SWW_APPS: an app's Core Rule Set fixes apply only to the hostnames that serve it (closes #220)

gitea's fixes (its parameters, its cookies and gitea.conf) now apply
only to a hostname SWW_APPS lists gitea for, or to every hostname while
it is unset. Each app's fixes are one .conf file, whose first rule skips
the rest unless Inspect sets tx.app_<name>, and one entry in apps.

A hostname in SWW_APPS that is not a DNS name, such as *.example.com,
stops the start. Unset, SWW_APPS is logged at start as null; set
empty, as "".

Model: opus-5-5

README.md

@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
 Every setting the code reads, with its default:
 
 | Variable                                 | Default                                                                                  | What it does                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
-| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| ---------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | `SWW_COMMAND`                            | `rproxy`                                                                                 | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`.                                                                                                                                                                         |
 | `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND`                       | required                                                                                 | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`.                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
 | `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`                      | `http://127.0.0.1:8081`                                                                  | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more.                                                                                                                                                                                             |
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ Every setting the code reads, with its default:
 | `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS`                   | empty                                                                                    | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect.                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
 | `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT`                     | `off`                                                                                    | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none.                                                                                                                                                                       |
 | `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE`      | unset                                                                                    | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only.                                                                                                                                                  |
+| `SWW_APPS`                               | unset                                                                                    | The apps each hostname serves, such as `git.example.com:gitea;cloud.example.com:gitea`; only those apps' fixes apply there. Unset, every app's fixes apply to every hostname.                                                                                   |
 | `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS`                     | empty                                                                                    | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`.                                                                                                                                     |
 | `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH`                  | `24h`                                                                                    | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more.                                                                                                                                                                                         |
 | `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION`                   | `deny`                                                                                   | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`.                                                                                                                                                                          |
@@ -311,7 +312,7 @@ Every setting the code reads, with its default:
 | `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL`            | unset                                                                                    | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message.                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
 | `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL`                     | unset                                                                                    | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`.                                                                                                                                                                 |
 | `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN`                   | unset                                                                                    | An ntfy access token sent with each alert.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
-| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS`                       | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says.                                                                                                                                                                                  |
+| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS`                       | `ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says.                                                                                                                                                                                  |
 | `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN`                     | `15m`                                                                                    | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`.                                                                                                                                                                             |
 | `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR`                 | `60`                                                                                     | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`.                                                                                                                                                               |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off`                                                                                    | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count.                                                                                                                                                                                       |
@@ -469,7 +470,7 @@ services:
             # Alerts to an ntfy topic, with its token read from a file.
             SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL: https://ntfy.example/smallwebwaf
             SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/sww/tokens/ntfy
-            SWW_ALERT_EVENTS: ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,source_failure,file_error
+            SWW_ALERT_EVENTS: ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,source_failure,file_error
         volumes:
             - discriminator-state:/var/lib/sww
             - /srv/ipinfo:/var/lib/ipinfo:ro
@@ -581,11 +582,15 @@ client's limits by tag. See "Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md).
   headers of every request, and no body unless `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` is set. In
   front of a code forge, bodies carry what people write and publish, which the
   rules take for attacks.
-- `smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set in eight ways so that it lets ordinary
+- `smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set in six ways so that it lets ordinary
   requests to a code forge through, such as git over HTTP and sign-in through
-  Git Credential Manager. On gitea's own paths, its searches, file names and
+  Git Credential Manager. No setting undoes the changes; "Attack detection" in
-  branch names get through too. No setting undoes the changes; "Attack
+  [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists them.
-  detection" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists them.
+- Each supported app also has its own fixes, which let its ordinary requests
+  through. gitea's let its searches, file names and branch names through.
+  `SWW_APPS` names the apps each hostname serves. A hostname gets only its own
+  apps' fixes, and a hostname it does not list gets none. Unset, every app's
+  fixes apply to every hostname.
 - `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` switches single rules off for an app's own
   fields or paths.
 - Rule files are plain text, one rule to a line, edited by hand and read again
@@ -632,9 +637,10 @@ is set aside as `<name>.bad`, and never stops the running process (see
 - `internal/rproxy`: the reverse proxy in front of one app.
 - `internal/discriminator`: `discriminator`'s server, which runs the checks and
   answers its own endpoints.
-- `internal/ratelimit`, `internal/bans`, `internal/rules`, `internal/waf`,
+- `internal/ratelimit`, `internal/bans`, `internal/rules`,
-  `internal/lookup`, `internal/reputation`, `internal/routewatch`,
+  `internal/coreruleset`, `internal/lookup`, `internal/reputation`,
-  `internal/anomaly` and `internal/alerts`: one check or source each.
+  `internal/routewatch`, `internal/anomaly` and `internal/alerts`: one check or
+  source each.
 - `internal/state`, `internal/requestlog`, `internal/remotelog` and
   `internal/metrics`: the state files, the log lines, the syslog sender and the
   metrics.

SPEC.md

@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ to them.
       of bans is full.
     - `internal/rules`: reads the rule files at start and again when they
       change, and tells which rules a request matches.
-    - `internal/waf`: the Core Rule Set, with the eight changes listed under
+    - `internal/coreruleset`: the Core Rule Set, with the six changes and the
-      "Attack detection", as Coraza directives.
+      apps' fixes listed under "Attack detection", as Coraza directives.
     - `internal/lookup`: looks clients up through GeoJS or in the lookup
       database.
     - `internal/reputation`: fetches the lists, asks the DNS blocklists and
@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ files, the limits and the bans still apply to the client that sends it.
   match, and scores are still logged. A request with more than 1000 query
   parameters or body fields adds 5 to its score, since Coraza reads only the
   first 1000. For a match, in `block` and `detect` mode alike, the log line
-  gives the rule ids and the score, and a `waf_block` alert is sent.
+  gives the rule ids and the score, and a `core_rule_set_match` alert is sent.
 - `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` switches off rule ids when an app trips a false
   positive. The default switches off six rules:
     - 920340, 920420 and 920640 refuse a request for the type of its body, when
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ files, the limits and the bans still apply to the client that sends it.
 - `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` names a file of exclusions, written as
   Coraza directives. An exclusion switches one rule off for some fields or paths
   only, where `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` switches it off everywhere. The file
-  holds an app's own exclusions; the eighth change below holds gitea's.
+  holds an app's own exclusions; gitea's fixes below hold gitea's.
     - `discriminator` loads the file after `smallwebwaf`'s own setup rules and
       before the Core Rule Set's rules. The Core Rule Set loads its own
       `REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS.conf` at the same point.
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ files, the limits and the bans still apply to the client that sends it.
     scanner from an ordinary client. In front of a code forge, registry and git
     clients get `404` and `401` by design, hundreds of times a minute.
 
-`smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set 4.25.0 in eight ways, since in front of
+`smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set 4.25.0 in six ways, since in front of
 gitea it would otherwise refuse ordinary requests. The changes hold in front of
 every app, and no setting undoes them:
 
@@ -739,8 +739,52 @@ every app, and no setting undoes them:
    and tea, which gitea registers for OAuth sign-in, ask to be sent back to
    `http://127.0.0.1` on the user's own machine. The server never fetches that
    address.
-4. Ten query parameters are not checked against the Core Rule Set's lists of
+4. `Referer` is not checked for a Unix command given without arguments (932340),
-   system files (930120), shell paths (932160) and command names (932260):
+   for Java starting a process (944110) or for a Java class name (944130).
+   `Referer` names the page a request comes from, on everything that page loads
+   and on every link followed from it. The Core Rule Set takes some page
+   addresses for attacks:
+    - a search for `env`;
+    - OpenJDK's `Runtime.java`, whose path holds both `runtime` and `java.`;
+    - a file named `java.lang.String.md`.
+
+    Every request from such a page would be refused. `Referer` keeps the other
+    rules, except after some gitea searches (gitea's fixes). An app that passes
+    `Referer` to a shell must check it itself.
+
+5. Responses are not inspected. A raw file from a repository, such as a shell
+   script, looks to the response rules like source code leaking from the server.
+6. The `from` parameter of a container registry's upload path,
+   `/v2/<image>/blobs/uploads/`, is not checked for command names (932260). When
+   a push reuses a layer, `from` names the image the layer comes from. An image
+   such as `owner/python3-app` would have that push refused.
+
+Each supported app also has its own fixes, which let its ordinary requests
+through. An app's fixes hold for the hostnames `SWW_APPS` lists the app for:
+
+- `SWW_APPS` holds entries separated by semicolons. Each is a hostname, a colon,
+  then one or more apps separated by commas, for example
+  `git.example.com:gitea;code.example.com:gitea`.
+- The request's `Host` is matched by exact name, without its port and without
+  regard to case. There are no wildcards.
+- A hostname not listed gets no app's fixes, so every rule checks it in full.
+  Set empty, `SWW_APPS` lists no hostname.
+- Unset, every app's fixes hold for every hostname. An app's fixes then weaken
+  the check of any other app that serves the same paths or fields.
+- Any of these mistakes stops the start:
+    - an unknown app;
+    - a hostname that is not a DNS name, such as `*.example.com`;
+    - a hostname listed twice;
+    - an app listed twice for one hostname;
+    - an entry without a colon.
+
+`gitea` is the only app supported. Each app's fixes are in one file, such as
+`internal/coreruleset/gitea.conf`, and one entry of `apps` in
+`internal/coreruleset/coreruleset.go`. gitea's fixes are:
+
+1. Ten query parameters are not checked against the Core Rule Set's lists of
+   system files (930120), shell paths (932160) and command names (932260), on
+   any path:
     - `path`, `files`, `skip-to` and `sub_path`;
     - `ref`, `sha`, `branch` and `workflow`;
     - `artifactName` and `redirect_to`.
@@ -753,44 +797,21 @@ every app, and no setting undoes them:
     catch reaches the app, such as the command `|cat /etc/passwd`. Path
     traversal, SQL and script injection, and PHP, Java and Node.js code are
     still refused there. Other parameters keep all three rules, except on the
-    gitea paths the eighth change names. An app that uses one of these
+    gitea paths the third fix names.
-    parameters as a file on the server, or passes it to a shell, must check the
-    value itself. A rule file can refuse it instead.
 
-5. Two cookies are left out, and `Referer` keeps fewer rules:
+2. The Core Rule Set reads the request without the `gitea_flash` and
-    - The Core Rule Set reads the request without the `gitea_flash` and
    `redirect_to` cookies. gitea puts a message naming what was just done into
-      `gitea_flash`. It puts into `redirect_to` the page to return to after
+   `gitea_flash`. It puts into `redirect_to` the page to return to after signing
-      signing in. The Core Rule Set takes file names in them, such as
+   in. The Core Rule Set takes file names in them, such as `package.json`, for
-      `package.json`, for attacks. A browser sends such a cookie with every
+   attacks. A browser sends such a cookie with every request until gitea
-      request until gitea replaces it. gitea cannot replace it while those
+   replaces it. gitea cannot replace it while those requests are refused, so one
-      requests are refused, so one refusal would keep the browser out of the
+   refusal would keep the browser out of the whole site. gitea shows the message
-      whole site. gitea shows the message with any script removed and returns
+   with any script removed and returns only to its own pages. Every other cookie
-      only to its own pages. Every other cookie is read in full. An app that
+   is read in full.
-      reads a cookie of either name must check it itself.
+3. On gitea's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused ordinary gitea
-    - `Referer` is not checked for a Unix command given without arguments
-      (932340), for Java starting a process (944110) or for a Java class name
-      (944130). `Referer` names the page a request comes from, on everything
-      that page loads and on every link followed from it. The Core Rule Set
-      takes some page addresses for attacks:
-        - a search for `env`;
-        - OpenJDK's `Runtime.java`, whose path holds both `runtime` and `java.`;
-        - a file named `java.lang.String.md`.
-
-        Every request from such a page would be refused. `Referer` keeps the
-        other rules, except after some gitea searches (the eighth change). An
-        app that passes `Referer` to a shell must check it itself.
-
-6. Responses are not inspected. A raw file from a repository, such as a shell
-   script, looks to the response rules like source code leaking from the server.
-7. The `from` parameter of a container registry's upload path,
-   `/v2/<image>/blobs/uploads/`, is not checked for command names (932260). When
-   a push reuses a layer, `from` names the image the layer comes from. An image
-   such as `owner/python3-app` would have that push refused.
-8. On gitea's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused ordinary gitea
    requests there. They are the fields where gitea sends a search, a file name
-   or a branch name. `internal/waf/gitea.conf` lists each rule and the request
+   or a branch name. `internal/coreruleset/gitea.conf` lists each rule and the
-   it refused. The fields are:
+   request it refused. The fields are:
     - `q` on gitea's searches of code, of issues and pull requests, and of
       commits. A code search holds code, such as `<script>`,
       `SELECT * FROM users WHERE` or `../`.
@@ -805,8 +826,7 @@ every app, and no setting undoes them:
         - packages.
 
         A user's or an organisation's page is any path of one segment, so on
-        every such path, on any app, `q` skips these three rules, for example on
+        every such path `q` skips these three rules, for example on `/search`.
-        `/search`.
 
         Some of these searches also skip the rule for Java class names (944130),
         which refused `org.apache.commons.logging`.
@@ -844,11 +864,14 @@ every app, and no setting undoes them:
       `actions/upload-artifact@v3` (920450).
 
     Elsewhere these fields keep every rule. The paths are those of gitea at the
-    site root. An app other than gitea that serves one of them must check these
+    site root.
-    fields itself.
 
-The parameter and cookie names in these changes are matched without regard to
+On a hostname that gets gitea's fixes, an app other than gitea must check these
-case, as Coraza matches them.
+fields and cookies itself. Listing each hostname's own apps in `SWW_APPS` keeps
+the full check for the others.
+
+The parameter names in these changes and fixes are matched without regard to
+case, and the cookie names exactly.
 
 ### Ban lengths, response and scope
 
@@ -1378,11 +1401,11 @@ these fields, named as the request log's fields of the same meaning:
 - `request_bytes` and `response_bytes`: the body bytes each way, with what a
   WebSocket carried each way, each a whole number from `0` to `1125899906842624`
   (1 PiB);
-- `duration_total`: milliseconds from the request's headers being read to the
+- `duration_total_ms`: milliseconds from the request's headers being read to the
   end of the answer, from `0` to `1000000000000` (about 31 years);
-- `duration_upstream_total`: milliseconds from the hand-over to the app to the
+- `duration_upstream_total_ms`: milliseconds from the hand-over to the app to
-  end of the answer, in the same range, and `0` for a request not passed to the
+  the end of the answer, in the same range, and `0` for a request not passed to
-  app.
+  the app.
 
 `discriminator` answers `400` and writes a process warning when the body:
 

docs/alerts.md

@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ back or dropped.
 - `ban`: a ban `discriminator` made.
 - `permanent_ban`: a permanent ban it made, or an existing ban made permanent by
   a request.
-- `waf_block`: the Core Rule Set scored a request at or over the threshold. The
+- `core_rule_set_match`: the Core Rule Set scored a request at or over the
-  request was refused unless the alert's `detail` gives `mode`: `detect` or
+  threshold. The request was refused unless the alert's `detail` gives `mode`:
-  `observe`.
+  `detect` or `observe`.
 - `anomaly`: a count over an anomaly threshold.
 - `reputation_hit`: a request from a client on a blocklist, the CrowdSec
   decision list or a DNS blocklist, or with an AbuseIPDB score that is a hit.
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ The priority and tag by event:
 
 - `ban`: priority `default`, tag `no_entry`.
 - `permanent_ban`: priority `high`, tag `no_entry`.
-- `waf_block`: priority `default`, tag `shield`.
+- `core_rule_set_match`: priority `default`, tag `shield`.
 - `anomaly`: priority `high`, tag `chart_with_upwards_trend`.
 - `reputation_hit`: priority `low`, tag `label`.
 - `source_failure` and `file_error`: priority `high`, tag `warning`.

docs/metrics.md

@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says.
 ## Attack detection
 
 - `sww_rule_matches_total`, by `rule_id` and `action`, and `sww_rules_loaded`;
-- `sww_waf_matches_total`, by `mode` and `rule_id`, for the rules that fired.
+- `sww_core_rule_set_matches_total`, by `mode` and `rule_id`, for the rules that
+  fired.
 
 ## Countries and AS numbers
 
@@ -43,8 +44,8 @@ For the `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` busiest of each, the rest as `other`:
 ## Lookups
 
 - `sww_geojs_requests_total` and `sww_geojs_failures_total`;
-- `sww_geojs_unanswered_total`: the requests that needed an answer and went on
+- `sww_requests_without_geojs_answer_total`: the requests that needed an answer
-  without it;
+  and went on without it;
 - with the file source, `sww_lookup_database_last_read_timestamp_seconds` and
   `sww_lookup_database_read_failures_total`.
 
@@ -70,8 +71,8 @@ By `file`:
 ## Remote log, alerts and the process
 
 - while a syslog server is set, `sww_remote_log_lines_sent_total`,
-  `sww_remote_log_lines_dropped_total` and `sww_remote_log_buffer_depth`;
+  `sww_remote_log_lines_dropped_total` and `sww_remote_log_lines_waiting`;
-- by `destination`, `sww_alerts_sent_total`, `sww_alerts_failed_total`,
+- by `destination`, `sww_alerts_sent_total`, `sww_alert_send_failures_total`,
   `sww_alerts_suppressed_total` and `sww_alerts_dropped_total`;
 - Go's own `go_` metrics and the process's `process_` metrics.
 

docs/request-log.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ These questions write no line:
 A `report` line:
 
 ```
-{"type":"request","discriminator_line":"report","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"fsn1/discriminator","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","asn":"AS64496","as_name":"Example Net","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40,"minute_bytes":5120,"hour_bytes":61440,"day_bytes":204800},"waf_score":0,"duration_total":3.217,"duration_checks":0.041,"duration_waf":0.029,"duration_upstream_total":3.104}
+{"type":"request","discriminator_line":"report","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"fsn1/discriminator","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","asn":"AS64496","as_name":"Example Net","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40,"minute_bytes":5120,"hour_bytes":61440,"day_bytes":204800},"core_rule_set_score":0,"duration_total_ms":3.217,"duration_checks_ms":0.041,"duration_core_rule_set_ms":0.029,"duration_upstream_total_ms":3.104}
 ```
 
 ### Every line
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Every one of these lines has:
 - the standard web log fields;
 - `request_id`, `peer_ip` and `client_group`;
 - `asn`, `as_name` and `country`;
-- `action` and `duration_total`.
+- `action` and `duration_total_ms`.
 
 ### Standard web log fields
 
@@ -103,10 +103,10 @@ Every one of these lines has:
     - `permanently_banned`: refused under a ban that never runs out, including a
       ban this request made or made permanent;
     - `country_denied`, `client_is_rate_limited`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and
-      `waf_blocked`: refused by that check;
+      `blocked_by_core_rule_set`: refused by that check;
     - `request_header_too_large`: over a header limit;
-    - `admin`: answered at one of `discriminator`'s own endpoints, or `404` for
+    - `own_endpoint`: answered at one of `discriminator`'s own endpoints, or
-      a path under `/_sww/`.
+      `404` for a path under `/_sww/`.
 - `would_action`: in `observe` mode, what `enforce` mode would have done with a
   request it would have refused. `action` then names what was done, normally
   `forward`.
@@ -140,9 +140,10 @@ Every one of these lines has:
     `byte_limits` bans when the report comes, so only the `report` line names
     it.
 
-- `limit_percent` and `limit_percent_setting`: the client's percentage of the
+- `rate_limit_percent` and `rate_limit_percent_setting`: the client's percentage
-  rate limits and the setting that lowered it, when one did. `bytes_percent` and
+  of the rate limits and the setting that lowered it, when one did.
-  `bytes_percent_setting` do the same for the byte limits.
+  `bytes_limit_percent` and `bytes_limit_percent_setting` do the same for the
+  byte limits.
 - `counts`: the client's totals as rate limiting counts them, this request
   included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It
   holds:
@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ Every one of these lines has:
 - `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
     - `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
     - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
-    - `error_burst`.
+    - `minute_refusals` for the error burst (`SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`).
 
     When the bytes counted for a request and its response break a limit, the
     request has been passed on whole, so its `action` stays `forward`. Only its
@@ -166,8 +167,8 @@ Every one of these lines has:
 
 - `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
   refused.
-- `waf_score` and `waf_rule_ids`: the Core Rule Set's score and the rules that
+- `core_rule_set_score` and `core_rule_set_rule_ids`: the Core Rule Set's score
-  matched, for a request it inspected.
+  and the rules that matched, for a request it inspected.
 - `reputation`: the sources the client is on, in this order:
     - blocklist URLs;
     - the CrowdSec decision list's URL;
@@ -189,14 +190,14 @@ Every one of these lines has:
 
 All in milliseconds:
 
-- `duration_total`:
+- `duration_total_ms`:
     - on the `decision` line, from `discriminator` having read the question's
       body to the line;
     - on the `report` line, from `rproxy` having read the request's headers to
       the end of the answer.
-- `duration_checks`: to the end of the checks;
+- `duration_checks_ms`: to the end of the checks;
-- `duration_waf`: the part of that the Core Rule Set took;
+- `duration_core_rule_set_ms`: the part of that the Core Rule Set took;
-- `duration_upstream_total`: on the `report` line of an allowed request, from
+- `duration_upstream_total_ms`: on the `report` line of an allowed request, from
   the hand-over to the app to the end of the answer.
 
 ### Requests to its own endpoints
@@ -209,8 +210,8 @@ these meanings where they differ:
 - `scheme`: `http`.
 - `time`: when the request's headers had been read.
 - `request_bytes`: the bytes read of a ban to add, and otherwise `0`.
-- `action`: `admin`.
+- `action`: `own_endpoint`.
-- `duration_total`: from the request's headers being read to the line.
+- `duration_total_ms`: from the request's headers being read to the line.
 
 ## `rproxy`'s line
 
@@ -228,10 +229,10 @@ these meanings where they differ:
   a WebSocket carried from the visitor.
 - `response_bytes`: the bytes of the answer's body, with what a WebSocket
   carried from the app.
-- `duration_request`: milliseconds from the request's headers being read until
+- `duration_request_ms`: milliseconds from the request's headers being read
-  the app had been sent the whole request, or the answer started if that was
+  until the app had been sent the whole request, or the answer started if that
-  sooner. It includes the wait for `discriminator`.
+  was sooner. It includes the wait for `discriminator`.
-- `duration_response`: milliseconds from then until the end of the answer.
+- `duration_response_ms`: milliseconds from then until the end of the answer.
 - `disposition`: what was done with the request: `allow`, `deny` or `close`. It
   is `discriminator`'s answer, or the value of `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`. It is
   left out when:
@@ -245,5 +246,5 @@ these meanings where they differ:
 For example:
 
 ```
-{"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","host":"app.example","method":"GET","path":"/","query":"","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"duration_request":1.204,"duration_response":3.104,"disposition":"allow"}
+{"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","host":"app.example","method":"GET","path":"/","query":"","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"duration_request_ms":1.204,"duration_response_ms":3.104,"disposition":"allow"}
 ```

docs/settings.md

@@ -255,6 +255,24 @@ the request first.
   a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
   such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
   yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
+- `SWW_APPS` (default unset): the apps each hostname serves. A request gets the
+  fixes of its hostname's apps only (see "Attack detection" in
+  [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
+    - Entries are separated by semicolons. Each is a hostname, a colon, then one
+      or more apps separated by commas, for example
+      `git.example.com:gitea;code.example.com:gitea`.
+    - `gitea` is the only app supported.
+    - The request's `Host` is matched by exact name, without its port and
+      without regard to case. There are no wildcards.
+    - A hostname not listed gets no app's fixes, so every rule checks it in
+      full. Set empty, it lists no hostname.
+    - Unset, every app's fixes apply to every hostname.
+    - Any of these mistakes stops the start:
+        - an unknown app;
+        - a hostname that is not a DNS name, such as `*.example.com`;
+        - a hostname listed twice;
+        - an app listed twice for one hostname;
+        - an entry without a colon.
 - `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may get
   in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
   `off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
@@ -324,7 +342,7 @@ the request first.
 - `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` (default unset): an ntfy access token. A control
   character in it is refused.
 - `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` (default
-  `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error`):
+  `ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error`):
   the event types alerts are sent for, from those in [`alerts.md`](alerts.md)
   but `summary`. Any other name is refused.
 - `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` (default `15m`): how long after an alert is sent its

docs/state-files.md

@@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ since it was first seen:
 - body bytes of its requests, and of the responses it was sent;
 - responses by status class;
 - offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and
-  `waf_blocked`. A file may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which
+  `blocked_by_core_rule_set`. A file may also hold `token_refused`, which is
-  nothing adds to.
+  kept, and which nothing adds to.
 
 ## `lookups.json`
 

internal/alerts/alerts.go

@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ const (
 	// EventAnomaly is a count of requests or bytes over an anomaly
 	// threshold.
 	EventAnomaly = "anomaly"
-	// EventWAFBlock is a request the Core Rule Set scored at or over
+	// EventCoreRuleSetMatch is a request the Core Rule Set scored at or over
 	// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
 	// detect mode.
-	EventWAFBlock = "waf_block"
+	EventCoreRuleSetMatch = "core_rule_set_match"
 	// EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist, the
 	// CrowdSec decision list or a DNSBL zone lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score
 	// is a hit.
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ const (
 // default.
 func Events() []string {
 	return []string{
-		EventBan, EventPermanentBan, EventWAFBlock, EventAnomaly,
+		EventBan, EventPermanentBan, EventCoreRuleSetMatch, EventAnomaly,
 		EventReputationHit, EventSourceFailure, EventFileError,
 	}
 }
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ type State struct {
 // requests to it failed, and how many alerts were dropped from its full
 // queue or given up as it refused them.
 type Counts struct {
-	Sent, Failed, Dropped int64
+	Sent, SendFailures, Dropped int64
 }
 
 // Queue takes the alerts raised, holds back those it must, and sends the
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ type destination struct {
 	// waiting are the alerts waiting to be sent, oldest first.
 	waiting []*Alert
 
-	sent, failed, dropped atomic.Int64
+	sent, sendFailures, dropped atomic.Int64
 }
 
 // cooldownKey is what makes an alert a repeat of another: the same event
@@ -426,7 +426,9 @@ func (q *Queue) Counts(name string) Counts {
 	for _, d := range q.destinations {
 		if d.name == name {
 			return Counts{
-				Sent: d.sent.Load(), Failed: d.failed.Load(), Dropped: d.dropped.Load(),
+				Sent:         d.sent.Load(),
+				SendFailures: d.sendFailures.Load(),
+				Dropped:      d.dropped.Load(),
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -675,7 +677,7 @@ func (d *destination) run(ctx context.Context) {
 				retryAt = time.Time{}
 			case errors.Is(err, errRefused):
 				d.remove(alert)
-				d.failed.Add(1)
+				d.sendFailures.Add(1)
 				d.dropped.Add(1)
 
 				retryDelay = 0
@@ -684,7 +686,7 @@ func (d *destination) run(ctx context.Context) {
 				d.processLog.Warn("gave up an alert "+d.setting+" refused",
 					"event", alert.Event, "error", err.Error())
 			case ctx.Err() == nil: // not cut off as sww stops
-				d.failed.Add(1)
+				d.sendFailures.Add(1)
 
 				retryDelay = min(max(retryDelayFactor*retryDelay, firstRetryDelay),
 					maxRetryDelay)
@@ -871,7 +873,7 @@ func ntfyPriority(event string) string {
 		return "high"
 	case EventReputationHit:
 		return "low"
-	default: // ban, waf_block and summary
+	default: // ban, core_rule_set_match and summary
 		return "default"
 	}
 }
@@ -882,7 +884,7 @@ func ntfyTag(event string) string {
 	switch event {
 	case EventBan, EventPermanentBan:
 		return "no_entry"
-	case EventWAFBlock:
+	case EventCoreRuleSetMatch:
 		return "shield"
 	case EventAnomaly:
 		return "chart_with_upwards_trend"

internal/alerts/alerts_test.go

@@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ func TestDestinationThatDoesNotAnswerHoldsUpNeitherOther(t *testing.T) {
 		synctest.Wait()
 
 		wantDestinationCounts(t, q, alerts.DestinationSlack,
-			alerts.Counts{Sent: 3, Failed: 1})
+			alerts.Counts{Sent: 3, SendFailures: 1})
 
 		logged := log.String()
 		if !strings.Contains(logged,
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ func TestDropsAreCountedForEachDestination(t *testing.T) {
 		for destination, want := range map[string]alerts.Counts{
 			alerts.DestinationWebhook: {Sent: all},
 			alerts.DestinationSlack:   {Dropped: 1},
-			alerts.DestinationNtfy:    {Failed: all, Dropped: all},
+			alerts.DestinationNtfy:    {SendFailures: all, Dropped: all},
 		} {
 			wantDestinationCounts(t, q, destination, want)
 		}
@@ -1223,12 +1223,12 @@ func wantEvents(t *testing.T, webhook *standIn, want ...string) {
 // requests to it that it counts as failed, the alerts it counts as held
 // back, and those it counts as dropped for the webhook.
 func wantCounts(
-	t *testing.T, q *alerts.Queue, sent, failed, suppressed, dropped int64,
+	t *testing.T, q *alerts.Queue, sent, sendFailures, suppressed, dropped int64,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 
 	wantDestinationCounts(t, q, alerts.DestinationWebhook,
-		alerts.Counts{Sent: sent, Failed: failed, Dropped: dropped})
+		alerts.Counts{Sent: sent, SendFailures: sendFailures, Dropped: dropped})
 
 	if q.Suppressed() != suppressed {
 		t.Errorf("%d alerts held back, want %d", q.Suppressed(), suppressed)
@@ -1281,12 +1281,12 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 		},
 		{
 			alerts.Alert{
-				Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock, Client: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"),
+				Event: alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch, Client: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"),
 				Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"),
 				Reason:   "refused by the Core Rule Set",
 				Host:     "app.example",
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/blog: waf_block", "default shield",
+			"fsn1app1/blog: core_rule_set_match", "default shield",
 			"refused by the Core Rule Set\nhost: app.example\nclient: 192.0.2.1\n" +
 				"netblock: 192.0.2.1/32",
 		},

internal/anomaly/anomaly.go

@@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ const (
 	ScopeASN = "asn"
 	// ScopeTotal is the whole service.
 	ScopeTotal = "total"
-	// ScopeWatch is a named netblock of SWW_WATCH_NETS.
+	// ScopeWatchedNet is a named netblock of SWW_WATCH_NETS.
-	ScopeWatch = "watch"
+	ScopeWatchedNet = "watched_net"
 )
 
 // Scopes returns every scope.
 func Scopes() []string {
-	return []string{ScopeClient, ScopeNet, ScopeASN, ScopeTotal, ScopeWatch}
+	return []string{ScopeClient, ScopeNet, ScopeASN, ScopeTotal, ScopeWatchedNet}
 }
 
 // The windows a counter counts in, as the alerts name them.
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ func (c *Counters) scopesOf(r Request) []scope {
 	for _, named := range p.NamedNetblocks {
 		if named.Netblock.Contains(client) {
 			all = append(all, scope{
-				key{scope: ScopeWatch, netblock: named.Netblock, name: named.Name}, p.Watch,
+				key{scope: ScopeWatchedNet, netblock: named.Netblock, name: named.Name}, p.Watch,
 			})
 		}
 	}
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ func alertFor(r Request, k key, o overThreshold) alerts.Alert {
 		detail["asn"] = k.asn
 	case ScopeTotal:
 		counted = "the whole service"
-	default: // watch
+	default: // watched_net
 		counted = "the named netblock " + k.name + ", " + k.netblock.String()
 		detail["name"] = k.name
 	}

internal/bans/admin_test.go

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ func TestBanWithoutACauseIsAnAdmins(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{Netblock: netblock, Start: midnight()}})
 
 	if got := ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Cause; got != bans.CauseAdmin {
@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ func TestBanWithoutACauseIsAnAdmins(t *testing.T) {
 func TestAdminsBansAreNeverDroppedAndDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	rules := defaultRules()
+	params := defaultParams()
-	rules.MaxBans = 1
+	params.MaxBans = 1
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	adminsOnly := netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")
 	both := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
 	second := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ func TestAdminsBansAreNeverDroppedAndDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
 func TestEarlierBansCountABanDroppedAfterAnAdminsBan(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	rules := defaultRules()
+	params := defaultParams()
-	rules.MaxBans = 2
+	params.MaxBans = 2
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
 	other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
 
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ func TestEarlierBansCountABanDroppedAfterAnAdminsBan(t *testing.T) {
 func TestEarlierBansCountABanAnAdminKeepsOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
 
 	// The netblock breaks a limit twice, the second time after its first
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ func TestEarlierBansCountABanAnAdminKeepsOnce(t *testing.T) {
 func TestReasonOfTheBansSwwMakes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 
 	limit, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32"), midnight(),
 		bans.Notes{Kind: "requests", Limit: 1000, Window: "minute"})
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ func TestLiftedBanForALimitRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
 		Lifted:   midnight().Add(10 * time.Minute),
 	}
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{lifted})
 
 	// While it would still last, it refuses nothing, and a limit broken
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func TestLiftedBanForAnAttackRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// A permanent ban for a clear sign of attack, lifted.
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{
 		Netblock: netblock,
 		Start:    midnight(),
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ func TestLiftedBanForAnAttackRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
 func TestLoadEditCountsTheBansAnAdminMade(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	made, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32"), midnight(),
 		bans.Notes{})
 	atStart := bans.Ban{
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ func TestAdminsBanIsMadeWhileAnotherLasts(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 
 	// An hour's ban for a broken limit.
 	ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ func TestLiftLiftsEveryActiveBanCoveringTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	wide := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
 	other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{
 		// Ended an hour ago.
 		{
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ func TestPermanentBanOnAWiderNetblockIsReturnedOverATemporaryBan(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	client := netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9")
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 
 	// The temporary ban is made first, so that its netblock is looked at first.
 	ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ func TestOlderPermanentBanIsReturnedOverANewerTemporaryBan(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 
 	ledger.BanForAdmin(netblock, midnight(), time.Time{}, "for good")
 	ledger.BanForAdmin(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), midnight().Add(time.Hour),

internal/bans/bans.go

@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ const repeatFactor = 3
 // maxTextBytes is how much of each text in a ban's notes is kept.
 const maxTextBytes = 256
 
-// Rules are how long a ban lasts, and how many bans are held.
+// Params are how long a ban lasts, and how many bans are held.
-type Rules struct {
+type Params struct {
 	// LimitBanDuration is how long a first ban for a broken limit lasts.
 	LimitBanDuration time.Duration
 	// LimitBanRepeatWindow is how soon after the end of the netblock's
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ type Request struct {
 
 // Ledger holds the bans. It is safe for concurrent use.
 type Ledger struct {
-	rules Rules
+	params Params
 	// changed receives a value when a ban is made, unless one is waiting
 	// already.
 	changed chan struct{}
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ type Ledger struct {
 	// Find make each netblock they find the most recently seen.
 	netblocks *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, *[]Ban]
 	// held is how many bans netblocks holds whose cause is not CauseAdmin,
-	// at most rules.MaxBans.
+	// at most params.MaxBans.
 	held int
 	// made is how many bans have been made since the start, by cause: by
 	// the ledger, and by an admin, through BanForAdmin or in an edit of
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ type Ledger struct {
 }
 
 // New returns a Ledger with no ban yet.
-func New(rules Rules) *Ledger {
+func New(params Params) *Ledger {
 	// The ledger drops bans itself, and never those whose cause is
 	// CauseAdmin, however many there are, so the LRU has no limit of its
 	// own: it keeps the netblocks in the order they were last seen.
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ func New(rules Rules) *Ledger {
 	}
 
 	return &Ledger{
-		rules:     rules,
+		params:    params,
 		changed:   make(chan struct{}, 1),
 		netblocks: netblocks,
 		made:      map[string]int{},
@@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) covering(client netip.Addr) []*[]Ban {
 // unless ban's cause is CauseAdmin, which does not count toward MaxBans.
 func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
 	counted := ban.Cause != CauseAdmin
-	if counted && l.held == l.rules.MaxBans {
+	if counted && l.held == l.params.MaxBans {
 		l.dropOne()
 	}
 
@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
 // new ban longer. A ban an admin adds to bans.json can start after
 // another and end before it, so that one is looked for among them all.
 func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
-	length := l.rules.LimitBanDuration
+	length := l.params.LimitBanDuration
 
 	var last *Ban
 
@@ -858,18 +858,18 @@ func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
 		}
 	}
 
-	if last != nil && now.Sub(last.Expires) <= l.rules.LimitBanRepeatWindow {
+	if last != nil && now.Sub(last.Expires) <= l.params.LimitBanRepeatWindow {
 		lastLength := last.Expires.Sub(last.Start)
 		// This is repeatFactor * lastLength > MaxBanDuration, written so
 		// that it cannot overflow.
-		if lastLength > l.rules.MaxBanDuration/repeatFactor {
+		if lastLength > l.params.MaxBanDuration/repeatFactor {
 			return time.Time{}
 		}
 
 		length = repeatFactor * lastLength
 	}
 
-	if length > l.rules.MaxBanDuration {
+	if length > l.params.MaxBanDuration {
 		return time.Time{}
 	}
 
@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) attackExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
 		}
 	}
 
-	return now.Add(l.rules.AttackBanDuration)
+	return now.Add(l.params.AttackBanDuration)
 }
 
 // dropOne drops the earliest ban whose cause is not CauseAdmin of the

internal/bans/bans_test.go

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ const day = 24 * time.Hour
 func TestRepeatsTripleUntilPermanent(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	now := midnight()
 
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func TestRepeatWindowRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 
-			ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+			ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 			netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 
 			first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ func TestRepeatWindowRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
 func TestFirstBanLongerThanTheMaximumIsPermanent(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	rules := defaultRules()
+	params := defaultParams()
-	rules.LimitBanDuration = rules.MaxBanDuration + time.Hour
+	params.LimitBanDuration = params.MaxBanDuration + time.Hour
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 
 	ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), midnight(),
 		bans.Notes{})
@@ -97,9 +97,9 @@ func TestLongestBanSetFarOffDoesNotOverflow(t *testing.T) {
 	// With bans of up to 100,000 days, the 14th ban in a row, of 3^13
 	// hours, is within the maximum, and three times as long would not fit
 	// in a time.Duration. The 15th is permanent.
-	rules := defaultRules()
+	params := defaultParams()
-	rules.MaxBanDuration = 100000 * day
+	params.MaxBanDuration = 100000 * day
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	now := midnight()
 
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ func TestLongestBanSetFarOffDoesNotOverflow(t *testing.T) {
 func TestBrokenLimitDuringABanMakesNoOther(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 
 	first, made := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ func TestBrokenLimitDuringABanMakesNoOther(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCheckRefusesWhileTheBanLastsAndCountsTheRefusals(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Requests: 5})
 
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ func TestCheckRefusesWhileTheBanLastsAndCountsTheRefusals(t *testing.T) {
 func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Requests: 5})
 
@@ -200,9 +200,9 @@ func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
 func TestMaxBansDropsTheEarliestBanOfTheNetblockSeenLongestAgo(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	rules := defaultRules()
+	params := defaultParams()
-	rules.MaxBans = 3
+	params.MaxBans = 3
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	a := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
 	b := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
 	c := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.3/32")
@@ -239,9 +239,9 @@ func TestFullLedgerDropsTheEarlierBanOfTheNetblockBannedAgain(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// With room for one ban, the netblock's ended ban goes to make room for
 	// its new one, whose notes still count it.
-	rules := defaultRules()
+	params := defaultParams()
-	rules.MaxBans = 1
+	params.MaxBans = 1
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 
 	first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ func TestFullLedgerDropsTheEarlierBanOfTheNetblockBannedAgain(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRequestDuringAnAttackBanMakesItPermanent(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	notes := bans.Notes{RuleID: "env-file", Target: "path"}
 
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ func TestRequestDuringAnAttackBanMakesItPermanent(t *testing.T) {
 func TestAttackAfterAnAttackBanHasEndedBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 
 	// A ban for a broken limit before does not count.
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ func TestAttackAfterAnAttackBanHasEndedBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
 func TestWouldBanGivesTheBanWithoutMakingIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
 	wantChanged(t, ledger, true)
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ func TestWouldBanGivesTheBanWithoutMakingIt(t *testing.T) {
 func TestWouldBePermanentAnswersAsTheBanWouldBeMade(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	now := midnight()
 
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ func TestWouldBePermanentAnswersAsTheBanWouldBeMade(t *testing.T) {
 func TestAttackBanDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 
 	// Three times the seven days would be permanent; a limit broken as the
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ func TestAttackBanDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRequestTextsAreCutTo256Bytes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	long := strings.Repeat("a", 300)
 	request := bans.Request{
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ func TestRequestTextsAreCutTo256Bytes(t *testing.T) {
 func TestLookupFillsTheNotesOfTheNetblocksBansWithoutOne(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	other := netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.7/32")
 
@@ -494,9 +494,9 @@ func TestLookupFillsTheNotesOfTheNetblocksBansWithoutOne(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// defaultRules are the rules at the settings' defaults.
+// defaultParams are the params at the settings' defaults.
-func defaultRules() bans.Rules {
+func defaultParams() bans.Params {
-	return bans.Rules{
+	return bans.Params{
 		LimitBanDuration:     time.Hour,
 		LimitBanRepeatWindow: day,
 		MaxBanDuration:       7 * day,

internal/bans/crowdsec_test.go

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ const scenario = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
 func TestCrowdSecBanLastsUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
 
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func TestCrowdSecBanLastsUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCrowdSecBanIsNeverMadePermanent(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
 	ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), expires, scenario, bans.Notes{})
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func TestCrowdSecBanIsNeverMadePermanent(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCrowdSecBanIsCountedAndDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 
 	// Three times the three days would be permanent; a limit broken as the

internal/bans/snapshot_test.go

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import (
 func TestChangedAfterABanIsMade(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 
 	wantChanged(t, ledger, false)
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ func TestChangedAfterABanIsMade(t *testing.T) {
 func TestSnapshotListsEveryBanByNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	v6 := netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64")
 	high := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
 	low := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
@@ -67,14 +67,14 @@ func TestSnapshotListsEveryBanByNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 func TestLoadedBansCarryOn(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	before := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	before := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	ban, _ := before.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Limit: 1})
 
 	// Loaded into a new ledger, as across a restart, the ban still refuses
 	// while it lasts, and once it has ended a broken limit bans for three
 	// times as long, with the loaded ban counted among the earlier ones.
-	after := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	after := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	after.Load(before.Snapshot())
 
 	_, banned, _ := after.Check(netblock.Addr(), ban.Expires.Add(-time.Second))
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ func TestLoadedBanRefusesEveryClientInItsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	// Two entries as an admin might write them, with addresses not masked
 	// to their lengths, the IPv6 one shorter than the /64 an IPv6 client's
 	// ban covers, beside a ban the ledger makes on one IPv4 address.
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{
 		{Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/24"), Start: midnight()},
 		{Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::1/48"), Start: midnight()},
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ func TestPermanentBanStartedBeforeAnEndedOneRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 		Expires:  midnight().Add(time.Hour),
 	}
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{permanent, ended})
 
 	now := midnight().Add(2 * time.Hour)
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ func TestNextBanWorkedOutFromTheBanThatEndedLast(t *testing.T) {
 		Expires:  midnight().Add(2 * time.Hour),
 	}
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{nineHours, admins})
 
 	// Once both have ended, a limit broken within the repeat window bans
@@ -219,9 +219,9 @@ func TestLoadKeepsAtMostMaxBansDroppingTheEarliest(t *testing.T) {
 		Cause:    bans.CauseLimit,
 	}
 
-	rules := defaultRules()
+	params := defaultParams()
-	rules.MaxBans = 1
+	params.MaxBans = 1
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{later, earlier})
 
 	held := ledger.Snapshot()
@@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ func TestLoadReplacesTheBansHeld(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// Room for three bans, so that the second load, were it added to the
 	// two bans held, would drop none of them to make room.
-	rules := defaultRules()
+	params := defaultParams()
-	rules.MaxBans = 3
+	params.MaxBans = 3
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	kept := bans.Ban{
 		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64"),
 		Start:    midnight(),
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ func TestLoadCutsTheTextsTo256Bytes(t *testing.T) {
 		}},
 	}
 
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{ban})
 
 	cut := long[:256]

internal/config/config.go

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import (
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
 )
 
@@ -235,6 +236,11 @@ type Config struct {
 	WAFExemptPaths            []string
 	WAFBodyLimit              int64
 	CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile string
+	// Apps are the names of the apps each hostname serves, by hostname in
+	// lowercase (SWW_APPS): a request gets only its hostname's apps' fixes
+	// to the Core Rule Set. Apps is nil while SWW_APPS is unset, and every
+	// request gets every app's fixes.
+	Apps map[string][]string
 	// TrapPaths are the paths a request for which is a clear sign of
 	// attack (SWW_TRAP_PATHS), each starting with / and without a ?.
 	TrapPaths []string
@@ -336,7 +342,7 @@ const (
 	maxParanoiaLevel = 4
 	// firstSetupRuleID to lastSetupRuleID are the ids the Core Rule Set
 	// keeps for the rules that set it up, which sww's own rules
-	// have too (see internal/waf). Switching one off would undo a change
+	// have too (see internal/coreruleset). Switching one off would undo a change
 	// that no setting undoes.
 	firstSetupRuleID = 900000
 	lastSetupRuleID  = 900999
@@ -404,6 +410,11 @@ var (
 	errNotTrapPath = errors.New(
 		"is not a path starting with / and without a ?, such as /wp-login.php",
 	)
+	errNotAppsEntry = errors.New(
+		"is not a hostname, : and a list of apps, such as git.example.com:gitea",
+	)
+	errNotHostname      = errors.New("is not a DNS name such as git.example.com")
+	errNotApp           = errors.New("is not an app sww has fixes for; the apps are")
 	errNotWAFMode       = errors.New("is not off, detect or block")
 	errNotParanoiaLevel = errors.New("is not a paranoia level, from 1 to 4")
 	errNotRuleID        = errors.New(
@@ -432,7 +443,7 @@ var (
 		"holds a control character, such as the carriage return of a Windows line end",
 	)
 	errNotAlertEvent = errors.New(
-		"is not ban, permanent_ban, waf_block, anomaly, reputation_hit, " +
+		"is not ban, permanent_ban, core_rule_set_match, anomaly, reputation_hit, " +
 			"source_failure or file_error")
 	errNotNumberOrOff = errors.New(
 		"is not a whole number above zero, such as 60, or off",
@@ -577,6 +588,7 @@ func FromEnvironment(
 		WAFBodyLimit:   env.wafBodyLimit("SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT", off),
 		CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile: env.filePath(
 			"SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"),
+		Apps:                 env.apps("SWW_APPS"),
 		TrapPaths:            env.trapPaths("SWW_TRAP_PATHS"),
 		ErrorBurstThreshold:  env.count("SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD", "30"),
 		LogRemoteURL:         env.logRemoteURL("SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL"),
@@ -832,6 +844,25 @@ func (e *environment) pathPrefixes(name, defaultValue string) []string {
 	return prefixes
 }
 
+// apps reads the setting that is the apps each hostname serves. It is nil
+// while the setting is unset, and logged as null, unlike a setting set
+// empty.
+func (e *environment) apps(name string) map[string][]string {
+	value, set := e.lookup(name)
+	if !set {
+		e.settings = append(e.settings, slog.Any(name, nil))
+
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	e.settings = append(e.settings, slog.String(name, value))
+
+	apps, err := parseApps(value)
+	e.check(name, err)
+
+	return apps
+}
+
 // trapPaths reads the setting that is the list of trap paths. It is empty
 // by default.
 func (e *environment) trapPaths(name string) []string {
@@ -1849,6 +1880,65 @@ func parseTrapPaths(value string) ([]string, error) {
 	return paths, nil
 }
 
+// parseApps reads the apps each hostname serves: entries separated by
+// semicolons, each a hostname, a colon, and a comma-separated list of the
+// names coreruleset.AppNames returns, such as
+// git.example.com:gitea;cloud.example.com:nextcloud,wordpress. Each
+// hostname is a DNS name, without a wildcard. It returns them by hostname
+// in lowercase, since a hostname is matched without regard to case. An
+// empty value lists no hostname.
+func parseApps(value string) (map[string][]string, error) {
+	apps := map[string][]string{}
+
+	if strings.TrimSpace(value) == "" {
+		return apps, nil
+	}
+
+	for entry := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
+		hostname, list, found := strings.Cut(entry, ":")
+		if !found {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", entry, errNotAppsEntry)
+		}
+
+		hostname = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(hostname))
+		if hostname == "" {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", entry, errNotAppsEntry)
+		}
+
+		if !isZone(hostname) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", hostname, errNotHostname)
+		}
+
+		if _, listed := apps[hostname]; listed {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", hostname, errListedTwice)
+		}
+
+		names, err := parseList(list)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+
+		if len(names) == 0 {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", entry, errNotAppsEntry)
+		}
+
+		for i, name := range names {
+			if !slices.Contains(coreruleset.AppNames(), name) {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w %s", name, errNotApp,
+					strings.Join(coreruleset.AppNames(), ", "))
+			}
+
+			if slices.Contains(names[:i], name) {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", name, errListedTwice)
+			}
+		}
+
+		apps[hostname] = names
+	}
+
+	return apps, nil
+}
+
 // parseRuleIDs reads a comma-separated list of the ids of Core Rule Set
 // rules, each a whole number above zero and outside firstSetupRuleID to
 // lastSetupRuleID.
@@ -2455,7 +2545,8 @@ func MaskZoneKey(zone string) string {
 	return masked + "." + rest
 }
 
-// isZone reports whether each label of zone is as parseZones takes it.
+// isZone reports whether each label of zone is as parseZones takes it. It
+// also checks the hostnames of SWW_APPS, which are DNS names too.
 func isZone(zone string) bool {
 	for label := range strings.SplitSeq(zone, ".") {
 		badChar := strings.ContainsFunc(label, func(char rune) bool {

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ const (
 	wafExemptPaths       = "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
 	wafBodyLimit         = "SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
 	exclusionsFile       = "SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"
+	apps                 = "SWW_APPS"
 	trapPaths            = "SWW_TRAP_PATHS"
 	errorBurstThreshold  = "SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
 	logRemoteURL         = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
@@ -160,7 +161,7 @@ func loggedAnomalyDefaults() map[string]string {
 // defaultAlertEvents is the default of SWW_ALERT_EVENTS, and
 // defaultAlertCooldown that of SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN.
 const (
-	defaultAlertEvents = "ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit," +
+	defaultAlertEvents = "ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit," +
 		"source_failure,file_error"
 	defaultAlertCooldown = "15m"
 )
@@ -582,6 +583,92 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetSettings(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestApps(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		env  environment
+		want map[string][]string
+	}{
+		{environment{}, nil},
+		{environment{apps: ""}, map[string][]string{}},
+		{
+			environment{apps: "Git.Example.com:gitea; cloud.example.com : gitea "},
+			map[string][]string{
+				"git.example.com": {"gitea"}, "cloud.example.com": {"gitea"},
+			},
+		},
+	} {
+		cfg := fromEnvironment(t, tc.env)
+		if !reflect.DeepEqual(cfg.Apps, tc.want) {
+			t.Errorf("%v gave %#v, want %#v", tc.env, cfg.Apps, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Unset and set empty, SWW_APPS has opposite effects, so it logs differently.
+func TestUnsetAndEmptyAppsAreLoggedDifferently(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		env  environment
+		want string
+	}{
+		{environment{}, `"` + apps + `":null`},
+		{environment{apps: ""}, `"` + apps + `":""`},
+	} {
+		var out bytes.Buffer
+
+		slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&out, nil)).
+			Info("starting", "settings", fromEnvironment(t, tc.env))
+
+		if !strings.Contains(out.String(), tc.want) {
+			t.Errorf("%v logged %s, want %s in it", tc.env, out.String(), tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInvalidAppsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const (
+		notEntry = " is not a hostname, : and a list of apps, " +
+			"such as git.example.com:gitea"
+		notHostname = " is not a DNS name such as git.example.com"
+	)
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ value, want string }{
+		{"git.example.com:gitea;blog.example.com", `"blog.example.com"` + notEntry},
+		{"git.example.com:gitea;", `""` + notEntry},
+		{":gitea", `":gitea"` + notEntry},
+		{"git.example.com:", `"git.example.com:"` + notEntry},
+		{"*.example.com:gitea", `"*.example.com"` + notHostname},
+		{"git.example.com/:gitea", `"git.example.com/"` + notHostname},
+		{"git example.com:gitea", `"git example.com"` + notHostname},
+		{
+			"git.example.com:gitea,nextcloud",
+			`"nextcloud" is not an app sww has fixes for; the apps are gitea`,
+		},
+		{
+			"git.example.com:gitea;GIT.example.com:gitea",
+			`"git.example.com" is listed twice`,
+		},
+		{"git.example.com:gitea,gitea", `"gitea" is listed twice`},
+		{"git.example.com:gitea,", `"gitea," has an empty item in its list`},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{apps: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
+
+			want := apps + ": " + tc.want
+			if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
+				t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestWAFBodyLimitOf64K(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
@@ -2589,6 +2676,7 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
 		wafExemptPaths:       "",
 		wafBodyLimit:         off,
 		exclusionsFile:       "",
+		apps:                 "", // logged as null, which decodes as ""
 		trapPaths:            "",
 		errorBurstThreshold:  "30",
 		logRemoteURL:         "",

internal/coreruleset/coreruleset.go

@@ -1,21 +1,23 @@
-// Package waf runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
+// Package coreruleset runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
 // method, the URL with its query and the headers of a request, and on its
-// body while SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the eight changes sww
+// body while SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the six changes sww
-// makes to it and the exclusions in SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as
+// makes to it, the fixes for the apps SWW_APPS names, and the exclusions in
-// "Attack detection" under "Settings" in SPEC.md describes them. It reads no
+// SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as "Attack detection" under "Settings"
-// response.
+// in SPEC.md describes them. It reads no response.
 //
 // sww writes only to its state directory, so Coraza is built with
 // its no_fs_access tag, as the Dockerfile and script/build build it: of a
 // file in a multipart body, Coraza then counts the bytes instead of
 // writing them to the system's temporary directory.
-package waf
+package coreruleset
 
 import (
 	_ "embed"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
+	"maps"
+	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"os"
@@ -32,8 +34,8 @@ import (
 
 // directives are the Core Rule Set as sww runs it, with the
 // paranoia level for %d, bodyDirectives for the first %s while
-// SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, the exclusions file for the second, and
+// SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, the exclusions file for the second, and the
-// giteaExclusions for the third.
+// directives of every app in apps for the third.
 // Each rule sww adds has an id from 900000 to 900999, the ids the
 // Core Rule Set keeps for the rules that set it up, which
 // SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES and the exclusions file refuse, so that no
@@ -81,44 +83,28 @@ SecRule ARGUMENTS_LIMIT_REACHED "@eq 1" "id:900300,phase:2,pass,\
 # before the rules of phase 1 too.
 %s
 
-# The eighth change comes before the rules for the same reason.
+# The apps' fixes come before the rules for the same reason.
 %s
 
-# The sixth: only the rules for requests are loaded, and no response is
+# The fifth: only the rules for requests are loaded, and no response is
 # inspected.
 Include @owasp_crs/REQUEST-*.conf
 
 # The third: redirect_uri is not checked for a URL naming an IP address or
-# localhost. Coraza matches a parameter name here, and in the fourth,
+# localhost. Coraza matches a parameter name here without regard to case.
-# without regard to case. ARGS holds the fields of a form data or multipart
+# ARGS holds the fields of a form data or multipart body Coraza reads as
-# body Coraza reads as well as the query parameters, so a field of one of
+# well as the query parameters, so a field of this name is left out too.
-# these names is left out too.
 SecRuleUpdateTargetById 931100 "!ARGS:redirect_uri"
 SecRuleUpdateTargetById 934110 "!ARGS:redirect_uri"
 
-# The fourth: the query parameters in which gitea sends names within a
+# The fourth: Referer is not checked for a Unix command without arguments,
-# repository or its own records, or a page of its own site, are not
+# for Java starting a process, or for a Java class name. 944130 refused
-# checked against the lists of system files, shell paths and command
+# every page opened from the page of java.lang.String.md.
-# names. Coraza takes one rule id per directive.
-SecRuleUpdateTargetById 930120 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
-    !ARGS:sub_path|!ARGS:ref|!ARGS:sha|!ARGS:branch|!ARGS:workflow|\
-    !ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"
-SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932160 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
-    !ARGS:sub_path|!ARGS:ref|!ARGS:sha|!ARGS:branch|!ARGS:workflow|\
-    !ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"
-SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932260 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
-    !ARGS:sub_path|!ARGS:ref|!ARGS:sha|!ARGS:branch|!ARGS:workflow|\
-    !ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"
-
-# The fifth, for Referer: it is not checked for a Unix command without
-# arguments, for Java starting a process, or for a Java class name. 944130
-# refused every page opened from the page of java.lang.String.md. The
-# cookies are left out in Inspect.
 SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932340 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
 SecRuleUpdateTargetById 944110 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
 SecRuleUpdateTargetById 944130 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
 
-# The seventh: a container image push that reuses a layer names the image
+# The sixth: a container image push that reuses a layer names the image
 # it takes the layer from in the query parameter from, which is not
 # checked for command names. 932260 refused the push of a layer from
 # owner/python3-app.
@@ -168,18 +154,36 @@ SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" "id:900450,phase:2,pass,\
     severity:'CRITICAL',setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+5'"
 `
 
-// giteaExclusions are the eighth change: the fields of gitea's own
+// app is an app whose ordinary requests the Core Rule Set would refuse,
-// requests that skip the rules that refused them there, as Coraza
+// with the fixes that let them pass.
-// directives.
+type app struct {
-//
+	// directives are Coraza exclusions, loaded before the Core Rule Set's
-//go:embed gitea.conf
+	// rules. Their first rule skips the rest unless Inspect sets the
-var giteaExclusions string
+	// transaction variable app_ and the app's name, and they end with the
+	// marker it skips to.
+	directives string
+	// cookies are the cookies the Core Rule Set reads a request without.
+	cookies []string
+}
 
-// cookiesNotRead are the cookies the Core Rule Set reads a request
+//go:embed gitea.conf
-// without, the rest of the fifth change.
+var giteaDirectives string
+
+// apps are the apps whose fixes sww has, by the name SWW_APPS gives each.
 //
-//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
+//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a map
-var cookiesNotRead = []string{"gitea_flash", "redirect_to"}
+var apps = map[string]app{
+	"gitea": {
+		directives: giteaDirectives,
+		cookies:    []string{"gitea_flash", "redirect_to"},
+	},
+}
+
+// AppNames returns the names of the apps whose fixes sww has, in
+// alphabetical order.
+func AppNames() []string {
+	return slices.Sorted(maps.Keys(apps))
+}
 
 // Params are what New needs.
 type Params struct {
@@ -195,6 +199,10 @@ type Params struct {
 	// Core Rule Set's rules (SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE), "" while
 	// there is none.
 	ExclusionsFile string
+	// Apps are the names of the apps each hostname serves, by hostname in
+	// lowercase (SWW_APPS). A request gets the fixes of its hostname's
+	// apps only, or of every app while Apps is nil.
+	Apps map[string][]string
 }
 
 // The ids of sww's own rules, which an exclusions file may not
@@ -284,15 +292,17 @@ func checkExclusions(exclusions string) error {
 // CoreRuleSet is the Core Rule Set, ready to inspect requests. It is safe
 // for concurrent use.
 type CoreRuleSet struct {
-	waf       coraza.WAF
+	engine    coraza.WAF
 	bodyLimit int64
+	apps      map[string][]string
 }
 
-// New returns the Core Rule Set with the eight changes, at params'
+// New returns the Core Rule Set with the six changes and the apps' fixes,
-// paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, reading request
+// at params' paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, reading
-// bodies up to params' limit, and with params' exclusions file loaded
+// request bodies up to params' limit, and with params' exclusions file
-// before the Core Rule Set's rules. An exclusions file is an error if it
+// loaded before the Core Rule Set's rules. An exclusions file is an error
-// cannot be read or does not parse, or if checkExclusions refuses it.
+// if it cannot be read or does not parse, or if checkExclusions refuses
+// it.
 func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
 	body := ""
 	if params.BodyLimit > 0 {
@@ -315,8 +325,13 @@ func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
 		}
 	}
 
+	var fixes strings.Builder
+	for _, name := range AppNames() {
+		fixes.WriteString(apps[name].directives + "\n")
+	}
+
 	text := fmt.Sprintf(directives, params.ParanoiaLevel, body, exclusions,
-		giteaExclusions)
+		fixes.String())
 
 	if len(params.DisabledRules) > 0 {
 		ids := make([]string, len(params.DisabledRules))
@@ -327,14 +342,16 @@ func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
 		text += "SecRuleRemoveById " + strings.Join(ids, " ") + "\n"
 	}
 
-	waf, err := coraza.NewWAF(coraza.NewWAFConfig().
+	engine, err := coraza.NewWAF(coraza.NewWAFConfig().
 		WithRootFS(coreruleset.FS).
 		WithDirectives(text))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("load the Core Rule Set: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	return &CoreRuleSet{waf: waf, bodyLimit: params.BodyLimit}, nil
+	return &CoreRuleSet{
+		engine: engine, bodyLimit: params.BodyLimit, apps: params.Apps,
+	}, nil
 }
 
 // Result is what the Core Rule Set found in a request.
@@ -346,25 +363,37 @@ type Result struct {
 	Score int
 }
 
-// Inspect runs the Core Rule Set on r, a request from client: on its
+// Inspect runs the Core Rule Set on r, a request from client, with the
-// method, its URL with the query, and its headers, the Cookie header
+// fixes of the apps appsFor names for r's hostname: on its method, its URL
-// without the cookies in cookiesNotRead, and on body, r's body as the
+// with the query, and its headers, the Cookie header without those apps'
-// caller has it, as readBody reads it. It returns what it found, what it
+// cookies, and on body, r's body as the caller has it, as readBody reads
-// read of body, and the error that ended the reading early, if one did.
+// it. It returns what it found, what it read of body, and the error that
+// ended the reading early, if one did.
 func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
 	r *http.Request, client netip.Addr, body io.Reader,
 ) (Result, []byte, error) {
-	tx := c.waf.NewTransaction()
+	tx := c.engine.NewTransaction()
 	// Closing would remove the files Coraza wrote, and it writes none.
 	defer func() { _ = tx.Close() }()
 
+	// The transaction's variables are set only through Coraza's interface
+	// for plugins.
+	state := tx.(plugintypes.TransactionState) //nolint:forcetypeassert // every one is
+
+	var cookiesNotRead []string
+
+	for _, name := range c.appsFor(r.Host) {
+		state.Variables().TX().Set("app_"+name, []string{"1"})
+		cookiesNotRead = append(cookiesNotRead, apps[name].cookies...)
+	}
+
 	tx.ProcessConnection(client.String(), 0, "", 0)
 	tx.ProcessURI(r.URL.String(), r.Method, r.Proto)
 
 	for name, values := range r.Header {
 		for _, value := range values {
 			if name == "Cookie" {
-				value = withoutCookiesNotRead(value)
+				value = withoutCookies(value, cookiesNotRead)
 				if value == "" {
 					continue // it held those cookies alone
 				}
@@ -457,9 +486,26 @@ func score(tx types.Transaction) int {
 	return n
 }
 
-// withoutCookiesNotRead returns value, a Cookie header's, without the
+// appsFor returns the names of the apps whose fixes a request for host,
-// cookies in cookiesNotRead.
+// its Host header, gets: every app while SWW_APPS is unset, and otherwise
-func withoutCookiesNotRead(value string) string {
+// those SWW_APPS lists for host's name, without the port and in
+// lowercase.
+func (c *CoreRuleSet) appsFor(host string) []string {
+	if c.apps == nil {
+		return AppNames()
+	}
+
+	hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
+	if err != nil {
+		hostname = host // it has no port
+	}
+
+	return c.apps[strings.ToLower(hostname)]
+}
+
+// withoutCookies returns value, a Cookie header's, without the cookies
+// named in cookiesNotRead.
+func withoutCookies(value string, cookiesNotRead []string) string {
 	var kept []string
 
 	for cookie := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {

internal/coreruleset/coreruleset_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package waf_test
+package coreruleset_test
 
 import (
 	"net/http"
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
 )
 
 // defaultDisabledRules are the rules SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off
@@ -23,10 +23,12 @@ var defaultDisabledRules = []int{920340, 920420, 920440, 920640, 930130, 930140}
 
 // newCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at paranoia level level, with
 // the rules in disabled switched off.
-func newCoreRuleSet(t *testing.T, level int, disabled ...int) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
+func newCoreRuleSet(t *testing.T, level int, disabled ...int) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
 	t.Helper()
 
-	crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{ParanoiaLevel: level, DisabledRules: disabled})
+	crs, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
+		ParanoiaLevel: level, DisabledRules: disabled,
+	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("load the Core Rule Set: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -49,7 +51,7 @@ func get(target string, headers ...string) request {
 
 // inspect returns what crs finds in r, sent to git.example by a browser,
 // whose Host, User-Agent and Accept r.headers may replace.
-func inspect(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request) waf.Result {
+func inspect(t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, r request) coreruleset.Result {
 	t.Helper()
 
 	result, _ := inspectBody(t, crs, r, "")
@@ -60,8 +62,8 @@ func inspect(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request) waf.Result {
 // inspectBody is inspect for r with body, which is announced with its
 // Content-Length unless it is "", and returns what crs read of body too.
 func inspectBody(
-	t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string,
+	t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string,
-) (waf.Result, string) {
+) (coreruleset.Result, string) {
 	t.Helper()
 
 	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), r.method,
@@ -96,7 +98,9 @@ func inspectBody(
 }
 
 // wantResult checks what crs finds in r.
-func wantResult(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, want waf.Result) {
+func wantResult(
+	t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, r request, want coreruleset.Result,
+) {
 	t.Helper()
 
 	if got := inspect(t, crs, r); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
@@ -106,28 +110,29 @@ func wantResult(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, want waf.Result)
 
 // matched is the result of a request that the rules ids match, each of
 // them a critical one, which adds 5 to the score.
-func matched(ids ...int) waf.Result {
+func matched(ids ...int) coreruleset.Result {
 	const critical = 5
 
-	return waf.Result{RuleIDs: ids, Score: critical * len(ids)}
+	return coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: ids, Score: critical * len(ids)}
 }
 
 // atDefaults returns the Core Rule Set as sww runs it by default.
-func atDefaults(t *testing.T) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
+func atDefaults(t *testing.T) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
 	t.Helper()
 
 	return newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, defaultDisabledRules...)
 }
 
 // wantChange checks that crs lets through passes, a gitea request one of
-// the eight changes is for, and still finds result in refused, a request
+// the six changes or gitea's fixes are for, and still finds result in
-// like it that the change is not for.
+// refused, a request like it that they are not for.
 func wantChange(
-	t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, passes, refused request, result waf.Result,
+	t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, passes, refused request,
+	result coreruleset.Result,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 
-	wantResult(t, crs, passes, waf.Result{})
+	wantResult(t, crs, passes, coreruleset.Result{})
 	wantResult(t, crs, refused, result)
 }
 
@@ -162,12 +167,12 @@ func TestExpectAndContentEncodingAreAllowed(t *testing.T) {
 
 	wantResult(t, crs,
 		request{http.MethodPost, push, []string{pushType, length, "Expect: 100-continue"}},
-		waf.Result{})
+		coreruleset.Result{})
 	wantResult(t, crs,
 		request{http.MethodPost, fetch, []string{
 			fetchType, length, "Content-Encoding: gzip",
 		}},
-		waf.Result{})
+		coreruleset.Result{})
 
 	// Every other header on the Core Rule Set's list stays refused.
 	for _, header := range []string{
@@ -196,7 +201,7 @@ func TestTransferEncodingIsRead(t *testing.T) {
 			"Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request",
 			"Transfer-Encoding: chunked",
 		}},
-		waf.Result{})
+		coreruleset.Result{})
 }
 
 func TestMoreParametersThanCorazaKeepsIsAMatch(t *testing.T) {
@@ -250,7 +255,7 @@ func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInSkipTheListsOfFilesPathsAndCommands(t *testi
 	for _, value := range []struct {
 		name string
 		// result is what a parameter that is not one of gitea's gets.
-		result waf.Result
+		result coreruleset.Result
 	}{
 		// A file on the list of system files.
 		{".gitignore", matched(930120)},
@@ -271,7 +276,7 @@ func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInSkipTheListsOfFilesPathsAndCommands(t *testi
 	wantChange(t, crs, get("/?path=|cat%20/etc/passwd"), get("/?q=|cat%20/etc/passwd"),
 		matched(930120, 932160))
 	wantResult(t, crs, get("/?path=../../etc/passwd"),
-		waf.Result{RuleIDs: []int{930100, 930110}, Score: 20})
+		coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: []int{930100, 930110}, Score: 20})
 	wantResult(t, crs, get("/?path=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"), matched(942100))
 }
 
@@ -341,7 +346,7 @@ func TestEmptyHeaderIsRead(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// An empty User-Agent is a notice, which adds 2.
 	wantResult(t, atDefaults(t), get("/", "User-Agent: "),
-		waf.Result{RuleIDs: []int{920330}, Score: 2})
+		coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: []int{920330}, Score: 2})
 }
 
 func TestParanoiaLevel(t *testing.T) {
@@ -350,7 +355,7 @@ func TestParanoiaLevel(t *testing.T) {
 	// Accept-Charset is refused from paranoia level 2.
 	r := get("/", "Accept-Charset: utf-8")
 
-	wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1), r, waf.Result{})
+	wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1), r, coreruleset.Result{})
 	wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 2), r, matched(920451))
 }
 
@@ -362,8 +367,8 @@ func TestEachDisabledRuleIsSwitchedOff(t *testing.T) {
 	r := request{http.MethodTrace, "/", []string{"Host: 192.0.2.1"}}
 
 	wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1), r,
-		waf.Result{RuleIDs: []int{911100, 920350}, Score: 8})
+		coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: []int{911100, 920350}, Score: 8})
-	wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, 920350, 911100), r, waf.Result{})
+	wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, 920350, 911100), r, coreruleset.Result{})
 }
 
 func TestImagePushThatReusesALayerIsNotCheckedForCommandNames(t *testing.T) {
@@ -381,10 +386,100 @@ func TestImagePushThatReusesALayerIsNotCheckedForCommandNames(t *testing.T) {
 		matched(930120, 932160))
 }
 
+// giteaFixed are gitea requests that only gitea's fixes let through, one
+// for each kind of fix, each with what the Core Rule Set finds in it
+// without them.
+//
+//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
+var giteaFixed = []struct {
+	request request
+	result  coreruleset.Result
+}{
+	// A search of code, on the path of gitea's search.
+	{get("/explore/code?q=SELECT%20*%20FROM%20users%20WHERE"), matched(942100)},
+	// A file name, in a parameter gitea sends names in, on any path.
+	{get("/?path=.gitignore"), matched(930120)},
+	// A file name, in a cookie of gitea's.
+	{
+		get("/owner/repo", "Cookie: gitea_flash=success%3DFile%2Bpackage.json%2Bdeleted"),
+		matched(930120),
+	},
+}
+
+// The hostnames of the tests of SWW_APPS: the one that serves gitea, and
+// one that serves another app.
+const (
+	giteaHost = "git.example"
+	otherHost = "blog.example"
+)
+
+// withHost returns r sent to host.
+func withHost(r request, host string) request {
+	return request{r.method, r.target, append([]string{"Host: " + host}, r.headers...)}
+}
+
+// servingApps returns the Core Rule Set at the defaults, with SWW_APPS
+// giving apps.
+func servingApps(t *testing.T, apps map[string][]string) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	crs, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
+		ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, Apps: apps,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load the Core Rule Set: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	return crs
+}
+
+func TestAppsUnsetGivesEveryHostnameEveryAppsFixes(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	crs := servingApps(t, nil)
+
+	for _, fixed := range giteaFixed {
+		for _, host := range []string{giteaHost, otherHost} {
+			wantResult(t, crs, withHost(fixed.request, host), coreruleset.Result{})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestListedHostnameGetsItsAppsFixes(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	crs := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{giteaHost: {"gitea"}})
+
+	// The hostname is matched without the port and without regard to case.
+	for _, host := range []string{giteaHost, "GIT.Example:8443"} {
+		for _, fixed := range giteaFixed {
+			wantResult(t, crs, withHost(fixed.request, host), coreruleset.Result{})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUnlistedHostnameGetsTheFullCheck(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, apps := range []map[string][]string{
+		{giteaHost: {"gitea"}},
+		// SWW_APPS set empty lists no hostname.
+		{},
+	} {
+		crs := servingApps(t, apps)
+
+		for _, host := range []string{otherHost, otherHost + ":8443", "git.example.org"} {
+			for _, fixed := range giteaFixed {
+				wantResult(t, crs, withHost(fixed.request, host), fixed.result)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 // withExclusions returns the Core Rule Set at the defaults, with the
 // exclusions file at path.
-func withExclusions(path string) (*waf.CoreRuleSet, error) {
+func withExclusions(path string) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
-	return waf.New(waf.Params{
+	return coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
 		ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, ExclusionsFile: path,
 	})
 }
@@ -422,7 +517,7 @@ func TestExclusionsFileIsLoadedBeforeTheRules(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRuleSwitchedOffAndNamedInTheExclusionsFileIsOff(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
+	crs, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
 		ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: []int{920500},
 		ExclusionsFile: exclusionsFile(t, backupFileExclusion),
 	})
@@ -430,7 +525,7 @@ func TestRuleSwitchedOffAndNamedInTheExclusionsFileIsOff(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("load the exclusions: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	wantResult(t, crs, get("/notes.txt~"), waf.Result{})
+	wantResult(t, crs, get("/notes.txt~"), coreruleset.Result{})
 }
 
 func TestExclusionsFileMayNameAnyNumberInAComment(t *testing.T) {
@@ -566,10 +661,10 @@ const injection = "1' OR '1'='1"
 
 // readingBodies returns the Core Rule Set as sww runs it by
 // default, but reading bodies up to bodyLimit.
-func readingBodies(t *testing.T) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
+func readingBodies(t *testing.T) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
 	t.Helper()
 
-	crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
+	crs, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
 		ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: bodyLimit,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
@@ -603,7 +698,8 @@ func padded(head, tail string, n int) string {
 // wantBody checks what crs finds in r with body, and that what it read of
 // body is read.
 func wantBody(
-	t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string, want waf.Result,
+	t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string,
+	want coreruleset.Result,
 	read string,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
@@ -627,7 +723,7 @@ func TestBodiesAreReadOnlyWhileBodyLimitIsSet(t *testing.T) {
 		{jsonBody, `{"q":"` + injection + `"}`},
 		{xmlBody, "<q>" + injection + "</q>"},
 	} {
-		wantBody(t, off, post(tc.header), tc.body, waf.Result{}, "")
+		wantBody(t, off, post(tc.header), tc.body, coreruleset.Result{}, "")
 		wantBody(t, on, post(tc.header), tc.body, matched(942100), tc.body)
 	}
 }
@@ -650,7 +746,7 @@ func TestFormDataAndMultipartAreReadUpToTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	} {
 		wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.attackFirst, matched(942100),
 			tc.attackFirst[:bodyLimit+1])
-		wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.attackLast, waf.Result{},
+		wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.attackLast, coreruleset.Result{},
 			tc.attackLast[:bodyLimit+1])
 	}
 
@@ -660,7 +756,7 @@ func TestFormDataAndMultipartAreReadUpToTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), atLimit, matched(930120, 932160), atLimit)
 
 	pastLimit := padded("pad=", "&q=/etc/passwd", bodyLimit+1)
-	wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), pastLimit, waf.Result{}, pastLimit)
+	wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), pastLimit, coreruleset.Result{}, pastLimit)
 }
 
 func TestJSONAndXMLAreReadOnlyWhenNoLargerThanTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
@@ -676,7 +772,7 @@ func TestJSONAndXMLAreReadOnlyWhenNoLargerThanTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
 		wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), fits, matched(942100), fits)
 
 		larger := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, bodyLimit+1)
-		wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), larger, waf.Result{}, larger)
+		wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), larger, coreruleset.Result{}, larger)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -694,7 +790,7 @@ func TestOtherBodiesAreNotRead(t *testing.T) {
 		"Content-Type: text/plain",
 		"Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request",
 	} {
-		wantBody(t, crs, post(header), body, waf.Result{}, "")
+		wantBody(t, crs, post(header), body, coreruleset.Result{}, "")
 	}
 }
 
@@ -722,8 +818,8 @@ func TestContentEncodingIsRefusedOnTheKindsOfBodyTheCoreRuleSetReads(t *testing.
 	// It is allowed on a body of any other kind, and on every body while no
 	// body is read.
 	fetch := "Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-request"
-	wantBody(t, crs, post(fetch, gzip), "a", waf.Result{}, "")
+	wantBody(t, crs, post(fetch, gzip), "a", coreruleset.Result{}, "")
-	wantBody(t, atDefaults(t), post(formData, gzip), "a", waf.Result{}, "")
+	wantBody(t, atDefaults(t), post(formData, gzip), "a", coreruleset.Result{}, "")
 }
 
 func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInAreLeftOutAmongFormFieldsToo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -734,18 +830,18 @@ func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInAreLeftOutAmongFormFieldsToo(t *testing.T) {
 
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		body string
-		want waf.Result
+		want coreruleset.Result
 	}{
-		{"path=.gitignore", waf.Result{}},
+		{"path=.gitignore", coreruleset.Result{}},
 		{"q=.gitignore", matched(930120)},
-		{"redirect_uri=" + local, waf.Result{}},
+		{"redirect_uri=" + local, coreruleset.Result{}},
 		{"next=" + local, matched(931100, 934110)},
 	} {
 		wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), tc.body, tc.want, tc.body)
 	}
 
 	body := field("path", ".gitignore") + end
-	wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, waf.Result{}, body)
+	wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, coreruleset.Result{}, body)
 
 	body = field("q", ".gitignore") + end
 	wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, matched(930120), body)
@@ -869,7 +965,7 @@ func TestCorazaWritesNoFile(t *testing.T) {
 func TestBodyLimitOf1GLoads(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	_, err := waf.New(waf.Params{ParanoiaLevel: 1, BodyLimit: 1 << 30})
+	_, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{ParanoiaLevel: 1, BodyLimit: 1 << 30})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Errorf("load the Core Rule Set reading bodies up to 1G: %v", err)
 	}

internal/coreruleset/gitea.conf

@@ -1,8 +1,51 @@
-# The eighth change: on gitea's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused
+# gitea's fixes: some fields skip the rules that refused ordinary gitea requests.
-# ordinary gitea requests there. They are the fields where gitea sends a search,
+# They are the fields where gitea sends a search, a file name or a branch name.
-# a file name or a branch name. Each exclusion runs with the request, before the
+# Each exclusion runs with the request, before the rules it switches off, those
-# rules it switches off, those of phase 1 included, so this file is loaded before
+# of phase 1 included, so this file is loaded before the Core Rule Set's rules.
-# the Core Rule Set's rules. Each comment names a request the rule refused.
+# Each comment names a request the rule refused.
+
+# A request whose hostname SWW_APPS does not list gitea for skips every rule
+# below. Inspect sets tx.app_gitea on the others.
+SecRule &TX:app_gitea "@eq 0" \
+    "id:900590,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END_GITEA"
+
+# The query parameters in which gitea sends names within a repository or its
+# own records, or a page of its own site, are not checked against the lists of
+# system files, shell paths and command names, on any path:
+#   930120: .gitignore
+#   932160: bin/docker-entrypoint
+#   932260: docker-build
+SecAction "id:900591,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:files,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:skip-to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:sub_path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:ref,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:sha,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:branch,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:workflow,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:artifactName,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:redirect_to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:files,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:skip-to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:sub_path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:ref,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:sha,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:branch,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:workflow,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:artifactName,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:redirect_to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:files,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:skip-to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:sub_path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:ref,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:sha,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:branch,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:workflow,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:artifactName,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:redirect_to"
 
 # gitea's searches of code, of issues and pull requests, and of commits send the
 # text searched for in q, which skips these rules there:
@@ -155,8 +198,8 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME \
 #   942140: information_schema.sql
 #   944110: java/lang/Runtime.java
 #   944130: java.lang.String.md
-# Each request skips the rules that refused it. The fourth change already has
+# Each request skips the rules that refused it. Rule 900591 already has path and
-# path and redirect_to skip 930120, 932160 and 932260 on every path.
+# redirect_to skip 930120, 932160 and 932260 on every path.
 
 # A file's commit graph, in file.
 SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/graph$" \
@@ -281,3 +324,5 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME \
     "@rx ^/api/actions_pipeline/_apis/pipelines/workflows/[0-9]+/artifacts/[^/]+/upload$" \
     "id:900640,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
     ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920450;REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES:Content-Range"
+
+SecMarker END_GITEA

internal/coreruleset/testdata/gitea-requests.txt

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Ordinary gitea 1.27 requests that the Core Rule Set must let through at the
 # defaults. Each line is a path and query, and may end with one header after a
-# space. The tests of internal/waf inspect each as a GET. The Core Rule Set reads
+# space. The tests of internal/coreruleset inspect each as a GET. The Core Rule Set reads
 # the query and the headers the same way for any method.
 
 # Searches with ordinary words and symbols.

internal/discriminator/admin.go

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ var (
 
 // answerHealth answers a request for the health endpoint.
 func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
-	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
+	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint
 	// Set here rather than left to Go's server, which would set it only
 	// after the log line has taken the response's headers.
 	rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
 // refused with 401. An endpoint whose token is unset answers 404, as any other
 // path does.
 func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
-	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
+	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint
 
 	token, answer := rq.endpoint()
 

internal/discriminator/admin_test.go

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
 	// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
 	for _, authorization := range []string{adminBearer, bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
 		for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
-			s.adminRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusNotFound)
+			s.ownEndpointRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusNotFound)
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
 		for _, authorization := range []string{
 			"", bearer, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(adminSecret), "Basic " + adminSecret,
 		} {
-			got := s.adminRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
+			got := s.ownEndpointRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
 				http.StatusUnauthorized)
 			if got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
 				t.Errorf("%s %s with %q was answered without WWW-Authenticate: Bearer",
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 
 	for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
-		s.adminRequest("", e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		s.ownEndpointRequest("", e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusUnauthorized)
 	}
 
 	if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
@@ -356,16 +356,16 @@ func adminEndpoints() []adminEndpoint {
 
 // admin sends a request with method for path, with body, to discriminator's own
 // address, with the admin token, and checks that it is answered with status, its
-// log line's action admin. It returns the answer.
+// log line's action own_endpoint. It returns the answer.
 func (s *sender) admin(method, path, body string, status int) answer {
 	s.t.Helper()
 
-	return s.adminRequest(adminBearer, method, path, body, status)
+	return s.ownEndpointRequest(adminBearer, method, path, body, status)
 }
 
-// adminRequest is admin with authorization as the request's Authorization header
+// ownEndpointRequest is admin with authorization as the request's Authorization
-// unless it is "".
+// header unless it is "".
-func (s *sender) adminRequest(
+func (s *sender) ownEndpointRequest(
 	authorization, method, path, body string, status int,
 ) answer {
 	s.t.Helper()
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ func (s *sender) adminRequest(
 
 	line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
 	s.sent++
-	wantLine(s.t, line, status, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
+	wantLine(s.t, line, status, requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint)
 
 	return got
 }

internal/discriminator/anomaly_test.go

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ func TestEachScopeAndWindowOverItsThresholdAlertsOncePerCooldown(t *testing.T) {
 		{anomalyASN, anomaly.ScopeASN, netip.Prefix{}, asnDE, map[string]any{"asn": asnDE}},
 		{anomalyTotal, anomaly.ScopeTotal, netip.Prefix{}, "the whole service", nil},
 		{
-			anomalyWatch, anomaly.ScopeWatch, netip.MustParsePrefix(clientsNet),
+			anomalyWatch, anomaly.ScopeWatchedNet, netip.MustParsePrefix(clientsNet),
 			"the named netblock office, " + clientsNet, map[string]any{"name": "office"},
 		},
 	} {

internal/discriminator/answertime_test.go

@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ const (
 	// tooLarge is how discriminator refuses a request over the header limits.
 	tooLarge = http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge
 	// silentAbuseIPDBURL is where AbuseIPDB never answers: at the stand-in
-	// that unansweredGeoJSURL names too.
+	// that silentGeoJSURL names too.
-	silentAbuseIPDBURL = "unanswered://abuseipdb/api/v2/check"
+	silentAbuseIPDBURL = "silent://abuseipdb/api/v2/check"
 	// wholeLimit is the percentage of a rate limit that lowers it not at all.
 	wholeLimit = 100
 	// clientsDecision is the CrowdSec decision list holding client alone.
@@ -86,8 +86,8 @@ func TestSixteenThousandCookiesAreRefusedWellWithinTheTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
 	wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
 
-	if line.DurationWAF != nil {
+	if line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS != nil {
-		t.Errorf("the Core Rule Set read the request, for %f ms", *line.DurationWAF)
+		t.Errorf("the Core Rule Set read the request, for %f ms", *line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
 			wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
 			wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 
-			if line.DurationWAF == nil {
+			if line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS == nil {
 				t.Error("the Core Rule Set did not read a request within the limits")
 			}
 		})
@@ -220,9 +220,9 @@ func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsUnread(t *testing.T) {
 
 	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
 	if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge ||
-		line.DurationWAF != nil {
+		line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS != nil {
-		t.Errorf("would_action %q and duration_waf %v, want %q and none",
+		t.Errorf("would_action %q and duration_core_rule_set_ms %v, want %q and none",
-			line.WouldAction, line.DurationWAF, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
+			line.WouldAction, line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -283,8 +283,8 @@ func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
 	wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
 
-	if line.LimitPercent != nil {
+	if line.RateLimitPercent != nil {
-		t.Errorf("limit percentage %d, want none", *line.LimitPercent)
+		t.Errorf("limit percentage %d, want none", *line.RateLimitPercent)
 	}
 
 	// The client is under no ban, and GeoJS places it in a country.
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ func newDiscriminatorInBubble(
 	settings := map[string]string{tagDeny: "country=KP"}
 	maps.Copy(settings, env)
 
-	server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now, settings)
+	server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now, settings)
 
 	return server, out
 }

internal/discriminator/bans.go

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
 	case ratelimit.KindBytes:
 		rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window + "_bytes" // as counts names the byte totals
 	case ratelimit.KindRefusals:
-		rq.line.LimitHit = requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst
+		rq.line.LimitHit = requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals
 	default:
 		rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window
 	}
@@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
 
 	switch hit.Kind {
 	case ratelimit.KindRequests:
-		notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
+		notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.rateLimitPercent.logged()
 	case ratelimit.KindBytes:
-		notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
+		notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.bytesLimitPercent.logged()
 	}
 
 	if rq.h.config.Observe {

internal/discriminator/bans_test.go

@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ func startWithClock(
 
 // sender sends requests to rproxy one after another, each on a connection of its
 // own, and checks each one's answer and log line. discriminatorAddr is where
-// discriminator's own endpoints are, which adminRequest asks. Every request
+// discriminator's own endpoints are, which ownEndpointRequest asks. Every request
 // discriminator gets must come through the sender, since the log lines are
 // matched to them in order.
 type sender struct {

internal/discriminator/biased_test.go

@@ -79,14 +79,16 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
 				{http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
 			} {
 				line := s.get(tc.from, sent.status, sent.action)
-				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+				wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+					line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 					"50 from "+tc.setting)
 			}
 
 			// fromKP, which no setting lists, has the whole limit.
 			for range 3 {
 				line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+				wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+					line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 					none)
 			}
 		})
@@ -119,7 +121,8 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheByteLimits(t *testing.T) {
 				t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want %s", line.LimitHit, minuteBytes)
 			}
 
-			wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+				line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
 				"50 from "+tc.setting)
 
 			// fromKP, which no setting lists, has the whole limit.
@@ -128,7 +131,8 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheByteLimits(t *testing.T) {
 				t.Errorf("log line for %s has limit_hit %q, want none", fromKP, line.LimitHit)
 			}
 
-			wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting, none)
+			wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+				line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting, none)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -139,9 +143,9 @@ func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(t *testing.T)
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		env  map[string]string
-		// limitPercent and bytesPercent are the log line's, as percentText
+		// rateLimitPercent and bytesLimitPercent are the log line's, as
-		// gives them, and limitHit is its limit_hit.
+		// percentText gives them, and limitHit is its limit_hit.
-		limitPercent, bytesPercent, limitHit string
+		rateLimitPercent, bytesLimitPercent, limitHit string
 	}{
 		{
 			"lowering the byte limits alone",
@@ -177,10 +181,12 @@ func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(t *testing.T)
 				t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want %q", line.LimitHit, tc.limitHit)
 			}
 
-			wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
-				tc.limitPercent)
+				line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
-			wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
+				tc.rateLimitPercent)
-				tc.bytesPercent)
+			wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+				line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
+				tc.bytesLimitPercent)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -193,10 +199,10 @@ func TestZeroPercentIsAZeroAllowance(t *testing.T) {
 	// The first request breaks the limit, and bans the client; the log line
 	// gives the 0.
 	line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
-	if line.fields["limit_percent"] != float64(0) ||
+	if line.fields["rate_limit_percent"] != float64(0) ||
-		line.fields["limit_percent_setting"] != unknownLimitPercent {
+		line.fields["rate_limit_percent_setting"] != unknownLimitPercent {
-		t.Errorf("log line has limit_percent %v from %v, want 0 from %s",
+		t.Errorf("log line has rate_limit_percent %v from %v, want 0 from %s",
-			line.fields["limit_percent"], line.fields["limit_percent_setting"],
+			line.fields["rate_limit_percent"], line.fields["rate_limit_percent_setting"],
 			unknownLimitPercent)
 	}
 
@@ -210,7 +216,7 @@ func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
 		name string
 		env  map[string]string
 		from string
-		// want is the log line's limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
+		// want is the log line's rate_limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
 		want string
 	}{
 		{
@@ -251,7 +257,8 @@ func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
 			s.get(tc.from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 
 			line := s.get(tc.from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
-			wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+				line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 				tc.want)
 		})
 	}
@@ -284,7 +291,7 @@ func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownLimitPercent(t *testing.T) {
 	// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
 	// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
-		server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
+		server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
 			map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
 
 		// Once the time the request waits for its answer is up, the client
@@ -294,7 +301,8 @@ func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownLimitPercent(t *testing.T) {
 
 		line := out.requestLine(t)
 		wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
-		wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+		wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+			line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 			"0 from "+unknownLimitPercent)
 	})
 }
@@ -327,7 +335,7 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
 			// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
 			// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
 			synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
-				server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
+				server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
 					map[string]string{
 						lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList, tc.setting: tc.value,
 					})

internal/discriminator/bytelimits.go

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ func (byteLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict
 	}
 
 	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountBytes(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
-		rq.countedBytes(), rq.bytesPercent.percent)
+		rq.countedBytes(), rq.bytesLimitPercent.percent)
 	rq.line.Counts.MinuteBytes = counts.MinuteBytes
 	rq.line.Counts.HourBytes = counts.HourBytes
 	rq.line.Counts.DayBytes = counts.DayBytes

internal/discriminator/coreruleset.go

@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ import (
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
 )
 
 // coreRuleSet inspects the request with the Core Rule Set, unless
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import (
 // pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and its score in the
 // log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it adds the tag exploitsignature,
-// raises the waf_block alert, and in block mode refuses the request with 403,
+// raises the core_rule_set_match alert, and in block mode refuses the request with 403,
 // which is an offence its client's history counts. Its figures are the score
 // and the threshold.
 type coreRuleSet struct{}
@@ -38,12 +38,12 @@ func (coreRuleSet) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	result, read, _ := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, rq.in.Body)
 	rq.requestBytes = int64(len(read))
 
-	rq.line.DurationWAF = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(time.Since(start)))
+	rq.line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(time.Since(start)))
-	rq.line.WAFRuleIDs = result.RuleIDs
+	rq.line.CoreRuleSetRuleIDs = result.RuleIDs
-	rq.line.WAFScore = &result.Score
+	rq.line.CoreRuleSetScore = &result.Score
 
 	for _, id := range result.RuleIDs {
-		rq.h.metrics.WAFMatched(cfg.WAFMode, id)
+		rq.h.metrics.CoreRuleSetMatched(cfg.WAFMode, id)
 	}
 
 	threshold := cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold
@@ -52,26 +52,26 @@ func (coreRuleSet) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	}
 
 	rq.addTag(config.ExploitSignatureTag)
-	rq.alertWAFBlock(result)
+	rq.alertCoreRuleSetMatch(result)
 
 	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	rq.wafBlocked = true
+	rq.blockedByCoreRuleSet = true
 
 	return &verdict{
-		action:  requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked,
+		action:  requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet,
 		figures: map[string]any{figureScore: result.Score, "threshold": threshold},
 	}
 }
 
-// alertWAFBlock raises the waf_block alert for the request, which the Core
+// alertCoreRuleSetMatch raises the core_rule_set_match alert for the request,
-// Rule Set scored at result, at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its
+// which the Core Rule Set scored at result, at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its
 // detail gives the rule ids, the score, the method and the path with the
 // query, and, for a request that is not refused for it, the mode: detect,
 // or observe in observe mode.
-func (rq *request) alertWAFBlock(result waf.Result) {
+func (rq *request) alertCoreRuleSetMatch(result coreruleset.Result) {
 	detail := map[string]any{
 		"rule_ids": result.RuleIDs,
 		"score":    result.Score,
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ func (rq *request) alertWAFBlock(result waf.Result) {
 	}
 
 	rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
-		Event:    alerts.EventWAFBlock,
+		Event:    alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch,
 		Host:     rq.site,
 		Client:   rq.client,
 		Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),

internal/discriminator/coreruleset_test.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ const (
 	wafDisabledRules    = "SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
 	wafExemptPaths      = "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
 	wafBodyLimit        = "SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
+	apps                = "SWW_APPS"
 	block               = "block"
 	detect              = "detect"
 )
@@ -40,24 +42,30 @@ const (
 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
 const sqlInjection = "/?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"
 
-// wantWAF checks the request log line's waf_rule_ids and waf_score, and
+// wantCoreRuleSet checks the request log line's core_rule_set_rule_ids and
-// that it has duration_waf, or with no score, that it has none of the
+// core_rule_set_score, and that it has duration_core_rule_set_ms, or with no
-// three: the Core Rule Set did not inspect the request.
+// score, that it has none of the three: the Core Rule Set did not inspect the
-func wantWAF(t *testing.T, line logLine, score *int, ruleIDs ...int) {
+// request.
+func wantCoreRuleSet(t *testing.T, line logLine, score *int, ruleIDs ...int) {
 	t.Helper()
 
-	if !slices.Equal(line.WAFRuleIDs, ruleIDs) {
+	if !slices.Equal(line.CoreRuleSetRuleIDs, ruleIDs) {
-		t.Errorf("log line has waf_rule_ids %v, want %v", line.WAFRuleIDs, ruleIDs)
+		t.Errorf("log line has core_rule_set_rule_ids %v, want %v",
+			line.CoreRuleSetRuleIDs, ruleIDs)
 	}
 
 	switch {
-	case score == nil && (line.WAFScore != nil || line.DurationWAF != nil):
+	case score == nil &&
-		t.Errorf("log line has waf_score %v and duration_waf %v, want neither",
+		(line.CoreRuleSetScore != nil || line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS != nil):
-			line.fields["waf_score"], line.fields["duration_waf"])
+		t.Errorf("log line has core_rule_set_score %v and "+
-	case score != nil && (line.WAFScore == nil || *line.WAFScore != *score):
+			"duration_core_rule_set_ms %v, want neither",
-		t.Errorf("log line has waf_score %v, want %d", line.fields["waf_score"], *score)
+			line.fields["core_rule_set_score"], line.fields["duration_core_rule_set_ms"])
-	case score != nil && line.DurationWAF == nil:
+	case score != nil &&
-		t.Error("log line has no duration_waf")
+		(line.CoreRuleSetScore == nil || *line.CoreRuleSetScore != *score):
+		t.Errorf("log line has core_rule_set_score %v, want %d",
+			line.fields["core_rule_set_score"], *score)
+	case score != nil && line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS == nil:
+		t.Error("log line has no duration_core_rule_set_ms")
 	}
 }
 
@@ -70,7 +78,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetMatchAddsTheExploitSignatureTag(t *testing.T) {
 		status int
 		action string
 	}{
-		{block, block, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked},
+		{block, block, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet},
 		{detect, detect, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -133,14 +141,14 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(t *test
 				mode, action string
 				status       int
 			}{
-				{block, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, http.StatusForbidden},
+				{block, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, http.StatusForbidden},
 				{detect, requestlog.ActionForward, http.StatusOK},
 			} {
 				s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: tc.mode})
 
 				line := s.requestWithHeader(client, attack.path, attack.header,
 					tc.status, tc.action)
-				wantWAF(t, line, &attack.score, attack.ruleIDs...)
+				wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, &attack.score, attack.ruleIDs...)
 			}
 		})
 	}
@@ -152,7 +160,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalNamesItsHeuristicScoreAndThreshold(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
 
 	line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "core_rule_set", `{"score": 5, "threshold": 5}`)
 }
 
@@ -163,7 +171,7 @@ func TestOrdinaryRequestIsInspectedAndPassed(t *testing.T) {
 
 	line := s.request(client, "/owner/repo/src/branch/main/README.md?display=source",
 		http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))
 }
 
 func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
@@ -183,26 +191,26 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
 	// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, and a path SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS
 	// exempts, are not inspected.
 	line := s.request(allowed, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)
 	line = s.request(client, "/api/v1/repos?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusOK,
 		requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)
 
 	// The prefix is matched as rate limit exempt paths are: a path that
 	// goes up and out of it is inspected.
 	line = s.request(client, "/api/../?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
-	wantWAF(t, line, new(25), 930100, 930110, 942100)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(25), 930100, 930110, 942100)
 
 	// A request a rule file refuses is not inspected.
 	line = s.request(otherClient, "/blocked?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
 		requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
-	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)
 
 	// With SWW_WAF_MODE off, no request is.
 	s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: off})
 	line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)
 }
 
 func TestAnomalyThreshold(t *testing.T) {
@@ -216,13 +224,14 @@ func TestAnomalyThreshold(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 
 		line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-		wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
+		wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(5), 942100)
 	}
 
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		wafMode: block, wafAnomalyThreshold: "5",
 	})
-	s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
+	s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
 }
 
 func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
@@ -265,7 +274,7 @@ func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
 			s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
 			line, _ := s.requestWithBody(request.method, client, request.path,
 				request.header, body, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
+			wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))
 
 			// A list given replaces the default.
 			s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
@@ -273,16 +282,37 @@ func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
 			})
 			score := 5 * len(request.ruleIDs)
 			line, _ = s.requestWithBody(request.method, client, request.path,
-				request.header, body, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
+				request.header, body, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
-			wantWAF(t, line, &score, request.ruleIDs...)
+			wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, &score, request.ruleIDs...)
 
 			// And switches off the rules it lists.
 			line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
+			wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))
 		})
 	}
 }
 
+func TestGiteasFixesApplyOnlyToAHostnameThatServesGitea(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// Only gitea's fixes let a file name through in path, a parameter
+	// gitea sends file names in.
+	const fileName = "/?path=.gitignore"
+
+	s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{
+		wafMode: block, apps: siteA + ":gitea",
+	})
+
+	wantDisposition(t, do(t, s.question(siteA, client, fileName)),
+		http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
+	wantDisposition(t, do(t, s.question(siteB, client, fileName)),
+		http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
+
+	lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
+	wantLine(t, lines[0], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
+}
+
 func TestAttackInAFormBodyIsRefusedOnlyWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
@@ -294,14 +324,14 @@ func TestAttackInAFormBodyIsRefusedOnlyWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
 	line, _ := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
 		http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))
 
 	s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
 	})
 	line, _ = s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
-		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
+		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
-	wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(5), 942100)
 }
 
 func TestBodiesReachTheAppAsSentWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
@@ -391,32 +421,33 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T)
 	})
 
 	for range 2 {
-		s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
+		s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
+			requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
 	}
 
 	// The third refusal in a minute breaks the error burst, and bans the
 	// client.
 	line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
-	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst ||
+	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals ||
 		line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
-		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want error_burst and limit",
+		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want minute_refusals and limit",
 			line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
 	}
 
 	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 
-	want := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, WAFBlocked: 3}
+	want := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, BlockedByCoreRuleSet: 3}
 	if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
 		t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
 	}
 
 	metrics := s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`sww_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="block",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
+		`sww_core_rule_set_matches_total{instance="app",mode="block",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="waf_blocked"}`, 3)
+		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_core_rule_set"}`, 3)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="waf_blocked",`+
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="blocked_by_core_rule_set",`+
 		`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 3)
 }
 
@@ -440,9 +471,9 @@ func TestDetectModeMatchIsNoOffenceAndNotCountedTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T
 
 	metrics := s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`sww_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="detect",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
+		`sww_core_rule_set_matches_total{instance="app",mode="detect",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
 	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
-		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="waf_blocked"}`)
+		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_core_rule_set"}`)
 }
 
 func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheCoreRuleSetWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -451,17 +482,17 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheCoreRuleSetWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block, mode: observe})
 
 	line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
-	wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(5), 942100)
 
 	// It is an offence as in enforce mode.
-	want := ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1}
+	want := ratelimit.Offences{BlockedByCoreRuleSet: 1}
 	if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
 		t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
 	}
 }
 
-func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheCoreRuleSetMatchAlert(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -475,7 +506,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
 	}{
 		{
 			"block", map[string]string{wafMode: block},
-			http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, "",
+			http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, "",
 		},
 		{
 			"detect", map[string]string{wafMode: detect},
@@ -510,7 +541,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
 			wantAlerts(t, queue, alerts.Alert{
 				Instance: alertInstance,
 				Time:     clk.Now(),
-				Event:    alerts.EventWAFBlock,
+				Event:    alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch,
 				Host:     appHost,
 				Client:   netip.MustParseAddr(client),
 				Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),

internal/discriminator/discriminator.go

@@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ type Report struct {
 	Status                  int     `json:"status"`
 	RequestBytes            int64   `json:"request_bytes"`
 	ResponseBytes           int64   `json:"response_bytes"`
-	DurationTotal         float64 `json:"duration_total"`
+	DurationTotalMS         float64 `json:"duration_total_ms"`
-	DurationUpstreamTotal float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total"`
+	DurationUpstreamTotalMS float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total_ms"`
 }
 
 // New returns the server `sww discriminator` runs. It answers
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ func (h *handler) answerQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	rq.line.DiscriminatorLine = requestlog.DiscriminatorLineDecision
 	refused := rq.check(r.Context())
 	rq.checked = time.Now()
-	underOwnPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, adminPrefix)
+	underOwnPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, ownEndpointPrefix)
 
 	if refused == nil && !underOwnPrefix {
 		// In observe mode, what enforce mode would have refused counts here.
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ func (h *handler) answerQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	// The app never sees this prefix. discriminator's own endpoints are at its
 	// own address, so this answers as a path with no endpoint does.
-	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
+	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint
 	rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
 	http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
 }
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ func readReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (Report, error) {
 
 	for _, name := range []string{
 		"request_id", "status", "request_bytes", "response_bytes",
-		"duration_total", "duration_upstream_total",
+		"duration_total_ms", "duration_upstream_total_ms",
 	} {
 		value, there := fields[name]
 		if !there || string(value) == "null" {
@@ -431,11 +431,11 @@ func (report *Report) checkRanges() error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: request_bytes", errReportValue)
 	case report.ResponseBytes < 0 || report.ResponseBytes > maxReportedBytes:
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: response_bytes", errReportValue)
-	case report.DurationTotal < 0 || report.DurationTotal > maxReportedMilliseconds:
+	case report.DurationTotalMS < 0 || report.DurationTotalMS > maxReportedMilliseconds:
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_total", errReportValue)
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_total_ms", errReportValue)
-	case report.DurationUpstreamTotal < 0 ||
+	case report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS < 0 ||
-		report.DurationUpstreamTotal > maxReportedMilliseconds:
+		report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS > maxReportedMilliseconds:
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_upstream_total", errReportValue)
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_upstream_total_ms", errReportValue)
 	}
 
 	return nil
@@ -459,18 +459,18 @@ func (h *handler) finishWith(ctx context.Context, held *decision, report Report)
 	rq.line.Status = report.Status
 	rq.line.RequestBytes = report.RequestBytes
 	rq.line.ResponseBytes = report.ResponseBytes
-	rq.line.DurationTotal = report.DurationTotal
+	rq.line.DurationTotalMS = report.DurationTotalMS
 
 	if rq.allowed {
-		rq.line.DurationUpstreamTotal = &report.DurationUpstreamTotal
+		rq.line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS = &report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS
 
 		rq.runBanningHeuristics(ctx, onReport())
 		rq.countAnomalies()
 		rq.addToHistory()
 
 		rq.h.metrics.RequestReported(&rq.line,
-			time.Duration(report.DurationTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)),
+			time.Duration(report.DurationTotalMS*float64(time.Millisecond)),
-			time.Duration(report.DurationUpstreamTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)))
+			time.Duration(report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS*float64(time.Millisecond)))
 	}
 
 	rq.writeLine()

internal/discriminator/discriminator_test.go

@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ const (
 	reportStatus           = "status"
 	reportRequestBytes     = "request_bytes"
 	reportResponseBytes    = "response_bytes"
-	reportDuration         = "duration_total"
+	reportDuration         = "duration_total_ms"
-	reportUpstreamDuration = "duration_upstream_total"
+	reportUpstreamDuration = "duration_upstream_total_ms"
 )
 
 // Discriminator is a discriminator running for one test, on a clock set to midnight.
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ func TestQuestionUnderTheOwnPrefixIsDeniedWith404AfterTheChecks(t *testing.T) {
 		wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusNotFound, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 	}
 
-	wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
+	wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint)
 
 	got := s.ask(otherClient, discriminator.MetricsPath)
 	wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
@@ -725,9 +725,9 @@ func TestObserveModeRefusalAnsweredAllowCountsForTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
-	if lines[0].LimitHit != "" || lines[1].LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst {
+	if lines[0].LimitHit != "" || lines[1].LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals {
 		t.Errorf("log lines have limit_hit %q and %q, want none and %q",
-			lines[0].LimitHit, lines[1].LimitHit, requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst)
+			lines[0].LimitHit, lines[1].LimitHit, requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -744,9 +744,9 @@ func TestDeniedQuestionCountsForTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
-	if lines[0].LimitHit != "" || lines[1].LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst {
+	if lines[0].LimitHit != "" || lines[1].LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals {
 		t.Errorf("log lines have limit_hit %q and %q, want none and %q",
-			lines[0].LimitHit, lines[1].LimitHit, requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst)
+			lines[0].LimitHit, lines[1].LimitHit, requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ func TestDeniedRequestIsFinishedAtItsDecision(t *testing.T) {
 
 	got := s.report(discriminator.Report{
 		RequestID: denied.Header.Get(requestIDHeader), Status: http.StatusForbidden,
-		ResponseBytes: 1000, DurationTotal: 2,
+		ResponseBytes: 1000, DurationTotalMS: 2,
 	})
 	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
 
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountAnAllowedRequestFromItsReport(t *testing.T) {
 	got := s.report(discriminator.Report{
 		RequestID: id, Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
 		RequestBytes: bodyBytes, ResponseBytes: answerBytes,
-		DurationTotal: 5, DurationUpstreamTotal: 4,
+		DurationTotalMS: 5, DurationUpstreamTotalMS: 4,
 	})
 	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
 
@@ -951,7 +951,8 @@ func TestMetricsCountAnAllowedRequestFromItsReport(t *testing.T) {
 	unscraped := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
 
 	got = unscraped.report(discriminator.Report{
-		RequestID: unscraped.allowed(client), Status: http.StatusBadGateway, DurationTotal: 5,
+		RequestID: unscraped.allowed(client), Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
+		DurationTotalMS: 5,
 	})
 	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
 	wantMetric(t, unscraped.metrics(),
@@ -1189,8 +1190,8 @@ func wantReportsFields(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
 	if line.DiscriminatorLine != requestlog.DiscriminatorLineReport ||
 		line.Status != http.StatusCreated ||
 		line.RequestBytes != bodyBytes || line.ResponseBytes != answerBytes ||
-		line.DurationTotal != 12.5 || line.DurationUpstreamTotal == nil ||
+		line.DurationTotalMS != 12.5 || line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS == nil ||
-		*line.DurationUpstreamTotal != 10.25 {
+		*line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS != 10.25 {
 		t.Errorf("the report's line lacks the report's fields: %+v", line.Line)
 	}
 }
@@ -1205,8 +1206,8 @@ func wantSameDecision(t *testing.T, reported, decided logLine) {
 	same.Status = decided.Status
 	same.RequestBytes = decided.RequestBytes
 	same.ResponseBytes = decided.ResponseBytes
-	same.DurationTotal = decided.DurationTotal
+	same.DurationTotalMS = decided.DurationTotalMS
-	same.DurationUpstreamTotal = decided.DurationUpstreamTotal
+	same.DurationUpstreamTotalMS = decided.DurationUpstreamTotalMS
 	same.Counts.MinuteBytes = decided.Counts.MinuteBytes
 	same.Counts.HourBytes = decided.Counts.HourBytes
 	same.Counts.DayBytes = decided.Counts.DayBytes
@@ -1224,7 +1225,7 @@ func wantDecisionsFields(t *testing.T, line logLine, id, query, accept string) {
 
 	if line.DiscriminatorLine != requestlog.DiscriminatorLineDecision ||
 		line.Status != http.StatusOK || line.ResponseBytes != 0 ||
-		line.DurationUpstreamTotal != nil || line.DurationChecks == nil ||
+		line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS != nil || line.DurationChecksMS == nil ||
 		line.RequestID != id || line.Query != query ||
 		!line.HasAuthorization || !line.HasCookie ||
 		line.RequestHeaders["accept"] != accept || len(line.RuleIDs) != 1 ||
@@ -1260,7 +1261,7 @@ func TestReportWritesTheLastLineWithTheDecisionsAndTheReportsFields(t *testing.T
 	got := s.report(discriminator.Report{
 		RequestID: id, Status: http.StatusCreated,
 		RequestBytes: bodyBytes, ResponseBytes: answerBytes,
-		DurationTotal: 12.5, DurationUpstreamTotal: 10.25,
+		DurationTotalMS: 12.5, DurationUpstreamTotalMS: 10.25,
 	})
 	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
 
@@ -1305,7 +1306,7 @@ func TestEveryDeniedRequestsReportGetsItsLastLine(t *testing.T) {
 			0, requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
 		},
 		{"own prefix", nil, discriminator.HealthPath, http.StatusNotFound,
-			requestlog.ActionAdmin},
+			requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
@@ -1317,7 +1318,7 @@ func TestEveryDeniedRequestsReportGetsItsLastLine(t *testing.T) {
 			do(t, req)
 
 			got := s.report(discriminator.Report{
-				RequestID: id, Status: tc.status, ResponseBytes: 8, DurationTotal: 3,
+				RequestID: id, Status: tc.status, ResponseBytes: 8, DurationTotalMS: 3,
 			})
 			wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
 
@@ -1325,8 +1326,8 @@ func TestEveryDeniedRequestsReportGetsItsLastLine(t *testing.T) {
 			wantLine(t, line, tc.status, tc.action)
 
 			if line.DiscriminatorLine != requestlog.DiscriminatorLineReport ||
-				line.RequestID != id || line.ResponseBytes != 8 || line.DurationTotal != 3 ||
+				line.RequestID != id || line.ResponseBytes != 8 || line.DurationTotalMS != 3 ||
-				line.DurationUpstreamTotal != nil {
+				line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS != nil {
 				t.Errorf("the report's line is %+v", line.Line)
 			}
 		})
@@ -1583,9 +1584,10 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetAlertNamesTheSite(t *testing.T) {
 	wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 
 	waiting := s.queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
-	if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventWAFBlock ||
+	if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch ||
 		waiting[0].Host != siteA {
-		t.Errorf("alerts waiting are %+v, want a waf_block naming %s", waiting, siteA)
+		t.Errorf("alerts waiting are %+v, want a core_rule_set_match naming %s",
+			waiting, siteA)
 	}
 }
 

internal/discriminator/health_test.go

@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ func TestHealthEndpointCountsTowardNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 
 	for range healthChecks {
-		got := s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
+		got := s.ownEndpointRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.HealthPath, "",
+			http.StatusOK)
 
 		if string(got.body) != "ok\n" || got.header.Get("Content-Type") != contentType {
 			t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q with Content-Type %q, want ok "+

internal/discriminator/history_test.go

@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ func TestOwnEndpointsAreNotInTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
 
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
 
-	s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
+	s.ownEndpointRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
-	s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
+	s.ownEndpointRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
 		http.StatusUnauthorized)
 	s.scrape()
 

internal/discriminator/lookup_test.go

@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays(t *testing.T) {
 		// is never reached.
 		const timeout = 3 * time.Second
 
-		server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
+		server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
 			map[string]string{
 				lookupTimeout:    timeout.String(),
 				allowedCountries: "DE",
@@ -405,25 +405,25 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 
-// unansweredGeoJSURL is where a GeoJS that never answers is asked: a
+// silentGeoJSURL is where a GeoJS that never answers is asked: a
 // request to it waits, without the network, until it is abandoned.
 // TestMain registers it with Go's default transport, through which GeoJS
 // is asked.
-const unansweredGeoJSURL = "unanswered://geojs/v1/ip/geo.json"
+const silentGeoJSURL = "silent://geojs/v1/ip/geo.json"
 
 func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
 	transport, _ := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport)
-	transport.RegisterProtocol("unanswered", unansweredGeoJS{})
+	transport.RegisterProtocol("silent", silentGeoJS{})
 	transport.RegisterProtocol("abuseipdb", abuseIPDBStandIn{})
 
 	m.Run()
 }
 
-// unansweredGeoJS is the GeoJS at unansweredGeoJSURL.
+// silentGeoJS is the GeoJS at silentGeoJSURL.
-type unansweredGeoJS struct{}
+type silentGeoJS struct{}
 
 // RoundTrip waits until req is abandoned.
-func (unansweredGeoJS) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+func (silentGeoJS) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 	<-req.Context().Done()
 
 	return nil, req.Context().Err()

internal/discriminator/metrics_test.go

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ func TestMetricsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
 	for _, authorization := range []string{bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
-		s.adminRequest(authorization, http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
+		s.ownEndpointRequest(authorization, http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
 			http.StatusNotFound)
 	}
 }
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
 		{http.MethodGet, "/_sww/bans", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
 		{http.MethodPost, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
 	} {
-		got := s.adminRequest(tc.authorization, tc.method, tc.path, "", tc.status)
+		got := s.ownEndpointRequest(tc.authorization, tc.method, tc.path, "", tc.status)
 
 		if tc.status == http.StatusUnauthorized &&
 			got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
 	out.endedLines(t, 2)
 
 	forward := `{action="forward",instance="app",status_class="2xx"}`
-	notFound := `{action="admin",instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`
+	notFound := `{action="own_endpoint",instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`
 
 	// The request for the metrics is itself under way.
 	metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
 
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_requests_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_failures_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_unanswered_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_without_geojs_answer_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
 }
 
 // keptAnswer returns GeoJS's answer that the client at addr is in
@@ -381,8 +381,8 @@ func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
 func (s *sender) scrape() string {
 	s.t.Helper()
 
-	return string(s.adminRequest(bearer, http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
+	return string(s.ownEndpointRequest(bearer, http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath,
-		http.StatusOK).body)
+		"", http.StatusOK).body)
 }
 
 // metric returns the value of series in metrics, which are in the

internal/discriminator/proxy.go

@@ -16,18 +16,18 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/routewatch"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
 )
 
-// adminPrefix starts the path of each of discriminator's own endpoints. The app never
+// ownEndpointPrefix starts the path of each of discriminator's own endpoints. The app
-// sees a path under it.
+// never sees a path under it.
-const adminPrefix = "/_sww/"
+const ownEndpointPrefix = "/_sww/"
 
 // HealthPath is the health endpoint of discriminator and of rproxy, which the
 // container's health check asks.
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ type Params struct {
 	LookupFile *lookup.File
 	// CoreRuleSet is what NewCoreRuleSet returns: what inspects requests
 	// while SWW_WAF_MODE is not off, and nil while it is.
-	CoreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
+	CoreRuleSet *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet
 	// Now tells the time by which requests are counted for the rate
 	// limits, bans are made and run out, and GeoJS's answers are kept,
 	// normally time.Now in UTC, the time the state files give.
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
 			BytesPerHour:   params.Config.BytesLimitPerHour,
 			BytesPerDay:    params.Config.BytesLimitPerDay,
 		}, params.Config.MaxTrackedClients),
-		ledger: bans.New(bans.Rules{
+		ledger: bans.New(bans.Params{
 			LimitBanDuration:     params.Config.LimitBanDuration,
 			LimitBanRepeatWindow: params.Config.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
 			MaxBanDuration:       params.Config.MaxBanDuration,
@@ -221,21 +221,23 @@ func newReputation(
 // NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
 // without the rules SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
 // up to SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, with the exclusions in
-// SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, or nil while SWW_WAF_MODE is off. It
+// SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE and the fixes of the apps in SWW_APPS,
+// or nil while SWW_WAF_MODE is off. It
 // reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
 // QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the Core Rule Set does not read a
-// JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that waf.New refuses is
+// JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that coreruleset.New refuses is
 // an error in every mode. While the mode is off, a set file is loaded with the
 // Core Rule Set only to check it.
-func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) (*waf.CoreRuleSet, error) {
+func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
 	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff && cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile == "" {
 		return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // off is no Core Rule Set, and no error
 	}
 
-	coreRuleSet, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
+	coreRuleSet, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
 		ParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel, DisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules,
 		BodyLimit:      min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1),
 		ExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
+		Apps:           cfg.Apps,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: %w", err)
@@ -266,7 +268,7 @@ type handler struct {
 	abuseIPDB   *reputation.AbuseIPDB
 	routeWatch  *routewatch.Client
 	rules       *rules.Files
-	coreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
+	coreRuleSet *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet
 	alerts      *alerts.Queue
 	// awaitingReport holds the decision on each answered question by its id
 	// until its report comes, and nil for a question still being handled.

internal/discriminator/ratelimits.go

@@ -28,12 +28,14 @@ func (rateLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	rq.limitPercent, rq.bytesPercent = rq.limitPercentages()
+	rq.rateLimitPercent, rq.bytesLimitPercent = rq.limitPercentages()
-	rq.line.LimitPercent, rq.line.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
+	rq.line.RateLimitPercent, rq.line.RateLimitPercentSetting =
-	rq.line.BytesPercent, rq.line.BytesPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
+		rq.rateLimitPercent.logged()
+	rq.line.BytesLimitPercent, rq.line.BytesLimitPercentSetting =
+		rq.bytesLimitPercent.logged()
 
 	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
-		rq.limitPercent.percent)
+		rq.rateLimitPercent.percent)
 	rq.line.Counts = counts
 
 	if !over {

internal/discriminator/refusallimit.go

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func (refusalLimit) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdic
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	if !rq.attack && !rq.blockedByBlockRule && !rq.wafBlocked {
+	if !rq.attack && !rq.blockedByBlockRule && !rq.blockedByCoreRuleSet {
 		return nil
 	}
 
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ func (refusalLimit) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdic
 	status := rq.out.status
 
 	switch rq.line.WouldAction {
-	case requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
+	case requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet:
 		status = http.StatusForbidden
 	case requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned:
 		status = cfg.BanResponse

internal/discriminator/refusallimit_test.go

@@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
 			// The fourth is answered as the others were, breaks the error
 			// burst, and bans the client.
 			line := tc.refusals[3].send(s, client)
-			if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst ||
+			if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals ||
 				line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
-				t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want error_burst "+
+				t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want minute_refusals "+
 					"and limit", line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
 			}
 
@@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ func TestErrorBurstOffOrAtItsDefault(t *testing.T) {
 				line = blockRule.send(s, client)
 			}
 
-			if broken := line.LimitHit == requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst; broken != tc.broken {
+			broken := line.LimitHit == requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals
+			if broken != tc.broken {
 				t.Errorf("the 31st refusal broke the error burst: %t, want %t",
 					broken, tc.broken)
 			}
@@ -306,8 +307,8 @@ func TestErrorBurstCountsEachClientTheChecksApplyTo(t *testing.T) {
 	blockRule.send(s, exempt)
 
 	line := blockRule.send(s, exempt)
-	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst {
+	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals {
-		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want error_burst", line.LimitHit)
+		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want minute_refusals", line.LimitHit)
 	}
 
 	s.get(exempt, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
@@ -367,8 +368,8 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 	line := s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
 
-	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst || line.BanExpires != "" {
+	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals || line.BanExpires != "" {
-		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, want error_burst "+
+		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, want minute_refusals "+
 			"and none", line.LimitHit, line.BanExpires)
 	}
 

internal/discriminator/reputation_test.go

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		action string
 		// statuses and actions are those of a listed client's three
-		// requests, and percent their limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
+		// requests, and percent their rate_limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
 		statuses []int
 		actions  []string
 		percent  string
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 				for i := range 3 {
 					line := s.get(from, tc.statuses[i], tc.actions[i])
 					wantReputation(t, line, dropURL)
-					wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent,
+					wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent", line.RateLimitPercent,
-						line.LimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)
+						line.RateLimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)
 
 					// A request refused for the list is not counted.
 					counted := line.fields["counts"] != nil
@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 			for range 3 {
 				line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusOK, forward)
 				wantReputation(t, line)
-				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+				wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+					line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 					none)
 			}
 
@@ -207,7 +208,7 @@ func TestBlocklistLimitTakesPartInTheLowestPercentageOfEveryLimit(t *testing.T)
 
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		action, asnPercent string
-		// want is the upload's limit_percent and bytes_percent, as
+		// want is the upload's rate_limit_percent and bytes_limit_percent, as
 		// percentText gives them, and limitHit its limit_hit.
 		want, limitHit string
 	}{
@@ -229,9 +230,11 @@ func TestBlocklistLimitTakesPartInTheLowestPercentageOfEveryLimit(t *testing.T)
 			// The upload's 100 bytes are over 49, a quarter of 199, and 99,
 			// half of it, and within 199.
 			line := s.uploadFrom(fromDE)
-			wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+				line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 				tc.want)
-			wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+				line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
 				tc.want)
 
 			if line.LimitHit != tc.limitHit {
@@ -253,9 +256,9 @@ func TestASNLimitPercentFileCountsAsTheSettingDoesTheLowerWinning(t *testing.T)
 		name string
 		env  map[string]string
 		file string
-		// limitPercent and bytesPercent are the upload's, as percentText
+		// rateLimitPercent and bytesLimitPercent are the upload's, as
-		// gives them.
+		// percentText gives them.
-		limitPercent, bytesPercent string
+		rateLimitPercent, bytesLimitPercent string
 	}{
 		{"the file's alone", nil, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, fromURL},
 		{
@@ -288,10 +291,12 @@ func TestASNLimitPercentFileCountsAsTheSettingDoesTheLowerWinning(t *testing.T)
 			loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{asnURL: {"# by AS number", tc.file}})
 
 			line := s.uploadFrom(fromDE)
-			wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
-				tc.limitPercent)
+				line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
-			wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
+				tc.rateLimitPercent)
-				tc.bytesPercent)
+			wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+				line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
+				tc.bytesLimitPercent)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -385,7 +390,7 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		action string
 		// statuses and actions are those of a listed client's three
-		// requests, and percent their limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
+		// requests, and percent their rate_limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
 		statuses []int
 		actions  []string
 		percent  string
@@ -422,8 +427,8 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
 					line := s.get(from, tc.statuses[i], tc.actions[i])
 					// In the order SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names them.
 					wantReputation(t, line, listedBy[from]...)
-					wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent,
+					wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent", line.RateLimitPercent,
-						line.LimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)
+						line.RateLimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)
 
 					// A request refused for the verdict is not counted.
 					counted := line.fields["counts"] != nil
@@ -438,7 +443,8 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
 			for range 3 {
 				line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusOK, forward)
 				wantReputation(t, line)
-				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+				wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+					line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 					none)
 			}
 
@@ -546,7 +552,7 @@ func TestReputationLimitTakesPartInTheLowestPercentageOfEveryLimit(t *testing.T)
 
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		blocklistAction, reputationAction string
-		// want is the request's limit_percent and bytes_percent, as
+		// want is the request's rate_limit_percent and bytes_limit_percent, as
 		// percentText gives them.
 		want string
 	}{
@@ -571,9 +577,11 @@ func TestReputationLimitTakesPartInTheLowestPercentageOfEveryLimit(t *testing.T)
 			// Named by the blocklist, then by the zone.
 			line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 			wantReputation(t, line, dropURL, dnsblZone)
-			wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+				line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 				tc.want)
-			wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+				line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
 				tc.want)
 		})
 	}
@@ -819,7 +827,7 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
 		},
 		{
 			"the Core Rule Set", sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
-			requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1},
+			requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, ratelimit.Offences{BlockedByCoreRuleSet: 1},
 		},
 		{
 			"a ban rule", probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
@@ -863,7 +871,7 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *test
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		action string
 		// statuses and actions are those of fromDE's three requests, and
-		// percent their limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
+		// percent their rate_limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
 		statuses []int
 		actions  []string
 		percent  string
@@ -896,7 +904,8 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *test
 			for i := range 3 {
 				line := s.get(fromDE, tc.statuses[i], tc.actions[i])
 				wantReputation(t, line, abuseipdb)
-				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+				wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+					line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 					tc.percent)
 
 				// A request refused for the score is not counted.
@@ -910,7 +919,8 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *test
 			for range 3 {
 				line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, forward)
 				wantReputation(t, line)
-				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+				wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+					line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 					none)
 			}
 

internal/discriminator/request.go

@@ -48,16 +48,16 @@ type decision struct {
 	// so that not waiting never lowers its client's limits.
 	skippedLookupWait bool
 	// counted is true for a request the rate limits counted, whose bytes
-	// the byte limits count once it has ended. limitPercent and
+	// the byte limits count once it has ended. rateLimitPercent and
-	// bytesPercent are then its client's limit percentages for the rate
+	// bytesLimitPercent are then its client's limit percentages for the rate
 	// limits and for the byte limits.
 	counted                             bool
-	limitPercent, bytesPercent percentage
+	rateLimitPercent, bytesLimitPercent percentage
 	// attack is true for a request that matched a ban rule or asked for a
 	// trap path, blockedByBlockRule for one a block rule refused, and
-	// wafBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence its
+	// blockedByCoreRuleSet for one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence
-	// client's history counts.
+	// its client's history counts.
-	attack, blockedByBlockRule, wafBlocked bool
+	attack, blockedByBlockRule, blockedByCoreRuleSet bool
 	// reputation is the reputation sources that list the client, for the
 	// notes of a ban the request makes.
 	reputation []bans.ReputationHit
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
 
 		return nil
 	case action == requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule ||
-		action == requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
+		action == requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet:
 		return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
 	case action == requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge:
 		return &refusal{status: http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge, action: action}
@@ -262,8 +262,8 @@ func (rq *request) finish() {
 	}
 
 	duration := time.Since(rq.start)
-	line.DurationTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(duration)
+	line.DurationTotalMS = requestlog.Milliseconds(duration)
-	line.DurationChecks = timing(rq.start, rq.checked)
+	line.DurationChecksMS = timing(rq.start, rq.checked)
 
 	// Counted before the log line is written, so that the metrics count
 	// every request whose line is out. An allowed request is the exception:
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
 		BrokeLimit:           rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
 		Attack:               rq.attack,
 		BlockedByBlockRule:   rq.blockedByBlockRule,
-		WAFBlocked:         rq.wafBlocked,
+		BlockedByCoreRuleSet: rq.blockedByCoreRuleSet,
 	}
 
 	rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), request)

internal/discriminator/requestlog_test.go

@@ -156,9 +156,9 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
 
 // withTimings returns want with the timings of line.
 func withTimings(line logLine, want requestlog.Line) requestlog.Line {
-	want.DurationTotal = line.DurationTotal
+	want.DurationTotalMS = line.DurationTotalMS
-	want.DurationChecks = line.DurationChecks
+	want.DurationChecksMS = line.DurationChecksMS
-	want.DurationUpstreamTotal = line.DurationUpstreamTotal
+	want.DurationUpstreamTotalMS = line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS
 
 	return want
 }
@@ -226,10 +226,10 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// A request passed to the app has every timing; one refused, none of
 	// the app's; the health check, which runs no check, only the total.
-	wantTimings(t, forwarded, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
+	wantTimings(t, forwarded, "duration_total_ms", "duration_checks_ms",
-		"duration_upstream_total")
+		"duration_upstream_total_ms")
-	wantTimings(t, refused, "duration_total", "duration_checks")
+	wantTimings(t, refused, "duration_total_ms", "duration_checks_ms")
-	wantTimings(t, health, "duration_total")
+	wantTimings(t, health, "duration_total_ms")
 
 	if t.Failed() {
 		return
@@ -237,9 +237,9 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// In whole microseconds, as they are logged, so that the sum below is
 	// exact.
-	total := microseconds(forwarded.DurationTotal)
+	total := microseconds(forwarded.DurationTotalMS)
-	checks := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationChecks)
+	checks := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationChecksMS)
-	upstream := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamTotal)
+	upstream := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamTotalMS)
 
 	// The checks end before the request is handed to the app.
 	if checks+upstream > total {
@@ -247,9 +247,9 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
 			total, checks, upstream)
 	}
 
-	if *refused.DurationChecks > refused.DurationTotal {
+	if *refused.DurationChecksMS > refused.DurationTotalMS {
 		t.Errorf("refused request's checks took %v of %v milliseconds",
-			*refused.DurationChecks, refused.DurationTotal)
+			*refused.DurationChecksMS, refused.DurationTotalMS)
 	}
 }
 

internal/discriminator/tagdeny_test.go

@@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ func TestTagLimitPercentLowersALimitTheLowestWinning(t *testing.T) {
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 
 	line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
-	wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+	wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+		line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 		"25 from "+tagLimitPercent)
 }
 
@@ -108,7 +109,8 @@ func TestTagLimitPercentLowersAByteLimitByAListTag(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want %s", line.LimitHit, minuteBytes)
 	}
 
-	wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
+	wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+		line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
 		"50 from "+tagLimitPercent)
 
 	// fromKP, which the list does not hold, has the whole limit.
@@ -117,5 +119,6 @@ func TestTagLimitPercentLowersAByteLimitByAListTag(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("log line for %s has limit_hit %q, want none", fromKP, line.LimitHit)
 	}
 
-	wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting, none)
+	wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+		line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting, none)
 }

internal/lookup/lookup.go

@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
 
 	answer, found := g.kept(client)
 	if !found {
-		g.metrics.GeoJSUnanswered.Inc()
+		g.metrics.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc()
 	}
 
 	w, waiting := g.waiting[client]
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
 	}
 
 	if w == nil {
-		g.metrics.GeoJSUnanswered.Inc()
+		g.metrics.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc()
 
 		return Answer{}, nil // too many clients wait already
 	}
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
 	}
 
 	if w.late {
-		g.metrics.GeoJSUnanswered.Inc()
+		g.metrics.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc()
 
 		return Answer{}, nil
 	}

internal/lookup/lookup_test.go

@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ func TestWithoutWaitTheRequestGoesOnAtOnceAndTheAnswerIsGivenWhenItComes(
 		mu.Unlock()
 
 		wantCountry(t, g, client, germany)
-		wantUnanswered(t, m, 0)
+		wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t, m, 0)
 	})
 }
 
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ func TestClientsWithoutAnAnswerAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
 		// GeoJS fails, so the first client goes without an answer, and GeoJS
 		// is left alone for a second, which does not pass in this test.
 		wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
-		wantUnanswered(t, m, 1)
+		wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t, m, 1)
 
 		// Meanwhile each new client goes without one at once, while there is
 		// room for it among the 10,000 that may wait.
@@ -604,11 +604,11 @@ func TestClientsWithoutAnAnswerAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
 			wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
 		}
 
-		wantUnanswered(t, m, 10000)
+		wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t, m, 10000)
 
 		// One more, for which there is no room, goes without one too.
 		wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
-		wantUnanswered(t, m, 10001)
+		wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t, m, 10001)
 	})
 }
 
@@ -841,12 +841,12 @@ func wantAsked(t *testing.T, geojs *standIn, i int, want ...string) {
 	}
 }
 
-// wantUnanswered checks how many requests m counts as having gone without
+// wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer checks how many requests m counts as having
-// an answer from GeoJS.
+// gone without an answer from GeoJS.
-func wantUnanswered(t *testing.T, m *metrics.Metrics, want float64) {
+func wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t *testing.T, m *metrics.Metrics, want float64) {
 	t.Helper()
 
-	got := testutil.ToFloat64(m.GeoJSUnanswered)
+	got := testutil.ToFloat64(m.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer)
 	if got != want {
 		t.Errorf("%v requests went without an answer, want %v", got, want)
 	}

internal/metrics/metrics.go

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ type Metrics struct {
 	upstreamDuration   prometheus.Histogram
 	rateLimitHits      *prometheus.CounterVec
 	offences           *prometheus.CounterVec
-	wafMatches       *prometheus.CounterVec
+	coreRuleSetMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
 	// ruleMatches are made by AddRules, and reputationHits by
 	// AddReputation.
 	ruleMatches    *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ type Metrics struct {
 	asns           *busiest
 
 	// GeoJSRequests are the requests to GeoJS, and GeoJSFailures those
-	// that failed. GeoJSUnanswered are the requests that needed their
+	// that failed. RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer are the requests that needed
-	// client's answer, for a setting that acts on it, and went on without
+	// their client's answer, for a setting that acts on it, and went on
-	// it because GeoJS had not given it in time.
+	// without it because GeoJS had not given it in time.
 	GeoJSRequests              prometheus.Counter
 	GeoJSFailures              prometheus.Counter
-	GeoJSUnanswered prometheus.Counter
+	RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer prometheus.Counter
 
 	stateFileWrites        *prometheus.CounterVec
 	stateFileWriteFailures *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
 			[]string{"window", "kind"}),
 		offences: counterVec("sww_offences_total",
 			"Offences, by kind.", []string{"kind"}),
-		wafMatches: counterVec("sww_waf_matches_total",
+		coreRuleSetMatches: counterVec("sww_core_rule_set_matches_total",
 			"Requests that matched a rule of the Core Rule Set, by SWW_WAF_MODE "+
 				"and the rule's id.", []string{"mode", "rule_id"}),
 		countries: newCountries(topN),
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
 			Name: "sww_geojs_failures_total",
 			Help: "Requests to GeoJS that failed.",
 		}),
-		GeoJSUnanswered: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
+		RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "sww_geojs_unanswered_total",
+			Name: "sww_requests_without_geojs_answer_total",
 			Help: "Requests that needed their client's answer from GeoJS and " +
 				"went on without it, because GeoJS had not given it in time.",
 		}),
@@ -139,9 +139,9 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
 		collectors.NewProcessCollector(collectors.ProcessCollectorOpts{}),
 		m.inFlight, m.requests, m.requestBytes, m.responseBytes,
 		m.requestDuration, m.upstreamDuration,
-		m.rateLimitHits, m.offences, m.wafMatches,
+		m.rateLimitHits, m.offences, m.coreRuleSetMatches,
 		m.countries, m.asns,
-		m.GeoJSRequests, m.GeoJSFailures, m.GeoJSUnanswered,
+		m.GeoJSRequests, m.GeoJSFailures, m.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer,
 		m.stateFileWrites, m.stateFileWriteFailures,
 		m.stateFileLastWrite, m.stateFileSize,
 		m.stateFileEditsTakenIn, m.stateFileEditsSetAside,
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddRemoteLog(remote *remotelog.Sender) {
 			return float64(remote.Dropped())
 		}),
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "sww_remote_log_buffer_depth",
+			Name: "sww_remote_log_lines_waiting",
 			Help: "Log lines in the buffer, waiting to be sent.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(remote.Depth())
@@ -355,11 +355,11 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddAlerts(queue *alerts.Queue) {
 				return float64(queue.Counts(name).Sent)
 			}),
 			prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-				Name:        "sww_alerts_failed_total",
+				Name:        "sww_alert_send_failures_total",
 				Help:        "Requests to the destination that failed.",
 				ConstLabels: destination,
 			}, func() float64 {
-				return float64(queue.Counts(name).Failed)
+				return float64(queue.Counts(name).SendFailures)
 			}),
 			prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
 				Name: "sww_alerts_suppressed_total",
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) Offences(r ratelimit.Request) {
 		"limit":                    r.BrokeLimit,
 		"attack":                   r.Attack,
 		"blocked_by_block_rule":    r.BlockedByBlockRule,
-		"waf_blocked":           r.WAFBlocked,
+		"blocked_by_core_rule_set": r.BlockedByCoreRuleSet,
 	} {
 		if committed {
 			m.offences.WithLabelValues(kind).Inc()
@@ -441,10 +441,10 @@ func (m *Metrics) RuleMatched(id, action string) {
 	m.ruleMatches.WithLabelValues(id, action).Inc()
 }
 
-// WAFMatched counts a request that matched the Core Rule Set's rule id,
+// CoreRuleSetMatched counts a request that matched the Core Rule Set's rule id,
 // with SWW_WAF_MODE at mode.
-func (m *Metrics) WAFMatched(mode string, id int) {
+func (m *Metrics) CoreRuleSetMatched(mode string, id int) {
-	m.wafMatches.WithLabelValues(mode, strconv.Itoa(id)).Inc()
+	m.coreRuleSetMatches.WithLabelValues(mode, strconv.Itoa(id)).Inc()
 }
 
 // StateFileWritten counts a write of the state file name, of size bytes,

internal/ratelimit/ratelimit.go

@@ -123,11 +123,12 @@ type Offences struct {
 	// Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
 	// error burst, Attack those that were a clear sign of attack, a match
 	// of a ban rule or a request for a trap path, BlockedByBlockRule those a
-	// block rule refused, and WAFBlocked those the Core Rule Set refused.
+	// block rule refused, and BlockedByCoreRuleSet those the Core Rule Set
+	// refused.
 	Limit                int64 `json:"limit"`
 	Attack               int64 `json:"attack"`
 	BlockedByBlockRule   int64 `json:"blocked_by_block_rule"`
-	WAFBlocked         int64 `json:"waf_blocked"`
+	BlockedByCoreRuleSet int64 `json:"blocked_by_core_rule_set"`
 	// TokenRefused is what a clients.json written by an earlier version gives,
 	// which must still load. Nothing adds to it.
 	TokenRefused int64 `json:"token_refused,omitempty"`
@@ -148,11 +149,11 @@ type Request struct {
 	// BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit, a byte
 	// limit or the error burst, Attack for one that matched a ban rule or
 	// asked for a trap path, BlockedByBlockRule for one a block rule refused,
-	// and WAFBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused.
+	// and BlockedByCoreRuleSet for one the Core Rule Set refused.
 	BrokeLimit           bool
 	Attack               bool
 	BlockedByBlockRule   bool
-	WAFBlocked         bool
+	BlockedByCoreRuleSet bool
 }
 
 // New returns a Limiter for limits, with no client counted yet, whose
@@ -327,8 +328,8 @@ func (l *Limiter) AddToHistory(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, r Request) {
 		h.Offences.BlockedByBlockRule++
 	}
 
-	if r.WAFBlocked {
+	if r.BlockedByCoreRuleSet {
-		h.Offences.WAFBlocked++
+		h.Offences.BlockedByCoreRuleSet++
 	}
 }
 

internal/requestlog/requestlog.go

@@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ const (
 	// block rule.
 	ActionBlockedByBlockRule = "blocked_by_block_rule"
 
-	// ActionWAFBlocked is a request refused because the Core Rule Set
+	// ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet is a request refused because the Core Rule
-	// scored it at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
+	// Set scored it at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
-	ActionWAFBlocked = "waf_blocked"
+	ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet = "blocked_by_core_rule_set"
 
 	// ActionClientDenied is a request refused because its client is in
 	// SWW_DENY_NETS, in a blocklist while SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny,
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ const (
 	// ActionCountryDenied is a request refused because its client's country
 	// is not in SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
 	ActionCountryDenied = "country_denied"
-	// ActionAdmin is a request discriminator answered at one of its own
+	// ActionOwnEndpoint is a request discriminator answered at one of its own
 	// endpoints, or a question about a path under /_sww/.
-	ActionAdmin = "admin"
+	ActionOwnEndpoint = "own_endpoint"
 )
 
 // OffenceLimit is the offence a request line names for a request that
@@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ const (
 // limit.
 const OffenceLimit = "limit"
 
-// LimitHitErrorBurst is the limit_hit a request line names for a request
+// LimitHitMinuteRefusals is the limit_hit a request line names for a request
 // that broke the error burst.
-const LimitHitErrorBurst = "error_burst"
+const LimitHitMinuteRefusals = "minute_refusals"
 
 // The discriminator_line a request line names, which says which of
 // discriminator's two lines about a question it is.
@@ -141,8 +141,9 @@ type Line struct {
 	// WouldAction is, in observe mode, the action enforce mode would have
 	// taken with a request it would have refused: ActionClientDenied,
 	// ActionTemporarilyBanned, ActionPermanentlyBanned, ActionCountryDenied,
-	// ActionClientIsRateLimited, ActionBlockedByBlockRule, ActionWAFBlocked,
+	// ActionClientIsRateLimited, ActionBlockedByBlockRule,
-	// or, in discriminator, ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge for the header limits.
+	// ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, or, in discriminator,
+	// ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge for the header limits.
 	WouldAction string `json:"would_action,omitempty"`
 	// Heuristic is the name of the heuristic that refused the request, in
 	// observe mode too, and HeuristicFigures are the figures it acted on, by
@@ -154,15 +155,15 @@ type Line struct {
 	// request.
 	AfterAnswerHeuristic        string         `json:"after_answer_heuristic,omitempty"`
 	AfterAnswerHeuristicFigures map[string]any `json:"after_answer_heuristic_figures,omitempty"` //nolint:lll // a struct tag cannot be split
-	// LimitPercent and LimitPercentSetting are, for a request the rate
+	// RateLimitPercent and RateLimitPercentSetting are, for a request the
-	// limits counted whose client a biased threshold gives a percentage of
+	// rate limits counted whose client a biased threshold gives a percentage
-	// the rate limits below 100, that percentage and the setting that gave
+	// of the rate limits below 100, that percentage and the setting that gave
-	// it. BytesPercent and BytesPercentSetting are the same for the byte
+	// it. BytesLimitPercent and BytesLimitPercentSetting are the same for the
-	// limits.
+	// byte limits.
-	LimitPercent        *int64 `json:"limit_percent,omitempty"`
+	RateLimitPercent         *int64 `json:"rate_limit_percent,omitempty"`
-	LimitPercentSetting string `json:"limit_percent_setting,omitempty"`
+	RateLimitPercentSetting  string `json:"rate_limit_percent_setting,omitempty"`
-	BytesPercent        *int64 `json:"bytes_percent,omitempty"`
+	BytesLimitPercent        *int64 `json:"bytes_limit_percent,omitempty"`
-	BytesPercentSetting string `json:"bytes_percent_setting,omitempty"`
+	BytesLimitPercentSetting string `json:"bytes_limit_percent_setting,omitempty"`
 	// Counts are, for a request the rate limits counted, the client's
 	// requests as they counted them with this one, and its bytes as the
 	// byte limits counted them, with this request's once it has ended if
@@ -170,15 +171,15 @@ type Line struct {
 	Counts ratelimit.Counts `json:"counts,omitzero"`
 	// RuleIDs are the ids of the rule file rules the request matched.
 	RuleIDs []string `json:"rule_ids,omitempty"`
-	// WAFRuleIDs are the ids of the Core Rule Set's rules the request
+	// CoreRuleSetRuleIDs are the ids of the Core Rule Set's rules the request
-	// matched, and WAFScore its anomaly score, nil for a request the Core
+	// matched, and CoreRuleSetScore its anomaly score, nil for a request the
-	// Rule Set did not inspect.
+	// Core Rule Set did not inspect.
-	WAFRuleIDs []int `json:"waf_rule_ids,omitempty"`
+	CoreRuleSetRuleIDs []int `json:"core_rule_set_rule_ids,omitempty"`
-	WAFScore   *int  `json:"waf_score,omitempty"`
+	CoreRuleSetScore   *int  `json:"core_rule_set_score,omitempty"`
 	// LimitHit is the window whose limit the request went over, named as
 	// Counts names its count: minute, hour or day for a rate limit, and
 	// minute_bytes, hour_bytes or day_bytes for a byte limit; or
-	// LimitHitErrorBurst for the error burst.
+	// LimitHitMinuteRefusals for the error burst.
 	LimitHit string `json:"limit_hit,omitempty"`
 	// Reputation are the URLs of the blocklists that list the client, then
 	// that of the CrowdSec decision list when it does, then the DNSBL zones
@@ -197,15 +198,15 @@ type Line struct {
 	// ends: a time, or "permanent".
 	BanExpires string `json:"ban_expires,omitempty"`
 
-	// The timings, in milliseconds. DurationChecks is the time until the
+	// The timings. DurationChecksMS is the time until the checks were done, and
-	// checks were done, and DurationWAF the part of it the Core Rule Set
+	// DurationCoreRuleSetMS the part of it the Core Rule Set took.
-	// took. DurationUpstreamTotal is what the report of an allowed request gives,
+	// DurationUpstreamTotalMS is what the report of an allowed request gives,
 	// from the hand-over to the app until the end of its answer. Each but
-	// DurationTotal is nil for a request that did not get that far.
+	// DurationTotalMS is nil for a request that did not get that far.
-	DurationTotal         float64  `json:"duration_total"`
+	DurationTotalMS         float64  `json:"duration_total_ms"`
-	DurationChecks        *float64 `json:"duration_checks,omitempty"`
+	DurationChecksMS        *float64 `json:"duration_checks_ms,omitempty"`
-	DurationWAF           *float64 `json:"duration_waf,omitempty"`
+	DurationCoreRuleSetMS   *float64 `json:"duration_core_rule_set_ms,omitempty"`
-	DurationUpstreamTotal *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total,omitempty"`
+	DurationUpstreamTotalMS *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total_ms,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // RProxyLine is rproxy's short line in the request log about one request. The
@@ -225,11 +226,11 @@ type RProxyLine struct {
 	Status        int    `json:"status"`
 	RequestBytes  int64  `json:"request_bytes"`
 	ResponseBytes int64  `json:"response_bytes"`
-	// DurationRequest runs in milliseconds from the request's headers being read
+	// DurationRequestMS runs from the request's headers being read until the app
-	// until the app has been sent the whole request, or the answer has started
+	// has been sent the whole request, or the answer has started if that is
-	// if that is sooner. DurationResponse runs from then until the answer ends.
+	// sooner. DurationResponseMS runs from then until the answer ends.
-	DurationRequest  float64 `json:"duration_request"`
+	DurationRequestMS  float64 `json:"duration_request_ms"`
-	DurationResponse float64 `json:"duration_response"`
+	DurationResponseMS float64 `json:"duration_response_ms"`
 	// Disposition is the valid disposition discriminator answered or, while
 	// DefaultDisposition is true, the value of SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION. It is ""
 	// when neither gave one.

internal/requestlog/requestlog_test.go

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ func TestWriteWritesOneJSONLineMarkedRequest(t *testing.T) {
 		ClientIP:        "203.0.113.9",
 		Status:          200,
 		Action:          requestlog.ActionForward,
-		DurationTotal: requestlog.Milliseconds(1500 * time.Microsecond),
+		DurationTotalMS: requestlog.Milliseconds(1500 * time.Microsecond),
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func TestWriteWritesOneJSONLineMarkedRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	want := map[string]any{
 		"type": "request", "time": "2026-10-03T12:00:00.000Z",
 		"client_ip": "203.0.113.9", "status": 200.0, "action": "forward",
-		"duration_total": 1.5,
+		"duration_total_ms": 1.5,
 	}
 	for name, value := range want {
 		if fields[name] != value {
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ func TestWriteWritesOneJSONLineMarkedRequest(t *testing.T) {
 		"forwarded_for", "content_type", "content_length", "request_headers",
 		"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "websocket", "response_content_type",
 		"upstream_status", "cache_control", "location", "aborted", "counts",
-		"limit_hit", "offence", "ban_expires", "duration_checks",
+		"limit_hit", "offence", "ban_expires", "duration_checks_ms",
 		"duration_upstream_connect", "duration_upstream_first_byte",
-		"duration_upstream_total",
+		"duration_upstream_total_ms",
 	}
 	for _, name := range unset {
 		_, present := fields[name]
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ func TestWriteRProxyLineWritesOneJSONLineWithOnlyItsFields(t *testing.T) {
 
 	const want = `{"type":"request","time":"","request_id":"an-id","client_ip":"",` +
 		`"host":"","method":"","path":"","query":"","status":0,"request_bytes":0,` +
-		`"response_bytes":0,"duration_request":0,"duration_response":0,` +
+		`"response_bytes":0,"duration_request_ms":0,"duration_response_ms":0,` +
 		`"disposition":"allow"}` + "\n"
 	if out.String() != want {
 		t.Errorf("wrote %s, want %s", out.String(), want)

internal/rproxy/request.go

@@ -371,8 +371,8 @@ func (rq *request) finish(ctx context.Context) {
 		Status:             rq.out.status,
 		RequestBytes:       requestBytes,
 		ResponseBytes:      responseBytes,
-		DurationRequest:    requestlog.Milliseconds(requestEnd.Sub(rq.start)),
+		DurationRequestMS:  requestlog.Milliseconds(requestEnd.Sub(rq.start)),
-		DurationResponse:   requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(requestEnd)),
+		DurationResponseMS: requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(requestEnd)),
 		Disposition:        rq.disposition,
 		DefaultDisposition: rq.byDefault,
 	})
@@ -389,10 +389,10 @@ func (rq *request) finish(ctx context.Context) {
 		Status:          min(rq.out.status, reportStatusMax),
 		RequestBytes:    requestBytes,
 		ResponseBytes:   responseBytes,
-		DurationTotal: requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(rq.start)),
+		DurationTotalMS: requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(rq.start)),
 	}
 	if !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero() {
-		report.DurationUpstreamTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(rq.upstreamStart))
+		report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS = requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(rq.upstreamStart))
 	}
 
 	rq.h.sendReport(ctx, report)

internal/rproxy/rproxy.go

@@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ const (
 	idleTimeout = 120 * time.Second
 )
 
-// adminPrefix starts the path of every request for sww itself, which
+// ownEndpointPrefix starts the path of every request for sww itself, which
 // never reaches the app.
-const adminPrefix = "/_sww/"
+const ownEndpointPrefix = "/_sww/"
 
 // allowedMethods lists the methods rproxy passes on, as an Allow header gives
 // them. It answers any other method 405 itself.
@@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 }
 
 // passToApp passes the request on to the app, unless a limit or its path keeps
-// it from the app. discriminator answers a path under adminPrefix itself, so such a
+// it from the app. discriminator answers a path under ownEndpointPrefix itself, so
-// request gets here only when SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION allowed it. ctx is the
+// such a request gets here only when SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION allowed it. ctx is the
 // request's own context.
 func (rq *request) passToApp(ctx context.Context) {
 	maxBytes := rq.h.config.MaxRequestSize
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ func (rq *request) passToApp(ctx context.Context) {
 	switch {
 	case rq.refused.Load() != 0 || (maxBytes > 0 && rq.in.ContentLength > maxBytes):
 		rq.answer(http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
-	case strings.HasPrefix(rq.in.URL.Path, adminPrefix):
+	case strings.HasPrefix(rq.in.URL.Path, ownEndpointPrefix):
 		rq.answer(http.StatusNotFound)
 	default:
 		rq.forward(ctx)

internal/rproxy/rproxy_test.go

@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ func TestDenyGivesTheVisitorDiscriminatorsAnswer(t *testing.T) {
 	report := standIn.report(t)
 	if report.Status != http.StatusForbidden ||
 		report.ResponseBytes != int64(len(deniedBody)) ||
-		report.DurationUpstreamTotal != 0 {
+		report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("report %+v, of a request denied", report)
 	}
 
@@ -871,9 +871,9 @@ func TestALineForARequestClosedWithoutAnAnswerHasNoNegativeTime(t *testing.T) {
 
 		line := out.requestLine(t)
 
-		duration, ok := line["duration_response"].(float64)
+		duration, ok := line["duration_response_ms"].(float64)
 		if !ok || duration < 0 {
-			t.Errorf("line %v, want a duration_response that is not negative", line)
+			t.Errorf("line %v, want a duration_response_ms that is not negative", line)
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -1428,8 +1428,8 @@ func TestReportGivesWhatHappened(t *testing.T) {
 	if report.RequestID == "" || report.Status != http.StatusOK ||
 		report.RequestBytes != int64(len(body)) ||
 		report.ResponseBytes != int64(len(greeting)) ||
-		report.DurationTotal <= 0 || report.DurationUpstreamTotal <= 0 ||
+		report.DurationTotalMS <= 0 || report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS <= 0 ||
-		report.DurationUpstreamTotal > report.DurationTotal {
+		report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS > report.DurationTotalMS {
 		t.Errorf("report %+v, of %d bytes up and %d back", report, len(body), len(greeting))
 	}
 
@@ -1748,7 +1748,7 @@ func TestLogLineGivesTheRequestAsSent(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("default_disposition is %v, want it left out", line["default_disposition"])
 	}
 
-	for _, name := range []string{"duration_request", "duration_response"} {
+	for _, name := range []string{"duration_request_ms", "duration_response_ms"} {
 		duration, ok := line[name].(float64)
 		if !ok || duration <= 0 {
 			t.Errorf("%s is %v, want a time", name, line[name])

internal/state/state.go

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ var (
 	errCause       = errors.New("is not limit, attack, admin or crowdsec")
 	errExpires     = errors.New("is not after its start")
 	errDestination = errors.New("is not webhook, slack or ntfy")
-	errScope       = errors.New("is not client, net, asn, total or watch")
+	errScope       = errors.New("is not client, net, asn, total or watched_net")
 	errWaitingList = errors.New(`waiting is a list, but now lists the alerts by ` +
 		`destination: put the list under "webhook", as "waiting": {"webhook": [...]}, ` +
 		`or remove the file`)
@@ -858,8 +858,8 @@ func (f *alertsFile) check([]byte) error {
 }
 
 // checkAnomalyCounters refuses an anomaly counter whose scope is not
-// client, net, asn, total or watch, most likely misspelt, and one without
+// client, net, asn, total or watched_net, most likely misspelt, and one
-// a field it needs, as missingFromCounter tells.
+// without a field it needs, as missingFromCounter tells.
 func checkAnomalyCounters(counters []anomaly.Counter) error {
 	for i, counter := range counters {
 		if !slices.Contains(anomaly.Scopes(), counter.Scope) {
@@ -879,9 +879,9 @@ func checkAnomalyCounters(counters []anomaly.Counter) error {
 // missingFromCounter returns the first field counter, an anomaly counter,
 // needs and has not, or "" when it has them all: what tells it from the
 // others in its scope, without which it would never be counted again, the
-// netblock of a client, net or watch counter, the AS number of an asn one
+// netblock of a client, net or watched_net counter, the AS number of an
-// and the name of a watch one; and the start of a window in which it has
+// asn one and the name of a watched_net one; and the start of a window in
-// requests or bytes, without which they would be dropped.
+// which it has requests or bytes, without which they would be dropped.
 func missingFromCounter(counter anomaly.Counter) string {
 	scope := counter.Scope
 
@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ func missingFromCounter(counter anomaly.Counter) string {
 		return "netblock"
 	case scope == anomaly.ScopeASN && counter.ASN == "":
 		return "asn"
-	case scope == anomaly.ScopeWatch && counter.Name == "":
+	case scope == anomaly.ScopeWatchedNet && counter.Name == "":
 		return "name"
 	case countsWithoutStart(counter.Minute):
 		return "minute.start"

internal/state/state_test.go

@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ const filledAlertsJSON = `{
             }
         },
         {
-            "scope": "watch",
+            "scope": "watched_net",
             "netblock": "203.0.113.0/24",
             "name": "office",
             "hour": {
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ func TestFileThatDoesNotParseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 			`{"version": 1, "anomaly_counters": [{"scope": "total"}, ` +
 				`{"scope": "nett", "netblock": "203.0.113.0/24"}]}`,
 			`: anomaly_counters entry 2's scope "nett" is not client, net, asn, total ` +
-				`or watch`,
+				`or watched_net`,
 		},
 		{
 			"a copy of a list with a line that does not read", reputationJSON,
@@ -831,12 +831,12 @@ func TestAlertsJSONEntryWithoutAFieldItNeedsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 		{
 			"an anomaly counter of a named netblock without its name",
 			`{"version": 1, "anomaly_counters": [` +
-				`{"scope": "watch", "netblock": "203.0.113.0/24"}]}`,
+				`{"scope": "watched_net", "netblock": "203.0.113.0/24"}]}`,
 			`: anomaly_counters entry 1 has no "name"`,
 		},
 		{
 			"an anomaly counter of a named netblock without its netblock",
-			`{"version": 1, "anomaly_counters": [{"scope": "watch", "name": "office"}]}`,
+			`{"version": 1, "anomaly_counters": [{"scope": "watched_net", "name": "office"}]}`,
 			`: anomaly_counters entry 1 has no "netblock"`,
 		},
 		{
@@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ func newParams(dir string) state.Params {
 		Dir:             dir,
 		WriteDelay:      time.Hour,
 		CounterInterval: time.Hour,
-		Ledger: bans.New(bans.Rules{
+		Ledger: bans.New(bans.Params{
 			LimitBanDuration:     time.Hour,
 			LimitBanRepeatWindow: 24 * time.Hour,
 			MaxBanDuration:       7 * 24 * time.Hour,

internal/sww/sww.go

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import (
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
@@ -29,7 +30,6 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
 )
 
 // shutdownTimeout is how long requests in progress may take to finish
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ func RunDiscriminator(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
 func newServer(
 	cfg *config.Config, stdout io.Writer, processLog *slog.Logger,
 	now func() time.Time, ruleFiles *rules.Files, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
-	crs *waf.CoreRuleSet,
+	crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet,
 ) (*discriminator.Server, error) {
 	var lookupFile *lookup.File
 

internal/sww/sww_test.go

@@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ func TestStalledRemoteLogEndpointHoldsUpNoRequest(t *testing.T) {
 		metrics := metricsText(t, url+"_sww/metrics", token)
 		for _, series := range []string{
 			`sww_remote_log_lines_sent_total{instance="fsn1app1/blog"} 0`,
-			`sww_remote_log_buffer_depth{instance="fsn1app1/blog"} 1`,
+			`sww_remote_log_lines_waiting{instance="fsn1app1/blog"} 1`,
 		} {
 			if !strings.Contains(metrics, "\n"+series+"\n") {
 				t.Errorf("no %q in the metrics:\n%s", series, metrics)
@@ -1068,8 +1068,12 @@ func TestBanIsAlertedAndAnAlertNotSentIsKeptAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) {
 		metrics := metricsWith(t, url+"_sww/metrics", token,
 			"\nsww_alerts_sent_total"+ofWebhook+" 1\n")
 
-		for _, series := range []string{"failed", "suppressed", "dropped"} {
+		for _, series := range []string{
-			zero := "\nsww_alerts_" + series + "_total" + ofWebhook + " 0\n"
+			"sww_alert_send_failures_total",
+			"sww_alerts_suppressed_total",
+			"sww_alerts_dropped_total",
+		} {
+			zero := "\n" + series + ofWebhook + " 0\n"
 			if !strings.Contains(metrics, zero) {
 				t.Errorf("no %q in the metrics:\n%s", zero, metrics)
 			}