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sneak 948ced2cbf README: blocks misbehaving scrapers, not normal ones (closes #387)
check / check (push) Failing after 2m12s
The opening now lists what bans a client with the default settings: the
rate and byte limits, a probe for a secret path, a security scanner's
user agent, and the refusal limit. A scraper that does none of these is
left alone.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-14 17:10:54 +00:00
4 changed files with 71 additions and 96 deletions

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@@ -2,7 +2,20 @@
`smallwebwaf` is an MIT-licensed web application firewall, written in Go by
[@sneak](https://sneak.berlin), for self-hosted web apps. It refuses the
requests of scrapers, scanners and other abusers before they reach an app.
requests of misbehaving scrapers, scanners and other abusers before they reach
an app.
With the default settings, a client is banned when it does any of these:
- makes more than 120 requests in a minute, 1500 in an hour or 6000 in a day;
- moves more than `50G` of request and response bodies in an hour, or `100G` in
a day;
- asks for a secret or backup file, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`;
- sends a user agent that names a security scanner, such as `sqlmap` or `nikto`;
- has more than 30 requests in a minute refused as probes or attacks.
A scraper that does none of these is left alone. A scraper that waits 15 seconds
between requests stays under the rate limits.
## What it does
@@ -10,11 +23,10 @@ A web application firewall reads each request on its way to a web app and
refuses the ones that look like abuse. `smallwebwaf` is one program, `sww`,
shipped in one image, with two commands that do this together:
- `sww rproxy` is a small reverse proxy in front of one app. It sits behind the
reverse proxy that terminates TLS, such as traefik, nginx or Caddy. It asks
`waf` about each request, passes the allowed ones to the app, and passes the
app's answers back. It keeps nothing between requests and writes nothing to
disk.
- `sww rproxy` is a small reverse proxy in front of one app. traefik routes to
it. It asks `waf` about each request, passes the allowed ones to the app, and
passes the app's answers back. It keeps nothing between requests and writes
nothing to disk.
- `sww waf` decides. It runs the checks and keeps the bans, the counters and
each client's history. One `waf` serves many sites: a client banned through
one site is refused on all of them, and its requests on all of them count
@@ -58,8 +70,8 @@ For the operator, it:
Not built, and not planned:
- TLS and routing by host name. Both stay with the reverse proxy in front of
`rproxy`.
- TLS and routing by host name. Both stay with traefik, the reverse proxy in
front of `rproxy`.
- Browser challenges such as captchas.
- A web console, or a configuration file.
- Defence against floods large enough to fill the host's network link.
@@ -91,48 +103,20 @@ accepts connections, whether or not `waf` answers; in `waf`'s container, once
The usual setup is three containers on one private network:
- the app;
- `rproxy`, in front of the app, which the reverse proxy that terminates TLS
forwards to: `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` names `waf` and
`SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` names the app;
- `rproxy`, in front of the app, which traefik routes to:
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` names `waf` and `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` names the
app;
- `waf`, with `SWW_COMMAND=waf` and a volume at `/var/lib/sww` for its state
files.
Publish no port of the app or of `waf`. Anything on that network can reach the
app around `rproxy`, and can ask `waf` questions, so the network holds only what
you trust. Each further app adds its own container and its own `rproxy`, whose
Point traefik's labels at port 8080 of `rproxy`
(`traefik.http.services.<name>.loadbalancer.server.port=8080`). Publish no port
of the app or of `waf`. Anything on that network can reach the app around
`rproxy`, and can ask `waf` questions, so the network holds only what you trust.
Each further app adds its own container and its own `rproxy`, whose
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` names the same `waf`. The "Smallest setup" example
below shows this shape.
### The reverse proxy in front
`rproxy` serves plain HTTP. It runs behind any reverse proxy that terminates
TLS, such as traefik, nginx or Caddy. That proxy must:
- forward each request to port 8080 of `rproxy` over plain HTTP;
- keep the visitor's `Host` header;
- add the visitor's address to `X-Forwarded-For`;
- set `X-Forwarded-Proto` to the scheme the visitor used;
- connect to `rproxy` from an address in `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES`, by
default `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12` or `192.168.0.0/16`.
From any other address, `rproxy` ignores the forwarded headers and takes the
proxy for the visitor. Every visitor then shares one address, and one ban.
traefik and Caddy keep the `Host` header and set both forwarded headers by
default. traefik's Docker label
`traefik.http.services.<name>.loadbalancer.server.port=8080` names the port, and
Caddy's `reverse_proxy rproxy:8080` needs nothing more. nginx sets none of the
headers by default, so its site names them:
```nginx
location / {
proxy_pass http://rproxy:8080;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
```
### `rproxy` in the app's container
An app's image can instead be built on the `smallwebwaf` image, so that `rproxy`
@@ -183,13 +167,13 @@ entrypoint starts `rproxy` and the app side by side, each as its own user. Run
the app's image with `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` set. `deploy/example-app` is such
an app, and the "`rproxy` beside the app" example below runs one.
The app sees the headers the reverse proxy in front sent, with that proxy's
address added to `X-Forwarded-For`, from a TCP peer that is `rproxy`. So the app
must trust `rproxy`'s address for forwarded headers. In a container of its own,
`rproxy` is on the private network, which the usual default of a trusted-proxy
setting covers. Beside the app, its address is `127.0.0.1` or `::1`, which the
private ranges leave out, so the app's own setting must name them too, as
`app.run` does.
The app sees the headers traefik sent, with traefik's address added to
`X-Forwarded-For`, from a TCP peer that is `rproxy`. So the app must trust
`rproxy`'s address for forwarded headers. In a container of its own, `rproxy` is
on the private network, which the usual default of a trusted-proxy setting
covers. Beside the app, its address is `127.0.0.1` or `::1`, which the private
ranges leave out, so the app's own setting must name them too, as `app.run`
does.
### Checking that it works
@@ -197,9 +181,9 @@ private ranges leave out, so the app's own setting must name them too, as
`healthy` for each container of `smallwebwaf`.
- A log line with `"msg":"starting"` gives the version, the address and every
setting in effect, with secrets masked.
- A request to the site through the reverse proxy in front gets the app's
answer. `https://<site>/_sww/healthz` answers `ok`. `waf`'s log lines about
the request have `"action":"forward"`.
- A request to the site through traefik gets the app's answer.
`https://<site>/_sww/healthz` answers `ok`. `waf`'s log lines about the
request have `"action":"forward"`.
- To see a refusal without banning yourself, run `waf` with
`SWW_WAF_MODE=observe` and ask for `/.env`. The request reaches the app.
`waf`'s log lines have `"would_action":"temporarily_banned"` and
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@@ -3,8 +3,7 @@
`smallwebwaf` is a web application firewall for self-hosted apps. It is one
binary, `sww`, and two of its commands do the work:
- `sww rproxy` is a reverse proxy between one app and the reverse proxy that
terminates TLS.
- `sww rproxy` is a reverse proxy between traefik and one app.
- `sww waf` decides what happens to each request, for many sites.
This document says what it must do and why, each requirement once. Everything in
@@ -46,8 +45,7 @@ never as a time.
## Non-goals
- TLS, certificates and routing by host name. Those are the job of the reverse
proxy in front of `rproxy`, such as traefik, nginx or Caddy.
- TLS, certificates and routing by host name. Those are traefik's job.
- More than one app behind one `rproxy`. Each app has its own.
- Browser challenges such as captchas or proof of work. If wanted, chain Anubis
between `rproxy` and the app.
@@ -1945,10 +1943,10 @@ leave out a cookie only when its name matches exactly, case included.
### Ban lengths, response and scope
`SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE` is `403` by default, which makes a ban easy to recognise
when debugging; `429` and `close` are the alternatives. `close` does not leave
the client unanswered: the reverse proxy in front answers `502`, as it does
whenever its backend drops a connection. `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` widens an
IPv4 ban to the surrounding netblock. The four ban lengths are under "Bans".
when debugging; `429` and `close` are the alternatives. Behind traefik, `close`
does not leave the client unanswered: traefik answers `502`, as it does whenever
its backend drops a connection. `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` widens an IPv4 ban
to the surrounding netblock. The four ban lengths are under "Bans".
### Reputation
@@ -2773,10 +2771,9 @@ its whole body. The visitor gets that answer at once, and the connection closes
after it.
The largest request line and headers is 32 KiB. A kept-open connection is closed
after 120 seconds idle. Neither has a setting. The reverse proxy in front should
close an unused connection sooner, so that it never sends a request on a
connection `rproxy` is closing. traefik closes one after 90 seconds by default.
nginx, by default, opens a new connection for each request.
after 120 seconds idle. Neither has a setting. traefik, by default, closes an
unused connection after 90 seconds. So traefik closes first, and never sends a
request on a connection `rproxy` is closing.
What the visitor gets when a limit is passed:
@@ -2827,16 +2824,14 @@ chooses: `waf` runs `waf`, and with it unset the image runs `rproxy`.
The usual setup is three containers on one private network:
- the app;
- `rproxy`, which the reverse proxy that terminates TLS forwards to, with
`SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` naming the app and `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` naming
`waf`;
- `rproxy`, which traefik routes to, with `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` naming the
app and `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` naming `waf`;
- `waf`, with `SWW_COMMAND=waf` and a volume for its state files.
Each further app adds its own container and its own `rproxy`, whose
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` names the same `waf` (see "Sites"). Anything on that
network can reach an app around `rproxy`, and can ask `waf` questions or send it
reports. So the network holds only what you trust. "The reverse proxy in front"
in `README.md` lists what that proxy must do.
reports. So the network holds only what you trust.
### `rproxy` in the app's container
@@ -2908,10 +2903,10 @@ process that stops at start is started again every second, not in a tight loop.
container's output, which `docker logs` shows.
- When a service exits, runit runs its `run` script again, and the container
does not stop. Beside an app, the other process keeps running.
- While `rproxy` is down, the reverse proxy in front answers `502`. While the
app is down, `rproxy` answers `502`, which is not a client offence. While
`waf` is down, `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` decides (see
"Without an answer from `waf`").
- While `rproxy` is down, traefik answers `502`. While the app is down, `rproxy`
answers `502`, which is not a client offence. While `waf` is down,
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` decides (see "Without an answer
from `waf`").
- Only faults found at start stop `waf`:
- invalid configuration;
- a lookup database that is missing or unreadable;
@@ -2944,26 +2939,23 @@ checks:
- With `SWW_COMMAND` unset, empty or `rproxy`, it passes while `rproxy` answers
that request on `127.0.0.1`, at the port in `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR`, and the
app accepts connections at `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`. It does not ask `waf`,
so that the site stays in the routes of the reverse proxy in front while `waf`
is down.
so that the site stays in traefik's routes while `waf` is down.
- With any other value, it fails with a message naming `SWW_COMMAND` and its
value.
A reverse proxy that reads Docker's health status, as traefik does, sends a
container no requests until it shows as healthy. So the check runs every second
from the container's start until it first passes, for up to a minute, and every
30 seconds after that. An app with a health check of its own can replace the
image's `HEALTHCHECK` with one that checks both.
traefik sends a container no requests until it shows as healthy. So the check
runs every second from the container's start until it first passes, for up to a
minute, and every 30 seconds after that. An app with a health check of its own
can replace the image's `HEALTHCHECK` with one that checks both.
### Ports
`rproxy` listens on no port but the one in `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR`, 8080 by
default, which the reverse proxy in front forwards to. It passes requests to the
app at `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`, `http://127.0.0.1:8081` by default. Another
port may be set: the health check follows the setting, and the reverse proxy in
front must name it, as traefik's port label
(`traefik.http.services.<name>.loadbalancer.server.port`) does. An app beside
`rproxy` must leave that port free.
default, which traefik routes to. It passes requests to the app at
`SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`, `http://127.0.0.1:8081` by default. Another port may
be set: the health check follows the setting, and traefik's port label
(`traefik.http.services.<name>.loadbalancer.server.port`) must name it. An app
beside `rproxy` must leave that port free.
`waf` listens on no port but the one in `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR`, 8080 by default.
The questions, the reports and its own endpoints all come there.
@@ -3004,9 +2996,9 @@ in `docs/settings.md` shows the commands.
### Forwarded headers
The app's TCP peer is `rproxy`, and the `X-Forwarded-For` the app receives ends
with the address of the reverse proxy in front, which `rproxy` adds after the
visitor's. So the app must trust `rproxy`'s address for forwarded headers,
besides the private address ranges that proxy is on.
with traefik's address, which `rproxy` adds after the visitor's. So the app must
trust `rproxy`'s address for forwarded headers, besides the private address
ranges traefik is on.
- In a container of its own, `rproxy`'s address is on the private network. The
usual default for a trusted-proxy setting, the private ranges, covers it.
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@@ -68,8 +68,7 @@ Every one of these lines has:
### Request detail
- `request_id`: the id `rproxy` made for the request when it arrived.
- `peer_ip`: the address of `rproxy`'s TCP peer, normally the reverse proxy in
front of it.
- `peer_ip`: the address of `rproxy`'s TCP peer, normally traefik.
- `forwarded_for`: the `X-Forwarded-For` header the visitor's request came with.
- `client_group`: the client as rate limiting counts it, an IPv4 address as a
/32 or an IPv6 group.
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@@ -478,9 +478,9 @@ start, and an invalid value stops the start. Any can be given as a file, as a
`10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`): the netblocks whose
`X-Forwarded-For` is believed. Set but empty, it trusts nothing. A client
outside these netblocks cannot claim another address. Where other containers
reach `rproxy` directly, or visitors on a private network reach the reverse
proxy in front, they can name another address in the header. Narrowing the
setting to that proxy's own network closes that gap.
reach `rproxy` directly, or visitors on a private network reach traefik, they
can name another address in the header. Narrowing the setting to traefik's own
network closes that gap.
## The image's command