Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 1dbe17e594 README rewritten from scratch so a newcomer can follow it (closes #154, closes #155)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
The old README opened with project history and one list of a hundred
settings. The new one leads with what smallwebwaf is, what it protects
against, how to build and deploy it, what happens to a request, the
settings most deployments touch, how to check it works, the entrypoints,
the rationale and the design, as REPO_POLICIES.md requires. The reference
lists, every setting, the rule file format, the endpoints, the request
log's fields, the alert events, the metrics, the state files, the image
and the gitea notes, move to files under docs/, each linked from the
README, with SPEC.md as the one place for behaviour. Every statement was
checked against the code on next.

Model: fable-5-1
2026-10-22 22:29:53 +00:00
36 changed files with 1955 additions and 4017 deletions
+132 -64
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@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ scanners and other abusers before they reach the app.
A web application firewall reads each request on its way to a web app and
refuses the ones that look like abuse. `smallwebwaf` is also a reverse proxy: it
accepts requests on the app's behalf, passes them to the app, and passes the
app's answers back.
app's answers back. A request it does not refuse reaches the app as it came,
apart from a few headers (see "Design" below).
It needs no setting. Every setting has a default chosen for a service on the
open internet. [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) says how `smallwebwaf` behaves and why. The
@@ -17,10 +18,10 @@ reference documents under [`docs/`](docs/) are listed under "Documents" below.
## What it protects against
- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Rate limiting gives each
client 6000 requests a minute, 100,000 an hour and 1,000,000 a day. Byte
limits give it 4 GiB a minute, 20 GiB an hour and 200 GiB a day. A client over
a limit is refused and banned. The first ban lasts an hour. Each repeat within
a day makes the next ban three times as long. A ban that would last more than
client 1000 requests a minute, 10,000 an hour and 50,000 a day. Byte limits
give it 10 GiB a minute, 20 GiB an hour and 50 GiB a day. A client over a
limit is refused and banned. The first ban lasts an hour. Each repeat within a
day makes the next ban three times as long. A ban that would last more than
seven days is permanent.
- Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The
default rule file bans such a client for seven days at its first probe. Its
@@ -29,8 +30,8 @@ reference documents under [`docs/`](docs/) are listed under "Documents" below.
of your own, or an entry in `SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS`, bans those the same way.
- Attacks carried in a request's URL or headers, such as SQL injection and path
traversal. The OWASP Core Rule Set is a published set of rules that recognise
common web attacks. Coraza, a Go engine, runs those rules (see "Attack
detection" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)). A request the rules take for an attack is
common web attacks. Coraza, a Go engine, runs those rules (step 11 under "What
happens to a request" below). A request the rules take for an attack is
refused.
- Abuse from networks and countries you do not want. You can:
- refuse whole netblocks and countries;
@@ -141,32 +142,89 @@ while working on it, see "Entrypoints" below.
## What happens to a request
`smallwebwaf` handles each request in fifteen steps, in this order. Once a step
refuses a request, the steps after it are skipped, apart from step 15, and
nothing of the request reaches the app. "What happens to a request" in
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) gives each step in full, under the same numbers.
Two terms recur below. A clear sign of attack is a request that matches a rule
whose action is `ban`, or asks for a trap path (steps 9 and 10). An offence is a
request that counts against its client in its history. It is one of:
1. The health check, `GET /_smallwebwaf/healthz`, is answered at once.
2. The client is identified.
3. The static lists, `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` and `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`.
4. The bans.
5. The lookup of the client's AS number and country.
6. The country lists.
7. The reputation sources.
8. The client's limit percentage.
9. The rate limits.
10. The trap paths.
11. The rule files.
12. The Core Rule Set.
13. `smallwebwaf`'s own endpoints, under `/_smallwebwaf/`.
14. The request is passed to the app.
15. After the answer: the byte limits, the error burst and the client's history.
- a clear sign of attack;
- a broken limit;
- a refusal by a rule, by the Core Rule Set or for a missing or wrong token.
A refused visitor is answered with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE`, `403` by default (see
"Ban lengths, response and scope" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)). A `block` rule or a
Core Rule Set match answers `403`. A missing or wrong token gets `401`. A
request over a size or time limit gets the status for that limit, such as `413`
for a body too large (see "Size and time limits" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)).
`smallwebwaf` handles each request in this order. A request one step refuses
skips the steps after it, apart from step 13. Nothing of a refused request
reaches the app. "What happens to a request" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) gives each
step in full.
1. `GET /_smallwebwaf/healthz` is answered `200` with `ok` at once, before any
check and without asking the app.
2. The client is worked out. A netblock is a range of addresses, written as an
address and a prefix length: `203.0.113.0/24`. `SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES` lists
the netblocks traefik comes from, by default the private address ranges. For
a TCP peer inside them, `X-Forwarded-For` is read from the right, and the
first address outside those netblocks is the client. A peer outside them is
the client itself. An IPv6 client is its group: the whole netblock around its
address, a /64 by default; `SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` sets its length.
3. A client in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips steps 4 to 11, the byte limits and the
error burst, but still needs a token at step 12. A client in
`SWWAF_DENY_NETS` is refused.
4. A client under a ban is refused. If the ban was made for a clear sign of
attack, this request makes it permanent.
5. The client's AS number and country are looked up, unless
`SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` is `off`. An AS number names the network an address
belongs to, such as `AS64496`.
6. The country lists are checked. A client from a country in
`SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES` is refused. When
`SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` is set, a client from any other country
is refused, and so is a client without a country. Such a refusal is not an
offence.
7. The reputation sources are checked: the blocklists, the CrowdSec decision
list, the DNS blocklists and AbuseIPDB. A client on the CrowdSec decision
list is banned until the decision ends. Any other source refuses the client,
lowers its limits or only notes it, as `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` and
`SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` say. No request waits for a query.
8. Rate limiting counts the request, unless the client or the path is exempt. A
request that takes the client over a limit is refused and bans the client.
9. A request for a path in `SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS` is refused and bans the client, as
a clear sign of attack.
10. The rule files are checked. A `log` rule notes the match. A `block` rule
refuses the request. A `ban` rule refuses it and bans the client, as a clear
sign of attack.
11. The Core Rule Set inspects the request's method, URL and headers, and, once
`SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` is set, form, JSON and XML bodies. A request it takes
for an attack is refused while `SWWAF_WAF_MODE` is `block`, the default, and
let through while it is `detect`. It bans no one by itself.
12. A request under `/_smallwebwaf/` is answered here by `smallwebwaf`, after
its token is checked. Any other request is passed to the app. The app's
answer is streamed back within the size and time limits.
13. Once the answer has ended, a request passed to the app has its bytes counted
for the byte limits. If a rule, a trap path, the Core Rule Set or a token
check refused the request, the refusal is counted for the error burst. The
client's history and the anomaly counters are updated. More than
`SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` refusals of one client in a minute ban it.
In `observe` mode (`SWWAF_MODE=observe`), `smallwebwaf` makes no ban of its own.
It refuses a request only for a size or time limit, or for a missing or wrong
token. A request it would otherwise have refused is passed to the app, and its
log line says what `enforce` mode would have done. Observe mode is for trying a
configuration before enforcing it.
What a refused visitor sees:
- `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE`, by default `403` with the plain text `Forbidden`. It can
be `429` instead, or `close`, which closes the connection, so that traefik
answers `502`. It answers:
- a ban or a broken rate limit;
- a `ban` rule or a trap path;
- `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` and the country lists;
- a reputation source whose action is `deny`.
- `403` for a `block` rule and the Core Rule Set.
- For a size or time limit:
- `431` for headers over their limit;
- `413` for a body over its limit;
- `408` for a client too slow to send its body;
- `502` or `504` when the app passes a limit or cannot be reached.
- `401` from an endpoint of `smallwebwaf`'s own, for a request without its
token.
## Settings you are likely to touch
@@ -175,11 +233,8 @@ Each setting is an environment variable of the app's container, such as
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) lists every setting, its default and the
values it takes. The ones most deployments touch:
- `SWWAF_MODE=observe`: `smallwebwaf` makes no ban of its own, and refuses a
request only for a size or time limit or a missing or wrong token. A request
it would have refused is passed to the app, and its log line says what
`enforce` mode would have done. For trying a configuration before enforcing
it.
- `SWWAF_MODE=observe`: log what would have been refused, refuse almost nothing,
ban no one. For trying a configuration.
- `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`: netblocks you trust, such as your monitoring. Their
clients are refused only for a size or time limit or a missing or wrong token.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`: netblocks exempt from rate limiting and the
@@ -321,41 +376,54 @@ nixpkgs fixed at one release. An app's `Dockerfile` installs a package with
[`docs/image.md`](docs/image.md) lists what the image holds and how each part is
pinned.
- runit, a service supervisor, runs `smallwebwaf` and the app side by side, each
as its own user, and starts either again when it exits. The app cannot touch
the state files or the process of `smallwebwaf`.
- `smallwebwaf` listens on port 8080 and passes requests to the app on
`127.0.0.1:8081`. The app listens on `127.0.0.1` only, so nothing reaches it
except through `smallwebwaf`. `smallwebwaf`'s own endpoints are under
`/_smallwebwaf/`, on the same port.
- The app sees the headers traefik sent, with traefik's address added to
`X-Forwarded-For`, from a TCP peer on `127.0.0.1`. So the app must trust
`127.0.0.1` and `::1` for forwarded headers, besides the private address
ranges.
- Both processes start with the container's environment variables, so every
setting of `smallwebwaf` starts with `SWWAF_`, and the app can read a token
given as one. A token given as a file that only the `smallwebwaf` user can
read is out of its reach (see "Settings given as files" in
- The container's first process is `runsvinit`, which starts runit, a service
supervisor. runit runs the `run` script of each directory under
`/etc/service`, and runs it again a second after its program exits.
`smallwebwaf` runs as the `smallwebwaf` user (uid 65532) and the app as a user
of its own. So the app cannot touch the state files or the process of
`smallwebwaf`.
- `smallwebwaf` listens on port 8080, on every address. traefik sends the app's
requests there. `smallwebwaf` passes them to the app on `127.0.0.1:8081`. The
app listens on `127.0.0.1` only, so nothing reaches it except through
`smallwebwaf`. The health check, the metrics and the ban management are on the
same port, under `/_smallwebwaf/`. A request for that prefix never reaches the
app.
- The app sees what it would see from traefik directly: the same `Host`, the
same `X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-For` with traefik's address added
at the end. The app's TCP peer is `smallwebwaf` on `127.0.0.1`. So the app
must trust `127.0.0.1` and `::1` for forwarded headers, besides the private
address ranges. An app that keeps its usual trusted proxies sees every visitor
as `127.0.0.1`. Each request also carries its id in `X-Request-ID`. Any
`X-Client-ASN` or `X-Client-Country` header a client sent is removed.
- Both processes start with the container's environment variables. That is why
every setting of `smallwebwaf` starts with `SWWAF_`. A token given as an
environment variable is readable by the app. A token given as a file that only
the `smallwebwaf` user can read is not (see "Settings given as files" in
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md)).
- The state files live in `/var/lib/smallwebwaf`. A volume mounted there keeps
them across a deploy.
- `smallwebwaf servewaf` runs the same checks for the sites that ask it about
each request, and passes nothing to an app (see "`servewaf`" in
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)).
- `docker stop` stops both processes at once. `smallwebwaf` gives the requests
in progress five seconds to finish, so the app must keep answering for five
- The state files live in `/var/lib/smallwebwaf`. Without a volume there, they
survive a restart of the container and are lost when a deploy replaces it. The
`run` script gives that directory and every file in it to the `smallwebwaf`
user at each start, so a host directory mounted there needs no change of
owner.
- The image's health check passes while `smallwebwaf` answers
`GET /_smallwebwaf/healthz` and the app accepts connections. traefik sends a
container no requests until it is healthy.
- When `smallwebwaf` or the app exits, runit starts it again a second later. The
other process keeps running. While either is down, the client gets `502`. A
`smallwebwaf` that stops at start, as on an invalid setting, is started again
every second until the cause is fixed, and logs its message each time.
- `docker stop` has runit send `SIGTERM` to both processes at once.
`smallwebwaf` gives the requests in progress five seconds to finish and writes
its state files. To let them finish, the app must keep answering for five
seconds after `SIGTERM`.
"Deployment" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) has the rest: the health check, what
happens when a process stops, moving `smallwebwaf` to another port, and the
forwarded headers. "Architecture" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists the packages and
what each does.
"Deployment" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) has the rest: moving `smallwebwaf` to
another port, the health check's timing, and the forwarded headers.
"Architecture" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists the packages and what each does.
## TODO
- Planned, as "Planned, not built" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) describes:
- `smallwebwaf rproxy`, the reverse proxy in front of each app that asks
`smallwebwaf servewaf` about each request;
- sharing bans between the instances of several apps;
- sending the log over RELP.
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+1 -2
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@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
The endpoints under `/_smallwebwaf/`, what each takes and what each answers.
"Admin endpoints" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says which checks they go through
and how their tokens work. `smallwebwaf servewaf` answers them at its own
address, without those checks (see "`servewaf`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
and how their tokens work.
- `GET /_smallwebwaf/healthz`: `200` and `ok`, to anyone.
- `GET /_smallwebwaf/metrics`: the metrics, for `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` (see
+9 -15
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@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ on one line:
"asn": "",
"as_name": "",
"country": "",
"reason": "requests per minute over the limit of 6000",
"reason": "requests per minute over the limit of 1000",
"detail": {
"ban_expires": "2026-10-06T13:00:00.123Z",
"cause": "limit",
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ on one line:
"as_name": "",
"country": "",
"kind": "requests",
"limit": 6000,
"limit": 1000,
"window": "minute",
"count": 6001,
"count": 1001,
"request": {
"time": "2026-10-06T12:00:00.123456789Z",
"method": "GET",
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ on one line:
"status": 403,
"user_agent": "scraper/1.0"
},
"requests": 8210,
"requests": 5210,
"refused": 0,
"earlier_bans": {
"limit": 0,
@@ -78,21 +78,17 @@ on one line:
- `instance`: `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME`. `time`: when the alert was raised. `event`:
one of the events above.
- `host`: the site of the request that raised the alert. Only `servewaf` sends
this field, since it serves many sites, and not for `source_failure`,
`file_error` and `summary`.
- `client`: the address whose request raised the alert. Empty for
`source_failure`, `file_error` and `summary`.
- `netblock`: empty for `source_failure`, `file_error` and `summary`; otherwise
one of:
`source_failure` and `file_error`.
- `netblock`: empty for `source_failure` and `file_error`; otherwise one of:
- the ban's netblock;
- the netblock an anomaly counted, empty in the `asn` and `total` scopes;
- the netblock an anomaly counted;
- for the other events, the client as rate limiting counts it: an IPv4
address as a /32, or an IPv6 group.
- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, as known when the alert was
raised. They are empty when GeoJS had not answered yet.
- `reason`: a short sentence, such as
`requests per minute over the limit of 6000` or `listed by a blocklist`.
`requests per minute over the limit of 1000` or `listed by a blocklist`.
- `detail`: what is particular to the event:
- for a ban, its `cause`, `ban_expires` and `notes` (the notes are listed
under `bans.json` in [`state-files.md`](state-files.md));
@@ -101,8 +97,6 @@ on one line:
- for a Core Rule Set match, the `rule_ids`, `score`, `method` and `path`;
- for a source failure, the `source` and `error`;
- for a file error, the `file` and `error`;
- for a summary, the `hour` it covers, the `count` of alerts held back, and
that count by event in `events`;
- `mode`, when the request was not refused: `detect` or `observe`.
- `suppressed_repeats`: how many repeats the cooldown held back before this
alert.
@@ -113,7 +107,7 @@ Slack and ntfy get a message with a title and a text. The title is the instance
and the event, such as `fsn1app1/gitea: ban`. The text is the `reason`, then one
line for each of these that the alert has:
- the host, the client, the netblock and the country;
- the client, the netblock and the country;
- the file, the source, the error and the mode from `detail`;
- the suppressed repeats, if any.
+8 -11
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@@ -11,10 +11,8 @@ checked again when gitea or the Core Rule Set changes version.
- SSH access to gitea does not pass through `smallwebwaf` and is not protected
by it.
- A clone is a response. It fits the defaults of 30 minutes and 1 GiB unless the
repository is large or the link slow. A repository whose clone is larger than
1 GiB needs `SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` raised, and the byte limits with it
("Byte limits, per client" in `SPEC.md`).
- A clone is a response. It fits the defaults of 30 minutes and 5 GiB for all
but the largest repositories and slowest links.
- A push is a request, and so is every other upload:
- a git push;
- an LFS object;
@@ -32,13 +30,12 @@ checked again when gitea or the Core Rule Set changes version.
request limits do most of the work there.
- An Actions runner that reaches gitea through `smallwebwaf` sends requests all
day. One older than version 0.4 (April 2026) asks for work every 2 seconds,
43,200 requests a day. While it runs a job, it reports the job's log and state
every second instead, two requests a second. So one runner busy all day sends
172,800 requests, under the request limits. Six such runners on one address,
each busy all day, pass the day limit of 1,000,000 within two days; five stay
under it. Their address is then banned, their running jobs fail, and each
repeat within a day makes the ban longer. Newer runners ask for work less
often. Put the runners' addresses in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
43,200 requests a day, and reports a running job's log and state every second.
So it passes the day limit of 50,000 after about an hour and a quarter of
jobs. It is then banned, the job it is running fails, and each repeat within a
day makes the ban longer. Newer runners ask less often, but a busy one, or
several on one address, can still pass it. Put the runners' addresses in
`SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
## What the Core Rule Set lets through
+3 -12
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@@ -1,17 +1,8 @@
# The metrics
What `GET /_smallwebwaf/metrics` answers with. "Metrics endpoint" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) describes the endpoint. Prometheus keeps the `instance`
label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets `honor_labels: true`.
`smallwebwaf servewaf` counts a denied request at its decision. It counts an
allowed request when its report comes, with the status, bytes and times the
report gives. These are not counted:
- a report itself;
- an allowed request whose report never comes;
- a question refused with `400`;
- a question whose body stopped arriving.
The metrics `GET /_smallwebwaf/metrics` answers with, as "Metrics endpoint" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) describes it. Prometheus keeps the `instance` label as
`exported_instance` unless the scrape sets `honor_labels: true`.
## Traffic
-62
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@@ -117,65 +117,3 @@ All in milliseconds:
connection;
- `duration_upstream_first_byte`: until the first byte of the answer;
- `duration_upstream_total`: until the end of the answer.
## `servewaf`'s lines
`smallwebwaf servewaf` writes two lines for each question it answers, joined by
`request_id`. The field `servewaf_line` says which of the two a line is:
- `decision`: the line it writes once it has answered the question;
- `report`: the line it writes when `rproxy`'s report comes, with everything
known. The repetition is intended.
A request to its own endpoints writes one line, without `servewaf_line`. A
report writes no line but the `report` line of the request it names.
These questions write no line:
- a question refused with `400` (see "The question" under "`servewaf`" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md));
- a question whose body stopped arriving, which gets no answer.
### The `decision` line
It has the fields above, with these meanings where they differ:
- `client_ip`: `X-Smallwebwaf-Client`.
- `peer_ip`: `X-Smallwebwaf-Peer`.
- `host`: the site the visitor asked for.
- `protocol`: the question's own, `HTTP/1.1`.
- `content_length`: `X-Smallwebwaf-Content-Length`.
- `request_id`: the question's `X-Request-ID`.
- `status`: what `servewaf` answered: `200` for `allow`, the status of `deny`,
or `0` for `close`, as the visitor is then sent nothing.
- `request_bytes`: how much of the question's body the Core Rule Set read.
- `response_bytes`: the body of `servewaf`'s answer.
- `action`: `forward` for `allow`, and `admin` for the `404` for a path under
`/_smallwebwaf/`.
- `aborted`: true when `rproxy` went away before the answer.
- `duration_total`: from the question's headers being read to the line.
The line leaves out `upstream_status`, `websocket` and the
`duration_upstream_...` fields, since `servewaf` passes nothing to the app.
The bytes of an allowed request are counted when its report comes. So `counts`
holds the client's bytes without this request's.
### The `report` line
It has every field of the `decision` line, and `time` stays when the request
arrived. These fields say what the report says:
- `status`: what the visitor got, `0` if nothing;
- `request_bytes` and `response_bytes`: the body bytes each way, with what a
WebSocket carried each way;
- `duration_total`: from the request's headers being read by `rproxy` to the end
of the answer;
- `duration_upstream_total`: from the hand-over to the app to the end of the
answer, for an allowed request.
For an allowed request, the report's counting also changes these fields:
- `counts`: the byte totals now include this request's;
- `limit_hit`, `offence` and `ban_expires`: set when the report's bytes broke a
byte limit.
+14 -37
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@@ -4,23 +4,6 @@ Every setting, its default and the values it takes, in the groups of "Settings"
in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md). That section gives the conventions, the settings
that take `off`, the `_FILE` form, and what each group does and why.
## `servewaf`
`smallwebwaf servewaf` uses every setting here but these, which it ignores:
- `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL` and `SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES`;
- the five timeouts under "Size and time limits";
- `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES`, `SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` and
`SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES`.
An invalid value of one of these still stops the start, and the line of settings
at start still shows them.
`SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` puts the headers on the answer to `rproxy`, not on a
request to an app. `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` has an effect up to 64 KiB less one
byte, whatever its value. A question carries no more of a body than 64 KiB (see
"`servewaf`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## Forms of values
- A duration is Go's syntax, with `d` for days: `90s`, `15m`, `24h`, `7d`. Zero
@@ -108,24 +91,24 @@ byte, whatever its value. A question carries no more of a body than 64 KiB (see
## Static lists
- `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` (default empty): netblocks you trust, such as your
monitoring (see step 3 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
monitoring. Their clients are refused only for a size or time limit or a
missing or wrong token.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are
exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits.
- `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are refused (see
step 3 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are always refused.
## Request rate limits, per client
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `6000`), `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `100000`) and `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `1000000`): the
most requests a client may make in each window. A count or `off`.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `1000`), `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `10000`) and `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `50000`): the most
requests a client may make in each window. A count or `off`.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes exempt from
rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`.
## Byte limits, per client
- `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `4G`), `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `20G`) and `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `200G`): the most
- `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `10G`), `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `20G`) and `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `50G`): the most
bytes counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
- `SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
`response`, `request` or `both`.
@@ -148,18 +131,12 @@ byte, whatever its value. A question carries no more of a body than 64 KiB (see
to send its whole answer. A duration or `off`.
- `SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A size
or `off`.
- `SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A size
- `SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` (default `5G`): the largest response body. A size
or `off`.
## Lookup of AS number and country
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` (default `geojs`): `geojs`, `file` or `off`. `off` stops
the start while a setting that needs a lookup is set:
- the two country lists;
- `SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`;
- the four biased threshold lists and `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`;
- `SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` below `100`;
- an anomaly threshold per AS number.
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` (default `geojs`): `geojs`, `file` or `off`.
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` (default empty): the IPinfo Lite database file, in its
`.mmdb` form, for `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`.
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` (default `1s`): how long a request waits for its
@@ -213,7 +190,8 @@ byte, whatever its value. A question carries no more of a body than 64 KiB (see
- `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` (default `off`): `off`, or how much of a request body
the Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `1G`.
- `SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client
in a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
in a minute for a rule match, a trap path, a Core Rule Set match or a failed
token check. A count or `off`.
## Ban lengths, response and scope
@@ -308,7 +286,7 @@ as `REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`:
client;
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` (default `48`, from 0 to 128) for an IPv6
client.
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_...`: per AS number.
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_...`: per AS number. Needs a lookup source.
- `SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_...`: the whole service.
- `SWWAF_WATCH_...`: each netblock in `SWWAF_WATCH_NETS`, as a whole.
`SWWAF_WATCH_NETS` (default empty) is a list of name, `=` and netblock, such
@@ -344,5 +322,4 @@ A few limits are fixed rather than settings:
- at most 100,000 DNS blocklist verdicts and 100,000 AbuseIPDB scores are kept;
- at most 1,000 DNS blocklist queries are under way at once;
- at most 20,000 anomaly counters are kept;
- each alert destination's queue holds at most 1,000 alerts;
- `servewaf` holds at most 10,000 answered requests awaiting their reports.
- each alert destination's queue holds at most 1,000 alerts.
+9 -15
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
// Package alerts sends alerts on bans, on traffic over an anomaly
// threshold, on a source that fails and on a file with an error to each
// destination set: to the webhook
// SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names, each as one JSON object, as "The JSON
// object" in docs/alerts.md describes, to the Slack incoming
// SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names, each as one JSON object, as the "Alert
// webhook schema" section of SPEC.md describes, to the Slack incoming
// webhook SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names, as a message, and to the
// ntfy topic SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL names. A repeat within
// SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN is held back, and so is an alert past
@@ -149,17 +149,15 @@ type Params struct {
}
// Alert is one alert, as the webhook is sent it and alerts.json holds it,
// with the fields of "The JSON object" in docs/alerts.md. ASN, ASName and
// Country are, for a ban, the client's as the ban's notes give them. Host is
// the site of the request that raised the alert, while one servewaf serves
// many sites, and "" otherwise.
// with the fields of the "Alert webhook schema" section of SPEC.md. ASN,
// ASName and Country are, for a ban, the client's as the ban's notes give
// them.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/alerts.md names the alert's fields in snake_case
//nolint:tagliatelle // SPEC.md's alert webhook schema names its fields in snake_case
type Alert struct {
Instance string `json:"instance"`
Time time.Time `json:"time"`
Event string `json:"event"`
Host string `json:"host,omitempty"`
Client netip.Addr `json:"client"`
Netblock netip.Prefix `json:"netblock"`
ASN string `json:"asn"`
@@ -902,16 +900,12 @@ func title(alert *Alert) string {
}
// text returns the text of alert in Slack and ntfy: its reason, then a
// line for each of its host, client, netblock and country, the file,
// source, error and mode its detail gives, and its suppressed repeats, that
// it has.
// line for each of its client, netblock and country, the file, source,
// error and mode its detail gives, and its suppressed repeats, that it
// has.
func text(alert *Alert) string {
lines := []string{alert.Reason}
if alert.Host != "" {
lines = append(lines, "host: "+alert.Host)
}
if alert.Client.IsValid() {
lines = append(lines, "client: "+alert.Client.String())
}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -1284,11 +1284,9 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock, Client: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"),
Reason: "refused by the Core Rule Set",
Host: "app.example",
},
"fsn1app1/gitea: waf_block", "default shield",
"refused by the Core Rule Set\nhost: app.example\nclient: 192.0.2.1\n" +
"netblock: 192.0.2.1/32",
"refused by the Core Rule Set\nclient: 192.0.2.1\nnetblock: 192.0.2.1/32",
},
{
alerts.Alert{
+2 -5
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
// Package anomaly counts requests and bytes over a minute and an hour, per
// client, per surrounding netblock, per AS number, for the whole service
// and per named netblock, and raises an anomaly alert for a count over its
// threshold, as "Anomaly thresholds" under "Settings" in SPEC.md
// describes. It refuses and bans nothing. At most 20,000 counters
// threshold, as "Anomaly thresholds" under "Configuration surface" in
// SPEC.md describes. It refuses and bans nothing. At most 20,000 counters
// are kept, in memory, and written to alerts.json and read from it by the
// state package.
package anomaly
@@ -103,8 +103,6 @@ type Counter struct {
// Request is a request that has ended, as the counters count it.
type Request struct {
// Host is the site the alert names, "" for none.
Host string
// Client is the client's address, and ClientGroup the client it is
// counted as: its IPv4 address, or the IPv6 netblock of
// SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX its address is in.
@@ -398,7 +396,6 @@ func alertFor(r Request, k key, o overThreshold) alerts.Alert {
return alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventAnomaly,
Host: r.Host,
Client: r.Client,
Netblock: k.netblock,
ASN: r.ASN,
+6 -6
View File
@@ -502,17 +502,17 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
UpstreamRequestTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT", "60s"),
UpstreamResponseTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT", "30m"),
RequestMaxBytes: env.size("SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES", "100M"),
ResponseMaxBytes: env.size("SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES", "1G"),
ResponseMaxBytes: env.size("SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES", "5G"),
AllowNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS", ""),
RateLimitExemptNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS", ""),
DenyNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_DENY_NETS", ""),
RateLimitPerMinute: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "6000"),
RateLimitPerHour: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "100000"),
RateLimitPerDay: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "1000000"),
RateLimitPerMinute: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "1000"),
RateLimitPerHour: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "10000"),
RateLimitPerDay: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "50000"),
RateLimitExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
BytesLimitPerMinute: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "4G"),
BytesLimitPerMinute: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "10G"),
BytesLimitPerHour: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "20G"),
BytesLimitPerDay: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "200G"),
BytesLimitPerDay: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "50G"),
BytesCount: env.bytesCount("SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT", "both"),
LookupSource: env.lookupSource("SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE", "geojs"),
LookupDBPath: env.value("SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH", ""),
+12 -12
View File
@@ -261,10 +261,10 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
UpstreamRequestTimeout: time.Minute,
UpstreamResponseTimeout: 30 * time.Minute,
RequestMaxBytes: 100 << 20,
ResponseMaxBytes: 1 << 30,
RateLimitPerMinute: 6000,
RateLimitPerHour: 100000,
RateLimitPerDay: 1000000,
ResponseMaxBytes: 5 << 30,
RateLimitPerMinute: 1000,
RateLimitPerHour: 10000,
RateLimitPerDay: 50000,
BanResponse: 403,
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: 24 * time.Hour,
@@ -284,8 +284,8 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
LookupSource: defaultLookupSource, LookupTimeout: time.Second,
})
wantByteLimitSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
BytesLimitPerMinute: 4 << 30, BytesLimitPerHour: 20 << 30,
BytesLimitPerDay: 200 << 30, BytesCount: "both",
BytesLimitPerMinute: 10 << 30, BytesLimitPerHour: 20 << 30,
BytesLimitPerDay: 50 << 30, BytesCount: "both",
})
if cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != "http://127.0.0.1:8081" {
@@ -2371,17 +2371,17 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
upstreamRequestTimeout: "60s",
upstreamResponseTimeout: "30m",
requestMaxBytes: "100M",
responseMaxBytes: "1G",
responseMaxBytes: "5G",
allowNets: "",
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
denyNets: "",
rateLimitPerMinute: "6000",
rateLimitPerHour: "100000",
rateLimitPerDay: "1000000",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1000",
rateLimitPerHour: "10000",
rateLimitPerDay: "50000",
rateLimitExemptPaths: "",
bytesLimitPerMinute: "4G",
bytesLimitPerMinute: "10G",
bytesLimitPerHour: "20G",
bytesLimitPerDay: "200G",
bytesLimitPerDay: "50G",
bytesCount: "both",
lookupSource: defaultLookupSource,
lookupDBPath: "",
+23 -44
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
// Package metrics keeps smallwebwaf's Prometheus metrics, as
// docs/metrics.md lists them, and serves them in the Prometheus text
// format, as the "Metrics endpoint" section of SPEC.md requires. No
// metric carries a client's address.
// Package metrics keeps smallwebwaf's Prometheus metrics, as the "Metrics
// endpoint" section of SPEC.md lists them, and serves them in the
// Prometheus text format. No metric carries a client's address.
package metrics
import (
@@ -403,21 +402,28 @@ func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(
line *requestlog.Line, limit string, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
) {
m.inFlight.Dec()
m.count(line, limit, duration, upstreamDuration)
}
// RequestAllowed counts a question of rproxy's, answered allow, as no longer
// under way. RequestReported counts the request it was about.
func (m *Metrics) RequestAllowed() {
m.inFlight.Dec()
}
class := statusClass(line.Status)
m.requests.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Inc()
m.requestBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.RequestBytes))
m.responseBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.ResponseBytes))
m.requestDuration.Observe(duration.Seconds())
// RequestReported counts a request rproxy passed to the app, as RequestEnded
// does, from what its report says, which line holds.
func (m *Metrics) RequestReported(
line *requestlog.Line, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
) {
m.count(line, "", duration, upstreamDuration)
if upstreamDuration > 0 {
m.upstreamDuration.Observe(upstreamDuration.Seconds())
}
if limit != "" {
m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits.WithLabelValues(limit).Inc()
}
if line.Country != "" {
m.countries.add(line.Country, line)
}
if line.ASN != "" {
m.asns.add(line.ASN, line)
}
}
// LimitHit counts a request that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
@@ -486,33 +492,6 @@ func (m *Metrics) StateFileEditSetAside(name string) {
m.stateFileEditsSetAside.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()
}
// count counts a request that has ended, as RequestEnded describes.
func (m *Metrics) count(
line *requestlog.Line, limit string, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
) {
class := statusClass(line.Status)
m.requests.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Inc()
m.requestBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.RequestBytes))
m.responseBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.ResponseBytes))
m.requestDuration.Observe(duration.Seconds())
if upstreamDuration > 0 {
m.upstreamDuration.Observe(upstreamDuration.Seconds())
}
if limit != "" {
m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits.WithLabelValues(limit).Inc()
}
if line.Country != "" {
m.countries.add(line.Country, line)
}
if line.ASN != "" {
m.asns.add(line.ASN, line)
}
}
// addReputationQueries adds the counter of the queries to source, a DNSBL
// zone, or of the checks of clients with AbuseIPDB, which count tells.
func (m *Metrics) addReputationQueries(source prometheus.Labels, count func() int) {
-9
View File
@@ -41,15 +41,6 @@ var (
errNotAddress = errors.New("is not an address, such as 203.0.113.9")
)
// answerHealth answers a request for the health endpoint.
func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
// Set here rather than left to Go's server, which would set it only
// after the log line has taken the response's headers.
rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
_, _ = io.WriteString(rq.out, "ok\n")
}
// answerAdmin answers a request for smallwebwaf itself, under
// /_smallwebwaf/, once it has passed the checks. Each endpoint needs a
// token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics
+3 -5
View File
@@ -15,11 +15,9 @@ func TestWithEveryAnomalyThresholdOffARequestIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
// anomaly counters, nor a clock, and the request no response: reading
// any of them to count the request panics.
rq := &request{
decision: decision{
client: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"),
lookedUp: true,
},
h: &handler{config: &config.Config{LookupSource: "geojs"}},
h: &handler{config: &config.Config{LookupSource: "geojs"}},
client: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"),
lookedUp: true,
}
defer func() {
+4 -5
View File
@@ -323,7 +323,6 @@ func (rq *request) alertBan(ban bans.Ban) {
rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
Event: event,
Host: rq.site,
Client: rq.client,
Netblock: ban.Netblock,
ASN: ban.Notes.ASN,
@@ -340,11 +339,11 @@ func (rq *request) alertBan(ban bans.Ban) {
func (rq *request) noted(now time.Time, status int) bans.Request {
return bans.Request{
Time: now,
Method: rq.line.Method,
Host: rq.line.Host,
Path: rq.requestURI,
Method: rq.in.Method,
Host: rq.in.Host,
Path: rq.in.URL.RequestURI(),
Status: status,
UserAgent: rq.line.UserAgent,
UserAgent: rq.in.UserAgent(),
}
}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ const (
userAgent = "ban-test/1.0"
// permanent is the log line's ban_expires for a permanent ban.
permanent = "permanent"
// banResponseClose is the SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE that closes the connection.
banResponseClose = "close"
)
func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
@@ -239,7 +237,7 @@ func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
{"", http.StatusForbidden},
{"403", http.StatusForbidden},
{"429", http.StatusTooManyRequests},
{banResponseClose, 0},
{"close", 0},
} {
t.Run(banResponse+"="+tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
-1
View File
@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ func (rq *request) alertWAFBlock(result waf.Result) {
rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock,
Host: rq.site,
Client: rq.client,
Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
+1 -1
View File
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
rateLimitExemptNets: scraper,
denyNets: denied,
banResponse: banResponseClose,
banResponse: "close",
limitBanDuration: "1h",
maxBanDuration: "2h",
})
+33 -52
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
// Package proxy runs the checks on each request and writes its request log
// line. New passes each request it lets through to the app and the app's
// answer back, unchanged, within the size and time limits. NewServeWAF instead
// answers rproxy's question about each request, and takes rproxy's report once
// the visitor's answer has ended, which writes the request a second log line.
// Package proxy passes each request to the app and the app's answer back,
// unchanged, within the size and time limits, and writes one request log
// line for each request.
package proxy
import (
@@ -13,8 +11,6 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
@@ -23,6 +19,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
)
@@ -56,8 +53,7 @@ const ClientsPath = "/_smallwebwaf/clients/"
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
Config *config.Config
// RequestLog receives one JSON line per request, and from servewaf a second
// when the request's report comes.
// RequestLog receives one JSON line per request.
RequestLog io.Writer
// ProcessLog receives the process's own messages.
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
@@ -113,23 +109,6 @@ type Server struct {
// SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT while the headers arrive; the proxy
// applies the timeouts and size limits from then on.
func New(params Params) *Server {
h := newHandler(params)
return h.server(&http.Server{
Handler: h,
ReadHeaderTimeout: params.Config.ClientRequestTimeout,
// Off is an IdleTimeout of 0, which Go's server replaces with
// ReadTimeout: no limit, as long as ReadTimeout stays unset.
IdleTimeout: params.Config.ClientIdleTimeout,
// Go's server reads 4 KiB past MaxHeaderBytes before it
// refuses, so the limit a client meets is the setting.
MaxHeaderBytes: int(params.Config.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes - 4<<10),
})
}
// newHandler returns the handler with what every request shares, as the
// settings in params make it.
func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
errorLog := slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn)
m := metrics.New(params.Config.MetricsTopN, params.Config.InstanceName)
lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB := newReputation(params, m)
@@ -192,7 +171,29 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
m.AddBansAndClients(h.ledger, h.limiter, params.Now)
m.AddRules(params.Rules)
return h
return &Server{
Server: &http.Server{
Addr: params.Config.ListenAddr,
Handler: h,
ReadHeaderTimeout: params.Config.ClientRequestTimeout,
// Off is an IdleTimeout of 0, which Go's server replaces with
// ReadTimeout: no limit, as long as ReadTimeout stays unset.
IdleTimeout: params.Config.ClientIdleTimeout,
// Go's server reads 4 KiB past MaxHeaderBytes before it
// refuses, so the limit a client meets is the setting.
MaxHeaderBytes: int(params.Config.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes - 4<<10),
ErrorLog: errorLog,
},
Ledger: h.ledger,
Limiter: h.limiter,
GeoJS: h.geojs,
Anomalies: h.anomalies,
LookupFile: h.lookupFile,
Lists: h.lists,
DNSBL: h.dnsbl,
AbuseIPDB: h.abuseIPDB,
Metrics: m,
}
}
// newReputation returns the lists fetched from URLs, the DNSBL zones'
@@ -273,10 +274,6 @@ type handler struct {
rules *rules.Files
coreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
alerts *alerts.Queue
// awaitingReport holds, in servewaf, the decision on each answered
// question by its id until its report comes, and nil for a question still
// being handled.
awaitingReport *lru.Cache[string, *decision]
}
// newTransport returns what carries requests to the app. It never goes
@@ -302,7 +299,11 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// The health endpoint is answered at once, before any check, so that
// a health checker is never refused. It does not ask the app.
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == HealthPath {
rq.answerHealth()
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
// Set here rather than left to Go's server, which would set it only
// after the log line has taken the response's headers.
rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
_, _ = io.WriteString(rq.out, "ok\n")
return
}
@@ -338,23 +339,3 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
rq.forward(r.Context())
}
// server returns the Server of h, which listens at SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR and
// logs through h, with what httpServer sets.
func (h *handler) server(httpServer *http.Server) *Server {
httpServer.Addr = h.config.ListenAddr
httpServer.ErrorLog = h.errorLog
return &Server{
Server: httpServer,
Ledger: h.ledger,
Limiter: h.limiter,
GeoJS: h.geojs,
Anomalies: h.anomalies,
LookupFile: h.lookupFile,
Lists: h.lists,
DNSBL: h.dnsbl,
AbuseIPDB: h.abuseIPDB,
Metrics: h.metrics,
}
}
+1 -11
View File
@@ -284,16 +284,6 @@ func newProxy(
) (*proxy.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
return newServerWith(t, proxy.New, appURL, geojsURL, now, env)
}
// newServerWith is newProxy for the server build makes.
func newServerWith(
t *testing.T, build func(proxy.Params) *proxy.Server,
appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
) (*proxy.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL, rulesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app",
wafMode: off,
@@ -344,7 +334,7 @@ func newServerWith(
}
}
server := build(proxy.Params{
server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: out,
ProcessLog: processLog,
-1
View File
@@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ func (rq *request) noteHit(hit bans.ReputationHit, reason string) {
rq.h.metrics.ReputationHit(hit.Source)
rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventReputationHit,
Host: rq.site,
Client: rq.client,
Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
+55 -97
View File
@@ -39,20 +39,20 @@ type refusal struct {
limit string
}
// decision is what the checks note of a request: its log line, and what
// counting the request needs once it has ended. servewaf keeps a copy of it
// until the request's report comes. It holds no credentials, since the log line
// never does, and neither the request's objects nor their bodies.
type decision struct {
line requestlog.Line
client netip.Addr
// requestURI is the path with the query, as a ban's notes keep it.
requestURI string
// site is, in servewaf, the host the visitor asked for, which the
// alerts name, since one servewaf serves many sites. It is "" otherwise.
site string
// allowed is true for a question answered with DispositionAllow.
allowed bool
// request is one request on its way through smallwebwaf, from the moment
// its headers have been read to its log line.
type request struct {
h *handler
in *http.Request
// rc sets the deadlines of the connection to the client.
rc *http.ResponseController
out *responseWriter
body *requestBody // nil for a request without a body
line requestlog.Line
client netip.Addr
peer netip.Addr
peerTrusted bool
// lookedUp is true once the client's AS number and country have been
// looked up, whether or not an answer was there, and lookupAnswer is
// what the lookup gave then, the zero Answer while GeoJS had given none.
@@ -65,37 +65,18 @@ type decision struct {
counted bool
limitPercent, bytesPercent percentage
// attack is true for a request that matched a ban rule or asked for a
// trap path, ruleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and wafBlocked for
// one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence its client's history
// counts.
attack, ruleBlocked, wafBlocked bool
// reputation is the reputation sources that list the client, for the
// notes of a ban the request makes.
reputation []bans.ReputationHit
}
// request is one request on its way through smallwebwaf, from the moment
// its headers have been read to its log line.
type request struct {
decision
h *handler
in *http.Request
// rc sets the deadlines of the connection to the client.
rc *http.ResponseController
out *responseWriter
body *requestBody // nil for a request without a body
peer netip.Addr
peerTrusted bool
// tokenRefused is true for a request refused for a missing or wrong
// token, an offence its client's history counts.
tokenRefused bool
// trap path, ruleBlocked for one a block rule refused, wafBlocked for
// one the Core Rule Set refused, and tokenRefused for one refused for a
// missing or wrong token, each an offence its client's history counts.
attack, ruleBlocked, wafBlocked, tokenRefused bool
// blocklisted is true once a blocklist is found to list the client,
// dnsblListed once a DNSBL zone's verdict is, and abuseIPDBHit once
// AbuseIPDB's score of it is a hit.
blocklisted, dnsblListed, abuseIPDBHit bool
start time.Time
// reputation is the reputation sources that list the client, for the
// notes of a ban the request makes.
reputation []bans.ReputationHit
start time.Time
// checked is when the checks were done, and upstreamStart when the
// request was handed to the app.
checked time.Time
@@ -127,62 +108,50 @@ type request struct {
answerStarted time.Time
}
// newRequest starts handling r: it works out the client from the TCP peer
// and X-Forwarded-For, and goes on as startRequest does.
// newRequest starts handling r: it notes the time, counts the request as
// under way, works out the client, and starts the log line with what is
// known of the request.
func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
peer := peerAddress(r)
trusted := h.config.TrustedProxies
client := clientAddress(peer, r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"), trusted)
return h.startRequest(w, r, client, peer, isInside(peer, trusted))
}
// startRequest starts handling r from client, which came through peer: it
// notes the time, counts the request as under way, and starts the log line
// with what is known of the request. peerTrusted says whether to believe
// the request's id and scheme, which r's headers give.
func (h *handler) startRequest(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, client, peer netip.Addr, peerTrusted bool,
) *request {
h.metrics.RequestStarted()
start := time.Now()
peer := peerAddress(r)
trusted := h.config.TrustedProxies
peerTrusted := isInside(peer, trusted)
forwardedFor := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For")
client := clientAddress(peer, forwardedFor, trusted)
rq := &request{
decision: decision{
client: client,
requestURI: r.URL.RequestURI(),
line: requestlog.Line{
Time: requestlog.FormatTime(start),
Instance: h.config.InstanceName,
ClientIP: client.String(),
Method: r.Method,
Scheme: scheme(r, peerTrusted),
Host: r.Host,
Path: rules.Path(r),
Query: r.URL.RawQuery,
Protocol: r.Proto,
Referer: r.Referer(),
UserAgent: r.UserAgent(),
RequestID: requestID(r, peerTrusted),
PeerIP: peer.String(),
ForwardedFor: strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
ClientGroup: h.clientGroup(client).String(),
ContentType: r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
RequestHeaders: requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders),
HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0,
HasCookie: len(r.Header.Values("Cookie")) > 0,
Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
},
},
h: h,
in: r,
rc: http.NewResponseController(w),
out: &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
client: client,
peer: peer,
peerTrusted: peerTrusted,
start: start,
line: requestlog.Line{
Time: requestlog.FormatTime(start),
Instance: h.config.InstanceName,
ClientIP: client.String(),
Method: r.Method,
Scheme: scheme(r, peerTrusted),
Host: r.Host,
Path: rules.Path(r),
Query: r.URL.RawQuery,
Protocol: r.Proto,
Referer: r.Referer(),
UserAgent: r.UserAgent(),
RequestID: requestID(r, peerTrusted),
PeerIP: peer.String(),
ForwardedFor: strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
ClientGroup: h.clientGroup(client).String(),
ContentType: r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
RequestHeaders: requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders),
HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0,
HasCookie: len(r.Header.Values("Cookie")) > 0,
Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
},
}
// A length of -1 is a body whose length was not announced.
@@ -600,20 +569,10 @@ func (rq *request) finish() {
}
// Counted before the log line is written, so that the metrics count
// every request whose line is out. An allowed request is the exception:
// its report gives the status, bytes and times the metrics count.
if rq.allowed {
rq.h.metrics.RequestAllowed()
} else {
rq.h.metrics.RequestEnded(line, limit, duration, upstreamDuration)
}
// every request whose line is out.
rq.h.metrics.RequestEnded(line, limit, duration, upstreamDuration)
rq.writeLine()
}
// writeLine writes the request's log line.
func (rq *request) writeLine() {
err := requestlog.Write(rq.h.requestLog, &rq.line)
err := requestlog.Write(rq.h.requestLog, line)
if err != nil {
rq.h.processLog.Error("writing the request log failed", "error", err.Error())
}
@@ -675,7 +634,6 @@ func (rq *request) countAnomalies() {
answer, _ := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
rq.h.anomalies.Count(rq.h.now(), anomaly.Request{
Host: rq.site,
Client: rq.client,
ClientGroup: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: answer.ASN,
-464
View File
@@ -1,464 +0,0 @@
package proxy
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The headers of rproxy's question and of servewaf's answer, as
// "servewaf" in SPEC.md gives them.
const (
// ClientHeader marks a request as rproxy's question, and gives the
// visitor's address.
ClientHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Client"
// PeerHeader gives the address of rproxy's own TCP peer.
PeerHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Peer"
// ContentLengthHeader gives the body length the visitor announced.
ContentLengthHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Content-Length"
// DispositionHeader gives servewaf's answer.
DispositionHeader = "X-Smallwebwaf-Disposition"
)
// The values of DispositionHeader.
const (
// DispositionAllow tells rproxy to pass the request to the app.
DispositionAllow = "allow"
// DispositionDeny tells rproxy to give the visitor the answer's status,
// headers and body.
DispositionDeny = "deny"
// DispositionClose tells rproxy to close the visitor's connection
// without an answer, which SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE asks for when it is close.
// servewaf closing the question's connection instead would read as
// servewaf being down, and rproxy would then let the request through.
DispositionClose = "close"
)
// ReportPath is where rproxy sends the report of each request servewaf
// answered.
const ReportPath = "/_smallwebwaf/report"
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes is the most of a visitor's body a question carries.
const QuestionBodyMaxBytes = 64 << 10
const (
// maxAwaitingReport is the most answered requests held until their
// reports come. Past it, the request answered longest ago is dropped.
maxAwaitingReport = 10000
// maxRequestIDBytes is the longest id a question may give.
maxRequestIDBytes = 128
// reportBodyMaxBytes is the most of a report's body that is read. It is
// far above any report's.
reportBodyMaxBytes = 1 << 20
// maxHTTPStatus is the highest status a report may give.
maxHTTPStatus = 599
// maxReportedBytes is the most bytes a report may give for each way, 1
// PiB, so that adding them up cannot overflow.
maxReportedBytes = 1 << 50
// maxReportedMilliseconds is the longest duration a report may give,
// about 31 years, so that it fits a time.Duration.
maxReportedMilliseconds = 1e12
// serveWAFTimeout bounds how long a request to servewaf takes to arrive,
// and its answer to leave, and serveWAFIdleTimeout how long a kept-open
// connection waits for its next request.
serveWAFTimeout = 60 * time.Second
serveWAFIdleTimeout = 120 * time.Second
)
var (
errReportFieldMissing = errors.New("a field is missing")
errReportValue = errors.New("a value is out of range")
)
// Report is the JSON object rproxy posts to ReportPath once the visitor's
// answer has ended, its fields named as the request log's of the same
// meaning. RequestID is the question's id. Status is what the visitor got, 0
// if nothing. The durations are in milliseconds.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
type Report struct {
RequestID string `json:"request_id"`
Status int `json:"status"`
RequestBytes int64 `json:"request_bytes"`
ResponseBytes int64 `json:"response_bytes"`
DurationTotal float64 `json:"duration_total"`
DurationUpstreamTotal float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total"`
}
// NewServeWAF returns the server `smallwebwaf servewaf` runs. It answers
// rproxy's questions with the checks New runs, takes rproxy's reports and
// answers its own endpoints. It passes nothing to an app. rproxy applies
// the size and time limits to the visitor, so their settings do not apply
// here. Go's default limit on a request's line and headers, 1 MiB, stays:
// it is far above rproxy's, and a question refused for its size would have
// rproxy let the request through.
func NewServeWAF(params Params) *Server {
cfg := *params.Config
cfg.RequestMaxBytes = 0
cfg.ClientRequestTimeout = serveWAFTimeout
// The server's WriteTimeout does this. It sets a new deadline for each
// request, where a deadline a handler sets stays on a kept-open
// connection, and would run out under a later request's answer.
cfg.ClientResponseTimeout = 0
// A question's body of QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the
// Core Rule Set does not read a JSON or XML body over its limit.
cfg.WAFBodyLimit = min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1)
params.Config = &cfg
h := newHandler(params)
awaitingReport, err := lru.New[string, *decision](maxAwaitingReport)
if err != nil {
panic(err) // New fails only for a size below one
}
h.awaitingReport = awaitingReport
return h.server(&http.Server{
Handler: http.HandlerFunc(h.serveWAF),
ReadTimeout: serveWAFTimeout,
WriteTimeout: serveWAFTimeout,
IdleTimeout: serveWAFIdleTimeout,
})
}
// serveWAF handles one request to servewaf: a request carrying
// ClientHeader is rproxy's question, and any other is for servewaf itself.
func (h *handler) serveWAF(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if len(r.Header.Values(ClientHeader)) > 0 {
h.answerQuestion(w, r)
return
}
h.answerOwnEndpoint(w, r)
}
// answerQuestion runs the checks on the visitor's request a question
// carries, and answers rproxy what to do with it. A denied request's counting
// is finished here, and an allowed one's by its report.
func (h *handler) answerQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
client, body, ok := h.readQuestion(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
// One that cannot be read leaves the log line's peer_ip invalid.
peer, _ := netip.ParseAddr(r.Header.Get(PeerHeader))
rq := h.startRequest(w, asTheVisitorSentIt(r, body), client.Unmap(), peer.Unmap(),
true)
// The last deferred runs first, so that what is held has the finished log
// line. Go's server sends the answer only once this function has
// returned, so the report cannot come before it is held.
defer rq.holdForReport()
defer rq.finish()
rq.site = r.Host
rq.line.ServeWAFLine = requestlog.ServeWAFLineDecision
refused := rq.check(r.Context())
rq.checked = time.Now()
underOwnPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, adminPrefix)
if refused == nil && !underOwnPrefix {
// In observe mode, what enforce mode would have refused counts here.
defer rq.countRefusal()
rq.allow()
return
}
// The last deferred runs first, as in ServeHTTP.
defer rq.addToHistory()
defer rq.countAnomalies()
defer rq.countRefusal()
if refused != nil {
rq.deny(*refused)
return
}
// The app never sees this prefix. servewaf's own endpoints are at its
// own address, so this answers as a path with no endpoint does.
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
}
// readQuestion returns the visitor's address and the body a question carries,
// and whether servewaf takes the question. It answers a question it does not
// take with 400 and no disposition, which rproxy treats as it treats no
// answer. The id of a question it takes is held from here on, without a
// decision yet, so that another question with that id is refused while this
// one is being handled.
//
// The body is read before any check, since Go's server does not send an answer
// until it has read the body. A question whose body stops arriving gets no
// answer, and is not looked at.
func (h *handler) readQuestion(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
) (netip.Addr, []byte, bool) {
client, err := netip.ParseAddr(r.Header.Get(ClientHeader))
if err != nil || client.Zone() != "" {
h.refuseQuestion(w, ClientHeader+" is not an address without a zone")
return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
}
id := r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
if id == "" || len(id) > maxRequestIDBytes || !utf8.ValidString(id) {
h.refuseQuestion(w, requestIDHeader+" is not a valid id")
return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, QuestionBodyMaxBytes))
if _, tooLarge := errors.AsType[*http.MaxBytesError](err); tooLarge {
h.refuseQuestion(w, "the body is over 64 KiB")
return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
}
if err != nil {
h.processLog.Warn("a question's body stopped arriving", "error", err.Error())
// This panic has Go's server close the connection without an answer,
// and log nothing.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
}
held, _ := h.awaitingReport.ContainsOrAdd(id, nil)
if held {
h.refuseQuestion(w, requestIDHeader+" is the id of a request servewaf holds")
return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
}
return client, body, true
}
// refuseQuestion answers a question servewaf does not take, for reason.
func (h *handler) refuseQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, reason string) {
h.processLog.Warn("a question is refused", "reason", reason)
http.Error(w, reason, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
// asTheVisitorSentIt returns a copy of r, a question, as the checks and the
// log line are to see it: without the headers rproxy adds for servewaf, with
// body, which has been read of r, and with the length the visitor announced,
// as -1 when it announced none. The question's own length covers only the part
// of the body it carries.
func asTheVisitorSentIt(r *http.Request, body []byte) *http.Request {
sent := r.Clone(r.Context())
announced := sent.Header.Get(ContentLengthHeader)
sent.Header.Del(ClientHeader)
sent.Header.Del(PeerHeader)
sent.Header.Del(ContentLengthHeader)
sent.Header.Del("Content-Length")
sent.ContentLength = -1
length, err := strconv.ParseInt(announced, 10, 64)
if err == nil && length >= 0 {
sent.ContentLength = length
sent.Header.Set("Content-Length", announced)
}
sent.Body = http.NoBody
if len(body) > 0 {
sent.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(body))
}
return sent
}
// allow answers a question with DispositionAllow and, while
// SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set, the client's AS number and country.
func (rq *request) allow() {
rq.allowed = true
header := rq.out.Header()
header.Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionAllow)
if rq.h.config.AddLookupHeaders {
setLookupHeaders(header, rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country)
}
rq.out.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
// holdForReport holds a copy of what the report's steps need, by the request's
// id. A report only ever reaches that copy, never the request being handled.
func (rq *request) holdForReport() {
held := rq.decision
rq.h.awaitingReport.Add(rq.line.RequestID, &held)
}
// deny answers a question with what the visitor is to get for r.
func (rq *request) deny(r refusal) {
if r.status == 0 {
// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE is close. Written past rq.out, since the log line's
// status stays 0: the visitor is sent nothing.
rq.refused.CompareAndSwap(nil, &r)
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionClose)
rq.out.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
rq.answer(r)
}
// answerOwnEndpoint answers a request to servewaf's own address. No check
// runs on it: the address is on the private network, where the peers are
// rproxy and the admin's tools, not visitors.
func (h *handler) answerOwnEndpoint(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == http.MethodPost && r.URL.Path == ReportPath {
h.takeReport(w, r)
return
}
peer := peerAddress(r)
rq := h.startRequest(w, r, peer, peer, false)
defer rq.finish()
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == HealthPath {
rq.answerHealth()
return
}
rq.answerAdmin()
}
// takeReport answers POST ReportPath: it finishes the request the report
// names, if it holds that request's decision, and ignores the report
// otherwise.
func (h *handler) takeReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
report, err := readReport(w, r)
if err != nil {
h.processLog.Warn("a report is refused", "error", err.Error())
http.Error(w, "the body is not a report", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
held, found := h.awaitingReport.Peek(report.RequestID)
// Remove reports true to one report only, of several that name the id.
if found && held != nil && h.awaitingReport.Remove(report.RequestID) {
h.finishWith(held, report)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// readReport reads a report from r's body, which must be one JSON object with
// all of Report's fields, in the ranges SPEC.md gives.
func readReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (Report, error) {
var report Report
body, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, reportBodyMaxBytes))
if err != nil {
return report, fmt.Errorf("read the body: %w", err)
}
var fields map[string]json.RawMessage
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &fields)
if err != nil {
return report, fmt.Errorf("decode the body: %w", err)
}
for _, name := range []string{
"request_id", "status", "request_bytes", "response_bytes",
"duration_total", "duration_upstream_total",
} {
value, there := fields[name]
if !there || string(value) == "null" {
return report, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errReportFieldMissing, name)
}
}
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &report)
if err != nil {
return report, fmt.Errorf("decode the body: %w", err)
}
return report, report.checkRanges()
}
// checkRanges returns an error for a value of the report that cannot be true.
func (report *Report) checkRanges() error {
switch {
case report.Status != 0 &&
(report.Status < http.StatusContinue || report.Status > maxHTTPStatus):
return fmt.Errorf("%w: status", errReportValue)
case report.RequestBytes < 0 || report.RequestBytes > maxReportedBytes:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: request_bytes", errReportValue)
case report.ResponseBytes < 0 || report.ResponseBytes > maxReportedBytes:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: response_bytes", errReportValue)
case report.DurationTotal < 0 || report.DurationTotal > maxReportedMilliseconds:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_total", errReportValue)
case report.DurationUpstreamTotal < 0 ||
report.DurationUpstreamTotal > maxReportedMilliseconds:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_upstream_total", errReportValue)
}
return nil
}
// finishWith finishes a request with what its report says, and writes the
// request's last log line, which holds its decision's fields and the report's.
// For an allowed request it first takes the steps ServeHTTP takes once a
// request passed to the app has ended, with the status and bytes of the report
// in place of those it would have seen. A denied request's counting was
// finished at its decision.
func (h *handler) finishWith(held *decision, report Report) {
rq := &request{
decision: *held,
h: h,
out: &responseWriter{status: report.Status, bytes: report.ResponseBytes},
body: &requestBody{},
}
rq.body.bytes.Store(report.RequestBytes)
rq.line.ServeWAFLine = requestlog.ServeWAFLineReport
rq.line.Status = report.Status
rq.line.RequestBytes = report.RequestBytes
rq.line.ResponseBytes = report.ResponseBytes
rq.line.DurationTotal = report.DurationTotal
if rq.allowed {
rq.line.DurationUpstreamTotal = &report.DurationUpstreamTotal
// addToHistory goes by this for whether the request reached the app.
rq.upstreamStart = time.Now()
rq.countBytes()
rq.countAnomalies()
rq.addToHistory()
rq.h.metrics.RequestReported(&rq.line,
time.Duration(report.DurationTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)),
time.Duration(report.DurationUpstreamTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)))
}
rq.writeLine()
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+1 -1
View File
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ type Hit struct {
// Counts are a client's requests and bytes in the minute, the hour and
// the day that end at a request, that request's included.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
//nolint:tagliatelle // SPEC.md's request log names its fields in snake_case
type Counts struct {
Minute float64 `json:"minute"`
Hour float64 `json:"hour"`
+6 -18
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// Package requestlog writes the lines smallwebwaf prints on stdout: one
// JSON object per request, or two from servewaf, marked "type":"request", and
// the process's own messages as JSON lines marked "type":"process".
// JSON object per request, marked "type":"request", and the process's own
// messages as JSON lines marked "type":"process".
package requestlog
import (
@@ -60,29 +60,17 @@ const OffenceLimit = "limit"
// that broke the error burst.
const LimitHitErrorBurst = "error_burst"
// The servewaf_line a request line names, which says which of servewaf's two
// lines about a question it is.
const (
// ServeWAFLineDecision is servewaf's line at its decision.
ServeWAFLineDecision = "decision"
// ServeWAFLineReport is servewaf's line when rproxy's report comes, with
// the decision's fields and the report's together.
ServeWAFLineReport = "report"
)
// timeLayout is RFC 3339 with milliseconds.
const timeLayout = "2006-01-02T15:04:05.000Z07:00"
// Line is one request's line in the request log. The field names, and
// their order, are those of docs/request-log.md. A field that may not
// apply to a request is left out of its line when it does not.
// their order, are those of the "Request log" section of SPEC.md. A field
// that may not apply to a request is left out of its line when it does
// not.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
//nolint:tagliatelle // SPEC.md's request log names its fields in snake_case
type Line struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
// ServeWAFLine is ServeWAFLineDecision or ServeWAFLineReport on servewaf's
// two lines about a question.
ServeWAFLine string `json:"servewaf_line,omitempty"`
// The standard web log fields. Scheme is how the client reached
// smallwebwaf, or the trusted proxy in front of it.
+6 -13
View File
@@ -60,19 +60,8 @@ func TestHealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
}, 0, "")
}
// Another test can take a closed server's port at once, so the app's
// address here is a multicast address, to which TCP cannot connect.
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
listenAddr: ":" + port,
upstreamURL: "http://224.0.0.1",
}, 1, "unhealthy: connect to the app: ")
// Listening on port 0 takes any free port, so nothing listens on port 0
// itself.
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{listenAddr: ":0"}, 1,
"unhealthy: ask smallwebwaf: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{listenAddr: "8080"}, 1,
"unhealthy: invalid setting: SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
app.Close()
wantHealthCheck(t, env, 1, "unhealthy: connect to the app: ")
stop()
@@ -81,6 +70,10 @@ func TestHealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("still running after being told to stop")
}
wantHealthCheck(t, env, 1, "unhealthy: ask smallwebwaf: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{listenAddr: "8080"}, 1,
"unhealthy: invalid setting: SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
}
func TestHealthCheckRefusesAnArgument(t *testing.T) {
-210
View File
@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
package smallwebwaf_test
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"syscall"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
)
// commandForMain, while set in the environment, has this test binary run Main
// with the command it gives, in place of the tests, so that a test can run
// Main in a process of its own.
const commandForMain = "SMALLWEBWAF_TEST_COMMAND"
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
command, set := os.LookupEnv(commandForMain)
if !set {
os.Exit(m.Run())
}
os.Args = strings.Fields("smallwebwaf " + command)
os.Exit(smallwebwaf.Main(testVersion))
}
func TestMainAnswersQuestionsOnlyAsServeWAF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
command, disposition string
}{
{"servewaf", proxy.DispositionAllow},
{"", ""},
} {
t.Run("command "+tc.command, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
binary, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("find the test binary: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 3*waitLimit)
defer cancel()
out := &output{}
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, binary) //nolint:gosec // this test binary
cmd.Stdout = out
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
commandForMain+"="+tc.command,
listenAddr+"="+localhost+":0",
upstreamURL+"="+startApp(t),
stateDir+"="+t.TempDir(),
rulesDir+"="+t.TempDir(),
lookupSource+"=off")
err = cmd.Start()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
_ = cmd.Wait()
})
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusOK, tc.disposition)
err = cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.SIGTERM)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("signal: %v", err)
}
err = cmd.Wait()
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("exit: %v; output:\n%s", err, out.text())
}
})
}
}
// ask sends servewaf at addr rproxy's question about a request for path from
// placed, checks the answer's status and disposition, and closes it.
func ask(t *testing.T, addr, path string, status int, disposition string) {
t.Helper()
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"http://"+addr+path, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, placed)
req.Header.Set("X-Request-ID", rand.Text())
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := (&http.Client{Transport: transport}).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("question: %v", err)
}
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != status ||
res.Header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader) != disposition {
t.Errorf("answered %d with disposition %q, want %d with %q", res.StatusCode,
res.Header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader), status, disposition)
}
}
// runServeWAF runs `smallwebwaf servewaf` with the settings in env, has use
// send it requests at the address it listens on, stops it as SIGTERM does, and
// checks that it stopped in order.
func runServeWAF(t *testing.T, env map[string]string, use func(addr string)) {
t.Helper()
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
exited <- runAs(ctx, true, env, out)
}()
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
use(addr)
stop()
select {
case status := <-exited:
if status != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit status %d, want 0; output:\n%s", status, out.text())
}
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("still running after being told to stop")
}
out.line(t, "msg", "stopped")
}
func TestServeWAFKeepsItsBansAcrossARestartAndNeedsNoApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
}
runServeWAF(t, env, func(addr string) {
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
// The default rule file bans a probe for this.
ask(t, addr, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
})
runServeWAF(t, env, func(addr string) {
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
})
}
func TestWithoutACommandTheClientHeaderIsNoQuestion(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runUntilStopped(t, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
}, func(url string) {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, url,
http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, placed)
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := (&http.Client{Transport: transport}).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
if err != nil || string(body) != greeting ||
res.Header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader) != "" {
t.Errorf("answered %q (%v) with disposition %q, want the app's greeting",
body, err, res.Header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader))
}
})
}
+8 -21
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
// Package smallwebwaf runs the smallwebwaf process: it reads the settings,
// the rule files, the lookup database and the state files, serves requests
// until it is told to stop, and then stops in an orderly way, writing the
// state files. It serves them in front of an app, or, as `smallwebwaf
// servewaf`, by answering rproxy's questions about them.
// state files.
package smallwebwaf
import (
@@ -46,15 +45,11 @@ type Params struct {
LookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)
// Stdout receives the request log and the process's own messages.
Stdout io.Writer
// ServeWAF makes it `smallwebwaf servewaf`, which answers rproxy's
// questions, rather than the proxy in front of an app.
ServeWAF bool
}
// Main runs smallwebwaf until SIGTERM or SIGINT, and returns the
// process's exit status. Run as `smallwebwaf servewaf`, it answers
// rproxy's questions rather than pass requests to an app. Run as
// `smallwebwaf healthcheck`, it is the container's health check instead.
// process's exit status. Run as `smallwebwaf healthcheck`, it is the
// container's health check instead.
func Main(version string) int {
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "healthcheck" {
return HealthCheck(context.Background(), os.Args[2:], os.LookupEnv, os.Stderr)
@@ -68,7 +63,6 @@ func Main(version string) int {
Version: version,
LookupEnv: os.LookupEnv,
Stdout: os.Stdout,
ServeWAF: len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "servewaf",
})
}
@@ -123,12 +117,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
return 1
}
newProxy := proxy.New
if params.ServeWAF {
newProxy = proxy.NewServeWAF
}
server, err := newServer(newProxy, cfg, stdout, processLog, now, ruleFiles, alertQueue)
server, err := newServer(cfg, stdout, processLog, now, ruleFiles, alertQueue)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("cannot use the lookup database", "error", err.Error())
@@ -162,12 +151,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
return serve(ctx, server, listener, files, ruleFiles, alertQueue, processLog)
}
// newServer returns the server smallwebwaf runs, which newProxy makes, with
// the metrics of the alerts, after reading the lookup database while
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file. A lookup database that cannot be read is an
// error.
// newServer returns the server smallwebwaf runs, with the metrics of the
// alerts, after reading the lookup database while SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is
// file. A lookup database that cannot be read is an error.
func newServer(
newProxy func(proxy.Params) *proxy.Server,
cfg *config.Config, stdout io.Writer, processLog *slog.Logger,
now func() time.Time, ruleFiles *rules.Files, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
) (*proxy.Server, error) {
@@ -187,7 +174,7 @@ func newServer(
}
}
server := newProxy(proxy.Params{
server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: stdout,
ProcessLog: processLog,
+5 -13
View File
@@ -113,13 +113,6 @@ func (o *output) text() string {
// returns its exit status. SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it,
// so that no test sends GeoJS its clients' addresses.
func run(ctx context.Context, env map[string]string, out *output) int {
return runAs(ctx, false, env, out)
}
// runAs is run as `smallwebwaf servewaf` while serveWAF is true.
func runAs(
ctx context.Context, serveWAF bool, env map[string]string, out *output,
) int {
return smallwebwaf.Run(ctx, smallwebwaf.Params{
Version: testVersion,
LookupEnv: func(name string) (string, bool) {
@@ -130,8 +123,7 @@ func runAs(
return value, ok
},
Stdout: out,
ServeWAF: serveWAF,
Stdout: out,
})
}
@@ -1248,13 +1240,13 @@ func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, appURL, dir string) {
"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT": "60s",
"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT": "30m",
"SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES": "100M",
"SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES": "1G",
"SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES": "5G",
"SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS": "",
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
"SWWAF_DENY_NETS": "",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "6000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR": "100000",
rateLimitPerDay: "1000000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "1000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR": "10000",
rateLimitPerDay: "50000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS": "",
"SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES": "",
+1 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
// Package state keeps smallwebwaf's state in JSON files in
// SWWAF_STATE_DIR, as the "Persistent state" section of SPEC.md requires
// and docs/state-files.md lists them:
// SWWAF_STATE_DIR, as the "Persistent state" section of SPEC.md describes:
// bans.json holds the bans, clients.json each client's counters and
// history, lookups.json GeoJS's answers, reputation.json the last try and
// last good copy of each list fetched from a URL, the DNSBL zones'
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1019,8 +1019,8 @@ func TestEditJustBeforeAScheduledWriteSurvivesIt(t *testing.T) {
edit(t, dir, bansJSON, permanentBansJSON)
// The write takes the edit in first, and writes it back. The second
// ban, made after the admin opened the file, is lost, as the
// "Persistent state" section of SPEC.md says.
// ban, made after the admin opened the file, is lost, as "Edits
// while running" in SPEC.md says.
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
// Package waf runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
// method, the URL with its query and the headers of a request, and on its
// body while SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the six changes smallwebwaf
// makes to it, as "Attack detection" under "Settings" in SPEC.md describes
// them. It reads no response.
// makes to it, as "Attack detection" under "Configuration surface" in
// SPEC.md describes them. It reads no response.
//
// smallwebwaf writes only to its state directory, so Coraza is built with
// its no_fs_access tag, as the Dockerfile and script/build build it: of a
+5 -6
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,11 @@
# script/gitea-requests: build the image and run gitea 1.27.3 behind it,
# with every setting of smallwebwaf at its default but SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL,
# which names gitea's container. Then send through it the gitea requests
# that reading gitea's source found the Core Rule Set refuses, which
# docs/gitea.md records, and a short sample of gitea's ordinary use:
# signing in, pages of files and commits, a diff, the API, a push, clone
# and fetch over HTTP, and two container image pushes. Last, print each
# request smallwebwaf logged, with what it did with it and the ids of the
# Core Rule Set's rules that matched it.
# that reading gitea's source found the Core Rule Set refuses, and a short
# sample of gitea's ordinary use: signing in, pages of files and commits,
# a diff, the API, a push, clone and fetch over HTTP, and two container
# image pushes. Last, print each request smallwebwaf logged, with what it
# did with it and the ids of the Core Rule Set's rules that matched it.
# Every request comes from one client, docker's gateway, so more than
# SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD, 30, refusals in a minute would ban it, and
# the requests after would show as banned. The containers, the network,