Say which bytes the byte limits count, and what passing one does (closes #203)

Documents only. The byte limits and byte anomaly thresholds count body
bytes, as SWW_BYTES_COUNT chooses them, with WebSocket traffic each way,
once a response has ended; the request that passes a limit is not cut
off and the client is banned. README.md, SPEC.md and docs/ now say so,
and no longer call a response's bytes the request's. Also made plain:
rate limits, the refusal threshold, SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS,
SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE, the metrics' byte series, and the SPEC.md claim about
answering within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. EVALUATION.md is audited too; its
survey facts and date are unchanged.

Model: fable-5-1 (first audit); opus-5-5 (rework)

EVALUATION.md

@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
 - R1: rate limits per minute, per hour and per day
 - R2: netblocks that bypass rate limiting
 - R3: alerts on attacks through webhook, Slack or ntfy
-- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests or bytes per minute or hour, for given IPs
+- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests made or bytes transferred per minute or
-  or netblocks, crossing a threshold
+  hour, for given IPs or netblocks, crossing a threshold
 - R5: temporary blocks for abusers, permanent bans for repeat offenders
 - R6: one or more RBLs or IP reputation APIs
 - R7: AS number lookup
@@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
 ## Verdict
 
 Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8 (scaling limits by AS
-number or country) or the bytes half of R4 at all, and the tools that come
+number or country) or R4's alerts on bytes transferred, and the tools that come
 closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML or a web UI.
 The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar; `SPEC.md` in this
-directory begins that spec. It reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field as
+directory begins that spec. The sidecar reuses the mature parts of the surveyed
-libraries and data sources (Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set for attack
+field as libraries and data sources (Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set for
-detection, DNSBLs, AbuseIPDB, optionally a CrowdSec decision feed) instead of
+attack detection, DNSBLs, AbuseIPDB, optionally a CrowdSec decision feed)
-reimplementing them.
+instead of reimplementing them.
 
 Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 
@@ -46,12 +46,12 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
       blacklist and whitelist decisions), R9 (ModSecurity with the Core Rule
       Set, or Coraza plugin), env-var settings.
     - Fails: R8 (AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a
-      limit), R4 (no volume or byte threshold alerts in the free edition;
+      limit), R4 (no alerts on request-count or byte thresholds in the free
-      reporting is a paid feature), R5 escalation, and R10 in spirit: since 1.6
+      edition; reporting is a paid feature), R5 escalation, and R10's plain
-      it needs a `bunkerweb` container plus a `bw-scheduler` container and a
+      sidecar: since 1.6 it needs a `bunkerweb` container plus a `bw-scheduler`
-      database, or the all-in-one image that bundles nginx, scheduler, UI and
+      container and a database, or the all-in-one image that bundles nginx,
-      Redis in one container. It is designed to be the front door for many
+      scheduler, UI and Redis in one container. It is designed as the proxy in
-      sites, not a per-app sidecar. AGPL-3.0.
+      front of many sites, not as a sidecar for one app. AGPL-3.0.
     - Unverified: whether several rates (minute, hour, day) can be stacked on
       the same URL pattern; the documented design is one rate per URL pattern.
 - CrowdSec is the strongest detection and ban engine, but it is not a proxy.
@@ -68,14 +68,15 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
       answers 429.
     - Fails: R10 (needs the security engine container with persistent state, log
       acquisition from traefik, a bouncer such as the traefik plugin, and YAML
-      for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications), bytes half of R4.
+      for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications), R4's alerts on
+      bytes.
 - CrowdSec plus traefik's own `rateLimit` middleware is the best combination
   with no new code. It gives inline limiting (one window per middleware, keyed
   by IP, with `sourceCriterion` exclusions), bans with escalation, alerts and
-  reputation. It still fails R8, the bytes half of R4, R1's three stacked
+  reputation lookups. It still fails R8, R4's alerts on bytes, and R10 entirely:
-  windows only by chaining three middlewares per router, and R10 entirely: the
+  the configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not
-  configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not in
+  in one sidecar's environment. It meets R1's three windows only by chaining
-  one sidecar's environment.
+  three middlewares per router.
 
 ## Candidate by candidate
 
@@ -87,10 +88,10 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
       cached, streamed decision list (recommended), standalone against the
       central API, or AppSec only. Supports captcha remediation.
     - Covers: R5, R6, R9, R3 and R7 through the engine (see Verdict).
-    - Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4 bytes.
+    - Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4's alerts on bytes.
     - Configuration: traefik static config to load the plugin, dynamic config or
       labels for the middleware, CrowdSec YAML for everything else.
-    - Sidecar fit: no. It lives inside traefik, plus a separate engine
+    - Sidecar fit: no. It runs inside traefik and needs a separate engine
       container.
     - Maturity: widely used (about 900 stars, listed in the traefik plugin
       catalog, documented by CrowdSec itself), actively maintained. Traefik
@@ -115,7 +116,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
     - What it is: nginx-derived (Tengine) reverse proxy with a proprietary
       semantic detection engine and a web console. About 22,000 stars.
     - Covers: R9 well, basic per-IP rate limiting with block duration, bot
-      challenge, authentication gate.
+      challenge, authentication in front of the app.
     - Misses: R8, R7, R4; R1 has one window per rule. Country blocking, alert
       messages, syslog forwarding and the better reputation database are paid
       (Lite about 10 USD per month, Pro about 100 USD per month); the free
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 - Coraza (`corazawaf/coraza`) and Coraza-based proxies
     - What it is: a Go library that implements the ModSecurity rule language and
       runs the OWASP Core Rule Set. OWASP project, actively maintained, the
-      successor path now that ModSecurity is in maintenance only.
+      successor to ModSecurity, which is now in maintenance only.
     - Packagings: `coraza-caddy` (Caddy module), `coraza-spoa` (HAProxy),
       `coraza-proxy-wasm` (Envoy), a traefik WASM plugin, and
       `coreruleset/coraza-crs-docker` (Caddy plus Coraza plus the Core Rule Set,
@@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 - ModSecurity Core Rule Set containers (`owasp/modsecurity-crs`)
     - What it is: official images of Apache or nginx with ModSecurity and the
       Core Rule Set, as a reverse proxy configured by env vars (`BACKEND`,
-      paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images carry
+      paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images contain
       ModSecurity 2.9.x on Apache and Core Rule Set 4.x.
     - Covers: R9, and R10 (single container, env vars, one backend).
     - Misses: R1 to R8.
@@ -152,8 +153,8 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 - Anubis (`TecharoHQ/anubis`), 1.27 current
     - What it is: a single-binary reverse proxy that makes browsers solve a
       proof-of-work challenge before passing them to `TARGET`. Aimed at
-      scrapers, which is likely a large share of unwanted traffic on a public
+      scrapers, which are likely a large share of the unwanted traffic on a
-      code forge.
+      public code forge.
     - Covers: R10 well (one container, env vars for listener, target,
       difficulty, cookies). Policy rules can match on path, user agent, headers,
       IP ranges, and with the vendor's hosted data service also AS number and
@@ -180,13 +181,13 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
       temporary ban, no escalation, state lost on traefik restart) and R2
       (allowlist). Nothing else.
     - `juitde/traefik-plugin-fail2ban`, fail2ban connector plugins, GeoBlock
-      plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): same
+      plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): each adds
-      shape, each one small feature, configured in traefik, state in memory.
+      one small feature, is configured in traefik and keeps its state in memory.
     - Sidecar fit: no; they live inside traefik.
 - Traefik built-in middlewares
     - `rateLimit` (one average-and-burst window per middleware, optional Redis
       in traefik 3.x), `inFlightReq`, `ipAllowList`. No bans, alerts, reputation
-      or AS number awareness.
+      lookups or AS number lookups.
 - caddy-waf (`fabriziosalmi/caddy-waf`), 0.4.x
     - What it is: a Caddy module with regex rules and anomaly scoring, per-IP
       and per-path rate limiting with one configurable window, IP and DNS
@@ -198,12 +199,12 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 - open-appsec (Check Point)
     - Machine-learning WAF agent attached to nginx, Kong, Envoy or similar, with
       a declarative policy file or the vendor's cloud console. Covers R9 only;
-      rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. Not a sidecar in the
+      rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. It attaches to an
-      required sense.
+      existing proxy, so it is not the sidecar R10 asks for.
 - iocaine
     - Serves generated garbage pages to clients the fronting proxy classifies as
-      scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope except as a
+      scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope, and only of
-      curiosity for scraper traffic.
+      passing interest for scraper traffic.
 - Pangolin
     - A tunnelled access platform that bundles traefik and optionally CrowdSec.
       Replaces the ingress rather than adding a sidecar; out of scope.
@@ -214,17 +215,17 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
   Everyone else offers one window per rule or none.
 - R2 bypass netblocks: BunkerWeb, CrowdSec, traefik, fail2ban plugins.
 - R3 alerts: CrowdSec (best), BunkerWeb (denied requests only), SafeLine (paid).
-- R4 volume and byte anomalies: none. CrowdSec can approximate request-count
+- R4 alerts on request counts and bytes: none. CrowdSec can approximate alerts
-  anomalies with a custom scenario; nothing handles bytes.
+  on request counts with a custom scenario; no surveyed tool alerts on bytes.
-- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb has fixed or permanent,
+- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb's ban is either one
-  not both by history.
+  fixed length or permanent, and does not change with a client's history.
 - R6 reputation: CrowdSec, BunkerWeb, go-away, caddy-waf (static lists).
 - R7 AS number lookup: CrowdSec (enrichment), BunkerWeb and caddy-waf (allow or
   deny), Anubis (hosted service).
 - R8 biased thresholds: none.
 - R9 attack detection: Coraza or ModSecurity with the Core Rule Set (open,
-  standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps the
+  standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps Coraza
-  first).
+  or ModSecurity).
 - R10 env-var sidecar: `owasp/modsecurity-crs`, `coraza-crs-docker`, Anubis.
   None of these covers anything beyond its one job.
 

Makefile

@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
-.PHONY: bootstrap setup test lint fmt fmt-check tidy check docker hooks build \
+.PHONY: bootstrap setup test lint fmt fmt-check tidy check docker publish \
-	run example-app
+	hooks build run example-app
 
 # Makefile targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
 # per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
 # of README.md). tidy writes go.mod and go.sum as `go mod tidy` does,
 # which test checks. build and run are for working on the code by hand;
-# example-app checks the image with an app built on it.
+# example-app checks the image with an app built on it; publish builds
+# the image on the Docker host and pushes it to the registry.
 
 bootstrap:
 	@script/bootstrap
@@ -34,6 +35,9 @@ check:
 docker:
 	@script/docker
 
+publish:
+	@script/publish
+
 hooks:
 	@script/install-precommit
 

README.md

@@ -68,8 +68,9 @@ Not built, and not planned:
 
 ### The image
 
-No image is published. Build it from a clone. `make docker` runs the tests and
+The image is published at `git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf`. You can also build it
-the linter, then builds the image, tagged `smallwebwaf`.
+from a clone. `make docker` runs the tests and the linter, then builds the
+image, tagged `smallwebwaf`.
 
 ```sh
 git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf.git
@@ -209,9 +210,10 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
   percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100. A path prefix starts with `/`.
 - `off` switches a limit, a threshold or a timeout off where the table says a
   setting takes it.
-- The byte limits and the anomaly thresholds on bytes count body bytes: the
+- The byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count only body bytes: the
   app's response bodies, the visitors' request bodies, or both, as
-  `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted.
+  `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent over
+  a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
 - An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
   variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged
   on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`.
@@ -219,7 +221,7 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
 Every setting the code reads, with its default:
 
 | Variable                                 | Default                                                                        | What it does                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
-| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | `SWW_COMMAND`                            | `rproxy`                                                                       | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`.                                                                                                                                                                         |
 | `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND`                       | required                                                                       | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`.                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
 | `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`                      | `http://127.0.0.1:8081`                                                        | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more.                                                                                                                                                                                             |
@@ -244,11 +246,11 @@ Every setting the code reads, with its default:
 | `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`                | `1500`                                                                         | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client.                                                                                                                                              |
 | `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY`                 | `6000`                                                                         | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client.                                                                                                                                                |
 | `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS`            | empty                                                                          | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`.                                                                                                                                                          |
-| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`             | `off`                                                                          | The most body bytes a client's requests may total in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes the total past a byte limit is passed on whole, and bans the client once its response has ended. |
+| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`             | `off`                                                                          | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`: response bodies, request bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends.                        |
-| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`               | `50G`                                                                          | The most body bytes a client's requests may total in an hour, a size or `off`.                                                                                                                          |
+| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`               | `50G`                                                                          | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`: response bodies, request bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends.                         |
-| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY`                | `100G`                                                                         | The most body bytes a client's requests may total in a day, a size or `off`.                                                                                                                            |
+| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY`                | `100G`                                                                         | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`: response bodies, request bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends.                           |
-| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT`                        | `both`                                                                         | Which body bytes the byte limits and the anomaly thresholds on bytes count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`.                                  |
+| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT`                        | `both`                                                                         | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
-| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`              | `30`                                                                           | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; the next such refusal bans the client.                                               |
+| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`              | `30`                                                                           | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client.                                                                                                              |
 | `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`                       | `403`                                                                          | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection.                                                                                                                                                                          |
 | `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION`                 | `1h`                                                                           | The ban for a first broken limit.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
 | `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW`            | `24h`                                                                          | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long.                                                                                                                                                             |
@@ -313,27 +315,27 @@ Every setting the code reads, with its default:
 | `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR`                 | `60`                                                                           | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`.                                                                                                                                                               |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count.                                                                                                                                                                                       |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`   | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count.                                                                                                                                                                                        |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`    | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one client's body bytes total more than this in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                            |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`    | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                                         |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR`      | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one client's body bytes total more than this in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                             |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR`      | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                                          |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`    | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count.                                                                                                                                                                     |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`      | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count.                                                                                                                                                                      |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`       | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the body bytes of the netblock around a client total more than this in a minute, a size.                                                                                                     |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`       | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                       |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR`         | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the body bytes of the netblock around a client total more than this in an hour, a size.                                                                                                      |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR`         | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                        |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX`              | `24`                                                                           | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32.                                                                                                                                             |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX`              | `48`                                                                           | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128.                                                                                                                                            |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`    | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count.                                                                                                                                                                                    |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`      | `off`                                                                          | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count.                                                                                                                                                                                     |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`       | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the body bytes of one AS number total more than this in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                    |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`       | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                                      |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR`         | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the body bytes of one AS number total more than this in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                     |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR`         | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                                       |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`  | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count.                                                                                                                                                                                 |
 | `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`    | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count.                                                                                                                                                                                  |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`     | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the body bytes of the whole service total more than this in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`     | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                                  |
-| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR`       | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the body bytes of the whole service total more than this in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                 |
+| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR`       | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                                   |
 | `SWW_WATCH_NETS`                         | empty                                                                          | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`.                                                                                                                                   |
 | `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`          | `off`                                                                          | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count.                                                                                                                                                                               |
 | `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`            | `off`                                                                          | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count.                                                                                                                                                                                |
-| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`             | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the body bytes of a watched netblock total more than this in a minute, a size.                                                                                                               |
+| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`             | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size.                                                                                                                                 |
-| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR`               | `off`                                                                          | Alert when the body bytes of a watched netblock total more than this in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                |
+| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR`               | `off`                                                                          | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size.                                                                                                                                  |
 
 [`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
 full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
@@ -669,6 +671,15 @@ on the host.
   `make check`.
 - `script/docker`: builds the image, whose build runs the tests and the linter
   first. `make docker`.
+- `script/publish`: runs `script/docker`, whose build happens on the Docker host
+  named by `DOCKER_HOST` (`ssh://root@fsn1app1` unless set). It then pushes the
+  image to `PUBLISH_IMAGE` (`git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf` unless set). It
+  refuses a working tree with uncommitted changes. `make publish`. It pushes
+  four tags:
+    - the UTC date as `YYYY-MM-DD`;
+    - the short commit hash;
+    - the branch name;
+    - `latest`.
 - `script/cibuild`: what CI runs: `script/bootstrap`, `script/check`, then the
   image build.
 - `script/precommit`: run by the git pre-commit hook; runs `script/check`.

SPEC.md

@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ to them.
   key or a token stays off until the operator supplies it.
 - It keeps a site answering while the part that decides is down, slow or
   restarting (see "Without an answer from `discriminator`").
-- It limits each client's requests and bytes per minute, hour and day. It bounds
+- It limits each client's requests and body bytes per minute, hour and day. It
-  the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
+  bounds the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
 - It bans abusers: briefly at first, for seven days on a clear sign of attack,
   and permanently when they keep at it.
 - It looks up each client's AS number and country. It can refuse whole countries
@@ -252,7 +252,8 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
       clear sign of attack bans it permanently at once.
 - A broken limit, one of:
     - a request over a rate limit;
-    - a request whose body bytes take the client's total past a byte limit;
+    - the bytes counted for a request and its response taking the client's total
+      past a byte limit;
     - more than `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` refusals within a minute.
 
     The bans for a broken limit:
@@ -441,8 +442,10 @@ the same way.
 ### Byte limits, per client
 
 The byte limits count body bytes: the app's response bodies, the visitors'
-request bodies, or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. A
+request bodies, or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted.
-request's bytes are counted once its response has ended (see step 15). So the
+What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app
+sent as response bytes. The bytes counted for a request and its response are
+added to the client's total once the response has ended (see step 15). So the
 request that takes a client past a limit is passed on whole, and the ban refuses
 the client's requests from then on. By default there is no minute limit, so a
 client can download in a burst at full speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB

docs/metrics.md

@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ What `GET /_sww/metrics` answers with, at `discriminator`'s own address.
 keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
 `honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
 
+Every `sww_*request_bytes_total` and `sww_*response_bytes_total` series counts
+body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says.
+
 ## Traffic
 
 - `sww_requests_total`, `sww_request_bytes_total` and

docs/request-log.md

@@ -144,20 +144,22 @@ Every one of these lines has:
   included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It
   holds:
     - `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
-    - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: bytes.
+    - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: the body bytes
+      `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, in that window.
 
     A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
-    [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes of an allowed request are counted when
+    [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes counted for an allowed request and its
-    its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the bytes are without this
+    response are added when its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the
-    request's.
+    three byte totals leave them out.
 
 - `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
     - `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
     - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
     - `error_burst`.
 
-    A request whose bytes broke a limit was passed on whole, so its `action`
+    When the bytes counted for a request and its response break a limit, the
-    stays `forward`. Only its `report` line gives that limit.
+    request has been passed on whole, so its `action` stays `forward`. Only its
+    `report` line gives that limit.
 
 - `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
   refused.

docs/settings.md

@@ -122,16 +122,21 @@ The request past one of these limits is refused, and the client is banned.
 
 ## Byte limits, per client
 
-These count body bytes, never headers. A request's bytes are counted once its
+These count body bytes, never headers. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
+counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. The bytes
+counted for a request and its response are added to the client's total once the
 response has ended. The request that takes a client's total past a limit is not
 cut off; the client is banned.
 
 - `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
-  (default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most body
+  (default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes
-  bytes a client's requests may total in each window. A size or `off`.
+  counted for a client in each window, a size or `off`: response bodies, request
-- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits and the
+  bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. The request that passes the limit
-  anomaly thresholds on bytes count: `response`, the app's response bodies;
+  is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends.
-  `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`.
+- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte anomaly
+  thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the
+  visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
+  counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
 
 ## Lookup of AS number and country
 
@@ -205,8 +210,9 @@ cut off; the client is banned.
   a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
   such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
   yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
-- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client in
+- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may get
-  a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
+  in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
+  `off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
 
 ## Ban lengths, response and scope
 

internal/config/config.go

@@ -397,18 +397,21 @@ var (
 	errNotPathPrefix = errors.New(
 		"is not a path prefix starting with /, such as /assets/")
 	errNotTrapPath = errors.New(
-		"is not a path starting with / and without a ?, such as /wp-login.php")
+		"is not a path starting with / and without a ?, such as /wp-login.php",
+	)
 	errNotWAFMode       = errors.New("is not off, detect or block")
 	errNotParanoiaLevel = errors.New("is not a paranoia level, from 1 to 4")
 	errNotRuleID        = errors.New(
-		"is not the id of a Core Rule Set rule, a whole number such as 942100")
+		"is not the id of a Core Rule Set rule, a whole number such as 942100",
+	)
 	errSetupRuleID = errors.New(
 		"is from 900000 to 900999, the ids of the rules that set the Core Rule Set " +
 			"up and of sww's own, which cannot be switched off")
 	errNotBoolean      = errors.New("is not true or false")
 	errNotLogRemoteURL = errors.New(
 		"is not syslog+udp, syslog+tcp or syslog+tls with a host and a port, " +
-			"and nothing more, such as syslog+tls://logs.example:6514")
+			"and nothing more, such as syslog+tls://logs.example:6514",
+	)
 	errNoCertificate = errors.New("holds no PEM certificate")
 	errNotFacility   = errors.New("is not a syslog facility such as local0 or daemon")
 	errNotAppName    = errors.New(
@@ -421,16 +424,21 @@ var (
 		"is not a header name followed by : and the header's value, " +
 			"such as Authorization:Bearer <token>")
 	errControlCharacter = errors.New(
-		"holds a control character, such as the carriage return of a Windows line end")
+		"holds a control character, such as the carriage return of a Windows line end",
+	)
 	errNotAlertEvent = errors.New(
 		"is not ban, permanent_ban, waf_block, anomaly, reputation_hit, " +
 			"source_failure or file_error")
-	errNotNumberOrOff = errors.New("is not a whole number above zero, such as 60, or off")
+	errNotNumberOrOff = errors.New(
+		"is not a whole number above zero, such as 60, or off",
+	)
 	errNotUTF8        = errors.New("is not valid UTF-8")
 	errNotASN         = errors.New("is not an AS number such as AS64496")
 	errNotPercentItem = errors.New(
 		"is not a code, : and a percentage, such as AS64496:50 or cn:25")
-	errNotPercent  = errors.New("is not a percentage, a whole number from 0 to 100")
+	errNotPercent = errors.New(
+		"is not a percentage, a whole number from 0 to 100",
+	)
 	errListedTwice = errors.New("is listed twice")
 	errNotListURL  = errors.New(
 		"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
@@ -439,11 +447,17 @@ var (
 	errNotAnHourOrMore = errors.New("is not a duration of 1h or more, such as 24h")
 	errNotAction       = errors.New(
 		"is not deny, limit:<percent> such as limit:25, or log")
-	errNotZone     = errors.New("is not a DNS zone such as dnsbl.dronebl.org")
+	errNotZone = errors.New(
-	errZoneTooLong = errors.New("is longer than 189 characters, too long for the " +
+		"is not a DNS zone such as dnsbl.dronebl.org",
-		"names IPv6 clients are asked about by")
+	)
-	errNotResolver = errors.New("is not an IP address with an optional port, " +
+	errZoneTooLong = errors.New(
-		"such as 192.0.2.53 or [2001:db8::53]:5353")
+		"is longer than 189 characters, too long for the " +
+			"names IPv6 clients are asked about by",
+	)
+	errNotResolver = errors.New(
+		"is not an IP address with an optional port, " +
+			"such as 192.0.2.53 or [2001:db8::53]:5353",
+	)
 	errNotLAPIURL = errors.New(
 		"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
 			"such as http://172.17.0.1:8080")
@@ -460,7 +474,9 @@ var (
 // setting that is set but invalid is an error that names it.
 //
 //nolint:funlen // one line for each setting, a list that grows with them
-func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
+func FromEnvironment(
+	lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
+) (*Config, error) {
 	env := &environment{lookupEnv: lookupEnv}
 	cfg := &Config{
 		ListenAddr:           env.address("SWW_LISTEN_ADDR"),
@@ -658,7 +674,10 @@ func (e *environment) lookup(name string) (string, bool) {
 	}
 
 	if set {
-		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("is set, and so is %s; %w", fileName, errSetTwice))
+		e.check(
+			name,
+			fmt.Errorf("is set, and so is %s; %w", fileName, errSetTwice),
+		)
 
 		return value, set
 	}
@@ -916,7 +935,10 @@ func (e *environment) zones(name string) []string {
 		logged[i] = MaskZoneKey(zone)
 	}
 
-	e.settings = append(e.settings, slog.String(name, strings.Join(logged, ",")))
+	e.settings = append(
+		e.settings,
+		slog.String(name, strings.Join(logged, ",")),
+	)
 
 	return zones
 }
@@ -1058,7 +1080,9 @@ func (e *environment) headerNames(name, defaultValue string) []string {
 
 // durationNotOff reads a setting that is a duration and, unlike a
 // timeout, cannot be off.
-func (e *environment) durationNotOff(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
+func (e *environment) durationNotOff(
+	name, defaultValue string,
+) time.Duration {
 	duration, err := ParseDurationNotOff(e.value(name, defaultValue))
 	e.check(name, err)
 
@@ -1257,7 +1281,10 @@ func (e *environment) instanceName() string {
 // appName reads the setting that is the APP-NAME of the records the log
 // lines are sent in, by default the instance name. Its value is checked
 // when it is set, and, while lines are sent, when it is the instance name.
-func (e *environment) appName(name, instanceName string, sending bool) string {
+func (e *environment) appName(
+	name, instanceName string,
+	sending bool,
+) string {
 	value, set := e.lookup(name)
 	if !set {
 		value = instanceName
@@ -1280,7 +1307,10 @@ func (e *environment) appName(name, instanceName string, sending bool) string {
 // checkInstanceNameForNtfy refuses an instance name that holds a control
 // character while ntfySet, SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL being set: ntfy is sent
 // the instance name in a header, which cannot hold one.
-func (e *environment) checkInstanceNameForNtfy(instanceName string, ntfySet bool) {
+func (e *environment) checkInstanceNameForNtfy(
+	instanceName string,
+	ntfySet bool,
+) {
 	if ntfySet && strings.ContainsFunc(instanceName, unicode.IsControl) {
 		e.check("SWW_INSTANCE_NAME", fmt.Errorf(
 			"%q %w, and is sent to ntfy in a header while SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL is set",
@@ -1604,7 +1634,10 @@ func parseNamedNetblocks(value string) ([]anomaly.NamedNetblock, error) {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", name, errListedTwice)
 		}
 
-		named = append(named, anomaly.NamedNetblock{Name: name, Netblock: netblock})
+		named = append(
+			named,
+			anomaly.NamedNetblock{Name: name, Netblock: netblock},
+		)
 	}
 
 	return named, nil
@@ -1843,8 +1876,11 @@ func parseHeaderNames(value string) ([]string, error) {
 		header := strings.ToLower(item)
 		switch header {
 		case "host":
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w; the request's host is the field host",
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf(
-				item, errHeaderTakenOut)
+				"%q %w; the request's host is the field host",
+				item,
+				errHeaderTakenOut,
+			)
 		case "transfer-encoding":
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item, errHeaderTakenOut)
 		}
@@ -1881,9 +1917,11 @@ func parseUpstreamURL(value string) (*url.URL, error) {
 	}
 
 	onlySchemeAndHost := (upstream.Scheme == "http" || upstream.Scheme == "https") &&
-		upstream.Hostname() != "" && upstream.User == nil && upstream.Opaque == "" &&
+		upstream.Hostname() != "" && upstream.User == nil &&
+		upstream.Opaque == "" &&
 		(upstream.Path == "" || upstream.Path == "/") &&
-		upstream.RawQuery == "" && upstream.Fragment == ""
+		upstream.RawQuery == "" &&
+		upstream.Fragment == ""
 	if !onlySchemeAndHost {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotUpstreamURL)
 	}
@@ -1907,7 +1945,11 @@ func parseLogRemoteURL(value string) (*url.URL, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotLogRemoteURL)
 	}
 
-	schemes := []string{remotelog.SchemeUDP, remotelog.SchemeTCP, remotelog.SchemeTLS}
+	schemes := []string{
+		remotelog.SchemeUDP,
+		remotelog.SchemeTCP,
+		remotelog.SchemeTLS,
+	}
 	port, err := strconv.ParseUint(remote.Port(), 10, 16)
 
 	onlySchemeHostAndPort := slices.Contains(schemes, remote.Scheme) &&
@@ -1970,7 +2012,9 @@ func isHTTPURL(u *url.URL) bool {
 
 	return (u.Scheme == "http" || u.Scheme == "https") && u.Hostname() != "" &&
 		(u.Port() == "" || (err == nil && port != 0)) &&
-		u.User == nil && u.Opaque == "" && u.Fragment == ""
+		u.User == nil &&
+		u.Opaque == "" &&
+		u.Fragment == ""
 }
 
 // isListURL reports whether value is a URL a list can be fetched from, as
@@ -2037,9 +2081,12 @@ func parseZones(value string) ([]string, error) {
 
 	for i, zone := range zones {
 		shown := MaskZoneKey(zone)
-		listedBefore := slices.ContainsFunc(zones[:i], func(earlier string) bool {
+		listedBefore := slices.ContainsFunc(
+			zones[:i],
+			func(earlier string) bool {
 				return strings.EqualFold(MaskZoneKey(earlier), shown)
-		})
+			},
+		)
 
 		switch {
 		case len(zone) > maxZoneLength:
@@ -2126,8 +2173,13 @@ func parseWebhookHeaders(value string) (http.Header, string, error) {
 		name, headerValue, found := strings.Cut(item, ":")
 		name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
 
-		if !found || !IsHeaderName(name) || strings.ContainsAny(headerValue, "\r\n\x00") {
+		if !found || !IsHeaderName(name) ||
-			return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("item %d %w", i+1, errNotWebhookHeader)
+			strings.ContainsAny(headerValue, "\r\n\x00") {
+			return nil, "", fmt.Errorf(
+				"item %d %w",
+				i+1,
+				errNotWebhookHeader,
+			)
 		}
 
 		headers.Add(name, strings.TrimSpace(headerValue))

internal/lookup/file.go

@@ -133,8 +133,11 @@ func (f *File) Watch(ctx context.Context) {
 	}
 
 	if err != nil {
-		f.params.ProcessLog.Error("cannot watch the lookup database for replacements",
+		f.params.ProcessLog.Error(
-			"error", err.Error())
+			"cannot watch the lookup database for replacements",
+			"error",
+			err.Error(),
+		)
 
 		return
 	}
@@ -194,7 +197,10 @@ func (f *File) readAgain() {
 		f.params.Alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
 			Event:  alerts.EventFileError,
 			Reason: kept,
-			Detail: map[string]any{"file": f.params.Path, "error": err.Error()},
+			Detail: map[string]any{
+				"file":  f.params.Path,
+				"error": err.Error(),
+			},
 		})
 		f.params.ProcessLog.Error(kept, "error", err.Error())
 
@@ -212,7 +218,11 @@ func (f *File) use(reader *maxminddb.Reader) {
 	f.lastRead = f.params.Now()
 	f.mu.Unlock()
 
-	f.params.ProcessLog.Info("read the lookup database", "file", f.params.Path)
+	f.params.ProcessLog.Info(
+		"read the lookup database",
+		"file",
+		f.params.Path,
+	)
 }
 
 // read reads the lookup database at path. The whole file is read into

internal/requestlog/requestlog.go

@@ -19,27 +19,34 @@ const (
 	// ActionForward is a request discriminator allowed, which rproxy passes to
 	// the app.
 	ActionForward = "forward"
+
 	// ActionTooLarge is a request over the header limits.
 	ActionTooLarge = "too_large"
+
 	// ActionRateLimited is a request refused because it took its client
 	// over a rate limit, which bans the client.
 	ActionRateLimited = "rate_limited"
+
 	// ActionBanned is a request refused because a ban covers its client,
 	// or because it matched a ban rule, asked for a trap path or the
 	// CrowdSec decision list lists its client, each of which bans the
 	// client.
 	ActionBanned = "banned"
+
 	// ActionRuleBlocked is a request refused because it matched a block
 	// rule.
 	ActionRuleBlocked = "rule_blocked"
+
 	// ActionWAFBlocked is a request refused because the Core Rule Set
 	// scored it at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
 	ActionWAFBlocked = "waf_blocked"
+
 	// ActionDenied is a request refused because its client is in
 	// SWW_DENY_NETS, in a blocklist while SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny,
 	// or listed by a DNSBL zone, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, while
 	// SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny.
 	ActionDenied = "denied"
+
 	// ActionCountryDenied is a request refused for its client's country.
 	ActionCountryDenied = "country_denied"
 	// ActionAdmin is a request discriminator answered at one of its own
@@ -255,7 +262,11 @@ func FormatTime(t time.Time) string {
 
 // Milliseconds is d in milliseconds, to the microsecond.
 func Milliseconds(d time.Duration) float64 {
-	return float64(d.Microseconds()) / float64(time.Millisecond/time.Microsecond)
+	return float64(
+		d.Microseconds(),
+	) / float64(
+		time.Millisecond/time.Microsecond,
+	)
 }
 
 // NewProcessLogger returns the logger for the process's own messages:
@@ -263,17 +274,25 @@ func Milliseconds(d time.Duration) float64 {
 // as a request line's, and instanceName, SWW_INSTANCE_NAME, as instance.
 // It writes only the messages at level, SWW_LOG_LEVEL, or more severe;
 // the request lines Write writes are never held back.
-func NewProcessLogger(w io.Writer, instanceName string, level slog.Level) *slog.Logger {
+func NewProcessLogger(
+	w io.Writer,
+	instanceName string,
+	level slog.Level,
+) *slog.Logger {
 	handler := slog.NewJSONHandler(w, &slog.HandlerOptions{
 		Level: level,
 		ReplaceAttr: func(groups []string, attr slog.Attr) slog.Attr {
 			if attr.Key == slog.TimeKey && len(groups) == 0 {
-				return slog.String(slog.TimeKey, FormatTime(attr.Value.Time()))
+				return slog.String(
+					slog.TimeKey,
+					FormatTime(attr.Value.Time()),
+				)
 			}
 
 			return attr
 		},
 	})
 
-	return slog.New(handler).With("type", "process", "instance", instanceName)
+	return slog.New(handler).
+		With("type", "process", "instance", instanceName)
 }

script/publish

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# script/publish: build the image on the Docker host and push it to the
+# registry under four tags: the UTC date (YYYY-MM-DD), the short commit
+# hash, the branch name and latest. The build is script/docker's, so the
+# tests and the linter run first. The host and the registry name are
+# environment variables with defaults, for running it against another.
+#
+# The working tree must be clean: the hash tag names a commit, and an
+# image built from uncommitted changes would carry a hash that does not
+# describe it.
+set -eu
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
+ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
+
+: "${DOCKER_HOST:=ssh://root@fsn1app1}"
+: "${PUBLISH_IMAGE:=git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf}"
+export DOCKER_HOST
+
+main() {
+    cd "$ROOT"
+
+    # Own line: a failing command substitution inside an argument does
+    # not trip `set -e`.
+    changes="$(git status --porcelain)"
+    if [ -n "$changes" ]; then
+        echo "script/publish: the working tree is not clean; commit or stash first" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
+    date="$(date -u +%Y-%m-%d)"
+    hash="$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
+    branch="$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)"
+    if [ "$branch" = "HEAD" ]; then
+        echo "script/publish: detached HEAD; check out a branch first" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    # A tag is [A-Za-z0-9_.-]; a branch name such as feature/x is not.
+    branch="$(printf '%s' "$branch" | tr -c 'A-Za-z0-9_.-' '-')"
+
+    local_tag="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")"
+    "$SCRIPT_DIR/docker"
+
+    for tag in "$date" "$hash" "$branch" latest; do
+        docker tag "$local_tag" "$PUBLISH_IMAGE:$tag"
+    done
+    for tag in "$date" "$hash" "$branch" latest; do
+        docker push "$PUBLISH_IMAGE:$tag"
+    done
+
+    echo "pushed $PUBLISH_IMAGE with tags: $date $hash $branch latest"
+}
+
+main "$@"