m",
upstreamResponseTimeout: off,
requestMaxBytes: "512K",
responseMaxBytes: "1234",
allowNets: "192.0.2.7",
rateLimitExemptNets: "2001:db8::/48, 10.9.8.7",
denyNets: "198.51.100.0/24",
rateLimitPerMinute: "60",
rateLimitPerHour: "600",
rateLimitPerDay: "6000",
deniedCountries: "cn, RU,kp,Xk",
allowedCountries: "de",
banResponse: "429",
limitBanDuration: "15m",
limitBanRepeatWindow: "2d",
maxBanDuration: "30d",
attackBanDuration: "1d",
maxBans: "100",
banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
stateDir: "/srv/waf-state",
stateWriteDelay: "500ms",
stateCounterInterval: "1h",
metricsToken: token,
metricsTopN: "10",
rulesDir: "/srv/waf-rules",
rulesEnabled: "false",
})
wantSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
ListenAddr: "127.0.0.1:9000",
Observe: true,
RateLimitPerMinute: 60,
RateLimitPerHour: 600,
RateLimitPerDay: 6000,
BanResponse: 429,
LimitBanDuration: 15 * time.Minute,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: 48 * time.Hour,
MaxBanDuration: 30 * 24 * time.Hour,
AttackBanDuration: 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBans: 100,
BanScopeV4Prefix: 24,
StateDir: "/srv/waf-state",
StateWriteDelay: 500 * time.Millisecond,
StateCounterInterval: time.Hour,
MetricsToken: token,
MetricsTopN: 10,
RulesDir: "/srv/waf-rules",
RulesEnabled: false,
ListenAddr: "127.0.0.1:9000",
Observe: true,
ClientRequestTimeout: 90 * time.Second,
ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes: 8 << 10,
ClientIdleTimeout: 5 * time.Minute,
ClientResponseTimeout: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
UpstreamRequestTimeout: 90 * time.Minute,
UpstreamResponseTimeout: 0,
RequestMaxBytes: 512 << 10,
ResponseMaxBytes: 1234,
RateLimitPerMinute: 60,
RateLimitPerHour: 600,
RateLimitPerDay: 6000,
BanResponse: 429,
LimitBanDuration: 15 * time.Minute,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: 48 * time.Hour,
MaxBanDuration: 30 * 24 * time.Hour,
AttackBanDuration: 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBans: 100,
BanScopeV4Prefix: 24,
StateDir: "/srv/waf-state",
StateWriteDelay: 500 * time.Millisecond,
StateCounterInterval: time.Hour,
MetricsToken: token,
MetricsTopN: 10,
RulesDir: "/srv/waf-rules",
RulesEnabled: false,
})
if cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != "https://app.internal:8443/" {
t.Errorf("%s is %s", upstreamURL, cfg.UpstreamURL)
}
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.TrustedProxies, "192.0.2.1/32", "10.0.0.0/8", "2001:db8::/32")
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.AllowNets, "192.0.2.7/32")
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets, "2001:db8::/48", "10.9.8.7/32")
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.DenyNets, "198.51.100.0/24")
@@ -540,14 +581,13 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetSettings(t *testing.T) {
environment{
wafMode: config.WAFModeDetect, wafParanoiaLevel: "4", wafAnomalyThreshold: "10",
wafDisabledRules: "942100, 920350", wafExemptPaths: "/api/, /static/",
wafBodyLimit: "32K", exclusionsFile: "/etc/smallwebwaf/crs-exclusions.conf",
wafBodyLimit: "128K",
},
config.Config{
WAFMode: config.WAFModeDetect, WAFParanoiaLevel: 4, WAFAnomalyThreshold: 10,
WAFDisabledRules: []int{942100, 920350},
WAFExemptPaths: []string{"/api/", "/static/"},
WAFBodyLimit: 32 << 10,
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile: "/etc/smallwebwaf/crs-exclusions.conf",
WAFDisabledRules: []int{942100, 920350},
WAFExemptPaths: []string{"/api/", "/static/"},
WAFBodyLimit: 128 << 10,
},
},
{
@@ -567,8 +607,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetSettings(t *testing.T) {
WAFMode: cfg.WAFMode, WAFParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel,
WAFAnomalyThreshold: cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold,
WAFDisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules, WAFExemptPaths: cfg.WAFExemptPaths,
WAFBodyLimit: cfg.WAFBodyLimit,
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
WAFBodyLimit: cfg.WAFBodyLimit,
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, tc.want) {
t.Errorf("%v gave\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", tc.env, got, tc.want)
@@ -576,12 +615,12 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetSettings(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestWAFBodyLimitOf64K(t *testing.T) {
func TestWAFBodyLimitOf1G(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{wafBodyLimit: "64K"})
if cfg.WAFBodyLimit != 64<<10 {
t.Errorf("64K read as %d", cfg.WAFBodyLimit)
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{wafBodyLimit: "1G"})
if cfg.WAFBodyLimit != 1<<30 {
t.Errorf("1G read as %d", cfg.WAFBodyLimit)
}
}
@@ -630,10 +669,10 @@ func TestInvalidCoreRuleSetSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
wafBodyLimit, "128KB",
`"128KB" is not a size such as 512K, 100M or 5G, or off`,
},
{wafBodyLimit, "65K", `"65K" is more than 64K, the most servewaf gets of a body`},
{wafBodyLimit, "2G", `"2G" is more than 1G, the most Coraza reads`},
{
wafBodyLimit, "65537",
`"65537" is more than 64K, the most servewaf gets of a body`,
wafBodyLimit, "1073741825",
`"1073741825" is more than 1G, the most Coraza reads`,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1126,7 +1165,7 @@ func TestLookupSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
cfg = fromEnvironment(t, environment{lookupSource: off})
wantLookupSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
LookupSource: off, LookupTimeout: 800 * time.Millisecond,
LookupSource: off, LookupTimeout: time.Second,
})
}
@@ -1928,15 +1967,45 @@ func TestSizesAndOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{
bytesLimitPerMinute: "3G",
bytesLimitPerHour: off,
alertCooldown: off,
requestMaxBytes: "3G",
responseMaxBytes: off,
clientRequestTimeout: off,
clientIdleTimeout: off,
})
if cfg.BytesLimitPerMinute != 3<<30 || cfg.BytesLimitPerHour != 0 ||
cfg.AlertCooldown != 0 {
t.Errorf("3G, off and off read as %d, %d and %s",
cfg.BytesLimitPerMinute, cfg.BytesLimitPerHour, cfg.AlertCooldown)
if cfg.RequestMaxBytes != 3<<30 || cfg.ResponseMaxBytes != 0 ||
cfg.ClientRequestTimeout != 0 || cfg.ClientIdleTimeout != 0 {
t.Errorf("3G, off, off and off read as %d, %d, %s and %s",
cfg.RequestMaxBytes, cfg.ResponseMaxBytes, cfg.ClientRequestTimeout,
cfg.ClientIdleTimeout)
}
}
func TestRequestHeaderMaxBytesJustOver4K(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{clientHeaderMaxBytes: "4097"})
if cfg.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes != 4097 {
t.Errorf("4097 read as %d", cfg.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes)
}
}
func TestRequestHeaderMaxBytesRefusalNeverOffersOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, value := range []string{"32KB", "0", "4K", off} {
t.Run(value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(
environment{clientHeaderMaxBytes: value}.lookupEnv)
want := clientHeaderMaxBytes + `: "` + value +
`" is not a size of more than 4K, such as 32K`
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
})
}
}
@@ -1965,12 +2034,34 @@ func TestBanResponseCloseIsZero(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestTrustedProxiesSetButEmptyTrustNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{trustedProxies: ""})
if len(cfg.TrustedProxies) != 0 {
t.Errorf("trusted proxies %v, want none", cfg.TrustedProxies)
}
}
func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
wantStartStopped(t, []struct{ name, value string }{
{listenAddr, "8080"}, {listenAddr, ":http"}, {listenAddr, ":65536"},
{upstreamURL, "127.0.0.1:8081"},
{upstreamURL, "ftp://127.0.0.1:8081"},
{upstreamURL, "http://"},
{upstreamURL, "http://:8081"},
{upstreamURL, "http://127.0.0.1:0"},
{upstreamURL, "http://127.0.0.1:99999"},
{upstreamURL, "http://127.0.0.1:8081/app"},
{upstreamURL, "http://127.0.0.1:8081/?a=1"},
{upstreamURL, "http://user:secret@127.0.0.1:8081"},
{mode, "Observe"}, {mode, "block"}, {mode, ""},
{trustedProxies, "10.0.0.0/33"},
{trustedProxies, "traefik"},
{trustedProxies, "10.0.0.0/8,,192.168.0.0/16"},
{trustedProxies, "fe80::1%eth0"},
{ipv6GroupPrefix, "31"}, {ipv6GroupPrefix, "129"}, {ipv6GroupPrefix, "/64"},
{ipv6GroupPrefix, off}, {ipv6GroupPrefix, ""},
{maxTrackedClients, "0"}, {maxTrackedClients, "-1"}, {maxTrackedClients, off},
@@ -1978,18 +2069,19 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{allowNets, "192.0.2.0/24,monitoring"},
{rateLimitExemptNets, "2001:db8::/129"},
{denyNets, "198.51.100.0/24,"},
{alertCooldown, "60"}, {alertCooldown, ""},
{alertCooldown, "0s"},
{alertCooldown, "2 minutes"},
{alertCooldown, "1y"},
{alertCooldown, "-1s"},
{alertCooldown, "1.5d"},
{bytesLimitPerMinute, "100MB"},
{bytesLimitPerMinute, "100m"},
{bytesLimitPerMinute, "1.5M"},
{bytesLimitPerHour, "0"},
{bytesLimitPerHour, "-5"},
{bytesLimitPerHour, "99999999999G"},
{clientRequestTimeout, "60"}, {clientRequestTimeout, ""},
{clientIdleTimeout, "0s"},
{clientIdleTimeout, "2 minutes"},
{clientResponseTimeout, "1y"},
{upstreamRequestTimeout, "-1s"},
{upstreamResponseTimeout, "0s"},
{upstreamResponseTimeout, "1.5d"},
{requestMaxBytes, "100MB"},
{requestMaxBytes, "100m"},
{requestMaxBytes, "1.5M"},
{responseMaxBytes, "0"},
{responseMaxBytes, "-5"},
{responseMaxBytes, "99999999999G"},
{rateLimitPerMinute, ""},
{rateLimitPerMinute, "1K"},
{rateLimitPerHour, "0"},
@@ -2154,10 +2246,10 @@ func TestSettingFromFileIsCheckedAsTheSettingItself(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
bytesLimitPerMinute + "_FILE": writeFile(t, "lots\n"),
requestMaxBytes + "_FILE": writeFile(t, "lots\n"),
}.lookupEnv)
want := bytesLimitPerMinute + `: "lots" is not a size such as 512K, 100M or 5G, or off`
want := requestMaxBytes + `: "lots" is not a size such as 512K, 100M or 5G, or off`
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
@@ -2262,90 +2354,99 @@ func writeFile(t *testing.T, contents string) string {
func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{rateLimitPerMinute: "45"})
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{clientRequestTimeout: "45s"})
hostname, _ := os.Hostname()
want := map[string]string{
listenAddr: ":8080",
mode: "enforce",
ipv6GroupPrefix: "64",
maxTrackedClients: "20000",
allowNets: "",
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
denyNets: "",
rateLimitPerMinute: "45",
rateLimitPerHour: "1500",
rateLimitPerDay: "6000",
rateLimitExemptPaths: "",
bytesLimitPerMinute: "off",
bytesLimitPerHour: "50G",
bytesLimitPerDay: "100G",
bytesCount: "both",
lookupSource: defaultLookupSource,
lookupDBPath: "",
lookupTimeout: "800ms",
addLookupHeaders: "false",
deniedCountries: "",
allowedCountries: "",
asnLimitPercent: "",
countryLimitPercent: "",
asnBytesPercent: "",
countryBytesPercent: "",
unknownLimitPercent: "100",
asnLimitPercentURL: "",
blocklistURLs: "",
blocklistRefresh: "24h",
blocklistAction: actionDeny,
dnsblZones: "",
dnsblResolver: "",
abuseIPDBKey: "",
abuseIPDBMinScore: "75",
abuseIPDBDailyBudget: "900",
reputationAction: "limit:25",
reputationCacheTTL: defaultReputationCacheTTL,
reputationTimeout: "2s",
crowdSecURL: "",
crowdSecKey: "",
banResponse: "403",
limitBanDuration: "1h",
limitBanRepeatWindow: "24h",
maxBanDuration: "7d",
attackBanDuration: "7d",
maxBans: "5000",
banScopeV4Prefix: "32",
stateDir: "/var/lib/smallwebwaf",
stateWriteDelay: "10s",
stateCounterInterval: "15m",
adminToken: "",
metricsToken: "",
metricsTopN: "50",
instanceName: hostname,
logRequestHeaders: defaultLogRequestHeaders,
logLevel: "info",
rulesDir: "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d",
rulesEnabled: "true",
wafMode: config.WAFModeBlock,
wafParanoiaLevel: "1",
wafAnomalyThreshold: "5",
wafDisabledRules: defaultWAFDisabledRules,
wafExemptPaths: "",
wafBodyLimit: off,
exclusionsFile: "",
trapPaths: "",
errorBurstThreshold: "30",
logRemoteURL: "",
logRemoteTLSCAFile: "",
logRemoteBuffer: "10000",
logRemoteFacility: "local0",
logRemoteAppName: hostname,
alertWebhookURL: "",
alertWebhookHeaders: "",
alertSlackWebhookURL: "",
alertNtfyURL: "",
alertNtfyToken: "",
alertEvents: defaultAlertEvents,
alertCooldown: defaultAlertCooldown,
alertMaxPerHour: "60",
listenAddr: ":8080",
upstreamURL: "http://127.0.0.1:8081",
mode: "enforce",
trustedProxies: "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16",
ipv6GroupPrefix: "64",
maxTrackedClients: "20000",
clientRequestTimeout: "45s",
clientHeaderMaxBytes: "32K",
clientIdleTimeout: "120s",
clientResponseTimeout: "30m",
upstreamRequestTimeout: "60s",
upstreamResponseTimeout: "30m",
requestMaxBytes: "100M",
responseMaxBytes: "1G",
allowNets: "",
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
denyNets: "",
rateLimitPerMinute: "6000",
rateLimitPerHour: "100000",
rateLimitPerDay: "1000000",
rateLimitExemptPaths: "",
bytesLimitPerMinute: "4G",
bytesLimitPerHour: "20G",
bytesLimitPerDay: "200G",
bytesCount: "both",
lookupSource: defaultLookupSource,
lookupDBPath: "",
lookupTimeout: "1s",
addLookupHeaders: "false",
deniedCountries: "",
allowedCountries: "",
asnLimitPercent: "",
countryLimitPercent: "",
asnBytesPercent: "",
countryBytesPercent: "",
unknownLimitPercent: "100",
asnLimitPercentURL: "",
blocklistURLs: "",
blocklistRefresh: "24h",
blocklistAction: actionDeny,
dnsblZones: "",
dnsblResolver: "",
abuseIPDBKey: "",
abuseIPDBMinScore: "75",
abuseIPDBDailyBudget: "900",
reputationAction: "limit:25",
reputationCacheTTL: defaultReputationCacheTTL,
reputationTimeout: "2s",
crowdSecURL: "",
crowdSecKey: "",
banResponse: "403",
limitBanDuration: "1h",
limitBanRepeatWindow: "24h",
maxBanDuration: "7d",
attackBanDuration: "7d",
maxBans: "5000",
banScopeV4Prefix: "32",
stateDir: "/var/lib/smallwebwaf",
stateWriteDelay: "10s",
stateCounterInterval: "15m",
adminToken: "",
metricsToken: "",
metricsTopN: "50",
instanceName: hostname,
logRequestHeaders: defaultLogRequestHeaders,
logLevel: "info",
rulesDir: "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d",
rulesEnabled: "true",
wafMode: config.WAFModeBlock,
wafParanoiaLevel: "1",
wafAnomalyThreshold: "5",
wafDisabledRules: defaultWAFDisabledRules,
wafExemptPaths: "",
wafBodyLimit: off,
trapPaths: "",
errorBurstThreshold: "30",
logRemoteURL: "",
logRemoteTLSCAFile: "",
logRemoteBuffer: "10000",
logRemoteFacility: "local0",
logRemoteAppName: hostname,
alertWebhookURL: "",
alertWebhookHeaders: "",
alertSlackWebhookURL: "",
alertNtfyURL: "",
alertNtfyToken: "",
alertEvents: defaultAlertEvents,
alertCooldown: defaultAlertCooldown,
alertMaxPerHour: "60",
}
maps.Copy(want, loggedAnomalyDefaults())
@@ -2380,6 +2481,14 @@ func wantSettings(t *testing.T, got *config.Config, want config.Config) {
if got.ListenAddr != want.ListenAddr ||
got.Observe != want.Observe ||
got.ClientRequestTimeout != want.ClientRequestTimeout ||
got.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes != want.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes ||
got.ClientIdleTimeout != want.ClientIdleTimeout ||
got.ClientResponseTimeout != want.ClientResponseTimeout ||
got.UpstreamRequestTimeout != want.UpstreamRequestTimeout ||
got.UpstreamResponseTimeout != want.UpstreamResponseTimeout ||
got.RequestMaxBytes != want.RequestMaxBytes ||
got.ResponseMaxBytes != want.ResponseMaxBytes ||
got.RateLimitPerMinute != want.RateLimitPerMinute ||
got.RateLimitPerHour != want.RateLimitPerHour ||
got.RateLimitPerDay != want.RateLimitPerDay {
internal/config/rproxy.go
-192
View File
@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
package config
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
// RProxy is the settings of `smallwebwaf rproxy`. A size or time limit of zero
// is off.
type RProxy struct {
// ListenAddr is where rproxy listens (SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR).
ListenAddr string
// UpstreamURL is the app (SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL).
UpstreamURL *url.URL
// TrustedProxies are the netblocks whose X-Forwarded-For is believed
// (SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// WAFBackend is servewaf's URL (SWRP_WAF_BACKEND).
WAFBackend *url.URL
// Timeout is how long rproxy waits for servewaf's answer to a question,
// and to a report (SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS). It cannot be off.
Timeout time.Duration
// DefaultDisposition is what is done with a request when servewaf cannot be
// connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer within Timeout:
// allow or deny (SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION).
DefaultDisposition string
// MaxRequestSize is the largest request body (SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE), and
// MaxResponseSize the largest response body (SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE).
MaxRequestSize int64
MaxResponseSize int64
// MaxRequestTime bounds sending the whole request: the visitor's request
// line and headers, and then, from their end, its body on its way to the
// app (SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS). MaxResponseTime bounds the answer, from
// the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor
// (SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS).
MaxRequestTime time.Duration
MaxResponseTime time.Duration
// settings are the values read, as given or by default, for the log line
// at start.
settings []slog.Attr
}
var (
errNeedsWAFBackend = errors.New(
"is required: it is servewaf's URL, such as http://servewaf:8080")
errNotDisposition = errors.New("is not allow or deny")
errNotMilliseconds = errors.New(
"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 2000")
errNotMillisecondsOrOff = errors.New(
"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 60000, or off")
)
// RProxyFromEnvironment reads rproxy's settings with lookupEnv, normally
// os.LookupEnv. A setting that is not set takes its default, and
// SWRP_WAF_BACKEND, which has none, must be set. A setting that is set but
// invalid is an error that names it. Since rproxy never touches disk, its
// settings have no _FILE form.
func RProxyFromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*RProxy, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: withoutFileForms(lookupEnv)}
cfg := &RProxy{
ListenAddr: env.address("SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"),
UpstreamURL: env.appURL("SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL),
TrustedProxies: env.netblocks("SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
WAFBackend: env.wafBackend("SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"),
Timeout: env.milliseconds("SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS", "2000"),
DefaultDisposition: env.disposition("SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION", "allow"),
MaxRequestSize: env.size("SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE", "100M"),
MaxResponseSize: env.size("SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE", "1G"),
MaxRequestTime: env.millisecondsOrOff("SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS", "60000"),
MaxResponseTime: env.millisecondsOrOff("SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS", "1800000"),
}
if env.err != nil {
return nil, env.err
}
cfg.settings = env.settings
return cfg, nil
}
// RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL reads only SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR and
// SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL. The health check in rproxy's container needs no other
// setting, so it reads no other.
func RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(
lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
) (string, *url.URL, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: withoutFileForms(lookupEnv)}
listenAddr := env.address("SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR")
upstreamURL := env.appURL("SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL)
if env.err != nil {
return "", nil, env.err
}
return listenAddr, upstreamURL, nil
}
// withoutFileForms returns lookupEnv finding no setting named with _FILE, since
// rproxy never touches disk.
func withoutFileForms(
lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
) func(string) (string, bool) {
return func(name string) (string, bool) {
if strings.HasSuffix(name, "_FILE") {
return "", false
}
return lookupEnv(name)
}
}
// LogValue makes an RProxy log as each setting's name with the value it was
// given, or its default.
func (c *RProxy) LogValue() slog.Value {
return slog.GroupValue(c.settings...)
}
// wafBackend reads the setting that is servewaf's URL, which must be set.
func (e *environment) wafBackend(name string) *url.URL {
value := e.value(name, "")
if value == "" {
e.check(name, errNeedsWAFBackend)
return nil
}
backend, err := parseUpstreamURL(value)
e.check(name, err)
return backend
}
// disposition reads the setting that is what is done with a request when servewaf
// cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer in time:
// allow or deny.
func (e *environment) disposition(name, defaultValue string) string {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
if value != "allow" && value != "deny" {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotDisposition))
}
return value
}
// milliseconds reads a setting that is a whole number of milliseconds above
// zero.
func (e *environment) milliseconds(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
duration, valid := parseMilliseconds(value)
if !valid {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotMilliseconds))
}
return duration
}
// millisecondsOrOff reads a setting that is a whole number of milliseconds
// above zero, or off, which is 0.
func (e *environment) millisecondsOrOff(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
if value == off {
return 0
}
duration, valid := parseMilliseconds(value)
if !valid {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotMillisecondsOrOff))
}
return duration
}
// parseMilliseconds reads a whole number of milliseconds above zero, and
// reports whether it is one.
func parseMilliseconds(value string) (time.Duration, bool) {
n, err := strconv.ParseInt(value, 10, 64)
if err != nil || n <= 0 || n > math.MaxInt64/int64(time.Millisecond) {
return 0, false
}
return time.Duration(n) * time.Millisecond, true
}
internal/config/rproxy_test.go
-231
View File
@@ -1,231 +0,0 @@
package config_test
import (
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
)
// rproxy's settings, by name, and their values in these tests.
const (
wafBackend = "SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"
rproxyTimeout = "SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS"
rproxyDefault = "SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION"
rproxyListen = "SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"
rproxyUpstream = "SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL"
rproxyTrusted = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
rproxyMaxRequest = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
rproxyMaxResponse = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
rproxyRequestTime = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
rproxyAnswerTime = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
backendURL = "http://servewaf:8080"
rproxyDefaultAddr = ":8080"
rproxyDefaultApp = "http://127.0.0.1:8081"
notASize = "a lot"
)
// rproxyConfig reads rproxy's settings from env.
func rproxyConfig(env map[string]string) (*config.RProxy, error) {
return config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := env[name]
return value, ok
})
}
func TestRProxyDefaults(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
if cfg.ListenAddr != rproxyDefaultAddr ||
cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != rproxyDefaultApp ||
cfg.WAFBackend.String() != backendURL {
t.Errorf("addresses %q, %v, %v", cfg.ListenAddr, cfg.UpstreamURL, cfg.WAFBackend)
}
if cfg.Timeout != 2*time.Second || cfg.DefaultDisposition != "allow" {
t.Errorf("timeout %v, default disposition %q", cfg.Timeout, cfg.DefaultDisposition)
}
if cfg.MaxRequestSize != 100<<20 || cfg.MaxResponseSize != 1<<30 {
t.Errorf("sizes %d and %d", cfg.MaxRequestSize, cfg.MaxResponseSize)
}
if cfg.MaxRequestTime != time.Minute || cfg.MaxResponseTime != 30*time.Minute {
t.Errorf("times %v and %v", cfg.MaxRequestTime, cfg.MaxResponseTime)
}
want := []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/12"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16"),
}
if !slices.Equal(cfg.TrustedProxies, want) {
t.Errorf("trusted proxies %v, want %v", cfg.TrustedProxies, want)
}
}
func TestRProxySettingsAreRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
wafBackend: "https://waf.example:8443",
rproxyListen: ":9000",
rproxyUpstream: "http://app:3000",
rproxyTrusted: "192.0.2.0/24",
rproxyTimeout: "150",
rproxyDefault: "deny",
rproxyMaxRequest: "1K",
rproxyMaxResponse: off,
rproxyRequestTime: off,
rproxyAnswerTime: "250",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
if cfg.ListenAddr != ":9000" || cfg.UpstreamURL.Host != "app:3000" ||
cfg.WAFBackend.Host != "waf.example:8443" ||
cfg.TrustedProxies[0] != netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24") {
t.Errorf("addresses %+v", cfg)
}
if cfg.Timeout != 150*time.Millisecond || cfg.DefaultDisposition != "deny" ||
cfg.MaxRequestSize != 1024 || cfg.MaxResponseSize != 0 ||
cfg.MaxRequestTime != 0 || cfg.MaxResponseTime != 250*time.Millisecond {
t.Errorf("limits %+v", cfg)
}
}
func TestRProxyInvalidSettingsAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, value string
}{
{wafBackend, ""},
{wafBackend, "servewaf:8080"},
{wafBackend, "http://servewaf:8080/path"},
{rproxyTimeout, "0"},
{rproxyTimeout, "-1"},
{rproxyTimeout, off},
{rproxyTimeout, "2s"},
{rproxyTimeout, "1.25"},
{rproxyTimeout, "99999999999999999"},
{rproxyDefault, "maybe"},
{rproxyListen, "8080"},
{rproxyUpstream, "app"},
{rproxyUpstream, "127.0.0.1:8081"},
{rproxyUpstream, "ftp://127.0.0.1:8081"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://:8081"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:0"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:99999"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:8081/app"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:8081/?a=1"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://user:secret@127.0.0.1:8081"},
{rproxyTrusted, "not a netblock"},
{rproxyTrusted, "10.0.0.0/33"},
{rproxyTrusted, "10.0.0.0/8,,192.168.0.0/16"},
{rproxyTrusted, "fe80::1%eth0"},
{rproxyMaxRequest, notASize},
{rproxyMaxResponse, notASize},
{rproxyRequestTime, "0"},
{rproxyRequestTime, "1m"},
{rproxyAnswerTime, "0"},
} {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL, tc.name: tc.value})
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), tc.name+": ") {
t.Errorf("error %v, want one naming %s", err, tc.name)
}
})
}
}
func TestRProxyTrustedProxiesSetButEmptyTrustNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL, rproxyTrusted: ""})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
if len(cfg.TrustedProxies) != 0 {
t.Errorf("trusted proxies %v, want none", cfg.TrustedProxies)
}
}
func TestRProxyNeedsItsBackend(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := rproxyConfig(nil)
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), wafBackend+": is required") {
t.Errorf("error %v, want one saying %s is required", err, wafBackend)
}
}
func TestRProxyReadsNoFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "backend")
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("http://from-a-file:8080\n"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
_, err = rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend + "_FILE": path})
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), wafBackend+": is required") {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s still required", err, wafBackend)
}
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
wafBackend: backendURL,
rproxyTimeout + "_FILE": "/nonexistent/timeout",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v, with the file left unread", err)
}
if cfg.Timeout != 2*time.Second {
t.Errorf("timeout %v, want the default", cfg.Timeout)
}
}
func TestRProxySettingsAreLoggedByName(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
group := cfg.LogValue().Group()
names := make([]string, 0, len(group))
for _, attr := range group {
names = append(names, attr.Key)
}
for _, name := range []string{
rproxyListen, rproxyUpstream, rproxyTrusted, wafBackend, rproxyTimeout, rproxyDefault,
rproxyMaxRequest, rproxyMaxResponse, rproxyRequestTime, rproxyAnswerTime,
} {
if !slices.Contains(names, name) {
t.Errorf("%s is not logged, only %v", name, names)
}
}
}
internal/lookup/lookup.go
+4 -12
View File
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ func New(params Params) *GeoJS {
// own address for IPv4, and an address in the same place for an IPv6
// netblock.
func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
answer, asked := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client, g.wait)
answer, asked := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client)
if asked == nil {
return answer
}
@@ -209,14 +209,6 @@ func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
return answer
}
// LookUpWithoutWaiting is LookUp for a request that does not need the answer,
// whatever Wait says: it returns the zero Answer at once when none is kept.
func (g *GeoJS) LookUpWithoutWaiting(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
answer, _ := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client, false)
return answer
}
// Kept returns client's answer, if one is kept, without asking GeoJS.
func (g *GeoJS) Kept(client netip.Prefix) (Answer, bool) {
g.mu.Lock()
@@ -271,9 +263,9 @@ func (g *GeoJS) Load(answers []Answer) {
// answerOrWait returns client's kept answer if it has one. Otherwise it
// puts the client among those waiting if there is room, has GeoJS asked
// about them if it can be, and returns what to wait on for the answer, or
// nil when there is nothing to wait for or mustWait is false.
// nil when there is nothing to wait for.
func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix, mustWait bool,
ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix,
) (Answer, <-chan struct{}) {
g.mu.Lock()
defer g.mu.Unlock()
@@ -291,7 +283,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
g.ask(ctx)
if !mustWait {
if !g.wait {
return Answer{}, nil // the answer is not needed before the request goes on
}
internal/lookup/lookup_test.go
+2 -35
View File
@@ -72,39 +72,6 @@ func TestKeptAnswerIsUsedFor7DaysThenAskedAgain(t *testing.T) {
})
}
func TestLookUpWithoutWaitingAsksGeoJSAndGoesOnAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
geojs, clock, g := start()
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
// Wait is set, and GeoJS does not answer.
geojs.set(hanging)
began := time.Now()
answer := g.LookUpWithoutWaiting(t.Context(), client)
if waited := time.Since(began); waited != 0 || answer != (lookup.Answer{}) {
t.Errorf("got %+v after %s, want no answer at once", answer, waited)
}
waitForRequests(t, geojs, 1)
wantAsked(t, geojs, 0, "203.0.113.9")
// That request is abandoned, and has failed once this returns. GeoJS
// answers when it is asked again, and the answer is kept.
time.Sleep(timeout)
synctest.Wait()
geojs.set(answering)
waitForCountry(t, g, clock, client, germany)
if got := g.LookUpWithoutWaiting(t.Context(), client).Country; got != germany {
t.Errorf("the kept answer gives the country %q, want %q", got, germany)
}
})
}
func TestNewClientWaitsAtMostOneSecondThenCountsAsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -156,8 +123,8 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheTimeoutSaysAndGeoJSIsAbandonedAfterIt(t *testing
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
// A timeout longer than the default, and a GeoJS that does not
// answer.
// A timeout longer than the default second, and a GeoJS that does
// not answer.
const longerTimeout = 3 * time.Second
m := metrics.New(1, "app")
internal/metrics/metrics.go
+36 -25
View File
@@ -28,15 +28,16 @@ type Metrics struct {
registry prometheus.Registerer
handler http.Handler
inFlight prometheus.Gauge
requests *prometheus.CounterVec
requestBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
responseBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
requestDuration prometheus.Histogram
upstreamDuration prometheus.Histogram
rateLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
offences *prometheus.CounterVec
wafMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
inFlight prometheus.Gauge
requests *prometheus.CounterVec
requestBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
responseBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
requestDuration prometheus.Histogram
upstreamDuration prometheus.Histogram
rateLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
sizeAndTimeLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
offences *prometheus.CounterVec
wafMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
// ruleMatches are made by AddRules, and reputationHits by
// AddReputation.
ruleMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -99,6 +100,9 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
"Requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the error burst, by "+
"its window and its kind, requests, bytes or refusals.",
[]string{"window", "kind"}),
sizeAndTimeLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total",
"Requests that passed a size or time limit, by its setting.",
[]string{"limit"}),
offences: counterVec("smallwebwaf_offences_total",
"Offences, by kind.", []string{"kind"}),
wafMatches: counterVec("smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total",
@@ -139,7 +143,7 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
collectors.NewProcessCollector(collectors.ProcessCollectorOpts{}),
m.inFlight, m.requests, m.requestBytes, m.responseBytes,
m.requestDuration, m.upstreamDuration,
m.rateLimitHits, m.offences, m.wafMatches,
m.rateLimitHits, m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits, m.offences, m.wafMatches,
m.countries, m.asns,
m.GeoJSRequests, m.GeoJSFailures, m.GeoJSUnanswered,
m.stateFileWrites, m.stateFileWriteFailures,
@@ -391,11 +395,15 @@ func (m *Metrics) RequestStarted() {
m.inFlight.Inc()
}
// RequestEnded counts a request that has ended without being passed to the app,
// from its log line. duration is how long the request took.
func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(line *requestlog.Line, duration time.Duration) {
// RequestEnded counts a request that has ended, from its log line. limit
// is the setting whose size or time limit the request passed, "" if none.
// duration is how long the request took, and upstreamDuration how long it
// took from when it was passed to the app, zero if it was not.
func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(
line *requestlog.Line, limit string, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
) {
m.inFlight.Dec()
m.count(line, duration, 0)
m.count(line, limit, duration, upstreamDuration)
}
// RequestAllowed counts a question of rproxy's, answered allow, as no longer
@@ -404,13 +412,12 @@ func (m *Metrics) RequestAllowed() {
m.inFlight.Dec()
}
// RequestReported counts a request rproxy passed to the app, from what its
// report says, which line holds: duration is how long the request took, and
// upstreamDuration how long it took from when it was passed to the app.
// RequestReported counts a request rproxy passed to the app, as RequestEnded
// does, from what its report says, which line holds.
func (m *Metrics) RequestReported(
line *requestlog.Line, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
) {
m.count(line, duration, upstreamDuration)
m.count(line, "", duration, upstreamDuration)
}
// LimitHit counts a request that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
@@ -424,10 +431,11 @@ func (m *Metrics) LimitHit(hit ratelimit.Hit) {
// them.
func (m *Metrics) Offences(r ratelimit.Request) {
for kind, committed := range map[string]bool{
"limit": r.BrokeLimit,
"attack": r.Attack,
"rule_blocked": r.RuleBlocked,
"waf_blocked": r.WAFBlocked,
"limit": r.BrokeLimit,
"attack": r.Attack,
"rule_blocked": r.RuleBlocked,
"waf_blocked": r.WAFBlocked,
"token_refused": r.TokenRefused,
} {
if committed {
m.offences.WithLabelValues(kind).Inc()
@@ -478,10 +486,9 @@ func (m *Metrics) StateFileEditSetAside(name string) {
m.stateFileEditsSetAside.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()
}
// count counts a request that has ended, as RequestEnded and RequestReported
// describe.
// count counts a request that has ended, as RequestEnded describes.
func (m *Metrics) count(
line *requestlog.Line, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
line *requestlog.Line, limit string, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
) {
class := statusClass(line.Status)
m.requests.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Inc()
@@ -493,6 +500,10 @@ func (m *Metrics) count(
m.upstreamDuration.Observe(upstreamDuration.Seconds())
}
if limit != "" {
m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits.WithLabelValues(limit).Inc()
}
if line.Country != "" {
m.countries.add(line.Country, line)
}
internal/servewaf/admin.go → internal/proxy/admin.go
+42 -12
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf
package proxy
import (
"bytes"
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"io"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -49,13 +50,16 @@ func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
_, _ = io.WriteString(rq.out, "ok\n")
}
// answerAdmin answers a request for one of servewaf's own endpoints. Each
// needs a token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics
// SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without it is
// refused with 401. An endpoint whose token is unset answers 404, as any other
// path does.
// answerAdmin answers a request for smallwebwaf itself, under
// /_smallwebwaf/, once it has passed the checks. Each endpoint needs a
// token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics
// SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without
// it is refused with 401, which counts toward the error burst. An
// endpoint whose token is unset answers 404, as any other request under
// /_smallwebwaf/ does.
func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
rq.startClientResponseTimeout()
token, answer := rq.endpoint()
@@ -63,8 +67,12 @@ func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
case token == "":
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
case !hasToken(rq.in, token):
rq.tokenRefused = true
rq.out.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer")
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)
rq.answer(refusal{
status: http.StatusUnauthorized,
action: requestlog.ActionAdmin,
})
default:
answer()
}
@@ -121,7 +129,26 @@ type banToAdd struct {
// an admin, from now for the duration the body gives, with its reason,
// and answers with that ban.
func (rq *request) addBan() {
// The body must arrive within SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, as any
// other request's must.
rq.stopReadingBody(rq.clientRequestDeadline())
toAdd, err := rq.readBanToAdd()
if refused := rq.refused.Load(); refused != nil {
rq.answer(*refused) // the body is over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES
return
}
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded) {
rq.answer(refusal{
status: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
limit: "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT",
})
return
}
var (
netblock netip.Prefix
@@ -150,9 +177,12 @@ func (rq *request) addBan() {
// readBanToAdd reads the body of POST BansPath: a JSON object with
// nothing but whitespace after it, in at most banBodyMaxBytes.
func (rq *request) readBanToAdd() (banToAdd, error) {
data, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(nil, rq.in.Body, banBodyMaxBytes))
rq.requestBytes = int64(len(data))
var body io.ReadCloser = http.NoBody
if rq.body != nil {
body = rq.body
}
data, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(nil, body, banBodyMaxBytes))
if err != nil {
return banToAdd{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errNotBanToAdd, err)
}
@@ -250,9 +280,9 @@ type clientAnswer struct {
Bans []state.BanEntry `json:"bans"`
}
// showClient answers GET ClientsPath<ip> with what servewaf knows of the client:
// its counters, its history, which holds its country as last looked up and its
// offences, and its bans with their notes.
// showClient answers GET ClientsPath<ip> with what smallwebwaf knows of
// the client: its counters, its history, which holds its country as last
// looked up and its offences, and its bans with their notes.
func (rq *request) showClient() {
addr, err := pathAddress(rq.in.URL.Path, ClientsPath)
if err != nil {
internal/servewaf/admin_test.go → internal/proxy/admin_test.go
+160 -42
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state"
)
@@ -22,6 +23,8 @@ const (
// how a request carries it.
adminSecret = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
adminBearer = "Bearer " + adminSecret
// adminClient is the client the tests' admin sends its requests from.
adminClient = "192.0.2.10"
// banOtherClient is the body of a request to ban otherClient for an
// hour.
banOtherClient = `{"netblock": "` + otherClient + `", "duration": "1h", ` +
@@ -40,7 +43,8 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
for _, authorization := range []string{adminBearer, bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
s.adminRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusNotFound)
s.adminRequest(adminClient, authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
}
}
@@ -67,8 +71,8 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
for _, authorization := range []string{
"", bearer, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(adminSecret), "Basic " + adminSecret,
} {
got := s.adminRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
http.StatusUnauthorized)
got := s.adminRequest(adminClient, authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
if got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
t.Errorf("%s %s with %q was answered without WWW-Authenticate: Bearer",
e.method, e.path, authorization)
@@ -88,11 +92,11 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
// Any other request under /_smallwebwaf/ is not found.
for _, e := range []adminEndpoint{
{http.MethodPut, servewaf.BansPath, banOtherClient},
{http.MethodDelete, servewaf.BansPath, ""},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodPost, servewaf.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodGet, strings.TrimSuffix(servewaf.ClientsPath, "/"), ""},
{http.MethodPut, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient},
{http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath, ""},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodPost, proxy.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodGet, strings.TrimSuffix(proxy.ClientsPath, "/"), ""},
} {
s.admin(e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusNotFound)
}
@@ -118,7 +122,7 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
Reason: "probes for logins",
}
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, servewaf.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK),
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK),
want)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
@@ -129,7 +133,7 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
// Its notes count the request it refused.
want.Notes.Requests, want.Notes.Refused = 1, 1
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, servewaf.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
// Ten minutes on, lifting the bans on client lifts that one, which is
// kept, marked lifted.
@@ -138,13 +142,13 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
lifted := clk.Now()
want.Lifted = &lifted
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodDelete, servewaf.BansPath+"/"+client, "",
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath+"/"+client, "",
http.StatusOK), want)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, servewaf.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
// No ban on it is active any more.
s.admin(http.MethodDelete, servewaf.BansPath+"/"+client, "", http.StatusNotFound)
s.admin(http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath+"/"+client, "", http.StatusNotFound)
}
func TestBanToAddGivesItsNetblockAndDuration(t *testing.T) {
@@ -181,7 +185,7 @@ func TestBanToAddGivesItsNetblockAndDuration(t *testing.T) {
want.Expires = &expires
}
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, servewaf.BansPath, body, http.StatusOK), want)
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, body, http.StatusOK), want)
}
}
@@ -250,7 +254,7 @@ func TestBanToAddThatCannotBeReadIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
"request body too large",
},
} {
got := s.admin(http.MethodPost, servewaf.BansPath, tc.body, http.StatusBadRequest)
got := s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, tc.body, http.StatusBadRequest)
if !strings.Contains(string(got.body), tc.want) {
t.Errorf("%.80s was answered %q, want it to say %q", tc.body, got.body, tc.want)
}
@@ -261,12 +265,64 @@ func TestBanToAddThatCannotBeReadIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestBanToAddOverTheRequestSizeLimitIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
adminToken: adminSecret,
requestMaxBytes: "16",
})
// Sent in a chunk, its length is not announced, so that it is found
// over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES only as it is read.
chunk := `{"netblock": "203.0.113.9", "duration": "1h"}`
s.adminRequest(adminClient, adminBearer+"\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked",
http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath,
strconv.FormatInt(int64(len(chunk)), 16)+"\r\n"+chunk+"\r\n0\r\n\r\n",
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want no ban", held)
}
}
func TestBanToAddSlowerThanTheClientRequestTimeoutIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
adminToken: adminSecret,
metricsToken: token,
clientRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
})
// The chunk announces 256 bytes and the rest of it never comes, so only
// the timeout ends the wait. A hold-up of the test process can only
// make the answer later, so the time is checked only for not being
// shorter than the timeout.
start := time.Now()
s.adminRequest(adminClient, adminBearer+"\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked",
http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, "100\r\n"+`{"netblock": "203.0.113.9", `,
http.StatusRequestTimeout, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
if took := time.Since(start); took < shortTimeout {
t.Errorf("answered after %s, before the timeout of %s ran out", took, shortTimeout)
}
wantLimitHits(t, s.addr, clientRequestTimeout, 1)
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want no ban", held)
}
}
func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
adminToken: adminSecret,
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
adminToken: adminSecret,
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
rateLimitExemptNets: adminClient,
})
start := clk.Now()
@@ -283,7 +339,7 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
Bans []state.BanEntry `json:"bans"`
}
decode(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, servewaf.ClientsPath+addr, "", http.StatusOK), &got)
decode(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath+addr, "", http.StatusOK), &got)
if got.Client == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: no client", addr)
@@ -305,16 +361,71 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
// Of an address no request came from and no ban covers, nothing is
// known.
got := s.admin(http.MethodGet, servewaf.ClientsPath+"198.51.100.99", "", http.StatusOK)
got := s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath+"198.51.100.99", "", http.StatusOK)
if string(got.body) != "{\n \"client\": null,\n \"bans\": []\n}\n" {
t.Errorf("an unknown client is answered\n%s", got.body)
}
s.admin(http.MethodGet, servewaf.ClientsPath+"203.0.113", "", http.StatusBadRequest)
s.admin(http.MethodDelete, servewaf.BansPath+"/203.0.113.0/24", "",
s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath+"203.0.113", "", http.StatusBadRequest)
s.admin(http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath+"/203.0.113.0/24", "",
http.StatusBadRequest)
}
func TestBannedClientIsRefusedAtTheEndpointsEvenWithTheToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{adminToken: adminSecret})
s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
// otherClient cannot lift its own ban either.
for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
s.adminRequest(otherClient, adminBearer, e.method, e.path, e.body,
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
}
func TestAdminRequestsCountTowardTheLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
adminToken: adminSecret,
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
})
// A request refused for a missing token and one answered count toward
// the limit of two a minute, so the next breaks it.
s.adminRequest(client, "", http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
s.adminRequest(client, adminBearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
s.adminRequest(client, adminBearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
}
func TestClientInAllowNetsSkipsTheChecksButNeedsTheToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
adminToken: adminSecret,
allowNets: allowed,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
// A ban on it refuses nothing, and its requests are not counted.
server.Ledger.BanForAdmin(netip.MustParsePrefix(allowed+"/32"), clk.Now(),
time.Time{}, "")
for range 2 {
s.adminRequest(allowed, "", http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
s.adminRequest(allowed, adminBearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
}
}
func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -324,7 +435,8 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
})
for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
s.adminRequest("", e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusUnauthorized)
s.adminRequest(adminClient, "", e.method, e.path, e.body,
http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
}
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
@@ -342,40 +454,46 @@ type adminEndpoint struct {
// bans on otherClient, and asking about otherClient.
func adminEndpoints() []adminEndpoint {
return []adminEndpoint{
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.BansPath, ""},
{http.MethodPost, servewaf.BansPath, banOtherClient},
{http.MethodDelete, servewaf.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, ""},
{http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient},
{http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
}
}
// admin sends a request with method for path, with body, to servewaf's own
// address, with the admin token, and checks that it is answered with status, its
// log line's action admin. It returns the answer.
// admin sends a request with method for path, with body, from
// adminClient, with the admin token, and checks that it is answered with
// status, its log line's action admin. It returns the answer.
func (s *sender) admin(method, path, body string, status int) answer {
s.t.Helper()
return s.adminRequest(adminBearer, method, path, body, status)
return s.adminRequest(adminClient, adminBearer, method, path, body, status,
requestlog.ActionAdmin)
}
// adminRequest is admin with authorization as the request's Authorization header
// unless it is "".
// adminRequest sends a request with method for path, with body, from the
// client at from, with authorization as its Authorization header unless
// it is "", and checks its answer's status and its log line's action, as
// request does. authorization may end in more header lines. A body that
// is not "" has its length announced, unless authorization names
// Transfer-Encoding. It returns the answer.
func (s *sender) adminRequest(
authorization, method, path, body string, status int,
from, authorization, method, path, body string, status int, action string,
) answer {
s.t.Helper()
req := newRequest(s.t, method, s.serveWAFAddr, path, strings.NewReader(body))
var header []string
if authorization != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", authorization)
header = append(header, "Authorization: "+authorization)
}
got := do(s.t, req)
wantStatus(s.t, got, status)
if body != "" && !strings.Contains(authorization, "Transfer-Encoding") {
header = append(header, "Content-Length: "+strconv.Itoa(len(body)))
}
line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
s.sent++
wantLine(s.t, line, status, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
_, got := s.requestWithBody(method, from, path, strings.Join(header, "\r\n"),
body, status, action)
return got
}
internal/servewaf/alerts_test.go → internal/proxy/alerts_test.go
+5 -8
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"maps"
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ func TestObserveModeWorksOutABanOnlyWhenItsAlertWouldBeSent(t *testing.T) {
// never sent them, and returns the queue they wait in as well.
func startWithAlerts(
t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *servewaf.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
return startAppWithAlerts(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {}, env)
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ func startWithAlerts(
// startAppWithAlerts is startWithAlerts in front of the app handler.
func startAppWithAlerts(
t *testing.T, handler http.HandlerFunc, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *servewaf.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
app := startApp(t, handler)
@@ -224,9 +224,7 @@ func startAppWithAlerts(
addr, out, server, queue := startProxyWithAlerts(t, app.URL, "", clk.Now, settings)
s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, serveWAFAddr: server.Addr, out: out}
return s, clk, server, queue
return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}, clk, server, queue
}
// banAlert returns the alert for event, raised by a request from client at
@@ -239,7 +237,6 @@ func banAlert(
Instance: alertInstance,
Time: raised,
Event: event,
Host: appHost,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(client),
Netblock: ban.Netblock,
Reason: ban.Reason,
internal/servewaf/anomaly_internal_test.go → internal/proxy/anomaly_internal_test.go
+4 -6
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf
package proxy
import (
"net/netip"
@@ -15,11 +15,9 @@ func TestWithEveryAnomalyThresholdOffARequestIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
// anomaly counters, nor a clock, and the request no response: reading
// any of them to count the request panics.
rq := &request{
decision: decision{
client: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"),
lookedUp: true,
},
h: &handler{config: &config.Config{LookupSource: "geojs"}},
h: &handler{config: &config.Config{LookupSource: "geojs"}},
client: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"),
lookedUp: true,
}
defer func() {
internal/servewaf/anomaly_test.go → internal/proxy/anomaly_test.go
+3 -4
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"maps"
@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// The anomaly thresholds: the prefix of a scope followed by the end of a
@@ -117,7 +117,6 @@ func TestEachScopeAndWindowOverItsThresholdAlertsOncePerCooldown(t *testing.T) {
Instance: alertInstance,
Time: start,
Event: alerts.EventAnomaly,
Host: appHost,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(client),
Netblock: scope.netblock,
ASN: asnDE,
@@ -319,7 +318,7 @@ func TestRequestCountsForTheASNumberGeoJSGivesBeforeItEnds(t *testing.T) {
// kept.
geojsURL, _, release := startHeldGeoJS(t)
var server atomic.Pointer[servewaf.Server]
var server atomic.Pointer[proxy.Server]
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
release()
internal/servewaf/bans.go → internal/proxy/bans.go
+30 -17
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf
package proxy
import (
"net/http"
@@ -58,12 +58,13 @@ func (rq *request) limitBroken(now time.Time) bool {
}
// countBytes counts the request's bytes, as countedBytes gives them, for
// the byte limits, once its report has come, and notes the client's byte totals
// for the log line; its requests stay there as the rate limits counted them.
// Only an allowed request has them counted, and only one the rate limits
// counted; in observe mode, not one that enforce mode would have refused. Bytes
// that take the client over a byte limit, as its limit percentage for the byte
// limits lowers it, break it; the response was passed on whole.
// the byte limits, once its response has ended, and notes the client's
// byte totals for the log line; its requests stay there as the rate limits
// counted them. Only a request passed to the app has them counted, and
// only one the rate limits counted; in observe mode, not one that enforce
// mode would have refused. Bytes that take the client over a byte limit,
// as its limit percentage for the byte limits lowers it, break it; the
// response was passed on whole.
func (rq *request) countBytes() {
if !rq.counted || rq.line.WouldAction != "" {
return
@@ -83,8 +84,9 @@ func (rq *request) countBytes() {
}
// countRefusal counts the request for the error burst once it has been
// answered, if servewaf refused it after a rule file match, a trap path or a
// Core Rule Set match, and in observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
// answered, if smallwebwaf refused it after a rule file match, a trap path
// or a Core Rule Set match, or for a missing or wrong token, and in
// observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
// SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute
// break a limit. A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, which the checks skip, is
// not counted, and nothing is while the threshold is off.
@@ -94,7 +96,11 @@ func (rq *request) countRefusal() {
return
}
if !rq.attack && !rq.ruleBlocked && !rq.wafBlocked {
// In observe mode, a request that enforce mode would have refused
// before it reached the endpoint has had no token refused there.
tokenRefused := rq.tokenRefused && rq.line.WouldAction == "" &&
!isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets)
if !rq.attack && !rq.ruleBlocked && !rq.wafBlocked && !tokenRefused {
return
}
@@ -121,9 +127,16 @@ func (rq *request) countRefusal() {
// countedBytes returns the request's bytes, once it has ended, as the
// byte limits and the anomaly thresholds count them: the response's body
// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT says.
// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT says. For an
// upgraded connection, such as a WebSocket, which has closed by then, what
// it carried from the app counts with the response's and what it carried
// from the client with the request's.
func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
response, request := rq.out.bytes, rq.requestBytes
response, request := rq.out.bytes, rq.requestBytes()
if rq.upgraded != nil {
response += rq.upgraded.fromApp.Load()
request += rq.upgraded.toApp.Load()
}
switch rq.h.config.BytesCount {
case "response":
@@ -138,7 +151,7 @@ func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
// banForLimit bans the client's netblock at now for a broken limit, the
// one hit names, notes the offence for the log line and counts the hit in
// the metrics. status is what the client was sent, or is sent:
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over a rate limit, what the report says for
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over a rate limit, the app's answer for
// one whose bytes broke a byte limit, the refusal for one that broke the
// error burst. The ban's notes give the client's limit percentage for a
// rate limit or a byte limit; the error burst is not lowered. The ban sets
@@ -327,11 +340,11 @@ func (rq *request) alertBan(ban bans.Ban) {
func (rq *request) noted(now time.Time, status int) bans.Request {
return bans.Request{
Time: now,
Method: rq.line.Method,
Host: rq.line.Host,
Path: rq.requestURI,
Method: rq.in.Method,
Host: rq.in.Host,
Path: rq.in.URL.RequestURI(),
Status: status,
UserAgent: rq.line.UserAgent,
UserAgent: rq.in.UserAgent(),
}
}
internal/servewaf/bans_test.go → internal/proxy/bans_test.go
+25 -28
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"bufio"
@@ -9,14 +9,13 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
@@ -375,14 +374,14 @@ func (c *clock) advance(d time.Duration) {
c.now = c.now.Add(d)
}
// startWithClock starts servewaf, and rproxy in front of an app that answers 200,
// startWithClock starts smallwebwaf in front of an app that answers 200,
// with the settings in env on top of trusting localhost's
// X-Forwarded-For, clients' AS numbers and countries looked up at
// geojsURL, and a clock set to midnight, the start of a bucket in every
// window.
func startWithClock(
t *testing.T, geojsURL string, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *servewaf.Server) {
) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server) {
t.Helper()
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
@@ -392,19 +391,18 @@ func startWithClock(
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now, settings)
return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, serveWAFAddr: server.Addr, out: out}, clk, server
return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}, clk, server
}
// sender sends requests to rproxy one after another, each on a connection of its
// own, and checks each one's answer and log line. serveWAFAddr is where servewaf's
// own endpoints are, which adminRequest asks. Every request servewaf gets must
// come through the sender, since the log lines are matched to them in order.
// sender sends requests to smallwebwaf one after another, each on a
// connection of its own, and checks each one's answer and log line. They
// must be the only requests smallwebwaf is sent, since the log lines are
// matched to them in order.
type sender struct {
t *testing.T
addr string
serveWAFAddr string
out *output
sent int
t *testing.T
addr string
out *output
sent int
}
// get sends a GET request for / from the client at from.
@@ -421,19 +419,22 @@ func (s *sender) get(from string, status int, action string) logLine {
func (s *sender) request(from, path string, status int, action string) logLine {
s.t.Helper()
return s.requestWithHeader(from, path, "", status, action)
line, _ := s.requestWithHeader(from, path, "", status, action)
return line
}
// requestWithHeader is request with header, such as "Authorization:
// Bearer x", added to the request unless it is "".
// Bearer x", added to the request unless it is "". It returns the body of
// the answer too.
func (s *sender) requestWithHeader(
from, path, header string, status int, action string,
) logLine {
) (logLine, string) {
s.t.Helper()
line, _ := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodGet, from, path, header, "", status, action)
line, got := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodGet, from, path, header, "", status, action)
return line
return line, string(got.body)
}
// requestWithBody is requestWithHeader for a request with method, whose
@@ -449,14 +450,10 @@ func (s *sender) requestWithBody(
header += "\r\n"
}
// rproxy refuses a request with more than one.
if !strings.Contains(header, "User-Agent:") {
header += "User-Agent: " + userAgent + "\r\n"
}
conn := dial(s.t, s.addr)
send(s.t, conn, method+" "+path+" HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+"\r\n"+
forwardedFor+": "+from+"\r\n"+header+"\r\n"+body)
send(s.t, conn, method+" "+path+" HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+
"\r\nUser-Agent: "+userAgent+"\r\n"+forwardedFor+": "+from+"\r\n"+
header+"\r\n"+body)
err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(waitLimit))
if err != nil {
@@ -481,7 +478,7 @@ func (s *sender) requestWithBody(
got.status, status)
}
line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
line := s.out.requestLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
s.sent++
wantLine(s.t, line, status, action)
internal/servewaf/biased.go → internal/proxy/biased.go
+9 -9
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf
package proxy
import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
@@ -34,19 +34,19 @@ func biasedThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
// percentage SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its AS number, the one the file
// SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names gives it, the one
// SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country, for a client without a
// country, unless its request skipped the wait for GeoJS,
// SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist lists, the
// percentage of SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and for a client
// a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is a hit, the
// percentage of SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For the byte
// limits, SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT take the
// place of the first three for an AS number or a country they list.
// country, SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist lists,
// the percentage of SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and for a
// client a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is a hit,
// the percentage of SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For the
// byte limits, SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT
// take the place of the first three for an AS number or a country they
// list.
func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
cfg := rq.h.config
asn, country := rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country
unknown := percentage{percent: whole}
if country == "" && !rq.skippedLookupWait {
if country == "" {
unknown = percentage{cfg.UnknownLimitPercent, "SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"}
}
internal/servewaf/biased_test.go → internal/proxy/biased_test.go
+22 -17
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
@@ -16,8 +17,8 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup/lookuptest"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// The biased thresholds.
@@ -280,12 +281,12 @@ func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownLimitPercent(t *testing.T) {
// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out, _ := newServeWAF(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
server, out, _ := newProxy(t, "http://app.invalid", unansweredGeoJSURL,
time.Now, map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
// Once the time the request waits for its answer is up, the client
// Once the second the request waits for its answer is up, the client
// counts as without a country, and its zero allowance refuses the
// request.
// request before it reaches the app.
serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodGet, http.NoBody)
line := out.requestLine(t)
@@ -319,8 +320,13 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out, _ := newServeWAF(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), tc.setting: tc.value})
// The request's body is over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES, so that it
// is refused after the checks, and never reaches the app.
server, out, _ := newProxy(t, "http://app.invalid", unansweredGeoJSURL,
time.Now, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), requestMaxBytes: "1",
tc.setting: tc.value,
})
began := time.Now()
serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodPost, strings.NewReader("ab"))
@@ -334,7 +340,8 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("the request waited %s for its answer, want %s", waited, want)
}
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
// The bubble's clock stops once this function returns, so the
// request to GeoJS, which a request that did not wait leaves
@@ -419,7 +426,7 @@ func TestBanForALoweredLimitGivesThePercentageInItsNotesAndItsAlert(t *testing.T
// clock.
func startWithLookups(
t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *servewaf.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
) (*sender, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
s, _, server, queue := startWithLookupsAndClock(t, env)
@@ -434,7 +441,7 @@ func startWithLookups(
// country, and no other address.
func startWithLookupsAndClock(
t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *servewaf.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ipinfo_lite.mmdb")
@@ -460,15 +467,13 @@ func (s *sender) uploadFrom(from string) logLine {
return line
}
// serveFromDE hands a question about a request from fromDE with method and body
// straight to server's handler, without the network, and returns once it is
// answered.
func serveFromDE(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, method string, body io.Reader) {
// serveFromDE hands a request from fromDE with method and body straight to
// server's handler, without the network, and returns once it is answered.
func serveFromDE(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, method string, body io.Reader) {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), method, "/", body)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, fromDE)
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-id")
req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(fromDE, "1234")
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
}
internal/rproxy/bodies.go → internal/proxy/bodies.go
+76 -48
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package rproxy
package proxy
import (
"bufio"
@@ -7,38 +7,39 @@ import (
"net"
"net/http"
"sync/atomic"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// errResponseTooLarge ends an app's response body that is longer than
// SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE.
// SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES.
var errResponseTooLarge = errors.New(
"the response body is over SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE")
"the response body is over SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES")
// requestBody is the visitor's request body. rproxy first reads up to the first
// 64 KiB of it into held, and then, on its way to the app, the transport reads
// it on a goroutine of its own.
// requestBody is the client's request body on its way to the app. The
// transport reads it on a goroutine of its own.
type requestBody struct {
// body is the visitor's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
// SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE.
// body is the client's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
// SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES.
body io.ReadCloser
rq *request
// held is the part read before the request goes to the app, which Read gives
// first.
held []byte
// waiting is true while a Read waits for the visitor to send more.
// readByCoreRuleSet is what the Core Rule Set read of the body before
// the request went to the app, and Read gives first.
readByCoreRuleSet []byte
// waiting is true while a Read waits for the client to send more.
waiting atomic.Bool
// received is true once the visitor has sent the whole body.
// received is true once the client has sent the whole body.
received atomic.Bool
// bytes is how much of the body has been read.
bytes atomic.Int64
}
// Read reads from the visitor's body, after the part held, which has been
// counted already.
// Read reads from the client's body, after what the Core Rule Set read of
// it, which has been counted already.
func (b *requestBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if len(b.held) > 0 {
n := copy(p, b.held)
b.held = b.held[n:]
if len(b.readByCoreRuleSet) > 0 {
n := copy(p, b.readByCoreRuleSet)
b.readByCoreRuleSet = b.readByCoreRuleSet[n:]
return n, nil
}
@@ -53,22 +54,27 @@ func (b *requestBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, io.EOF):
b.received.Store(true)
b.rq.bodyReceived()
case errors.As(err, &tooLarge):
b.rq.refuse(http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
b.rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
limit: "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES",
})
}
return n, err
}
// Close closes the visitor's body.
// Close closes the client's body.
func (b *requestBody) Close() error {
return b.body.Close()
}
// responseBody is the app's response body on its way to the visitor.
// responseBody is the app's response body on its way to the client.
type responseBody struct {
// body is the app's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
// SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE.
// SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES.
body io.ReadCloser
rq *request
}
@@ -86,13 +92,20 @@ func (b *responseBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
case errors.Is(err, io.EOF):
b.rq.responseReceived()
case errors.As(err, &tooLarge):
b.rq.refuse(http.StatusBadGateway)
b.rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusBadGateway,
action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
limit: "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES",
})
return n, errResponseTooLarge
case b.rq.in.Context().Err() == nil:
// The answer broke off, not because the visitor went away. If a time
// limit cut it, that refusal came first and is the one kept.
b.rq.refuse(http.StatusBadGateway)
// The answer broke off, not because the client went away. If a
// timeout cut it, that refusal came first and is the one kept.
b.rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusBadGateway,
action: requestlog.ActionUpstreamError,
})
}
return n, err
@@ -104,14 +117,15 @@ func (b *responseBody) Close() error {
}
// upgradedConn is the connection to the app once the app has switched
// protocols, as for a WebSocket. ReverseProxy writes to it what the visitor
// sends and reads from it what the app sends, on goroutines of its own, until
// the connection closes; it counts the bytes each way, for the report.
// protocols, as for a WebSocket. ReverseProxy writes to it what the client
// sends and reads from it what the app sends, on goroutines of its own,
// until the connection closes; it counts the bytes each way, for the byte
// limits.
type upgradedConn struct {
io.ReadWriteCloser
// fromApp is how many bytes the app has sent, and toApp how many the
// visitor has.
// client has.
fromApp atomic.Int64
toApp atomic.Int64
}
@@ -124,7 +138,7 @@ func (c *upgradedConn) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
return n, err
}
// Write sends the app what the visitor sent.
// Write sends the app what the client sent.
func (c *upgradedConn) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
n, err := c.ReadWriteCloser.Write(p)
c.toApp.Add(int64(n))
@@ -132,9 +146,9 @@ func (c *upgradedConn) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
return n, err
}
// CloseWrite tells the app that the visitor sends no more, while what the app
// sends still passes. ReverseProxy calls it once the visitor has stopped
// sending, and closes the connection there if it is not supported.
// CloseWrite tells the app that the client sends no more, while what the
// app sends still passes. ReverseProxy calls it once the client has
// stopped sending, and closes the connection there if it is not supported.
func (c *upgradedConn) CloseWrite() error {
conn, ok := c.ReadWriteCloser.(interface{ CloseWrite() error })
if !ok {
@@ -144,8 +158,8 @@ func (c *upgradedConn) CloseWrite() error {
return conn.CloseWrite()
}
// limitBody returns body, cut off with an *http.MaxBytesError after maxBytes, or
// unchanged if maxBytes is zero, which is off.
// limitBody returns body, cut off with an *http.MaxBytesError after
// maxBytes, or unchanged if maxBytes is zero, which is off.
func limitBody(body io.ReadCloser, maxBytes int64) io.ReadCloser {
if maxBytes == 0 {
return body
@@ -155,18 +169,19 @@ func limitBody(body io.ReadCloser, maxBytes int64) io.ReadCloser {
return http.MaxBytesReader(nil, body, maxBytes)
}
// responseWriter is the response to the visitor. It notes the status and size
// for the log line and the report.
// responseWriter is the response to the client. It notes the status and
// size for the log line, and the first error writing to the client.
type responseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
// status is the final status sent, or zero before one is.
status int
bytes int64
err error
}
// WriteHeader sends the status and headers. An informational 1xx status is
// passed on and the final status still comes later.
// WriteHeader sends the status and headers. An informational 1xx status
// is passed on and the final status still comes later.
func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(status int) {
if status >= http.StatusOK && w.status == 0 {
w.status = status
@@ -181,20 +196,26 @@ func (w *responseWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
w.status = http.StatusOK
}
n, err := w.ResponseWriter.Write(p) //nolint:gosec // the answer, as it was given
n, err := w.ResponseWriter.Write(p)
w.bytes += int64(n)
w.noteError(err)
return n, err
}
// FlushError sends what has been written so far. http.ResponseController calls
// it, as ReverseProxy does after each write.
// FlushError sends what has been written so far.
// http.ResponseController calls it, as ReverseProxy does after each
// write.
func (w *responseWriter) FlushError() error {
return http.NewResponseController(w.ResponseWriter).Flush()
err := http.NewResponseController(w.ResponseWriter).Flush()
w.noteError(err)
return err
}
// Hijack takes over the connection to the visitor, which ReverseProxy does only
// to pass on the app's 101 Switching Protocols: that is then the status sent.
// Hijack takes over the connection to the client, which ReverseProxy does
// only to pass on the app's 101 Switching Protocols: that is then the
// status sent.
func (w *responseWriter) Hijack() (net.Conn, *bufio.ReadWriter, error) {
conn, buffered, err := http.NewResponseController(w.ResponseWriter).Hijack()
if err == nil {
@@ -204,8 +225,15 @@ func (w *responseWriter) Hijack() (net.Conn, *bufio.ReadWriter, error) {
return conn, buffered, err
}
// Unwrap lets http.ResponseController reach net/http's own ResponseWriter for
// what responseWriter does not do itself.
// Unwrap lets http.ResponseController reach net/http's own
// ResponseWriter for what responseWriter does not do itself.
func (w *responseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
return w.ResponseWriter
}
// noteError keeps the first error writing to the client.
func (w *responseWriter) noteError(err error) {
if w.err == nil {
w.err = err
}
}
internal/servewaf/bytelimits_test.go → internal/proxy/bytelimits_test.go
+61 -4
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"bufio"
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ const (
func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
for _, tc := range []struct {
setting, window string
// apart is the time between the two requests, which the window
@@ -92,7 +94,7 @@ func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{`+
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{`+
`instance="`+alertInstance+`",kind="bytes",window="`+tc.window+`"}`, 1)
})
}
@@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ func TestBytesOfAnAnswerThatBreaksOffAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
// The 70 bytes passed on before the app broke off are over the limit of
// 50, and ban the client for an hour.
line, got := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodGet, client, "/", "", "", http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward)
requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
if len(got.body) != answerBytes || line.LimitHit != minuteBytes ||
line.BanExpires != expires {
t.Errorf("got %d bytes, and the log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, "+
@@ -166,6 +168,39 @@ func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestWebSocketPassesTheAnswerAfterTheClientStopsSending(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, echoOnceTheClientStops)
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL,
map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost})
s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
conn, reader := s.openWebSocket()
send(t, conn, uploadBody)
// The client closes its sending side and waits for the answer, which the
// app sends only once it has seen the client stop. smallwebwaf passes the
// close on to the app through CloseWrite on upgradedConn; without that,
// it closes both connections, and the answer is lost.
tcp, ok := conn.(*net.TCPConn)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("connection is a %T, want a *net.TCPConn", conn)
}
err := tcp.CloseWrite()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("close the sending side: %v", err)
}
got, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
if err != nil || string(got) != uploadBody {
t.Errorf("got %q (%v), want %q", got, err, uploadBody)
}
s.closeWebSocket(conn)
}
func TestBytesCountSaysWhichBytesCount(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -430,6 +465,28 @@ func answerAfterUpgrade(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
}
}
// echoOnceTheClientStops is an app that switches protocols, as for a
// WebSocket, reads what the client sends until the client stops sending,
// and then sends it all back.
func echoOnceTheClientStops(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
conn, buffered, err := http.NewResponseController(w).Hijack()
if err != nil {
return
}
defer func() {
_ = conn.Close()
}()
_, _ = buffered.WriteString("HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" +
"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
_ = buffered.Flush()
received, _ := io.ReadAll(buffered)
_, _ = buffered.Write(received)
_ = buffered.Flush()
}
// webSocket opens a WebSocket from client to answerAfterUpgrade, sends a
// line of bodyBytes on it, reads the answer, and closes it. It checks the
// answer, and the log line as request does, and returns the log line.
@@ -486,7 +543,7 @@ func (s *sender) closeWebSocket(conn net.Conn) logLine {
_ = conn.Close()
line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
line := s.out.requestLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
s.sent++
wantLine(s.t, line, http.StatusSwitchingProtocols, requestlog.ActionForward)
internal/rproxy/client.go → internal/proxy/client.go
+52 -32
View File
@@ -1,40 +1,30 @@
package rproxy
package proxy
import (
"crypto/rand"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strings"
)
// The headers rproxy sets on the requests it passes to the app. Go writes every
// header name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so
// X-Client-ASN arrives as X-Client-Asn, and Del removes a visitor's own whatever
// their case; header names are not case-sensitive.
const (
requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
asnHeader = "X-Client-Asn"
countryHeader = "X-Client-Country"
)
// peerAddress is the address of the request's TCP peer, normally traefik, without
// any IPv6 zone, which servewaf refuses.
// peerAddress is the address of the request's TCP peer, normally traefik.
func peerAddress(r *http.Request) netip.Addr {
addrPort, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return netip.Addr{}
}
return addrPort.Addr().Unmap().WithZone("")
return addrPort.Addr().Unmap()
}
// clientAddress works out who the visitor is. A peer outside the trusted
// proxies is the visitor, and what it says in X-Forwarded-For is ignored. For a
// peer inside them, X-Forwarded-For is read from the right, and the first
// address outside them is the visitor; if every address in it is inside, the
// leftmost is, and with no header, the peer. An entry that is not an address
// ends the reading, since nothing to its left can be believed. The visitor's
// address never has an IPv6 zone, which servewaf refuses.
// clientAddress works out who the client is. A peer outside the trusted
// proxies is the client, and what it says in X-Forwarded-For is ignored.
// For a peer inside them, X-Forwarded-For is read from the right, and the
// first address outside them is the client; if every address in it is
// inside, the leftmost is, and with no header, the peer. An entry that is
// not an address ends the reading, since nothing to its left can be
// believed.
func clientAddress(
peer netip.Addr, forwardedFor []string, trusted []netip.Prefix,
) netip.Addr {
@@ -50,7 +40,7 @@ func clientAddress(
break
}
client = addr.Unmap().WithZone("")
client = addr.Unmap()
if !isInside(client, trusted) {
break
}
@@ -59,8 +49,24 @@ func clientAddress(
return client
}
// scheme is how the visitor reached traefik, as a trusted proxy says in
// X-Forwarded-Proto, or otherwise http, the only scheme rproxy serves.
// requestIDHeader carries the request's id, from traefik and to the app.
const requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
// requestID is the request's id: the one a trusted proxy sent, or a new
// random one. A peer outside the trusted proxies did not come through
// traefik, so the id it sends is its own claim, and is replaced.
func requestID(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
id := r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
if !peerTrusted || id == "" {
id = rand.Text()
}
return id
}
// scheme is how the client reached traefik, as a trusted proxy says in
// X-Forwarded-Proto, or otherwise http, the only scheme smallwebwaf
// serves.
func scheme(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
proto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")
if !peerTrusted || proto == "" {
@@ -70,6 +76,19 @@ func scheme(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
return proto
}
// clientGroup is the client a request is counted toward: its IPv4
// address, or its IPv6 group, the netblock its IPv6 address is in of the
// length SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets, a /64 by default, since one abuser
// usually holds a whole /64. An IPv4 address in IPv6 form counts as IPv4.
func (h *handler) clientGroup(addr netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
addr = addr.Unmap()
if addr.Is6() {
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, h.config.IPv6GroupPrefix).Masked()
}
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen())
}
// isInside reports whether addr is in one of the netblocks.
func isInside(addr netip.Addr, netblocks []netip.Prefix) bool {
return slices.ContainsFunc(netblocks, func(netblock netip.Prefix) bool {
@@ -78,11 +97,12 @@ func isInside(addr netip.Addr, netblocks []netip.Prefix) bool {
}
// setForwardedHeaders sets the headers in which the app learns about the
// visitor, so that it sees what it would see from traefik directly. A trusted
// proxy's forwarded headers pass on, with the proxy's own address added to
// X-Forwarded-For. Those of any other peer are its own claims and are replaced:
// X-Forwarded-For names the peer, X-Forwarded-Host the host it asked for, and
// X-Forwarded-Proto plain http, which is how it reached rproxy.
// client, so that it sees what it would see from traefik directly. A
// trusted proxy's forwarded headers pass on, with the proxy's own address
// added to X-Forwarded-For. Those of any other peer are its own claims and
// are replaced: X-Forwarded-For names the peer, X-Forwarded-Host the host
// it asked for, and X-Forwarded-Proto plain http, which is how it reached
// smallwebwaf.
func setForwardedHeaders(in, out *http.Request, peer netip.Addr, trusted bool) {
forwardedFor := peer.String()
@@ -105,9 +125,9 @@ func setForwardedHeaders(in, out *http.Request, peer netip.Addr, trusted bool) {
return
}
// ReverseProxy has removed Forwarded and the three set below; these are the
// other headers in which traefik tells the app about the visitor and its
// request.
// ReverseProxy has removed Forwarded and the three set below; these
// are the other headers in which traefik tells the app about the
// client and its request.
for _, name := range []string{
"X-Forwarded-Port", "X-Forwarded-Server", "X-Forwarded-Uri",
"X-Forwarded-Method", "X-Forwarded-Prefix", "X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert",
internal/proxy/client_test.go
+165
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"testing"
)
const (
// trustLocalhost trusts the address every test connects from, and a
// network for proxies in front of it.
trustLocalhost = localhost + "/32,10.0.0.0/8"
// appHost is the host every test asks for.
appHost = "app.example"
// client is the client's address, as a proxy names it.
client = "203.0.113.9"
// forwardedFor is the header that lists the client and its proxies,
// and forwardedProto the one that gives the scheme the client used.
forwardedFor = "X-Forwarded-For"
forwardedProto = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
// secure is the scheme a client reached traefik with, and plain the
// one smallwebwaf serves.
secure = "https"
plain = "http"
)
// appHeaders is what the app tells about the headers it received.
type appHeaders struct {
Host string `json:"host"`
ForwardedFor string `json:"forwardedFor"`
ForwardedHost string `json:"forwardedHost"`
ForwardedProto string `json:"forwardedProto"`
RealIP string `json:"realIp"`
}
// clientAddressCase is a request and what smallwebwaf makes of it.
type clientAddressCase struct {
name string
env map[string]string
header http.Header
wantClient string
wantApp appHeaders
}
func TestClientAddressAndForwardedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range clientAddressCases() {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, line := requestWithHeaders(t, tc.env, tc.header)
tc.wantApp.Host = appHost
if got != tc.wantApp {
t.Errorf("app received %+v, want %+v", got, tc.wantApp)
}
if line.ClientIP != tc.wantClient || line.PeerIP != localhost {
t.Errorf("log line has client_ip %q and peer_ip %q, want %q and %q",
line.ClientIP, line.PeerIP, tc.wantClient, localhost)
}
})
}
}
// clientAddressCases are the requests TestClientAddressAndForwardedHeaders
// sends, from 127.0.0.1, which the default trusted proxies leave out.
func clientAddressCases() []clientAddressCase {
trusted := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
forged := http.Header{
forwardedFor: {client},
"X-Forwarded-Host": {"forged.example"},
forwardedProto: {secure},
"X-Real-Ip": {client},
}
replaced := appHeaders{
ForwardedFor: localhost, ForwardedHost: appHost, ForwardedProto: plain,
}
return []clientAddressCase{{
name: "a peer outside the trusted proxies is the client, " +
"and its forwarded headers are replaced",
header: forged, wantClient: localhost, wantApp: replaced,
}, {
name: "set but empty, the trusted proxies trust nothing",
env: map[string]string{trustedProxies: ""},
header: forged, wantClient: localhost, wantApp: replaced,
}, {
name: "behind a trusted peer, the client is the first address " +
"outside the trusted proxies from the right",
env: trusted,
header: http.Header{
forwardedFor: {"198.51.100.7, " + client + ", 10.0.0.2"},
"X-Forwarded-Host": {appHost},
forwardedProto: {secure},
"X-Real-Ip": {client},
},
wantClient: client,
wantApp: appHeaders{
ForwardedFor: "198.51.100.7, " + client + ", 10.0.0.2, " + localhost,
ForwardedHost: appHost, ForwardedProto: secure, RealIP: client,
},
}, {
name: "when every address is a trusted proxy, the leftmost is the client",
env: trusted,
header: http.Header{forwardedFor: {"10.0.0.5, 10.0.0.2"}},
wantClient: "10.0.0.5",
wantApp: appHeaders{ForwardedFor: "10.0.0.5, 10.0.0.2, " + localhost},
}, {
name: "with no header, a trusted peer is the client",
env: trusted,
wantClient: localhost,
wantApp: appHeaders{ForwardedFor: localhost},
}, {
name: "an entry that is not an address ends the reading",
env: trusted,
header: http.Header{forwardedFor: {client + ", unknown, 10.0.0.2"}},
wantClient: "10.0.0.2",
wantApp: appHeaders{
ForwardedFor: client + ", unknown, 10.0.0.2, " + localhost,
},
}, {
name: "several header lines are read as one list",
env: trusted,
header: http.Header{forwardedFor: {"2001:db8::7", "10.0.0.2"}},
wantClient: "2001:db8::7",
wantApp: appHeaders{ForwardedFor: "2001:db8::7, 10.0.0.2, " + localhost},
}}
}
// requestWithHeaders sends a request for appHost with header through
// smallwebwaf, with the settings in env, and returns the headers the app
// received and the request's log line.
func requestWithHeaders(
t *testing.T, env map[string]string, header http.Header,
) (appHeaders, logLine) {
t.Helper()
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(appHeaders{
Host: r.Host,
ForwardedFor: r.Header.Get(forwardedFor),
ForwardedHost: r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"),
ForwardedProto: r.Header.Get(forwardedProto),
RealIP: r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"),
})
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, env)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Host = appHost
req.Header = header.Clone()
answered := do(t, req)
var got appHeaders
err := json.Unmarshal(answered.body, &got)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode the app's answer %q: %v", answered.body, err)
}
return got, out.requestLine(t)
}
internal/servewaf/coreruleset.go → internal/proxy/coreruleset.go
+43 -6
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
package servewaf
package proxy
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"os"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
@@ -16,7 +19,8 @@ import (
// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it raises the waf_block alert,
// and in block mode refuses the request, which is an offence its client's
// history counts, and so returns ActionWAFBlocked. It returns "" for a
// request it does not refuse.
// request it does not refuse, and for one whose body meets a size or time
// limit while the Core Rule Set reads it, which it notes nothing of.
func (rq *request) checkCoreRuleSet() string {
cfg := rq.h.config
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff || pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.WAFExemptPaths) {
@@ -25,10 +29,10 @@ func (rq *request) checkCoreRuleSet() string {
start := time.Now()
// A question's body has been read into memory, so that reading it here
// cannot fail.
result, read, _ := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, rq.in.Body)
rq.requestBytes = int64(len(read))
result := rq.inspect()
if rq.refused.Load() != nil {
return "" // the refusal for that limit, which check returns
}
rq.line.DurationWAF = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(time.Since(start)))
rq.line.WAFRuleIDs = result.RuleIDs
@@ -54,6 +58,39 @@ func (rq *request) checkCoreRuleSet() string {
return requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked
}
// inspect runs the Core Rule Set on the request, which reads the part of
// its body it inspects within SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, and keeps that
// part for the app. A client that runs out of time is refused with 408
// here, and a body over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES with 413 as it is read;
// check returns the refusal. A body that breaks off for any other reason
// is passed on as far as it came, and the request to the app fails there,
// as it would have without the Core Rule Set.
func (rq *request) inspect() waf.Result {
if rq.body == nil {
// Nothing is read of no body, so nothing can go wrong reading it.
result, _, _ := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, http.NoBody)
return result
}
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(rq.clientRequestDeadline())
result, read, err := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, rq.body)
// The timeouts that run while the request goes to the app take over.
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})
rq.body.readByCoreRuleSet = read
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded) {
rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
limit: "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT",
})
}
return result
}
// alertWAFBlock raises the waf_block alert for the request, which the Core
// Rule Set scored at result, at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its
// detail gives the rule ids, the score, the method and the path with the
internal/servewaf/coreruleset_test.go → internal/proxy/coreruleset_test.go
+124 -14
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"io"
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
@@ -28,13 +29,6 @@ const (
// formData is the type of a form's body.
const formData = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
// sizeLimit is SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies, 1K as a
// setting.
const (
sizeLimit = 1 << 10
sizeLimitSetting = "1K"
)
// sqlInjection asks for / with an SQL injection in its query, which only
// the Core Rule Set's rule 942100 matches, with a score of 5, the default
// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
@@ -102,7 +96,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(t *test
} {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: tc.mode})
line := s.requestWithHeader(client, attack.path, attack.header,
line, _ := s.requestWithHeader(client, attack.path, attack.header,
tc.status, tc.action)
wantWAF(t, line, &attack.score, attack.ruleIDs...)
}
@@ -305,7 +299,7 @@ func TestBodiesReachTheAppAsSentWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
tc.name, len(got.body), got.status, len(tc.body))
}
line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if line.RequestBytes != int64(len(tc.body)) {
@@ -315,6 +309,119 @@ func TestBodiesReachTheAppAsSentWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestFormBodyLongerThanTheLimitStreamsOnToTheApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
first = "a=" // and twice the limit of b's, then the rest
rest = 64 * sizeLimit
)
// past is closed once the app has received twice what the Core Rule
// Set reads, and got is the length of the whole body it received.
past := make(chan struct{})
got := make(chan int64, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
n, _ := io.CopyN(io.Discard, r.Body, 2*sizeLimit)
close(past)
m, _ := io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
got <- n + m
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
})
// The client sends the rest only once the app has received the first
// part: were smallwebwaf to hold the body until the end, it would
// never come.
body, sender := io.Pipe()
go func() {
_, _ = io.WriteString(sender, first+strings.Repeat("b", 2*sizeLimit))
select {
case <-past:
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Error("the app got no more than the Core Rule Set reads " +
"before the whole body was sent")
_ = sender.CloseWithError(io.ErrUnexpectedEOF)
return
}
_, _ = io.WriteString(sender, strings.Repeat("b", rest))
_ = sender.Close()
}()
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", formData)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
want := int64(len(first) + 2*sizeLimit + rest)
if n := <-got; n != want {
t.Errorf("the app got %d bytes, want %d", n, want)
}
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
func TestClientTooSlowToSendWhatTheCoreRuleSetReads(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
clientRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting, metricsToken: token,
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "POST /comment HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nContent-Type: "+formData+
"\r\nContent-Length: 100\r\n\r\ncontent=the first bytes")
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusRequestTimeout)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusRequestTimeout, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
wantNotSentToTheApp(t, line)
wantLimitHits(t, addr, clientRequestTimeout, 1)
}
func TestBodyOverTheSizeLimitWhileTheCoreRuleSetReadsIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: "4K",
requestMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting, metricsToken: token,
})
// Sent in chunks, its length is not announced, and is found to be over
// the limit as the Core Rule Set reads it.
body := io.MultiReader(strings.NewReader("a=" + strings.Repeat("b", 2*sizeLimit)))
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", formData)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
wantNotSentToTheApp(t, line)
wantLimitHits(t, addr, requestMaxBytes, 1)
}
// wantNotSentToTheApp checks that the request of line was not sent to the
// app at all.
func wantNotSentToTheApp(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
t.Helper()
_, sent := line.fields["duration_upstream_total"]
if sent {
t.Error("log line has duration_upstream_total, for a request sent to the app")
}
}
func TestResponsesAreNotInspected(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -334,12 +441,14 @@ func TestResponsesAreNotInspected(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("answered %d with %q, want 200 with the app's page", got.status, got.body)
}
wantLine(t, out.endedLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, errorBurstThreshold: "2", metricsToken: token,
})
@@ -365,7 +474,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T)
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
}
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="block",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
@@ -377,6 +486,8 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T)
func TestDetectModeMatchIsNoOffenceAndNotCountedTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: detect, errorBurstThreshold: "2", metricsToken: token,
})
@@ -392,7 +503,7 @@ func TestDetectModeMatchIsNoOffenceAndNotCountedTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want none", offences)
}
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="detect",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
@@ -465,7 +576,6 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
Instance: alertInstance,
Time: clk.Now(),
Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock,
Host: appHost,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(client),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
internal/servewaf/countries.go → internal/proxy/countries.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf
package proxy
import (
"slices"
internal/servewaf/countries_test.go → internal/proxy/countries_test.go
+12 -8
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"encoding/json"
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, sent.client)
got := do(t, req)
line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
if line.ASN != sent.asn || line.ASName != sent.asName ||
line.Country != sent.country {
t.Errorf("log line has %q, %q and %q, want %q, %q and %q",
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
func TestCountryRefusalComesBeforeTheBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -109,9 +109,13 @@ func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromKP)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
line := out.endedLine(t)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
if line.RequestBytes != 0 {
t.Errorf("log line has request_bytes %d, want 0", line.RequestBytes)
}
if calls.Load() != 0 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want none", calls.Load())
}
@@ -207,7 +211,7 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
for _, field := range []string{"asn", "as_name", "country"} {
@@ -280,9 +284,9 @@ func TestExclusiveListRefusesAPrivateAddressUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
// each in an AS of its own, and no other address. It returns its URL, and
// what returns the addresses it has been asked about. A test that needs
// the stand-in to be asked or to answer sets SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT to an
// hour, whether or not a request waits for the answer: on the default, a
// hold-up of the test process can abandon the request to the stand-in, and
// leave the client unknown.
// hour, whether or not a request waits for the answer: on the default
// second, a hold-up of the test process can abandon the request to the
// stand-in, and leave the client unknown.
func startGeoJS(t *testing.T) (string, func() []string) {
t.Helper()
internal/servewaf/crowdsec_test.go → internal/proxy/crowdsec_test.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"net/http"
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// The CrowdSec settings, and the tests' engine, which is never asked: each
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testi
// The ban and the hit are counted, and the list has the metrics of any
// list fetched from a URL.
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + decisionsURL + `"}`
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="crowdsec",`+
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsAndAlertsTheBan(
// decisionsURL, answer, the engine's answer, fetched at fetched, as
// reputation.json would at start.
func loadDecisions(
t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, fetched time.Time, answer string,
t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, fetched time.Time, answer string,
) {
t.Helper()
internal/servewaf/errorburst_test.go → internal/proxy/errorburst_test.go
+49 -20
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"maps"
@@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const errorBurstThreshold = "SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
// refused is a request the tests here send, which servewaf refuses after a rule
// file match.
// refused is a request the tests here send, which smallwebwaf refuses
// after a rule file match, or for a missing or wrong token.
type refused int
const (
@@ -27,6 +27,11 @@ const (
// banRule is one its ban rule refuses with 403, and bans the client
// for.
banRule
// noMetricsToken is one for the metrics without a token, and
// wrongAdminToken one for the bans with the metrics token, each
// refused with 401.
noMetricsToken
wrongAdminToken
)
// send sends r from the client at from, checks its answer and log line as
@@ -40,6 +45,14 @@ func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
case banRule:
return s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
case noMetricsToken:
return s.request(from, proxy.MetricsPath, http.StatusUnauthorized,
requestlog.ActionAdmin)
case wrongAdminToken:
line, _ := s.requestWithHeader(from, proxy.BansPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
return line
}
s.t.Fatalf("no request for the refusal %d", r)
@@ -47,16 +60,17 @@ func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
return logLine{}
}
// startForErrorBurst is startWithClock with testRules, the metrics token and
// startForErrorBurst is startWithClock with testRules, both tokens and
// SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD at threshold, and the settings in env.
func startForErrorBurst(
t *testing.T, threshold string, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *servewaf.Server) {
) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
errorBurstThreshold: threshold,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
adminToken: adminSecret,
metricsToken: token,
}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
@@ -73,7 +87,14 @@ func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
refusals []refused
}{
{"block rule", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, blockRule}},
{"a ban rule last", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, banRule}},
{
"missing or wrong token",
[]refused{noMetricsToken, wrongAdminToken, noMetricsToken, wrongAdminToken},
},
{
"a mix ending in a ban rule",
[]refused{blockRule, noMetricsToken, blockRule, banRule},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -109,11 +130,13 @@ func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
s, clk, server := startForErrorBurst(t, "2", nil)
start := clk.Now()
blockRule.send(s, client)
blockRule.send(s, client)
wrongAdminToken.send(s, client)
line := blockRule.send(s, client)
expires := start.Add(time.Hour)
@@ -150,17 +173,19 @@ func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, RuleBlocked: 3}
wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, RuleBlocked: 2, TokenRefused: 1}
if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != wantOffences {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, wantOffences)
}
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
`kind="refusals",window="minute"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 3)
`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="token_refused"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
}
@@ -266,15 +291,19 @@ func TestErrorBurstCountsEachClientTheChecksApplyTo(t *testing.T) {
allowNets: allowed, rateLimitExemptNets: exempt,
})
// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS is not refused, and so not counted.
// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS still needs the token, but is not
// counted.
for range 3 {
s.request(allowed, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := noMetricsToken.send(s, allowed)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
}
}
// One the rate limits do not apply to is.
blockRule.send(s, exempt)
noMetricsToken.send(s, exempt)
line := blockRule.send(s, exempt)
line := wrongAdminToken.send(s, exempt)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want error_burst", line.LimitHit)
}
@@ -307,6 +336,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
mode: observe,
errorBurstThreshold: "1",
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
adminToken: adminSecret,
})
start := clk.Now()
held := bans.Ban{
@@ -317,11 +347,10 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
}
server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{held})
// Under a ban, enforce mode would have refused these before the rule, so
// they are not counted.
// Under a ban, enforce mode would have refused these before the
// endpoint, so their tokens are not counted.
for range 2 {
line := s.request(otherClient, blockedPath, http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward)
line := wrongAdminToken.send(s, otherClient)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
@@ -331,7 +360,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
// The block rule's refusal, which enforce mode would have answered 403,
// is the second of the client's, and would have banned it.
s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wrongAdminToken.send(s, client)
line := s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
internal/proxy/health_test.go
+56
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"net/http"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
func TestHealthEndpointIsAnsweredBeforeAnyCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls atomic.Int32
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
})
// With a limit of one request a minute, any request counted before
// the last one would have it refused.
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
const (
healthChecks = 3
contentType = "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
)
for range healthChecks {
got := get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath)
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
if string(got.body) != "ok\n" || got.header.Get("Content-Type") != contentType {
t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q with Content-Type %q, want ok "+
"with %q", got.body, got.header.Get("Content-Type"), contentType)
}
}
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusOK)
lines := out.requestLines(t, healthChecks+1)
for _, line := range lines[:healthChecks] {
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
if line.ResponseContentType != contentType {
t.Errorf("health check's log line has response_content_type %q, "+
"want %q", line.ResponseContentType, contentType)
}
}
wantLine(t, lines[healthChecks], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if calls.Load() != 1 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
}
}
internal/servewaf/history_test.go → internal/proxy/history_test.go
+19 -14
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"io"
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ func TestHistoryCountsTheBodiesEachWay(t *testing.T) {
got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc")))
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
out.endedLine(t)
out.requestLine(t)
history := historyOf(t, server, localhost)
if history.RequestBytes != 3 || history.ResponseBytes != 5 {
@@ -95,38 +95,43 @@ func TestHistoryCountsTheBodiesEachWay(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestOwnEndpointsAreNotInTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
func TestHealthEndpointIsNotInTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, nil)
s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, servewaf.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized)
s.scrape()
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
out.requestLine(t)
if clients := server.Limiter.Snapshot(); len(clients) != 0 {
t.Errorf("the table holds %+v, want no client", clients)
}
}
func TestPathUnderTheOwnPrefixIsNeitherForwardedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
func TestRequestForSmallwebwafIsRefusedOnlyWithoutTheToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, nil)
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now,
map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
// The metrics and the 404 are neither forwarded nor refused; the 401
// is refused.
scrape(t, addr)
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_smallwebwaf/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
out.endedLine(t)
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.MetricsPath), http.StatusUnauthorized)
out.requestLines(t, 3)
history := historyOf(t, server, localhost)
if history.Requests != 1 || history.Forwarded != 0 || history.Refused != 0 {
if history.Requests != 3 || history.Forwarded != 0 || history.Refused != 1 {
t.Errorf("history counts %d requests, %d forwarded and %d refused, "+
"want 1, 0 and 0", history.Requests, history.Forwarded, history.Refused)
"want 3, 0 and 1", history.Requests, history.Forwarded, history.Refused)
}
}
// historyOf returns the history of the client at addr.
func historyOf(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, addr string) ratelimit.History {
func historyOf(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, addr string) ratelimit.History {
t.Helper()
client := netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32")
internal/proxy/limits_test.go
+162
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// sizeLimit is the size limit the tests set, 1K as a setting.
const (
sizeLimit = 1 << 10
sizeLimitSetting = "1K"
)
func TestRequestBodyLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
size int
// announced sends the size in Content-Length; otherwise the body
// is sent in chunks with no length given.
announced bool
want int
action string
// refusedBeforeApp is a refusal before anything reaches the app.
// A body over the limit with no length given has already partly
// reached the app when it is refused.
refusedBeforeApp bool
}{
{"announced, over the limit", 2 * sizeLimit, true,
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge, true},
{"announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, true,
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, false},
{"not announced, over the limit", 4 * sizeLimit, false,
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge, false},
{"not announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, false,
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, false},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls atomic.Int32
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
requestMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
metricsToken: token,
})
var body io.Reader = bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, tc.size))
if !tc.announced {
body = io.MultiReader(body) // hides the length
}
wantStatus(t, do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/upload", body)),
tc.want)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.want, tc.action)
hits := 0
if tc.action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge {
hits = 1
}
wantLimitHits(t, addr, requestMaxBytes, hits)
if tc.refusedBeforeApp && calls.Load() != 0 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
}
})
}
}
func TestResponseBodyLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
size int
// announced sends the size in Content-Length; otherwise the body
// is sent in chunks with no length given.
announced bool
want int
action string
// received is how much of a body the client gets, and cutOff
// whether the connection is then cut.
received int
cutOff bool
}{
{"announced, over the limit", 2 * sizeLimit, true, http.StatusBadGateway,
requestlog.ActionTooLarge, len("Bad Gateway\n"), false},
{"announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, true, http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward, sizeLimit, false},
{"not announced, over the limit", 4 * sizeLimit, false, http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionTooLarge, sizeLimit, true},
{"not announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, false, http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward, sizeLimit, false},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
answerWithSize(w, tc.size, tc.announced)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
responseMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
metricsToken: token,
})
got := get(t, addr, "/download")
wantStatus(t, got, tc.want)
if len(got.body) != tc.received ||
errors.Is(got.err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) != tc.cutOff {
t.Errorf("client got %d bytes (%v), want %d",
len(got.body), got.err, tc.received)
}
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, tc.want, tc.action)
if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d", line.UpstreamStatus)
}
hits := 0
if tc.action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge {
hits = 1
}
wantLimitHits(t, addr, responseMaxBytes, hits)
})
}
}
// answerWithSize answers with a body of size bytes, announced in
// Content-Length or sent in chunks with no length given.
func answerWithSize(w http.ResponseWriter, size int, announced bool) {
body := make([]byte, size)
if announced {
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(size))
_, _ = w.Write(body)
return
}
// Sending part of it before the end keeps Go's server from working
// out the length.
_, _ = w.Write(body[:size/2])
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
_, _ = w.Write(body[size/2:])
}
internal/servewaf/lookup.go → internal/proxy/lookup.go
+15 -22
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
package servewaf
package proxy
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
)
// The headers in which an answer of allow gives rproxy the client's AS number
// and country, for the app, while SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes
// every header name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so
// X-Client-ASN arrives as X-Client-Asn; header names are not case-sensitive.
// The headers in which the app is passed the client's AS number and
// country while SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes every header
// name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so X-Client-ASN
// arrives as X-Client-Asn, and Del removes a client's own whatever their
// case; header names are not case-sensitive.
const (
asnHeader = "X-Client-Asn"
countryHeader = "X-Client-Country"
@@ -23,24 +23,17 @@ const (
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off or the client is on a private, loopback or
// link-local address, which no lookup can place. The lookup database
// answers at once. With GeoJS, while a setting needs the answer, such as a
// country list or a biased threshold, a new client's request waits for it,
// unless refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports true. ctx is the request's own
// context.
func (rq *request) lookUp(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) {
// country list or a biased threshold, a new client's request waits for it.
// ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) lookUp(ctx context.Context) {
if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "off" || !canBePlaced(rq.client) {
return
}
client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
switch {
case rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file":
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.lookupFile.LookUp(client)
case rq.refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now):
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUpWithoutWaiting(ctx, client)
rq.skippedLookupWait = rq.lookupAnswer.Answered.IsZero()
default:
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUp(ctx, client)
if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" {
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.lookupFile.LookUp(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
} else {
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUp(ctx, rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
}
rq.lookedUp = true
@@ -59,8 +52,8 @@ func (h *handler) addLookup(answer lookup.Answer) {
answer.ASN, answer.ASName, answer.Country)
}
// setLookupHeaders sets the headers that give the client's AS number and
// country, leaving out one that is unknown.
// setLookupHeaders sets the headers in which the app is passed the
// client's AS number and country, leaving out one that is unknown.
func setLookupHeaders(header http.Header, asn, country string) {
if asn != "" {
header.Set(asnHeader, asn)
internal/servewaf/lookup_test.go → internal/proxy/lookup_test.go
+15 -10
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
@@ -140,7 +142,7 @@ func TestRequestThatWaitedForItsLookupIsCountedWhenItGoesOn(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("first request: %v", err)
}
wantLine(t, out.endedLines(t, 2)[1], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, 2)[1], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// The third request's count holds all three: the first was counted
// when it went on, in the minute under way, and the second's count
@@ -148,7 +150,7 @@ func TestRequestThatWaitedForItsLookupIsCountedWhenItGoesOn(t *testing.T) {
clk.advance(500 * time.Millisecond)
wantStatus(t, do(t, requestFromDE()), http.StatusOK)
if got := out.endedLines(t, 3)[2].Counts.Minute; got != 3 {
if got := out.requestLines(t, 3)[2].Counts.Minute; got != 3 {
t.Errorf("the third request's count in the minute is %v, want 3", got)
}
}
@@ -317,7 +319,7 @@ func TestLookupHeadersArePassedToTheAppAndTheClientsOwnRemoved(t *testing.T) {
addr, out, _ := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, time.Now, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
addLookupHeaders: on,
addLookupHeaders: "true",
})
s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
@@ -379,21 +381,24 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays(t *testing.T) {
// clock of the test's own: the wait lasts exactly as long as it should,
// however slowly the test process runs. Nothing in it may wait on the
// network, which would keep that clock from moving on: the request is
// handed to servewaf's handler, and GeoJS is one that never answers.
// handed to the proxy's handler, and GeoJS is one that never answers.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
// Not the default. The exclusive list needs the answer, and the app
// is never reached.
// Not the default second. The exclusive list needs the answer, and
// the app is never reached.
const timeout = 3 * time.Second
server, out, _ := newServeWAF(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{
server, out, _ := newProxy(t, "http://app.invalid", unansweredGeoJSURL,
time.Now, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: timeout.String(),
allowedCountries: "DE",
})
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/",
http.NoBody)
req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(fromDE, "1234")
began := time.Now()
serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodGet, http.NoBody)
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
if waited := time.Since(began); waited != timeout {
t.Errorf("the request waited %s for its answer, want %s", waited, timeout)
internal/servewaf/metrics_test.go → internal/proxy/metrics_test.go
+175 -61
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"io"
@@ -7,13 +7,15 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
@@ -28,38 +30,65 @@ const (
func TestMetricsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", nil)
var calls atomic.Int32
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
for _, authorization := range []string{bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
s.adminRequest(authorization, http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "",
http.StatusNotFound)
for i, authorization := range []string{bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
if authorization != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", authorization)
}
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusNotFound)
wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], http.StatusNotFound,
requestlog.ActionAdmin)
}
if calls.Load() != 0 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
}
}
func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
var calls atomic.Int32
for _, tc := range []struct {
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
for i, tc := range []struct {
method, path, authorization string
status int
}{
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
{
http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(token),
http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(token),
http.StatusUnauthorized,
},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "Basic " + token, http.StatusUnauthorized},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusOK},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "bearer " + token, http.StatusOK},
{http.MethodPost, servewaf.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath + "/", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "Basic " + token, http.StatusUnauthorized},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusOK},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "bearer " + token, http.StatusOK},
{http.MethodPost, proxy.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath + "/", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodGet, "/_smallwebwaf/bans", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodPost, servewaf.HealthPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodPost, proxy.HealthPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
} {
got := s.adminRequest(tc.authorization, tc.method, tc.path, "", tc.status)
req := newRequest(t, tc.method, addr, tc.path, http.NoBody)
if tc.authorization != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.authorization)
}
got := do(t, req)
wantStatus(t, got, tc.status)
wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], tc.status, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
if tc.status == http.StatusUnauthorized &&
got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
@@ -72,28 +101,58 @@ func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("the metrics are\n%s", got.body)
}
}
if calls.Load() != 0 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
}
}
func TestMetricsAreAskedForThroughTheChecks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
metricsToken: token,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
// Asking for the metrics counts toward the client's limit of one
// request a minute, so its next request breaks it, and bans it. A
// banned client is refused the metrics too.
s.scrape(client)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.requestWithHeader(client, proxy.MetricsPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
arrived, release := make(chan struct{}), make(chan struct{})
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
if r.URL.Path == "/held" {
close(arrived)
<-release
}
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
})
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now,
map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
releaseApp := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(release) })
t.Cleanup(releaseApp)
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc")))
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_smallwebwaf/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
out.endedLines(t, 2)
out.requestLines(t, 2)
forward := `{action="forward",instance="app",status_class="2xx"}`
notFound := `{action="admin",instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`
// The request for the metrics is itself under way.
metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
metrics := scrape(t, addr)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_total"+forward, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_total"+notFound, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_request_bytes_total"+forward, 3)
@@ -107,20 +166,50 @@ func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 1)
metric(t, metrics, `go_goroutines{instance="app"}`)
metric(t, metrics, `process_start_time_seconds{instance="app"}`)
// A request the app holds is under way until it ends.
httpClient := newClient(t)
held := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/held", http.NoBody)
ended := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
res, err := httpClient.Do(held)
if err == nil {
err = readAnswer(res).err
}
ended <- err
}()
<-arrived
wantMetric(t, scrape(t, addr), `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 2)
releaseApp()
err := <-ended
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("held request: %v", err)
}
out.requestLines(t, 5)
wantMetric(t, scrape(t, addr), `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 1)
}
func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
const (
scraper = "192.0.2.200" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
)
s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
metricsToken: token,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
banResponse: banResponseClose,
limitBanDuration: "1h",
maxBanDuration: "2h",
metricsToken: token,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
rateLimitExemptNets: scraper,
denyNets: denied,
banResponse: banResponseClose,
limitBanDuration: "1h",
maxBanDuration: "2h",
})
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
@@ -130,7 +219,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="denied",instance="app",status_class="none"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
@@ -141,35 +230,38 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
clk.advance(time.Hour)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `smallwebwaf_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), `smallwebwaf_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
// A limit broken again right after would ban for three hours, longer
// than SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
metrics = s.scrape()
metrics = s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
// denied and client.
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_tracked_clients{instance="app"}`, 2)
// denied, client, and the scraper as of its earlier requests.
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_tracked_clients{instance="app"}`, 3)
}
func TestMetricsCountTheBansAnAdminMakes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
metricsToken: token,
adminToken: adminSecret,
metricsToken: token,
adminToken: adminSecret,
rateLimitExemptNets: scraper,
})
const admins = `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="admin",instance="app"}`
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 0)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 0)
// As an admin's edit of bans.json that adds a ban is taken in.
server.Ledger.LoadEdit([]bans.Ban{{
@@ -177,11 +269,11 @@ func TestMetricsCountTheBansAnAdminMakes(t *testing.T) {
Start: clk.Now(),
}})
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 1)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 1)
// And a ban made through the endpoint.
s.admin(http.MethodPost, servewaf.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 2)
s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 2)
}
func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
@@ -220,7 +312,7 @@ func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
// Each is counted before the next is sent, so that the
// countries are ranked in the order sent.
lines++
out.endedLines(t, lines)
out.requestLines(t, lines)
}
}
@@ -229,7 +321,7 @@ func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
send(fromDE, 2, http.StatusOK)
send(fromFR, 1, http.StatusOK)
metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
metrics := scrape(t, addr)
lines++
wantMetric(t, metrics,
@@ -257,7 +349,7 @@ func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
// from then on, and DE's is gone.
send(fromFR, 3, http.StatusOK)
metrics = scrape(t, server.Addr)
metrics = scrape(t, addr)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
@@ -291,12 +383,13 @@ func TestMetricsByASNumberKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
answer(fromDE, "AS64501"), answer(fromKP, "AS64502"),
})
// With one AS number of its own, the other is counted as other.
// With one AS number of its own, the other is counted as other. The
// metrics are asked for from a private address, which has no AS number.
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape("10.0.0.9")
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_asn_requests_total{asn="AS64501",instance="app"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
@@ -319,12 +412,11 @@ func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(geojs.Close)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, _, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, time.Now,
map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
deniedCountries: "kp",
})
addr, _ := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
deniedCountries: "kp",
})
// GeoJS fails, so the client counts as coming from an unknown country,
// which SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES does not refuse.
@@ -332,16 +424,16 @@ func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
// The client stops waiting for GeoJS once SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT is up, so
// GeoJS's failure can come after its request has ended.
// The client stops waiting for GeoJS after a second, so GeoJS's
// failure can come after its request has ended.
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
metrics := scrape(t, addr)
for metric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total{instance="app"}`) == 0 &&
time.Now().Before(deadline) {
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
metrics = scrape(t, server.Addr)
metrics = scrape(t, addr)
}
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_geojs_requests_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
@@ -360,12 +452,12 @@ func keptAnswer(addr, country string) lookup.Answer {
}
}
// scrape asks servewaf at addr for the metrics, with the token, and returns
// them.
// scrape asks smallwebwaf at addr for the metrics, with the token, and
// returns them.
func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
t.Helper()
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, servewaf.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", bearer)
got := do(t, req)
@@ -376,12 +468,15 @@ func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
return string(got.body)
}
// scrape asks for the metrics, with the token, and returns them.
func (s *sender) scrape() string {
// scrape asks for the metrics, with the token, from the client at from,
// and returns them.
func (s *sender) scrape(from string) string {
s.t.Helper()
return string(s.adminRequest(bearer, http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "",
http.StatusOK).body)
_, metrics := s.requestWithHeader(from, proxy.MetricsPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
return metrics
}
// metric returns the value of series in metrics, which are in the
@@ -429,3 +524,22 @@ func wantNoSeries(t *testing.T, metrics, series string) {
t.Errorf("there is a series %s", series)
}
}
// wantLimitHits checks that the metrics of smallwebwaf at addr count hits
// requests that passed the size or time limit of the setting limit, with
// no series for it when hits is 0.
func wantLimitHits(t *testing.T, addr, limit string, hits int) {
t.Helper()
series := `smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total{instance="app",limit="` +
limit + `"}`
metrics := scrape(t, addr)
if hits == 0 {
wantNoSeries(t, metrics, series)
return
}
wantMetric(t, metrics, series, float64(hits))
}
internal/servewaf/observe_test.go → internal/proxy/observe_test.go
+66 -1
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"bytes"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
@@ -72,6 +76,11 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
// Passed to the app, which answered it.
line := s.get(sent.from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, sent.refusal)
if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d, want 200",
line.UpstreamStatus)
}
}
})
}
@@ -124,6 +133,62 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestObserveModeKeepsTheSizeLimitsAndTheToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
var calls atomic.Int32
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
answerWithSize(w, 2*sizeLimit, true)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
mode: observe,
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
denyNets: denied,
requestMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
responseMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
metricsToken: token,
})
// SWWAF_DENY_NETS would refuse each request; instead a size limit or
// the missing token does.
for i, tc := range []struct {
method, path string
body io.Reader
status int
action string
}{
{
http.MethodPost, "/upload", bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, 2*sizeLimit)),
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
},
{
http.MethodGet, "/download", http.NoBody,
http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
},
{
http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody,
http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin,
},
} {
req := newRequest(t, tc.method, addr, tc.path, tc.body)
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, denied)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), tc.status)
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
wantLine(t, line, tc.status, tc.action)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
}
// The upload was refused before it reached the app.
if calls.Load() != 1 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
}
}
// wantWouldAction checks the request log line's would_action, and that a
// line that should have none has no such field.
func wantWouldAction(t *testing.T, line logLine, want string) {
internal/proxy/passthrough_test.go
+556
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,556 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// A request target with an escaped slash and space in its path, and a
// query with a parameter ReverseProxy cannot parse.
const (
rawPath = "/some%2Fpath/with%20space"
rawQuery = "b=2&a=1&bad=%zz;x"
)
// chunkSize is the size of each part of a body a test sends in parts.
const chunkSize = 1 << 10
var errNotStreamed = errors.New("the first part never reached the app")
// appSaw is what the app received.
type appSaw struct {
method string
target string
header http.Header
body []byte
}
func TestPassesRequestAndAnswerUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requestBody := bytes.Repeat([]byte("request body "), 8000)
answerBody := bytes.Repeat([]byte("answer body "), 8000)
saw := make(chan appSaw, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
saw <- appSaw{r.Method, r.RequestURI, r.Header.Clone(), body}
w.Header().Set("X-App", "yes")
w.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", "a=1")
w.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", "b=2")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTeapot)
_, _ = w.Write(answerBody)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPatch, addr, rawPath+"?"+rawQuery,
bytes.NewReader(requestBody))
req.Header.Add("X-Test", "one")
req.Header.Add("X-Test", "two")
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "test-agent")
got := do(t, req)
wantAppSaw(t, <-saw, requestBody)
wantAnswer(t, got, answerBody)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusTeapot, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantRequestFields(t, line, addr, len(requestBody), len(answerBody))
}
func TestPassesThePathAsSent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, path := range []string{
// An encoded slash and a character Go escapes: |, ^, and é sent
// as its UTF-8 bytes.
"/a%2Fb|c", "/feat%2Fx/file^1", "/x%2Fy/café",
// A path starting with //, which Go would send as a scheme and
// host if it were put in URL.Opaque.
"//a%2Fb",
} {
t.Run(path, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
saw := make(chan string, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
saw <- r.RequestURI
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET "+path+"?q=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+"\r\n\r\n")
got := readResponse(t, conn)
if got.status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status %d, want %d", got.status, http.StatusOK)
}
target := <-saw
if target != path+"?q=1" {
t.Errorf("app saw %s, want %s", target, path+"?q=1")
}
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line.Path != path {
t.Errorf("log line has path %s, want %s", line.Path, path)
}
})
}
}
// wantAppSaw checks that the app received the test's request unchanged.
func wantAppSaw(t *testing.T, saw appSaw, body []byte) {
t.Helper()
if saw.method != http.MethodPatch || saw.target != rawPath+"?"+rawQuery {
t.Errorf("app saw %s %s, want %s %s", saw.method, saw.target,
http.MethodPatch, rawPath+"?"+rawQuery)
}
if !slices.Equal(saw.header.Values("X-Test"), []string{"one", "two"}) {
t.Errorf("app saw X-Test %q", saw.header.Values("X-Test"))
}
if saw.header.Get("User-Agent") != "test-agent" {
t.Errorf("app saw User-Agent %q", saw.header.Get("User-Agent"))
}
if !bytes.Equal(saw.body, body) {
t.Errorf("app saw a body of %d bytes, want the %d sent",
len(saw.body), len(body))
}
}
// wantAnswer checks that the client received the app's answer unchanged.
func wantAnswer(t *testing.T, got answer, body []byte) {
t.Helper()
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusTeapot)
if got.header.Get("X-App") != "yes" {
t.Errorf("client got X-App %q", got.header.Get("X-App"))
}
if !slices.Equal(got.header.Values("Set-Cookie"), []string{"a=1", "b=2"}) {
t.Errorf("client got Set-Cookie %q", got.header.Values("Set-Cookie"))
}
if got.err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got.body, body) {
t.Errorf("client got %d bytes (%v), want the %d the app sent",
len(got.body), got.err, len(body))
}
}
// wantRequestFields checks the log line's fields about the request. Its
// time, its id and its timings are checked only for being there.
func wantRequestFields(t *testing.T, line logLine, host string, sent, received int) {
t.Helper()
bytes := float64(sent + received)
want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: "app",
ClientIP: localhost, Method: http.MethodPatch, Scheme: plain, Host: host,
Path: rawPath, Query: rawQuery, Protocol: protocol,
Status: http.StatusTeapot, RequestBytes: int64(sent),
ResponseBytes: int64(received), UserAgent: "test-agent",
RequestID: line.RequestID, PeerIP: localhost, ClientGroup: localhost + "/32",
ContentLength: int64(sent), ResponseContentType: "text/plain; charset=utf-8",
UpstreamStatus: http.StatusTeapot, Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
Counts: ratelimit.Counts{
Minute: 1, Hour: 1, Day: 1,
MinuteBytes: bytes, HourBytes: bytes, DayBytes: bytes,
},
})
if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) {
t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", line.Line, want)
}
_, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, line.Time)
if err != nil || line.RequestID == "" || line.DurationTotal <= 0 ||
line.DurationUpstreamTotal == nil || *line.DurationUpstreamTotal <= 0 {
t.Errorf("log line has time %q, request_id %q and durations %v and %v",
line.Time, line.RequestID, line.DurationTotal,
line.fields["duration_upstream_total"])
}
}
func TestAddsNoContentTypeTheAppDidNotSend(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const typed = "text/plain"
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/typed" {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", typed)
} else {
// The key with no value keeps Go's server from adding one.
w.Header()["Content-Type"] = nil
}
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "<!doctype html><title>page</title>")
})
addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if got.header.Values("Content-Type") != nil {
t.Errorf("client got Content-Type %q, want none",
got.header.Get("Content-Type"))
}
got = get(t, addr, "/typed")
if got.header.Get("Content-Type") != typed {
t.Errorf("client got Content-Type %q, want %q",
got.header.Get("Content-Type"), typed)
}
}
func TestStreamsTheRequestBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
chunk := bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), chunkSize)
firstArrived := make(chan struct{})
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
first := make([]byte, len(chunk))
_, err := io.ReadFull(r.Body, first)
if err != nil {
return
}
close(firstArrived)
rest, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
_, _ = w.Write(rest)
})
addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
body, writer := io.Pipe()
go func() {
_, _ = writer.Write(chunk)
select {
case <-firstArrived:
_, _ = writer.Write(chunk)
_ = writer.Close()
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
_ = writer.CloseWithError(errNotStreamed)
}
}()
got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/upload", body))
if got.err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got.body, chunk) {
t.Errorf("app read %d bytes after the first part (%v), want %d",
len(got.body), got.err, len(chunk))
}
}
func TestStreamsTheAnswerBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
chunk := bytes.Repeat([]byte("y"), chunkSize)
firstArrived := make(chan struct{})
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write(chunk)
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
select {
case <-firstArrived:
_, _ = w.Write(chunk)
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
}
})
addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/download", http.NoBody)
res, err := newClient(t).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
}
first := make([]byte, len(chunk))
_, err = io.ReadFull(res.Body, first)
close(firstArrived)
got := readAnswer(res)
if err != nil || got.err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got.body, chunk) {
t.Errorf("client read %d bytes after the first part (%v, %v), want %d",
len(got.body), err, got.err, len(chunk))
}
}
func TestUpgradedConnectionOutlastsTheTimeouts(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, echoAfterUpgrade)
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
clientRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
clientResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
upstreamRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
upstreamResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET /socket HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n"+
"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
reader := bufio.NewReader(conn)
res, err := http.ReadResponse(reader, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read the answer to the upgrade: %v", err)
}
answered := time.Now()
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusSwitchingProtocols {
t.Fatalf("status %d, want %d", res.StatusCode, http.StatusSwitchingProtocols)
}
// Every timeout started before the upgrade was answered, the response
// timeouts last, at the end of the request: wait until just past
// shortTimeout after the answer was read, then use the connection.
time.Sleep(time.Until(answered.Add(shortTimeout + 100*time.Millisecond)))
send(t, conn, "still here\n")
echoed, err := reader.ReadString('\n')
if err != nil || echoed != "still here\n" {
t.Errorf("echo %q (%v), want %q", echoed, err, "still here\n")
}
_ = conn.Close()
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusSwitchingProtocols,
requestlog.ActionForward)
}
// echoAfterUpgrade is an app that switches protocols on request, and then
// sends back each line it receives.
func echoAfterUpgrade(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get("Upgrade") != "websocket" {
http.Error(w, "not an upgrade", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
conn, buffered, err := http.NewResponseController(w).Hijack()
if err != nil {
return
}
defer func() {
_ = conn.Close()
}()
_, _ = buffered.WriteString("HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" +
"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
_ = buffered.Flush()
for {
line, err := buffered.ReadString('\n')
if err != nil {
return
}
_, _ = buffered.WriteString(line)
_ = buffered.Flush()
}
}
func TestAnswers502WhenTheAppSwitchesToAnotherProtocol(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// answerAfterUpgrade switches to websocket whatever the client asked
// for, and ReverseProxy passes on a switch only to the protocol the
// client asked for, here "websocket, foo".
app := startApp(t, answerAfterUpgrade)
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET /ws HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n"+
"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket, foo\r\n\r\n")
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusBadGateway)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
}
func TestServerHasTheDefaultLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(func(string) (string, bool) { return "", false })
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("default settings: %v", err)
}
server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: io.Discard,
ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(io.Discard, cfg.InstanceName, cfg.LogLevel),
})
if server.Addr != ":8080" || server.MaxHeaderBytes != 28<<10 ||
server.IdleTimeout != 2*time.Minute || server.ReadHeaderTimeout != time.Minute {
t.Errorf("server listens on %q with header limit %d, idle time %s and "+
"header timeout %s", server.Addr, server.MaxHeaderBytes,
server.IdleTimeout, server.ReadHeaderTimeout)
}
}
func TestRefusesHeadersOverTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
limit int
}{
{"by default", nil, 32 << 10},
{"as set", map[string]string{clientHeaderMaxBytes: "8K"}, 8 << 10},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls atomic.Int32
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
})
addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, tc.env)
// size counts every byte of the request: the request line,
// the headers and the blank line that ends them.
const (
start = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nX-Large: "
end = "\r\n\r\n"
)
for _, sent := range []struct{ size, want int }{
{tc.limit, http.StatusOK},
{tc.limit + 1, http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge},
} {
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn,
start+strings.Repeat("a", sent.size-len(start)-len(end))+end)
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), sent.want)
}
if calls.Load() != 1 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
}
})
}
}
func TestAnswers502WhenTheAppCannotBeReached(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// No test can listen on port 1: listening on port 0 gets one from 32768 up.
addr, out := startProxy(t, "http://"+localhost+":1", nil)
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusBadGateway)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
// There never was a connection to the app, nor an answer from it.
wantTimings(t, line, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
"duration_upstream_total")
logged := slices.ContainsFunc(out.lines(t), func(line map[string]any) bool {
return line["type"] == "process" && line["msg"] == "request to the app failed"
})
if !logged {
t.Errorf("no process line says the request to the app failed")
}
}
func TestLogLevelHoldsBackNoRequestLine(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// At error the warning that the request to the app failed is held back,
// and is written before the answer is.
addr, out := startProxy(t, "http://"+localhost+":1", map[string]string{
"SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL": "error",
})
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusBadGateway)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
for _, line := range out.lines(t) {
if line["type"] == "process" {
t.Errorf("process line %v, want none at error", line)
}
}
}
func TestLogsAnAnswerThatBrokeOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "the first part")
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler) // drops the connection mid-answer
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if string(got.body) != "the first part" || !errors.Is(got.err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
t.Errorf("client read %q (%v), want the first part cut off", got.body, got.err)
}
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
}
func TestLogsAClientThatWentAway(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
arrived := make(chan struct{})
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
close(arrived)
<-r.Context().Done()
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET /slow HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n\r\n")
select {
case <-arrived:
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("the request never reached the app")
}
_ = conn.Close()
line := out.requestLine(t)
if !line.Aborted || line.Status != 0 || line.Action != requestlog.ActionForward {
t.Errorf("log line has aborted %v, status %d and action %q, "+
"want true, 0 and %q",
line.Aborted, line.Status, line.Action, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
}
internal/servewaf/proxy.go → internal/proxy/proxy.go
+155 -59
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
// Package servewaf is the server the servewaf command runs. It answers rproxy's
// questions, takes rproxy's reports and answers its own endpoints, and writes a
// log line for each.
package servewaf
// Package proxy runs the checks on each request and writes one request log
// line for it. New passes each request it lets through to the app and the
// app's answer back, unchanged, within the size and time limits. NewServeWAF
// instead answers rproxy's question about each request, and takes rproxy's
// report once the visitor's answer has ended.
package proxy
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2"
@@ -24,12 +27,18 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
)
// adminPrefix starts the path of each of servewaf's own endpoints. The app never
// sees a path under it.
// How smallwebwaf keeps connections to the app open between requests.
const (
appIdleConns = 100
appIdleConnTimeout = 90 * time.Second
)
// adminPrefix starts the path of every request for smallwebwaf itself,
// which never reaches the app.
const adminPrefix = "/_smallwebwaf/"
// HealthPath is the health endpoint of servewaf and of rproxy, which the
// container's health check asks.
// HealthPath is smallwebwaf's health endpoint, which the container's
// health check asks.
const HealthPath = "/_smallwebwaf/healthz"
// MetricsPath is where the metrics are, for a request that carries
@@ -40,15 +49,14 @@ const MetricsPath = "/_smallwebwaf/metrics"
// a client's address, lifts them, with SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
const BansPath = "/_smallwebwaf/bans"
// ClientsPath is where an admin asks what servewaf knows of a client, by the
// client's address after it, with SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
// ClientsPath is where an admin asks what smallwebwaf knows of a client,
// by the client's address after it, with SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
const ClientsPath = "/_smallwebwaf/clients/"
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
Config *config.Config
// RequestLog receives two JSON lines per question, one at its decision and
// one when its report comes, and one per request to servewaf's own endpoints.
// RequestLog receives one JSON line per request.
RequestLog io.Writer
// ProcessLog receives the process's own messages.
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
@@ -61,9 +69,6 @@ type Params struct {
// LookupFile is the lookup database they are looked up in while
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and nil otherwise.
LookupFile *lookup.File
// CoreRuleSet is what NewCoreRuleSet returns: what inspects requests
// while SWWAF_WAF_MODE is not off, and nil while it is.
CoreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
// Now tells the time by which requests are counted for the rate
// limits, bans are made and run out, and GeoJS's answers are kept,
// normally time.Now in UTC, the time the state files give.
@@ -71,7 +76,7 @@ type Params struct {
// Rules are the rule files' rules, which each request is checked
// against.
Rules *rules.Files
// Alerts receive the alert for each ban servewaf makes or makes
// Alerts receive the alert for each ban the proxy makes or makes
// permanent, for each count over an anomaly threshold, for each request
// whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL zone or
// AbuseIPDB lists, for each request the Core Rule Set scores at or over
@@ -81,10 +86,11 @@ type Params struct {
Alerts *alerts.Queue
}
// Server is the server servewaf runs, with the parts whose state the state
// files keep, the lookup database, nil unless SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the
// lists fetched from URLs, which its Run fetches, the DNSBL zones' verdicts,
// AbuseIPDB's scores and checks spent, and the metrics.
// Server is the server smallwebwaf runs, with the parts of the proxy
// whose state the state files keep, the lookup database, nil unless
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the lists fetched from URLs, which its Run
// fetches, the DNSBL zones' verdicts, AbuseIPDB's scores and checks
// spent, and the metrics.
type Server struct {
*http.Server
@@ -99,24 +105,41 @@ type Server struct {
Metrics *metrics.Metrics
}
// New returns the server smallwebwaf runs: each request it reads passes
// through the proxy. Go's server itself refuses a request line and
// headers over SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES, with 431, closes a
// connection idle for SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT, and applies
// SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT while the headers arrive; the proxy
// applies the timeouts and size limits from then on.
func New(params Params) *Server {
h := newHandler(params)
return h.server(&http.Server{
Handler: h,
ReadHeaderTimeout: params.Config.ClientRequestTimeout,
// Off is an IdleTimeout of 0, which Go's server replaces with
// ReadTimeout: no limit, as long as ReadTimeout stays unset.
IdleTimeout: params.Config.ClientIdleTimeout,
// Go's server reads 4 KiB past MaxHeaderBytes before it
// refuses, so the limit a client meets is the setting.
MaxHeaderBytes: int(params.Config.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes - 4<<10),
})
}
// newHandler returns the handler with what every request shares, as the
// settings in params make it.
func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
errorLog := slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn)
m := metrics.New(params.Config.MetricsTopN, params.Config.InstanceName)
lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB := newReputation(params, m)
awaitingReport, err := lru.New[string, *decision](maxAwaitingReport)
if err != nil {
panic(err) // New fails only for a size below one
}
h := &handler{
config: params.Config,
requestLog: params.RequestLog,
processLog: params.ProcessLog,
now: params.Now,
metrics: m,
awaitingReport: awaitingReport,
config: params.Config,
requestLog: params.RequestLog,
processLog: params.ProcessLog,
errorLog: errorLog,
transport: newTransport(),
now: params.Now,
metrics: m,
limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{
PerMinute: params.Config.RateLimitPerMinute,
PerHour: params.Config.RateLimitPerHour,
@@ -148,7 +171,7 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
dnsbl: dnsbl,
abuseIPDB: abuseIPDB,
rules: params.Rules,
coreRuleSet: params.CoreRuleSet,
coreRuleSet: newCoreRuleSet(params.Config),
alerts: params.Alerts,
}
h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{
@@ -206,43 +229,36 @@ func newReputation(
return lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB
}
// NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
// newCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
// without the rules SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
// up to SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, with the exclusions in
// SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, or nil while SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off. It
// reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the Core Rule Set does not read a
// JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that cannot be read, does
// not parse or names an id of smallwebwaf's own rules is an error in every
// mode. While the mode is off, a set file is loaded with the Core Rule Set only
// to check it.
func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) (*waf.CoreRuleSet, error) {
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff && cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile == "" {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // off is no Core Rule Set, and no error
// up to SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, or nil while SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off.
func newCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff {
return nil
}
coreRuleSet, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel, DisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules,
BodyLimit: min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1),
ExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
BodyLimit: cfg.WAFBodyLimit,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: %w", err)
// The Core Rule Set is built in, and the settings cannot break it:
// the paranoia level is from 1 to 4, the body limit at most 1G, and
// the id of no rule switches nothing off.
panic(err)
}
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // off is no Core Rule Set, and no error
}
return coreRuleSet, nil
return coreRuleSet
}
// handler is servewaf's handler. It holds what every request shares; what
// belongs to one request is in a request.
// handler is the proxy. It holds what every request shares; what belongs
// to one request is in a request.
type handler struct {
config *config.Config
requestLog io.Writer
processLog *slog.Logger
errorLog *log.Logger
transport http.RoundTripper
now func() time.Time
metrics *metrics.Metrics
limiter *ratelimit.Limiter
@@ -256,7 +272,87 @@ type handler struct {
rules *rules.Files
coreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
alerts *alerts.Queue
// awaitingReport holds the decision on each answered question by its id
// until its report comes, and nil for a question still being handled.
awaitingReport *lru.Cache[string, *decision]
// awaitingReport holds, in servewaf, each allowed request by its id
// until its report comes.
awaitingReport *lru.Cache[string, *request]
}
// newTransport returns what carries requests to the app. It never goes
// through a proxy named in the environment, and leaves the app's answers
// compressed or not as the app sent them.
func newTransport() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{
MaxIdleConns: appIdleConns,
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: appIdleConns,
IdleConnTimeout: appIdleConnTimeout,
DisableCompression: true,
}
}
// ServeHTTP handles one request: it works out the client, runs the
// checks, passes the request to the app and the answer back within the
// limits, or answers it itself if it is for smallwebwaf, and writes the
// request's log line.
func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
rq := h.newRequest(w, r)
defer rq.finish()
// The health endpoint is answered at once, before any check, so that
// a health checker is never refused. It does not ask the app.
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == HealthPath {
rq.answerHealth()
return
}
// Once the request has ended, before its log line is written. The
// last deferred runs first: countRefusal before addToHistory, so that
// a broken error burst is in the client's history.
defer rq.addToHistory()
defer rq.countAnomalies()
defer rq.countRefusal()
refused := rq.check(r.Context())
rq.checked = time.Now()
if refused != nil {
rq.answer(*refused)
return
}
// A request for smallwebwaf itself is answered where another would be
// passed to the app, so that it goes through every check first.
if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, adminPrefix) {
rq.answerAdmin()
return
}
// Once the response has ended, before the request is added to its
// client's history. Deferred, since ReverseProxy panics to end a
// response it cannot finish.
defer rq.countBytes()
rq.forward(r.Context())
}
// server returns the Server of h, which listens at SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR and
// logs through h, with what httpServer sets.
func (h *handler) server(httpServer *http.Server) *Server {
httpServer.Addr = h.config.ListenAddr
httpServer.ErrorLog = h.errorLog
return &Server{
Server: httpServer,
Ledger: h.ledger,
Limiter: h.limiter,
GeoJS: h.geojs,
Anomalies: h.anomalies,
LookupFile: h.lookupFile,
Lists: h.lists,
DNSBL: h.dnsbl,
AbuseIPDB: h.abuseIPDB,
Metrics: h.metrics,
}
}
internal/servewaf/proxy_test.go → internal/proxy/proxy_test.go
+104 -218
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"log/slog"
"maps"
"net"
"net/http"
@@ -18,78 +17,80 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
// shortTimeout is what a test sets a timeout to, to see it run out.
// It starts before the test has set up its case, such as an upgrade
// or the app's buffers filling, so it is as long as the hold-up of the
// test process that wantTimedOut allows: a shorter one can run out
// first on a busy host.
shortTimeout = waitLimit / 2
// longTimeoutSetting is a timeout that does not run out in a test.
longTimeoutSetting = "1m"
// waitLimit bounds how long a test waits for what should happen.
waitLimit = 10 * time.Second
// pollInterval is how often a test looks for a log line.
pollInterval = 10 * time.Millisecond
// localhost is where every test server listens, and so the address rproxy
// sees each test's requests come from.
// localhost is where every test server listens, and so the address
// smallwebwaf sees each test's requests come from.
localhost = "127.0.0.1"
// requestType is the type that marks a request log line.
requestType = "request"
// protocol is the protocol of every question.
// protocol is the protocol of every test's requests.
protocol = "HTTP/1.1"
// trustLocalhost trusts the address every test connects from, and a
// network for proxies in front of it.
trustLocalhost = localhost + "/32,10.0.0.0/8"
// appHost is the host every test asks for.
appHost = "app.example"
// client is the client's address, as a proxy names it.
client = "203.0.113.9"
// forwardedFor is the header that lists the client and its proxies,
// and forwardedProto the one that gives the scheme the client used.
forwardedFor = "X-Forwarded-For"
forwardedProto = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
// secure is the scheme a client reached traefik with, and plain the one
// rproxy serves.
secure = "https"
plain = "http"
)
// shortTimeoutSetting is shortTimeout as a setting's value.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot call String
var shortTimeoutSetting = shortTimeout.String()
// The settings the tests set.
const (
mode = "SWWAF_MODE"
trustedProxies = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWWAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
lookupSource = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
deniedCountries = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
allowedCountries = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
banResponse = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWWAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
instanceName = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
attackBanDuration = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
wafMode = "SWWAF_WAF_MODE"
clientRequestTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
clientHeaderMaxBytes = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES"
clientIdleTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT"
clientResponseTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
upstreamRequestTimeout = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
upstreamResponseTimeout = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
mode = "SWWAF_MODE"
requestMaxBytes = "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES"
responseMaxBytes = "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES"
trustedProxies = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWWAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
lookupSource = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
deniedCountries = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
allowedCountries = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
banResponse = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWWAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
instanceName = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
attackBanDuration = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
wafMode = "SWWAF_WAF_MODE"
)
// off is the value that switches a setting off.
const off = "off"
// on is the value that switches a setting that takes true or false on.
const on = "true"
// output collects what smallwebwaf writes on stdout.
type output struct {
mu sync.Mutex
@@ -175,73 +176,6 @@ func (o *output) requestLine(t *testing.T) logLine {
return o.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
}
// endedLines waits for count requests that went through rproxy, or to servewaf's
// own endpoints, to have ended, and returns the last log line of each, in the
// order servewaf took them. A question's last line is the one its report writes.
func (o *output) endedLines(t *testing.T, count int) []logLine {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
found := o.lastLines(t)
ended := len(found) >= count
for _, line := range found[:min(count, len(found))] {
if line.ServeWAFLine == requestlog.ServeWAFLineDecision {
ended = false
}
}
if ended {
return found
}
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
}
t.Fatalf("fewer than %d requests have ended after %s", count, waitLimit)
return nil
}
// lastLines returns the last request log line written so far of each request,
// in the order servewaf took them.
func (o *output) lastLines(t *testing.T) []logLine {
t.Helper()
var found []logLine
places := map[string]int{}
for _, fields := range o.lines(t) {
if fields["type"] != requestType {
continue
}
line := decodeLine(t, fields)
place, seen := places[line.RequestID]
if seen {
found[place] = line
continue
}
places[line.RequestID] = len(found)
found = append(found, line)
}
return found
}
// endedLine waits for a test's one request to have ended, and returns its last
// log line.
func (o *output) endedLine(t *testing.T) logLine {
t.Helper()
return o.endedLines(t, 1)[0]
}
// decodeLine reads a request log line's fields into a logLine.
func decodeLine(t *testing.T, fields map[string]any) logLine {
t.Helper()
@@ -261,7 +195,7 @@ func decodeLine(t *testing.T, fields map[string]any) logLine {
return line
}
// startApp starts app as the app rproxy passes requests to.
// startApp starts app as the app smallwebwaf passes requests to.
func startApp(t *testing.T, app http.HandlerFunc) *httptest.Server {
t.Helper()
@@ -271,9 +205,9 @@ func startApp(t *testing.T, app http.HandlerFunc) *httptest.Server {
return server
}
// startProxy starts servewaf, and rproxy in front of the app at appURL, each with
// the settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns where rproxy listens
// and what servewaf writes.
// startProxy starts smallwebwaf in front of the app at appURL, with the
// settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns where it listens and
// what it writes.
func startProxy(t *testing.T, appURL string, env map[string]string) (string, *output) {
t.Helper()
@@ -293,14 +227,14 @@ func startProxyWithGeoJS(
}
// startProxyWithClock is startProxyWithGeoJS with requests counted and
// bans made by the time now tells, and returns servewaf's server as well, whose
// Addr is where servewaf listens. Unless env sets SWWAF_RULES_DIR, it is an empty
// directory, of no rules, and unless it sets SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app,
// the label instance of every metric.
// bans made by the time now tells, and returns the server as well. Unless
// env sets SWWAF_RULES_DIR, it is an empty directory, of no rules, and
// unless it sets SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app, the label instance of
// every metric.
func startProxyWithClock(
t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
env map[string]string,
) (string, *output, *servewaf.Server) {
) (string, *output, *proxy.Server) {
t.Helper()
addr, out, server, _ := startProxyWithAlerts(t, appURL, geojsURL, now, env)
@@ -309,70 +243,14 @@ func startProxyWithClock(
}
// startProxyWithAlerts is startProxyWithClock, and returns the queue of
// the alerts servewaf raises as well, as newServeWAF makes them.
// the alerts the proxy raises as well, as newProxy makes them.
func startProxyWithAlerts(
t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
env map[string]string,
) (string, *output, *servewaf.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
) (string, *output, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
server, out, alertQueue := newServeWAF(t, geojsURL, now, env)
serve(t, server)
return startRProxy(t, server.Addr, appURL, env), out, server, alertQueue
}
// serve serves server on a port of its own until the test ends, and sets its
// Addr to where it listens.
func serve(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server) {
t.Helper()
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
server.Addr = listener.Addr().String()
go func() {
_ = server.Serve(listener)
}()
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = server.Close()
})
}
// startRProxy starts rproxy in front of the app at appURL, asking the servewaf
// at serveWAFAddr, with the settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns
// where it listens. What it writes is dropped. SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS is a minute unless
// env sets it, so that on a busy host SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION does not decide.
func startRProxy(
t *testing.T, serveWAFAddr, appURL string, env map[string]string,
) string {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
"SWRP_WAF_BACKEND": "http://" + serveWAFAddr,
"SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
"SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS": "60000",
}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := settings[name]
return value, ok
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", settings, err)
}
server := rproxy.New(rproxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: io.Discard,
ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(io.Discard, "rproxy", slog.LevelInfo),
})
server, out, alertQueue := newProxy(t, appURL, geojsURL, now, env)
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
@@ -387,35 +265,38 @@ func startRProxy(
_ = server.Close()
})
return listener.Addr().String()
return listener.Addr().String(), out, server, alertQueue
}
// newServeWAF makes servewaf's server, without starting it, and returns it, what
// it writes, and the queue of the alerts it raises, as the settings in env make
// it. No alert is sent from the queue: they wait in it, for the test to look at.
// With no geojsURL, there is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup
// database SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY. SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off unless
// env sets it, so that only the tests of the Core Rule Set have their requests
// inspected by it.
func newServeWAF(
t *testing.T, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
) (*servewaf.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
// newProxy makes the server startProxyWithClock starts, without starting
// it, and returns it, what it writes, and the queue of the alerts the
// proxy raises, as the settings in env make it. No alert is sent from the
// queue: they wait in it, for the test to look at. With no geojsURL, there
// is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE
// is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup database
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY. SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off
// unless env sets it, so that only the tests of the Core Rule Set have
// their requests inspected by it.
func newProxy(
t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
env map[string]string,
) (*proxy.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
return newServeWAFWith(t, servewaf.New, geojsURL, now, env)
return newServerWith(t, proxy.New, appURL, geojsURL, now, env)
}
// newServeWAFWith is newServeWAF for the server build makes.
func newServeWAFWith(
t *testing.T, build func(servewaf.Params) *servewaf.Server,
geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
) (*servewaf.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
// newServerWith is newProxy for the server build makes.
func newServerWith(
t *testing.T, build func(proxy.Params) *proxy.Server,
appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
) (*proxy.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
rulesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app", wafMode: off,
"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL, rulesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app",
wafMode: off,
}
if geojsURL == "" {
settings[lookupSource] = off
@@ -463,19 +344,13 @@ func newServeWAFWith(
}
}
coreRuleSet, err := servewaf.NewCoreRuleSet(cfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Core Rule Set: %v", err)
}
server := build(servewaf.Params{
server := build(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: out,
ProcessLog: processLog,
GeoJSURL: geojsURL,
AbuseIPDBURL: abuseIPDBURL,
LookupFile: lookupFile,
CoreRuleSet: coreRuleSet,
Now: now,
Rules: ruleFiles,
Alerts: alertQueue,
@@ -513,7 +388,7 @@ func readAnswer(res *http.Response) answer {
return answer{status: res.StatusCode, header: res.Header, body: body, err: err}
}
// newRequest makes a request for path to addr, where rproxy or servewaf listens.
// newRequest makes a request for path to smallwebwaf at addr.
func newRequest(t *testing.T, method, addr, path string, body io.Reader) *http.Request {
t.Helper()
@@ -537,15 +412,15 @@ func do(t *testing.T, req *http.Request) answer {
return readAnswer(res)
}
// get sends a GET request for path to addr.
// get sends a GET request for path to smallwebwaf at addr.
func get(t *testing.T, addr, path string) answer {
t.Helper()
return do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, path, http.NoBody))
}
// dial opens a connection to addr, for requests the HTTP client cannot make,
// such as one that stops sending halfway.
// dial opens a connection to smallwebwaf at addr, for requests the HTTP
// client cannot make, such as one that stops sending halfway.
func dial(t *testing.T, addr string) net.Conn {
t.Helper()
@@ -606,3 +481,14 @@ func wantStatus(t *testing.T, got answer, status int) {
t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", got.status, status)
}
}
// wantTimedOut checks that what began at start ended once shortTimeout
// had run out, and not much later.
func wantTimedOut(t *testing.T, start time.Time) {
t.Helper()
took := time.Since(start)
if took < shortTimeout || took > shortTimeout+waitLimit/2 {
t.Errorf("took %s, want %s", took, shortTimeout)
}
}
internal/servewaf/ratelimits_test.go → internal/proxy/ratelimits_test.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"net/http"
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, sent.client)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), sent.want)
line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
if line.ClientIP != sent.logged {
t.Errorf("log line has client_ip %q, want %q", line.ClientIP, sent.logged)
}
internal/servewaf/reputation.go → internal/proxy/reputation.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf
package proxy
import (
"context"
internal/servewaf/reputation_test.go → internal/proxy/reputation_test.go
+17 -15
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"fmt"
@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// The reputation settings.
@@ -272,7 +272,6 @@ func TestEachBlocklistThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
Instance: alertInstance,
Time: clk.Now(),
Event: alerts.EventReputationHit,
Host: appHost,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(fromDE),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32"),
ASN: asnDE,
@@ -290,7 +289,7 @@ func TestEachBlocklistThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
// Each list's hits, none of its fetches failed, and when its copy was
// fetched, 0 for the one without.
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
fetched := float64(listsFetched().Unix())
for listURL, want := range map[string]struct{ hits, fetched float64 }{
@@ -514,7 +513,6 @@ func TestEachZoneThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
Instance: alertInstance,
Time: clk.Now(),
Event: alerts.EventReputationHit,
Host: appHost,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(fromDE),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32"),
ASN: asnDE,
@@ -532,7 +530,7 @@ func TestEachZoneThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
// Each zone's hits, and its queries and their failures, none, since
// every client had its verdicts.
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
for _, zone := range []string{dnsblZone, otherZone} {
labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + zone + `"}`
@@ -566,7 +564,7 @@ func TestZoneKeyIsMaskedInTheLogTheAlertAndTheMetrics(t *testing.T) {
masked)
}
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total{instance="`+
alertInstance+`",source="`+masked+`"}`, 1)
@@ -617,7 +615,7 @@ const (
// AbuseIPDB.
const abuseipdb = reputation.AbuseIPDBSource
// abuseIPDBURL is where newServeWAF has clients checked with AbuseIPDB: at
// abuseIPDBURL is where newProxy has clients checked with AbuseIPDB: at
// abuseIPDBStandIn, which TestMain registers with Go's default transport,
// through which AbuseIPDB is asked.
const abuseIPDBURL = "abuseipdb://stand-in/api/v2/check"
@@ -739,6 +737,10 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
"a trap path", "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
},
{
"a missing token", proxy.MetricsPath, http.StatusUnauthorized,
requestlog.ActionAdmin, ratelimit.Offences{TokenRefused: 1},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -746,7 +748,7 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules), attackBanDuration: "1h",
trapPaths: trapPathList, wafMode: block,
trapPaths: trapPathList, metricsToken: token, wafMode: block,
})
s.request(client, tc.path, tc.status, tc.action)
@@ -860,7 +862,7 @@ func TestAbuseIPDBHitRaisesAnAlertWithTheScoreOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
// The hits, and the checks, none, since no client committed an
// offence, so that the whole budget is left.
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + abuseipdb + `"}`
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 2)
@@ -887,7 +889,7 @@ func TestWithoutAnAbuseIPDBKeyNoClientIsCheckedNorAScoreUsed(t *testing.T) {
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)
wantNoSeries(t, s.scrape(), `smallwebwaf_reputation_daily_budget_remaining{`+
wantNoSeries(t, s.scrape(unplaced), `smallwebwaf_reputation_daily_budget_remaining{`+
`instance="`+alertInstance+`",source="`+abuseipdb+`"}`)
}
@@ -975,7 +977,7 @@ func verdictsFetched() time.Time {
// verdictsFetched, as reputation.json would at start: one that lists the
// client from each zone listedBy gives for it, and one that does not from
// each other zone.
func loadVerdicts(server *servewaf.Server, listedBy map[string][]string) {
func loadVerdicts(server *proxy.Server, listedBy map[string][]string) {
verdicts := make([]reputation.Verdict, 0, len(listedBy)*len(server.DNSBL.Zones()))
for client, zones := range listedBy {
@@ -993,7 +995,7 @@ func loadVerdicts(server *servewaf.Server, listedBy map[string][]string) {
// loadScores puts into server's AbuseIPDB the score scores gives each
// client, an IPv4 address, fetched at verdictsFetched, as reputation.json
// would at start.
func loadScores(server *servewaf.Server, scores map[string]int64) {
func loadScores(server *proxy.Server, scores map[string]int64) {
kept := make([]reputation.Score, 0, len(scores))
for client, score := range scores {
kept = append(kept, reputation.Score{
@@ -1007,7 +1009,7 @@ func loadScores(server *servewaf.Server, scores map[string]int64) {
// wantAbuseIPDBChecks checks how many clients server has checked with
// AbuseIPDB.
func wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, want int) {
func wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, want int) {
t.Helper()
if got := server.AbuseIPDB.Checked(); got != want {
@@ -1017,7 +1019,7 @@ func wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, want int) {
// loadLists puts copies of lists into server's lists, by URL, each with
// its lines, fetched at listsFetched, as reputation.json would at start.
func loadLists(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, copies map[string][]string) {
func loadLists(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, copies map[string][]string) {
t.Helper()
lists := make([]reputation.List, 0, len(copies))
internal/proxy/request.go
+914
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,914 @@
package proxy
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptrace"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/netip"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// flushAfterEachWrite has ReverseProxy pass on each part of the app's
// answer as soon as it arrives.
const flushAfterEachWrite time.Duration = -1
// refusal is smallwebwaf refusing a request, or refusing to go on with it:
// the status the client is answered if the response has not started yet,
// 0 to close the connection without an answer, the action the log line
// names, and the setting whose size or time limit the request passed, if
// that is why.
type refusal struct {
status int
action string
limit string
}
// request is one request on its way through smallwebwaf, from the moment
// its headers have been read to its log line.
type request struct {
h *handler
in *http.Request
// rc sets the deadlines of the connection to the client.
rc *http.ResponseController
out *responseWriter
body *requestBody // nil for a request without a body
line requestlog.Line
client netip.Addr
peer netip.Addr
peerTrusted bool
// site is, in servewaf, the host the visitor asked for, which the
// alerts name, since one servewaf serves many sites. It is "" otherwise.
site string
// allowed is true for a question answered with DispositionAllow.
allowed bool
// lookedUp is true once the client's AS number and country have been
// looked up, whether or not an answer was there, and lookupAnswer is
// what the lookup gave then, the zero Answer while GeoJS had given none.
lookedUp bool
lookupAnswer lookup.Answer
// counted is true for a request the rate limits counted, whose bytes
// the byte limits count once it has ended. limitPercent and
// bytesPercent are then its client's limit percentages for the rate
// limits and for the byte limits.
counted bool
limitPercent, bytesPercent percentage
// attack is true for a request that matched a ban rule or asked for a
// trap path, ruleBlocked for one a block rule refused, wafBlocked for
// one the Core Rule Set refused, and tokenRefused for one refused for a
// missing or wrong token, each an offence its client's history counts.
attack, ruleBlocked, wafBlocked, tokenRefused bool
// blocklisted is true once a blocklist is found to list the client,
// dnsblListed once a DNSBL zone's verdict is, and abuseIPDBHit once
// AbuseIPDB's score of it is a hit.
blocklisted, dnsblListed, abuseIPDBHit bool
// reputation is the reputation sources that list the client, for the
// notes of a ban the request makes.
reputation []bans.ReputationHit
start time.Time
// checked is when the checks were done, and upstreamStart when the
// request was handed to the app.
checked time.Time
upstreamStart time.Time
// cancel ends the request to the app.
cancel context.CancelFunc
// refused is the first refusal, from whichever goroutine meets it.
refused atomic.Pointer[refusal]
// complete is true once the app's whole answer has been passed on.
complete bool
// upgraded is the connection to the app once the app has switched
// protocols, as for a WebSocket, and nil otherwise.
upgraded *upgradedConn
// mu guards what follows. The timeouts run on goroutines of their
// own, and the transport starts and stops them, and notes the times
// below, from its own; once timersStopped is set, none of the timeouts
// acts any more.
mu sync.Mutex
timersStopped bool
clientRequestTimer *time.Timer
upstreamRequestTimer *time.Timer
upstreamResponseTimer *time.Timer
// connected is when there was a connection to the app, requestSent
// when the app had been sent the whole request, and answerStarted
// when the first byte of its answer arrived.
connected time.Time
requestSent time.Time
answerStarted time.Time
}
// newRequest starts handling r: it works out the client from the TCP peer
// and X-Forwarded-For, and goes on as startRequest does.
func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
peer := peerAddress(r)
trusted := h.config.TrustedProxies
client := clientAddress(peer, r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"), trusted)
return h.startRequest(w, r, client, peer, isInside(peer, trusted))
}
// startRequest starts handling r from client, which came through peer: it
// notes the time, counts the request as under way, and starts the log line
// with what is known of the request. peerTrusted says whether to believe
// the request's id and scheme, which r's headers give.
func (h *handler) startRequest(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, client, peer netip.Addr, peerTrusted bool,
) *request {
h.metrics.RequestStarted()
start := time.Now()
forwardedFor := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For")
rq := &request{
h: h,
in: r,
rc: http.NewResponseController(w),
out: &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
client: client,
peer: peer,
peerTrusted: peerTrusted,
start: start,
line: requestlog.Line{
Time: requestlog.FormatTime(start),
Instance: h.config.InstanceName,
ClientIP: client.String(),
Method: r.Method,
Scheme: scheme(r, peerTrusted),
Host: r.Host,
Path: rules.Path(r),
Query: r.URL.RawQuery,
Protocol: r.Proto,
Referer: r.Referer(),
UserAgent: r.UserAgent(),
RequestID: requestID(r, peerTrusted),
PeerIP: peer.String(),
ForwardedFor: strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
ClientGroup: h.clientGroup(client).String(),
ContentType: r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
RequestHeaders: requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders),
HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0,
HasCookie: len(r.Header.Values("Cookie")) > 0,
Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
},
}
// A length of -1 is a body whose length was not announced.
if r.ContentLength > 0 {
rq.line.ContentLength = r.ContentLength
}
if r.Body != http.NoBody {
rq.body = &requestBody{body: limitBody(r.Body, h.config.RequestMaxBytes), rq: rq}
}
return rq
}
// requestHeaders returns the headers of r that names lists, by name in
// lower case, each with its values joined by ", ". Authorization, Cookie
// and Set-Cookie are never among them, whatever names says.
func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
headers := map[string]string{}
for _, name := range names {
switch name {
case "authorization", "cookie", "set-cookie":
continue
}
values := r.Header.Values(name)
if len(values) > 0 {
headers[name] = strings.Join(values, ", ")
}
}
return headers
}
// check is the one place where a request can be refused once its client
// is known, before anything reaches the app, and before its body is read,
// but for the part the Core Rule Set reads. It returns nil to let the
// request through. The checks of checkClient come first, answered with
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, or 403 for a block rule or the Core Rule Set, and
// then the size limit, so that a request the rate limits count is counted
// even when it is refused for its size. In observe mode a request
// checkClient refuses goes on to the size limit like any other. A size or
// time limit the Core Rule Set's reading of the body meets ends the
// request in either mode. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
action := rq.checkClient(ctx)
refused := rq.refused.Load()
if refused != nil {
return refused
}
switch {
case action == "":
case rq.h.config.Observe:
// The log line names what enforce mode would have done.
rq.line.WouldAction = action
case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked || action == requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
default:
return rq.banResponse(action)
}
maxBytes := rq.h.config.RequestMaxBytes
if maxBytes > 0 && rq.in.ContentLength > maxBytes {
return &refusal{
status: http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
limit: "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES",
}
}
return nil
}
// checkClient runs the checks on the request's client, and returns the
// action of the first that refuses the request, or "" when none does. A
// client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them, and is not looked up. For any
// other client, SWWAF_DENY_NETS comes first, then a ban on its netblock,
// so that a client either refuses is not looked up, then the lookup of
// its AS number and country, then the country lists, then the blocklists,
// then the CrowdSec decision list, which bans the client it lists, then
// the DNSBL zones' verdicts, and then AbuseIPDB's score; a request any of
// them refuses is not counted for the rate limits. Then come the
// rate limits, unless the client is in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS or the
// request's path is exempt under SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS, so that
// every other request is counted, each of them by the client's limit
// percentages, then SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS, then the rule files, and last the
// Core Rule Set. A request exempt from the rate limits is exempt from the
// byte limits too. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
cfg := rq.h.config
if isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets) {
return ""
}
now := rq.h.now()
if isInside(rq.client, cfg.DenyNets) {
return requestlog.ActionDenied
}
if rq.banned(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
rq.lookUp(ctx)
// The lookup can wait for GeoJS, so the checks after it read the time
// again: a request counted at the time it arrived could be counted
// after a later one of its client's, which the rate limits would take
// for the clock set back.
now = rq.h.now()
if rq.countryDenied() {
return requestlog.ActionCountryDenied
}
if rq.blocklistDenied() {
return requestlog.ActionDenied
}
if rq.crowdSecBanned(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
if rq.dnsblDenied(ctx) || rq.abuseIPDBDenied(ctx) {
return requestlog.ActionDenied
}
rq.counted = !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) &&
!pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
if rq.counted {
rq.limitPercent, rq.bytesPercent = rq.limitPercentages()
rq.line.LimitPercent, rq.line.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
rq.line.BytesPercent, rq.line.BytesPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
}
if rq.counted && rq.limitBroken(now) {
return requestlog.ActionRateLimited
}
if rq.trapPath(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
action := rq.checkRules(now)
if action != "" {
return action
}
return rq.checkCoreRuleSet()
}
// pathExempt reports whether r is exempt under prefixes,
// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS or SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its
// path as sent, the path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts
// with one of prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an
// app whose router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded
// path contains .. anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an
// encoded slash (%2F or %2f), never is, since an app may act on it as a
// path outside every prefix: /assets/..%2Flogin as /login, or /assets%2Fx
// as one path segment, as Go's router does.
func pathExempt(r *http.Request, prefixes []string) bool {
decoded := r.URL.Path
sent := rules.Path(r)
if strings.Contains(decoded, "..") || strings.Contains(decoded, `\`) ||
strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(sent), "%2f") {
return false
}
return slices.ContainsFunc(prefixes, func(prefix string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(sent, prefix)
})
}
// forward passes the request to the app and the app's answer back. ctx
// is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) forward(ctx context.Context) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
defer cancel()
rq.cancel = cancel
ctx = httptrace.WithClientTrace(ctx, &httptrace.ClientTrace{
GotConn: rq.gotConn,
WroteRequest: rq.wroteRequest,
GotFirstResponseByte: rq.gotFirstResponseByte,
})
out := rq.in.WithContext(ctx)
if rq.body != nil {
out.Body = rq.body
}
reverseProxy := &httputil.ReverseProxy{
Rewrite: rq.rewrite,
Transport: rq.h.transport,
FlushInterval: flushAfterEachWrite,
ErrorLog: rq.h.errorLog,
ModifyResponse: rq.modifyResponse,
ErrorHandler: rq.answerError,
}
rq.startRequestTimers()
rq.upstreamStart = time.Now()
reverseProxy.ServeHTTP(rq.out, out)
}
// rewrite makes the request the app receives: the client's request,
// unchanged, sent to SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL, with the forwarded headers and
// the request's id set, without any X-Client-ASN or X-Client-Country the
// client sent, whatever SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS says, and, while it is
// set, with the client's AS number and country in them.
func (rq *request) rewrite(pr *httputil.ProxyRequest) {
upstream := rq.h.config.UpstreamURL
pr.Out.URL.Scheme = upstream.Scheme
pr.Out.URL.Host = upstream.Host
// ReverseProxy drops query parameters it cannot parse; the app gets
// the query as the client sent it.
pr.Out.URL.RawQuery = pr.In.URL.RawQuery
// ReverseProxy sends the path URL.EscapedPath gives, which, for a path
// holding a character Go escapes, such as |, is the whole path decoded
// and escaped again, %2F turned into /. Opaque is sent as it is, so the
// app gets the path as the client sent it. Left out are a target that
// is no path, such as *, and a path starting with //, which Go would
// send in Opaque as a scheme and host.
path := rules.Path(pr.In)
if strings.HasPrefix(path, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(path, "//") {
pr.Out.URL.Opaque = path
}
setForwardedHeaders(pr.In, pr.Out, rq.peer, rq.peerTrusted)
pr.Out.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, rq.line.RequestID)
pr.Out.Header.Del(asnHeader)
pr.Out.Header.Del(countryHeader)
if rq.h.config.AddLookupHeaders {
setLookupHeaders(pr.Out.Header, rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country)
}
}
// modifyResponse looks at the app's answer before ReverseProxy passes it
// on.
func (rq *request) modifyResponse(res *http.Response) error {
rq.line.UpstreamStatus = res.StatusCode
if res.StatusCode == http.StatusSwitchingProtocols {
// An upgraded connection, such as a WebSocket, is not cut by the
// timeouts. ReverseProxy writes this answer straight to the
// connection it takes over, not through rq.out, and then copies
// what passes each way through res.Body, the connection to the app.
// It may still refuse the switch, as when the app's Upgrade is not
// the client's, so the status is noted only once it has taken over
// the connection, by rq.out's Hijack.
rq.stopTimers()
rq.line.Websocket = true
conn, ok := res.Body.(io.ReadWriteCloser)
if ok {
rq.upgraded = &upgradedConn{ReadWriteCloser: conn}
res.Body = rq.upgraded
}
return nil
}
maxBytes := rq.h.config.ResponseMaxBytes
if maxBytes > 0 && res.Body != http.NoBody && res.ContentLength > maxBytes {
rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusBadGateway,
action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
limit: "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES",
})
return errResponseTooLarge
}
// Go's server adds a Content-Type it guesses from the body to a
// response whose headers have no Content-Type key. The key with no
// value sends none, as the app sent none.
if res.Header.Get("Content-Type") == "" {
rq.out.Header()["Content-Type"] = nil
}
res.Body = &responseBody{body: limitBody(res.Body, maxBytes), rq: rq}
rq.startClientResponseTimeout()
return nil
}
// answerError is ReverseProxy's ErrorHandler: the request could not be
// passed to the app, or the app's answer cannot be passed on.
func (rq *request) answerError(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request, err error) {
if rq.upgraded != nil {
// The app switched protocols, but the switch was not passed on,
// and ReverseProxy leaves the app's connection open when it
// refuses it.
_ = rq.upgraded.Close()
}
refused := rq.refused.Load()
if refused == nil {
if rq.in.Context().Err() != nil {
return // the client has gone, and there is no one to answer
}
rq.h.processLog.Warn("request to the app failed", "error", err.Error())
refused = &refusal{
status: http.StatusBadGateway,
action: requestlog.ActionUpstreamError,
}
}
rq.answer(*refused)
}
// answer sends smallwebwaf's own answer, unless the response has already
// started, and records the refusal for the log line.
func (rq *request) answer(r refusal) {
rq.refused.CompareAndSwap(nil, &r)
if rq.out.status != 0 {
return // too late to answer: the connection can only be cut
}
if r.status == 0 {
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE is close. This panic has Go's server close
// the connection without an answer, and log nothing; the log line
// is still written as the handler returns.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
}
// A client found too slow is read no more; any other may go on
// sending until its time is up, so that Go's server can read the
// rest of the body and end the request cleanly.
deadline := rq.clientRequestDeadline()
if r.status == http.StatusRequestTimeout {
deadline = time.Now()
}
rq.stopReadingBody(deadline)
timeout := rq.h.config.ClientResponseTimeout
if timeout > 0 {
_ = rq.rc.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(timeout))
}
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(r.status), r.status)
}
// refuse records r, unless an earlier refusal was, and ends the request
// to the app, if one was made: smallwebwaf reads the body of a request
// it answers itself too.
func (rq *request) refuse(r refusal) {
rq.refused.CompareAndSwap(nil, &r)
if rq.cancel != nil {
rq.cancel()
}
}
// finish ends the request's timeouts, counts it in the metrics and writes
// its log line.
func (rq *request) finish() {
rq.stopTimers()
refused := rq.refused.Load()
if refused == nil {
rq.stopReadingBody(rq.clientRequestDeadline())
}
line := &rq.line
line.Status = rq.out.status
line.ResponseBytes = rq.out.bytes
header := rq.out.Header()
line.ResponseContentType = header.Get("Content-Type")
line.CacheControl = header.Get("Cache-Control")
line.Location = header.Get("Location")
line.RequestBytes = rq.requestBytes()
// limit is the setting whose size or time limit the request passed.
var limit string
switch {
case refused != nil:
line.Action = refused.action
limit = refused.limit
case errors.Is(rq.out.err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded):
// The client took longer than SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT to
// take the response.
line.Action = requestlog.ActionTimedOut
limit = "SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
case !rq.complete && (rq.out.err != nil || rq.in.Context().Err() != nil):
line.Aborted = true
}
now := time.Now()
duration := now.Sub(rq.start)
line.DurationTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(duration)
line.DurationChecks = timing(rq.start, rq.checked)
var upstreamDuration time.Duration
if !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero() {
upstreamDuration = now.Sub(rq.upstreamStart)
line.DurationUpstreamTotal = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(upstreamDuration))
rq.mu.Lock()
line.DurationUpstreamConnect = timing(rq.upstreamStart, rq.connected)
line.DurationUpstreamFirstByte = timing(rq.upstreamStart, rq.answerStarted)
rq.mu.Unlock()
}
// Counted before the log line is written, so that the metrics count
// every request whose line is out. An allowed request is the exception:
// its report gives the status, bytes and times the metrics count.
if rq.allowed {
rq.h.metrics.RequestAllowed()
} else {
rq.h.metrics.RequestEnded(line, limit, duration, upstreamDuration)
}
err := requestlog.Write(rq.h.requestLog, line)
if err != nil {
rq.h.processLog.Error("writing the request log failed", "error", err.Error())
}
}
// timing is the time from start to end in milliseconds, for one of the
// log line's timings, or nil when end is zero: what it times never
// happened.
func timing(start, end time.Time) *float64 {
if end.IsZero() {
return nil
}
return new(requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(start)))
}
// addToHistory adds the request, which has ended, to its client's
// history, and counts its offences in the metrics, and then the lookup's
// answer about the client, as answerAtTheEnd gives it, to that history and
// to the notes of the bans on its netblock: an answer may have come
// before either was there, and one from GeoJS that comes later is added
// when it comes.
func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
forwarded := !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero()
request := ratelimit.Request{
Forwarded: forwarded,
Refused: !forwarded && rq.refused.Load() != nil,
Status: rq.out.status,
RequestBytes: rq.requestBytes(),
ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes,
BrokeLimit: rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
Attack: rq.attack,
RuleBlocked: rq.ruleBlocked,
WAFBlocked: rq.wafBlocked,
TokenRefused: rq.tokenRefused,
}
rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), request)
rq.h.metrics.Offences(request)
answer, found := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
if found {
rq.h.addLookup(answer)
}
}
// countAnomalies counts the request, which has ended, and its bytes, as
// countedBytes gives them, for the anomaly thresholds, whatever was done
// with it: a request refused, one from a client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS or
// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and one for a path in
// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS are counted too. It is counted for its
// client's AS number when answerAtTheEnd gives one. With every anomaly
// threshold off, the default, it does nothing.
func (rq *request) countAnomalies() {
if !anomalyThresholdsSet(rq.h.config) {
return
}
answer, _ := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
rq.h.anomalies.Count(rq.h.now(), anomaly.Request{
Host: rq.site,
Client: rq.client,
ClientGroup: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: answer.ASN,
ASName: answer.ASName,
Country: answer.Country,
Bytes: rq.countedBytes(),
})
}
// anomalyThresholdsSet reports whether any anomaly threshold is set.
func anomalyThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
off := anomaly.Thresholds{}
return cfg.AnomalyClient != off || cfg.AnomalyNet != off || cfg.AnomalyASN != off ||
cfg.AnomalyTotal != off || cfg.AnomalyWatch != off
}
// answerAtTheEnd returns, for a client that was looked up, the lookup's
// answer about it as the request ends, and whether there is one: the
// lookup database's, which was there at once, or the one GeoJS has given
// by then, which a request does not wait for unless a setting needs it.
func (rq *request) answerAtTheEnd() (lookup.Answer, bool) {
if !rq.lookedUp {
return lookup.Answer{}, false
}
if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" {
return rq.lookupAnswer, true
}
return rq.h.geojs.Kept(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
}
// requestBytes is how many bytes of the request's body have been read.
func (rq *request) requestBytes() int64 {
if rq.body == nil {
return 0
}
return rq.body.bytes.Load()
}
// clientRequestDeadline is when the client must have sent its whole
// request, or zero when SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT is off.
func (rq *request) clientRequestDeadline() time.Time {
timeout := rq.h.config.ClientRequestTimeout
if timeout == 0 {
return time.Time{}
}
return rq.start.Add(timeout)
}
// stopReadingBody ends, at deadline, the reading of a client body that has
// not arrived whole: Go's server then reads no more of it, and closes the
// connection after the answer.
func (rq *request) stopReadingBody(deadline time.Time) {
if rq.body == nil || rq.body.received.Load() {
return
}
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(deadline)
}
// startRequestTimers starts the timeouts that run while the request goes
// to the app: SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT until the client has sent its
// whole body, and SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT until the app has been
// sent the whole request.
func (rq *request) startRequestTimers() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if rq.body != nil && rq.h.config.ClientRequestTimeout > 0 {
rq.clientRequestTimer = time.AfterFunc(
time.Until(rq.clientRequestDeadline()), func() {
rq.requestTimedOut("SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT")
})
}
timeout := rq.h.config.UpstreamRequestTimeout
if timeout > 0 {
rq.upstreamRequestTimer = time.AfterFunc(timeout, func() {
rq.requestTimedOut("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT")
})
}
}
// requestTimedOut is called when limit, SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT or
// SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, runs out while the request is still on
// its way to the app. The answer names the side smallwebwaf was waiting
// on at that moment: 408 when it was waiting for the client to send more
// of its body, 504 when it was waiting for the app to be reached or to
// take what it had.
func (rq *request) requestTimedOut(limit string) {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if rq.timersStopped {
return
}
if rq.body == nil || !rq.body.waiting.Load() {
// Once the app has answered, the transport, ReverseProxy and Go's
// server each close the client's body, and closing it reads what
// is left of a body under 256 KiB without requestBody.Read, so
// waiting is false while that read waits for the client. That
// read ends now, before refuse: should smallwebwaf still answer
// itself, answer then sets the deadline it gives its own answers.
if !rq.answerStarted.IsZero() {
rq.stopReadingBody(time.Now())
}
rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
limit: limit,
})
return
}
rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
limit: limit,
})
// The transport gives up on the app only once its Read of the
// client's body returns, so that Read is ended now. The lock keeps
// this from reaching the connection after the request is handled.
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(time.Now())
}
// bodyReceived is called once the client has sent its whole body.
func (rq *request) bodyReceived() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
stopTimer(rq.clientRequestTimer)
}
// gotConn is called once there is a connection to the app, a new one or
// one kept open from an earlier request.
func (rq *request) gotConn(httptrace.GotConnInfo) {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.connected = time.Now()
}
// gotFirstResponseByte is called once the first byte of the app's answer
// has arrived.
func (rq *request) gotFirstResponseByte() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.answerStarted = time.Now()
}
// wroteRequest is called once the app has been sent the whole request:
// the request timeouts end and SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT starts.
func (rq *request) wroteRequest(info httptrace.WroteRequestInfo) {
if info.Err != nil {
return // the transport gives up, or tries again
}
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if rq.timersStopped {
return
}
stopTimer(rq.clientRequestTimer)
stopTimer(rq.upstreamRequestTimer)
rq.requestSent = time.Now()
timeout := rq.h.config.UpstreamResponseTimeout
if timeout > 0 {
rq.upstreamResponseTimer = time.AfterFunc(timeout, rq.responseTimedOut)
}
}
// responseTimedOut is called when SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT runs out
// before the app has sent its whole answer.
func (rq *request) responseTimedOut() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if !rq.timersStopped {
rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
limit: "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT",
})
}
}
// responseReceived is called once the app has sent its whole answer. An
// app may answer before the client has sent its whole body, as with a 404
// it sends without reading it. The timeouts then run on: until the
// transport's read of the body returns, Go's server cannot send the
// answer, and SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT is what ends that read for a
// client that stops sending.
func (rq *request) responseReceived() {
rq.complete = true
if rq.body != nil && !rq.body.received.Load() {
return
}
rq.stopTimers()
}
// startClientResponseTimeout sets SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT on the
// connection to the client: the response must reach the client within it
// of the end of the request, or of now if the app answers before it has
// the whole request.
func (rq *request) startClientResponseTimeout() {
timeout := rq.h.config.ClientResponseTimeout
if timeout == 0 {
return
}
from := rq.sentAt()
if from.IsZero() {
from = time.Now()
}
_ = rq.rc.SetWriteDeadline(from.Add(timeout))
}
// sentAt is when the app had been sent the whole request, or zero.
func (rq *request) sentAt() time.Time {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
return rq.requestSent
}
// stopTimers stops the request's timeouts and keeps any from starting
// later: the app's answer is complete, the connection upgraded, or the
// request handled.
func (rq *request) stopTimers() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.timersStopped = true
stopTimer(rq.clientRequestTimer)
stopTimer(rq.upstreamRequestTimer)
stopTimer(rq.upstreamResponseTimer)
}
// stopTimer stops t, which is nil when its timeout is off.
func stopTimer(t *time.Timer) {
if t != nil {
t.Stop()
}
}
internal/proxy/request_internal_test.go
+55
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
package proxy
import (
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
)
func TestAnAnswerWithoutAContentTypeGetsNone(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
rq := &request{
h: &handler{config: &config.Config{}},
out: &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
}
app := &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
Header: http.Header{},
Body: http.NoBody,
}
err := rq.modifyResponse(app)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("modifyResponse: %v", err)
}
// The headers go out with this, the first part of the body,
// which Go's server would guess a Content-Type from.
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "<!doctype html><title>page</title>")
}))
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, srv.URL,
http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
res, err := srv.Client().Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get: %v", err)
}
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.Header.Values("Content-Type") != nil {
t.Errorf("client got Content-Type %q, want none",
res.Header.Get("Content-Type"))
}
}
internal/servewaf/requestlog_test.go → internal/proxy/requestlog_test.go
+119 -26
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"io"
"maps"
"math"
"net/http"
"reflect"
@@ -10,9 +11,9 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
@@ -41,6 +42,9 @@ func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
w.Header().Set("Location", "/elsewhere")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "moved")
})
@@ -66,7 +70,7 @@ func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
// A request's log line can come after its answer: each is waited for
// before the next request, so that the lines are in order.
full := out.endedLines(t, 1)[0]
full := out.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
// This one comes from 127.0.0.1, which the rate limits do not count,
// with a body of 4 bytes whose length it does not announce, so that its
@@ -77,7 +81,7 @@ func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n4\r\nbody\r\n0\r\n\r\n")
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusNoContent)
bare := out.endedLines(t, 2)[1]
bare := out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]
wantFullLine(t, full)
wantBareLine(t, bare)
@@ -104,23 +108,24 @@ func wantFullLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
headers := map[string]string{"accept": "text/html", "x-custom": "one, two"}
want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
Type: requestType, ServeWAFLine: requestlog.ServeWAFLineReport,
Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
ClientIP: ipv6Client, Method: http.MethodPost, Scheme: secure,
Host: appHost, Path: "/full", Protocol: protocol,
Status: http.StatusFound, RequestBytes: 3, ResponseBytes: 5,
RequestID: line.RequestID, PeerIP: localhost,
RequestID: "from-traefik", PeerIP: localhost,
ForwardedFor: "198.51.100.7, " + ipv6Client, ClientGroup: ipv6Group,
ContentType: "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", ContentLength: 3,
RequestHeaders: headers, HasAuthorization: true, HasCookie: true,
ResponseContentType: "text/html", UpstreamStatus: http.StatusFound,
CacheControl: "no-store", Location: "/elsewhere",
Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
// Its 3 bytes in and 5 out, each way counted by default.
Counts: ratelimit.Counts{
Minute: 1, Hour: 1, Day: 1, MinuteBytes: 8, HourBytes: 8, DayBytes: 8,
},
})
if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) || line.RequestID == "from-traefik" {
t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v, with a new request id", line.Line, want)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) {
t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", line.Line, want)
}
}
@@ -130,13 +135,12 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
t.Helper()
want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
Type: requestType, ServeWAFLine: requestlog.ServeWAFLineReport,
Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
ClientIP: localhost, Method: http.MethodPost, Scheme: plain,
Host: appHost, Path: "/bare", Protocol: protocol,
Status: http.StatusNoContent, RequestBytes: 4, RequestID: line.RequestID,
PeerIP: localhost, ClientGroup: localhost + "/32",
Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
UpstreamStatus: http.StatusNoContent, Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
})
if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) || line.RequestID == "" {
t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v, with a request id", line.Line, want)
@@ -144,7 +148,8 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
for _, name := range []string{
"forwarded_for", "content_type", "content_length", "request_headers",
"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "response_content_type", "counts",
"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "websocket", "response_content_type",
"cache_control", "location", "counts",
} {
_, present := line.fields[name]
if present {
@@ -157,6 +162,8 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
func withTimings(line logLine, want requestlog.Line) requestlog.Line {
want.DurationTotal = line.DurationTotal
want.DurationChecks = line.DurationChecks
want.DurationUpstreamConnect = line.DurationUpstreamConnect
want.DurationUpstreamFirstByte = line.DurationUpstreamFirstByte
want.DurationUpstreamTotal = line.DurationUpstreamTotal
return want
@@ -181,7 +188,7 @@ func TestHasAuthorizationAndHasCookieEachComeFromTheirOwnHeader(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(tc.header, "secret")
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
line := out.endedLine(t)
line := out.requestLine(t)
_, otherPresent := line.fields[tc.other]
if line.fields[tc.field] != true || otherPresent {
@@ -192,20 +199,81 @@ func TestHasAuthorizationAndHasCookieEachComeFromTheirOwnHeader(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRequestIDAndSchemeComeOnlyFromATrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const sentID = "from-traefik"
sent := http.Header{requestIDHeader: {sentID}, forwardedProto: {secure}}
trusted := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
header http.Header
// wantID is the request id logged, "" for a new one.
wantID, wantScheme string
}{
{"a trusted proxy's are kept", trusted, sent, sentID, secure},
{"without them, the id is new and the scheme http", trusted, nil, "", plain},
{"another peer's are replaced", nil, sent, "", plain},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
received := make(chan string, 2)
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
received <- r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, tc.env)
// Two requests, so that two new ids can be told apart.
ids := make([]string, 0, 2)
for i := range 2 {
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
maps.Copy(req.Header, tc.header)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
ids = append(ids, line.RequestID)
got := <-received
if line.RequestID != got || line.Scheme != tc.wantScheme {
t.Errorf("log line has request_id %q and scheme %q, and the "+
"app received id %q; want the same id and scheme %q",
line.RequestID, line.Scheme, got, tc.wantScheme)
}
}
switch {
case tc.wantID != "" && (ids[0] != tc.wantID || ids[1] != tc.wantID):
t.Errorf("request ids %q, want %q", ids, tc.wantID)
case tc.wantID == "" && (slices.Contains(ids, sentID) ||
slices.Contains(ids, "") || ids[0] == ids[1]):
t.Errorf("request ids %q, want two new ones", ids)
}
})
}
}
func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
// The pause sets the times apart; a hold-up of the test only lengthens
// it.
// The pauses set the times apart; a hold-up of the test only
// lengthens them.
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "done")
})
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, map[string]string{
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
denyNets: denied,
})
@@ -213,19 +281,20 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
// Each log line is waited for before the next request, so that the
// lines are in order.
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusOK)
forwarded := out.endedLines(t, 1)[0]
forwarded := out.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, denied)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
refused := out.endedLines(t, 2)[1]
refused := out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]
wantStatus(t, get(t, server.Addr, servewaf.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
health := out.endedLines(t, 3)[2]
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
health := out.requestLines(t, 3)[2]
// A request passed to the app has every timing; one refused, none of
// the app's; the health check, which runs no check, only the total.
wantTimings(t, forwarded, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
"duration_upstream_connect", "duration_upstream_first_byte",
"duration_upstream_total")
wantTimings(t, refused, "duration_total", "duration_checks")
wantTimings(t, health, "duration_total")
@@ -238,12 +307,17 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
// exact.
total := microseconds(forwarded.DurationTotal)
checks := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationChecks)
connect := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamConnect)
firstByte := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamFirstByte)
upstream := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamTotal)
// The checks end before the request is handed to the app.
if checks+upstream > total {
t.Errorf("timings in microseconds: total %d, checks %d, upstream total %d",
total, checks, upstream)
// The checks end before the request is handed to the app, and the
// connection comes before the answer, which the app ends after a
// pause.
if checks+upstream > total || connect >= firstByte || firstByte >= upstream {
t.Errorf("timings in microseconds: total %d, checks %d, connect %d, "+
"first byte %d, upstream total %d", total, checks, connect, firstByte,
upstream)
}
if *refused.DurationChecks > refused.DurationTotal {
@@ -276,3 +350,22 @@ func wantTimings(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
func microseconds(milliseconds float64) int64 {
return int64(math.Round(milliseconds * 1000))
}
func TestLogsAnUpgradedConnection(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, echoAfterUpgrade)
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET /socket HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n"+
"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusSwitchingProtocols)
_ = conn.Close()
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line.fields["websocket"] != true {
t.Errorf("log line has websocket %v, want true", line.fields["websocket"])
}
}
internal/servewaf/rulefiles_test.go → internal/proxy/rulefiles_test.go
+4 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"net/http"
@@ -185,6 +185,8 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
metricsToken: token,
@@ -194,7 +196,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total{action="block",instance="app",rule_id="blocked"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
internal/servewaf/rules.go → internal/proxy/rules.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf
package proxy
import (
"slices"
internal/proxy/servewaf.go
+350
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
package proxy
import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The headers of rproxy's question and of servewaf's answer, as
// "servewaf" in SPEC.md gives them.
const (
// ClientHeader marks a request as rproxy's question, and gives the
// visitor's address.
ClientHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Client"
// PeerHeader gives the address of rproxy's own TCP peer.
PeerHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Peer"
// ContentLengthHeader gives the body length the visitor announced.
ContentLengthHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Content-Length"
// DispositionHeader gives servewaf's answer.
DispositionHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Disposition"
)
// The values of DispositionHeader.
const (
// DispositionAllow tells rproxy to pass the request to the app.
DispositionAllow = "allow"
// DispositionDeny tells rproxy to give the visitor the answer's status,
// headers and body.
DispositionDeny = "deny"
// DispositionClose tells rproxy to close the visitor's connection
// without an answer, which SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE asks for when it is close.
// servewaf closing the question's connection instead would read as
// servewaf being down, and rproxy would then let the request through.
DispositionClose = "close"
)
// ReportPath is where rproxy sends the report of each request it passed to
// the app.
const ReportPath = "/_smallwebwaf/report"
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes is the most of a visitor's body a question carries.
const QuestionBodyMaxBytes = 64 << 10
const (
// maxAwaitingReport is the most allowed requests held until their
// reports come. Past it, the request asked about longest ago is dropped.
maxAwaitingReport = 10000
// reportBodyMaxBytes is the most of a report's body that is read. It is
// far above any report's, since the longest thing in one is the request
// id, which comes from a header.
reportBodyMaxBytes = 1 << 20
// serveWAFTimeout bounds how long a request to servewaf takes to arrive,
// and its answer to leave, and serveWAFIdleTimeout how long a kept-open
// connection waits for its next request.
serveWAFTimeout = 60 * time.Second
serveWAFIdleTimeout = 120 * time.Second
)
// Report is the JSON object rproxy posts to ReportPath once the visitor's
// answer has ended, its fields named as the request log's of the same
// meaning. RequestID is the id servewaf's allow gave. Status is what the
// visitor got, 0 if nothing. The durations are in milliseconds.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
type Report struct {
RequestID string `json:"request_id"`
Status int `json:"status"`
RequestBytes int64 `json:"request_bytes"`
ResponseBytes int64 `json:"response_bytes"`
DurationTotal float64 `json:"duration_total"`
DurationUpstreamTotal float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total"`
}
// NewServeWAF returns the server `smallwebwaf servewaf` runs. It answers
// rproxy's questions with the checks New runs, takes rproxy's reports and
// answers its own endpoints. It passes nothing to an app. rproxy applies
// the size and time limits to the visitor, so their settings do not apply
// here. Go's default limit on a request's line and headers, 1 MiB, stays:
// it is far above rproxy's, and a question refused for its size would have
// rproxy let the request through.
func NewServeWAF(params Params) *Server {
cfg := *params.Config
cfg.RequestMaxBytes = 0
cfg.ClientRequestTimeout = serveWAFTimeout
// The server's WriteTimeout does this. It sets a new deadline for each
// request, where a deadline a handler sets stays on a kept-open
// connection, and would run out under a later request's answer.
cfg.ClientResponseTimeout = 0
// A question's body of QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the
// Core Rule Set does not read a JSON or XML body over its limit.
cfg.WAFBodyLimit = min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1)
params.Config = &cfg
h := newHandler(params)
awaitingReport, err := lru.New[string, *request](maxAwaitingReport)
if err != nil {
panic(err) // New fails only for a size below one
}
h.awaitingReport = awaitingReport
return h.server(&http.Server{
Handler: http.HandlerFunc(h.serveWAF),
ReadTimeout: serveWAFTimeout,
WriteTimeout: serveWAFTimeout,
IdleTimeout: serveWAFIdleTimeout,
})
}
// serveWAF handles one request to servewaf: a request carrying
// ClientHeader is rproxy's question, and any other is for servewaf itself.
func (h *handler) serveWAF(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if len(r.Header.Values(ClientHeader)) > 0 {
h.answerQuestion(w, r)
return
}
h.answerOwnEndpoint(w, r)
}
// answerQuestion runs the checks on the visitor's request a question
// carries, and answers rproxy what to do with it. A denied request is
// finished here. An allowed one is finished by its report. A question
// without a visitor's address gets no disposition, so that rproxy treats
// it as it treats no answer.
func (h *handler) answerQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
client, err := netip.ParseAddr(r.Header.Get(ClientHeader))
if err != nil {
h.processLog.Warn("a question gives no visitor's address", "error", err.Error())
http.Error(w, "X-Smallwebwaf-Client is not an address", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// One that cannot be read leaves the log line's peer_ip invalid.
peer, _ := netip.ParseAddr(r.Header.Get(PeerHeader))
rq := h.startRequest(w, asTheVisitorSentIt(r), client.Unmap(), peer.Unmap(), true)
defer rq.finish()
rq.site = r.Host
refused := rq.check(r.Context())
rq.checked = time.Now()
underOwnPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, adminPrefix)
if refused == nil && !underOwnPrefix {
// In observe mode, what enforce mode would have refused counts here.
defer rq.countRefusal()
rq.allow()
return
}
// The last deferred runs first, as in ServeHTTP.
defer rq.addToHistory()
defer rq.countAnomalies()
defer rq.countRefusal()
if refused != nil {
rq.deny(*refused)
return
}
// The app never sees this prefix. servewaf's own endpoints are at its
// own address, so this answers as a path with no endpoint does.
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
}
// asTheVisitorSentIt returns a copy of r, a question, as the checks and the
// log line are to see it: without the headers rproxy adds for servewaf, and
// with the length the visitor announced, as -1 when it announced none. The
// question's own length covers only the part of the body it carries.
func asTheVisitorSentIt(r *http.Request) *http.Request {
sent := r.Clone(r.Context())
announced := sent.Header.Get(ContentLengthHeader)
sent.Header.Del(ClientHeader)
sent.Header.Del(PeerHeader)
sent.Header.Del(ContentLengthHeader)
sent.Header.Del("Content-Length")
sent.ContentLength = -1
length, err := strconv.ParseInt(announced, 10, 64)
if err == nil && length >= 0 {
sent.ContentLength = length
sent.Header.Set("Content-Length", announced)
}
return sent
}
// allow answers a question with DispositionAllow, the request's id and,
// while SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set, the client's AS number and country,
// and holds the request until its report comes.
func (rq *request) allow() {
rq.allowed = true
// servewaf sends no app this part of the body, and the table of requests
// awaiting their reports must not hold it.
if rq.body != nil {
rq.body.readByCoreRuleSet = nil
}
rq.awaitReport()
header := rq.out.Header()
header.Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionAllow)
header.Set(requestIDHeader, rq.line.RequestID)
if rq.h.config.AddLookupHeaders {
setLookupHeaders(header, rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country)
}
// Go's server sends this only once the handler has returned, so a report
// that answers it cannot come while the handler still uses rq.
rq.out.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
// awaitReport holds the request by its id, which its report is to name. A
// visitor behind a trusted proxy can choose its id, which must not let it
// have its report taken for another request's, or lost, and its bytes not
// counted. So the request gets a new id when another held request has the
// question's, or when that is not valid UTF-8, which a JSON report cannot
// carry unchanged.
func (rq *request) awaitReport() {
id := rq.line.RequestID
if !utf8.ValidString(id) {
id = rand.Text()
}
held, _ := rq.h.awaitingReport.ContainsOrAdd(id, rq)
if held {
id = rand.Text()
rq.h.awaitingReport.Add(id, rq)
}
rq.line.RequestID = id
}
// deny answers a question with what the visitor is to get for r.
func (rq *request) deny(r refusal) {
if r.status == 0 {
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE is close. Written past rq.out, since the log line's
// status stays 0: the visitor is sent nothing.
rq.refused.CompareAndSwap(nil, &r)
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionClose)
rq.out.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
rq.answer(r)
}
// answerOwnEndpoint answers a request to servewaf's own address. No check
// runs on it: the address is on the private network, where the peers are
// rproxy and the admin's tools, not visitors. A report writes no log line.
func (h *handler) answerOwnEndpoint(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == http.MethodPost && r.URL.Path == ReportPath {
h.takeReport(w, r)
return
}
peer := peerAddress(r)
rq := h.startRequest(w, r, peer, peer, false)
defer rq.finish()
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == HealthPath {
rq.answerHealth()
return
}
rq.answerAdmin()
}
// takeReport answers POST ReportPath: it finishes the request the report
// names, if it holds that request, and ignores the report otherwise.
func (h *handler) takeReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var report Report
err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, reportBodyMaxBytes)).
Decode(&report)
if err != nil || report.RequestBytes < 0 || report.ResponseBytes < 0 {
http.Error(w, "the body is not a report", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
rq, held := h.awaitingReport.Peek(report.RequestID)
// Remove reports true to one report only, of several that name the id.
if held && h.awaitingReport.Remove(report.RequestID) {
rq.finishWith(report)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// finishWith finishes an allowed request with what its report says: the
// steps ServeHTTP takes once a request passed to the app has ended, with
// the status and bytes of the report in place of those it would have seen.
func (rq *request) finishWith(report Report) {
// A limit the question broke has been logged.
rq.line.LimitHit = ""
// addToHistory goes by this for whether the request reached the app.
rq.upstreamStart = time.Now()
rq.out = &responseWriter{status: report.Status, bytes: report.ResponseBytes}
rq.body = &requestBody{}
rq.body.bytes.Store(report.RequestBytes)
rq.countBytes()
rq.countAnomalies()
rq.addToHistory()
rq.line.Status = report.Status
rq.line.RequestBytes = report.RequestBytes
rq.line.ResponseBytes = report.ResponseBytes
rq.h.metrics.RequestReported(&rq.line,
time.Duration(report.DurationTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)),
time.Duration(report.DurationUpstreamTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)))
// The request's log line went out with the answer to its question.
if rq.line.LimitHit != "" {
rq.h.processLog.Warn("a report's bytes broke a byte limit",
"request_id", rq.line.RequestID,
"client_ip", rq.line.ClientIP,
"host", rq.line.Host,
"limit_hit", rq.line.LimitHit,
"ban_expires", rq.line.BanExpires)
}
}
internal/proxy/servewaf_test.go
+777
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,777 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"maps"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
const (
// siteA and siteB are two sites behind one servewaf.
siteA = "a.example"
siteB = "b.example"
// rproxyPeer is what the tests' questions give as rproxy's TCP peer.
rproxyPeer = "172.18.0.2"
)
// serveWAF is a servewaf running for one test, on a clock set to midnight.
type serveWAF struct {
t *testing.T
addr string
out *output
server *proxy.Server
clock *clock
queue *alerts.Queue
}
// startServeWAF starts servewaf with the settings in env, clients' AS numbers
// and countries looked up at geojsURL.
func startServeWAF(t *testing.T, geojsURL string, env map[string]string) *serveWAF {
t.Helper()
clk := &clock{now: time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)}
settings := map[string]string{
alertWebhookURL: "https://alerts.example/servewaf",
instanceName: alertInstance,
}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
server, out, queue := newServerWith(t, proxy.NewServeWAF,
"http://127.0.0.1:8081", geojsURL, clk.Now, settings)
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
go func() {
_ = server.Serve(listener)
}()
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = server.Close()
})
return &serveWAF{
t: t, addr: listener.Addr().String(), out: out, server: server,
clock: clk, queue: queue,
}
}
// question makes rproxy's question about a request for path on host, from the
// visitor at from.
func (s *serveWAF) question(host, from, path string) *http.Request {
s.t.Helper()
req := newRequest(s.t, http.MethodGet, s.addr, path, http.NoBody)
req.Host = host
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, from)
req.Header.Set(proxy.PeerHeader, rproxyPeer)
return req
}
// ask sends the question about a request for path on siteA from the visitor at
// from, and returns the answer.
func (s *serveWAF) ask(from, path string) answer {
s.t.Helper()
return do(s.t, s.question(siteA, from, path))
}
// allowed asks about a request for / on siteA, checks that the answer is allow,
// and returns the id the answer gives for the report.
func (s *serveWAF) allowed(from string) string {
s.t.Helper()
got := s.ask(from, "/")
wantDisposition(s.t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
return got.header.Get(requestIDHeader)
}
// report sends rproxy's report and returns the answer.
func (s *serveWAF) report(report proxy.Report) answer {
s.t.Helper()
body, err := json.Marshal(report)
if err != nil {
s.t.Fatalf("encode the report: %v", err)
}
return do(s.t, newRequest(s.t, http.MethodPost, s.addr, proxy.ReportPath,
bytes.NewReader(body)))
}
// passedOn asks about a request from the visitor at from on siteA, and reports
// it as answered 200 with bodyBytes and answerBytes.
func (s *serveWAF) passedOn(from string) {
s.t.Helper()
got := s.report(proxy.Report{
RequestID: s.allowed(from),
Status: http.StatusOK,
RequestBytes: bodyBytes,
ResponseBytes: answerBytes,
})
wantStatus(s.t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
}
// history returns what the table of clients holds of client's history.
func (s *serveWAF) history() ratelimit.History {
held, _ := s.server.Limiter.Client(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
return held.History
}
// metrics returns what the metrics endpoint answers, for a server started with
// the token as SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN.
func (s *serveWAF) metrics() string {
s.t.Helper()
req := newRequest(s.t, http.MethodGet, s.addr, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", bearer)
got := do(s.t, req)
wantStatus(s.t, got, http.StatusOK)
return string(got.body)
}
// wantDisposition checks an answer's status and disposition.
func wantDisposition(t *testing.T, got answer, status int, disposition string) {
t.Helper()
wantStatus(t, got, status)
if answered := got.header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader); answered != disposition {
t.Errorf("answered with disposition %q, want %q", answered, disposition)
}
}
// wantBody checks an answer's body.
func wantBody(t *testing.T, got answer, want string) {
t.Helper()
if string(got.body) != want {
t.Errorf("answered with the body %q, want %q", got.body, want)
}
}
func TestQuestionAllowedIsAnsweredAndLogged(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", nil)
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/page?q=1")
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-id")
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
req.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, "1234")
got := do(t, req)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantBody(t, got, "")
if id := got.header.Get(requestIDHeader); id != "the-id" {
t.Errorf("answered with the id %q, want the-id", id)
}
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if line.ClientIP != client || line.PeerIP != rproxyPeer || line.Host != siteA ||
line.Path != "/page" || line.Query != "q=1" || line.RequestID != "the-id" ||
line.Scheme != "https" || line.ContentLength != 1234 {
t.Errorf("log line is %+v", line.Line)
}
}
func TestIPv6VisitorIsCountedInItsGroup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
s.allowed("2001:db8::1")
got := s.ask("2001:db8::2", "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
}
func TestQuestionWithoutAnAddressGetsNoDisposition(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", nil)
got := s.ask("not an address", "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusBadRequest, "")
}
func TestQuestionDeniedGetsTheBanResponse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, status := range []int{http.StatusForbidden, http.StatusTooManyRequests} {
t.Run(strconv.Itoa(status), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
denyNets: client, banResponse: strconv.Itoa(status),
})
got := s.ask(client, "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, status, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantBody(t, got, http.StatusText(status)+"\n")
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
})
}
}
func TestBanResponseCloseIsAnAnswerOfItsOwn(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
denyNets: client, banResponse: banResponseClose, metricsToken: token,
})
got := s.ask(client, "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionClose)
wantBody(t, got, "")
// The visitor is sent nothing.
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantMetric(t, s.metrics(), `smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="denied",instance="`+
alertInstance+`",status_class="none"}`, 1)
}
func TestBlockRuleIsDeniedWith403AndABanRuleWithTheBanResponse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
banResponse: "429",
})
got := s.ask(client, "/blocked")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
got = s.ask(client, "/.env")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusTooManyRequests, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLines(t, 2)[1], http.StatusTooManyRequests,
requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
func TestQuestionUnderTheOwnPrefixIsDeniedWith404AfterTheChecks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
metricsToken: token, denyNets: otherClient,
})
for _, path := range []string{proxy.HealthPath, proxy.MetricsPath, proxy.ReportPath} {
got := s.ask(client, path)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusNotFound, proxy.DispositionDeny)
}
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
got := s.ask(otherClient, proxy.MetricsPath)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
}
func TestObserveModeAllowsAndLogsWhatEnforceModeWouldHaveDone(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{mode: observe, denyNets: client})
got := s.ask(client, "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
}
func TestAllowCarriesTheLookupHeadersWhileTheSettingIsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
setting string
wantASN, wantCountry string
}{
{"true", "AS64496", "DE"},
{"false", "", ""},
} {
t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startServeWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
addLookupHeaders: tc.setting, lookupTimeout: "1h", deniedCountries: "kp",
})
got := s.ask(fromDE, "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
asn, country := got.header.Get("X-Client-Asn"), got.header.Get("X-Client-Country")
if asn != tc.wantASN || country != tc.wantCountry {
t.Errorf("answered with the AS number %q and the country %q, want %q and %q",
asn, country, tc.wantASN, tc.wantCountry)
}
})
}
}
func TestReportCountsTowardAByteLimitWhichThenBans(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit})
// The request's own question counts no bytes: it is the report that does.
id := s.allowed(client)
s.allowed(client)
if held := s.server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("banned before any report: %v", held)
}
// 100 bytes are over the limit of 99.
got := s.report(proxy.Report{
RequestID: id, Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
RequestBytes: bodyBytes, ResponseBytes: answerBytes,
})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
held := s.server.Ledger.Snapshot()
if len(held) != 1 || held[0].Cause != bans.CauseLimit ||
held[0].Notes.Kind != ratelimit.KindBytes ||
held[0].Notes.Request.Status != http.StatusBadGateway ||
held[0].Notes.Request.Host != siteA {
t.Errorf("bans held are %+v", held)
}
got = s.ask(client, "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
if !strings.Contains(s.out.text(), `"msg":"a report's bytes broke a byte limit"`) {
t.Error("no message says that a report's bytes broke a byte limit")
}
}
func TestReportCountsAtThePercentageItsQuestionWasGiven(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
// 100 bytes pass half of a limit of 99 and are within a limit of 199.
s := startServeWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: "199", countryBytesPercent: countryDEHalf,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
})
s.passedOn(fromKP)
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromKP, "/"), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
s.passedOn(fromDE)
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromDE, "/"), http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
}
func TestReportAddsTheRequestToItsClientsHistoryAndTheAnomalyCounters(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
"SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE": "1000",
})
id := s.allowed(client)
if requests := s.history().Requests; requests != 0 {
t.Errorf("history holds %d requests before the report, want none", requests)
}
if counters := s.server.Anomalies.Snapshot(); len(counters) != 0 {
t.Errorf("anomaly counters %v before the report, want none", counters)
}
got := s.report(proxy.Report{
RequestID: id, Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
RequestBytes: bodyBytes, ResponseBytes: answerBytes,
})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
history := s.history()
if history.Requests != 1 || history.Forwarded != 1 ||
history.RequestBytes != bodyBytes || history.ResponseBytes != answerBytes ||
history.Responses.Status5xx != 1 {
t.Errorf("history is %+v", history)
}
if counters := s.server.Anomalies.Snapshot(); len(counters) != 1 {
t.Errorf("anomaly counters %v, want the client's", counters)
}
}
func TestDeniedRequestIsFinishedAtItsDecision(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
s.allowed(client)
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(client, "/"), http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
history := s.history()
if history.Requests != 1 || history.Refused != 1 {
t.Errorf("history is %+v, want the refused request alone", history)
}
}
func TestMetricsCountAnAllowedRequestFromItsReport(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
id := s.allowed(client)
const series = `{action="forward",instance="` + alertInstance + `",status_class="5xx"}`
metrics := s.metrics()
wantNoSeries(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_total"+series)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="`+alertInstance+`"}`,
1) // the scrape itself
got := s.report(proxy.Report{
RequestID: id, Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
RequestBytes: bodyBytes, ResponseBytes: answerBytes,
DurationTotal: 5, DurationUpstreamTotal: 4,
})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
metrics = s.metrics()
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_total"+series, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_request_bytes_total"+series, bodyBytes)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_response_bytes_total"+series, answerBytes)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_upstream_duration_seconds_sum{instance="`+
alertInstance+`"}`, 0.004)
}
func TestReportForARequestNotHeldIsIgnored(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit})
got := s.report(proxy.Report{RequestID: "no-such-request", ResponseBytes: 1000})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
if clients := s.server.Limiter.Snapshot(); len(clients) != 0 {
t.Errorf("the table of clients holds %v", clients)
}
if held := s.server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
t.Errorf("bans held are %v", held)
}
// A second report of the same request does not count it twice.
id := s.allowed(client)
for range 2 {
got = s.report(proxy.Report{RequestID: id, ResponseBytes: answerBytes})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
}
if counted := s.history().ResponseBytes; counted != answerBytes {
t.Errorf("history holds %d response bytes, want %d", counted, answerBytes)
}
}
func TestReportThatCannotBeReadIsRefusedAndTheRequestStaysHeld(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", nil)
id := s.allowed(client)
for _, body := range []string{
"not JSON",
`{"request_id":"` + id + `","request_bytes":-1}`,
`{"request_id":"` + id + `","response_bytes":-1}`,
} {
got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, s.addr, proxy.ReportPath,
strings.NewReader(body)))
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
got := s.report(proxy.Report{RequestID: id, ResponseBytes: answerBytes})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
if counted := s.history().ResponseBytes; counted != answerBytes {
t.Errorf("history holds %d response bytes, want %d", counted, answerBytes)
}
}
func TestVisitorCannotHaveItsReportTakenForAnothersByChoosingItsID(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
chosen = "chosen-by-a-visitor"
exempt = "/static/x"
)
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit, rateLimitExemptPaths: "/static/",
})
// The request whose bytes are not counted takes the id first.
first := s.question(siteA, client, exempt)
first.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, chosen)
gotFirst := do(t, first)
wantDisposition(t, gotFirst, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
second := s.question(siteA, client, "/download")
second.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, chosen)
gotSecond := do(t, second)
wantDisposition(t, gotSecond, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
id := gotSecond.header.Get(requestIDHeader)
if gotFirst.header.Get(requestIDHeader) != chosen || id == chosen || id == "" {
t.Errorf("answered with the ids %q and %q, want %q and a new one",
gotFirst.header.Get(requestIDHeader), id, chosen)
}
if line := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]; line.RequestID != id {
t.Errorf("log line has request_id %q, want %q", line.RequestID, id)
}
got := s.report(proxy.Report{RequestID: id, ResponseBytes: 1000})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
if held := s.server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 1 {
t.Errorf("bans held are %v, want the one the download's bytes make", held)
}
}
func TestIDAJSONReportCannotCarryIsReplaced(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "not-utf-8-\xff")
got := do(t, req)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
report := s.report(proxy.Report{
RequestID: got.header.Get(requestIDHeader), ResponseBytes: 1000,
})
wantStatus(t, report, http.StatusNoContent)
if held := s.server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 1 {
t.Errorf("bans held are %v, want the one the report's bytes make", held)
}
}
func TestBanMadeThroughOneHostRefusesTheClientOnAnother(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules)})
got := do(t, s.question(siteA, client, "/.env"))
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
got = do(t, s.question(siteB, client, "/"))
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
if lines[0].Host != siteA || lines[1].Host != siteB {
t.Errorf("log lines have the hosts %q and %q", lines[0].Host, lines[1].Host)
}
held := s.server.Ledger.Snapshot()
if len(held) != 1 || held[0].Notes.Request.Host != siteA {
t.Errorf("bans held are %+v, want one whose notes name %s", held, siteA)
}
waiting := s.queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) == 0 || waiting[0].Host != siteA {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting are %+v, want the ban's, naming %s", waiting, siteA)
}
}
func TestRequestsOnEverySiteCountTowardOneSetOfLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
s.allowed(client)
got := do(t, s.question(siteB, client, "/"))
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
}
func TestOwnEndpointsAnswerOnlyWithoutTheClientHeader(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Were a check run on its requests, localhost's would be refused.
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
metricsToken: token, adminToken: adminSecret, denyNets: localhost,
})
for _, tc := range []struct {
path, authorization string
want int
}{
{proxy.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK},
{proxy.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusOK},
{proxy.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
{proxy.BansPath, adminBearer, http.StatusOK},
{proxy.BansPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
{proxy.ClientsPath + client, adminBearer, http.StatusOK},
{proxy.ReportPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
{"/_smallwebwaf/other", "", http.StatusNotFound},
{"/", "", http.StatusNotFound},
} {
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, s.addr, tc.path, http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.authorization)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tc.want, "")
// The same request carrying the header is a question about it.
req = newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, s.addr, tc.path, http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.authorization)
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, client)
if strings.HasPrefix(tc.path, "/_smallwebwaf/") {
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusNotFound, proxy.DispositionDeny)
} else {
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
}
}
}
func TestReportWritesNoLogLine(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", nil)
s.passedOn(client)
// The health check's line comes after the question's.
wantStatus(t, get(t, s.addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
if len(lines) != 2 || lines[1].Path != proxy.HealthPath {
t.Errorf("request log lines are %+v, want the question's and the health check's",
lines)
}
}
func TestSettingsOfTheLimitsAndTheProxiesAreIgnored(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
requestMaxBytes: "1",
clientHeaderMaxBytes: "5K",
clientRequestTimeout: off,
clientResponseTimeout: off,
trustedProxies: localhost,
})
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, s.addr, "/", strings.NewReader("a body"))
req.Host = siteA
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, client)
req.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, "1073741824")
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, otherClient)
req.Header.Set("X-Long", strings.Repeat("x", 40<<10))
got := do(t, req)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if line.ClientIP != client || line.ContentLength != 1<<30 {
t.Errorf("log line has client_ip %q and content_length %d",
line.ClientIP, line.ContentLength)
}
}
func TestChecksSeeTheHeadersTheVisitorSent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, `
own-header header:X-Smallwebwaf-Client block .
announced header:Content-Length block ^70000$
carried header:Content-Length block ^6$
`),
})
// What the question's own Content-Length says, 6, is not what the visitor
// announced.
for _, tc := range []struct {
announced string
want int
}{
{"70000", http.StatusForbidden},
{"", http.StatusOK},
{"6000", http.StatusOK},
} {
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, s.addr, "/", strings.NewReader("a body"))
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, client)
if tc.announced != "" {
req.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, tc.announced)
}
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), tc.want)
}
}
func TestCoreRuleSetReadsTheBodyAQuestionCarries(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: "1M",
})
ask := func(contentType, body string) answer {
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, s.addr, "/", strings.NewReader(body))
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, client)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
req.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, "100000")
return do(t, req)
}
got := ask(formData, "id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
// The first 64 KiB of a longer JSON body cannot be parsed, which is no
// attack, so the Core Rule Set does not read it.
cut := `{"text":"` + strings.Repeat("x", proxy.QuestionBodyMaxBytes)
got = ask("application/json", cut[:proxy.QuestionBodyMaxBytes])
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
}
func TestAnomalyAlertNamesTheSite(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
"SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE": "1",
})
for range 2 {
s.passedOn(client)
}
waiting := s.queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventAnomaly ||
waiting[0].Host != siteA {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting are %+v, want an anomaly naming %s", waiting, siteA)
}
}
internal/servewaf/staticlists_test.go → internal/proxy/staticlists_test.go
+18 -5
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"net/http"
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const (
unlistedAddr = "2001:db8::2"
)
func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheckButTheSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
denyNets: fromKP,
deniedCountries: "kp",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
requestMaxBytes: "1K",
})
// Neither SWWAF_DENY_NETS, the country lists nor the limit of one
@@ -48,6 +49,14 @@ func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, want nothing", asked())
}
// The size limit still applies.
body := strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("a", 2<<10))
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromKP)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, 3)[2],
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
if calls.Load() != 2 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want 2", calls.Load())
}
@@ -73,7 +82,7 @@ func TestRequestFromAllowNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
})
}
func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookupAndTheBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -92,9 +101,13 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
line := out.endedLine(t)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
if line.RequestBytes != 0 {
t.Errorf("log line has request_bytes %d, want 0", line.RequestBytes)
}
if len(asked()) != 0 {
t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, want nothing", asked())
}
@@ -167,6 +180,6 @@ func wantAnswers(t *testing.T, addr string, out *output, requests []sentRequest)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, sent.client)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), sent.status)
wantLine(t, out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i], sent.status, sent.action)
wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], sent.status, sent.action)
}
}
internal/proxy/timeouts_test.go
+453
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"errors"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// largeBodySize is more than the connections between the client,
// smallwebwaf and the app can hold while nobody reads, so that a sender
// soon waits.
const largeBodySize = 64 << 20
// writeSize is how much a test sender writes at a time.
const writeSize = 32 << 10
func TestRequestTimeouts(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
// limit is the setting set to shortTimeout, which runs out; long
// is one set to longTimeoutSetting, which does not, or "".
limit, long string
// appTakesNothing has the app never read, while the client sends
// as fast as it can; otherwise the app reads, and the client
// stops sending halfway.
appTakesNothing bool
want int
}{
{
name: "client request timeout, waiting on the client",
limit: clientRequestTimeout,
want: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
},
{
name: "upstream request timeout, waiting on the client",
limit: upstreamRequestTimeout,
long: clientRequestTimeout,
want: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
},
{
name: "upstream request timeout, waiting on the app",
limit: upstreamRequestTimeout,
appTakesNothing: true,
want: http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
},
{
name: "client request timeout, waiting on the app",
limit: clientRequestTimeout,
long: upstreamRequestTimeout,
appTakesNothing: true,
want: http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
app *httptest.Server
appURL string
sendRequest func(*testing.T, string) net.Conn
appGotBody atomic.Bool
)
if tc.appTakesNothing {
appURL, sendRequest = startAppThatTakesNothing(t), sendLargeBody
} else {
app = startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
n, _ := io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
appGotBody.Store(n > 0)
})
appURL, sendRequest = app.URL, sendPartOfBody
}
env := map[string]string{tc.limit: shortTimeoutSetting, metricsToken: token}
if tc.long != "" {
env[tc.long] = longTimeoutSetting
}
addr, out := startProxy(t, appURL, env)
start := time.Now()
got := readResponse(t, sendRequest(t, addr))
wantTimedOut(t, start)
want := tc.want
if app != nil {
// Close returns once the app has finished with the request.
app.Close()
// Until some of the body has reached the app, smallwebwaf
// waits on the app, and SPEC.md asks for 504; the timeout
// runs out then only if the test process is held up.
if !appGotBody.Load() {
want = http.StatusGatewayTimeout
}
}
wantStatus(t, got, want)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), want, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
wantLimitHits(t, addr, tc.limit, 1)
})
}
}
// startAppThatTakesNothing starts an app that accepts connections and
// never reads from them, and returns its URL.
func startAppThatTakesNothing(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
var (
mu sync.Mutex
held []net.Conn
)
hold := func(conn net.Conn) {
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
held = append(held, conn)
}
go func() {
for {
conn, err := listener.Accept()
if err != nil {
return
}
hold(conn)
}
}()
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = listener.Close()
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
for _, conn := range held {
_ = conn.Close()
}
})
return "http://" + listener.Addr().String()
}
// sendPartOfBody sends a request that announces a large body, and only
// the first bytes of it.
func sendPartOfBody(t *testing.T, addr string) net.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "POST /upload HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nContent-Length: "+
strconv.Itoa(largeBodySize)+"\r\n\r\nthe first bytes")
return conn
}
// sendLargeBody sends a request with a large body, as fast as smallwebwaf
// takes it, from a goroutine of its own.
func sendLargeBody(t *testing.T, addr string) net.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "POST /upload HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nContent-Length: "+
strconv.Itoa(largeBodySize)+"\r\n\r\n")
go func() {
chunk := make([]byte, writeSize)
for range largeBodySize / writeSize {
_, err := conn.Write(chunk)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
}()
return conn
}
func TestClientStopsSendingAfterTheAppHasAnswered(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// answeredAt is when the app answered, or nil if the bytes the client
// sent never reached it.
var answeredAt atomic.Pointer[time.Time]
// The app answers without reading the whole body, as an app does for
// a path it does not serve, and only once smallwebwaf waits for the
// rest of it: the app takes the bytes the client sent, and then waits
// half the timeout, far longer than smallwebwaf takes to go on to
// wait.
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, err := io.ReadFull(r.Body, make([]byte, len("the first bytes")))
if err != nil {
return
}
time.Sleep(shortTimeout / 2)
answeredAt.Store(new(time.Now()))
http.NotFound(w, r)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
clientRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
metricsToken: token,
})
start := time.Now()
got := readResponse(t, sendPartOfBody(t, addr))
wantTimedOut(t, start)
// Close returns once the app has finished with the request.
app.Close()
// The app's answer came before the time ran out, so the client is
// sent that answer, not smallwebwaf's 408. Only a hold-up of the test
// process can make it come later, and SPEC.md then asks for 408, as
// smallwebwaf was waiting for the client, or for 504 if the bytes the
// client sent had not reached the app.
at := answeredAt.Load()
want := http.StatusNotFound
switch {
case at == nil:
want = http.StatusGatewayTimeout
case at.Sub(start) >= shortTimeout:
want = http.StatusRequestTimeout
}
wantStatus(t, got, want)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), want, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
wantLimitHits(t, addr, clientRequestTimeout, 1)
}
func TestClientStopsSendingWithLittleOfItsBodyLeft(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
// limit is the setting set to shortTimeout, which runs out, and
// clientTimeout what SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT is set to when it
// is not limit.
limit, clientTimeout string
}{
{
name: "client request timeout",
limit: clientRequestTimeout,
},
{
name: "upstream request timeout, client request timeout off",
limit: upstreamRequestTimeout,
clientTimeout: off,
},
{
name: "upstream request timeout, client request timeout longer",
limit: upstreamRequestTimeout,
clientTimeout: longTimeoutSetting,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// appClosed is closed once smallwebwaf has closed its
// connection to the app, which it does once it has the app's
// answer.
appClosed := make(chan struct{})
// The app answers without reading the rest of the body, and
// says it closes the connection, only once smallwebwaf waits
// for the client to send more: it takes the bytes the client
// sent, and then waits half the timeout, far longer than
// smallwebwaf takes to go on to wait.
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
conn, buf, err := http.NewResponseController(w).Hijack()
if err != nil {
return
}
_, _ = io.ReadFull(buf.Reader, make([]byte, len("the first bytes")))
time.Sleep(shortTimeout / 2)
_, _ = buf.WriteString("HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\r\n" +
"Content-Length: 0\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
_ = buf.Flush()
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, buf.Reader)
_ = conn.Close()
close(appClosed)
})
env := map[string]string{tc.limit: shortTimeoutSetting, metricsToken: token}
if tc.clientTimeout != "" {
env[clientRequestTimeout] = tc.clientTimeout
}
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, env)
// Less than 256 KiB of the body is left after the first bytes,
// little enough for Go's server in smallwebwaf to read the rest
// itself before it sends the app's answer.
start := time.Now()
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "POST /upload HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nContent-Length: 200000\r\n\r\n"+
"the first bytes")
select {
case <-appClosed:
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("smallwebwaf did not close its connection to the app")
}
// More of the body, which can no longer go to the app, and then
// nothing.
send(t, conn, strings.Repeat("x", 8<<10))
got := readResponse(t, conn)
wantTimedOut(t, start)
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNotFound)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
wantLimitHits(t, addr, tc.limit, 1)
})
}
}
func TestAppTooSlowToAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
<-r.Context().Done()
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
upstreamResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
metricsToken: token,
})
start := time.Now()
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/slow"), http.StatusGatewayTimeout)
wantTimedOut(t, start)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusGatewayTimeout, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
_, answered := line.fields["upstream_status"]
if answered {
t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %v for an app that never answered",
line.fields["upstream_status"])
}
wantLimitHits(t, addr, upstreamResponseTimeout, 1)
}
func TestAppTooSlowToFinishItsAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "the first part")
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
<-r.Context().Done()
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
upstreamResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
})
start := time.Now()
got := get(t, addr, "/slow")
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
if string(got.body) != "the first part" || !errors.Is(got.err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
t.Errorf("client read %q (%v), want the first part cut off", got.body, got.err)
}
wantTimedOut(t, start)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d, want %d",
line.UpstreamStatus, http.StatusOK)
}
}
func TestClientTooSlowToTakeTheAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
chunk := make([]byte, writeSize)
for range largeBodySize / writeSize {
_, err := w.Write(chunk)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
clientResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
metricsToken: token,
})
start := time.Now()
// The client asks, and never reads the answer.
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET /large HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n\r\n")
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantTimedOut(t, start)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
wantLimitHits(t, addr, clientResponseTimeout, 1)
}
func TestClosesAnIdleConnection(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
clientIdleTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
})
// The idle time starts once the answer is sent, so after start.
start := time.Now()
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n\r\n")
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusOK)
// The read deadline readResponse set still bounds this read.
_, err := conn.Read(make([]byte, 1))
if !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
t.Fatalf("read on the idle connection: %v, want it closed", err)
}
wantTimedOut(t, start)
}
internal/servewaf/trappaths_test.go → internal/proxy/trappaths_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package servewaf_test
package proxy_test
import (
"net/http"
internal/ratelimit/history_test.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEveryRequest(t *testing.T) {
{Forwarded: true, Status: 502, ResponseBytes: 12},
// Closed without an answer: refused, and no response.
{Refused: true, Status: 0},
// Answered 404 for a path under /_smallwebwaf/: neither forwarded nor
// refused.
// Answered 404 at smallwebwaf's own endpoints: neither forwarded
// nor refused.
{Status: 404},
} {
limiter.AddToHistory(client, start.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Minute), r)
internal/ratelimit/ratelimit.go
+27 -43
View File
@@ -92,9 +92,10 @@ type History struct {
ASName string `json:"as_name,omitempty"`
Country string `json:"country,omitempty"`
LookedUp time.Time `json:"looked_up,omitzero"`
// Requests are all the client's requests: Forwarded those servewaf allowed,
// Refused those it refused, and neither those for a path under
// /_smallwebwaf/.
// Requests are all the client's requests: Forwarded those passed to
// the app, Refused those refused before anything reached it, a 401 at
// smallwebwaf's own endpoints included, and neither the others
// smallwebwaf answered there.
Requests int64 `json:"requests"`
Forwarded int64 `json:"forwarded"`
Refused int64 `json:"refused"`
@@ -123,20 +124,21 @@ type Offences struct {
// Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
// error burst, Attack those that were a clear sign of attack, a match
// of a ban rule or a request for a trap path, RuleBlocked those a block
// rule refused, and WAFBlocked those the Core Rule Set refused.
Limit int64 `json:"limit"`
Attack int64 `json:"attack"`
RuleBlocked int64 `json:"rule_blocked"`
WAFBlocked int64 `json:"waf_blocked"`
// TokenRefused is what a clients.json written by an earlier version gives,
// which must still load. Nothing adds to it.
TokenRefused int64 `json:"token_refused,omitempty"`
// rule refused, WAFBlocked those the Core Rule Set refused, and
// TokenRefused those refused for a missing or wrong token.
Limit int64 `json:"limit"`
Attack int64 `json:"attack"`
RuleBlocked int64 `json:"rule_blocked"`
WAFBlocked int64 `json:"waf_blocked"`
TokenRefused int64 `json:"token_refused"`
}
// Request is what a client's history keeps of one of its requests.
type Request struct {
// Forwarded is true for a request servewaf allowed, and Refused for one it
// refused. Both are false for a request for a path under /_smallwebwaf/.
// Forwarded is true for a request passed to the app, Refused for one
// refused before anything reached it, a 401 at smallwebwaf's own
// endpoints included. Both are false for any other request smallwebwaf
// answered there.
Forwarded bool
Refused bool
// Status is what the client was sent, 0 if nothing was.
@@ -147,12 +149,14 @@ type Request struct {
ResponseBytes int64
// BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit, a byte
// limit or the error burst, Attack for one that matched a ban rule or
// asked for a trap path, RuleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and
// WAFBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused.
BrokeLimit bool
Attack bool
RuleBlocked bool
WAFBlocked bool
// asked for a trap path, RuleBlocked for one a block rule refused,
// WAFBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused, and TokenRefused for
// one refused for a missing or wrong token.
BrokeLimit bool
Attack bool
RuleBlocked bool
WAFBlocked bool
TokenRefused bool
}
// New returns a Limiter for limits, with no client counted yet, whose
@@ -224,30 +228,6 @@ func (l *Limiter) Count(
return l.count(client, now, 1, 0, percent)
}
// OverARateLimit reports whether one more request from client at now would
// take it over a whole rate limit. A client's percentage can only lower a
// limit, so that request is over the limit at any percentage. It counts
// nothing, and does not make the client the most recently seen.
func (l *Limiter) OverARateLimit(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time) bool {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
c, seen := l.clients.Peek(client)
if !seen {
return false
}
buckets := c.buckets()
for i, w := range l.windows {
if w.limit > 0 && buckets[i].Add(now, w.length, 0)+1 > float64(w.limit) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// CountBytes counts bytes, those of a request from client that has ended,
// at now, in every window, and returns the client's counts in each window.
// It reports whether the bytes take the client over a byte limit, of which
@@ -330,6 +310,10 @@ func (l *Limiter) AddToHistory(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, r Request) {
if r.WAFBlocked {
h.Offences.WAFBlocked++
}
if r.TokenRefused {
h.Offences.TokenRefused++
}
}
// AddLookup gives client's history its AS number, AS name and country, as
internal/ratelimit/ratelimit_test.go
-44
View File
@@ -26,50 +26,6 @@ const (
hour = "hour"
)
func TestOverARateLimitSaysWhatTheNextRequestWouldDoAndCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
now := midnight()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerDay: limit + 1},
tableSize)
if limiter.OverARateLimit(client, now) {
t.Error("a client never seen is over a rate limit")
}
if limiter.Len() != 0 {
t.Error("asking about a client never seen added it to the table")
}
for range limit {
if limiter.OverARateLimit(client, now) {
t.Error("a client with room for another request is over a rate limit")
}
wantCount(t, limiter, client, now, "")
}
if !limiter.OverARateLimit(client, now) {
t.Error("a client at its limit is not over a rate limit")
}
held, _ := limiter.Client(client)
if held.Minute.Current != limit {
t.Errorf("the client's minute holds %d requests, want %d", held.Minute.Current, limit)
}
wantCount(t, limiter, client, now, minute)
// A limit that is off is never gone over.
off := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
off.Count(client, now, whole)
if off.OverARateLimit(client, now) {
t.Error("a client is over a rate limit that is off")
}
}
func TestEachWindowRefusesAtItsLimitAndLetsTheClientBack(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
internal/requestlog/requestlog.go
+38 -78
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
// Package requestlog writes the lines smallwebwaf prints on stdout: one
// JSON object per request, two from servewaf and a short one from rproxy, marked
// "type":"request", and the process's own messages as JSON lines marked
// "type":"process".
// JSON object per request, marked "type":"request", and the process's own
// messages as JSON lines marked "type":"process".
package requestlog
import (
@@ -14,13 +13,18 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
)
// The action a request line names: what servewaf did with the request.
// The action a request line names: what smallwebwaf did with the
// request.
const (
// ActionForward is a request servewaf allowed, which rproxy passes to the
// app.
// ActionForward is a request passed to the app.
ActionForward = "forward"
// ActionTooLarge is a request over the header limits.
// ActionTooLarge is a request or response over its size limit.
ActionTooLarge = "too_large"
// ActionTimedOut is a request or response that ran out of time.
ActionTimedOut = "timed_out"
// ActionUpstreamError is a request the app could not be reached
// for, or whose answer could not be passed on.
ActionUpstreamError = "upstream_error"
// ActionRateLimited is a request refused because it took its client
// over a rate limit, which bans the client.
ActionRateLimited = "rate_limited"
@@ -42,8 +46,8 @@ const (
ActionDenied = "denied"
// ActionCountryDenied is a request refused for its client's country.
ActionCountryDenied = "country_denied"
// ActionAdmin is a request servewaf answered at one of its own endpoints,
// or a question about a path under /_smallwebwaf/.
// ActionAdmin is a request smallwebwaf answered at one of its own
// endpoints, under /_smallwebwaf/.
ActionAdmin = "admin"
)
@@ -56,16 +60,6 @@ const OffenceLimit = "limit"
// that broke the error burst.
const LimitHitErrorBurst = "error_burst"
// The servewaf_line a request line names, which says which of servewaf's two
// lines about a question it is.
const (
// ServeWAFLineDecision is servewaf's line at its decision.
ServeWAFLineDecision = "decision"
// ServeWAFLineReport is servewaf's line when rproxy's report comes, with
// the decision's fields and the report's together.
ServeWAFLineReport = "report"
)
// timeLayout is RFC 3339 with milliseconds.
const timeLayout = "2006-01-02T15:04:05.000Z07:00"
@@ -76,12 +70,9 @@ const timeLayout = "2006-01-02T15:04:05.000Z07:00"
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
type Line struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
// ServeWAFLine is ServeWAFLineDecision or ServeWAFLineReport on servewaf's
// two lines about a question.
ServeWAFLine string `json:"servewaf_line,omitempty"`
// The standard web log fields. Scheme is how the client reached rproxy, or
// the trusted proxy in front of it.
// The standard web log fields. Scheme is how the client reached
// smallwebwaf, or the trusted proxy in front of it.
Time string `json:"time"`
Instance string `json:"instance"`
ClientIP string `json:"client_ip"`
@@ -97,8 +88,8 @@ type Line struct {
Referer string `json:"referer"`
UserAgent string `json:"user_agent"`
// Request detail. RequestID is the id rproxy made for the request, or for a
// request to servewaf's own endpoints a new one. ForwardedFor is the
// Request detail. RequestID is the X-Request-ID a trusted proxy sent,
// or a new one, and is sent on to the app. ForwardedFor is the
// X-Forwarded-For header as received. ClientGroup is the netblock the
// client is counted as. ASN, ASName and Country are the client's AS
// number, AS name and country, as looked up.
@@ -117,10 +108,17 @@ type Line struct {
RequestHeaders map[string]string `json:"request_headers,omitempty"`
HasAuthorization bool `json:"has_authorization,omitempty"`
HasCookie bool `json:"has_cookie,omitempty"`
// Websocket is true when the connection was upgraded, as for a
// WebSocket.
Websocket bool `json:"websocket,omitempty"`
// Response detail, of servewaf's own answer. Aborted is true when rproxy, or
// the admin's tool, went away before the answer.
// Response detail, from the headers of the answer: the app's, as
// passed on, or those of smallwebwaf's own. Aborted is true when the
// client went away early.
ResponseContentType string `json:"response_content_type,omitempty"`
UpstreamStatus int `json:"upstream_status,omitempty"`
CacheControl string `json:"cache_control,omitempty"`
Location string `json:"location,omitempty"`
Aborted bool `json:"aborted,omitempty"`
// The decision.
@@ -128,8 +126,7 @@ type Line struct {
// WouldAction is, in observe mode, the action enforce mode would have
// taken with a request it would have refused: ActionDenied,
// ActionBanned, ActionCountryDenied, ActionRateLimited,
// ActionRuleBlocked, ActionWAFBlocked, or, in servewaf, ActionTooLarge
// for the header limits.
// ActionRuleBlocked or ActionWAFBlocked.
WouldAction string `json:"would_action,omitempty"`
// LimitPercent and LimitPercentSetting are, for a request the rate
// limits counted whose client a biased threshold gives a percentage of
@@ -170,60 +167,23 @@ type Line struct {
// The timings, in milliseconds. DurationChecks is the time until the
// checks were done, and DurationWAF the part of it the Core Rule Set
// took. DurationUpstreamTotal is what the report of an allowed request gives,
// from the hand-over to the app until the end of its answer. Each but
// DurationTotal is nil for a request that did not get that far.
DurationTotal float64 `json:"duration_total"`
DurationChecks *float64 `json:"duration_checks,omitempty"`
DurationWAF *float64 `json:"duration_waf,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamTotal *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total,omitempty"`
}
// RProxyLine is rproxy's short line in the request log about one request. The
// field names, and their order, are those of docs/request-log.md. A field that
// does not apply to a request is left out of its line.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
type RProxyLine struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Time string `json:"time"`
RequestID string `json:"request_id"`
ClientIP string `json:"client_ip"`
Host string `json:"host"`
Method string `json:"method"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Query string `json:"query"`
Status int `json:"status"`
RequestBytes int64 `json:"request_bytes"`
ResponseBytes int64 `json:"response_bytes"`
// DurationRequest runs in milliseconds from the request's headers being read
// until the app has been sent the whole request, or the answer has started
// if that is sooner. DurationResponse runs from then until the answer ends.
DurationRequest float64 `json:"duration_request"`
DurationResponse float64 `json:"duration_response"`
// Disposition is the valid disposition servewaf answered or, while
// DefaultDisposition is true, the value of SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION. It is ""
// when neither gave one.
Disposition string `json:"disposition,omitempty"`
DefaultDisposition bool `json:"default_disposition,omitempty"`
// took. DurationUpstreamConnect, DurationUpstreamFirstByte and
// DurationUpstreamTotal run from when the request was handed to the
// app: until there was a connection to it, until the first byte of its
// answer arrived, and until the end. Each but DurationTotal is nil for
// a request that did not get that far.
DurationTotal float64 `json:"duration_total"`
DurationChecks *float64 `json:"duration_checks,omitempty"`
DurationWAF *float64 `json:"duration_waf,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamConnect *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_connect,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamFirstByte *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_first_byte,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamTotal *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total,omitempty"`
}
// Write writes line to w as one JSON line marked "type":"request".
func Write(w io.Writer, line *Line) error {
line.Type = "request"
return writeJSONLine(w, line)
}
// WriteRProxyLine writes line to w as one JSON line marked "type":"request".
func WriteRProxyLine(w io.Writer, line *RProxyLine) error {
line.Type = "request"
return writeJSONLine(w, line)
}
// writeJSONLine writes line to w as one JSON line.
func writeJSONLine(w io.Writer, line any) error {
encoded, err := json.Marshal(line)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encode the request log line: %w", err)
internal/requestlog/requestlog_test.go
-22
View File
@@ -67,28 +67,6 @@ func TestWriteWritesOneJSONLineMarkedRequest(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestWriteRProxyLineWritesOneJSONLineWithOnlyItsFields(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var out bytes.Buffer
err := requestlog.WriteRProxyLine(&out, &requestlog.RProxyLine{
RequestID: "an-id",
Disposition: "allow",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
const want = `{"type":"request","time":"","request_id":"an-id","client_ip":"",` +
`"host":"","method":"","path":"","query":"","status":0,"request_bytes":0,` +
`"response_bytes":0,"duration_request":0,"duration_response":0,` +
`"disposition":"allow"}` + "\n"
if out.String() != want {
t.Errorf("wrote %s, want %s", out.String(), want)
}
}
func TestProcessLinesAreMarkedProcessAndGiveTheInstance(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
internal/rproxy/limits_test.go
-831
View File
@@ -1,831 +0,0 @@
package rproxy_test
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"errors"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// post is the start of a POST whose headers end with what follows it.
const post = "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"
// announcedLength is the header that announces a body of size bytes, and the
// end of the headers.
func announcedLength(size int) string {
return "Content-Length: " + strconv.Itoa(size) + "\r\n\r\n"
}
func TestServerHasTheFixedLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
if name == "SWRP_WAF_BACKEND" {
return nowhere, true
}
return "", false
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
server := rproxy.New(rproxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: io.Discard,
ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(io.Discard, "test", slog.LevelInfo),
})
if server.Addr != ":8080" || server.MaxHeaderBytes != 28<<10 ||
server.IdleTimeout != 2*time.Minute || server.ReadHeaderTimeout != time.Minute {
t.Errorf("server listens on %q with header limit %d, idle time %s and "+
"header timeout %s", server.Addr, server.MaxHeaderBytes,
server.IdleTimeout, server.ReadHeaderTimeout)
}
}
func TestABodyAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefusedOnceServeWAFAllowsIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, limit string
size, asked int
}{
{"with the limit within the first part", "1K", 1025, 1024},
{"with the limit past the first part", "128K", 129 << 10, questionBodyMaxBytes},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Error("the app was asked")
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestSize: tc.limit,
})
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/",
bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, tc.size))))
if got.status != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want 413", got)
}
if asked := standIn.question(t); len(asked.body) != tc.asked {
t.Errorf("the question carries %d bytes, want %d", len(asked.body), tc.asked)
}
report := standIn.report(t)
if report.Status != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 413", report)
}
})
}
}
func TestADenyOutranksTheBodySizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestSize: "1K",
})
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/",
bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, 1025))))
if got.status != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want servewaf's 403", got)
}
}
func TestABodyNotAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, limit string
size int
// mayReachApp is true when the part of the body the limit lets through
// goes on to the app before the limit is met. The app may still not have
// started on the request when it is cut off.
mayReachApp bool
}{
{"within the first part", "1K", 2 << 10, false},
{"past the first part", "128K", 129 << 10, true},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var asked atomic.Bool
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
asked.Store(true)
greet(w, r)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestSize: tc.limit,
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n"+
strconv.FormatInt(int64(tc.size), 16)+"\r\n"+strings.Repeat("x", tc.size)+
"\r\n0\r\n\r\n")
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 413", status)
}
if asked.Load() && !tc.mayReachApp {
t.Error("the app was asked")
}
})
}
}
func TestAResponseOverItsLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
large := strings.Repeat("x", 2<<10)
t.Run("announced, is refused", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set(contentLengthHeader, strconv.Itoa(len(large)))
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, large)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseSize: "1K",
})
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if got.status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("answered %d, want 502", got.status)
}
if report := standIn.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 502", report)
}
})
t.Run("not announced, is cut off", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, large[:1])
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, large[1:])
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseSize: "1K",
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
text, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
if err != nil || bytes.Contains(text, []byte(large)) {
t.Errorf("read %d bytes (%v), want the answer cut off", len(text), err)
}
report := standIn.report(t)
if report.Status != http.StatusOK || report.ResponseBytes > 1<<10 {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 200 and at most 1K of the answer", report)
}
})
}
func TestAHeadWhoseAnswerAnnouncesMoreThanTheResponseLimitIsPassedOn(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const announced = "2048"
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set(contentLengthHeader, announced)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseSize: "1K",
})
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodHead, addr, "/", http.NoBody))
if got.status != http.StatusOK || got.header.Get(contentLengthHeader) != announced {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want the app's 200 announcing %s bytes", got, announced)
}
}
func TestASettingOfOffSetsNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, setting := range []string{
maxRequestSize, maxResponseSize, maxRequestTime, maxResponseTime,
} {
t.Run(setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
setting: "off",
})
// A body and an answer that a limit of zero would cut off, as it would the
// next answer, which rproxy gives itself.
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/",
strings.NewReader("a body"))))
if got := get(t, addr, servewaf.HealthPath); got.status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want rproxy's own 200", got)
}
})
}
}
func TestAVisitorTooSlowToSendTheFirstPartIsAnswered408(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, rest string
}{
{"with its length announced", announcedLength(100) + "some of it"},
{"with no length announced", "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\na\r\nsome of it\r\n"},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "500",
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+tc.rest)
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusRequestTimeout {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 408", status)
}
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["disposition"] != nil || line["request_bytes"] != 10.0 {
t.Errorf("line %v, want no disposition and 10 bytes", line)
}
if len(standIn.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
})
}
}
func TestAVisitorThatGoesAwayBeforeTheFirstPartIsNotAsked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+announcedLength(100)+"some of it")
_ = conn.Close()
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != 0.0 || line["disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want no answer and no disposition", line)
}
if len(standIn.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
}
func TestABodyThatCannotBeReadClosesTheConnectionWithoutAnAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, request string
stopsSending bool
}{
{
"a malformed chunk", post + "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\nnot a chunk\r\n",
false,
},
{"a visitor that stops sending", post + announcedLength(100) + "some of it", true},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, tc.request)
if tc.stopsSending {
tcpConn, ok := conn.(*net.TCPConn)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("the connection is a %T", conn)
}
err := tcpConn.CloseWrite()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stop sending: %v", err)
}
}
text, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
if err != nil || len(text) != 0 {
t.Errorf("read %q (%v), want the connection closed without an answer",
text, err)
}
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != 0.0 || line["disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want no answer and no disposition", line)
}
if len(standIn.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
})
}
}
// deadlineRecorder notes the time limits rproxy sets on reading the visitor's body
// and on sending its answer.
type deadlineRecorder struct {
*httptest.ResponseRecorder
readDeadline time.Time
writeDeadline time.Time
}
// SetReadDeadline notes deadline.
func (w *deadlineRecorder) SetReadDeadline(deadline time.Time) error {
w.readDeadline = deadline
return nil
}
// SetWriteDeadline notes deadline.
func (w *deadlineRecorder) SetWriteDeadline(deadline time.Time) error {
w.writeDeadline = deadline
return nil
}
func TestABodyLeftUnreadIsReadOnlyUntilTheRequestTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
limit = 5 * time.Minute
// announced is over what Go's server reads of a body left unread, so that
// the app's own server answers without waiting for the rest.
announced = 100 * questionBodyMaxBytes
)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
})
_, _, server := startServer(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: strconv.FormatInt(limit.Milliseconds(), 10),
})
// The visitor sends the first part and a little more, and then nothing.
stalled, stop := io.Pipe()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = stop.Close() })
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodPost, "/",
io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, questionBodyMaxBytes+1)), stalled))
req.ContentLength = announced
req.Header.Set(contentLengthHeader, strconv.Itoa(announced))
w := &deadlineRecorder{ResponseRecorder: httptest.NewRecorder()}
before := time.Now()
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
t.Errorf("status %d, want the app's 204", w.Code)
}
if w.readDeadline.Before(before.Add(limit)) ||
w.readDeadline.After(time.Now().Add(limit)) {
t.Errorf("the reading of the body ends at %s, want %s from the request",
w.readDeadline, limit)
}
}
func TestAnAnswerRProxyGivesItselfHasTheResponseTimeToBeSent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const limit = 5 * time.Minute
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, target string
status int
}{
{"servewaf's deny", "/", http.StatusForbidden},
{"rproxy's own 400", "x:admin", http.StatusBadRequest},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
_, _, server := startServer(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: strconv.FormatInt(limit.Milliseconds(), 10),
})
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, tc.target,
http.NoBody)
w := &deadlineRecorder{ResponseRecorder: httptest.NewRecorder()}
before := time.Now()
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != tc.status {
t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", w.Code, tc.status)
}
if w.writeDeadline.Before(before.Add(limit)) ||
w.writeDeadline.After(time.Now().Add(limit)) {
t.Errorf("the time limit on sending ends at %s, want %s from the answer",
w.writeDeadline, limit)
}
})
}
}
func TestAVisitorTooSlowToSendTheRestIsAnswered408(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "3000",
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+announcedLength(2*questionBodyMaxBytes)+
strings.Repeat("x", questionBodyMaxBytes+1))
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusRequestTimeout {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 408", status)
}
if asked := standIn.question(t); len(asked.body) != questionBodyMaxBytes {
t.Errorf("the question carries %d bytes", len(asked.body))
}
if report := standIn.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusRequestTimeout {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 408", report)
}
}
// startAppThatTakesNothing starts an app that accepts connections and never
// reads from them, and returns its URL.
func startAppThatTakesNothing(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
stopped := make(chan struct{})
t.Cleanup(func() {
close(stopped)
_ = listener.Close()
})
go func() {
for {
conn, err := listener.Accept()
if err != nil {
return
}
go func() {
<-stopped
_ = conn.Close()
}()
}
}()
return "http://" + listener.Addr().String()
}
func TestAnAppTooSlowToTakeTheRequestIsAnswered504(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// More than the connections hold while nobody reads, written a little at a
// time, so that rproxy soon waits for the app.
const (
bodySize = 64 << 20
writeSize = 32 << 10
)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, startAppThatTakesNothing(t),
map[string]string{maxRequestTime: "3000"})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+announcedLength(bodySize))
go func() {
part := make([]byte, writeSize)
for range bodySize / writeSize {
_, err := conn.Write(part)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
}()
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusGatewayTimeout {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 504", status)
}
}
func TestAnAppTooSlowToAnswerIsAnswered504(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
release := make(chan struct{})
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
<-release
})
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: "300",
})
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if got.status != http.StatusGatewayTimeout {
t.Errorf("answered %d, want 504", got.status)
}
if report := standIn.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusGatewayTimeout {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 504", report)
}
}
func TestAnAppTooSlowToFinishItsAnswerIsCutOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const start = "the start"
release := make(chan struct{})
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, start)
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
<-release
})
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
// The time limit is long enough for a loaded host to pass on the start of the
// answer before it runs out.
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: "3000",
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
res, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(conn), nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read the answer: %v", err)
}
// The body breaks off when rproxy closes the connection. If the connection
// stays open, dial's deadline ends this read with a timeout instead.
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK || string(body) != start ||
!errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
t.Errorf("answered %d %q (%v), want the app's 200 %q, then the connection closed",
res.StatusCode, body, err, start)
}
if report := standIn.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want the status the visitor got", report)
}
}
func TestAVisitorTooSlowToTakeTheAnswerIsCutOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// More than the connections hold while nobody reads.
const (
bodySize = 64 << 20
writeSize = 32 << 10
)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
part := make([]byte, writeSize)
for range bodySize / writeSize {
_, err := w.Write(part)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
})
// The time limit is long enough for a loaded host to start passing on the
// answer before it runs out.
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: "3000",
})
// The visitor asks, and never reads the answer.
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
line := out.requestLine(t)
responseBytes, _ := line["response_bytes"].(float64)
if line["status"] != float64(http.StatusOK) || responseBytes >= bodySize {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 200 and the answer cut off", line)
}
report := standIn.report(t)
if report.Status != http.StatusOK || report.ResponseBytes >= bodySize {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 200 and the answer cut off", report)
}
}
func TestAnAppThatCannotBeReachedIsAnswered502WithAReport(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, nowhere, nil)
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if got.status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("answered %d, want 502", got.status)
}
if report := standIn.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 502", report)
}
}
func TestAVisitorThatStopsSendingAfterTheAppHasAnsweredGetsTheAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, greeting)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "3000",
})
// Far more announced than sent, so that Go's server answers for the app
// without waiting for the rest.
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+announcedLength(100*questionBodyMaxBytes)+
strings.Repeat("x", questionBodyMaxBytes))
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status %d, want the app's 200", status)
}
}
func TestAVisitorThatStopsSendingWhileTheAppWorksGetsNoAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
working := make(chan struct{})
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
close(working)
<-r.Context().Done()
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
select {
case <-working:
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("the app was not asked")
}
tcpConn, ok := conn.(*net.TCPConn)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("the connection is a %T", conn)
}
err := tcpConn.CloseWrite()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stop sending: %v", err)
}
text, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
if err != nil || len(text) != 0 {
t.Errorf("read %q (%v), want the connection closed without an answer", text, err)
}
if line := out.requestLine(t); line["status"] != 0.0 {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 0", line)
}
}
func TestTheRequestTimeLimitDoesNotCutAnAnswerOnceTheAppHasTheRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const answer = "the end of a long answer"
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
time.Sleep(2100 * time.Millisecond)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, answer)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "2000",
})
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("a body")))
if got.status != http.StatusOK || got.body != answer {
t.Errorf("answered %d %q, want the app's whole answer", got.status, got.body)
}
}
func TestAVisitorThatStopsSendingGetsAnAnswerRProxyGivesByTheDeadline(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, start string
status int
}{
{"a deny", post, http.StatusForbidden},
{
"the health check",
"GET " + servewaf.HealthPath + " HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n",
http.StatusOK,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
// The time limit is long enough for a loaded host to read the first part of
// the body before it runs out.
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "3000",
})
// Go's server waits for a little of the body left before it sends an answer,
// and the time for sending the request ends that wait.
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, tc.start+announcedLength(questionBodyMaxBytes+100)+
strings.Repeat("x", questionBodyMaxBytes))
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != tc.status {
t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", status, tc.status)
}
})
}
}
internal/rproxy/question_test.go
-523
View File
@@ -1,523 +0,0 @@
package rproxy_test
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/rand"
"io"
"maps"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// questionBodyMaxBytes is the most of a body a question carries.
const questionBodyMaxBytes = servewaf.QuestionBodyMaxBytes
// chunked is the encoding of a body whose length the visitor did not announce.
const chunked = "chunked"
// pathGoReencodes is a path Go's client would decode and escape again, %2F turned
// into / and | into %7C, unless told to send it as it is. A test sets it as the
// visitor's URL.Opaque, so that the visitor sends it unchanged too.
const pathGoReencodes = "/some%2Fpath/with%20space|pipe"
func TestQuestionIsTheVisitorsRequestWithRProxysHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
const target = pathGoReencodes + "?b=2&a=1&bad=%zz;x"
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodDelete, addr, target, http.NoBody)
req.URL.Opaque = pathGoReencodes
req.Host = site
req.Header.Set("X-Test", "from the visitor")
req.Header.Set(forwardedForHeader, "198.51.100.1")
req.Header.Set(forwardedProtoHeader, "gopher")
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-visitor's")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, "198.51.100.2")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.PeerHeader, "198.51.100.3")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader, "12345")
// Go's client then sends no User-Agent, so that one in the question would be
// Go's own.
req.Header["User-Agent"] = nil
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
asked := standIn.question(t)
if asked.method != http.MethodDelete || asked.target != target ||
asked.host != site {
t.Errorf("asked about %s %s at %s", asked.method, asked.target, asked.host)
}
if asked.header.Get(requestIDHeader) == "the-visitor's" {
t.Error("the question carries the visitor's id")
}
// Exactly these: visit's connection has the visitor send Connection: close.
want := http.Header{}
want.Set("Connection", "close")
want.Set("X-Test", "from the visitor")
want.Set(forwardedForHeader, "198.51.100.1")
want.Set(forwardedProtoHeader, "http")
want.Set(requestIDHeader, asked.header.Get(requestIDHeader))
want.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, localhost)
want.Set(servewaf.PeerHeader, localhost)
if !maps.EqualFunc(asked.header, want, slices.Equal) {
t.Errorf("the question's headers are %v, want %v", asked.header, want)
}
}
func TestQuestionNamesTheVisitorATrustedProxySpeaksFor(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const visitor = "203.0.113.9"
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, trusted, client, proto, forwarded string
}{
{
"from a trusted proxy", localhost + "/32", visitor, "https",
visitor + ", " + localhost,
},
{"from a peer not trusted", "10.0.0.0/8", localhost, "http", localhost},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
forwarded := make(chan http.Header, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
forwarded <- r.Header.Clone()
greet(w, r)
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: tc.trusted,
})
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set(forwardedForHeader, visitor)
req.Header.Set(forwardedProtoHeader, "https")
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
asked := standIn.question(t)
if asked.header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader) != tc.client ||
asked.header.Get(servewaf.PeerHeader) != localhost ||
asked.header.Get(forwardedForHeader) != visitor ||
asked.header.Get(forwardedProtoHeader) != tc.proto {
t.Errorf("the question's headers are %v", asked.header)
}
if line := out.requestLine(t); line["client_ip"] != tc.client {
t.Errorf("line %v, want client_ip %s", line, tc.client)
}
if got := (<-forwarded).Get(forwardedForHeader); got != tc.forwarded {
t.Errorf("the app saw %s %q, want %q", forwardedForHeader, got, tc.forwarded)
}
})
}
}
func TestQuestionNamesTheClientAsTheForwardedAddressesSay(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
header []string
client string
}{
{
"the first address outside the trusted proxies, from the right",
[]string{"198.51.100.7, 203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.2"}, "203.0.113.9",
},
{
"the leftmost, when every address is a trusted proxy",
[]string{"10.0.0.5, 10.0.0.2"}, "10.0.0.5",
},
{"the peer, with no header", nil, localhost},
{
"the last address read, before an entry that is not an address",
[]string{"203.0.113.9, unknown, 10.0.0.2"}, "10.0.0.2",
},
{
"read as one list, with several header lines",
[]string{"2001:db8::7", "10.0.0.2"}, "2001:db8::7",
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32,10.0.0.0/8",
})
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header[forwardedForHeader] = tc.header
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
if got := standIn.question(t).header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader); got != tc.client {
t.Errorf("the question names %s, want %s", got, tc.client)
}
})
}
}
// randomBytes returns n random bytes.
func randomBytes(n int) []byte {
body := make([]byte, n)
_, _ = rand.Read(body) // it never returns an error
return body
}
func TestFirst64KiBReachServeWAFAndTheWholeBodyTheApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, size := range []int{
1, questionBodyMaxBytes - 1, questionBodyMaxBytes, questionBodyMaxBytes + 1,
5 * questionBodyMaxBytes,
} {
for _, announced := range []bool{true, false} {
name := strconv.Itoa(size) + " bytes, length announced: " +
strconv.FormatBool(announced)
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := randomBytes(size)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
received := make(chan []byte, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
whole, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
received <- whole
greet(w, r)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", bytes.NewReader(body))
if !announced {
// Go's client sends a body of unknown length in chunks.
req.ContentLength = -1
}
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
asked := standIn.question(t)
want := body[:min(size, questionBodyMaxBytes)]
wantQuestionBody(t, asked, want, size, announced)
if !bytes.Equal(<-received, body) {
t.Error("the app did not get the whole body")
}
if report := standIn.report(t); report.RequestBytes != int64(size) {
t.Errorf("report %+v, of %d bytes", report, size)
}
})
}
}
}
// wantQuestionBody checks the body a question carries, want, and how it gives
// the length of the visitor's body, of size bytes.
func wantQuestionBody(
t *testing.T, asked question, want []byte, size int, announced bool,
) {
t.Helper()
if !bytes.Equal(asked.body, want) {
t.Errorf("the question carries %d bytes, want the first %d", len(asked.body),
len(want))
}
values := asked.header.Values(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader)
if announced {
if !slices.Equal(values, []string{strconv.Itoa(size)}) ||
asked.contentLength != int64(len(want)) {
t.Errorf("announced %v and length %d, want %d and %d", values,
asked.contentLength, size, len(want))
}
return
}
if len(values) != 0 || !slices.Equal(asked.transferEncoding, []string{chunked}) {
t.Errorf("announced %v and encoded %v, want none and chunked", values,
asked.transferEncoding)
}
}
func TestDenyNeedsOnlyTheFirstPartOfALargeBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
// Far more announced than sent. Go's server does not wait for that much, so
// the answer comes at once.
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+announcedLength(100*questionBodyMaxBytes)+
strings.Repeat("x", questionBodyMaxBytes))
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("status %d, want servewaf's 403", status)
}
if report := standIn.report(t); report.RequestBytes != questionBodyMaxBytes {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want the first part's bytes", report)
}
}
func TestAQuestionCarriesItsBodyWhateverTheMethod(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, framing, body string
encoding []string
}{
{
chunked, "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n4\r\nbody\r\n0\r\n\r\n", "body",
[]string{chunked},
},
{
"chunked and empty", "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\n", "",
[]string{chunked},
},
{"with its length", announcedLength(4) + "body", "body", nil},
} {
for _, method := range []string{
http.MethodGet, http.MethodDelete, http.MethodPost,
} {
t.Run(method+" "+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, nowhere, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, method+" /x HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"+tc.framing)
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("status %d, want servewaf's 403", status)
}
asked := standIn.question(t)
if string(asked.body) != tc.body ||
!slices.Equal(asked.transferEncoding, tc.encoding) {
t.Errorf("the question carries %q, encoded %v, want %q, encoded %v",
asked.body, asked.transferEncoding, tc.body, tc.encoding)
}
})
}
}
}
func TestAMethodNotPassedOnIsAnswered405(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, method := range []string{http.MethodTrace, "PROPFIND", "LOCK", "BREW"} {
t.Run(method, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Error("the app was asked")
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, method, addr, "/", http.NoBody))
if got.status != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed ||
got.header.Get("Allow") != "GET, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, QUERY" {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want 405 naming the methods passed on", got)
}
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != float64(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) ||
line["disposition"] != nil || line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 405 and no disposition", line)
}
if len(standIn.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
})
}
}
func TestEachMethodPassedOnReachesServeWAFAndTheApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, method := range []string{
http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead, http.MethodPost, http.MethodOptions,
http.MethodPut, http.MethodDelete, http.MethodPatch, "QUERY",
} {
t.Run(method, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
reached := make(chan string, 1)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
reached <- r.Method
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, method, addr, "/", http.NoBody))
if got.status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want the app's 200", got)
}
if asked := standIn.question(t); asked.method != method {
t.Errorf("servewaf was asked about %s", asked.method)
}
if atApp := <-reached; atApp != method {
t.Errorf("the app was asked %s", atApp)
}
})
}
}
func TestARequestThatCannotGoToServeWAFAsSentIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const host = "Host: site.example\r\n\r\n"
for name, request := range map[string]string{
"a target of a scheme": "GET x:admin HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"a target of a URL": "GET http://site.example/ HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"a host Go will not send": "GET http://a<b/ HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"a target of a host": "GET site.example:443 HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"a target of *": "GET * HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"a target of //": "GET //x/y HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"a target of // escaped": "GET //x%2Fadmin| HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"an empty Host": "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:\r\n\r\n",
"HTTP/1.0 with no Host": "GET / HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n",
"a Host with a zone": "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: [fe80::1%25eth0]:80\r\n\r\n",
"two User-Agents": "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nUser-Agent: a\r\nUser-Agent: b\r\n" +
host,
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, request)
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 400", status)
}
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != float64(http.StatusBadRequest) ||
line["disposition"] != nil || line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 400 and no disposition", line)
}
if len(standIn.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
})
}
}
func TestAHostWithAPercentSignButNoBracketGoesToServeWAF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const host = "a%b"
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+host+"\r\n\r\n")
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status %d, want the app's 200", status)
}
if asked := standIn.question(t); asked.host != host {
t.Errorf("asked about the host %q, want %q", asked.host, host)
}
}
func TestATrustedPeerWithNoForwardedProtoIsAskedAboutAsHTTP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const want = "http"
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
})
wantGreeting(t, get(t, addr, "/"))
asked := standIn.question(t)
if got := asked.header.Get(forwardedProtoHeader); got != want {
t.Errorf("the question's %s is %q, want %s", forwardedProtoHeader, got, want)
}
}
func TestAQuestionNamesNoZone(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, remoteAddr, forwardedFor, client, peer string
}{
{"from a link-local peer", "[fe80::1%eth0]:1234", "", "fe80::1", "fe80::1"},
{
"from X-Forwarded-For through a trusted peer", localhost + ":1234",
"2001:db8::1%eth0", "2001:db8::1", localhost,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
_, out, server := startServer(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
})
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", http.NoBody)
req.RemoteAddr = tc.remoteAddr
req.Header.Set(forwardedForHeader, tc.forwardedFor)
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
asked := standIn.question(t)
if asked.header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader) != tc.client ||
asked.header.Get(servewaf.PeerHeader) != tc.peer {
t.Errorf("the question's headers are %v", asked.header)
}
if line := out.requestLine(t); line["client_ip"] != tc.client {
t.Errorf("line %v, want client_ip %s", line, tc.client)
}
})
}
}
internal/rproxy/request.go
-593
View File
@@ -1,593 +0,0 @@
package rproxy
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptrace"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"os"
"strconv"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// flushAfterEachWrite has ReverseProxy pass on each part of the app's answer as
// soon as it arrives.
const flushAfterEachWrite time.Duration = -1
// reportStatusMax is the highest status servewaf takes in a report. An app can
// send a higher one, up to 999, and the visitor gets that as it is.
const reportStatusMax = 599
// plainText is the Content-Type of the answers rproxy gives itself.
const plainText = "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
// request is one request on its way through rproxy, from the moment its headers
// have been read to its log line and report.
type request struct {
h *handler
in *http.Request
// rc sets the deadlines of the connection to the visitor.
rc *http.ResponseController
out *responseWriter
body *requestBody // nil for a request without a body
// id is the fresh id made for the request when it arrived.
id string
client netip.Addr
peer netip.Addr
peerTrusted bool
start time.Time
// disposition is what is done with the request: servewaf's valid disposition,
// or SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION. It is "" when neither gave one.
disposition string
// answered is true when servewaf gave disposition, which makes a report due,
// and byDefault when SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION did.
answered bool
byDefault bool
// asn and country are servewaf's X-Client-ASN and X-Client-Country, for the
// app.
asn, country string
// upstreamStart is when the request was handed to the app.
upstreamStart time.Time
// cancel ends the request to the app.
cancel context.CancelFunc
// refused is the status of the first refusal, from whichever goroutine meets
// it: what the visitor is answered if the response has not started yet.
refused atomic.Int64
// upgraded is the connection to the app once the app has switched protocols,
// as for a WebSocket, and nil otherwise.
upgraded *upgradedConn
// mu guards what follows. The time limits run on goroutines of their own,
// and the transport starts and stops them, and notes the times below, from
// its own; once timersStopped is set, neither time limit acts any more.
mu sync.Mutex
timersStopped bool
requestTimer *time.Timer
responseTimer *time.Timer
// requestEnd is when the app had been sent the whole request, or the answer
// started, if that was sooner.
requestEnd time.Time
// answerStarted is when the first byte of the app's answer arrived.
answerStarted time.Time
}
// newRequest starts handling r: it notes the time, works out the visitor from
// the TCP peer and X-Forwarded-For, and makes the request's id.
func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
peer := peerAddress(r)
trusted := h.config.TrustedProxies
rq := &request{
h: h,
in: r,
rc: http.NewResponseController(w),
out: &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
id: rand.Text(),
client: clientAddress(peer, r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"), trusted),
peer: peer,
peerTrusted: isInside(peer, trusted),
start: time.Now(),
}
if r.Body != http.NoBody {
rq.body = &requestBody{body: limitBody(r.Body, h.config.MaxRequestSize), rq: rq}
}
return rq
}
// answerHealth answers the health check.
func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
rq.prepareOwnAnswer(rq.requestDeadline())
rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", plainText)
rq.send(http.StatusOK, []byte("ok\n"))
}
// readFirstPartOfBody reads up to the first 64 KiB of the body into memory,
// within SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS, and reports whether the request goes on. A
// visitor too slow to send it is answered 408. For a malformed chunk, or a
// visitor that went away or stopped its sending side, the connection is closed
// without an answer. A body over SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE goes on with the part
// read, so that servewaf is asked first; passToApp then refuses it.
func (rq *request) readFirstPartOfBody() bool {
if rq.body == nil {
return true
}
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(rq.requestDeadline())
held, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(rq.body, servewaf.QuestionBodyMaxBytes))
// From here on, the request timer ends a read of the rest of the body, so that
// the answer can name the side rproxy was waiting on.
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})
rq.body.held = held
switch {
case err == nil || rq.refused.Load() != 0:
return true
case errors.Is(err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded):
rq.answer(http.StatusRequestTimeout)
return false
default:
// This panic has Go's server close the connection without an answer, and
// log nothing; the deferred finish still runs.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
}
}
// setPathAsSent has out, the URL of a request made from in, send the path as the
// visitor sent it. Go sends the path URL.EscapedPath gives, which, for a path
// holding a character Go escapes, such as |, is the whole path decoded and
// escaped again, %2F turned into /. Opaque is sent as it is.
func setPathAsSent(out *url.URL, in *http.Request) {
out.Opaque = rules.Path(in)
}
// forward passes the request to the app, the part of the body held and then the
// rest, and the app's answer back. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) forward(ctx context.Context) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
defer cancel()
rq.cancel = cancel
ctx = httptrace.WithClientTrace(ctx, &httptrace.ClientTrace{
WroteRequest: rq.wroteRequest,
GotFirstResponseByte: rq.gotFirstResponseByte,
})
out := rq.in.WithContext(ctx)
if rq.body != nil {
out.Body = rq.body
}
reverseProxy := &httputil.ReverseProxy{
Rewrite: rq.rewrite,
Transport: rq.h.transport,
FlushInterval: flushAfterEachWrite,
ErrorLog: rq.h.errorLog,
ModifyResponse: rq.modifyResponse,
ErrorHandler: rq.answerError,
}
rq.startRequestTimer()
rq.upstreamStart = time.Now()
reverseProxy.ServeHTTP(rq.out, out)
}
// rewrite makes the request the app receives: the visitor's request, unchanged,
// sent to SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL, with the forwarded headers and the request's id set,
// without any X-Client-ASN or X-Client-Country the visitor sent, and with
// servewaf's.
func (rq *request) rewrite(pr *httputil.ProxyRequest) {
upstream := rq.h.config.UpstreamURL
pr.Out.URL.Scheme = upstream.Scheme
pr.Out.URL.Host = upstream.Host
// ReverseProxy drops query parameters it cannot parse; the app gets the
// query as the visitor sent it.
pr.Out.URL.RawQuery = pr.In.URL.RawQuery
setPathAsSent(pr.Out.URL, pr.In)
setForwardedHeaders(pr.In, pr.Out, rq.peer, rq.peerTrusted)
pr.Out.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, rq.id)
pr.Out.Header.Del(asnHeader)
pr.Out.Header.Del(countryHeader)
if rq.asn != "" {
pr.Out.Header.Set(asnHeader, rq.asn)
}
if rq.country != "" {
pr.Out.Header.Set(countryHeader, rq.country)
}
}
// modifyResponse looks at the app's answer before ReverseProxy passes it on.
func (rq *request) modifyResponse(res *http.Response) error {
if res.StatusCode == http.StatusSwitchingProtocols {
// An upgraded connection, such as a WebSocket, is not cut by the time
// limits. ReverseProxy writes this answer straight to the connection it
// takes over, not through rq.out, and then copies what passes each way
// through res.Body, the connection to the app. It may still refuse the
// switch, as when the app's Upgrade is not the visitor's, so the status
// is noted only once it has taken over the connection, by rq.out's
// Hijack.
rq.stopTimers()
conn, ok := res.Body.(io.ReadWriteCloser)
if ok {
rq.upgraded = &upgradedConn{ReadWriteCloser: conn}
res.Body = rq.upgraded
}
return nil
}
maxBytes := rq.h.config.MaxResponseSize
if maxBytes > 0 && res.Body != http.NoBody && res.ContentLength > maxBytes {
rq.refuse(http.StatusBadGateway)
return errResponseTooLarge
}
// Go's server adds a Content-Type it guesses from the body to a response
// whose headers have no Content-Type key. The key with no value sends none,
// as the app sent none.
if res.Header.Get("Content-Type") == "" {
rq.out.Header()["Content-Type"] = nil
}
res.Body = &responseBody{body: limitBody(res.Body, maxBytes), rq: rq}
rq.setResponseDeadline()
return nil
}
// answerError is ReverseProxy's ErrorHandler: the request could not be passed to
// the app, or the app's answer cannot be passed on.
func (rq *request) answerError(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request, err error) {
if rq.upgraded != nil {
// The app switched protocols, but the switch was not passed on, and
// ReverseProxy leaves the app's connection open when it refuses it.
_ = rq.upgraded.Close()
}
status := int(rq.refused.Load())
if status == 0 {
if rq.in.Context().Err() != nil {
// The visitor went away or stopped its sending side. This panic has Go's
// server close the connection without an answer, and log nothing; the
// deferred finish still runs.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
}
rq.h.processLog.Warn("request to the app failed", "error", err.Error())
status = http.StatusBadGateway
}
rq.answer(status)
}
// answer sends rproxy's own answer, unless the response has already started.
func (rq *request) answer(status int) {
rq.refused.CompareAndSwap(0, int64(status))
if rq.out.status != 0 {
return // too late to answer: the connection can only be cut
}
// A visitor found too slow is read no more; any other may go on sending until
// its time is up, so that Go's server can read the rest of the body and end
// the request cleanly.
deadline := rq.requestDeadline()
if status == http.StatusRequestTimeout {
deadline = time.Now()
}
rq.prepareOwnAnswer(deadline)
header := rq.out.Header()
header.Set("Content-Type", plainText)
header.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
rq.send(status, []byte(http.StatusText(status)+"\n"))
}
// send gives the visitor an answer rproxy holds whole: status, the headers set so
// far and body. Go's server would otherwise send so short an answer only once the
// handler has returned, after finish has written the log line and sent the report.
// Without Content-Length, the flush would send the body in chunks, the last of
// which would still wait for the handler. A HEAD's answer has no body, so any
// Content-Length it has stays as servewaf gave it.
func (rq *request) send(status int, body []byte) {
if rq.in.Method != http.MethodHead {
rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(body)))
}
rq.out.WriteHeader(status)
_, _ = rq.out.Write(body)
_ = rq.rc.Flush()
}
// prepareOwnAnswer readies the connection for an answer rproxy gives itself: the
// reading of a body that has not arrived whole ends at deadline, and the answer
// has SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS from now to reach the visitor, even when the app
// used that time up first.
func (rq *request) prepareOwnAnswer(deadline time.Time) {
rq.stopReadingBody(deadline)
rq.endRequest()
limit := rq.h.config.MaxResponseTime
if limit > 0 {
_ = rq.rc.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(limit))
}
}
// refuse records status, unless an earlier refusal was, and ends the request to
// the app, if one was made.
func (rq *request) refuse(status int) {
rq.refused.CompareAndSwap(0, int64(status))
if rq.cancel != nil {
rq.cancel()
}
}
// finish ends the request's time limits, writes its log line and, if servewaf
// answered the question, sends the report. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) finish(ctx context.Context) {
rq.stopTimers()
if rq.refused.Load() == 0 {
rq.stopReadingBody(rq.requestDeadline())
}
requestEnd := rq.endRequest()
end := time.Now()
requestBytes, responseBytes := rq.bytesEachWay()
err := requestlog.WriteRProxyLine(rq.h.requestLog, &requestlog.RProxyLine{
Time: requestlog.FormatTime(rq.start),
RequestID: rq.id,
ClientIP: rq.client.String(),
Host: rq.in.Host,
Method: rq.in.Method,
Path: rules.Path(rq.in),
Query: rq.in.URL.RawQuery,
Status: rq.out.status,
RequestBytes: requestBytes,
ResponseBytes: responseBytes,
DurationRequest: requestlog.Milliseconds(requestEnd.Sub(rq.start)),
DurationResponse: requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(requestEnd)),
Disposition: rq.disposition,
DefaultDisposition: rq.byDefault,
})
if err != nil {
rq.h.processLog.Error("writing the request log failed", "error", err.Error())
}
if !rq.answered {
return
}
report := &servewaf.Report{
RequestID: rq.id,
Status: min(rq.out.status, reportStatusMax),
RequestBytes: requestBytes,
ResponseBytes: responseBytes,
DurationTotal: requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(rq.start)),
}
if !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero() {
report.DurationUpstreamTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(rq.upstreamStart))
}
rq.h.sendReport(ctx, report)
}
// bytesEachWay returns the body bytes of the request and of the answer. For an
// upgraded connection, such as a WebSocket, which has closed by then, what it
// carried from the visitor counts with the request's and what it carried from the
// app with the answer's.
func (rq *request) bytesEachWay() (int64, int64) {
var requestBytes int64
if rq.body != nil {
requestBytes = rq.body.bytes.Load()
}
responseBytes := rq.out.bytes
if rq.upgraded != nil {
requestBytes += rq.upgraded.toApp.Load()
responseBytes += rq.upgraded.fromApp.Load()
}
return requestBytes, responseBytes
}
// requestDeadline is when the visitor must have sent its whole request, or zero
// when SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS is off.
func (rq *request) requestDeadline() time.Time {
limit := rq.h.config.MaxRequestTime
if limit == 0 {
return time.Time{}
}
return rq.start.Add(limit)
}
// stopReadingBody ends, at deadline, the reading of a visitor's body that has not
// arrived whole: Go's server then reads no more of it, and closes the connection
// after the answer.
func (rq *request) stopReadingBody(deadline time.Time) {
if rq.body == nil || rq.body.received.Load() {
return
}
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(deadline)
}
// startRequestTimer starts SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS, which runs from the
// request's headers being read until the app has been sent the whole request.
func (rq *request) startRequestTimer() {
deadline := rq.requestDeadline()
if deadline.IsZero() {
return
}
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.requestTimer = time.AfterFunc(time.Until(deadline), rq.requestTimedOut)
}
// requestTimedOut is called when SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS runs out while the
// request is still on its way to the app. The answer names the side rproxy was
// waiting on at that moment: 408 when it was waiting for the visitor to send more
// of its body, 504 when it was waiting for the app to be reached or to take what
// it had.
func (rq *request) requestTimedOut() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if rq.timersStopped {
return
}
if rq.body == nil || !rq.body.waiting.Load() {
// Once the app has answered, the transport, ReverseProxy and Go's server
// each close the visitor's body, and closing it reads what is left of a
// body under 256 KiB without requestBody.Read, so waiting is false while
// that read waits for the visitor. That read ends now, before refuse:
// should rproxy still answer itself, answer then sets the deadline it
// gives its own answers.
if !rq.answerStarted.IsZero() {
rq.stopReadingBody(time.Now())
}
rq.refuse(http.StatusGatewayTimeout)
return
}
rq.refuse(http.StatusRequestTimeout)
// The transport gives up on the app only once its Read of the visitor's body
// returns, so that Read is ended now. The lock keeps this from reaching the
// connection after the request is handled.
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(time.Now())
}
// gotFirstResponseByte is called once the first byte of the app's answer has
// arrived.
func (rq *request) gotFirstResponseByte() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.answerStarted = time.Now()
}
// wroteRequest is called once the app has been sent the whole request:
// SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS ends and SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS starts.
func (rq *request) wroteRequest(info httptrace.WroteRequestInfo) {
if info.Err != nil {
return // the transport gives up, or tries again
}
requestEnd := rq.endRequest()
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if rq.timersStopped {
return
}
stopTimer(rq.requestTimer)
limit := rq.h.config.MaxResponseTime
if limit > 0 {
rq.responseTimer = time.AfterFunc(time.Until(requestEnd.Add(limit)),
rq.responseTimedOut)
}
}
// responseTimedOut is called when SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS runs out before the
// app has sent its whole answer.
func (rq *request) responseTimedOut() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if !rq.timersStopped {
rq.refuse(http.StatusGatewayTimeout)
}
}
// responseReceived is called once the app has sent its whole answer. An app may
// answer before the visitor has sent its whole body, as with a 404 it sends
// without reading it. The time limits then run on: until the transport's read of
// the body returns, Go's server cannot send the answer, and
// SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS is what ends that read for a visitor that stops
// sending.
func (rq *request) responseReceived() {
if rq.body != nil && !rq.body.received.Load() {
return
}
rq.stopTimers()
}
// setResponseDeadline sets SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS on the connection to the
// visitor: the app's answer must reach the visitor within it of the end of the
// request.
func (rq *request) setResponseDeadline() {
requestEnd := rq.endRequest()
limit := rq.h.config.MaxResponseTime
if limit > 0 {
_ = rq.rc.SetWriteDeadline(requestEnd.Add(limit))
}
}
// endRequest notes now as the end of the request, unless an end is noted, and
// returns the end noted.
func (rq *request) endRequest() time.Time {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if rq.requestEnd.IsZero() {
rq.requestEnd = time.Now()
}
return rq.requestEnd
}
// stopTimers stops the request's time limits and keeps any from starting later:
// the app's answer is complete, the connection upgraded, or the request handled.
func (rq *request) stopTimers() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.timersStopped = true
stopTimer(rq.requestTimer)
stopTimer(rq.responseTimer)
}
// stopTimer stops t, which is nil when its time limit is off.
func stopTimer(t *time.Timer) {
if t != nil {
t.Stop()
}
}
internal/rproxy/rproxy.go
-228
View File
@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
// Package rproxy is the reverse proxy in front of one app that asks servewaf
// about each request. It passes a request servewaf allows to the app and the
// app's answer back, within the size and time limits. Any other answer from
// servewaf goes to the visitor as servewaf gave it. SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION
// decides only when servewaf cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or
// does not answer within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. rproxy itself refuses a request with a
// method it does not pass on, or one it cannot put to servewaf as the visitor
// sent it. It keeps nothing between requests and never touches disk. "rproxy" in
// SPEC.md says what it does.
package rproxy
import (
"context"
"io"
"log"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// How rproxy keeps connections to the app and to servewaf open between
// requests.
const (
idleConns = 100
idleConnTimeout = 90 * time.Second
)
// The limits on a connection from a visitor that have no setting.
const (
// requestHeaderMaxBytes is the largest request line and headers a visitor
// may send.
requestHeaderMaxBytes = 32 << 10
// goServerExtraHeaderBytes is how far past MaxHeaderBytes Go's server reads
// before it refuses.
goServerExtraHeaderBytes = 4 << 10
// idleTimeout is how long a kept-open connection may wait for its next
// request.
idleTimeout = 120 * time.Second
)
// adminPrefix starts the path of every request for smallwebwaf itself, which
// never reaches the app.
const adminPrefix = "/_smallwebwaf/"
// allowedMethods lists the methods rproxy passes on, as an Allow header gives
// them. It answers any other method 405 itself.
const allowedMethods = "GET, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, QUERY"
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
Config *config.RProxy
// RequestLog receives one short JSON line per request.
RequestLog io.Writer
// ProcessLog receives the process's own messages.
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
}
// Server is the server `smallwebwaf rproxy` runs.
type Server struct {
*http.Server
h *handler
}
// New returns the server `smallwebwaf rproxy` runs. Go's server itself refuses
// a request line and headers over requestHeaderMaxBytes, with 431, closes a
// connection idle for idleTimeout, and applies SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS while
// the headers arrive. The handler applies the time and size limits from then
// on.
func New(params Params) *Server {
backend := params.Config.WAFBackend
errorLog := slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn)
h := &handler{
config: params.Config,
requestLog: params.RequestLog,
processLog: params.ProcessLog,
errorLog: errorLog,
transport: newTransport(),
serveWAFTransport: newServeWAFTransport(),
reportURL: (&url.URL{
Scheme: backend.Scheme, Host: backend.Host, Path: servewaf.ReportPath,
}).String(),
}
return &Server{
Server: &http.Server{
Addr: params.Config.ListenAddr,
Handler: h,
ErrorLog: errorLog,
ReadHeaderTimeout: params.Config.MaxRequestTime,
IdleTimeout: idleTimeout,
MaxHeaderBytes: requestHeaderMaxBytes - goServerExtraHeaderBytes,
},
h: h,
}
}
// WaitForReports returns once the reports being sent have gone or failed,
// which SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS bounds. Any report after this call is dropped: that of
// a WebSocket that closes while rproxy stops, for one.
func (s *Server) WaitForReports() {
s.h.reportsMu.Lock()
s.h.reportsStopped = true
s.h.reportsMu.Unlock()
s.h.reports.Wait()
}
// handler is the proxy. It holds what every request shares; what belongs to
// one request is in a request.
type handler struct {
config *config.RProxy
requestLog io.Writer
processLog *slog.Logger
errorLog *log.Logger
// transport carries requests to the app, and serveWAFTransport questions and
// reports to servewaf.
transport http.RoundTripper
serveWAFTransport http.RoundTripper
// reportURL is where the reports go.
reportURL string
// reports waits for the reports being sent. reportsMu guards starting one
// against reportsStopped, which is set once nothing is to wait for another.
reports sync.WaitGroup
reportsMu sync.Mutex
reportsStopped bool
}
// newTransport returns what carries requests to the app. It never goes through
// a proxy named in the environment, and leaves answers compressed or not as they
// were sent.
func newTransport() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{
MaxIdleConns: idleConns,
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: idleConns,
IdleConnTimeout: idleConnTimeout,
DisableCompression: true,
}
}
// newServeWAFTransport returns what carries questions and reports to servewaf.
// It speaks HTTP/1.1 only. Go's HTTP/2 client refuses to send a visitor's Upgrade
// header, or a Connection header other than close or keep-alive, and that would
// read as servewaf giving no answer.
func newServeWAFTransport() *http.Transport {
transport := newTransport()
transport.Protocols = new(http.Protocols)
transport.Protocols.SetHTTP1(true)
return transport
}
// ServeHTTP handles one request: it answers the health check itself, refuses a
// request with a method it does not pass on or one it cannot put to servewaf as
// the visitor sent it, and for any other request reads the first part of the
// body, asks servewaf, and does what the answer says. Once the answer has ended,
// it writes the request's log line and sends its report.
func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
rq := h.newRequest(w, r)
defer rq.finish(r.Context())
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == servewaf.HealthPath {
rq.answerHealth()
return
}
if !slices.Contains(strings.Split(allowedMethods, ", "), r.Method) {
rq.out.Header().Set("Allow", allowedMethods)
rq.answer(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
if !canBeAsked(r) {
rq.answer(http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if !rq.readFirstPartOfBody() {
return
}
answer, err := rq.ask(r.Context())
if err != nil {
rq.handleNoUsableAnswer(r.Context(), err)
return
}
rq.noteAnswer(answer)
switch rq.disposition {
case servewaf.DispositionAllow:
rq.passToApp(r.Context())
case servewaf.DispositionClose:
// This panic has Go's server close the connection without an answer,
// and log nothing; the deferred finish still runs.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
default: // a deny, an error, or an answer without a valid disposition
rq.answerWith(answer)
}
}
// passToApp passes the request on to the app, unless a limit or its path keeps
// it from the app. servewaf answers a path under adminPrefix itself, so such a
// request gets here only when SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION allowed it. ctx is the
// request's own context.
func (rq *request) passToApp(ctx context.Context) {
maxBytes := rq.h.config.MaxRequestSize
switch {
case rq.refused.Load() != 0 || (maxBytes > 0 && rq.in.ContentLength > maxBytes):
rq.answer(http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
case strings.HasPrefix(rq.in.URL.Path, adminPrefix):
rq.answer(http.StatusNotFound)
default:
rq.forward(ctx)
}
}
internal/rproxy/rproxy_test.go
-1760
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
internal/rproxy/servewaf.go
-266
View File
@@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
package rproxy
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// answerBodyMaxBytes is the most of the body of servewaf's answer that is read.
// It is far above any answer's.
const answerBodyMaxBytes = 1 << 20
// reportAnswerMaxBytes is the most of the answer to a report that is read,
// which has no body when servewaf takes the report.
const reportAnswerMaxBytes = 4 << 10
var (
errCannotPassOn = errors.New("the answer cannot be passed to the visitor")
errReportRefused = errors.New("the report was answered")
)
// servewafAnswer is what servewaf answered to a question.
type servewafAnswer struct {
status int
header http.Header
body []byte
}
// noteAnswer notes what servewaf answered. An answer without a valid disposition
// notes nothing, and no report is due for it: servewaf holds no decision to report
// on.
func (rq *request) noteAnswer(answer *servewafAnswer) {
disposition := answer.header.Get(servewaf.DispositionHeader)
switch disposition {
case servewaf.DispositionAllow, servewaf.DispositionDeny, servewaf.DispositionClose:
rq.disposition = disposition
rq.answered = true
rq.asn = answer.header.Get(asnHeader)
rq.country = answer.header.Get(countryHeader)
}
}
// handleNoUsableAnswer deals with a request whose question ended in err, which
// leaves no answer to act on. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) handleNoUsableAnswer(ctx context.Context, err error) {
switch {
case ctx.Err() != nil:
// The visitor went away while servewaf was being asked. servewaf has not
// failed, and nothing is noted. This panic has Go's server close the
// connection without an answer, and log nothing; the deferred finish still
// runs.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
case errors.Is(err, errCannotPassOn):
rq.h.processLog.Warn("servewaf's answer is dropped", "error", err.Error())
rq.answer(http.StatusBadGateway)
default:
// servewaf cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer
// within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. A request that keeps servewaf busy past
// SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS, like any request while servewaf is overloaded, gets
// SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION here. deny closes this, at the cost of answering 503
// whenever servewaf is slow. Making such requests hard to send is
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf/issues/182.
rq.h.processLog.Warn("servewaf gave no answer", "error", err.Error())
rq.disposition = rq.h.config.DefaultDisposition
rq.byDefault = true
if rq.disposition == servewaf.DispositionAllow {
rq.passToApp(ctx)
} else {
rq.answer(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
}
}
}
// ask sends servewaf the question, and returns its answer, which must have come
// whole within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. It ends when ctx does, as when the visitor goes
// away.
func (rq *request) ask(ctx context.Context) (*servewafAnswer, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, rq.h.config.Timeout)
defer cancel()
question, err := rq.newQuestion(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
res, err := rq.h.serveWAFTransport.RoundTrip(question)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("send the question: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
_ = res.Body.Close()
}()
// The body of a 101 is the connection itself, and the time limit does not end
// a read of that. Go's client also takes a status below 100, which Go's server
// panics when asked to send.
if res.StatusCode < http.StatusOK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: its status is %d", errCannotPassOn, res.StatusCode)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, answerBodyMaxBytes+1))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read the answer: %w", err)
}
if len(body) > answerBodyMaxBytes {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: its body is over 1 MiB", errCannotPassOn)
}
return &servewafAnswer{res.StatusCode, res.Header, body}, nil
}
// canBeAsked reports whether Go's client can send servewaf r as the visitor sent
// it. It cannot send these as they came:
// - a target that does not start with /, or that starts with //;
// - an empty Host, for which it sends servewaf's own address;
// - a Host holding an IPv6 zone, which it removes;
// - more than one User-Agent, of which it sends the first;
// - an empty User-Agent, which it leaves out, the one case that still goes to
// servewaf.
func canBeAsked(r *http.Request) bool {
target, host := r.RequestURI, r.Host
hostHasZone := strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.Contains(host, "%")
return strings.HasPrefix(target, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(target, "//") &&
host != "" && !hostHasZone && len(r.Header.Values("User-Agent")) <= 1
}
// newQuestion returns the question about the request, as "The question" in
// SPEC.md gives it: the visitor's request as the visitor sent it, with the part
// of the body it holds and rproxy's headers.
func (rq *request) newQuestion(ctx context.Context) (*http.Request, error) {
in := rq.in
var held []byte
if rq.body != nil {
held = rq.body.held
}
question, err := http.NewRequestWithContext( //nolint:gosec // a setting's URL
ctx, in.Method, rq.h.config.WAFBackend.String(), bytes.NewReader(held))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("make the question: %w", err)
}
backend := question.URL
target := *in.URL
target.Scheme = backend.Scheme
target.Host = backend.Host
setPathAsSent(&target, in)
question.URL = &target
question.Host = in.Host
// The length NewRequestWithContext set is that of what is held. This line makes
// a body whose length the visitor did not announce go chunked, as "The question"
// in SPEC.md requires.
question.TransferEncoding = in.TransferEncoding
question.Header = in.Header.Clone()
question.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, rq.client.String())
question.Header.Set(servewaf.PeerHeader, rq.peer.String())
question.Header.Del(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader)
announced := in.Header.Get("Content-Length")
if announced != "" {
question.Header.Set(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader, announced)
}
question.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, rq.id)
question.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", scheme(in, rq.peerTrusted))
// Go's client adds a User-Agent of its own to a request without the key.
_, sent := question.Header["User-Agent"]
if !sent {
question.Header["User-Agent"] = nil
}
return question, nil
}
// answerWith gives the visitor servewaf's answer, less its disposition.
func (rq *request) answerWith(answer *servewafAnswer) {
rq.prepareOwnAnswer(rq.requestDeadline())
header := rq.out.Header()
maps.Copy(header, answer.header)
header.Del(servewaf.DispositionHeader)
// Go's server adds a Content-Type it guesses from the body to a response whose
// headers have no Content-Type key. The key with no value sends none.
if header.Get("Content-Type") == "" {
header["Content-Type"] = nil
}
rq.send(answer.status, answer.body)
}
// sendReport sends servewaf report on a goroutine of its own, so that the
// visitor does not wait for it. The report goes on after ctx, the request's own
// context, has ended.
func (h *handler) sendReport(ctx context.Context, report *servewaf.Report) {
h.reportsMu.Lock()
defer h.reportsMu.Unlock()
if h.reportsStopped {
return
}
h.reports.Go(func() {
err := h.postReport(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), report)
if err != nil {
h.processLog.Warn("a report is dropped", "error", err.Error())
}
})
}
// postReport posts report to servewaf, and waits for its answer for up to
// SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS.
func (h *handler) postReport(ctx context.Context, report *servewaf.Report) error {
body, err := json.Marshal(report)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encode the report: %w", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, h.config.Timeout)
defer cancel()
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext( //nolint:gosec // a setting's URL
ctx, http.MethodPost, h.reportURL, bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
res, err := h.serveWAFTransport.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("send the report: %w", err)
}
// The body of a 101 is the connection itself, and the time limit does not end
// a read of that.
if res.StatusCode >= http.StatusOK {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, io.LimitReader(res.Body, reportAnswerMaxBytes))
}
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusNoContent {
return fmt.Errorf("%w %s", errReportRefused, res.Status)
}
return nil
}
internal/servewaf/answertime_test.go
-566
View File
@@ -1,566 +0,0 @@
package servewaf_test
import (
"fmt"
"maps"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"testing/synctest"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
// answerTimeLimit is the default of rproxy's SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS, the time
// servewaf has to answer.
answerTimeLimit = 2 * time.Second
// defaultLookupWait is the default of SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT.
defaultLookupWait = 800 * time.Millisecond
// The header limits SPEC.md gives.
cookieLimit = 50
headerFieldLimit = 100
// cookieHeader is the header the cookie limit counts.
cookieHeader = "Cookie"
// tooLarge is how servewaf refuses a request over the header limits.
tooLarge = http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge
// silentAbuseIPDBURL is where AbuseIPDB never answers: at the stand-in
// that unansweredGeoJSURL names too.
silentAbuseIPDBURL = "unanswered://abuseipdb/api/v2/check"
// wholeLimit is the percentage of a rate limit that lowers it not at all.
wholeLimit = 100
// clientsDecision is the CrowdSec decision list holding client alone.
clientsDecision = `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", "scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", ` +
`"scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", "value": "` + client + `"}]`
)
// cookies returns a Cookie header's value with count cookies.
func cookies(count int) string {
parts := make([]string, 0, count)
for i := range count {
parts = append(parts, "c"+strconv.Itoa(i)+"=1")
}
return strings.Join(parts, "; ")
}
// fillHeaders adds headers to a question until the checks see total header
// fields: all but ClientHeader and PeerHeader, which servewaf removes. Go's
// client sends nothing else but Host, which the limit does not count, once
// User-Agent is set.
func fillHeaders(req *http.Request, total int) {
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "test")
for i := len(req.Header) - 2; i < total; i++ {
req.Header.Set("X-Filler-"+strconv.Itoa(i), "1")
}
}
func TestSixteenThousandCookiesAreRefusedWellWithinTheTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", 16000))
began := time.Now()
got := do(t, req)
if took := time.Since(began); took >= answerTimeLimit/2 {
t.Errorf("answered after %s, want well within %s", took, answerTimeLimit)
}
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
if line.DurationWAF != nil {
t.Errorf("the Core Rule Set read the request, for %f ms", *line.DurationWAF)
}
}
func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
repeated := make([]string, headerFieldLimit)
for i := range repeated {
repeated[i] = "1"
}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
make func(*http.Request)
// refused is true for a request over a limit, and false for one at it.
refused bool
}{
{"cookies at the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit))
}, false},
{"cookies over the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
}, true},
{"parts empty or only spaces and tabs are no cookies", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit)+"; \t;;")
}, false},
{"parts of no-break spaces count", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat(" ;", cookieLimit+1))
}, true},
{"cookies over the limit across two headers", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header[cookieHeader] = []string{cookies(cookieLimit), "last=1"}
}, true},
{"cookies without a value count", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", cookieLimit+1))
}, true},
{"header fields at the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
fillHeaders(req, headerFieldLimit)
}, false},
{"header fields over the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
fillHeaders(req, headerFieldLimit+1)
}, true},
{"a header sent many times counts each time", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header["X-Filler"] = repeated
}, true},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
tc.make(req)
got := do(t, req)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if tc.refused {
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
return
}
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if line.DurationWAF == nil {
t.Error("the Core Rule Set did not read a request within the limits")
}
})
}
}
func TestHeaderLimitsHoldWhateverTheCoreRuleSetSettingsSay(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, env := range []map[string]string{
{wafMode: off},
{wafMode: "detect"},
{wafMode: block, "SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS": "/"},
} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprint(env), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", env)
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
})
}
}
func TestClientInTheAllowNetsSkipsTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block, allowNets: client})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}
func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsUnread(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{mode: observe, wafMode: block})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", 16000))
began := time.Now()
got := do(t, req)
if took := time.Since(began); took >= answerTimeLimit/2 {
t.Errorf("answered after %s, want well within %s", took, answerTimeLimit)
}
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionTooLarge || line.DurationWAF != nil {
t.Errorf("would_action %q and duration_waf %v, want %q and none",
line.WouldAction, line.DurationWAF, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
}
}
func TestRequestsOverTheHeaderLimitsCountTowardTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
ask := func() answer {
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
return do(t, req)
}
wantDisposition(t, ask(), tooLarge, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, ask(), http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
}
func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeAfterTheTrapPathsAndTheRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, path, action string
}{
{"a trap path", "/wp-login.php", requestlog.ActionBanned},
{"a block rule", "/blocked", requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList, rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
})
req := s.question(siteA, client, tc.path)
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, tc.action)
})
}
}
func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startServeWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
unknownLimitPercent: "0", lookupTimeout: "1h",
})
req := s.question(siteA, fromDE, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
if line.LimitPercent != nil {
t.Errorf("limit percentage %d, want none", *line.LimitPercent)
}
// The client is under no ban, and GeoJS places it in a country.
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromDE, "/"), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}
func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startServeWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
s.server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"), ASN: "AS64512",
Answered: s.clock.Now(), Used: s.clock.Now(),
}})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
}
func TestObserveModeWaitsForGeoJSForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startServeWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
mode: observe, addLookupHeaders: on, lookupTimeout: "1h",
})
req := s.question(siteA, fromDE, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
got := do(t, req)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
asn, country := got.header.Get("X-Client-Asn"), got.header.Get("X-Client-Country")
if asn != asnDE || country != "DE" {
t.Errorf("answered with the AS number %q and the country %q, want %q and DE",
asn, country, asnDE)
}
}
// newServeWAFInBubble makes a servewaf for a synctest bubble: GeoJS never
// answers, a setting needs its answer, and everything is at its default but
// for env. No request to it may use the network.
func newServeWAFInBubble(
t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
) (*servewaf.Server, *output) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{deniedCountries: "KP"}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
server, out, _ := newServeWAF(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now, settings)
return server, out
}
// askDirectly hands a question about a request from client straight to server,
// as change leaves it, and returns the answer's status and how long it took.
func askDirectly(
t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, change func(*http.Request),
) (int, time.Duration) {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", http.NoBody)
req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(rproxyPeer, "1234")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, client)
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-id")
change(req)
recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()
began := time.Now()
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(recorder, req)
return recorder.Code, time.Since(began)
}
// banClient bans client at now.
func banClient(_ *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, now time.Time) {
server.Ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix(client+"/32"), now, bans.Notes{})
}
// countClient counts one request from client at now for the rate limits.
func countClient(_ *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, now time.Time) {
server.Limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(client+"/32"), now, wholeLimit)
}
// listClient puts client on the blocklist at dropURL.
func listClient(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, now time.Time) {
t.Helper()
err := server.Lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
URL: dropURL, Tried: now, Fetched: now, Lines: []string{client},
}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the blocklist: %v", err)
}
}
// decideOnClient puts client on the CrowdSec decision list.
func decideOnClient(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, now time.Time) {
t.Helper()
loadDecisions(t, server, now, clientsDecision)
}
// leaveAsItIs prepares nothing.
func leaveAsItIs(*testing.T, *servewaf.Server, time.Time) {}
func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const forbidden = http.StatusForbidden
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
// prepare gets the server ready, at now, before the question.
prepare func(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, now time.Time)
// cookie is the request's Cookie header.
cookie string
status int
action string
}{
{
name: "SWWAF_DENY_NETS", env: map[string]string{denyNets: client},
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
},
{
name: "a ban",
prepare: banClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
},
{
name: "the rate limits", env: map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"},
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
},
{
name: "the rate limits, with a biased threshold",
env: map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1", unknownLimitPercent: "50"},
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
},
{
name: "a blocklist", env: map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL},
prepare: listClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
},
{
name: "the CrowdSec decision list",
env: map[string]string{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey},
prepare: decideOnClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
},
{
name: "the header limits", cookie: cookies(cookieLimit + 1),
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: tooLarge, action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
// says, so that a request that does not wait takes no time at all.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out := newServeWAFInBubble(t, tc.env)
tc.prepare(t, server, time.Now())
status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, tc.cookie)
})
if status != tc.status || took != 0 {
t.Errorf("answered %d after %s, want %d at once; output:\n%s",
status, took, tc.status, out.text())
}
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.status, tc.action)
// GeoJS's request is abandoned before the bubble ends.
time.Sleep(defaultLookupWait)
})
})
}
}
func TestAQuestionWaitsForASlowGeoJSOnlyAsLongAsTheDefaultSays(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
// prepare gets the server ready, at now, before the question.
prepare func(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, now time.Time)
status int
action string
}{
{"nothing refuses it", nil, leaveAsItIs, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{
"a country list needs the answer", map[string]string{allowedCountries: "DE"},
leaveAsItIs, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
},
{
"a blocklist that only logs",
map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: actionLog},
listClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
},
{
"a blocklist that only limits",
map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: limitQuarter},
listClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
},
{
"over a rate limit on an exempt path",
map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1", rateLimitExemptPaths: "/"},
countClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out := newServeWAFInBubble(t, tc.env)
tc.prepare(t, server, time.Now())
status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(*http.Request) {})
if status != tc.status || took != defaultLookupWait {
t.Errorf("answered %d after %s, want %d after %s; output:\n%s",
status, took, tc.status, defaultLookupWait, out.text())
}
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.status, tc.action)
})
})
}
}
func TestServeWAFAnswersWithinTheTimeLimitWhileEveryOutsideSourceHangs(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
held, askedGeoJS, _ := startHeldGeoJS(t)
// A resolver that takes every query and answers none.
resolver, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).ListenPacket(t.Context(), "udp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = resolver.Close() })
server, out, _ := newServeWAFWith(t, func(params servewaf.Params) *servewaf.Server {
params.AbuseIPDBURL = silentAbuseIPDBURL
return servewaf.New(params)
}, held, time.Now, map[string]string{
deniedCountries: "KP", wafMode: block,
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: resolver.LocalAddr().String(),
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
blocklistURLs: held + "/drop.txt", asnLimitPercentURL: held + "/asn.txt",
crowdSecURL: held, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
})
// AbuseIPDB is asked only about a client with an offence.
group := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
server.Limiter.AddToHistory(group, time.Now(), ratelimit.Request{Attack: true})
go server.Lists.Run(t.Context())
status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "test")
req.Header.Set("Accept", "*/*")
req.Host = siteA
})
if status != http.StatusOK || took >= answerTimeLimit {
t.Errorf("answered %d after %s, want %d within %s; output:\n%s",
status, took, http.StatusOK, answerTimeLimit, out.text())
}
// Each outside source was asked, and none has answered. The stand-in for
// GeoJS is the lists' too, which name no address.
if !slices.Contains(askedGeoJS(), client) {
t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %q, not %s", askedGeoJS(), client)
}
if queries := server.DNSBL.Queries(dnsblZone); queries != 1 {
t.Errorf("%d queries to the DNS blocklist, want 1", queries)
}
if checked := server.AbuseIPDB.Checked(); checked != 1 {
t.Errorf("%d checks with AbuseIPDB, want 1", checked)
}
}
internal/servewaf/client.go
-62
View File
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
package servewaf
import (
"crypto/rand"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"slices"
)
// peerAddress is the address of the request's TCP peer.
func peerAddress(r *http.Request) netip.Addr {
addrPort, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return netip.Addr{}
}
return addrPort.Addr().Unmap()
}
// requestIDHeader carries the request's id, from rproxy.
const requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
// requestID is the request's id: the one a question gives, or for any other
// request a new random one.
func requestID(r *http.Request, isQuestion bool) string {
if isQuestion {
return r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
}
return rand.Text()
}
// scheme is how the visitor reached rproxy, or the trusted proxy in front of
// it, as a question says in X-Forwarded-Proto, or otherwise http.
func scheme(r *http.Request, isQuestion bool) string {
proto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")
if !isQuestion || proto == "" {
return "http"
}
return proto
}
// clientGroup is the client a request is counted toward: its IPv4
// address, or its IPv6 group, the netblock its IPv6 address is in of the
// length SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets, a /64 by default, since one abuser
// usually holds a whole /64. An IPv4 address in IPv6 form counts as IPv4.
func (h *handler) clientGroup(addr netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
addr = addr.Unmap()
if addr.Is6() {
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, h.config.IPv6GroupPrefix).Masked()
}
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen())
}
// isInside reports whether addr is in one of the netblocks.
func isInside(addr netip.Addr, netblocks []netip.Prefix) bool {
return slices.ContainsFunc(netblocks, func(netblock netip.Prefix) bool {
return netblock.Contains(addr)
})
}
internal/servewaf/health_test.go
-40
View File
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
package servewaf_test
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
func TestHealthEndpointCountsTowardNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// With a limit of one request a minute, any request counted before
// the last one would have it refused.
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
const (
healthChecks = 3
contentType = "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
)
for range healthChecks {
got := s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, servewaf.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
if string(got.body) != "ok\n" || got.header.Get("Content-Type") != contentType {
t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q with Content-Type %q, want ok "+
"with %q", got.body, got.header.Get("Content-Type"), contentType)
}
}
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
for _, line := range s.out.endedLines(t, healthChecks)[:healthChecks] {
if line.ResponseContentType != contentType {
t.Errorf("health check's log line has response_content_type %q, "+
"want %q", line.ResponseContentType, contentType)
}
}
}
internal/servewaf/request.go
-462
View File
@@ -1,462 +0,0 @@
package servewaf
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strings"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// refusal is servewaf refusing a request: the status the visitor is to get, 0
// to close its connection without an answer, and the action the log line names.
type refusal struct {
status int
action string
}
// decision is what the checks note of a request: its log line, and what
// counting the request needs once it has ended. servewaf keeps a copy of it
// until the request's report comes. It holds no credentials, since the log line
// never does, and neither the request's objects nor their bodies.
type decision struct {
line requestlog.Line
client netip.Addr
// requestURI is the path with the query, as a ban's notes keep it.
requestURI string
// site is, for a question, the host the visitor asked for, which the
// alerts name, since one servewaf serves many sites.
site string
// allowed is true for a question answered with DispositionAllow.
allowed bool
// lookedUp is true once the client's AS number and country have been
// looked up, whether or not an answer was there, and lookupAnswer is
// what the lookup gave then, the zero Answer while GeoJS had given none.
lookedUp bool
lookupAnswer lookup.Answer
// skippedLookupWait is true for a request that did not wait for GeoJS and
// found no answer kept. SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT does not apply to it,
// so that not waiting never lowers its client's limits.
skippedLookupWait bool
// counted is true for a request the rate limits counted, whose bytes
// the byte limits count once it has ended. limitPercent and
// bytesPercent are then its client's limit percentages for the rate
// limits and for the byte limits.
counted bool
limitPercent, bytesPercent percentage
// attack is true for a request that matched a ban rule or asked for a
// trap path, ruleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and wafBlocked for
// one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence its client's history
// counts.
attack, ruleBlocked, wafBlocked bool
// reputation is the reputation sources that list the client, for the
// notes of a ban the request makes.
reputation []bans.ReputationHit
}
// request is one request to servewaf, from the moment its headers have been
// read to its log line.
type request struct {
decision
h *handler
in *http.Request
out *responseWriter
// blocklisted is true once a blocklist is found to list the client,
// dnsblListed once a DNSBL zone's verdict is, and abuseIPDBHit once
// AbuseIPDB's score of it is a hit.
blocklisted, dnsblListed, abuseIPDBHit bool
start time.Time
// checked is when the checks were done.
checked time.Time
// refused is what the request was refused with, nil if it was not.
refused *refusal
// requestBytes is how many bytes of the request's body have been read.
requestBytes int64
}
// startRequest starts handling r from client, which came through peer: it
// notes the time, counts the request as under way, and starts the log line
// with what is known of the request. isQuestion says whether r is a question,
// whose headers give the request's id and scheme.
func (h *handler) startRequest(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, client, peer netip.Addr, isQuestion bool,
) *request {
h.metrics.RequestStarted()
start := time.Now()
forwardedFor := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For")
rq := &request{
decision: decision{
client: client,
requestURI: r.URL.RequestURI(),
line: requestlog.Line{
Time: requestlog.FormatTime(start),
Instance: h.config.InstanceName,
ClientIP: client.String(),
Method: r.Method,
Scheme: scheme(r, isQuestion),
Host: r.Host,
Path: rules.Path(r),
Query: r.URL.RawQuery,
Protocol: r.Proto,
Referer: r.Referer(),
UserAgent: r.UserAgent(),
RequestID: requestID(r, isQuestion),
PeerIP: peer.String(),
ForwardedFor: strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
ClientGroup: h.clientGroup(client).String(),
ContentType: r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
RequestHeaders: requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders),
HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0,
HasCookie: len(r.Header.Values("Cookie")) > 0,
Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
},
},
h: h,
in: r,
out: &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
start: start,
}
// A length of -1 is a body whose length was not announced.
if r.ContentLength > 0 {
rq.line.ContentLength = r.ContentLength
}
return rq
}
// requestHeaders returns the headers of r that names lists, by name in
// lower case, each with its values joined by ", ". Authorization, Cookie
// and Set-Cookie are never among them, whatever names says.
func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
headers := map[string]string{}
for _, name := range names {
switch name {
case "authorization", "cookie", "set-cookie":
continue
}
values := r.Header.Values(name)
if len(values) > 0 {
headers[name] = strings.Join(values, ", ")
}
}
return headers
}
// check is the one place where a request can be refused. It returns nil to let
// the request through. The checks of checkClient decide: a request they refuse
// is answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, 403 for a block rule or the Core Rule Set,
// or 431 for the header limits. In observe mode nothing is refused, and the log
// line names what enforce mode would have done. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
action := rq.checkClient(ctx)
switch {
case action == "":
return nil
case rq.h.config.Observe:
rq.line.WouldAction = action
return nil
case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked || action == requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
case action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge:
return &refusal{status: http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge, action: action}
default:
return rq.banResponse(action)
}
}
// checkClient runs the checks on the request's client, and returns the
// action of the first that refuses the request, or "" when none does. A
// client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them, and is not looked up. For any
// other client, SWWAF_DENY_NETS comes first, then a ban on its netblock,
// so that a client either refuses is not looked up, then the lookup of
// its AS number and country, then the country lists, then the blocklists,
// then the CrowdSec decision list, which bans the client it lists, then
// the DNSBL zones' verdicts, and then AbuseIPDB's score; a request any of
// them refuses is not counted for the rate limits. Then come the
// rate limits, unless the client is in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS or the
// request's path is exempt under SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS, so that
// every other request is counted, each of them by the client's limit
// percentages, then SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS, then the rule files, then the header
// limits, and last the Core Rule Set. A request exempt from the rate limits
// is exempt from the byte limits too. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
cfg := rq.h.config
if isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets) {
return ""
}
now := rq.h.now()
if isInside(rq.client, cfg.DenyNets) {
return requestlog.ActionDenied
}
if rq.banned(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
rq.lookUp(ctx, now)
// The lookup can wait for GeoJS, so the checks after it read the time
// again: a request counted at the time it arrived could be counted
// after a later one of its client's, which the rate limits would take
// for the clock set back.
now = rq.h.now()
if rq.countryDenied() {
return requestlog.ActionCountryDenied
}
if rq.blocklistDenied() {
return requestlog.ActionDenied
}
if rq.crowdSecBanned(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
if rq.dnsblDenied(ctx) || rq.abuseIPDBDenied(ctx) {
return requestlog.ActionDenied
}
rq.counted = rq.countedByRateLimits()
if rq.counted {
rq.limitPercent, rq.bytesPercent = rq.limitPercentages()
rq.line.LimitPercent, rq.line.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
rq.line.BytesPercent, rq.line.BytesPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
}
if rq.counted && rq.limitBroken(now) {
return requestlog.ActionRateLimited
}
if rq.trapPath(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
action := rq.checkRules(now)
if action != "" {
return action
}
if rq.overHeaderLimits() {
return requestlog.ActionTooLarge
}
return rq.checkCoreRuleSet()
}
// countedByRateLimits reports whether the rate limits count the request: its
// client is not in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and its path is not exempt
// under SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS.
func (rq *request) countedByRateLimits() bool {
cfg := rq.h.config
return !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) &&
!pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
}
// pathExempt reports whether r is exempt under prefixes,
// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS or SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its
// path as sent, the path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts
// with one of prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an
// app whose router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded
// path contains .. anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an
// encoded slash (%2F or %2f), never is, since an app may act on it as a
// path outside every prefix: /assets/..%2Flogin as /login, or /assets%2Fx
// as one path segment, as Go's router does.
func pathExempt(r *http.Request, prefixes []string) bool {
decoded := r.URL.Path
sent := rules.Path(r)
if strings.Contains(decoded, "..") || strings.Contains(decoded, `\`) ||
strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(sent), "%2f") {
return false
}
return slices.ContainsFunc(prefixes, func(prefix string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(sent, prefix)
})
}
// finish counts the request in the metrics and writes its log line.
func (rq *request) finish() {
line := &rq.line
line.Status = rq.out.status
line.ResponseBytes = rq.out.bytes
line.ResponseContentType = rq.out.Header().Get("Content-Type")
line.RequestBytes = rq.requestBytes
switch {
case rq.refused != nil:
line.Action = rq.refused.action
case rq.out.err != nil || rq.in.Context().Err() != nil:
line.Aborted = true
}
duration := time.Since(rq.start)
line.DurationTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(duration)
line.DurationChecks = timing(rq.start, rq.checked)
// Counted before the log line is written, so that the metrics count
// every request whose line is out. An allowed request is the exception:
// its report gives the status, bytes and times the metrics count.
if rq.allowed {
rq.h.metrics.RequestAllowed()
} else {
rq.h.metrics.RequestEnded(line, duration)
}
rq.writeLine()
}
// writeLine writes the request's log line.
func (rq *request) writeLine() {
err := requestlog.Write(rq.h.requestLog, &rq.line)
if err != nil {
rq.h.processLog.Error("writing the request log failed", "error", err.Error())
}
}
// timing is the time from start to end in milliseconds, for one of the
// log line's timings, or nil when end is zero: what it times never
// happened.
func timing(start, end time.Time) *float64 {
if end.IsZero() {
return nil
}
return new(requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(start)))
}
// addToHistory adds the request, which has ended, to its client's
// history, and counts its offences in the metrics, and then the lookup's
// answer about the client, as answerAtTheEnd gives it, to that history and
// to the notes of the bans on its netblock: an answer may have come
// before either was there, and one from GeoJS that comes later is added
// when it comes.
func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
request := ratelimit.Request{
Forwarded: rq.allowed,
Refused: rq.refused != nil,
Status: rq.out.status,
RequestBytes: rq.requestBytes,
ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes,
BrokeLimit: rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
Attack: rq.attack,
RuleBlocked: rq.ruleBlocked,
WAFBlocked: rq.wafBlocked,
}
rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), request)
rq.h.metrics.Offences(request)
answer, found := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
if found {
rq.h.addLookup(answer)
}
}
// countAnomalies counts the request, which has ended, and its bytes, as
// countedBytes gives them, for the anomaly thresholds, whatever was done
// with it: a request refused, one from a client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS or
// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and one for a path in
// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS are counted too. It is counted for its
// client's AS number when answerAtTheEnd gives one. With every anomaly
// threshold off, the default, it does nothing.
func (rq *request) countAnomalies() {
if !anomalyThresholdsSet(rq.h.config) {
return
}
answer, _ := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
rq.h.anomalies.Count(rq.h.now(), anomaly.Request{
Host: rq.site,
Client: rq.client,
ClientGroup: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: answer.ASN,
ASName: answer.ASName,
Country: answer.Country,
Bytes: rq.countedBytes(),
})
}
// anomalyThresholdsSet reports whether any anomaly threshold is set.
func anomalyThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
off := anomaly.Thresholds{}
return cfg.AnomalyClient != off || cfg.AnomalyNet != off || cfg.AnomalyASN != off ||
cfg.AnomalyTotal != off || cfg.AnomalyWatch != off
}
// answerAtTheEnd returns, for a client that was looked up, the lookup's
// answer about it as the request ends, and whether there is one: the
// lookup database's, which was there at once, or the one GeoJS has given
// by then, which a request does not wait for unless a setting needs it.
func (rq *request) answerAtTheEnd() (lookup.Answer, bool) {
if !rq.lookedUp {
return lookup.Answer{}, false
}
if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" {
return rq.lookupAnswer, true
}
return rq.h.geojs.Kept(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
}
// responseWriter is servewaf's answer to a request. It notes the status and
// size for the log line, and the first error writing the answer.
type responseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
// status is the status sent, or zero before one is.
status int
bytes int64
err error
}
// WriteHeader sends the status and headers.
func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(status int) {
if w.status == 0 {
w.status = status
}
w.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(status)
}
// Write sends part of the body.
func (w *responseWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
if w.status == 0 {
w.status = http.StatusOK
}
n, err := w.ResponseWriter.Write(p)
w.bytes += int64(n)
if w.err == nil {
w.err = err
}
return n, err
}
internal/servewaf/servewaf.go
-509
View File
@@ -1,509 +0,0 @@
package servewaf
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The headers of rproxy's question and of servewaf's answer, as
// "servewaf" in SPEC.md gives them.
const (
// ClientHeader marks a request as rproxy's question, and gives the
// visitor's address.
ClientHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Client"
// PeerHeader gives the address of rproxy's own TCP peer.
PeerHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Peer"
// ContentLengthHeader gives the body length the visitor announced.
ContentLengthHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Content-Length"
// DispositionHeader gives servewaf's answer.
DispositionHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Disposition"
)
// The values of DispositionHeader.
const (
// DispositionAllow tells rproxy to pass the request to the app.
DispositionAllow = "allow"
// DispositionDeny tells rproxy to give the visitor the answer's status,
// headers and body.
DispositionDeny = "deny"
// DispositionClose tells rproxy to close the visitor's connection
// without an answer, which SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE asks for when it is close.
// servewaf closing the question's connection instead would read as
// servewaf being down, and rproxy would then let the request through.
DispositionClose = "close"
)
// ReportPath is where rproxy sends the report of each request servewaf
// answered.
const ReportPath = "/_smallwebwaf/report"
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes is the most of a visitor's body a question carries.
const QuestionBodyMaxBytes = 64 << 10
// The header limits: the most cookies and header fields a request may have
// when the checks reach the Core Rule Set. Real clients never reach them.
const (
maxCookies = 50
maxHeaderFields = 100
)
const (
// maxAwaitingReport is the most answered requests held until their
// reports come. Past it, the request answered longest ago is dropped.
maxAwaitingReport = 10000
// maxRequestIDBytes is the longest id a question may give.
maxRequestIDBytes = 128
// reportBodyMaxBytes is the most of a report's body that is read. It is
// far above any report's.
reportBodyMaxBytes = 1 << 20
// maxHTTPStatus is the highest status a report may give.
maxHTTPStatus = 599
// maxReportedBytes is the most bytes a report may give for each way, 1
// PiB, so that adding them up cannot overflow.
maxReportedBytes = 1 << 50
// maxReportedMilliseconds is the longest duration a report may give,
// about 31 years, so that it fits a time.Duration.
maxReportedMilliseconds = 1e12
// serveWAFTimeout bounds how long a request to servewaf takes to arrive,
// and its answer to leave, and serveWAFIdleTimeout how long a kept-open
// connection waits for its next request.
serveWAFTimeout = 60 * time.Second
serveWAFIdleTimeout = 120 * time.Second
)
var (
errReportFieldMissing = errors.New("a field is missing")
errReportValue = errors.New("a value is out of range")
)
// Report is the JSON object rproxy posts to ReportPath once the visitor's
// answer has ended, its fields named as the request log's of the same
// meaning. RequestID is the question's id. Status is what the visitor got, 0
// if nothing. The durations are in milliseconds.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
type Report struct {
RequestID string `json:"request_id"`
Status int `json:"status"`
RequestBytes int64 `json:"request_bytes"`
ResponseBytes int64 `json:"response_bytes"`
DurationTotal float64 `json:"duration_total"`
DurationUpstreamTotal float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total"`
}
// New returns the server `smallwebwaf servewaf` runs. It answers
// rproxy's questions, takes rproxy's reports and answers its own endpoints. It
// passes nothing to an app. rproxy applies the size and time limits to the
// visitor. Go's default limit on a request's line and headers, 1 MiB, stays: it
// is far above rproxy's, and a question refused for its size would have rproxy
// let the request through.
func New(params Params) *Server {
h := newHandler(params)
return &Server{
Server: &http.Server{
Addr: params.Config.ListenAddr,
Handler: h,
ErrorLog: slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn),
ReadTimeout: serveWAFTimeout,
WriteTimeout: serveWAFTimeout,
IdleTimeout: serveWAFIdleTimeout,
},
Ledger: h.ledger,
Limiter: h.limiter,
GeoJS: h.geojs,
Anomalies: h.anomalies,
LookupFile: h.lookupFile,
Lists: h.lists,
DNSBL: h.dnsbl,
AbuseIPDB: h.abuseIPDB,
Metrics: h.metrics,
}
}
// ServeHTTP handles one request to servewaf: a request carrying ClientHeader is
// rproxy's question, and any other is for servewaf itself.
func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if len(r.Header.Values(ClientHeader)) > 0 {
h.answerQuestion(w, r)
return
}
h.answerOwnEndpoint(w, r)
}
// refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports whether the request is one that does not wait
// for GeoJS, since the checks will refuse it at now whatever GeoJS answers about
// its client: it is over the header limits, a blocklist lists its client while
// SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny, the CrowdSec decision list lists it, or it is
// over a whole rate limit. In observe mode, which refuses nothing, none is.
// rproxy lets a request through when servewaf answers too late.
func (rq *request) refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now time.Time) bool {
if rq.h.config.Observe {
return false
}
lists := rq.h.lists
_, decided := lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
return decided || rq.overHeaderLimits() ||
(rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny && len(lists.ListedBy(rq.client)) > 0) ||
(rq.countedByRateLimits() &&
rq.h.limiter.OverARateLimit(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now))
}
// overHeaderLimits reports whether servewaf refuses the request for its
// headers: it has more than maxHeaderFields fields, each value of a header sent
// twice being one, or more than maxCookies cookies, each part of a Cookie header
// between semicolons being one unless it is empty or only spaces and tabs. The
// Core Rule Set runs each of its rules on each cookie, so that thousands of small
// cookies keep it busy for over a second. It trims only spaces and control
// characters, of which a header value can hold only tabs, so a part of Unicode
// spaces is a cookie to it.
func (rq *request) overHeaderLimits() bool {
fields, cookies := 0, 0
for _, values := range rq.in.Header {
fields += len(values)
}
for _, value := range rq.in.Header.Values("Cookie") {
for part := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
if strings.Trim(part, " \t") != "" {
cookies++
}
}
}
return fields > maxHeaderFields || cookies > maxCookies
}
// answerQuestion runs the checks on the visitor's request a question
// carries, and answers rproxy what to do with it. A denied request's counting
// is finished here, and an allowed one's by its report.
func (h *handler) answerQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
client, body, ok := h.readQuestion(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
// One that cannot be read leaves the log line's peer_ip invalid.
peer, _ := netip.ParseAddr(r.Header.Get(PeerHeader))
rq := h.startRequest(w, asTheVisitorSentIt(r, body), client.Unmap(), peer.Unmap(),
true)
// The last deferred runs first, so that what is held has the finished log
// line. Go's server sends the answer only once this function has
// returned, so the report cannot come before it is held.
defer rq.holdForReport()
defer rq.finish()
rq.site = r.Host
rq.line.ServeWAFLine = requestlog.ServeWAFLineDecision
refused := rq.check(r.Context())
rq.checked = time.Now()
underOwnPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, adminPrefix)
if refused == nil && !underOwnPrefix {
// In observe mode, what enforce mode would have refused counts here.
defer rq.countRefusal()
rq.allow()
return
}
// The last deferred runs first: countRefusal before addToHistory, so that a
// broken error burst is in the client's history.
defer rq.addToHistory()
defer rq.countAnomalies()
defer rq.countRefusal()
if refused != nil {
rq.deny(*refused)
return
}
// The app never sees this prefix. servewaf's own endpoints are at its
// own address, so this answers as a path with no endpoint does.
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
}
// readQuestion returns the visitor's address and the body a question carries,
// and whether servewaf takes the question. It answers a question it does not
// take with 400 and no disposition, which rproxy treats as it treats no
// answer. The id of a question it takes is held from here on, without a
// decision yet, so that another question with that id is refused while this
// one is being handled.
//
// The body is read before any check, since Go's server does not send an answer
// until it has read the body. A question whose body stops arriving gets no
// answer, and is not looked at.
func (h *handler) readQuestion(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
) (netip.Addr, []byte, bool) {
client, err := netip.ParseAddr(r.Header.Get(ClientHeader))
if err != nil || client.Zone() != "" {
h.refuseQuestion(w, ClientHeader+" is not an address without a zone")
return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
}
id := r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
if id == "" || len(id) > maxRequestIDBytes || !utf8.ValidString(id) {
h.refuseQuestion(w, requestIDHeader+" is not a valid id")
return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, QuestionBodyMaxBytes))
if _, tooLarge := errors.AsType[*http.MaxBytesError](err); tooLarge {
h.refuseQuestion(w, "the body is over 64 KiB")
return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
}
if err != nil {
h.processLog.Warn("a question's body stopped arriving", "error", err.Error())
// This panic has Go's server close the connection without an answer,
// and log nothing.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
}
held, _ := h.awaitingReport.ContainsOrAdd(id, nil)
if held {
h.refuseQuestion(w, requestIDHeader+" is the id of a request servewaf holds")
return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
}
return client, body, true
}
// refuseQuestion answers a question servewaf does not take, for reason.
func (h *handler) refuseQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, reason string) {
h.processLog.Warn("a question is refused", "reason", reason)
http.Error(w, reason, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
// asTheVisitorSentIt returns a copy of r, a question, as the checks and the
// log line are to see it: without the headers rproxy adds for servewaf, with
// body, which has been read of r, and with the length the visitor announced,
// as -1 when it announced none. The question's own length covers only the part
// of the body it carries.
func asTheVisitorSentIt(r *http.Request, body []byte) *http.Request {
sent := r.Clone(r.Context())
announced := sent.Header.Get(ContentLengthHeader)
sent.Header.Del(ClientHeader)
sent.Header.Del(PeerHeader)
sent.Header.Del(ContentLengthHeader)
sent.Header.Del("Content-Length")
sent.ContentLength = -1
length, err := strconv.ParseInt(announced, 10, 64)
if err == nil && length >= 0 {
sent.ContentLength = length
sent.Header.Set("Content-Length", announced)
}
sent.Body = http.NoBody
if len(body) > 0 {
sent.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(body))
}
return sent
}
// allow answers a question with DispositionAllow and, while
// SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set, the client's AS number and country.
func (rq *request) allow() {
rq.allowed = true
header := rq.out.Header()
header.Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionAllow)
if rq.h.config.AddLookupHeaders {
setLookupHeaders(header, rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country)
}
rq.out.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
// holdForReport holds a copy of what the report's steps need, by the request's
// id. A report only ever reaches that copy, never the request being handled.
func (rq *request) holdForReport() {
held := rq.decision
rq.h.awaitingReport.Add(rq.line.RequestID, &held)
}
// deny answers a question with what the visitor is to get for r.
func (rq *request) deny(r refusal) {
rq.refused = &r
if r.status == 0 {
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE is close. Written past rq.out, since the log line's
// status stays 0: the visitor is sent nothing.
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionClose)
rq.out.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(r.status), r.status)
}
// answerOwnEndpoint answers a request to servewaf's own address. No check
// runs on it: the address is on the private network, where the peers are
// rproxy and the admin's tools, not visitors.
func (h *handler) answerOwnEndpoint(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == http.MethodPost && r.URL.Path == ReportPath {
h.takeReport(w, r)
return
}
peer := peerAddress(r)
rq := h.startRequest(w, r, peer, peer, false)
defer rq.finish()
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == HealthPath {
rq.answerHealth()
return
}
rq.answerAdmin()
}
// takeReport answers POST ReportPath: it finishes the request the report
// names, if it holds that request's decision, and ignores the report
// otherwise.
func (h *handler) takeReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
report, err := readReport(w, r)
if err != nil {
h.processLog.Warn("a report is refused", "error", err.Error())
http.Error(w, "the body is not a report", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
held, found := h.awaitingReport.Peek(report.RequestID)
// Remove reports true to one report only, of several that name the id. A
// question still being handled is held as nil.
if found && held != nil && h.awaitingReport.Remove(report.RequestID) {
h.finishWith(held, report)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// readReport reads a report from r's body, which must be one JSON object with
// all of Report's fields, in the ranges SPEC.md gives.
func readReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (Report, error) {
var report Report
body, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, reportBodyMaxBytes))
if err != nil {
return report, fmt.Errorf("read the body: %w", err)
}
var fields map[string]json.RawMessage
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &fields)
if err != nil {
return report, fmt.Errorf("decode the body: %w", err)
}
for _, name := range []string{
"request_id", "status", "request_bytes", "response_bytes",
"duration_total", "duration_upstream_total",
} {
value, there := fields[name]
if !there || string(value) == "null" {
return report, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errReportFieldMissing, name)
}
}
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &report)
if err != nil {
return report, fmt.Errorf("decode the body: %w", err)
}
return report, report.checkRanges()
}
// checkRanges returns an error for a value of the report that cannot be true.
func (report *Report) checkRanges() error {
switch {
case report.Status != 0 &&
(report.Status < http.StatusContinue || report.Status > maxHTTPStatus):
return fmt.Errorf("%w: status", errReportValue)
case report.RequestBytes < 0 || report.RequestBytes > maxReportedBytes:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: request_bytes", errReportValue)
case report.ResponseBytes < 0 || report.ResponseBytes > maxReportedBytes:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: response_bytes", errReportValue)
case report.DurationTotal < 0 || report.DurationTotal > maxReportedMilliseconds:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_total", errReportValue)
case report.DurationUpstreamTotal < 0 ||
report.DurationUpstreamTotal > maxReportedMilliseconds:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_upstream_total", errReportValue)
}
return nil
}
// finishWith finishes a request with what its report says, and writes the
// request's last log line, which holds its decision's fields and the report's.
// For an allowed request it first counts the request's bytes, and adds it to its
// client's history, the anomaly counters and the metrics, with the status and
// bytes the report gives. A denied request's counting was finished at its
// decision.
func (h *handler) finishWith(held *decision, report Report) {
rq := &request{
decision: *held,
h: h,
out: &responseWriter{status: report.Status, bytes: report.ResponseBytes},
requestBytes: report.RequestBytes,
}
rq.line.ServeWAFLine = requestlog.ServeWAFLineReport
rq.line.Status = report.Status
rq.line.RequestBytes = report.RequestBytes
rq.line.ResponseBytes = report.ResponseBytes
rq.line.DurationTotal = report.DurationTotal
if rq.allowed {
rq.line.DurationUpstreamTotal = &report.DurationUpstreamTotal
rq.countBytes()
rq.countAnomalies()
rq.addToHistory()
rq.h.metrics.RequestReported(&rq.line,
time.Duration(report.DurationTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)),
time.Duration(report.DurationUpstreamTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)))
}
rq.writeLine()
}
internal/servewaf/servewaf_test.go
-1612
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
internal/smallwebwaf/healthcheck.go
+23 -64
View File
@@ -11,22 +11,19 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
)
// healthCheckTimeout bounds the whole health check.
const healthCheckTimeout = 5 * time.Second
var errHealthEndpoint = errors.New("the health endpoint answered")
var errHealthEndpoint = errors.New("smallwebwaf's health endpoint answered")
// HealthCheck is the container's health check. In servewaf's container, where
// SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND is servewaf, it returns 0 while servewaf answers its health
// endpoint on 127.0.0.1, at the port in SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR. In rproxy's container,
// where SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND is rproxy, unset or empty, it returns 0 while rproxy
// answers its health endpoint on 127.0.0.1, at the port in SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR, and
// the app accepts connections at the address in SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL. Otherwise,
// any other value of SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND included, it writes why to stderr and
// returns 1. It reads no other setting, nor a file that another names, so neither
// HealthCheck is the container's health check. It returns 0 while
// smallwebwaf answers its health endpoint on 127.0.0.1, at the port in
// SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR, and the app accepts connections at the address in
// SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL. Otherwise it writes why to stderr and returns 1.
// It reads no other setting, nor a file that another names, so neither
// can fail it.
// args are the arguments after `healthcheck`; it takes none, and given
// one it names it on stderr and returns 1 without checking anything.
@@ -41,20 +38,7 @@ func HealthCheck(
return 1
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, healthCheckTimeout)
defer cancel()
command, err := config.Command(lookupEnv)
switch {
case err != nil:
err = fmt.Errorf("invalid setting: %w", err)
case command == "servewaf":
err = checkServeWAF(ctx, lookupEnv)
default:
err = checkRProxyAndApp(ctx, lookupEnv)
}
err := healthCheck(ctx, lookupEnv)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "unhealthy:", err)
@@ -64,50 +48,18 @@ func HealthCheck(
return 0
}
// checkServeWAF asks servewaf's health endpoint.
func checkServeWAF(ctx context.Context, lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) error {
listenAddr, err := config.ServeWAFListenAddr(lookupEnv)
func healthCheck(ctx context.Context, lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, healthCheckTimeout)
defer cancel()
listenAddr, upstreamURL, err := config.ListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(lookupEnv)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid setting: %w", err)
}
err = askHealthEndpoint(ctx, listenAddr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ask servewaf: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// checkRProxyAndApp asks rproxy's health endpoint, and connects to the app.
func checkRProxyAndApp(
ctx context.Context, lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
) error {
listenAddr, upstreamURL, err := config.RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(lookupEnv)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid setting: %w", err)
}
err = askHealthEndpoint(ctx, listenAddr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ask rproxy: %w", err)
}
conn, err := (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, "tcp", appAddress(upstreamURL))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("connect to the app: %w", err)
}
_ = conn.Close()
return nil
}
// askHealthEndpoint asks the health endpoint on 127.0.0.1 at the port of
// listenAddr, which the settings have checked has one.
func askHealthEndpoint(ctx context.Context, listenAddr string) error {
// The settings have checked that the address has a port.
_, port, _ := net.SplitHostPort(listenAddr)
health := "http://" + net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", port) + servewaf.HealthPath
health := "http://" + net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", port) + proxy.HealthPath
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, health, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
@@ -116,7 +68,7 @@ func askHealthEndpoint(ctx context.Context, listenAddr string) error {
res, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("send the request: %w", err)
return fmt.Errorf("ask smallwebwaf: %w", err)
}
_ = res.Body.Close()
@@ -125,6 +77,13 @@ func askHealthEndpoint(ctx context.Context, listenAddr string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("%w %s", errHealthEndpoint, res.Status)
}
conn, err := (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, "tcp", appAddress(upstreamURL))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("connect to the app: %w", err)
}
_ = conn.Close()
return nil
}
internal/smallwebwaf/healthcheck_test.go
+28 -85
View File
@@ -15,26 +15,22 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
)
const (
// commandSetting says which command a container runs, and which the health
// check checks.
commandSetting = "SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND"
// serveWAFCommand is the command that runs servewaf.
serveWAFCommand = "servewaf"
)
func TestHealthCheckInServeWAFsContainer(t *testing.T) {
func TestHealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := httptest.NewServer(http.NotFoundHandler())
defer app.Close()
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer stop()
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
settings := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: app.URL,
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
}
go func() {
@@ -43,36 +39,40 @@ func TestHealthCheckInServeWAFsContainer(t *testing.T) {
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
_, port, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
// The container's settings: an address to listen on with an empty
// host part, which the health check asks at 127.0.0.1.
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
commandSetting: serveWAFCommand, listenAddr: ":" + port,
}, 0, "")
env := map[string]string{listenAddr: ":" + port, upstreamURL: app.URL}
// The health check reads that setting alone, here given as a file: a removed
// or invalid token file, or an invalid value of another setting, does not
// fail it.
wantHealthCheck(t, env, 0, "")
// The health check reads those two settings alone, here given as
// files: a removed or invalid token file, or an invalid value of
// another setting, does not fail it.
for _, other := range []struct{ name, value string }{
{"SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "removed")},
{"SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE", writeFile(t, "too short\n")},
{"SWWAF_MODE", "neither"},
} {
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
commandSetting: serveWAFCommand,
listenAddr + "_FILE": writeFile(t, ":"+port+"\n"),
other.name: other.value,
listenAddr + "_FILE": writeFile(t, ":"+port+"\n"),
upstreamURL + "_FILE": writeFile(t, app.URL+"\n"),
other.name: other.value,
}, 0, "")
}
// Another test can take a closed server's port at once, so the app's
// address here is a multicast address, to which TCP cannot connect.
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
listenAddr: ":" + port,
upstreamURL: "http://224.0.0.1",
}, 1, "unhealthy: connect to the app: ")
// Listening on port 0 takes any free port, so nothing listens on port 0
// itself.
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
commandSetting: serveWAFCommand, listenAddr: ":0",
}, 1, "unhealthy: ask servewaf: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
commandSetting: serveWAFCommand, listenAddr: "8080",
}, 1, "unhealthy: invalid setting: SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{listenAddr: ":0"}, 1,
"unhealthy: ask smallwebwaf: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{listenAddr: "8080"}, 1,
"unhealthy: invalid setting: SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
stop()
@@ -83,63 +83,6 @@ func TestHealthCheckInServeWAFsContainer(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestHealthCheckInRProxysContainer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := httptest.NewServer(http.NotFoundHandler())
defer app.Close()
// Nothing listens at the backend. The health check asks rproxy and the app,
// whether or not servewaf answers.
site, _ := startRProxy(t, "http://127.0.0.1:9", app.URL)
_, port, _ := net.SplitHostPort(strings.TrimPrefix(site, "http://"))
settings := func(more ...string) map[string]string {
env := map[string]string{rproxyListenAddr: ":" + port, rproxyUpstreamURL: app.URL}
for i := 0; i < len(more); i += 2 {
env[more[i]] = more[i+1]
}
return env
}
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(), 0, "")
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(commandSetting, ""), 0, "")
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(commandSetting, "rproxy"), 0, "")
// SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND cannot be given as a file.
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(commandSetting+"_FILE", writeFile(t, "servewaf\n")),
0, "")
// Another setting does not fail it, even an invalid one, and neither does
// SWRP_WAF_BACKEND being unset.
wantHealthCheck(t, settings("SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS", "soon"), 0, "")
// Another test can take a closed server's port at once, so the app's
// address here is a multicast address, to which TCP cannot connect.
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(rproxyUpstreamURL, "http://224.0.0.1"), 1,
"unhealthy: connect to the app: ")
// Listening on port 0 takes any free port, so nothing listens on port 0
// itself.
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(rproxyListenAddr, ":0"), 1, "unhealthy: ask rproxy: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(rproxyListenAddr, "8080"), 1,
"unhealthy: invalid setting: SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
// No setting of rproxy's has a form given as a file.
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
rproxyListenAddr + "_FILE": writeFile(t, ":"+port+"\n"),
rproxyUpstreamURL: app.URL,
}, 1, "unhealthy: ask rproxy: ")
}
func TestHealthCheckFailsWithAnyOtherCommand(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{commandSetting: "healthcheck"}, 1,
"unhealthy: invalid setting: SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: "+
"\"healthcheck\" is not rproxy or servewaf\n")
}
func TestHealthCheckRefusesAnArgument(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
internal/smallwebwaf/rproxy.go
-99
View File
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
package smallwebwaf
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"os"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
)
// RunRProxy is `smallwebwaf rproxy`: it reads rproxy's settings, then serves
// requests until ctx is done. Then it gives the requests in progress
// shutdownTimeout to finish, and the reports being sent SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. It
// returns the process's exit status, 1 when rproxy cannot start. Its process
// messages name the host's name as instance, and it writes those at info or
// more severe: rproxy has no setting for either.
func RunRProxy(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
hostname, _ := os.Hostname() // "" when the host has no name to give
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(params.Stdout, hostname, slog.LevelInfo)
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(params.LookupEnv)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("invalid setting", "error", err.Error())
return 1
}
server := rproxy.New(rproxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: params.Stdout,
ProcessLog: processLog,
})
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(ctx, "tcp", cfg.ListenAddr)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("cannot listen on SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR", "error", err.Error())
return 1
}
processLog.Info("starting",
"version", params.Version,
"address", listener.Addr().String(),
"settings", cfg)
return serveRProxy(ctx, server, listener, processLog)
}
// serveRProxy serves requests on listener until ctx is done, and then stops as
// RunRProxy says.
func serveRProxy(
ctx context.Context, server *rproxy.Server, listener net.Listener,
processLog *slog.Logger,
) int {
served := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
served <- server.Serve(listener)
}()
select {
case err := <-served:
processLog.Error("serving failed", "error", err.Error())
return 1
case <-ctx.Done():
}
processLog.Info("stopping")
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx),
shutdownTimeout)
defer cancel()
err := server.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
if err != nil {
processLog.Warn("requests still in progress were cut off",
"error", err.Error())
_ = server.Close()
}
err = <-served
if !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
processLog.Error("serving failed", "error", err.Error())
return 1
}
server.WaitForReports()
processLog.Info("stopped")
return 0
}
internal/smallwebwaf/rproxy_test.go
-789
View File
@@ -1,789 +0,0 @@
package smallwebwaf_test
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"encoding/pem"
"io"
"maps"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
)
const (
// wafBackend is the setting that names servewaf to rproxy.
wafBackend = "SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"
// rproxyListenAddr is the setting that says where rproxy listens.
rproxyListenAddr = "SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"
// rproxyUpstreamURL is the setting that says where the app is.
rproxyUpstreamURL = "SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL"
// rproxyTimeout is the setting that says how long rproxy waits for servewaf.
rproxyTimeout = "SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS"
// bannedProbe is a path the default rule file bans a client for.
bannedProbe = "/.env"
// otherClient is a client the tests do not ban.
otherClient = "198.51.100.7"
)
// runRProxy runs `smallwebwaf rproxy` with the settings in env until ctx is
// done, and returns its exit status.
func runRProxy(ctx context.Context, env map[string]string, out *output) int {
return smallwebwaf.RunRProxy(ctx, smallwebwaf.Params{
Version: testVersion,
LookupEnv: func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := env[name]
return value, ok
},
Stdout: out,
})
}
// startRProxy runs rproxy with servewaf at backend and the app at appURL, and
// returns its URL and what it writes. It believes X-Forwarded-For from the
// tests. It stops as the test ends, and that it stopped in order is checked.
func startRProxy(t *testing.T, backend, appURL string) (string, *output) {
t.Helper()
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
exited <- runRProxy(ctx, map[string]string{
rproxyListenAddr: localhost + ":0",
"SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
"SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES": localhost + "/32",
wafBackend: backend,
}, out)
}()
t.Cleanup(func() {
stop()
select {
case status := <-exited:
if status != 0 {
t.Errorf("rproxy's exit status %d, want 0; output:\n%s", status, out.text())
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Error("rproxy still running after being told to stop")
}
out.line(t, "msg", "stopped")
})
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
return "http://" + addr, out
}
// startServeWAF runs servewaf with the settings in env, and returns its address
// and URL, what it writes, and what stops it, which checks that it stopped in
// order.
func startServeWAF(t *testing.T, env map[string]string) (string, *output, func()) {
t.Helper()
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
exited <- run(ctx, env, out)
}()
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
return addr, out, func() {
stop()
select {
case status := <-exited:
if status != 0 {
t.Fatalf("servewaf's exit status %d, want 0; output:\n%s", status, out.text())
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("servewaf still running after being told to stop")
}
}
}
// serveWAFSettings are servewaf's settings with the default rule file, to listen
// at any free port.
func serveWAFSettings(t *testing.T) map[string]string {
t.Helper()
return map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
}
}
func TestABanThroughOneSiteRefusesTheClientOnTheOther(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
addr, serveWAFOut, stop := startServeWAF(t, serveWAFSettings(t))
defer stop()
backend := "http://" + addr
first, firstOut := startRProxy(t, backend, startApp(t))
second, _ := startRProxy(t, backend, startApp(t))
wantStatus(t, first+"/", placed, http.StatusOK)
wantStatus(t, second+"/", placed, http.StatusOK)
// The default rule file bans a probe for this.
wantStatus(t, first+bannedProbe, placed, http.StatusForbidden)
wantStatus(t, second+"/", placed, http.StatusForbidden)
wantStatus(t, second+"/", otherClient, http.StatusOK)
// One request's three lines carry one id, rproxy's with servewaf's answer.
line := firstOut.line(t, "path", bannedProbe)
if line["disposition"] != servewaf.DispositionDeny || line["client_ip"] != placed {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v", line)
}
id, _ := line["request_id"].(string)
decision := serveWAFLine(t, serveWAFOut, id, "decision")
report := serveWAFLine(t, serveWAFOut, id, "report")
if decision["host"] != line["host"] || decision["client_ip"] != placed ||
report["status"] != float64(http.StatusForbidden) {
t.Errorf("servewaf's lines are %v and %v", decision, report)
}
}
// serveWAFLine waits for servewaf's line with request id and servewaf_line kind.
func serveWAFLine(t *testing.T, out *output, id, kind string) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
line := out.findLine(t, func(fields map[string]any) bool {
return fields["request_id"] == id && fields["servewaf_line"] == kind
})
if line != nil {
return line
}
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
}
t.Fatalf("no %s line for %s in:\n%s", kind, id, out.text())
return nil
}
func TestTheSiteAnswersWhileServeWAFIsStoppedAndStartedAgain(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := serveWAFSettings(t)
addr, _, stop := startServeWAF(t, env)
site, out := startRProxy(t, "http://"+addr, startApp(t))
// A visitor who keeps asking throughout, and is never refused.
visitorDone := make(chan struct{})
visitorStop := make(chan struct{})
var refused atomic.Int64
go func() {
defer close(visitorDone)
for {
select {
case <-visitorStop:
return
case <-time.After(pollInterval):
}
if !answersNormally(t.Context(), site+"/", otherClient) {
refused.Add(1)
}
}
}()
wantStatus(t, site+bannedProbe, placed, http.StatusForbidden)
wantStatus(t, site+"/", placed, http.StatusForbidden)
stop()
// With servewaf down, the site answers, and rproxy says the default did it.
wantStatus(t, site+"/after-stop", placed, http.StatusOK)
line := out.line(t, "path", "/after-stop")
if line["disposition"] != servewaf.DispositionAllow ||
line["default_disposition"] != true {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v", line)
}
// Back at its address, with its state files, it applies the ban again.
restarted := maps.Clone(env)
restarted[listenAddr] = addr
_, _, stop = startServeWAF(t, restarted)
defer stop()
wantStatus(t, site+"/", placed, http.StatusForbidden)
close(visitorStop)
<-visitorDone
if refused.Load() != 0 {
t.Errorf("the site refused its visitor %d times", refused.Load())
}
}
// answersNormally reports whether a request to url from the client at from, as
// X-Forwarded-For names it, gets the app's answer.
func answersNormally(ctx context.Context, url, from string) bool {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
return false
}
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", from)
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := transport.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
return false
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
return err == nil && res.StatusCode == http.StatusOK && string(body) == greeting
}
// sendRaw sends request, as it is, to rproxy at site, and returns the status of
// the answer.
func sendRaw(t *testing.T, site, request string) int {
t.Helper()
conn, err := (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(t.Context(), "tcp",
strings.TrimPrefix(site, "http://"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
}
defer func() {
_ = conn.Close()
}()
err = conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(waitLimit))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set the deadline: %v", err)
}
_, err = io.WriteString(conn, request)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("send: %v", err)
}
res, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(conn), nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read the answer: %v", err)
}
_ = res.Body.Close()
return res.StatusCode
}
func TestAChunkedBodyStaysABodyAtServeWAF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
addr, serveWAFOut, stop := startServeWAF(t, serveWAFSettings(t))
defer stop()
site, _ := startRProxy(t, "http://"+addr, startApp(t))
// Read as a further request, this body would ban otherClient on every site.
const smuggledID = "smuggled-request"
smuggled := "GET " + bannedProbe + " HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n" +
servewaf.ClientHeader + ": " + otherClient + "\r\n" +
"X-Request-ID: " + smuggledID + "\r\n\r\n"
status := sendRaw(t, site, "POST /upload HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"+
"X-Forwarded-For: "+placed+"\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n"+
strconv.FormatInt(int64(len(smuggled)), 16)+"\r\n"+smuggled+"\r\n0\r\n\r\n")
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status %d, want the app's 200", status)
}
// Read as a further request, it would act straight after the answer.
for range 20 {
wantStatus(t, site+"/", otherClient, http.StatusOK)
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
}
line := serveWAFOut.findLine(t, func(fields map[string]any) bool {
return fields["request_id"] == smuggledID
})
if line != nil {
t.Errorf("servewaf read the body as a request: %v", line)
}
}
func TestATargetThatCannotGoToServeWAFIsRefusedForABannedClient(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
addr, _, stop := startServeWAF(t, serveWAFSettings(t))
defer stop()
site, out := startRProxy(t, "http://"+addr, startApp(t))
wantStatus(t, site+bannedProbe, placed, http.StatusForbidden)
status := sendRaw(t, site, "GET x:admin HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"+
"X-Forwarded-For: "+placed+"\r\n\r\n")
if status != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 400", status)
}
line := out.line(t, "path", "admin")
if line["disposition"] != nil || line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v, want no disposition", line)
}
}
func TestAClientWithAZoneIsTheClientWithout(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const zoned = "2001:db8::1%eth0"
addr, _, stop := startServeWAF(t, serveWAFSettings(t))
defer stop()
site, out := startRProxy(t, "http://"+addr, startApp(t))
wantStatus(t, site+bannedProbe, zoned, http.StatusForbidden)
wantStatus(t, site+"/", zoned, http.StatusForbidden)
wantStatus(t, site+"/", "2001:db8::1", http.StatusForbidden)
line := out.line(t, "path", bannedProbe)
if line["client_ip"] != "2001:db8::1" || line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v", line)
}
}
func TestAStatusServeWAFDoesNotTakeIsReportedAs599(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const status = 799
app := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(status)
}))
t.Cleanup(app.Close)
addr, serveWAFOut, stop := startServeWAF(t, serveWAFSettings(t))
defer stop()
site, out := startRProxy(t, "http://"+addr, app.URL)
wantStatus(t, site+"/", placed, status)
line := out.line(t, "path", "/")
if line["status"] != float64(status) {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v, want the status the visitor got", line)
}
id, _ := line["request_id"].(string)
report := serveWAFLine(t, serveWAFOut, id, "report")
if report["status"] != 599.0 {
t.Errorf("servewaf's line is %v, want status 599", report)
}
}
// startRProxyProcess runs `smallwebwaf rproxy` in a process of its own, with the
// settings in env, each as NAME=value. It returns where rproxy listens, the
// process, and what rproxy writes.
func startRProxyProcess(t *testing.T, env ...string) (string, *exec.Cmd, *output) {
t.Helper()
binary, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("find the test binary: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 3*waitLimit)
t.Cleanup(cancel)
out := &output{}
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, binary) //nolint:gosec // this test binary
cmd.Stdout = out
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
commandForMain+"=rproxy",
"SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR="+localhost+":0")
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, env...)
err = cmd.Start()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
_ = cmd.Wait()
})
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
return addr, cmd, out
}
func TestRProxyAsksAServeWAFThatSpeaksHTTP2OverHTTP1(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
protocols := make(chan string, 10)
backend := httptest.NewUnstartedServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader) != "" {
protocols <- r.Proto
w.Header().Set(servewaf.DispositionHeader, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
}
}))
backend.EnableHTTP2 = true
backend.StartTLS()
t.Cleanup(backend.Close)
// rproxy has no setting for the certificates it trusts, so it is told of this
// one as Go's client is told of any, in a process of its own.
certificates := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "servewaf.pem")
err := os.WriteFile(certificates, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: backend.Certificate().Raw,
}), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write the certificate: %v", err)
}
addr, _, _ := startRProxyProcess(t,
wafBackend+"="+backend.URL,
"SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL="+startApp(t),
"SSL_CERT_FILE="+certificates)
for name, headers := range map[string]string{
"no such header": "",
"Upgrade": "Upgrade: anything\r\n",
"Connection": "Connection: anything\r\n",
"a WebSocket upgrade": "Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n",
} {
status := sendRaw(t, addr, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"+headers+"\r\n")
if status != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("with %s: status %d, want servewaf's 403", name, status)
}
select {
case protocol := <-protocols:
if protocol != "HTTP/1.1" {
t.Errorf("with %s: asked over %s, want HTTP/1.1", name, protocol)
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Errorf("with %s: servewaf was not asked", name)
}
}
}
func TestRProxyProcessLinesNameTheHostAndComeAtInfo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
hostname, err := os.Hostname()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the host's name: %v", err)
}
// Nothing listens at the backend's address; no request asks it.
_, out := startRProxy(t, "http://127.0.0.1:9", startApp(t))
line := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")
if line["instance"] != hostname || line["level"] != "INFO" {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v, want instance %s at INFO", line, hostname)
}
}
func TestRProxyStoppingWaitsForAReportBeingSent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
reportGotThere := make(chan struct{})
release := make(chan struct{})
backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader) != "" {
w.Header().Set(servewaf.DispositionHeader, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
return
}
close(reportGotThere)
<-release
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(backend.Close)
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer stop()
env := map[string]string{
rproxyListenAddr: localhost + ":0",
"SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL": startApp(t),
rproxyTimeout: "60000",
wafBackend: backend.URL,
}
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
exited <- runRProxy(ctx, env, out)
}()
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
wantStatus(t, "http://"+addr+"/", placed, http.StatusOK)
select {
case <-reportGotThere:
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("no report")
}
stop()
select {
case <-exited:
t.Error("rproxy stopped with a report on its way")
close(release)
return
case <-time.After(10 * pollInterval):
}
close(release)
select {
case status := <-exited:
if status != 0 {
t.Errorf("rproxy's exit status %d, want 0; output:\n%s", status, out.text())
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Error("rproxy still running, the report having been answered")
}
}
// sendAndKeepOpen sends request to rproxy at addr, and returns the connection. A
// read from it ends with an error once waitLimit is up.
func sendAndKeepOpen(t *testing.T, addr, request string) net.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn, err := (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(t.Context(), "tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = conn.Close()
})
err = conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(waitLimit))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set the deadline: %v", err)
}
_, err = io.WriteString(conn, request)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("send: %v", err)
}
return conn
}
func TestRProxyStoppingCutsOffARequestAfterFiveSeconds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
cutOffAfter = 5 * time.Second
upstreamSetting = "SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL"
)
asked := make(chan struct{})
release := make(chan struct{})
app := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
close(asked)
<-release
}))
t.Cleanup(app.Close)
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set(servewaf.DispositionHeader, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}))
t.Cleanup(backend.Close)
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer stop()
env := map[string]string{
rproxyListenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamSetting: app.URL,
wafBackend: backend.URL,
}
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
exited <- runRProxy(ctx, env, out)
}()
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
conn := sendAndKeepOpen(t, addr, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
select {
case <-asked:
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("the app was not asked")
}
stopped := time.Now()
stop()
text, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
if err != nil || len(text) != 0 {
t.Errorf("read %q (%v), want the connection cut off", text, err)
}
if elapsed := time.Since(stopped); elapsed < cutOffAfter {
t.Errorf("cut off after %s, want %s", elapsed, cutOffAfter)
}
select {
case status := <-exited:
if status != 0 {
t.Errorf("rproxy's exit status %d, want 0; output:\n%s", status, out.text())
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Error("rproxy still running after the cut-off")
}
out.line(t, "msg", "requests still in progress were cut off")
}
func TestRProxyInvalidSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, setting string
env map[string]string
}{
{"no backend", wafBackend, nil},
{
"another invalid", rproxyTimeout,
map[string]string{wafBackend: "http://servewaf:8080", rproxyTimeout: "soon"},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
out := &output{}
if status := runRProxy(t.Context(), tc.env, out); status != 1 {
t.Errorf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
}
line := out.line(t, "msg", "invalid setting")
message, _ := line["error"].(string)
if !strings.HasPrefix(message, tc.setting+": ") {
t.Errorf("start refused with %v, want it to name %s", line, tc.setting)
}
})
}
}
func TestRProxyAddressInUseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
taken, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
defer func() {
_ = taken.Close()
}()
out := &output{}
status := runRProxy(t.Context(), map[string]string{
wafBackend: "http://servewaf:8080",
rproxyListenAddr: taken.Addr().String(),
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Errorf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
}
out.line(t, "msg", "cannot listen on SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR")
}
func TestMainRunsRProxy(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Nothing listens there; the health check does not ask.
addr, cmd, out := startRProxyProcess(t, wafBackend+"=http://127.0.0.1:9")
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"http://"+addr+servewaf.HealthPath, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := transport.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("health check: %v", err)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
if err != nil || string(body) != "ok\n" {
t.Errorf("health check answered %q (%v)", body, err)
}
err = cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.SIGTERM)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("signal: %v", err)
}
err = cmd.Wait()
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("exit: %v; output:\n%s", err, out.text())
}
}
internal/smallwebwaf/servewaf_test.go
+44 -119
View File
@@ -1,126 +1,16 @@
package smallwebwaf_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"syscall"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
)
// commandForMain, while set in the environment, has this test binary run Main
// with the command it gives, in place of the tests, so that a test can run
// Main in a process of its own.
const commandForMain = "SMALLWEBWAF_TEST_COMMAND"
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
command, set := os.LookupEnv(commandForMain)
if !set {
os.Exit(m.Run())
}
os.Args = strings.Fields("smallwebwaf " + command)
os.Exit(smallwebwaf.Main(testVersion))
}
func TestMainRunsServeWAF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
binary, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("find the test binary: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 3*waitLimit)
defer cancel()
out := &output{}
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, binary) //nolint:gosec // this test binary
cmd.Stdout = out
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
commandForMain+"="+serveWAFCommand,
listenAddr+"="+localhost+":0",
stateDir+"="+t.TempDir(),
rulesDir+"="+t.TempDir(),
lookupSource+"=off")
err = cmd.Start()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
_ = cmd.Wait()
})
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
err = cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.SIGTERM)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("signal: %v", err)
}
err = cmd.Wait()
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("exit: %v; output:\n%s", err, out.text())
}
}
func TestMainWithoutACommandItKnowsPrintsTheCommands(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
binary, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("find the test binary: %v", err)
}
for _, command := range []string{"", "serve"} {
t.Run("command "+command, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), waitLimit)
defer cancel()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, binary)
cmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = &stdout, &stderr
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), commandForMain+"="+command)
err := cmd.Run()
if code := cmd.ProcessState.ExitCode(); code != 2 {
t.Errorf("exit status %d (%v), want 2", code, err)
}
for _, name := range []string{"rproxy", serveWAFCommand, "healthcheck"} {
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), name) {
t.Errorf("stderr %q does not name %s", stderr.String(), name)
}
}
if stdout.Len() != 0 {
t.Errorf("stdout %q, want nothing", stdout.String())
}
})
}
}
// ask sends servewaf at addr rproxy's question about a request for path from
// placed, checks the answer's status and disposition, and closes it.
func ask(t *testing.T, addr, path string, status int, disposition string) {
@@ -132,8 +22,7 @@ func ask(t *testing.T, addr, path string, status int, disposition string) {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, placed)
req.Header.Set("X-Request-ID", rand.Text())
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, placed)
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
@@ -147,9 +36,9 @@ func ask(t *testing.T, addr, path string, status int, disposition string) {
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != status ||
res.Header.Get(servewaf.DispositionHeader) != disposition {
res.Header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader) != disposition {
t.Errorf("answered %d with disposition %q, want %d with %q", res.StatusCode,
res.Header.Get(servewaf.DispositionHeader), status, disposition)
res.Header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader), status, disposition)
}
}
@@ -164,7 +53,7 @@ func runServeWAF(t *testing.T, env map[string]string, use func(addr string)) {
exited := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
exited <- run(ctx, env, out)
exited <- runAs(ctx, true, env, out)
}()
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
@@ -193,12 +82,48 @@ func TestServeWAFKeepsItsBansAcrossARestartAndNeedsNoApp(t *testing.T) {
}
runServeWAF(t, env, func(addr string) {
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
// The default rule file bans a probe for this.
ask(t, addr, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
ask(t, addr, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
})
runServeWAF(t, env, func(addr string) {
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
})
}
func TestWithoutACommandTheClientHeaderIsNoQuestion(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runUntilStopped(t, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
}, func(url string) {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, url,
http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, placed)
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := (&http.Client{Transport: transport}).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
if err != nil || string(body) != greeting ||
res.Header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader) != "" {
t.Errorf("answered %q (%v) with disposition %q, want the app's greeting",
body, err, res.Header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader))
}
})
}
internal/smallwebwaf/smallwebwaf.go
+50 -77
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,13 @@
// Package smallwebwaf runs the smallwebwaf process, as the command it is given.
// `smallwebwaf servewaf` reads the settings, the rule files, the lookup database
// and the state files, answers rproxy's questions until it is told to stop, and
// then stops in an orderly way, writing the state files. `smallwebwaf rproxy`
// reads rproxy's settings alone, and runs the reverse proxy in front of one app
// that asks servewaf about each request. `smallwebwaf healthcheck` is the
// container's health check.
// Package smallwebwaf runs the smallwebwaf process: it reads the settings,
// the rule files, the lookup database and the state files, serves requests
// until it is told to stop, and then stops in an orderly way, writing the
// state files. It serves them in front of an app, or, as `smallwebwaf
// servewaf`, by answering rproxy's questions about them.
package smallwebwaf
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
@@ -23,13 +20,12 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
)
// shutdownTimeout is how long requests in progress may take to finish
@@ -37,25 +33,12 @@ import (
// runit and docker wait a little longer before they kill the process.
const shutdownTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// remoteLogStopTimeout is how long, as servewaf stops, the log lines still
// waiting are sent to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL before they are given up. stdout has
// carried them.
// remoteLogStopTimeout is how long, as smallwebwaf stops, the log lines
// still waiting are sent to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL before they are given
// up. stdout has carried them.
const remoteLogStopTimeout = 2 * time.Second
// usageStatus is the exit status with no command, or one smallwebwaf does not
// know.
const usageStatus = 2
// usage is what smallwebwaf prints then.
const usage = `usage: smallwebwaf <command>
commands:
rproxy the reverse proxy in front of one app
servewaf decides for rproxy, and keeps bans, counters and history
healthcheck the container's health check
`
// Params are what RunServeWAF and RunRProxy need from the process.
// Params are what Run needs from the process.
type Params struct {
// Version is the version of the binary, set when it is built.
Version string
@@ -63,47 +46,36 @@ type Params struct {
LookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)
// Stdout receives the request log and the process's own messages.
Stdout io.Writer
// ServeWAF makes it `smallwebwaf servewaf`, which answers rproxy's
// questions, rather than the proxy in front of an app.
ServeWAF bool
}
// Main runs the command os.Args names, and returns the process's exit status.
// `smallwebwaf rproxy` and `smallwebwaf servewaf` run until SIGTERM or SIGINT.
// With no command, or one it does not know, it prints the commands and returns
// usageStatus.
// Main runs smallwebwaf until SIGTERM or SIGINT, and returns the
// process's exit status. Run as `smallwebwaf servewaf`, it answers
// rproxy's questions rather than pass requests to an app. Run as
// `smallwebwaf healthcheck`, it is the container's health check instead.
func Main(version string) int {
args := os.Args[1:]
if len(args) == 0 {
return printUsage(os.Stderr)
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "healthcheck" {
return HealthCheck(context.Background(), os.Args[2:], os.LookupEnv, os.Stderr)
}
ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(),
syscall.SIGTERM, os.Interrupt)
defer stop()
params := Params{Version: version, LookupEnv: os.LookupEnv, Stdout: os.Stdout}
switch args[0] {
case "rproxy":
return RunRProxy(ctx, params)
case "servewaf":
return RunServeWAF(ctx, params)
case "healthcheck":
return HealthCheck(ctx, args[1:], os.LookupEnv, os.Stderr)
default:
return printUsage(os.Stderr)
}
return Run(ctx, Params{
Version: version,
LookupEnv: os.LookupEnv,
Stdout: os.Stdout,
ServeWAF: len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "servewaf",
})
}
// printUsage writes the commands to w, and returns usageStatus.
func printUsage(w io.Writer) int {
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, usage)
return usageStatus
}
// RunServeWAF is `smallwebwaf servewaf`: it reads the settings, the rule files,
// the lookup database and the state files, then serves requests until ctx is
// done. It returns the process's exit status, 1 when servewaf cannot start.
func RunServeWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
// Run reads the settings, the rule files, the lookup database and the
// state files, then serves requests until ctx is done. It returns the
// process's exit status, 1 when smallwebwaf cannot start.
func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
// Until the settings are read, the one message is an invalid setting's
// error, which every SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL lets through.
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(params.Stdout,
@@ -151,14 +123,12 @@ func RunServeWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
return 1
}
crs, err := servewaf.NewCoreRuleSet(cfg)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("cannot use the Core Rule Set", "error", err.Error())
return 1
newProxy := proxy.New
if params.ServeWAF {
newProxy = proxy.NewServeWAF
}
server, err := newServer(cfg, stdout, processLog, now, ruleFiles, alertQueue, crs)
server, err := newServer(newProxy, cfg, stdout, processLog, now, ruleFiles, alertQueue)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("cannot use the lookup database", "error", err.Error())
@@ -178,7 +148,8 @@ func RunServeWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(ctx, "tcp", cfg.ListenAddr)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("cannot listen on SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR", "error", err.Error())
processLog.Error("cannot listen on SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR",
"error", err.Error())
return 1
}
@@ -191,14 +162,15 @@ func RunServeWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
return serve(ctx, server, listener, files, ruleFiles, alertQueue, processLog)
}
// newServer returns the server servewaf runs, with the metrics of the alerts,
// after reading the lookup database while SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file. A lookup
// database that cannot be read is an error.
// newServer returns the server smallwebwaf runs, which newProxy makes, with
// the metrics of the alerts, after reading the lookup database while
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file. A lookup database that cannot be read is an
// error.
func newServer(
newProxy func(proxy.Params) *proxy.Server,
cfg *config.Config, stdout io.Writer, processLog *slog.Logger,
now func() time.Time, ruleFiles *rules.Files, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
crs *waf.CoreRuleSet,
) (*servewaf.Server, error) {
) (*proxy.Server, error) {
var lookupFile *lookup.File
if cfg.LookupSource == "file" {
@@ -215,14 +187,13 @@ func newServer(
}
}
server := servewaf.New(servewaf.Params{
server := newProxy(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: stdout,
ProcessLog: processLog,
GeoJSURL: lookup.URL,
AbuseIPDBURL: reputation.AbuseIPDBURL,
LookupFile: lookupFile,
CoreRuleSet: crs,
Now: now,
Rules: ruleFiles,
Alerts: alertQueue,
@@ -239,7 +210,7 @@ func newServer(
// loadStateFiles reads the state files into the parts of server and into
// alertQueue, as state.Load does.
func loadStateFiles(
cfg *config.Config, server *servewaf.Server, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
cfg *config.Config, server *proxy.Server, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
now func() time.Time, processLog *slog.Logger,
) (*state.Files, error) {
return state.Load(state.Params{
@@ -325,7 +296,7 @@ func startSending(
// shutdownTimeout to finish, and writes every state file, alerts.json with
// the alerts still waiting.
func serve(
ctx context.Context, server *servewaf.Server, listener net.Listener,
ctx context.Context, server *proxy.Server, listener net.Listener,
files *state.Files, ruleFiles *rules.Files, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
processLog *slog.Logger,
) int {
@@ -380,10 +351,12 @@ func serve(
// Run and Watch have ended, so nothing else reads or writes the
// files, and no alert is being sent, so that alerts.json keeps every
// alert not yet sent. Every request has ended too, but for one cut off
// because Shutdown timed out, which adds to its client's history only as
// it ends. That can be after this write, and then that request is missing
// from clients.json.
// alert not yet sent. Every request has ended too, but for two kinds
// that Go's server does not wait for: one cut off because Shutdown
// timed out, and one whose connection switched protocols, such as a
// WebSocket. Such a request adds to its client's history only as it
// ends, which can be after this write, and then that request is
// missing from clients.json.
<-written
<-watched
<-rulesWatched
internal/smallwebwaf/smallwebwaf_test.go
+156 -147
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package smallwebwaf_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net"
@@ -19,9 +18,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup/lookuptest"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
)
@@ -35,6 +32,8 @@ const (
// localhost is where the tests listen.
localhost = "127.0.0.1"
listenAddr = "SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR"
upstreamURL = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL"
trustedProxies = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
stateDir = "SWWAF_STATE_DIR"
stateWriteDelay = "SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY"
stateCounterInterval = "SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
@@ -77,11 +76,21 @@ func (o *output) line(t *testing.T, key, value string) map[string]any {
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
fields := o.findLine(t, func(fields map[string]any) bool {
return fields[key] == value
})
if fields != nil {
return fields
o.mu.Lock()
text := o.buf.String()
o.mu.Unlock()
for line := range strings.Lines(text) {
var fields map[string]any
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("output line %q is not JSON: %v", line, err)
}
if fields[key] == value {
return fields
}
}
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
@@ -92,29 +101,6 @@ func (o *output) line(t *testing.T, key, value string) map[string]any {
return nil
}
// findLine returns the first line written so far for which matches is true, or
// nil.
func (o *output) findLine(
t *testing.T, matches func(map[string]any) bool,
) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
for line := range strings.Lines(o.text()) {
var fields map[string]any
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("output line %q is not JSON: %v", line, err)
}
if matches(fields) {
return fields
}
}
return nil
}
// text returns everything written so far.
func (o *output) text() string {
o.mu.Lock()
@@ -123,11 +109,18 @@ func (o *output) text() string {
return o.buf.String()
}
// run runs `smallwebwaf servewaf` with the settings in env until ctx is done,
// and returns its exit status. SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it,
// run runs smallwebwaf with the settings in env until ctx is done, and
// returns its exit status. SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it,
// so that no test sends GeoJS its clients' addresses.
func run(ctx context.Context, env map[string]string, out *output) int {
return smallwebwaf.RunServeWAF(ctx, smallwebwaf.Params{
return runAs(ctx, false, env, out)
}
// runAs is run as `smallwebwaf servewaf` while serveWAF is true.
func runAs(
ctx context.Context, serveWAF bool, env map[string]string, out *output,
) int {
return smallwebwaf.Run(ctx, smallwebwaf.Params{
Version: testVersion,
LookupEnv: func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := env[name]
@@ -137,7 +130,8 @@ func run(ctx context.Context, env map[string]string, out *output) int {
return value, ok
},
Stdout: out,
Stdout: out,
ServeWAF: serveWAF,
})
}
@@ -147,8 +141,8 @@ func TestInvalidSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
out := &output{}
status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{
"SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "lots",
instanceName: instance,
"SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES": "lots",
instanceName: instance,
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Errorf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
@@ -159,7 +153,7 @@ func TestInvalidSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
if line["type"] != "process" || line["instance"] != instance ||
line["level"] != "ERROR" ||
!strings.HasPrefix(message, "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE: ") {
!strings.HasPrefix(message, "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES: ") {
t.Errorf("start refused with %v", line)
}
}
@@ -221,6 +215,7 @@ func TestAddressInUseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
appURL := startApp(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
@@ -229,9 +224,10 @@ func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
go func() {
exited <- run(ctx, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: appURL,
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
}, out)
}()
@@ -241,10 +237,10 @@ func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
}
starting := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")
wantStartingLine(t, starting, dir)
wantStartingLine(t, starting, appURL, dir)
addr, _ := starting["address"].(string)
wantAllowed(t, "http://"+addr+"/")
wantGreeting(t, "http://"+addr+"/")
out.line(t, "type", "request")
stop()
@@ -316,6 +312,7 @@ func TestEveryLogLineAndMetricCarriesTheInstanceName(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
metricsToken: token,
@@ -353,6 +350,7 @@ func TestStateKeptAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
rateLimitPerDay: "2",
@@ -364,8 +362,8 @@ func TestStateKeptAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
// The two requests a day allows, and a stop.
runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantAllowed(t, url)
wantAllowed(t, url)
wantGreeting(t, url)
wantGreeting(t, url)
})
// After a restart the client has no fresh allowance: its third
@@ -389,8 +387,10 @@ func TestBanRefusesItsNetblockAfterARestartWithAnotherScope(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
rateLimitPerDay: "1",
scope: "24",
}
@@ -434,9 +434,11 @@ func TestBanAddedAndLiftedByEditingBansJSON(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
// No write comes due in the test, so only the watch on the
// directory can take the edits in.
stateWriteDelay: "1h",
@@ -457,10 +459,12 @@ func TestBanAddedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpointsKeptInBansJSON(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
adminToken: adminSecret,
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
adminToken: adminSecret,
// Neither comes due in the test: the files are written as
// smallwebwaf stops.
stateWriteDelay: "1h",
@@ -500,16 +504,17 @@ func TestRuleFileAddedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: dir,
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: dir,
// The requests sent until the rule takes effect must not break a
// rate limit, whose ban would refuse them too.
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "off",
}
out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantAllowed(t, url)
wantGreeting(t, url)
// Written once: each change would start the rule files' wait
// again. A file written before smallwebwaf watches the directory is
@@ -552,56 +557,6 @@ func TestRulesDirThatDoesNotExistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
": no such file or directory")
}
func TestCoreRuleSetExclusionsFileThatCannotBeReadStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "crs-exclusions.conf")
out := &output{}
status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE": path,
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
}
line := out.line(t, "msg", "cannot use the Core Rule Set")
want := "SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: read the exclusions file: open " +
path + ": no such file or directory"
if line["error"] != want {
t.Errorf("start refused with %v, want the error %q", line, want)
}
}
func TestCoreRuleSetExclusionsFileThatCannotBeUsedStopsTheStartWhileTheCoreRuleSetIsOff(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
broken := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "broken.conf")
err := os.WriteFile(broken, []byte("SecNoSuchDirective On\n"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, path := range []string{filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing.conf"), broken} {
out := &output{}
status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWWAF_WAF_MODE": config.WAFModeOff, "SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE": path,
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%s: exit status %d, want 1", path, status)
}
out.line(t, "msg", "cannot use the Core Rule Set")
}
}
func TestLookupDatabaseReplacedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -612,8 +567,10 @@ func TestLookupDatabaseReplacedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
metricsToken: token,
instanceName: instance,
lookupSource: "file",
@@ -709,8 +666,10 @@ func TestBlocklistTriesAndCopiesKeptInReputationJSONAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T)
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
metricsToken: token,
instanceName: instance,
"SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS": torURL,
@@ -791,8 +750,10 @@ func TestCrowdSecDecisionListKeptInReputationJSONAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
"SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL": engine.URL,
"SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY": bouncerKey,
}
@@ -890,13 +851,14 @@ func TestEveryLineIsAlsoSentToTheRemoteLogEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL": "syslog+tcp://" + endpoint.Addr().String(),
}
out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantAllowed(t, url)
wantGreeting(t, url)
})
out.line(t, "type", "request")
@@ -945,6 +907,7 @@ func TestStalledRemoteLogEndpointHoldsUpNoRequest(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL": "syslog+tls://" + endpoint.Addr().String(),
@@ -954,7 +917,7 @@ func TestStalledRemoteLogEndpointHoldsUpNoRequest(t *testing.T) {
}
out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantAllowed(t, url)
wantGreeting(t, url)
// More than one line has been written, and the buffer holds the
// last.
@@ -1004,6 +967,7 @@ func TestBanIsAlertedAndAnAlertNotSentIsKeptAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: rules,
"SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL": webhook.url,
@@ -1088,8 +1052,10 @@ func TestBanIsAlertedToSlackAndNtfy(t *testing.T) {
slack, ntfy := startDestination(t), startDestination(t)
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
rateLimitPerDay: "1",
// The metrics are read from 127.0.0.1, which no limit counts.
"SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS": localhost + "/32",
@@ -1229,8 +1195,8 @@ func startApp(t *testing.T) string {
return app.URL
}
// runUntilStopped runs `smallwebwaf servewaf` with the settings in env, has use
// send it requests at url, then stops it as SIGTERM does, checks that it
// runUntilStopped runs smallwebwaf with the settings in env, has use send
// it requests at url, then stops it as SIGTERM does, checks that it
// stopped in order, and returns its output.
func runUntilStopped(
t *testing.T, env map[string]string, use func(url string),
@@ -1263,33 +1229,43 @@ func runUntilStopped(
// wantStartingLine checks that the line at start gives the version and
// every setting's value.
func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, dir string) {
func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, appURL, dir string) {
t.Helper()
settings, _ := line["settings"].(map[string]any)
want := map[string]any{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
"SWWAF_MODE": "enforce",
stateWriteDelay: "10s",
stateCounterInterval: "15m",
"SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS": "",
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
"SWWAF_DENY_NETS": "",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "120",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR": "1500",
rateLimitPerDay: "6000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS": "",
"SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE": "403",
"SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION": "1h",
"SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW": "24h",
"SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION": "7d",
"SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION": "7d",
"SWWAF_MAX_BANS": "5000",
"SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX": "32",
"SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED": "true",
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: appURL,
stateDir: dir,
"SWWAF_MODE": "enforce",
stateWriteDelay: "10s",
stateCounterInterval: "15m",
trustedProxies: "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16",
"SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT": "60s",
"SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES": "32K",
"SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT": "120s",
"SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT": "30m",
"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT": "60s",
"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT": "30m",
"SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES": "100M",
"SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES": "1G",
"SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS": "",
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
"SWWAF_DENY_NETS": "",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "6000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR": "100000",
rateLimitPerDay: "1000000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS": "",
"SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE": "403",
"SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION": "1h",
"SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW": "24h",
"SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION": "7d",
"SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION": "7d",
"SWWAF_MAX_BANS": "5000",
"SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX": "32",
"SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED": "true",
}
for name, value := range want {
@@ -1303,11 +1279,30 @@ func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, dir string) {
}
}
// wantAllowed checks that servewaf at url allows a request from localhost.
func wantAllowed(t *testing.T, url string) {
// wantGreeting checks that a request to url gets the app's answer.
func wantGreeting(t *testing.T, url string) {
t.Helper()
wantStatus(t, url, localhost, http.StatusOK)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, url,
http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := (&http.Client{Transport: transport}).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
if err != nil || string(body) != greeting {
t.Errorf("got %q (%v), want the app's answer", body, err)
}
}
// messages returns the message of each record in received, octet-counted
@@ -1488,16 +1483,34 @@ func onlyBan(t *testing.T, dir string) map[string]any {
return file.Bans[0]
}
// wantRefused checks that servewaf at url refuses a request from localhost with
// 403, the default SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE.
// wantRefused checks that a request to url is refused with 403, the
// default SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE.
func wantRefused(t *testing.T, url string) {
t.Helper()
wantStatus(t, url, localhost, http.StatusForbidden)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, url,
http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := (&http.Client{Transport: transport}).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
}
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", res.StatusCode, http.StatusForbidden)
}
}
// wantStatus checks that a request to url from the client at from, as statusFrom
// sends it, is answered with status.
// wantStatus checks that a request to url from the client at from, as
// X-Forwarded-For names it, is answered with status.
func wantStatus(t *testing.T, url, from string, status int) {
t.Helper()
@@ -1664,10 +1677,8 @@ func (w *webhook) waitFor(t *testing.T, event string, answered bool) webhookPost
}
}
// statusFrom returns the status a request to url from the client at from is
// answered with. The request serves rproxy and servewaf alike. rproxy reads the
// client from X-Forwarded-For, and replaces the other two headers. To servewaf,
// they make it a question about that client.
// statusFrom returns the status a request to url from the client at
// from, as X-Forwarded-For names it, is answered with.
func statusFrom(t *testing.T, url, from string) int {
t.Helper()
@@ -1678,8 +1689,6 @@ func statusFrom(t *testing.T, url, from string) int {
}
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", from)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, from)
req.Header.Set("X-Request-ID", rand.Text())
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
internal/state/state_test.go
-21
View File
@@ -648,27 +648,6 @@ func TestClientWithRefusalsInTheMinuteWithoutTheirStartStopsTheStart(t *testing.
`: entry 1 has no "minute_refusals.start"`)
}
func TestClientsJSONFromAnEarlierVersionWithTokenRefusalsLoads(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, clientsJSON),
[]byte(`{"version": 1, "clients": [{"client": "203.0.113.9/32", `+
`"history": {"offences": {"token_refused": 2}}}]}`), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", clientsJSON, err)
}
params := newParams(dir)
load(t, params)
clients := params.Limiter.Snapshot()
if len(clients) != 1 || clients[0].History.Offences.TokenRefused != 2 {
t.Errorf("clients %+v, want one with its two refusals kept", clients)
}
}
func TestReputationJSONEntryWithoutAFieldItNeedsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt
Vendored
-337
View File
@@ -1,337 +0,0 @@
# Ordinary gitea requests that the Core Rule Set must let through with
# deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf. Each line is a path and query, and may end
# with one header after a space. The tests of internal/waf inspect each as a GET,
# and script/gitea-setup sends each to gitea through the setup as a GET. The Core
# Rule Set reads the query and the headers the same way for any method.
# Searches with ordinary words and symbols.
/owner/repo/search?q=package.json
/owner/repo/search?q=.gitignore
/owner/repo/search?q=docker-compose.yml
/owner/repo/search?q=python3
/owner/repo/search?q=ssh%20key
/owner/repo/search?q=feat%2Fdocker-support
/owner/repo/search?q=ls%20-la
/owner/repo/search?q=sed%20-i
/owner/repo/search?q=%2Fbin%2Fsh
/owner/repo/search?q=%60make%20check%60
/owner/repo/search?q=%60whoami%60
/owner/repo/search?q=fetch%28
/owner/repo/search?q=%24%7BVAR%7D
/owner/repo/search?q=%24%28pwd%29
/owner/repo/search?q=process.env
/owner/repo/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/search?q=%3Cscript%3E
/owner/repo/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/search?q=union%20select
/owner/repo/search?q=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A8080
/owner/repo/search?q=..%2F
/owner/repo/search?q=%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
/owner/repo/search?q=eval%28
/owner/repo/search?q=chmod%20%2Bx
/owner/repo/search?q=echo%20%24PATH
/owner/repo/search?q=java.lang.Runtime
/owner/repo/search?q=document.cookie
/owner/repo/search?q=alert%281%29
/owner/repo/search?q=__proto__
/owner/repo/search?q=C%3A%5CWindows%5CSystem32
/owner/repo/search?q=Invoke-WebRequest
/owner/repo/search?q=if%20%28a%20%3D%3D%20b%29%20%7B
/owner/repo/search?q=sudo%20apt%20install
/owner/repo/search?q=~%2F.ssh%2Fconfig
/owner/repo/search?q=.htaccess
/owner/repo/search?q=%24_GET%5B
/owner/repo/search?q=%24_POST
/owner/repo/search?q=%24_SERVER%5B%27REQUEST_URI%27%5D
/owner/repo/search?q=%3C%3Fphp%20echo
/owner/repo/search?q=information_schema
/owner/repo/search?q=LIKE%20%27%25foo%25%27
/owner/repo/search?q=onClick%3D%7B
/explore/repos?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/explore/repos?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/explore/code?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/explore/code?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/issues?type=all&state=open&q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/issues?type=all&state=open&q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/pulls?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/pulls?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/issues?type=your_repositories&q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/issues?type=your_repositories&q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/commits/branch/main/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/commits/branch/main/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/wiki/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/wiki/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/branches?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/branches?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/releases?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/releases?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/-/packages?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/-/packages?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/user/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/user/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/api/v1/repos/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/api/v1/repos/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
# Pages, raw files and edit pages of files, and the API's call for their
# contents.
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/package.json
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/package.json
/owner/repo/_edit/main/package.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/package.json
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.gitignore
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/.gitignore
/owner/repo/_edit/main/.gitignore
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/.gitignore
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/docker-compose.yml
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/docker-compose.yml
/owner/repo/_edit/main/docker-compose.yml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/docker-compose.yml
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/Dockerfile
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/Dockerfile
/owner/repo/_edit/main/Dockerfile
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/Dockerfile
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.htaccess
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/.htaccess
/owner/repo/_edit/main/.htaccess
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/.htaccess
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/rootfs/etc/passwd
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/rootfs/etc/passwd
/owner/repo/_edit/main/rootfs/etc/passwd
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/rootfs/etc/passwd
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/bin/docker-entrypoint
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/bin/docker-entrypoint
/owner/repo/_edit/main/bin/docker-entrypoint
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/bin/docker-entrypoint
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/scripts/python3-setup.sh
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/scripts/python3-setup.sh
/owner/repo/_edit/main/scripts/python3-setup.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/scripts/python3-setup.sh
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/src/java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/src/java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java
/owner/repo/_edit/main/src/java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/src/java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/java.lang.String.md
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/java.lang.String.md
/owner/repo/_edit/main/java.lang.String.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/java.lang.String.md
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/owner/repo/_edit/main/META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/process.env.d.ts
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/process.env.d.ts
/owner/repo/_edit/main/process.env.d.ts
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/process.env.d.ts
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/document.write.js
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/document.write.js
/owner/repo/_edit/main/document.write.js
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/document.write.js
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/test/fixtures/__proto__.json
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/test/fixtures/__proto__.json
/owner/repo/_edit/main/test/fixtures/__proto__.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/test/fixtures/__proto__.json
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/install-script.sh
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/install-script.sh
/owner/repo/_edit/main/install-script.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/install-script.sh
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/src/backend/catalog/information_schema.sql
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/src/backend/catalog/information_schema.sql
/owner/repo/_edit/main/src/backend/catalog/information_schema.sql
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/src/backend/catalog/information_schema.sql
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/docs/a%20b.xhtml
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/docs/a%20b.xhtml
/owner/repo/_edit/main/docs/a%20b.xhtml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/docs/a%20b.xhtml
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/%5Bdraft%5D.md
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/%5Bdraft%5D.md
/owner/repo/_edit/main/%5Bdraft%5D.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/%5Bdraft%5D.md
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/notes.txt~
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/notes.txt~
/owner/repo/_edit/main/notes.txt~
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/notes.txt~
# File names in the query string: the commit graph of a file, the API's lists
# of its commits and of its contents, an issue opened from a template, and the
# sign-in page on the way to its edit page.
/owner/repo/graph?file=package.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=package.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22package.json%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fpackage.json
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fpackage.json
/owner/repo/graph?file=.gitignore
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=.gitignore
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22.gitignore%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2F.gitignore
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2F.gitignore
/owner/repo/graph?file=docker-compose.yml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=docker-compose.yml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22docker-compose.yml%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fdocker-compose.yml
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fdocker-compose.yml
/owner/repo/graph?file=.htaccess
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=.htaccess
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22.htaccess%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2F.htaccess
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2F.htaccess
/owner/repo/graph?file=rootfs%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=rootfs%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22rootfs%2Fetc%2Fpasswd%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Frootfs%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Frootfs%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
/owner/repo/graph?file=bin%2Fdocker-entrypoint
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=bin%2Fdocker-entrypoint
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22bin%2Fdocker-entrypoint%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fbin%2Fdocker-entrypoint
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fbin%2Fdocker-entrypoint
/owner/repo/graph?file=scripts%2Fpython3-setup.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=scripts%2Fpython3-setup.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22scripts%2Fpython3-setup.sh%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fscripts%2Fpython3-setup.sh
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fscripts%2Fpython3-setup.sh
/owner/repo/graph?file=src%2Fjava.base%2Fshare%2Fclasses%2Fjava%2Flang%2FRuntime.java
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=src%2Fjava.base%2Fshare%2Fclasses%2Fjava%2Flang%2FRuntime.java
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22src%2Fjava.base%2Fshare%2Fclasses%2Fjava%2Flang%2FRuntime.java%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fsrc%2Fjava.base%2Fshare%2Fclasses%2Fjava%2Flang%2FRuntime.java
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fsrc%2Fjava.base%2Fshare%2Fclasses%2Fjava%2Flang%2FRuntime.java
/owner/repo/graph?file=java.lang.String.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=java.lang.String.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22java.lang.String.md%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fjava.lang.String.md
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fjava.lang.String.md
/owner/repo/graph?file=META-INF%2Fservices%2Forg.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=META-INF%2Fservices%2Forg.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22META-INF%2Fservices%2Forg.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2FMETA-INF%2Fservices%2Forg.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2FMETA-INF%2Fservices%2Forg.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/owner/repo/graph?file=process.env.d.ts
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=process.env.d.ts
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22process.env.d.ts%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fprocess.env.d.ts
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fprocess.env.d.ts
/owner/repo/graph?file=document.write.js
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=document.write.js
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22document.write.js%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fdocument.write.js
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fdocument.write.js
/owner/repo/graph?file=test%2Ffixtures%2F__proto__.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=test%2Ffixtures%2F__proto__.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22test%2Ffixtures%2F__proto__.json%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Ftest%2Ffixtures%2F__proto__.json
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Ftest%2Ffixtures%2F__proto__.json
/owner/repo/graph?file=install-script.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=install-script.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22install-script.sh%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Finstall-script.sh
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Finstall-script.sh
/owner/repo/graph?file=src%2Fbackend%2Fcatalog%2Finformation_schema.sql
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=src%2Fbackend%2Fcatalog%2Finformation_schema.sql
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22src%2Fbackend%2Fcatalog%2Finformation_schema.sql%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fsrc%2Fbackend%2Fcatalog%2Finformation_schema.sql
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fsrc%2Fbackend%2Fcatalog%2Finformation_schema.sql
/owner/repo/graph?file=docs%2Fa%20b.xhtml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=docs%2Fa%20b.xhtml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22docs%2Fa%20b.xhtml%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fdocs%2Fa%20b.xhtml
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fdocs%2Fa%20b.xhtml
/owner/repo/graph?file=%5Bdraft%5D.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=%5Bdraft%5D.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22%5Bdraft%5D.md%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2F%5Bdraft%5D.md
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2F%5Bdraft%5D.md
# File names of attachments uploaded through the API, to a release, an issue and
# a comment.
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=package.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=.gitignore
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=docker-compose.yml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=.htaccess
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=docker-entrypoint
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=python3-setup.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=Runtime.java
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=%5Bdraft%5D.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=notes.txt~
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=install-script.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=install-script.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=install-script.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=process.env.d.ts
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=process.env.d.ts
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=process.env.d.ts
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=java.lang.String.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=java.lang.String.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=java.lang.String.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=information_schema.sql
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=information_schema.sql
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=information_schema.sql
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=document.write.js
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=document.write.js
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=document.write.js
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=__proto__.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=__proto__.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=__proto__.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=index.xhtml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=index.xhtml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=index.xhtml
# An artifact upload from actions/upload-artifact@v3, which sends Content-Range.
/api/actions_pipeline/_apis/pipelines/workflows/1/artifacts/9b7c1f3a/upload?itemPath=artifact%2Freport.txt Content-Range: bytes 0-9/10
# Branch and tag names in the query string: deleting a branch, starting a
# release from a tag, a branch protection rule, a directory listing's last
# commits, and a container image push that reuses a layer.
/owner/repo/branches?name=docker-build
/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=docker-build
/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=docker-build
/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Fdocker-build
/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Fdocker-build
/owner/repo/branches?name=feat%2Fdocker-support
/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=feat%2Fdocker-support
/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=feat%2Fdocker-support
/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Ffeat%2Fdocker-support
/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Ffeat%2Fdocker-support
/owner/repo/branches?name=renovate%2Fdocker-build-push-action-6.x
/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=renovate%2Fdocker-build-push-action-6.x
/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=renovate%2Fdocker-build-push-action-6.x
/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Frenovate%2Fdocker-build-push-action-6.x
/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Frenovate%2Fdocker-build-push-action-6.x
/owner/repo/branches?name=python3-migration
/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=python3-migration
/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=python3-migration
/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Fpython3-migration
/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Fpython3-migration
/owner/repo/branches?name=ansible-roles
/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=ansible-roles
/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=ansible-roles
/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Fansible-roles
/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Fansible-roles
/owner/repo/branches?name=whoami
/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=whoami
/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=whoami
/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Fwhoami
/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Fwhoami
# Pages a signed-in user opens.
/
/owner/repo
/owner/repo/issues
/owner/repo/pulls
/owner/repo/releases
/owner/repo/wiki
/owner/repo/activity
/owner/repo/branches
/owner/repo/tags
/owner/repo/settings
/owner/repo/actions
/owner/repo/compare/main...main
/owner/repo/commits/branch/main
/owner/repo/archive/main.zip
/notifications
/user/settings
/user/settings/applications
/explore/repos
/-/admin
internal/waf/waf.go
+15 -95
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
// Package waf runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
// method, the URL with its query and the headers of a request, and on its
// body while SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the seven changes smallwebwaf
// makes to it and the exclusions in SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as
// "Attack detection" under "Settings" in SPEC.md describes them. It reads no
// response.
// body while SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the six changes smallwebwaf
// makes to it, as "Attack detection" under "Settings" in SPEC.md describes
// them. It reads no response.
//
// smallwebwaf writes only to its state directory, so Coraza is built with
// its no_fs_access tag, as the Dockerfile and script/build build it: of a
@@ -12,13 +11,10 @@
package waf
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"os"
"regexp"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -30,13 +26,12 @@ import (
)
// directives are the Core Rule Set as smallwebwaf runs it, with the
// paranoia level for %d, bodyDirectives for the first %s while
// SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, and the exclusions file for the second.
// Each rule smallwebwaf adds has an id from 900000 to 900999, the ids the
// Core Rule Set keeps for the rules that set it up, which
// SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES and the exclusions file refuse, so that no
// setting switches one off. Coraza joins a line ending in \ to the next,
// without the spaces at the start of the next.
// paranoia level for %d, and bodyDirectives for %s while
// SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set. Each rule smallwebwaf adds has an id from
// 900000 to 900999, the ids the Core Rule Set keeps for the rules that set
// it up, which SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES refuses, so that no setting
// switches one off. Coraza joins a line ending in \ to the next, without
// the spaces at the start of the next.
const directives = `
# The engine only detects. smallwebwaf compares the request's anomaly
# score with SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD itself, in block and detect mode
@@ -74,11 +69,6 @@ SecArgumentsLimit 1000
SecRule ARGUMENTS_LIMIT_REACHED "@eq 1" "id:900300,phase:2,pass,\
severity:'CRITICAL',setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+5'"
# The exclusions file comes before the rules, where the Core Rule Set puts
# its own file of exclusions that run before the rules, so that they run
# before the rules of phase 1 too.
%s
# The sixth: only the rules for requests are loaded, and no response is
# inspected.
Include @owasp_crs/REQUEST-*.conf
@@ -110,13 +100,6 @@ SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932260 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
# Inspect.
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932340 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 944110 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# The seventh: a container image push that reuses a layer names the image
# it takes the layer from in the query parameter from, which is not
# checked for command names. 932260 refused the push of a layer from
# owner/python3-app.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/v2/.+/blobs/uploads/$" \
"id:900500,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:from"
`
// bodyDirectives have the Core Rule Set read the part of a request body
@@ -177,51 +160,6 @@ type Params struct {
// BodyLimit is the most of a request body the Core Rule Set reads
// (SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
BodyLimit int64
// ExclusionsFile is the path of a file of exclusions loaded before the
// Core Rule Set's rules (SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE), "" while
// there is none.
ExclusionsFile string
}
// The ids of smallwebwaf's own rules, which an exclusions file may not
// name.
const (
firstOwnRuleID = 900000
lastOwnRuleID = 900999
)
// numberOrRange matches a number, or a range of numbers such as
// 900000-900999.
var numberOrRange = regexp.MustCompile(`(\d+)(?:-(\d+))?`)
// errSmallwebwafRuleID is the error of an exclusions file that names an
// id of smallwebwaf's own rules.
var errSmallwebwafRuleID = errors.New("an id of smallwebwaf's own rules")
// ownRuleNamed returns the first number or range in exclusions, the text
// of an exclusions file, that takes in an id of smallwebwaf's own rules,
// or "" if none does. Comment lines are skipped, as Coraza skips them.
func ownRuleNamed(exclusions string) string {
for line := range strings.Lines(exclusions) {
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(line), "#") {
continue
}
for _, match := range numberOrRange.FindAllStringSubmatch(line, -1) {
first, _ := strconv.Atoi(match[1])
last := first
if match[2] != "" {
last, _ = strconv.Atoi(match[2])
}
if first <= lastOwnRuleID && last >= firstOwnRuleID {
return match[0]
}
}
}
return ""
}
// CoreRuleSet is the Core Rule Set, ready to inspect requests. It is safe
@@ -231,35 +169,16 @@ type CoreRuleSet struct {
bodyLimit int64
}
// New returns the Core Rule Set with the seven changes, at params'
// paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, reading request
// bodies up to params' limit, and with params' exclusions file loaded
// before the Core Rule Set's rules. An exclusions file that cannot be
// read, does not parse or names an id of smallwebwaf's own rules is an
// error.
// New returns the Core Rule Set with the six changes, at params'
// paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, and reading request
// bodies up to params' limit.
func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
body := ""
if params.BodyLimit > 0 {
body = fmt.Sprintf(bodyDirectives, params.BodyLimit)
}
exclusions := ""
if params.ExclusionsFile != "" {
file, err := os.ReadFile(params.ExclusionsFile)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read the exclusions file: %w", err)
}
exclusions = string(file)
if named := ownRuleNamed(exclusions); named != "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("the exclusions file names %s: %w", named,
errSmallwebwafRuleID)
}
}
text := fmt.Sprintf(directives, params.ParanoiaLevel, body, exclusions)
text := fmt.Sprintf(directives, params.ParanoiaLevel, body)
if len(params.DisabledRules) > 0 {
ids := make([]string, len(params.DisabledRules))
@@ -293,7 +212,8 @@ type Result struct {
// method, its URL with the query, and its headers, the Cookie header
// without the cookies in cookiesNotRead, and on body, r's body as the
// caller has it, as readBody reads it. It returns what it found, what it
// read of body, and the error that ended the reading early, if one did.
// read of body, which the app is still to be sent, and the error that
// ended the reading early, if one did.
func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
r *http.Request, client netip.Addr, body io.Reader,
) (Result, []byte, error) {
internal/waf/waf_test.go
+1 -163
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"strconv"
@@ -120,7 +119,7 @@ func atDefaults(t *testing.T) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
}
// wantChange checks that crs lets through passes, a gitea request one of
// the seven changes is for, and still finds result in refused, a request
// the six changes is for, and still finds result in refused, a request
// like it that the change is not for.
func wantChange(
t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, passes, refused request, result waf.Result,
@@ -363,167 +362,6 @@ func TestEachDisabledRuleIsSwitchedOff(t *testing.T) {
wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, 920350, 911100), r, waf.Result{})
}
func TestImagePushThatReusesALayerIsNotCheckedForCommandNames(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := atDefaults(t)
reuse := "?mount=sha256:0000&from=owner/python3-app"
wantChange(t, crs, get("/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/"+reuse), get("/upload/"+reuse),
matched(932260))
// A command after the image's name is still refused.
wantResult(t, crs,
get("/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?from=owner/app;cat%20/etc/passwd"),
matched(930120, 932160))
}
// withExclusions returns the Core Rule Set at the defaults, with the
// exclusions file at path.
func withExclusions(path string) (*waf.CoreRuleSet, error) {
return waf.New(waf.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, ExclusionsFile: path,
})
}
// exclusionsFile writes text to a file of exclusions and returns its path.
func exclusionsFile(t *testing.T, text string) string {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "exclusions.conf")
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(text), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return path
}
// backupFileExclusion is an exclusions file that switches 920500, a rule
// of phase 1, off for the path of a backup file under /files/.
const backupFileExclusion = `SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /files/" ` +
`"id:1,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920500;REQUEST_FILENAME"` + "\n"
func TestExclusionsFileIsLoadedBeforeTheRules(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs, err := withExclusions(exclusionsFile(t, backupFileExclusion))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the exclusions: %v", err)
}
wantChange(t, crs, get("/files/notes.txt~"), get("/notes.txt~"), matched(920500))
}
func TestRuleSwitchedOffAndNamedInTheExclusionsFileIsOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: []int{920500},
ExclusionsFile: exclusionsFile(t, backupFileExclusion),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the exclusions: %v", err)
}
wantResult(t, crs, get("/notes.txt~"), waf.Result{})
}
func TestExclusionsFileMayNameAnyNumberInAComment(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := withExclusions(exclusionsFile(t,
"# 942100: GET /issues/900123\n"+backupFileExclusion))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("the exclusions did not load: %v", err)
}
}
func TestExclusionsFileThatCannotBeUsedIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, path := range []string{
filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing.conf"),
exclusionsFile(t, "SecNoSuchDirective On\n"),
// The Core Rule Set's rules are not loaded yet.
exclusionsFile(t, "SecRuleUpdateTargetById 942100 \"!ARGS:id\"\n"),
// smallwebwaf's own rules may not be switched off or changed, by
// id or in a range.
exclusionsFile(t, "SecRuleRemoveById 900300\n"),
exclusionsFile(t, "SecRuleRemoveById 899999-901000\n"),
exclusionsFile(t, "SecAction \"id:1,phase:1,pass,nolog,"+
"ctl:ruleRemoveById=899999-901000\"\n"),
exclusionsFile(t, "SecAction \"id:1,phase:1,pass,nolog,"+
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=900500;ARGS:from\"\n"),
} {
_, err := withExclusions(path)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s loaded", path)
}
}
}
// giteaRequests returns the recorded ordinary gitea requests in testdata,
// which script/gitea-setup sends too. Each has the Referer of a page that
// names the same, as a page opened from it has.
func giteaRequests(t *testing.T) []request {
t.Helper()
text, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("testdata", "gitea-requests.txt"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var requests []request
for line := range strings.Lines(string(text)) {
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
continue
}
target, header, _ := strings.Cut(line, " ")
headers := []string{"Referer: http://git.example" + target}
if header != "" {
headers = append(headers, header)
}
requests = append(requests, get(target, headers...))
}
return requests
}
func TestGiteaExclusionsLetOrdinaryGiteaRequestsThroughAndRefuseAttacks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs, err := withExclusions(filepath.Join("..", "..", "deploy", "gitea",
"crs-exclusions.conf"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load gitea's exclusions: %v", err)
}
const threshold = 5 // SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
for _, r := range giteaRequests(t) {
if got := inspect(t, crs, r); got.Score >= threshold {
t.Errorf("%s %q refused: %+v", r.target, r.headers[1:], got)
}
}
for _, attack := range []string{
"/owner/repo?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1",
"/owner/repo?id=..%2Fcustom%2Fconf%2Fapp.ini",
"/owner/repo?id=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E",
} {
if got := inspect(t, crs, get(attack)); got.Score < threshold {
t.Errorf("%s let through: %+v", attack, got)
}
}
}
// bodyLimit is SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies.
const bodyLimit = 8 << 10
script/example-app
+74 -140
View File
@@ -1,28 +1,19 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/example-app: build the image, and on it the example app in
# deploy/example-app, then run the app's container, with rproxy in it, and
# servewaf in a container of its own with a volume for the state files. It
# checks:
# - that the health checks pass;
# - that a request is served through rproxy, and a second one in a minute
# bans the client;
# - that a probe for /.env bans another client, which its next request bans
# for good;
# - that only servewaf's container changes the state directory's owner;
# - that the app still answers through rproxy with servewaf stopped, and
# that once servewaf has started again, bans apply again;
# - that `sv stop` stops rproxy in order, and `docker stop` stops each
# container without having to kill it;
# - that a new servewaf container on the same volume still refuses the banned
# client;
# - that a servewaf container with its state files on a new volume mounted at
# the directory SWWAF_STATE_DIR_FILE names becomes healthy;
# - that one whose SWWAF_STATE_DIR does not exist logs servewaf's message
# about it.
# servewaf runs with SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=off, so that no address is sent to
# GeoJS. The containers, the network, the volumes and both images are removed
# however the script ends. Building the app needs network access, for nixpkgs'
# binary cache. script/check does not run this.
# deploy/example-app, then run the app's container with a volume for the
# state files and check that the health check passes, that a request is
# served through smallwebwaf, that a second one in a minute bans the
# client, that a probe for /.env bans another client, which its next
# request bans for good, that `sv stop` stops smallwebwaf in order, that
# `docker stop` stops the container without having to kill it, that a
# new container on the same volume still refuses the banned client, that
# a container with its state files on a new volume mounted at the
# directory SWWAF_STATE_DIR_FILE names becomes healthy, and that one whose
# SWWAF_STATE_DIR does not exist logs smallwebwaf's message about it. The
# containers run with SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=off, so that no address is sent
# to GeoJS. The containers, the volumes and both images are removed
# however the script ends. Building the app needs network access, for
# nixpkgs' binary cache. script/check does not run this.
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
@@ -33,9 +24,7 @@ ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
NAME="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-example-$$"
IMAGE="$NAME-base"
APP_IMAGE="$NAME-app"
NETWORK="$NAME"
APP="$NAME-app-container"
SERVEWAF="$NAME-servewaf"
CONTAINER="$NAME"
VOLUME="$NAME-state"
# The volumes of the container whose state directory SWWAF_STATE_DIR_FILE
# names: its state files, and the file that names their directory.
@@ -43,18 +32,15 @@ MOVED_VOLUME="$NAME-moved-state"
SETTINGS_VOLUME="$NAME-settings"
cleanup() {
docker rm --force "$APP" "$SERVEWAF" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker network rm "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker rm --force "$CONTAINER" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker volume rm --force "$VOLUME" "$MOVED_VOLUME" "$SETTINGS_VOLUME" \
>/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker rmi --force "$APP_IMAGE" "$IMAGE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
fail() {
echo "example-app: $*; the app container's output:" >&2
docker logs "$APP" >&2 || true
echo "example-app: servewaf's output:" >&2
docker logs "$SERVEWAF" >&2 || true
echo "example-app: $*; the container's output:" >&2
docker logs "$CONTAINER" >&2 || true
exit 1
}
@@ -71,73 +57,52 @@ wait_for() {
done
}
# healthy <container>: docker says the container's health check passes.
healthy() {
status="$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' "$1")"
status="$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' "$CONTAINER")"
[ "$status" = healthy ]
}
# logged <container> <text>...: a line of the container's output holds every
# text, in any order.
# logged <text>...: a line of the container's output holds every text,
# in any order.
logged() {
lines="$(docker logs "$1" 2>&1)"
shift
lines="$(docker logs "$CONTAINER" 2>&1)"
for text in "$@"; do
lines="$(printf '%s\n' "$lines" | grep -F "$text")" || return 1
done
}
# start_servewaf: run servewaf from the image, with the state files on the
# volume, a rate limit of one request a minute and no client looked up, and wait
# until it is healthy.
start_servewaf() {
docker run --detach --name "$SERVEWAF" --network "$NETWORK" \
# start_container: run the app's container, with the state files on the
# volume, a rate limit of one request a minute and no client looked up,
# and wait until it is healthy.
start_container() {
docker run --detach --name "$CONTAINER" --publish 127.0.0.1::8080 \
--volume "$VOLUME:/var/lib/smallwebwaf" \
--env SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf \
--env SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE=1 \
--env SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=off \
"$IMAGE" >/dev/null
wait_for "servewaf's health check did not pass" healthy "$SERVEWAF"
}
# start_app: run the app's container, with rproxy in it, and wait until it is
# healthy.
start_app() {
docker run --detach --name "$APP" --network "$NETWORK" --publish 127.0.0.1::8080 \
--env SWRP_WAF_BACKEND="http://$SERVEWAF:8080" \
"$APP_IMAGE" >/dev/null
wait_for "the app's health check did not pass" healthy "$APP"
address="$(docker port "$APP" 8080/tcp)"
wait_for "the health check did not pass" healthy
address="$(docker port "$CONTAINER" 8080/tcp)"
}
# start_moved_servewaf: run servewaf with the state files on a new volume at
# /srv/state, which SWWAF_STATE_DIR_FILE names in a file only the smallwebwaf
# user can read, as under "Settings given as files" in docs/settings.md, and
# wait until it is healthy. servewaf can write the new volume only once the run
# script has given it to that user.
start_moved_servewaf() {
# start_moved_container: run the app's container with the state files on
# a new volume at /srv/state, which SWWAF_STATE_DIR_FILE names in a file
# only the smallwebwaf user can read, as under "Settings given as files"
# in docs/settings.md, and wait until it is healthy. smallwebwaf can write the
# new volume only once the run script has given it to that user.
start_moved_container() {
docker volume create "$MOVED_VOLUME" >/dev/null
docker volume create "$SETTINGS_VOLUME" >/dev/null
docker run --rm --volume "$SETTINGS_VOLUME:/settings" \
--entrypoint bash "$IMAGE" -c 'echo /srv/state > /settings/state-dir &&
chown smallwebwaf:smallwebwaf /settings/state-dir &&
chmod 0400 /settings/state-dir'
docker run --detach --name "$SERVEWAF" --network "$NETWORK" \
docker run --detach --name "$CONTAINER" \
--volume "$MOVED_VOLUME:/srv/state" \
--volume "$SETTINGS_VOLUME:/etc/smallwebwaf/settings:ro" \
--env SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf \
--env SWWAF_STATE_DIR_FILE=/etc/smallwebwaf/settings/state-dir \
--env SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=off \
"$IMAGE" >/dev/null
wait_for "servewaf's health check did not pass" healthy "$SERVEWAF"
}
# status_from <client> <path>: print the status a request for path from client,
# as X-Forwarded-For names it, gets. rproxy believes the header from docker's
# gateway, a private address.
status_from() {
curl --silent --output /dev/null --write-out '%{http_code}' \
--max-time 10 --header "X-Forwarded-For: $1" "http://$address$2" || true
"$APP_IMAGE" >/dev/null
wait_for "the health check did not pass" healthy
}
# refused: a request to the container gets 403, SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE's
@@ -148,14 +113,13 @@ refused() {
[ "$code" = 403 ]
}
# refused_from <client> <path>: a request for path from client gets 403.
# refused_from <client> <path>: a request for path from client, as
# X-Forwarded-For names it, gets 403. smallwebwaf believes the header
# from docker's gateway, a private address.
refused_from() {
[ "$(status_from "$1" "$2")" = 403 ]
}
# owner_of_state_dir <container>: print who owns /var/lib/smallwebwaf there.
owner_of_state_dir() {
docker exec "$1" stat --format '%U' /var/lib/smallwebwaf
code="$(curl --silent --output /dev/null --write-out '%{http_code}' \
--max-time 10 --header "X-Forwarded-For: $1" "http://$address$2")" || true
[ "$code" = 403 ]
}
main() {
@@ -167,88 +131,58 @@ main() {
docker build --no-cache --build-arg SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE="$IMAGE" \
-t "$APP_IMAGE" deploy/example-app
docker network create "$NETWORK" >/dev/null
docker volume create "$VOLUME" >/dev/null
start_servewaf
start_app
echo "example-app: the health checks pass"
[ "$(owner_of_state_dir "$SERVEWAF")" = smallwebwaf ] ||
fail "servewaf's container did not give the state directory to smallwebwaf"
[ "$(owner_of_state_dir "$APP")" = root ] ||
fail "the app's container changed the state directory's owner"
echo "example-app: only servewaf's container changes the state directory's owner"
start_container
echo "example-app: the health check passes"
page="$(curl --fail --silent --show-error --max-time 10 "http://$address/")" ||
fail "no answer on port 8080"
[ "$page" = "hello from the example app" ] || fail "port 8080 answered $page"
wait_for "servewaf logged no request it allowed" \
logged "$SERVEWAF" '"action":"forward"' '"servewaf_line":"report"'
echo "example-app: rproxy passes a request to the app and its answer back"
wait_for "smallwebwaf logged no request it forwarded" logged '"action":"forward"'
echo "example-app: smallwebwaf passes a request to the app and its answer back"
refused || fail "a second request in a minute was not refused"
wait_for "servewaf logged no ban" logged "$SERVEWAF" '"action":"rate_limited"'
wait_for "smallwebwaf logged no ban" logged '"action":"rate_limited"'
echo "example-app: a second request in a minute bans the client"
refused_from 203.0.113.9 /.env || fail "a probe for /.env was not refused"
wait_for "servewaf logged no ban for the probe" \
logged "$SERVEWAF" '"action":"banned"' '"rule_ids":["env-file"]'
wait_for "smallwebwaf logged no ban for the probe" \
logged '"action":"banned"' '"rule_ids":["env-file"]'
refused_from 203.0.113.9 / || fail "the client of the probe was let through"
wait_for "the client's next request did not make its ban permanent" \
logged "$SERVEWAF" '"ban_expires":"permanent"'
logged '"ban_expires":"permanent"'
echo "example-app: a probe for /.env bans the client, its next request for good"
docker exec "$SERVEWAF" sv stop smallwebwaf >/dev/null ||
fail "sv stop smallwebwaf failed in servewaf's container"
wait_for "servewaf did not stop in order" logged "$SERVEWAF" '"msg":"stopped"'
[ "$(status_from 203.0.113.9 /)" = 200 ] ||
fail "with servewaf stopped, the app did not answer through rproxy"
wait_for "rproxy logged no request SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION decided" \
logged "$APP" '"default_disposition":true'
docker exec "$APP" /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf healthcheck ||
fail "with servewaf stopped, the app's health check failed"
echo "example-app: with servewaf stopped, the app answers through rproxy"
docker exec "$CONTAINER" sv stop smallwebwaf >/dev/null ||
fail "sv stop smallwebwaf failed"
wait_for "smallwebwaf did not stop in order" logged '"msg":"stopped"'
echo "example-app: sv stop stops smallwebwaf in order"
docker exec "$SERVEWAF" sv start smallwebwaf >/dev/null ||
fail "sv start smallwebwaf failed in servewaf's container"
wait_for "once servewaf had started again, the ban did not apply" \
refused_from 203.0.113.9 /
echo "example-app: once servewaf has started again, bans apply again"
docker stop "$CONTAINER" >/dev/null
status="$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.ExitCode}}' "$CONTAINER")"
[ "$status" = 0 ] || fail "docker stop left exit status $status"
echo "example-app: docker stop stops the container in order"
docker exec "$APP" sv stop smallwebwaf >/dev/null ||
fail "sv stop smallwebwaf failed in the app's container"
wait_for "rproxy did not stop in order" logged "$APP" '"msg":"stopped"'
echo "example-app: sv stop stops rproxy in order"
docker rm "$CONTAINER" >/dev/null
start_container
refused || fail "the new container let the banned client through"
wait_for "smallwebwaf logged no request refused under the ban" \
logged '"action":"banned"'
echo "example-app: a new container on the same volume keeps the ban"
for container in "$APP" "$SERVEWAF"; do
docker stop "$container" >/dev/null
status="$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.ExitCode}}' "$container")"
[ "$status" = 0 ] || fail "docker stop left exit status $status"
done
echo "example-app: docker stop stops each container in order"
docker rm "$APP" "$SERVEWAF" >/dev/null
start_servewaf
start_app
refused || fail "the new servewaf container let the banned client through"
wait_for "servewaf logged no request refused under the ban" \
logged "$SERVEWAF" '"action":"banned"'
echo "example-app: a new servewaf container on the same volume keeps the ban"
docker rm --force "$SERVEWAF" >/dev/null
start_moved_servewaf
docker rm --force "$CONTAINER" >/dev/null
start_moved_container
echo "example-app: the run script gives the state files' directory named" \
"by SWWAF_STATE_DIR_FILE to the smallwebwaf user"
docker rm --force "$SERVEWAF" >/dev/null
docker run --detach --name "$SERVEWAF" --network "$NETWORK" \
--env SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf \
docker rm --force "$CONTAINER" >/dev/null
docker run --detach --name "$CONTAINER" \
--env SWWAF_STATE_DIR=/srv/missing \
--env SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=off \
"$IMAGE" >/dev/null
wait_for "servewaf did not report the missing state directory" \
logged "$SERVEWAF" "SWWAF_STATE_DIR cannot be written"
echo "example-app: servewaf reports a state directory that does not exist"
"$APP_IMAGE" >/dev/null
wait_for "smallwebwaf did not report the missing state directory" \
logged "SWWAF_STATE_DIR cannot be written"
echo "example-app: smallwebwaf reports a state directory that does not exist"
}
main "$@"
script/gitea-requests
+47 -62
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,13 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/gitea-requests: build the image and run gitea 1.27.3 behind rproxy
# and servewaf, three containers on one network. Every setting is at its
# default but these: SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL names gitea's container, SWRP_WAF_BACKEND
# names servewaf's, and SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS adds the header that labels a
# request. Then send through rproxy the gitea requests that reading gitea's
# source found the Core Rule Set refuses without the exclusions in
# deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf, and a
# short sample of gitea's ordinary use: signing in, pages of files and commits,
# a diff, the API, a push, clone and fetch over HTTP, and two container image
# pushes. Last, print each request servewaf logged, with what it did with it and
# the ids of the Core Rule Set's rules that matched it.
# script/gitea-requests: build the image and run gitea 1.27.3 behind it,
# with every setting of smallwebwaf at its default but SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL,
# which names gitea's container. Then send through it the gitea requests
# that reading gitea's source found the Core Rule Set refuses, which
# docs/gitea.md records, and a short sample of gitea's ordinary use:
# signing in, pages of files and commits, a diff, the API, a push, clone
# and fetch over HTTP, and two container image pushes. Last, print each
# request smallwebwaf logged, with what it did with it and the ids of the
# Core Rule Set's rules that matched it.
# Every request comes from one client, docker's gateway, so more than
# SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD, 30, refusals in a minute would ban it, and
# the requests after would show as banned. The containers, the network,
@@ -31,8 +29,7 @@ GITEA_IMAGE="gitea/gitea@sha256:87a67ee09d3ae0d1df5fda5dcda3e2a1f9236a45b0a59025
NAME="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-gitea-$$"
IMAGE="$NAME-image"
NETWORK="$NAME"
RPROXY="$NAME-rproxy"
SERVEWAF="$NAME-servewaf"
SMALLWEBWAF="$NAME-smallwebwaf"
GITEA="$NAME-gitea"
# gitea's one user, who owns the repository and the container images.
@@ -40,23 +37,16 @@ PASSWORD="owner-password"
BROWSER="Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:131.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/131.0"
# The header that labels a request in the report. rproxy makes every request's
# id itself, so a label cannot be the X-Request-ID.
LABEL_HEADER="X-Case"
# The default of SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS, and the header above.
LOGGED_HEADERS="accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range,x-case"
# The files the script makes, and rproxy's address once it runs, localhost and
# the port docker publishes it on: a host name, since the Core Rule Set takes a
# Host that is an IP address for a warning (920350).
# The files the script makes, and smallwebwaf's address once it runs,
# localhost and the port docker publishes it on: a host name, since the
# Core Rule Set takes a Host that is an IP address for a warning (920350).
WORK=""
address=""
cleanup() {
# So that a signal cannot stop it partway through.
trap '' HUP INT TERM
docker rm --force --volumes "$RPROXY" "$SERVEWAF" "$GITEA" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker rm --force --volumes "$SMALLWEBWAF" "$GITEA" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker network rm "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker rmi --force "$IMAGE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if [ -n "$address" ]; then
@@ -85,30 +75,30 @@ wait_for() {
done
}
# healthy <container>: docker says the container's health check passes.
healthy() {
status="$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' "$1")"
status="$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' "$SMALLWEBWAF")"
[ "$status" = healthy ]
}
# logged <text>...: a line of servewaf's output holds every text, in any order.
# logged <text>...: a line of smallwebwaf's output holds every text, in
# any order.
logged() {
lines="$(docker logs "$SERVEWAF" 2>&1)"
lines="$(docker logs "$SMALLWEBWAF" 2>&1)"
for text in "$@"; do
lines="$(printf '%s\n' "$lines" | grep -F "$text")" || return 1
done
}
# send <label> <path> <curl option>...: send a request for path to rproxy, with
# label in LABEL_HEADER, which the report gives, and keep the body of the answer
# in $WORK/answer. The Core Rule Set reads that header too, so a label names no
# file the cases name.
# send <label> <path> <curl option>...: send a request for path to
# smallwebwaf, with label as its X-Request-ID, which the report gives,
# and keep the body of the answer in $WORK/answer. The Core Rule Set
# reads that header too, so a label names no file the cases name.
send() {
label="$1"
path="$2"
shift 2
curl --silent --show-error --max-time 30 --output "$WORK/answer" \
--header "$LABEL_HEADER: $label" "$@" "http://$address$path"
--header "X-Request-ID: $label" "$@" "http://$address$path"
}
# page <label> <path> <curl option>...: send the request as a browser
@@ -183,7 +173,7 @@ make_repository() {
echo "line 41" >>"$dir/src/java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java"
repo_git -C "$dir" commit --quiet --all --message "Add a line"
repo_git -C "$dir" -c "http.extraHeader=$LABEL_HEADER: git-push" push --quiet \
repo_git -C "$dir" -c "http.extraHeader=X-Request-ID: git-push" push --quiet \
"http://owner:$PASSWORD@$address/owner/repo.git" main ||
fail "the push of the repository failed"
}
@@ -246,8 +236,9 @@ call_api() {
# push_images: push a container image to owner/python3-app, then the same
# image to owner/app. For the second, the case, docker asks gitea to take
# its layer from owner/python3-app, naming it in the query parameter
# from. docker sends no label, so the report gives its requests none. The image
# is one small file, imported rather than built.
# from. docker sends no X-Request-ID, so its requests have the ids
# smallwebwaf gives them. The image is one small file, imported rather
# than built.
push_images() {
echo "$NAME" >"$WORK/layer.txt"
tar -cf - -C "$WORK" layer.txt |
@@ -267,10 +258,10 @@ push_images() {
# clone_and_fetch: the clone and fetch over HTTP of the sample.
clone_and_fetch() {
repo_git -c "http.extraHeader=$LABEL_HEADER: git-clone" clone --quiet \
repo_git -c "http.extraHeader=X-Request-ID: git-clone" clone --quiet \
"http://owner:$PASSWORD@$address/owner/repo.git" "$WORK/clone" ||
fail "the clone failed"
repo_git -C "$WORK/clone" -c "http.extraHeader=$LABEL_HEADER: git-fetch" fetch --quiet ||
repo_git -C "$WORK/clone" -c "http.extraHeader=X-Request-ID: git-fetch" fetch --quiet ||
fail "the fetch failed"
}
@@ -280,19 +271,19 @@ field() {
printf '%s\n' "$2" | sed -n "s/.*\"$1\":\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/\1/p"
}
# report: print a line for each request rproxy reported to servewaf: what
# servewaf did with the request, the ids of the Core Rule Set's rules that
# matched it, its label, and the request. waf_blocked is a refusal by the Core
# Rule Set, and forward a request passed on to gitea, whatever gitea answered.
# report: print a line for each request smallwebwaf logged, but its
# health checks: what it did with the request, the ids of the Core Rule
# Set's rules that matched it, its X-Request-ID, and the request.
# waf_blocked is a refusal by the Core Rule Set, and forward a request
# passed on to gitea, whatever gitea answered.
report() {
docker logs "$SERVEWAF" 2>/dev/null | grep '"servewaf_line":"report"' |
sed 's/\\u0026/\&/g' >"$WORK/requests"
docker logs "$SMALLWEBWAF" 2>/dev/null | grep '"type":"request"' |
grep -v '"action":"admin"' | sed 's/\\u0026/\&/g' >"$WORK/requests"
while IFS= read -r line; do
ids="$(printf '%s\n' "$line" | sed -n 's/.*"waf_rule_ids":\[\([0-9,]*\)\].*/\1/p')"
query="$(field query "$line")"
label="$(field x-case "$line")"
printf '%-11s %-13s %-17s %s %s%s\n' "$(field action "$line")" "${ids:--}" \
"${label:--}" "$(field method "$line")" \
"$(field request_id "$line")" "$(field method "$line")" \
"$(field path "$line")" "${query:+?$query}"
done <"$WORK/requests"
echo "gitea-requests: $(grep -c . "$WORK/requests") requests," \
@@ -307,30 +298,24 @@ main() {
docker build --no-cache -t "$IMAGE" .
# rproxy first, so that gitea can be given the address it is reached at,
# and gitea's image pulled before, so that gitea starts within the minute
# rproxy's health check waits for it.
# smallwebwaf first, so that gitea can be given the address it is
# reached at, and gitea's image pulled before, so that gitea starts
# within the minute smallwebwaf's health check waits for it.
docker pull --quiet "$GITEA_IMAGE" >/dev/null
docker network create "$NETWORK" >/dev/null
docker run --detach --name "$SERVEWAF" --network "$NETWORK" \
--env SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf \
--env SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS="$LOGGED_HEADERS" \
"$IMAGE" >/dev/null
wait_for "servewaf's health check did not pass" healthy "$SERVEWAF"
docker run --detach --name "$RPROXY" --network "$NETWORK" \
docker run --detach --name "$SMALLWEBWAF" --network "$NETWORK" \
--publish 127.0.0.1::8080 \
--env SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL="http://$GITEA:3000" \
--env SWRP_WAF_BACKEND="http://$SERVEWAF:8080" \
--env SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL="http://$GITEA:3000" \
"$IMAGE" >/dev/null
published="$(docker port "$RPROXY" 8080/tcp)"
published="$(docker port "$SMALLWEBWAF" 8080/tcp)"
address="localhost:${published##*:}"
docker run --detach --name "$GITEA" --network "$NETWORK" \
--env GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true \
--env GITEA__server__ROOT_URL="http://$address/" \
"$GITEA_IMAGE" >/dev/null
# rproxy's health check passes once gitea takes connections.
wait_for "rproxy's health check did not pass" healthy "$RPROXY"
# smallwebwaf's health check passes once gitea takes connections.
wait_for "the health check did not pass" healthy
docker exec --user git "$GITEA" gitea admin user create --admin \
--username owner --password "$PASSWORD" --email owner@example.invalid \
--must-change-password=false >/dev/null
@@ -343,8 +328,8 @@ main() {
# The fetch's last request is the last of all; once it is logged, so
# is every other.
wait_for "servewaf logged no report of the fetch" \
logged '"x-case":"git-fetch"' '"method":"POST"' '"servewaf_line":"report"'
wait_for "smallwebwaf logged no line for the fetch" \
logged '"request_id":"git-fetch"' '"method":"POST"'
report
}
script/gitea-setup
-293
View File
@@ -1,293 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/gitea-setup: build the image, bring up deploy/gitea under a project
# name of its own, and check it:
# - that a page load, a push and a clone sent through traefik pass through
# rproxy, and that servewaf checks them;
# - that gitea logs the visitor's address, not rproxy's;
# - that a request from a container on the shared network skips the checks;
# - that the Core Rule Set refuses none of the ordinary gitea requests in
# internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt;
# - that it refuses none of the API calls with JSON bodies;
# - that it refuses no fetch;
# - that it refuses SQL injection, path traversal and script injection in a
# query string;
# - that with servewaf stopped, gitea still answers through rproxy.
# It publishes no port of traefik's, since this host's ports 80 and 443 may be
# taken. It reaches traefik at its address on the shared network instead, so
# its own requests come from the network's gateway, which servewaf checks like
# any visitor. Two runs at once on one docker host cannot both start, since
# both would use the subnet compose.yaml names. The containers, the network,
# the volumes, the image and the files the script makes are removed however it
# ends; the gitea and traefik images stay, as the base images of a build do.
# It needs network access. script/check does not run this.
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
# Named after this run, so that runs in other clones on the same host
# never touch each other's.
NAME="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-gitea-setup-$$"
IMAGE="$NAME-image"
NETWORK="${NAME}_shared"
VISITOR="$NAME-visitor"
# The site's host name and gitea's image, as deploy/gitea/compose.yaml names
# them. gitea's image also runs the container on the shared network.
SITE="git.example.org"
# gitea 1.27.3, 2026-08-29
GITEA_IMAGE="gitea/gitea@sha256:87a67ee09d3ae0d1df5fda5dcda3e2a1f9236a45b0a59025d6e00e46adc43bef"
# gitea's one user, who owns the repository.
PASSWORD="owner-password"
# The files the script makes, gitea's secret key for this run, and traefik's
# and the gateway's addresses on the shared network once the setup runs.
WORK=""
secret_key=""
traefik=""
gateway=""
cleanup() {
# So that a signal cannot stop it partway through.
trap '' HUP INT TERM
docker rm --force "$VISITOR" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if [ -n "$WORK" ]; then
compose down --volumes --remove-orphans --timeout 5 >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
rm -rf "$WORK"
fi
docker rmi --force "$IMAGE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
# compose <argument>...: docker compose on the setup, under this run's project
# name, with the image built here, this run's secret key and no port of
# traefik's published.
compose() {
SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE="$IMAGE" GITEA_SECRET_KEY="$secret_key" \
docker compose --project-name "$NAME" \
--file "$ROOT/deploy/gitea/compose.yaml" --file "$WORK/no-ports.yaml" "$@"
}
fail() {
echo "gitea-setup: $*; the last lines of each container's output:" >&2
compose logs --no-color --tail 30 >&2 || true
exit 1
}
# wait_for <what fails> <command>...: run the command every second until
# it succeeds, for at most a minute.
wait_for() {
failure="$1"
shift
tries=0
until "$@"; do
tries=$((tries + 1))
[ "$tries" -lt 60 ] || fail "$failure"
sleep 1
done
}
# logged <service> <text>...: a line of the service's output holds every text,
# in any order.
logged() {
lines="$(compose logs --no-color --no-log-prefix "$1" 2>&1)"
shift
for text in "$@"; do
lines="$(printf '%s\n' "$lines" | grep -F -e "$text")" || return 1
done
}
# send <path> <curl option>...: send a request for path to the site, at
# traefik's address, and print the status of the answer, 000 for none. traefik
# answers with a certificate it made itself, since the setup names no
# certificate resolver.
send() {
path="$1"
shift
curl --silent --show-error --insecure --max-time 30 --output /dev/null \
--write-out '%{http_code}' --resolve "$SITE:443:$traefik" "$@" \
"https://$SITE$path" || true
}
# routed: traefik passes a request for the site's front page on to gitea.
routed() {
[ "$(send / 2>/dev/null)" = 200 ]
}
# site_git <git argument>...: run git as the owner, without the host's own git
# settings, reaching the site at traefik's address. git gives up on a transfer
# slower than 1000 bytes a second for 30 seconds.
site_git() {
GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=/dev/null GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM=1 git \
-c user.name=owner -c user.email=owner@example.invalid \
-c http.sslVerify=false -c "http.curloptResolve=$SITE:443:$traefik" \
-c http.lowSpeedLimit=1000 -c http.lowSpeedTime=30 "$@"
}
# address_of <service>: print the service's address on the shared network.
address_of() {
docker inspect --format "{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks \"$NETWORK\").IPAddress}}" \
"$(compose ps --quiet "$1")"
}
# passed_through <method> <path>: rproxy passed a request from the gateway for
# path to gitea on servewaf's allow, and servewaf checked it: its report line
# gives the client's counts and the Core Rule Set's score.
passed_through() {
wait_for "rproxy logged no $1 $2 that servewaf allowed" logged rproxy \
"\"method\":\"$1\"" "\"path\":\"$2\"" "\"client_ip\":\"$gateway\"" \
'"disposition":"allow"'
wait_for "servewaf logged no check of $1 $2" logged servewaf \
'"servewaf_line":"report"' "\"method\":\"$1\"" "\"path\":\"$2\"" \
"\"client_ip\":\"$gateway\"" '"action":"forward"' '"counts":' '"waf_score":'
}
# refused: print each request servewaf logged as refused, for any reason.
refused() {
compose logs --no-color --no-log-prefix servewaf 2>&1 |
grep -F '"servewaf_line":"report"' | grep -v -F '"action":"forward"' || true
}
# ordinary_requests: sign in as the owner, save a file and open an issue
# through the API with JSON bodies, then send, signed in, each request in
# internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt, with the header its line ends with,
# if any, and that request's own address as its Referer, as a page opened from it
# has. One a second keeps them under the default limit of 120 requests a minute,
# since a request refused for a limit is never inspected. Fail if servewaf
# refuses any of them.
ordinary_requests() {
send /user/login --cookie-jar "$WORK/cookies" >/dev/null
status="$(send /user/login --cookie "$WORK/cookies" --cookie-jar "$WORK/cookies" \
--header "Origin: https://$SITE" --data-urlencode user_name=owner \
--data-urlencode "password=$PASSWORD")"
[ "$status" = 303 ] || fail "signing in was answered $status"
content="$(printf 'declare const env: Record<string, string>;\n' | base64)"
status="$(send /api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/process.env.d.ts \
--user "owner:$PASSWORD" --header "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data "{\"message\":\"Add process.env.d.ts\",\"content\":\"$content\"}")"
[ "$status" = 201 ] || fail "saving a file through the API was answered $status"
status="$(send /api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues --user "owner:$PASSWORD" \
--header "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{"title":"ls -la fails","body":"SELECT * FROM users; <img src=x>"}')"
[ "$status" = 201 ] || fail "opening an issue through the API was answered $status"
grep -v -e '^#' -e '^$' "$ROOT/internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt" |
while read -r target header; do
if [ -n "$header" ]; then
send "$target" --globoff --cookie "$WORK/cookies" \
--header "Referer: https://$SITE$target" --header "$header" >/dev/null
else
send "$target" --globoff --cookie "$WORK/cookies" \
--header "Referer: https://$SITE$target" >/dev/null
fi
sleep 1
done
# The last request's report is logged once its answer has ended.
send /api/v1/settings/api >/dev/null
wait_for "servewaf logged no report of the last ordinary request" logged servewaf \
'"servewaf_line":"report"' '"path":"/api/v1/settings/api"'
refusals="$(refused)"
[ -z "$refusals" ] || fail "servewaf refused ordinary requests:
$refusals"
}
# attacks: send SQL injection, path traversal and script injection in a query
# string, and fail unless the Core Rule Set refuses each.
attacks() {
# The traversal climbs one directory: the default rule file refuses two or
# more first, before the Core Rule Set runs.
for query in "id=1'%20OR%20'1'%3D'1" "id=..%2Fcustom%2Fconf%2Fapp.ini" \
"id=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E"; do
status="$(send "/owner/repo?$query")"
[ "$status" = 403 ] || fail "the attack ?$query was answered $status"
wait_for "servewaf logged no refusal of ?$query" logged servewaf \
'"servewaf_line":"report"' '"action":"waf_blocked"' "\"query\":\"$query\""
done
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
trap cleanup EXIT
trap 'exit 1' HUP INT TERM
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
printf 'services:\n traefik:\n ports: !reset []\n' >"$WORK/no-ports.yaml"
docker build --no-cache -t "$IMAGE" .
secret_key="$(docker run --rm "$GITEA_IMAGE" gitea generate secret SECRET_KEY)"
# rproxy is healthy once gitea takes connections.
compose up --detach --quiet-pull --wait --wait-timeout 120 ||
fail "the setup did not start"
traefik="$(address_of traefik)"
gateway="$(docker network inspect --format '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Gateway}}' "$NETWORK")"
wait_for "traefik did not route the site to rproxy" routed
compose exec --user git gitea gitea admin user create --admin \
--username owner --password "$PASSWORD" --email owner@example.invalid \
--must-change-password=false >/dev/null || fail "creating gitea's user failed"
status="$(send /api/v1/user/repos --user "owner:$PASSWORD" \
--header "Content-Type: application/json" --data '{"name":"repo"}')"
[ "$status" = 201 ] || fail "creating the repository was answered $status"
status="$(send /owner/repo)"
[ "$status" = 200 ] || fail "the repository's page was answered $status"
passed_through GET /owner/repo
echo "gitea-setup: a page load passes through rproxy, and servewaf checks it"
wait_for "gitea did not log the visitor's address" logged gitea \
"GET /owner/repo for $gateway:"
echo "gitea-setup: gitea logs the visitor's address, not rproxy's"
site_git init --quiet --initial-branch=main "$WORK/repo"
echo "hello" >"$WORK/repo/README.md"
site_git -C "$WORK/repo" add README.md
site_git -C "$WORK/repo" commit --quiet --message "Add a README"
site_git -C "$WORK/repo" push --quiet \
"https://owner:$PASSWORD@$SITE/owner/repo.git" main ||
fail "the push failed"
passed_through POST /owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack
echo "gitea-setup: a push passes through rproxy, and servewaf checks it"
site_git clone --quiet "https://owner:$PASSWORD@$SITE/owner/repo.git" \
"$WORK/clone" || fail "the clone failed"
[ "$(cat "$WORK/clone/README.md")" = hello ] || fail "the clone lacks the README"
passed_through POST /owner/repo.git/git-upload-pack
echo "gitea-setup: a clone passes through rproxy, and servewaf checks it"
# A container on the shared network, as sandcastle is, asks for the site
# by its name, and so reaches traefik from its own address.
status="$(docker run --rm --name "$VISITOR" --network "$NETWORK" \
--entrypoint curl "$GITEA_IMAGE" --silent --insecure --max-time 30 \
--output /dev/null --write-out '%{http_code}' "https://$SITE/api/v1/version" ||
true)"
[ "$status" = 200 ] || fail "the request from the shared network was answered $status"
wait_for "servewaf logged no request from the shared network" logged servewaf \
'"servewaf_line":"report"' '"path":"/api/v1/version"' '"action":"forward"'
line="$(compose logs --no-color --no-log-prefix servewaf |
grep -F '"servewaf_line":"report"' | grep -F '"path":"/api/v1/version"')"
case "$line" in
*"\"client_ip\":\"$gateway\""*)
fail "the request from the shared network came from the gateway" ;;
*'"counts":'* | *'"waf_score":'*)
fail "servewaf checked the request from the shared network" ;;
esac
echo "gitea-setup: a request from the shared network skips the checks"
site_git -C "$WORK/clone" fetch --quiet || fail "the fetch failed"
ordinary_requests
echo "gitea-setup: the Core Rule Set refuses no ordinary gitea request"
attacks
echo "gitea-setup: the Core Rule Set refuses the attacks"
compose stop servewaf >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "servewaf did not stop"
status="$(send /owner/repo)"
[ "$status" = 200 ] ||
fail "with servewaf stopped, the repository's page was answered $status"
wait_for "rproxy logged no request SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION decided" \
logged rproxy '"path":"/owner/repo"' '"default_disposition":true'
echo "gitea-setup: with servewaf stopped, gitea answers through rproxy"
}
main "$@"
script/run
+5 -31
View File
@@ -1,29 +1,14 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/run: build bin/smallwebwaf with script/build and run servewaf and
# rproxy on the host, with the settings in the environment, until rproxy
# exits or the script is told to stop. rproxy listens on port 8080 unless
# SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR says otherwise, in front of the app at SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL.
# servewaf listens on port 8090 unless SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR says otherwise, and
# rproxy asks it there unless SWRP_WAF_BACKEND says otherwise. Unless
# SWWAF_STATE_DIR is set, the state files go in bin/state, beside the binary,
# and unless SWWAF_RULES_DIR is set, the rule files are those of share/rules.d,
# script/run: build bin/smallwebwaf with script/build and run it, with
# the settings in the environment. Unless SWWAF_STATE_DIR is set, the
# state files go in bin/state, beside the binary, and unless
# SWWAF_RULES_DIR is set, the rule files are those of share/rules.d,
# which the image ships.
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
SERVEWAF=""
RPROXY=""
# stop_both: stop what runs, and wait for it, so that servewaf writes its state
# files.
stop_both() {
trap '' HUP INT TERM
kill $SERVEWAF $RPROXY 2>/dev/null || true
wait || true
}
main() {
"$SCRIPT_DIR/build"
if [ -z "${SWWAF_STATE_DIR+set}" ]; then
@@ -35,18 +20,7 @@ main() {
SWWAF_RULES_DIR="$ROOT/share/rules.d"
export SWWAF_RULES_DIR
fi
SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR="${SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR:-:8090}"
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND="${SWRP_WAF_BACKEND:-http://127.0.0.1:${SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR##*:}}"
export SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR SWRP_WAF_BACKEND
trap stop_both EXIT
trap 'exit 1' HUP INT TERM
"$ROOT/bin/smallwebwaf" servewaf &
SERVEWAF=$!
"$ROOT/bin/smallwebwaf" rproxy &
RPROXY=$!
wait "$RPROXY"
exec "$ROOT/bin/smallwebwaf"
}
main "$@"
share/smallwebwaf.run
+9 -25
View File
@@ -2,38 +2,22 @@
set -euo pipefail
# runit's run script for smallwebwaf, run again whenever smallwebwaf
# exits; the wait spaces out the restarts. SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND names the
# command to run: rproxy when it is unset or empty, or servewaf. With any
# other value the script starts nothing and stops with a message naming it.
# exits; the wait spaces out the restarts. The state directory and every
# file in it are given to the smallwebwaf user, so that a volume mounted
# there needs no change of owner; chown -R changes a symbolic link itself,
# never what it points to. When SWWAF_STATE_DIR, in either form, cannot be
# read or is not the absolute path of a directory, no owner is changed,
# and smallwebwaf starts and stops with a message naming the setting. A
# change of owner that fails, as on a volume mounted read-only, does not
# end the script either: smallwebwaf reports a directory it cannot write.
# exec, so that the signal `sv stop` sends reaches smallwebwaf itself.
main() {
sleep 1
local command="${SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND:-rproxy}"
case "$command" in
rproxy) ;;
servewaf) give_state_dir_to_smallwebwaf ;;
*)
printf 'SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: "%s" is not rproxy or servewaf\n' \
"$command" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
exec chpst -u smallwebwaf:smallwebwaf /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf "$command"
}
# give_state_dir_to_smallwebwaf gives the state directory and every file in
# it to the smallwebwaf user, so that a volume mounted there needs no change
# of owner; chown -R changes a symbolic link itself, never what it points
# to. When SWWAF_STATE_DIR, in either form, cannot be read or is not the
# absolute path of a directory, no owner is changed, and servewaf starts and
# stops with a message naming the setting. A change of owner that fails, as
# on a volume mounted read-only, does not end the script either: servewaf
# reports a directory it cannot write.
give_state_dir_to_smallwebwaf() {
local dir
if dir="$(state_dir)" && [[ "$dir" == /* && -d "$dir" ]]; then
chown -R smallwebwaf:smallwebwaf "$dir" || true
fi
exec chpst -u smallwebwaf:smallwebwaf /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf
}
# state_dir prints SWWAF_STATE_DIR, /var/lib/smallwebwaf when it is unset,