sneak/smallwebwaf
1
0 Fork 0
Code Issues 16 Pull Requests 6 Actions 2 Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Compare commits

base: sneak/smallwebwaf:de9c71a7966c811729e7040bfb6c6e104292fd6f
sneak/smallwebwaf:main sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-204-routewatch-tags sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-229-request-log-action-names sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-211-viper-config sneak/smallwebwaf:next sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-220-apps-by-hostname sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-216-oci-labels sneak/smallwebwaf:readme-rewrite-155
sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc2 sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc1
..
compare: sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-229-request-log-action-names
sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-204-routewatch-tags sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-229-request-log-action-names sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-211-viper-config sneak/smallwebwaf:next sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-220-apps-by-hostname sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-216-oci-labels sneak/smallwebwaf:main sneak/smallwebwaf:readme-rewrite-155
sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc2 sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc1
3 Commits
de9c71a796 .. issue-229-request-log-action-names
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 7fbe89469d Name request log actions so they say what they mean (closes #229)
check / check (push) In progress
Details 
Rename too_large, rate_limited, rule_blocked and denied, and split banned
into temporarily_banned and permanently_banned by whether the ban runs out.
A request that makes a ban permanent gets permanently_banned. A ban rule, a
trap path or a CrowdSec decision gets the value for the ban it makes, and in
observe mode would_action names the ban enforce mode would have made.

The offence kind rule_blocked follows, as a metric label and a key in
clients.json.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-11-09 04:05:44 +00:00
clawbot d7c62f2854 Say which bytes the byte limits count, and what passing one does (closes #203)
check / check (push) Failing after 3m48s
Details 
sneak asked for every document to be audited for sentences that do not say what they mean. The byte limits now say which bytes count (response bodies, request bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says, WebSocket traffic included) and what passing one does. Other unclear or false sentences in `README.md`, `SPEC.md`, `EVALUATION.md` and `docs/` are rewritten.

Documents only. `REPO_POLICIES.md` is shared policy text and stayed out.

Model: fable-5-1 (first audit); opus-5-5 (rework)
 2026-11-09 04:03:17 +01:00
clawbot c66277b111 Request tags, with refusing and limits per tag (closes #175)
check / check (push) Failing after 5m8s
Details 
Each request gets tags, logged as `tags`: `asn=`, `country=`, one per `SWW_TAG_LISTS` list holding the client, `crowdsec`, `dnsbl=<zone>`, `abuseipdb` and `exploitsignature`. `SWW_TAG_DENY` refuses by tag and `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` lowers limits by tag. They replace `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT`, `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` and `SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES`, with no aliases. A tag in those settings that nothing configured can give stops the start.

Judgement call: `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` stays, its entries counting like `asn=` tags.
Judgement call: `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` also lowers byte limits, as the settings it replaces did.
Trips a reader: `sww_country_list_refusals_total` now counts only `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` refusals.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-11-09 03:30:49 +01:00
48 changed files with 691 additions and 491 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files

No files matched your search

EVALUATION.md
+56 -44
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
- R1: rate limits per minute, per hour and per day
- R2: netblocks that bypass rate limiting
- R3: alerts on attacks through webhook, Slack or ntfy
- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests or bytes per minute or hour, for given IPs
or netblocks, crossing a threshold
- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests made or bytes transferred per minute or
hour, for given IPs or netblocks, crossing a threshold
- R5: temporary blocks for abusers, permanent bans for repeat offenders
- R6: one or more RBLs or IP reputation APIs
- R7: AS number lookup
@@ -24,14 +24,19 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
## Verdict
Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8 (scaling limits by AS
number or country) or the bytes half of R4 at all, and the tools that come
closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML or a web UI.
The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar; `SPEC.md` in this
directory begins that spec. It reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field as
libraries and data sources (Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set for attack
detection, DNSBLs, AbuseIPDB, optionally a CrowdSec decision feed) instead of
reimplementing them.
Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8, which asks for limits
scaled by AS number or country. None meets R4's alerts on bytes transferred. The
tools that come closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML
or a web UI. The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar;
`SPEC.md` in this directory begins that spec.
The sidecar reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field instead of
reimplementing them. It takes these as libraries and data sources:
- Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set, for attack detection
- DNSBLs
- AbuseIPDB
- optionally, a CrowdSec decision feed
Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
@@ -45,13 +50,16 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
external blacklist URLs, optional CrowdSec), R7 partly (AS number used for
blacklist and whitelist decisions), R9 (ModSecurity with the Core Rule
Set, or Coraza plugin), env-var settings.
- Fails: R8 (AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a
limit), R4 (no volume or byte threshold alerts in the free edition;
reporting is a paid feature), R5 escalation, and R10 in spirit: since 1.6
it needs a `bunkerweb` container plus a `bw-scheduler` container and a
database, or the all-in-one image that bundles nginx, scheduler, UI and
Redis in one container. It is designed to be the front door for many
sites, not a per-app sidecar. AGPL-3.0.
- Fails:
- R8: AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a limit.
- R4: no alerts on request-count or byte thresholds in the free edition;
reporting is a paid feature.
- R5: no escalation for repeat offenders.
- R10: since 1.6 it is not one plain sidecar. It needs a `bunkerweb`
container, a `bw-scheduler` container and a database, or the
all-in-one image that bundles nginx, the scheduler, the UI and Redis.
- It is designed as the proxy in front of many sites, not as a sidecar for
one app. AGPL-3.0.
- Unverified: whether several rates (minute, hour, day) can be stacked on
the same URL pattern; the documented design is one rate per URL pattern.
- CrowdSec is the strongest detection and ban engine, but it is not a proxy.
@@ -66,16 +74,20 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
listed AS numbers is possible, but each is a hand-written YAML scenario,
it reacts after the fact by banning, and it is not an inline limiter that
answers 429.
- Fails: R10 (needs the security engine container with persistent state, log
acquisition from traefik, a bouncer such as the traefik plugin, and YAML
for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications), bytes half of R4.
- Fails:
- R10, because it needs:
- the security engine container with persistent state
- log acquisition from traefik
- a bouncer such as the traefik plugin
- YAML for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications
- R4's alerts on bytes.
- CrowdSec plus traefik's own `rateLimit` middleware is the best combination
with no new code. It gives inline limiting (one window per middleware, keyed
by IP, with `sourceCriterion` exclusions), bans with escalation, alerts and
reputation. It still fails R8, the bytes half of R4, R1's three stacked
windows only by chaining three middlewares per router, and R10 entirely: the
configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not in
one sidecar's environment.
reputation lookups. It still fails R8, R4's alerts on bytes, and R10 entirely:
the configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not
in one sidecar's environment. It meets R1's three windows only by chaining
three middlewares per router.
## Candidate by candidate
@@ -87,10 +99,10 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
cached, streamed decision list (recommended), standalone against the
central API, or AppSec only. Supports captcha remediation.
- Covers: R5, R6, R9, R3 and R7 through the engine (see Verdict).
- Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4 bytes.
- Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4's alerts on bytes.
- Configuration: traefik static config to load the plugin, dynamic config or
labels for the middleware, CrowdSec YAML for everything else.
- Sidecar fit: no. It lives inside traefik, plus a separate engine
- Sidecar fit: no. It runs inside traefik and needs a separate engine
container.
- Maturity: widely used (about 900 stars, listed in the traefik plugin
catalog, documented by CrowdSec itself), actively maintained. Traefik
@@ -115,7 +127,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- What it is: nginx-derived (Tengine) reverse proxy with a proprietary
semantic detection engine and a web console. About 22,000 stars.
- Covers: R9 well, basic per-IP rate limiting with block duration, bot
challenge, authentication gate.
challenge, authentication in front of the app.
- Misses: R8, R7, R4; R1 has one window per rule. Country blocking, alert
messages, syslog forwarding and the better reputation database are paid
(Lite about 10 USD per month, Pro about 100 USD per month); the free
@@ -128,7 +140,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- Coraza (`corazawaf/coraza`) and Coraza-based proxies
- What it is: a Go library that implements the ModSecurity rule language and
runs the OWASP Core Rule Set. OWASP project, actively maintained, the
successor path now that ModSecurity is in maintenance only.
successor to ModSecurity, which is now in maintenance only.
- Packagings: `coraza-caddy` (Caddy module), `coraza-spoa` (HAProxy),
`coraza-proxy-wasm` (Envoy), a traefik WASM plugin, and
`coreruleset/coraza-crs-docker` (Caddy plus Coraza plus the Core Rule Set,
@@ -142,7 +154,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- ModSecurity Core Rule Set containers (`owasp/modsecurity-crs`)
- What it is: official images of Apache or nginx with ModSecurity and the
Core Rule Set, as a reverse proxy configured by env vars (`BACKEND`,
paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images carry
paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images contain
ModSecurity 2.9.x on Apache and Core Rule Set 4.x.
- Covers: R9, and R10 (single container, env vars, one backend).
- Misses: R1 to R8.
@@ -152,8 +164,8 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- Anubis (`TecharoHQ/anubis`), 1.27 current
- What it is: a single-binary reverse proxy that makes browsers solve a
proof-of-work challenge before passing them to `TARGET`. Aimed at
scrapers, which is likely a large share of unwanted traffic on a public
code forge.
scrapers, which are likely a large share of the unwanted traffic on a
public code forge.
- Covers: R10 well (one container, env vars for listener, target,
difficulty, cookies). Policy rules can match on path, user agent, headers,
IP ranges, and with the vendor's hosted data service also AS number and
@@ -180,13 +192,13 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
temporary ban, no escalation, state lost on traefik restart) and R2
(allowlist). Nothing else.
- `juitde/traefik-plugin-fail2ban`, fail2ban connector plugins, GeoBlock
plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): same
shape, each one small feature, configured in traefik, state in memory.
plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): each adds
one small feature, is configured in traefik and keeps its state in memory.
- Sidecar fit: no; they live inside traefik.
- Traefik built-in middlewares
- `rateLimit` (one average-and-burst window per middleware, optional Redis
in traefik 3.x), `inFlightReq`, `ipAllowList`. No bans, alerts, reputation
or AS number awareness.
lookups or AS number lookups.
- caddy-waf (`fabriziosalmi/caddy-waf`), 0.4.x
- What it is: a Caddy module with regex rules and anomaly scoring, per-IP
and per-path rate limiting with one configurable window, IP and DNS
@@ -198,12 +210,12 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- open-appsec (Check Point)
- Machine-learning WAF agent attached to nginx, Kong, Envoy or similar, with
a declarative policy file or the vendor's cloud console. Covers R9 only;
rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. Not a sidecar in the
required sense.
rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. It attaches to an
existing proxy, so it is not the sidecar R10 asks for.
- iocaine
- Serves generated garbage pages to clients the fronting proxy classifies as
scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope except as a
curiosity for scraper traffic.
scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope, and only of
passing interest for scraper traffic.
- Pangolin
- A tunnelled access platform that bundles traefik and optionally CrowdSec.
Replaces the ingress rather than adding a sidecar; out of scope.
@@ -214,17 +226,17 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
Everyone else offers one window per rule or none.
- R2 bypass netblocks: BunkerWeb, CrowdSec, traefik, fail2ban plugins.
- R3 alerts: CrowdSec (best), BunkerWeb (denied requests only), SafeLine (paid).
- R4 volume and byte anomalies: none. CrowdSec can approximate request-count
anomalies with a custom scenario; nothing handles bytes.
- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb has fixed or permanent,
not both by history.
- R4 alerts on request counts and bytes: none. CrowdSec can approximate alerts
on request counts with a custom scenario; no surveyed tool alerts on bytes.
- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb's ban is either one
fixed length or permanent, and does not change with a client's history.
- R6 reputation: CrowdSec, BunkerWeb, go-away, caddy-waf (static lists).
- R7 AS number lookup: CrowdSec (enrichment), BunkerWeb and caddy-waf (allow or
deny), Anubis (hosted service).
- R8 biased thresholds: none.
- R9 attack detection: Coraza or ModSecurity with the Core Rule Set (open,
standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps the
first).
standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps Coraza
or ModSecurity).
- R10 env-var sidecar: `owasp/modsecurity-crs`, `coraza-crs-docker`, Anubis.
None of these covers anything beyond its one job.
README.md
+129 -124
View File
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ without an answer in time, `rproxy` passes the request to the app.
It protects against:
- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Each client gets a limit on
requests and on bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults leave
room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that keeps up
one request every 2 seconds. A client over a limit is refused and banned: for
a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently when
it keeps at it.
requests and on body bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults
leave room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that
keeps up one request every 2 seconds. A client that breaks a limit is banned:
for a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently
when it keeps at it.
- Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The
default rule file bans such a client at its first probe, and its next request
during the ban makes the ban permanent. Your own rules, or a list of trap
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ does.
the request have `"action":"forward"`.
- To see a refusal without banning yourself, run `discriminator` with
`SWW_MODE=observe` and ask for `/.env`. The request reaches the app.
`discriminator`'s log lines have `"would_action":"banned"` and
`discriminator`'s log lines have `"would_action":"temporarily_banned"` and
`"rule_ids":["env-file"]`. A ban you get in `enforce` mode is lifted as
"Clients and bans" below describes.
- With `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` set, this answers with the metrics, from a host on
@@ -210,128 +210,132 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100. A path prefix starts with `/`.
- `off` switches a limit, a threshold or a timeout off where the table says a
setting takes it.
- The byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count only body bytes: the
app's response bodies, the visitors' request bodies, or both, as
`SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent over
a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
- An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged
on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`.
Every setting the code reads, with its default:
| Variable | Default | What it does |
| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `502`, or cut off once it has started. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | How long the visitor may take to send its request line and headers, and then the whole request to reach the app, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse. |
| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | Which body bytes the byte limits count: `response`, `request` or `both`. |
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs`, a web service, `file`, or `off`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWW_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
| `SWW_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
| `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| Variable | Default | What it does |
| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWW_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
| `SWW_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
| `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. |
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
@@ -527,8 +531,9 @@ of the request reaches the app.
17. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
18. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `discriminator` a report with the status
and the bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts the
bytes toward the byte limits and adds the request to the client's history.
and the body bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts
the bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names toward the byte limits, bans the client if
they take it past one, and adds the request to the client's history.
A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a Core
Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has false
SPEC.md
+41 -25
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ to them.
key or a token stays off until the operator supplies it.
- It keeps a site answering while the part that decides is down, slow or
restarting (see "Without an answer from `discriminator`").
- It limits each client's requests and bytes per minute, hour and day. It bounds
the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
- It limits each client's requests and body bytes per minute, hour and day. It
bounds the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
- It bans abusers: briefly at first, for seven days on a clear sign of attack,
and permanently when they keep at it.
- It looks up each client's AS number and country. It can refuse whole countries
@@ -192,11 +192,12 @@ request log's `heuristic` field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and
sent is removed.
18. After the visitor's answer has ended, `rproxy` sends the report (see "The
report"). `discriminator` then counts:
- For a request it allowed, the response bytes, the request bytes or both
are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. For a
WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client whose
total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit and
is banned (`byte_limits`). The response in progress is not cut off.
- For a request it allowed, the body bytes of the response, of the request
or of both are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. For
a WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client
whose total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit
and is banned (`byte_limits`). The request that broke it has already been
passed on whole; nothing is cut off.
- For a request it allowed, the client's history and the anomaly counters
are updated, and the alert thresholds are evaluated.
@@ -259,7 +260,8 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
clear sign of attack bans it permanently at once.
- A broken limit, one of:
- a request over a rate limit;
- a response that takes the client's byte total past a byte limit;
- the bytes counted for a request and its response taking the client's total
past a byte limit;
- more than `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` refusals within a minute.
The bans for a broken limit:
@@ -315,6 +317,13 @@ ban is dropped alike. A scanner whose ban was dropped that way is refused and
banned again by its next probe. A ban whose cause is `admin` is never dropped
and does not count toward `SWW_MAX_BANS`, so such bans can never fill the table.
A request refused under a ban that runs out is logged with the action
`temporarily_banned`. Under a permanent ban the action is `permanently_banned`.
A request refused for a clear sign of attack or a CrowdSec decision takes the
action for the ban it made. A request that makes a ban permanent is logged as
`permanently_banned`. A request over a rate limit is logged as
`client_is_rate_limited`, whichever ban it makes.
## Settings
`docs/settings.md` lists every setting with its default and the values it takes,
@@ -448,10 +457,15 @@ the same way.
### Byte limits, per client
By default there is no minute limit, so a client can download in a burst at full
speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB and the day limit to 100 GiB. They
allow several downloads of a few GiB each. A response's bytes are counted when
it ends (see step 18).
The byte limits count body bytes: the app's response bodies, the visitors'
request bodies, or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted.
What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app
sent as response bytes. The bytes counted for a request and its response are
added to the client's total once the response has ended (see step 18). So the
request that takes a client past a limit is passed on whole, and the ban refuses
the client's requests from then on. By default there is no minute limit, so a
client can download in a burst at full speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB
and the day limit to 100 GiB. They allow several downloads of a few GiB each.
### Lookup of AS number and country
@@ -554,9 +568,10 @@ lower case, except a country code, which is in capitals. `SWW_TAG_DENY` and
Two settings act on tags:
- `SWW_TAG_DENY` lists tags whose requests are refused with the action `denied`
(`tag_deny`). The check runs twice: just before the rate limits, and again
after the Core Rule Set, so that `exploitsignature` can refuse too.
- `SWW_TAG_DENY` lists tags whose requests are refused with the action
`client_denied` (`tag_deny`). The check runs twice: just before the rate
limits, and again after the Core Rule Set, so that `exploitsignature` can
refuse too.
- `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` lists tags with a percentage from 1 to 99. Their
clients get that percentage of every request and byte limit. The lowest
percentage among a client's tags applies. `exploitsignature` cannot be listed,
@@ -953,7 +968,8 @@ which the metrics show. They reveal a widely distributed scraper, thousands of
addresses at low rates each, which the per-client limits do not see. A low
percentage for its `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` is the response.
- Requests and bytes are counted per minute and per hour, for each of:
- Requests and body bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted per
minute and per hour, for each of:
- a client;
- the surrounding netblock;
- an AS number;
@@ -1263,9 +1279,9 @@ short.
### Answering in time
`rproxy` stops waiting for `discriminator` after `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, by default 2
seconds, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. So at the defaults,
`discriminator` answers a request well within that time, whatever the request
and whatever its outside sources do.
seconds, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. The longest a question
waits on an outside source is `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800 milliseconds,
well within that time.
GeoJS is the only outside source a question can wait on. A question waits only
when step 6 says so, and for at most `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800
@@ -1309,9 +1325,9 @@ over either one:
`Transfer-Encoding` do not count. `X-Request-ID` and `X-Forwarded-Proto` do.
Real clients never reach these limits. The answer is `deny` with `431`, and the
log line's action is `too_large`. The refusal makes no ban and is no offence.
The rate limits count the request as usual, so a client that keeps sending such
requests breaks a limit.
log line's action is `request_header_too_large`. The refusal makes no ban and is
no offence. The rate limits count the request as usual, so a client that keeps
sending such requests breaks a limit.
The limits apply on every path and in every `SWW_WAF_MODE`. A client in
`SWW_ALLOW_NETS` skips them, as it skips the Core Rule Set. In `observe` mode
@@ -1361,9 +1377,9 @@ answer.
For a request it holds, `discriminator` writes the request's last log line (see
"The log"). For a request it allowed, it first:
- counts the bytes as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says, toward the client's byte limits at
the percentages it gave that request;
- bans a client that passes a byte limit;
- counts the body bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, toward the client's byte limits
at the percentages it gave that request;
- bans a client whose total passes a byte limit;
- adds the request with its status to the client's history, the anomaly counters
and the metrics.
docs/metrics.md
+3
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ What `GET /_sww/metrics` answers with, at `discriminator`'s own address.
keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
`honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
Every `sww_*request_bytes_total` and `sww_*response_bytes_total` series counts
body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says.
## Traffic
- `sww_requests_total`, `sww_request_bytes_total` and
docs/request-log.md
+17 -13
View File
@@ -96,13 +96,15 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- `action`: what was done:
- `forward`: answered `allow`, so that `rproxy` passes it to the app;
- `denied`: refused for `SWW_DENY_NETS`, for a reputation source with the
action `deny`, or for a tag in `SWW_TAG_DENY`;
- `banned`: refused under a ban, or for a `ban` rule, a trap path or a
CrowdSec decision, each of which bans the client;
- `country_denied`, `rate_limited`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`:
refused by that check;
- `too_large`: over a header limit;
- `client_denied`: refused for `SWW_DENY_NETS`, for a reputation source with
the action `deny`, or for a tag in `SWW_TAG_DENY`;
- `temporarily_banned`: refused under a ban that runs out, or for a `ban`
rule, a trap path or a CrowdSec decision that made such a ban;
- `permanently_banned`: refused under a ban that never runs out, including a
ban this request made or made permanent;
- `country_denied`, `client_is_rate_limited`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and
`waf_blocked`: refused by that check;
- `request_header_too_large`: over a header limit;
- `admin`: answered at one of `discriminator`'s own endpoints, or `404` for
a path under `/_sww/`.
- `would_action`: in `observe` mode, what `enforce` mode would have done with a
@@ -145,20 +147,22 @@ Every one of these lines has:
included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It
holds:
- `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: bytes.
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: the body bytes
`SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, in that window.
A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes of an allowed request are counted when
its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the bytes are without this
request's.
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes counted for an allowed request and its
response are added when its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the
three byte totals leave them out.
- `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
- `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
- `error_burst`.
A request whose bytes broke a limit was passed on whole, so its `action`
stays `forward`. Only its `report` line gives that limit.
When the bytes counted for a request and its response break a limit, the
request has been passed on whole, so its `action` stays `forward`. Only its
`report` line gives that limit.
- `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
refused.
docs/settings.md
+23 -8
View File
@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Request rate limits, per client
The request past one of these limits is refused, and the client is banned.
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
person opening two pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files each.
@@ -120,11 +122,22 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Byte limits, per client
These count body bytes, never headers. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. The bytes
counted for a request and its response are added to the client's total once the
response has ended. The request that takes a client's total past a limit is not
cut off; the client is banned.
- `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes
counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
`response`, `request` or `both`.
counted for a client in each window, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says
which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that
passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response
ends.
- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte anomaly
thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the
visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
## Lookup of AS number and country
@@ -233,8 +246,9 @@ the request first.
a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client in
a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may get
in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
`off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
## Ban lengths, response and scope
@@ -311,9 +325,10 @@ the request first.
## Anomaly thresholds
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most bytes counted in
a minute and in an hour. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by
default. The four thresholds per client are:
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most body bytes
counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names.
Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by default. The four
thresholds per client are:
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
docs/state-files.md
+4 -3
View File
@@ -61,10 +61,11 @@ since it was first seen:
- the first and last time seen;
- the AS number, AS name and country last looked up, and when;
- total requests, and how many were forwarded and how many refused;
- bytes in each direction;
- body bytes of its requests, and of the responses it was sent;
- responses by status class;
- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`. A file
may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which nothing adds to.
- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and
`waf_blocked`. A file may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which
nothing adds to.
## `lookups.json`
internal/discriminator/abuseipdb.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func (abuseIPDB) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
}
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
figures: map[string]any{
figureScore: score, "min_score": rq.h.config.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
},
internal/discriminator/admin_test.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, banOtherClient,
http.StatusOK), want)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(expires) {
t.Errorf("the ban ends at %s, want %s", line.BanExpires, expires)
}
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
// limit of two a minute, and bans it.
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
// Asked about by its address in IPv6 form too.
for _, addr := range []string{otherClient, "::ffff:" + otherClient} {
internal/discriminator/alerts_test.go
+9 -7
View File
@@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ func TestBanForABrokenLimitRaisesABanAlertWithItsNotes(t *testing.T) {
start := clk.Now()
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
ban := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)[0]
// A request refused under the ban raises no other alert.
clk.advance(time.Minute)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantAlerts(t, queue, banAlert(alerts.EventBan, start, client, bans.Ban{
Netblock: netblock, Cause: bans.CauseLimit,
@@ -62,22 +62,24 @@ func TestAttackBanRaisesABanAlertThenAPermanentBanAlert(t *testing.T) {
// The probe bans the client for seven days, and its next request makes
// the ban permanent. The request after that changes nothing.
s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
attackBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)[0]
clk.advance(time.Minute)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
permanentBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)[0]
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
// Another client's probe after its first ban has run out without a
// request makes a permanent ban at once.
s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
clk.advance(7 * 24 * time.Hour)
s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
otherBans := server.Ledger.Bans(other)
internal/discriminator/anomaly_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ func TestEveryRequestIsCountedWhateverIsDoneWithIt(t *testing.T) {
{allowed, "/", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{exempt, "/", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{client, "/static/app.js", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{denied, "/", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
{denied, "/", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
} {
for range 3 {
s.request(sent.from, sent.path, sent.status, sent.action)
internal/discriminator/answertime_test.go
+22 -16
View File
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func TestSixteenThousandCookiesAreRefusedWellWithinTheTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
if line.DurationWAF != nil {
t.Errorf("the Core Rule Set read the request, for %f ms", *line.DurationWAF)
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
if tc.refused {
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
return
}
@@ -219,9 +219,10 @@ func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsUnread(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionTooLarge || line.DurationWAF != nil {
if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge ||
line.DurationWAF != nil {
t.Errorf("would_action %q and duration_waf %v, want %q and none",
line.WouldAction, line.DurationWAF, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
line.WouldAction, line.DurationWAF, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
}
}
@@ -240,7 +241,7 @@ func TestRequestsOverTheHeaderLimitsCountTowardTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, ask(), http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
}
func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeAfterTheTrapPathsAndTheRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
@@ -249,8 +250,8 @@ func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeAfterTheTrapPathsAndTheRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, path, action string
}{
{"a trap path", "/wp-login.php", requestlog.ActionBanned},
{"a block rule", "/blocked", requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked},
{"a trap path", "/wp-login.php", requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned},
{"a block rule", "/blocked", requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -280,7 +281,7 @@ func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
if line.LimitPercent != nil {
t.Errorf("limit percentage %d, want none", *line.LimitPercent)
@@ -304,7 +305,8 @@ func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(t *testing.T
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
}
func TestObserveModeWaitsForGeoJSForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
@@ -412,33 +414,37 @@ func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
}{
{
name: "SWW_DENY_NETS", env: map[string]string{denyNets: client},
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
},
{
name: "a ban",
prepare: banClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
prepare: banClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
},
{
name: "the rate limits", env: map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"},
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden,
action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
},
{
name: "the rate limits, with a biased threshold",
env: map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1", unknownLimitPercent: "50"},
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden,
action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
},
{
name: "a blocklist", env: map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL},
prepare: listClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
prepare: listClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
},
{
name: "the CrowdSec decision list",
env: map[string]string{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey},
prepare: decideOnClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
prepare: decideOnClient, status: forbidden,
action: requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
},
{
name: "the header limits", cookie: cookies(cookieLimit + 1),
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: tooLarge, action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: tooLarge,
action: requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
internal/discriminator/bans.go
+23 -9
View File
@@ -50,13 +50,23 @@ func (activeBan) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
}
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
action: banAction(ban.Permanent()),
figures: map[string]any{
figureNetblock: ban.Netblock.String(), "ban_expires": rq.line.BanExpires,
},
}
}
// banAction is the action of a request refused under a ban or for making one:
// permanent says the ban never runs out.
func banAction(permanent bool) string {
if permanent {
return requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned
}
return requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned
}
// limitFigures are the figures of a heuristic that broke hit, a limit: its
// window, the count and the limit.
func limitFigures(hit ratelimit.Hit) map[string]any {
@@ -151,11 +161,11 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
// attack, which notes name: the ban rule that matched, or the trap path
// asked for. It fills in the rest of the notes. In observe mode it makes
// no ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that
// alert would be sent.
func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
// alert would be sent. It returns the action for that ban.
func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) string {
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack) {
return
return banAction(rq.h.ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack))
}
notes.ASN = rq.line.ASN
@@ -171,7 +181,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
}
ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, now, notes)
@@ -180,16 +190,18 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
if made {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
}
// banForCrowdSec bans the client's netblock at now until decision,
// CrowdSec's decision on the client, ends. In observe mode it makes no
// ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that alert
// would be sent.
func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
// would be sent. It returns the action for that ban.
func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) string {
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
return
return banAction(rq.h.ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec))
}
notes := bans.Notes{
@@ -208,7 +220,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
}
ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, now, decision.Expires,
@@ -218,6 +230,8 @@ func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
if made {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
}
// wouldAlertBan reports whether the alert for a ban on netblock for cause
internal/discriminator/bans_test.go
+26 -24
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
// client for an hour, the default.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit ||
line.BanExpires != expires {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, offence %q and ban_expires %q, "+
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
// Every request while the ban lasts is refused.
clk.advance(time.Hour - time.Second)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.BanExpires != expires || line.Offence != "" || line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, offence %q and limit_hit %q, "+
"want %s and neither of the others", line.BanExpires, line.Offence,
@@ -78,7 +78,9 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
breakLimit := func() string {
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
return s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited).BanExpires
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
return line.BanExpires
}
wantExpires := func(got string, length time.Duration) {
t.Helper()
@@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
}
clk.advance(365 * 24 * time.Hour)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
}
func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
@@ -123,10 +125,10 @@ func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
// client for an hour.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
for range 3 {
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
// Later the same day the client has its whole allowance again: the
@@ -135,7 +137,7 @@ func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
clk.advance(time.Hour)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
banned := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
if len(banned) != 2 || banned[0].Notes.Refused != 3 {
@@ -190,10 +192,10 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", env)
s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
for _, sent := range tc.refused {
s.get(sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
for _, sent := range tc.let {
@@ -216,9 +218,9 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
// fromDE's ban covers otherClient, which is refused unasked about.
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.Country != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has country %q, want none", line.Country)
}
@@ -237,9 +239,9 @@ func TestRefusalUnderABanNamesItsHeuristicNetblockAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
expires := requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour))
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "active_ban",
`{"netblock": "`+clientsNet+`", "ban_expires": "`+expires+`"}`)
}
@@ -275,11 +277,11 @@ func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, env)
s.get(denied, tc.status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
s.get(fromKP, tc.status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
s.get(denied, tc.status, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
s.get(fromKP, tc.status, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
})
}
}
@@ -297,9 +299,9 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.request(fromDE, "/repo/commits?page=2",
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32")
want := bans.Ban{
@@ -342,7 +344,7 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
// The next ban counts this one among the earlier.
clk.advance(time.Hour)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
got = ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 2 || got[1].Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
@@ -360,12 +362,12 @@ func TestMaxBansDropsTheBanOfTheNetblockSeenLongestAgo(t *testing.T) {
// One ban is held, so otherClient's ban drops client's.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
// clock is the time a test sets, by which sww counts requests and
internal/discriminator/biased_test.go
+7 -7
View File
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
}{
{http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
} {
line := s.get(tc.from, sent.status, sent.action)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ func TestZeroPercentIsAZeroAllowance(t *testing.T) {
// The first request breaks the limit, and bans the client; the log line
// gives the 0.
line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
if line.fields["limit_percent"] != float64(0) ||
line.fields["limit_percent_setting"] != unknownLimitPercent {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_percent %v from %v, want 0 from %s",
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ func TestZeroPercentIsAZeroAllowance(t *testing.T) {
unknownLimitPercent)
}
s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
// A quarter of 4 requests a minute: the second breaks the limit.
s.get(tc.from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.get(tc.from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
line := s.get(tc.from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
tc.want)
})
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ func TestUnknownLimitPercentGivesEveryClientWithoutACountryItsPercentage(t *test
for _, from := range []string{unplaced, "10.0.0.8"} {
s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
}
// One in a country has the whole limit.
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownLimitPercent(t *testing.T) {
serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodGet, http.NoBody)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
"0 from "+unknownLimitPercent)
})
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ func TestBanForALoweredLimitGivesThePercentageInItsNotesAndItsAlert(t *testing.T
// A quarter of 12 requests a minute is 3: the fourth breaks it.
"a rate limit",
map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "12", tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter},
3, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
3, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
"requests per minute over the limit of 3", "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
},
{
internal/discriminator/blocklists.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func (blocklists) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
}
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
figures: map[string]any{"lists": listedBy},
}
}
internal/discriminator/bytelimits.go
+1 -3
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ package discriminator
import (
"context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// byteLimits counts the request's bytes, as countedBytes gives them, for the
@@ -39,5 +37,5 @@ func (byteLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict
rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.out.status)
return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBanned, figures: limitFigures(hit)}
return &verdict{figures: limitFigures(hit)}
}
internal/discriminator/bytelimits_test.go
+6 -6
View File
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
line.BanExpires, tc.window, expires)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{`+
`instance="`+alertInstance+`",kind="bytes",window="`+tc.window+`"}`, 1)
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ func TestResponseOverAByteLimitByItselfIsPassedOnWhole(t *testing.T) {
len(got.body), got.err, line.LimitHit, answerBytes, minuteBytes)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestBytesOfAnAnswerThatBreaksOffAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ func TestBytesOfAnAnswerThatBreaksOffAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
answerBytes, minuteBytes, expires)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
line.LimitHit, line.Counts.MinuteBytes, minuteBytes, tc.counted)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
})
}
}
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ func TestBytesCountSaysWhichBytesCount(t *testing.T) {
}
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
})
}
}
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLeavesOutTheBytesOfARequestEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T)
// counted, and the byte limit is not broken. Its line gives the bytes
// counted before it.
line := s.upload()
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Counts.MinuteBytes != bodyBytes+answerBytes {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and minute_bytes %v, want minute and %d",
internal/discriminator/coreruleset_test.go
+4 -3
View File
@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ func TestDetectedAttackIsRefusedByTagDenyLast(t *testing.T) {
wafMode: detect, tagDeny: "exploitsignature",
})
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "exploitsignature"}`)
}
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
// A request a rule file refuses is not inspected.
line = s.request(otherClient, "/blocked?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
// With SWW_WAF_MODE off, no request is.
@@ -403,7 +404,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T)
line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
want := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, WAFBlocked: 3}
if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
internal/discriminator/crowdsec.go
+1 -2
View File
@@ -30,10 +30,9 @@ func (crowdSec) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
rq.addTag(config.CrowdSecTag)
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision)
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
action: rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision),
figures: map[string]any{
"scenario": decision.Scenario,
"expires": requestlog.FormatTime(decision.Expires),
internal/discriminator/crowdsec_test.go
+7 -7
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testi
expires := requestlog.FormatTime(fetched.Add(4 * time.Hour))
// Its first request is refused, and bans it until the decision ends.
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
if line.BanExpires != expires {
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testi
// ban, and once it has ended the client is let through.
clk.advance(4*time.Hour - time.Second)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantReputation(t, line)
if line.BanExpires != expires {
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ func TestCrowdSecBanNamesItsHeuristicScenarioAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "crowdsec", `{"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", `+
`"expires": "`+requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(4*time.Hour))+`"}`)
wantTags(t, line, "crowdsec")
@@ -129,9 +129,9 @@ func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(t *testing.T
// Just before its end, the decision bans a client in the netblock, and
// one on an IPv6 address bans the address's group, the /64.
clk.advance(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
s.get("198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get("2001:db8::9", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get("2001:db8::5", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get("198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
s.get("2001:db8::9", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
s.get("2001:db8::5", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
// Once it has ended, it bans no other client, and the bans it made end
// with it.
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsAndAlertsTheBan(
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
internal/discriminator/denynets.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ func (denyNets) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
for _, netblock := range rq.h.config.DenyNets {
if netblock.Contains(rq.client) {
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
figures: map[string]any{figureNetblock: netblock.String()},
}
}
internal/discriminator/discriminator_test.go
+9 -9
View File
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ func TestQuestionDeniedGetsTheBanResponse(t *testing.T) {
got := s.ask(client, "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, status, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
wantBody(t, got, http.StatusText(status)+"\n")
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), status, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
})
}
}
@@ -655,8 +655,8 @@ func TestBanResponseCloseIsAnAnswerOfItsOwn(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionClose)
wantBody(t, got, "")
// The visitor is sent nothing.
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantMetric(t, s.metrics(), `sww_requests_total{action="denied",instance="`+
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), 0, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantMetric(t, s.metrics(), `sww_requests_total{action="client_denied",instance="`+
alertInstance+`",status_class="none"}`, 1)
}
@@ -671,12 +671,12 @@ func TestBlockRuleIsDeniedWith403AndABanRuleWithTheBanResponse(t *testing.T) {
got := s.ask(client, "/blocked")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
got = s.ask(client, "/.env")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusTooManyRequests, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLines(t, 2)[1], http.StatusTooManyRequests,
requestlog.ActionBanned)
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestQuestionUnderTheOwnPrefixIsDeniedWith404AfterTheChecks(t *testing.T) {
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ func TestObserveModeAllowsAndLogsWhatEnforceModeWouldHaveDone(t *testing.T) {
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
}
func TestObserveModeRefusalAnsweredAllowCountsForTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
@@ -894,7 +894,7 @@ func TestDeniedRequestIsFinishedAtItsDecision(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("history is %+v, want the refused request alone", history)
}
const series = `sww_requests_total{action="rate_limited",instance="` +
const series = `sww_requests_total{action="client_is_rate_limited",instance="` +
alertInstance + `",status_class="4xx"}`
wantMetric(t, s.metrics(), series, 1)
@@ -1298,11 +1298,11 @@ func TestEveryDeniedRequestsReportGetsItsLastLine(t *testing.T) {
}{
{
"deny", map[string]string{denyNets: client}, "/", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionDenied,
requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
},
{
"close", map[string]string{denyNets: client, banResponse: banResponseClose}, "/",
0, requestlog.ActionDenied,
0, requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
},
{"own prefix", nil, discriminator.HealthPath, http.StatusNotFound,
requestlog.ActionAdmin},
internal/discriminator/dnsbl.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ func (dnsbl) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
}
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
figures: map[string]any{"zones": listedBy},
}
}
internal/discriminator/headerlimits.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ func (headerLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict
}
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
action: requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge,
figures: map[string]any{
"fields": fields, "fields_limit": maxHeaderFields,
"cookies": cookies, "cookies_limit": maxCookies,
internal/discriminator/history_test.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
clk.advance(time.Second)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
clk.advance(time.Second)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
want := ratelimit.History{
FirstSeen: start,
internal/discriminator/lookup_test.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func TestEveryClientIsLookedUpWithoutWaitingWhileNoSettingNeedsIt(t *testing.T)
// comes too. None waits for GeoJS.
for _, line := range []logLine{
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited),
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited),
s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
} {
got := asnAndCountry{line.ASN, line.ASName, line.Country}
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ func TestASNumberAndNameInTheLogLineTheHistoryTheBanNotesAndTheAlert(t *testing.
for _, line := range []logLine{
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited),
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited),
} {
if got := (asnAndCountry{line.ASN, line.ASName, line.Country}); got != want {
t.Errorf("log line has %+v, want %+v", got, want)
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ func TestClientsAreLookedUpInTheLookupDatabaseAndGeoJSIsNotAsked(t *testing.T) {
want asnAndCountry
}{
{s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward), de},
{s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited), de},
{s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited), de},
{
s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied),
asnAndCountry{asnKP, asNameKP, "KP"},
internal/discriminator/metrics_test.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -125,15 +125,15 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
})
// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
s.get(denied, 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
s.get(denied, 0, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
// A first broken limit bans for an hour.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
metrics := s.scrape()
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`sww_requests_total{action="denied",instance="app",status_class="none"}`, 1)
`sww_requests_total{action="client_denied",instance="app",status_class="none"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
// A limit broken again right after would ban for three hours, longer
// than SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
metrics = s.scrape()
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
internal/discriminator/observe_test.go
+95 -7
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
@@ -14,6 +15,93 @@ import (
// observe is the value of SWW_MODE for observe mode.
const observe = "observe"
func TestBanActionSaysWhetherTheBanRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const trapPath = "/wp-login.php"
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
cause string
// endsIn is how long after the request the ban ends: negative for a
// ban that has ended, and zero for a permanent ban.
endsIn time.Duration
path string
want string
}{
{
"temporary ban", bans.CauseAdmin, time.Hour, "/",
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
},
{"permanent ban", bans.CauseAdmin, 0, "/", requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned},
{
"request that makes a ban permanent", bans.CauseAttack, time.Hour, "/",
requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned,
},
{
"trap path after an attack ban ended", bans.CauseAttack, -time.Hour,
trapPath, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned,
},
{
"first trap path after another ban ended", bans.CauseAdmin, -time.Hour,
trapPath, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
},
} {
for _, modeValue := range []string{"enforce", observe} {
t.Run(tc.name+" in "+modeValue, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList, mode: modeValue,
})
ban := bans.Ban{
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
Start: clk.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour),
Cause: tc.cause,
}
if tc.endsIn != 0 {
ban.Expires = clk.Now().Add(tc.endsIn)
}
server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{ban})
if modeValue == observe {
line := s.request(client, tc.path, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, tc.want)
return
}
s.request(client, tc.path, http.StatusForbidden, tc.want)
})
}
}
}
func TestObserveModeNamesAPermanentBanWhoseAlertWouldBeSent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList, mode: observe,
})
server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
Start: clk.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour),
Expires: clk.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
Cause: bans.CauseAttack,
}})
line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventPermanentBan {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting are %+v, want one %s", waiting, alerts.EventPermanentBan)
}
}
func TestObserveModeNamesTheHeuristicThatWouldHaveRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -22,7 +110,7 @@ func TestObserveModeNamesTheHeuristicThatWouldHaveRefused(t *testing.T) {
})
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+client+`/32"}`)
}
@@ -69,10 +157,10 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
for _, sent := range []struct{ from, refusal string }{
{denied, requestlog.ActionDenied},
{banned, requestlog.ActionBanned},
{fromKP, requestlog.ActionDenied},
{fromDE, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{denied, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
{banned, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned},
{fromKP, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
{fromDE, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
} {
if !tc.observe {
line := s.get(sent.from, http.StatusForbidden, sent.refusal)
@@ -110,7 +198,7 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
for range 2 {
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit ||
line.BanExpires != "" {
@@ -123,7 +211,7 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
// The ban read from bans.json refuses nothing, and so counts no
// refusal in its notes, but is kept.
line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(kept.Expires) {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s", line.BanExpires,
internal/discriminator/ratelimits.go
+3 -1
View File
@@ -42,7 +42,9 @@ func (rateLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict
rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.h.config.BanResponse)
return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited, figures: limitFigures(hit)}
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited, figures: limitFigures(hit),
}
}
// overAWholeRateLimit reports whether the heuristic rate_limits will refuse the
internal/discriminator/ratelimits_test.go
+11 -8
View File
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
if sent.want == http.StatusOK {
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
} else {
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
if line.LimitHit != minute {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want minute", line.LimitHit)
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusalNamesItsHeuristicWindowCountAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "rate_limits", `{"window": "minute", "count": 2, "limit": 1}`)
}
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
status int
action string
}{
{rateLimitPerMinute, "1", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{rateLimitPerMinute, "1", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
{bytesLimitPerMinute, byteLimit, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
} {
t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -160,14 +160,17 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
// A path outside every prefix is counted: /assets is not under
// /assets/, and breaks the limit.
s.request(client, "/assets", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.request(client, "/assets", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
// A ban, SWW_DENY_NETS and SWW_TAG_DENY still refuse a path under a
// prefix.
s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(denied, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
s.request(denied, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
s.request(fromKP, "/assets/app.js",
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
}
func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
@@ -211,7 +214,7 @@ func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
// Counted, the second request breaks the limit of one request
// a minute.
s.request(client, sent, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.request(client, sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.request(client, sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
})
}
}
internal/discriminator/refusallimit.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func (refusalLimit) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdic
return nil
}
if !rq.attack && !rq.ruleBlocked && !rq.wafBlocked {
if !rq.attack && !rq.blockedByBlockRule && !rq.wafBlocked {
return nil
}
@@ -42,13 +42,13 @@ func (refusalLimit) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdic
status := rq.out.status
switch rq.line.WouldAction {
case requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
case requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
status = http.StatusForbidden
case requestlog.ActionBanned:
case requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned:
status = cfg.BanResponse
}
rq.banForLimit(now, hit, status)
return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBanned, figures: limitFigures(hit)}
return &verdict{figures: limitFigures(hit)}
}
internal/discriminator/refusallimit_test.go
+22 -10
View File
@@ -37,9 +37,10 @@ func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
switch r {
case blockRule:
return s.request(from, blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
case banRule:
return s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
return s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
s.t.Fatalf("no request for the refusal %d", r)
@@ -71,9 +72,20 @@ func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
name string
// refusals are four, one over the threshold of three.
refusals []refused
// nextAction is the action of the client's next request: the next
// request after a ban for a ban rule makes it permanent.
nextAction string
}{
{"block rule", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, blockRule}},
{"a ban rule last", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, banRule}},
{
"block rule",
[]refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, blockRule},
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
},
{
"a ban rule last",
[]refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, banRule},
requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -101,7 +113,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
"and limit", line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, tc.nextAction)
})
}
}
@@ -169,7 +181,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, RuleBlocked: 3}
wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, BlockedByBlockRule: 3}
if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != wantOffences {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, wantOffences)
}
@@ -179,7 +191,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
`kind="refusals",window="minute"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 3)
`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_block_rule"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
}
@@ -298,7 +310,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstCountsEachClientTheChecksApplyTo(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want error_burst", line.LimitHit)
}
s.get(exempt, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(exempt, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestErrorBurstBanSetsTheRefusalsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
@@ -341,7 +353,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
for range 2 {
line := s.request(otherClient, blockedPath, http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
@@ -353,7 +365,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst || line.BanExpires != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, want error_burst "+
internal/discriminator/reputation_test.go
+21 -21
View File
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ const (
func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionClientDenied
for _, tc := range []struct {
action string
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
{
// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
"50 from " + blocklistAction,
},
{
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ func TestReputationRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndWhatListedTheClient(t *testing.T)
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, tc.env)
tc.load(t, server)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, tc.heuristic, tc.figures)
})
}
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientABlocklistDeniesAndAlertsIt(t *testing.T) {
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {fromDE}})
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantReputation(t, line, dropURL)
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ const (
func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionClientDenied
for _, tc := range []struct {
action string
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
{
// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
"50 from " + reputationAction,
},
{
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ func TestDNSBLZonesComeAfterTheBlocklistsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
// The blocklist refuses fromKP before its verdict is looked at, and
// fromDE, in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted
// for the zone, nor alerted, nor asked about.
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
dropURL)
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientADNSBLZoneDeniesAndAlertsIt(t *testing.T) {
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {dnsblZone}})
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantReputation(t, line, dnsblZone)
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
@@ -741,8 +741,8 @@ func TestOnlyAClientThatHasCommittedAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDB(t *testing.T
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward)
s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, forward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)
// Once the ban has ended, fromDE's first request has it checked in the
@@ -781,7 +781,7 @@ func TestIPv6ClientCostsOneAbuseIPDBCheckWhicheverOfItsAddressesSends(t *testing
s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusOK, forward)
}
s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
clk.advance(time.Hour)
// Once the ban has ended, which set its counters back to zero, a
@@ -814,20 +814,20 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
want ratelimit.Offences
}{
{
"a block rule", blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked,
ratelimit.Offences{RuleBlocked: 1},
"a block rule", blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, ratelimit.Offences{BlockedByBlockRule: 1},
},
{
"the Core Rule Set", sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1},
},
{
"a ban rule", probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
"a ban rule", probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
},
{
"a trap path", "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
"a trap path", "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned, ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionClientDenied
for _, tc := range []struct {
action string
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *test
{
// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
"50 from " + reputationAction,
},
{
@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ func TestWithoutAnAbuseIPDBKeyNoClientIsCheckedNorAScoreUsed(t *testing.T) {
// fromDE's score is not used, and once it has committed an offence it
// is not checked either.
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
clk.advance(time.Hour)
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)
@@ -996,10 +996,10 @@ func TestBanNotesNameEachReputationSourceThatListedTheClient(t *testing.T) {
}{
{"for a broken rate limit", func(s *sender, from string) {
s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
}},
{"for a clear sign of attack", func(s *sender, from string) {
s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
internal/discriminator/request.go
+16 -15
View File
@@ -54,10 +54,10 @@ type decision struct {
counted bool
limitPercent, bytesPercent percentage
// attack is true for a request that matched a ban rule or asked for a
// trap path, ruleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and wafBlocked for
// one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence its client's history
// counts.
attack, ruleBlocked, wafBlocked bool
// trap path, blockedByBlockRule for one a block rule refused, and
// wafBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence its
// client's history counts.
attack, blockedByBlockRule, wafBlocked bool
// reputation is the reputation sources that list the client, for the
// notes of a ban the request makes.
reputation []bans.ReputationHit
@@ -187,9 +187,10 @@ func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
rq.line.WouldAction = action
return nil
case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked || action == requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
case action == requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule ||
action == requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
case action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge:
case action == requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge:
return &refusal{status: http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge, action: action}
default:
return rq.banResponse(action)
@@ -303,15 +304,15 @@ func timing(start, end time.Time) *float64 {
// when it comes.
func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
request := ratelimit.Request{
Forwarded: rq.allowed,
Refused: rq.refused != nil,
Status: rq.out.status,
RequestBytes: rq.requestBytes,
ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes,
BrokeLimit: rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
Attack: rq.attack,
RuleBlocked: rq.ruleBlocked,
WAFBlocked: rq.wafBlocked,
Forwarded: rq.allowed,
Refused: rq.refused != nil,
Status: rq.out.status,
RequestBytes: rq.requestBytes,
ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes,
BrokeLimit: rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
Attack: rq.attack,
BlockedByBlockRule: rq.blockedByBlockRule,
WAFBlocked: rq.wafBlocked,
}
rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), request)
internal/discriminator/rulefiles.go
+10 -7
View File
@@ -16,9 +16,10 @@ import (
// ruleFiles checks the request against the rules of the rule files at now,
// notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, adds the tag
// exploitsignature when it matches any, and refuses the request
// when the last rule it matches refuses it: with ActionRuleBlocked for a block
// rule, and ActionBanned for a ban rule. A ban rule bans the client's netblock
// for a clear sign of attack, or in observe mode raises the alert for the ban
// when the last rule it matches refuses it: with ActionBlockedByBlockRule for a
// block rule, and for a ban rule with the action for the ban it makes. A ban
// rule bans the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack, or in observe
// mode raises the alert for the ban
// it would have made. Either rule's match is noted as an offence, for the
// client's history. Its figures are the rule's id and action.
type ruleFiles struct{}
@@ -45,14 +46,16 @@ func (ruleFiles) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
switch last.Action {
case rules.ActionBlock:
rq.ruleBlocked = true
rq.blockedByBlockRule = true
return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked, figures: figures}
return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, figures: figures}
case rules.ActionBan:
rq.attack = true
rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target})
return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBanned, figures: figures}
return &verdict{
action: rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target}),
figures: figures,
}
default:
return nil
}
internal/discriminator/rulefiles_test.go
+24 -18
View File
@@ -37,13 +37,14 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
// A block rule refuses with 403, whatever SWW_BAN_RESPONSE is, and
// bans no one.
line = s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "blocked")
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// A ban rule refuses with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, and bans the client for
// seven days, the default.
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusTooManyRequests,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "probe")
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
// against the rules, and makes the ban permanent.
clk.advance(time.Hour)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
if line.BanExpires != permanent {
@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
}
clk.advance(365 * 24 * time.Hour)
s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
}
func TestEachRuleActionAddsTheExploitSignatureTag(t *testing.T) {
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ func TestEachRuleActionAddsTheExploitSignatureTag(t *testing.T) {
wantTags(t, s.request(client, "/noted", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
"exploitsignature")
wantTags(t, s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked), "exploitsignature")
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule), "exploitsignature")
wantTags(t, s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
}
@@ -115,10 +116,11 @@ func TestRuleRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndTheRule(t *testing.T) {
})
line := s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", `{"rule_id": "blocked", "rule_action": "block"}`)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", `{"rule_id": "probe", "rule_action": "ban"}`)
}
@@ -131,7 +133,8 @@ func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
})
// The first probe bans for SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION.
line := s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line := s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour)) {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want an hour on", line.BanExpires)
}
@@ -141,7 +144,8 @@ func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
clk.advance(time.Hour)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
if line.BanExpires != permanent {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
}
@@ -169,7 +173,8 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
// A probe over the rate limit breaks the limit before any rule sees
// it.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
limitBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
@@ -179,7 +184,7 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
// A client the rate limits do not apply to is still checked.
s.get(exempt, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.request(exempt, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(exempt, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -191,11 +196,11 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
})
line := s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "blocked")
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "probe")
if line.BanExpires != "" {
@@ -219,9 +224,10 @@ func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
metricsToken: token,
})
s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
metrics := s.scrape()
wantMetric(t, metrics,
@@ -229,10 +235,10 @@ func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`sww_rule_matches_total{action="ban",instance="app",rule_id="probe"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rules_loaded{instance="app"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="rule_blocked",`+
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="blocked_by_block_rule",`+
`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 1)
`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_block_rule"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="attack"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="attack",instance="app"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 0)
internal/discriminator/staticlists_test.go
+8 -8
View File
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ func TestRequestFromAllowNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
})
}
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
line := out.endedLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
if len(asked()) != 0 {
t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, want nothing", asked())
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndNetblock(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{denyNets: clientsNet})
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+clientsNet+`"}`)
}
@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ func TestRequestRefusedByDenyNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
// listedAddr's refused requests are not counted, so the first request
// from unlistedAddr is within the limit of one a minute.
wantAnswers(t, addr, out, []sentRequest{
{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
})
}
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptNetsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
{fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
})
}
internal/discriminator/tagdeny.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ func (tagDeny) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
for _, tag := range rq.line.Tags {
if slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TagDeny, tag) {
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
figures: map[string]any{"tag": tag},
}
}
internal/discriminator/tagdeny_test.go
+6 -6
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ func TestTagDenyRefusesALookupTagAndNamesTheTag(t *testing.T) {
// in capitals.
s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{tagDeny: "Country=kp"})
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "country=KP"}`)
wantTags(t, line, "asn=64511", "country=KP")
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ func TestTagDenyRefusesAnASNTag(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{tagDeny: "asn=64511"})
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
"tag_deny", `{"tag": "asn=64511"}`)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ func TestTagDenyRefusesAListTagBeforeTheRateLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
// Each is refused for its tag: none is counted to break the limit of one.
for range 3 {
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
"tag_deny", `{"tag": "torexit"}`)
}
}
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ func TestTagDenyRefusesAMixedCaseZoneByItsLowerCaseTag(t *testing.T) {
})
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {mixedCaseZone}})
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
"tag_deny", `{"tag": "dnsbl=`+dnsblZone+`"}`)
}
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ func TestTagDenyRefusesAnExploitSignatureOfARuleThatOnlyLogs(t *testing.T) {
rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"), tagDeny: "exploitsignature",
})
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "exploitsignature"}`)
wantTags(t, line, "exploitsignature")
}
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ func TestTagLimitPercentLowersALimitTheLowestWinning(t *testing.T) {
// A quarter of 4 requests a minute: the second breaks the limit.
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
"25 from "+tagLimitPercent)
}
internal/discriminator/taglists_test.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ func TestTagListsTagARequestRefusedBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromDE, fromKP}})
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
if line.Heuristic != "deny_nets" {
t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q, want deny_nets", line.Heuristic)
}
@@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ func TestTagListsTagARequestRefusedBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
// The second request breaks the limit of one a minute, which bans the client.
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
line = s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.Heuristic != "active_ban" {
t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q, want active_ban", line.Heuristic)
}
internal/discriminator/trappaths.go
+1 -3
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
@@ -30,10 +29,9 @@ func (trapPaths) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
}
rq.attack = true
rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{TrapPath: path})
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
action: rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{TrapPath: path}),
figures: map[string]any{"path": path},
}
}
internal/discriminator/trappaths_test.go
+8 -6
View File
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
// The query is not part of the path.
line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x", http.StatusTooManyRequests,
requestlog.ActionBanned)
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
}
// The next request is refused under the ban, and makes it permanent.
line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
if line.BanExpires != permanent {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
}
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ func TestTrapPathRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndPath(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{trapPaths: trapPathList})
line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBanned)
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "trap_paths", `{"path": "/wp-login.php"}`)
}
@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ func TestTrapPathMatchesThePathDecodedOnce(t *testing.T) {
// %2577 decodes once to %77, not to w.
s.request(otherClient, "/%2577p-login.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.request(client, "/%77p-login.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(client, "/%77p-login.php", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
// The ban's notes give the path as the client sent it.
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
@@ -117,7 +118,8 @@ func TestTrapPathsNeedNoRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
"SWW_RULES_ENABLED": "false",
})
s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestObserveModeLogsWhatATrapPathWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -129,7 +131,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatATrapPathWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
})
line := s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
// No ban was made.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
internal/metrics/metrics.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -424,10 +424,10 @@ func (m *Metrics) LimitHit(hit ratelimit.Hit) {
// them.
func (m *Metrics) Offences(r ratelimit.Request) {
for kind, committed := range map[string]bool{
"limit": r.BrokeLimit,
"attack": r.Attack,
"rule_blocked": r.RuleBlocked,
"waf_blocked": r.WAFBlocked,
"limit": r.BrokeLimit,
"attack": r.Attack,
"blocked_by_block_rule": r.BlockedByBlockRule,
"waf_blocked": r.WAFBlocked,
} {
if committed {
m.offences.WithLabelValues(kind).Inc()
internal/ratelimit/ratelimit.go
+14 -14
View File
@@ -122,12 +122,12 @@ type Responses struct {
type Offences struct {
// Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
// error burst, Attack those that were a clear sign of attack, a match
// of a ban rule or a request for a trap path, RuleBlocked those a block
// rule refused, and WAFBlocked those the Core Rule Set refused.
Limit int64 `json:"limit"`
Attack int64 `json:"attack"`
RuleBlocked int64 `json:"rule_blocked"`
WAFBlocked int64 `json:"waf_blocked"`
// of a ban rule or a request for a trap path, BlockedByBlockRule those a
// block rule refused, and WAFBlocked those the Core Rule Set refused.
Limit int64 `json:"limit"`
Attack int64 `json:"attack"`
BlockedByBlockRule int64 `json:"blocked_by_block_rule"`
WAFBlocked int64 `json:"waf_blocked"`
// TokenRefused is what a clients.json written by an earlier version gives,
// which must still load. Nothing adds to it.
TokenRefused int64 `json:"token_refused,omitempty"`
@@ -147,12 +147,12 @@ type Request struct {
ResponseBytes int64
// BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit, a byte
// limit or the error burst, Attack for one that matched a ban rule or
// asked for a trap path, RuleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and
// WAFBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused.
BrokeLimit bool
Attack bool
RuleBlocked bool
WAFBlocked bool
// asked for a trap path, BlockedByBlockRule for one a block rule refused,
// and WAFBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused.
BrokeLimit bool
Attack bool
BlockedByBlockRule bool
WAFBlocked bool
}
// New returns a Limiter for limits, with no client counted yet, whose
@@ -323,8 +323,8 @@ func (l *Limiter) AddToHistory(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, r Request) {
h.Offences.Attack++
}
if r.RuleBlocked {
h.Offences.RuleBlocked++
if r.BlockedByBlockRule {
h.Offences.BlockedByBlockRule++
}
if r.WAFBlocked {
internal/requestlog/requestlog.go
+24 -19
View File
@@ -20,32 +20,37 @@ const (
// the app.
ActionForward = "forward"
// ActionTooLarge is a request over the header limits.
ActionTooLarge = "too_large"
// ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge is a request over the header limits.
ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge = "request_header_too_large"
// ActionRateLimited is a request refused because it took its client
// over a rate limit, which bans the client.
ActionRateLimited = "rate_limited"
// ActionClientIsRateLimited is a request refused because it took its
// client over a rate limit, which bans the client.
ActionClientIsRateLimited = "client_is_rate_limited"
// ActionBanned is a request refused because a ban covers its client,
// or because it matched a ban rule, asked for a trap path or the
// CrowdSec decision list lists its client, each of which bans the
// client.
ActionBanned = "banned"
// ActionTemporarilyBanned is a request refused because a ban that runs
// out covers its client, or because it matched a ban rule, asked for a
// trap path or the CrowdSec decision list lists its client, and so made
// such a ban.
ActionTemporarilyBanned = "temporarily_banned"
// ActionRuleBlocked is a request refused because it matched a block
// rule.
ActionRuleBlocked = "rule_blocked"
// ActionPermanentlyBanned is a request refused because a ban that never
// runs out covers its client, or because the request made such a ban or
// made its client's ban permanent.
ActionPermanentlyBanned = "permanently_banned"
// ActionBlockedByBlockRule is a request refused because it matched a
// block rule.
ActionBlockedByBlockRule = "blocked_by_block_rule"
// ActionWAFBlocked is a request refused because the Core Rule Set
// scored it at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
ActionWAFBlocked = "waf_blocked"
// ActionDenied is a request refused because its client is in
// ActionClientDenied is a request refused because its client is in
// SWW_DENY_NETS, in a blocklist while SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny,
// or listed by a DNSBL zone, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, while
// SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny, or that carries a tag in SWW_TAG_DENY.
ActionDenied = "denied"
ActionClientDenied = "client_denied"
// ActionCountryDenied is a request refused because its client's country
// is not in SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
@@ -134,10 +139,10 @@ type Line struct {
// The decision.
Action string `json:"action"`
// WouldAction is, in observe mode, the action enforce mode would have
// taken with a request it would have refused: ActionDenied,
// ActionBanned, ActionCountryDenied, ActionRateLimited,
// ActionRuleBlocked, ActionWAFBlocked, or, in discriminator, ActionTooLarge
// for the header limits.
// taken with a request it would have refused: ActionClientDenied,
// ActionTemporarilyBanned, ActionPermanentlyBanned, ActionCountryDenied,
// ActionClientIsRateLimited, ActionBlockedByBlockRule, ActionWAFBlocked,
// or, in discriminator, ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge for the header limits.
WouldAction string `json:"would_action,omitempty"`
// Heuristic is the name of the heuristic that refused the request, in
// observe mode too, and HeuristicFigures are the figures it acted on, by
internal/sww/sww_test.go
+6 -5
View File
@@ -373,13 +373,13 @@ func TestStateKeptAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantRefused(t, url)
})
out.line(t, "action", "rate_limited")
out.line(t, "action", "client_is_rate_limited")
// After another, the ban still refuses it.
out = runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantRefused(t, url)
})
out.line(t, "action", "banned")
out.line(t, "action", "temporarily_banned")
}
func TestBanRefusesItsNetblockAfterARestartWithAnotherScope(t *testing.T) {
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ func TestRuleFileAddedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
}
})
out.line(t, "action", "rule_blocked")
out.line(t, "action", "blocked_by_block_rule")
}
func TestRuleFileThatDoesNotParseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ func TestBlocklistTriesAndCopiesKeptInReputationJSONAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T)
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
}
})
wantDeniedByList(t, out.line(t, "action", "denied"), dropURL)
wantDeniedByList(t, out.line(t, "action", "client_denied"), dropURL)
if fetches := torFetches.Load(); fetches != 1 {
t.Errorf("tor.txt fetched %d times, want once, before the restart", fetches)
@@ -843,7 +843,8 @@ func wantDeniedByList(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, listURL string) {
t.Helper()
reputation, _ := line["reputation"].([]any)
if line["action"] != "denied" || len(reputation) != 1 || reputation[0] != listURL {
if line["action"] != "client_denied" || len(reputation) != 1 ||
reputation[0] != listURL {
t.Errorf("request log line %v, want one denied for %s", line, listURL)
}
}
script/example-app
+5 -4
View File
@@ -187,15 +187,16 @@ main() {
echo "example-app: rproxy passes a request to the app and its answer back"
refused || fail "a second request in a minute was not refused"
wait_for "discriminator logged no ban" logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"rate_limited"'
wait_for "discriminator logged no ban" \
logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"client_is_rate_limited"'
echo "example-app: a second request in a minute bans the client"
refused_from 203.0.113.9 /.env || fail "a probe for /.env was not refused"
wait_for "discriminator logged no ban for the probe" \
logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"banned"' '"rule_ids":["env-file"]'
logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"temporarily_banned"' '"rule_ids":["env-file"]'
refused_from 203.0.113.9 / || fail "the client of the probe was let through"
wait_for "the client's next request did not make its ban permanent" \
logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"ban_expires":"permanent"'
logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"permanently_banned"' '"ban_expires":"permanent"'
echo "example-app: a probe for /.env bans the client, its next request for good"
docker exec "$DISCRIMINATOR" sv stop sww >/dev/null ||
@@ -232,7 +233,7 @@ main() {
start_app
refused || fail "the new discriminator container let the banned client through"
wait_for "discriminator logged no request refused under the ban" \
logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"banned"'
logged "$DISCRIMINATOR" '"action":"temporarily_banned"'
echo "example-app: a new discriminator container on the same volume keeps the ban"
docker rm --force "$DISCRIMINATOR" >/dev/null