Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot 866b948ec0 Gitea setup: Core Rule Set blocks attacks, not ordinary Gitea traffic (closes #198)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
The Gitea setup runs the Core Rule Set in block mode. Rules that refused
ordinary Gitea requests are switched off only where they misfired:

- deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf, loaded through the new setting
  SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE before the Core Rule Set's rules,
  covers Gitea's search, file-name and branch-name fields, Referer, file
  paths, API attachment names and Actions artifact uploads;
- smallwebwaf's defaults gain a seventh change: the registry upload
  path's from parameter skips 932260.

A file that cannot be read, does not parse or names an id from 900000
to 900999 stops servewaf at start, in every mode. internal/waf's tests
and script/gitea-setup send the recorded requests in
internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt and three attacks.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-06 20:17:07 +00:00
clawbot 21cac70b50 Lower the default request and byte limits (closes #193)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m12s
New defaults, as sneak approved: 120 requests a minute, 1,500 an hour and 6,000 a day; bytes off a minute, 50G an hour and 100G a day. The README, `SPEC.md`, `docs/settings.md` and `docs/gitea.md` give the new figures and reasoning, and point Actions runners and shared addresses at `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`. The README examples now hold against the new defaults.

An Actions runner that is not exempted makes more requests an hour than the new limit and will be banned.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-06 20:14:23 +01:00
clawbot 2ab57eb278 Install the image's Ubuntu packages from the normal mirrors (closes #190)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m6s
The image's `ca-certificates`, `nix-bin` and `runit` now come from Ubuntu's archive instead of a dated snapshot, whose service had failed image builds. apt fetches them over plain HTTP and checks each against the archive's signed package lists, so no CA certificates are borrowed from the Go image. The README, `SPEC.md` and `docs/image.md` say so; the amd64-only limit, which came from the removed hash check, is gone.

Rule cut against: `REPO_POLICIES.md` pins every external reference by hash; sneak's ruling at sneak/prompts#72 (comment) allows Ubuntu's own package index.

Model: deepseek-v4-pro (implementation), opus-5-5 (rework)
2026-11-06 20:14:18 +01:00
clawbot a63b7e4d2d Rename internal/proxy to internal/servewaf (closes #173)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m44s
The package passes nothing on since the one-process mode went: it answers rproxy's questions, takes its reports and answers servewaf's own endpoints. It is now named after the command it serves, with `git mv`, and its constructor is `servewaf.New`. `SPEC.md` and the other documents follow. No change of behaviour.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-06 20:02:17 +01:00
clawbot 3cb41f27a8 deploy/gitea: Gitea behind traefik, rproxy and servewaf, with its test (closes #178)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m50s
A compose setup that runs gitea 1.27.3 behind traefik, rproxy and servewaf on one shared network with IPv4 and IPv6, and `script/gitea-setup` (`make gitea-setup`), which brings it up and checks that a page load, a push and a clone pass through rproxy and are checked by servewaf. Containers on the shared network skip servewaf's checks; the gateways do not. gitea gets a secret key made per install and has sign-up off. `docs/gitea.md` explains each setting.

Judgement call: the Core Rule Set runs in `detect` mode here until #198 lands.

Model: deepseek-v4-pro (implementation), opus-5-5 (rework)
2026-11-06 19:46:38 +01:00
clawbot 6deb9d7581 README: sections, compose examples, env var table (closes #188) (#189)
check / check (push) Successful in 4m40s
2026-11-06 00:06:25 +01:00
clawbot 8632da556a rproxy tests give a loaded host time before their limits run out (closes #185) (#186)
check / check (push) Successful in 6m15s
2026-11-05 23:17:16 +01:00
64 changed files with 2712 additions and 1102 deletions
+4 -25
View File
@@ -133,32 +133,11 @@ RUN mkdir /etc/sysusers.d \
&& echo 'u _runit-log - "runit svlogd user" /nonexistent /sbin/nologin' \
> /etc/sysusers.d/runit.conf
# ca-certificates, nix-bin and runit, from Ubuntu's archive as it was at
# the snapshot moment, which is never earlier than the Ubuntu image above.
# apt checks every package against the snapshot's InRelease files, and
# this step checks those against the hashes named here, which are those
# of the amd64 archive: other architectures use Ubuntu's ports archive.
# apt also fetches the live archive's InRelease files, which change daily
# and which the install does not use. The snapshot service is HTTPS only
# and this image has no CA certificates yet, so this step uses the Go
# image's. The snapshot service answers 503 at times; apt retries a
# failed download, waiting twice as long before each retry, and this
# step gives it five retries, about half a minute in all, where its
# default of three gives up after seven seconds.
RUN --mount=type=bind,from=builder,source=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt,target=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
apt-get update --snapshot 20261001T000000Z \
-o Acquire::https::CaInfo=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
-o Acquire::Retries=5 \
&& printf '%s\n' \
'45f95ce276cdba3e41870516a130e03c58b8b7a79e9546b0efe9e526d255740c snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute_InRelease' \
'802e675dd9de4c7f3916434a95e7c1d8eec0e82886622d7805ab19a2c6fe0365 snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-updates_InRelease' \
'64b3353f0bd4970b4f7271962245bcea9ff24d4cc7bea16b433f8a60e42ca3dd snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-backports_InRelease' \
'1d5041572116a8b23aabf79ac7439ad8af83d57ad3fb0f9aa0d4523ec10c5908 snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-security_InRelease' \
| (cd /var/lib/apt/lists && sha256sum --check --strict) \
# ca-certificates, nix-bin and runit, from Ubuntu's archive. apt fetches
# them over plain HTTP and checks each one against the archive's signed
# package lists, so no CA certificates are needed.
RUN apt-get update \
&& DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install --yes --no-install-recommends \
--snapshot 20261001T000000Z \
-o Acquire::https::CaInfo=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
-o Acquire::Retries=5 \
ca-certificates nix-bin runit \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+6 -2
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
.PHONY: bootstrap setup test lint fmt fmt-check tidy check docker hooks build \
run example-app gitea-requests
run example-app gitea-requests gitea-setup
# Makefile targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
# per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
# of README.md). tidy writes go.mod and go.sum as `go mod tidy` does,
# which test checks. build and run are for working on the code by hand;
# example-app checks the image with an app built on it; gitea-requests
# reports the gitea requests the Core Rule Set refuses at the defaults.
# reports the gitea requests the Core Rule Set refuses at the defaults;
# gitea-setup checks the setup in deploy/gitea.
bootstrap:
@script/bootstrap
@@ -49,3 +50,6 @@ example-app:
gitea-requests:
@script/gitea-requests
gitea-setup:
@script/gitea-setup
+612 -269
View File
@@ -4,59 +4,45 @@
[@sneak](https://sneak.berlin), for self-hosted web apps. It refuses the
requests of scrapers, scanners and other abusers before they reach an app.
## What it does
A web application firewall reads each request on its way to a web app and
refuses the ones that look like abuse. `smallwebwaf` is one binary with two
commands that do this together:
refuses the ones that look like abuse. `smallwebwaf` is one binary, shipped in
one image, with two commands that do this together:
- `smallwebwaf rproxy` is a small reverse proxy in front of one app. It accepts
requests on the app's behalf and asks `servewaf` about each one. It passes the
allowed ones to the app, and the app's answers back. It keeps nothing, and
never touches disk.
- `smallwebwaf servewaf` decides. It runs the checks, and keeps the bans,
counters and history. One `servewaf` serves many sites.
- `smallwebwaf rproxy` is a small reverse proxy in front of one app. traefik
routes to it. It asks `servewaf` about each request, passes the allowed ones
to the app, and passes the app's answers back. It keeps nothing and never
touches disk.
- `smallwebwaf servewaf` decides. It runs the checks and keeps the bans, the
counters and each client's history. One `servewaf` serves many sites: a client
banned through one site is refused on all of them, and its requests on all of
them count toward one set of limits.
The site keeps answering while `servewaf` is down, slow or restarting. `rproxy`
waits at most 2 seconds for `servewaf`'s answer, and without one passes the
request to the app.
The site keeps answering while `servewaf` is down, slow or restarting: without
an answer in time, `rproxy` passes the request to the app.
`rproxy` requires one setting, `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND`, which says where `servewaf`
is. In a container of its own, it also needs `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`, which says
where the app is. Every other setting has a default chosen for a service on the
open internet. [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) says how `smallwebwaf` behaves and why. The
reference documents under [`docs/`](docs/) are listed under "Documents" below.
It protects against:
## What it protects against
- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Rate limiting gives each
client 500 requests a minute, 20,000 an hour and 300,000 a day. That leaves
room for programmatic use of an API, such as an automation fleet on another
host. A fleet of about 20 agents makes about 120 requests a minute at its
busiest. A gitea page opened with an empty cache loads about 40 files, so a
few such first visits fit in the minute limit too. The minute limit catches,
within seconds, a client firing requests as fast as it can. The hour limit
catches a client that keeps up more than about 5.5 a second for an hour. The
day limit catches a client that keeps up 4 a second around the clock. Counting
cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits, such as one that
keeps up 3 a second; only the protections below can. Byte limits give each
client 4 GiB a minute, 20 GiB an hour and 200 GiB a day. A client over a limit
is refused and banned. The first ban lasts an hour. Each repeat within a day
makes the next ban three times as long. A ban that would last more than seven
days is permanent.
- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Each client gets a limit on
requests and on bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults leave
room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that keeps up
one request every 2 seconds. A client over a limit is refused and banned: for
a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently when
it keeps at it.
- Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The
default rule file bans such a client for seven days at its first probe. Its
next request during the ban makes the ban permanent. The default rule file
does not cover probes for other apps, such as a WordPress login. A `ban` rule
of your own, or an entry in `SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS`, bans those the same way.
default rule file bans such a client at its first probe, and its next request
during the ban makes the ban permanent. Your own rules, or a list of trap
paths, ban probes for other apps, such as a WordPress login, the same way.
- Attacks carried in a request's URL or headers, such as SQL injection and path
traversal. The OWASP Core Rule Set is a published set of rules that recognise
common web attacks. Coraza, a Go engine, runs those rules (see "Attack
detection" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)). A request the rules take for an attack is
refused.
traversal. The OWASP Core Rule Set, a published set of rules that recognise
common web attacks, runs on every request through Coraza, a Go engine. A
request the rules take for an attack is refused.
- Abuse from networks and countries you do not want. You can:
- refuse whole netblocks and countries;
- give the clients of chosen networks and countries a fraction of every
limit, so that they are banned sooner;
- refuse or limit clients on a blocklist or a DNS blocklist, or with a high
- refuse or limit clients on a blocklist, a DNS blocklist, or with a high
AbuseIPDB score;
- ban clients named by your own CrowdSec engine.
- Slow and oversized requests. Every request and every answer has a time limit
@@ -64,29 +50,26 @@ reference documents under [`docs/`](docs/) are listed under "Documents" below.
For the operator, it:
- logs each request as JSON lines, saying what it did and why (see
[`docs/request-log.md`](docs/request-log.md));
- sends alerts to a webhook, Slack or ntfy (see
[`docs/alerts.md`](docs/alerts.md));
- serves Prometheus metrics (see [`docs/metrics.md`](docs/metrics.md));
- logs each request as JSON lines, saying what it did and why;
- sends alerts to a webhook, Slack or ntfy;
- serves Prometheus metrics;
- keeps its bans, counters and history in JSON files you can read and edit, so
that a restart loses nothing and a ban can be lifted with an editor (see
[`docs/state-files.md`](docs/state-files.md)).
that a restart loses nothing and a ban can be lifted with an editor.
Not built, and not planned:
- TLS and routing by host name. Both stay with traefik, the reverse proxy in
front of `rproxy`.
- Browser challenges such as captchas.
- A web console.
- A web console, or a configuration file.
- Defence against floods large enough to fill the host's network link.
## Getting started
Build the image from a clone. `make docker` runs the tests and the linter, then
builds the image, tagged `smallwebwaf`. It builds for amd64, on an amd64 host
only: the `Dockerfile` checks Ubuntu's package lists against the hashes of the
amd64 archive.
### The image
No image is published. Build it from a clone. `make docker` runs the tests and
the linter, then builds the image, tagged `smallwebwaf`.
```sh
git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf.git
@@ -94,62 +77,38 @@ cd smallwebwaf
make docker
```
Push the image to a registry your hosts pull from.
Push the image to a registry your hosts pull from, and name it there by digest.
The image runs `rproxy` by default. To run `servewaf` from the same image, set
the container's `SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND` to `servewaf`.
the container's `SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND` to `servewaf`. The image's health check
follows the command: in `rproxy`'s container it passes once `rproxy` answers and
the app accepts connections, whether or not `servewaf` answers; in `servewaf`'s
container, once `servewaf` answers.
### The usual setup: three containers
The usual setup is three containers on one private network:
- the app;
- `rproxy`, in front of the app, which traefik routes to;
- `servewaf`, with a volume for its state files.
- `rproxy`, in front of the app, which traefik routes to: `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND`
names `servewaf` and `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` names the app;
- `servewaf`, with `SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf` and a volume at
`/var/lib/smallwebwaf` for its state files.
```sh
docker network create site
docker run --detach --name servewaf --network site \
--env SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf \
--volume servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf \
<registry>/smallwebwaf@sha256:<digest>
docker run --detach --name app --network site \
<registry>/app@sha256:<digest>
docker run --detach --name rproxy --network site \
--env SWRP_WAF_BACKEND=http://servewaf:8080 \
--env SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL=http://app:8081 \
<registry>/smallwebwaf@sha256:<digest>
```
Here the app listens on port 8081, at its container's address on that network.
Point traefik's labels at port 8080 of `rproxy`
(`traefik.http.services.<name>.loadbalancer.server.port=8080`). Publish no port
of the app or of `servewaf`. Anything on that network can reach the app around
`rproxy`, and can ask `servewaf` questions.
With no setting, `servewaf` sends the address of every new visitor to GeoJS, a
web service, to find its country and network. `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=off` sends
nothing. `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`, with `SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` naming a
database file on your own host, looks addresses up in that file (see "Lookup of
AS number and country" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)).
### Many sites, one `servewaf`
Run one `rproxy` for each app, all with `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` naming the same
`servewaf`. It keeps one table of clients and bans for all of them:
- A client banned through one site is refused on all of them.
- A client's requests on all of them count toward one set of limits.
- Log lines, alerts and ban notes name the site by its host.
`rproxy`, and can ask `servewaf` questions, so the network holds only what you
trust. Each further app adds its own container and its own `rproxy`, whose
`SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` names the same `servewaf`. The "Smallest setup" and "In front
of gitea" examples below show this shape.
### `rproxy` in the app's container
An app's image can also be built on the `smallwebwaf` image, so that `rproxy`
runs beside the app. `servewaf` still runs in a container of its own. The app's
`Dockerfile` starts `FROM` the `smallwebwaf` image, named by digest, and adds:
An app's image can instead be built on the `smallwebwaf` image, so that `rproxy`
runs beside the app in one container. `servewaf` still runs in a container of
its own. The app's `Dockerfile` starts `FROM` the `smallwebwaf` image, named by
digest, and adds:
- the app's binary;
- the packages the app needs, from the nixpkgs in the image;
@@ -191,39 +150,441 @@ main "$@"
Leave `ENTRYPOINT` and `USER` out of the app's `Dockerfile`. The image's own
entrypoint starts `rproxy` and the app side by side, each as its own user. Run
the app's image with `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` set.
the app's image with `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` set. `deploy/example-app` is such an
app, and the "`rproxy` beside the app" example below runs one.
`deploy/example-app` is such an app. `make example-app` builds it and checks it
(see "Checking that it works" below). To run `rproxy` and `servewaf` on the host
while working on them, see `script/run` under "Entrypoints" below.
The app sees the headers traefik sent, with traefik's address added to
`X-Forwarded-For`, from a TCP peer that is `rproxy`. So the app must trust
`rproxy`'s address for forwarded headers. In a container of its own, `rproxy` is
on the private network, which the usual default of a trusted-proxy setting
covers. Beside the app, its address is `127.0.0.1` or `::1`, which the private
ranges leave out, so the app's own setting must name them too, as `app.run`
does.
### When `servewaf` is down, slow or overloaded
### Checking that it works
`SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` decides what `rproxy` does with a request when
`servewaf`:
- `docker inspect --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' <container>` says
`healthy` for each container of `smallwebwaf`.
- A log line with `"msg":"starting"` gives the version, the address and every
setting in effect, with secrets masked.
- A request to the site through traefik gets the app's answer.
`https://<site>/_smallwebwaf/healthz` answers `ok`. `servewaf`'s log lines
about the request have `"action":"forward"`.
- To see a refusal without banning yourself, run `servewaf` with
`SWWAF_MODE=observe` and ask for `/.env`. The request reaches the app.
`servewaf`'s log lines have `"would_action":"banned"` and
`"rule_ids":["env-file"]`. A ban you get in `enforce` mode is lifted as
"Clients and bans" below describes.
- With `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` set, this answers with the metrics, from a host on
`servewaf`'s network:
`curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://servewaf:8080/_smallwebwaf/metrics`.
- `make example-app` builds the image and an app on it, runs them, and checks
the whole exchange (see "Entrypoints").
- cannot be connected to;
- does not answer at all;
- does not answer within `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, 2 seconds by default.
## Configuration
Its default, `allow`, passes the request to the app without `servewaf`'s answer.
`deny` answers `503` instead. Either way the request gets no report, so its
bytes are not counted and it is not added to its client's history. When
`servewaf` does answer, a `deny` or an error goes to the visitor as `servewaf`
gave it, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` plays no part.
Every setting is an environment variable, read once at start; changing one means
restarting the container. `rproxy` reads only the `SWRP_` settings, and
`servewaf` only the `SWWAF_` ones. Every setting but `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` has a
default, chosen for a service on the open internet. A setting that needs an
account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
## What happens to a request
- Any `SWWAF_` setting can be given as a file instead, for secrets and long
lists: `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE` names the file that holds `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN`.
The file's contents are the value, less one newline at the end. Setting both
forms stops the start. `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` and
`SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` already name a file, so they have no
`_FILE` form. No `SWRP_` setting has one, since `rproxy` never touches disk.
- A duration is Go's syntax, with `d` for days: `90s`, `15m`, `24h`, `7d`.
- A size is a number of bytes with an optional `K`, `M` or `G`, in powers of
1024: `512K`, `100M`, `5G`.
- A count is a whole number of requests, such as `1000`.
- A time in milliseconds is a whole number above zero, such as `2000`.
- A list is comma separated. A list set to an empty value is an empty list, and
replaces the default.
- A netblock is an address and a prefix length, such as `10.0.0.0/8`; a bare
address stands for itself alone. A country is a two-letter code in either
case, such as `de`. An AS number is `AS` and the number, such as `AS64496`. A
percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100. A path prefix starts with `/`.
- `off` switches a limit, a threshold or a timeout off where the table says a
setting takes it.
- An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged
on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`.
A request goes through fifteen steps, in this order. Once `servewaf` refuses a
request, the steps after that are skipped, apart from the report of step 15, and
nothing of the request reaches the app. "What happens to a request" in
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) gives each step in full, under the same numbers.
Every setting the code reads, with its default:
| Variable | Default | What it does |
| ------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `servewaf`. |
| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `servewaf`'s URL, such as `http://servewaf:8080`. |
| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `servewaf`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `servewaf` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `502`, or cut off once it has started. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | How long the visitor may take to send its request line and headers, and then the whole request to reach the app, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `servewaf` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `servewaf` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/servewaf`. |
| `SWWAF_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `servewaf` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse. |
| `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it. |
| `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`. |
| `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`. |
| `SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | Which body bytes the byte limits count: `response`, `request` or `both`. |
| `SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs`, a web service, `file`, or `off`. |
| `SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
| `SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES` | empty | Countries whose clients are refused, such as `cn,ru`. |
| `SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | AS numbers whose clients get a percentage of every request and byte limit, such as `AS14061:50,AS16276:25`. |
| `SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | The same by country, such as `cn:25`. |
| `SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT`. |
| `SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT`. |
| `SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; where it and `SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` both give a percentage, the lower applies. |
| `SWWAF_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWWAF_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only; `deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf` is gitea's. |
| `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
| `SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
| `SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWWAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
| `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/smallwebwaf` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `servewaf`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `servewaf` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_smallwebwaf/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWWAF_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWWAF_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWWAF_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWWAF_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWWAF_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWWAF_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
## docker-compose examples
Each example is a complete `compose.yaml`. `smallwebwaf` is the tag
`make docker` gives the image; on another host, use the name you pushed it
under, by digest. Docker Compose puts the services on a private network of its
own, where each reaches the others by service name. Only "In front of gitea"
uses traefik. The other three publish `rproxy`'s port on the host, for trying it
out.
### Smallest setup
One app, `rproxy` in front of it, and `servewaf` with a volume for its state
files, every setting at its default.
```yaml
services:
app:
# Your app, which listens on port 8081.
image: registry.example/app@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
rproxy:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://servewaf:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:8081
ports:
- "8080:8080"
servewaf:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: servewaf
volumes:
- servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf
volumes:
servewaf-state:
```
### Custom per-address limits
For a site with no API:
- tighter limits for everyone;
- no limits for the office and the automation host;
- no checks for monitoring;
- a refused netblock;
- a smaller share of the limits for two hosting networks and one country;
- trap paths;
- `429` for a refused client.
```yaml
services:
app:
image: registry.example/app@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
rproxy:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://servewaf:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:8081
ports:
- "8080:8080"
servewaf:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: servewaf
# Monitoring skips every check.
SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS: 192.0.2.10
# The office and the automation host are never rate limited.
SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS: 203.0.113.0/24,198.51.100.7
# A netblock that sends nothing wanted.
SWWAF_DENY_NETS: 198.51.100.128/25
# Tighter limits for everyone else: a small static site.
SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE: "60"
SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR: "600"
SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY: "3000"
# Hosting networks and one country get a share of those limits.
SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT: AS14061:50,AS16276:25
SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT: cn:25
# Paths only scanners ask for; one request bans the client.
SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS: /wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php
# Answer a refused client with 429 rather than 403.
SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE: "429"
SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION: 30m
volumes:
- servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf
volumes:
servewaf-state:
```
### In front of gitea
gitea behind traefik, set up for a code forge:
- the upload limits raised, in size and in time;
- the response size limit raised, for clones over 1 GiB;
- the Actions runners exempt from counting;
- the default request and byte limits kept.
`traefik` is the network traefik is on, made outside this file.
```yaml
services:
gitea:
# gitea 1.27.3, 2026-08-29
image: gitea/gitea@sha256:87a67ee09d3ae0d1df5fda5dcda3e2a1f9236a45b0a59025d6e00e46adc43bef
environment:
GITEA__server__ROOT_URL: https://git.example/
# The host and the port of the SSH clone URLs gitea shows.
GITEA__server__SSH_DOMAIN: git.example
GITEA__server__SSH_PORT: "2222"
# gitea's TCP peer is rproxy, on the private network.
GITEA__security__REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES: 10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16
volumes:
- gitea-data:/data
networks:
- site
ports:
# SSH does not pass through smallwebwaf.
- "2222:22"
rproxy:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://servewaf:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://gitea:3000
# Pushes, LFS objects and image layers over 100 MiB, or slower
# than a minute, are cut off at the defaults.
SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE: 2G
SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS: "600000"
# A clone larger than 1 GiB is cut off at the default.
SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE: 4G
networks:
- site
- traefik
labels:
traefik.enable: "true"
# rproxy is on two networks; traefik reaches it on this one.
traefik.docker.network: traefik
traefik.http.routers.git.rule: Host(`git.example`)
traefik.http.routers.git.entrypoints: websecure
traefik.http.routers.git.tls.certresolver: letsencrypt
traefik.http.services.git.loadbalancer.server.port: "8080"
servewaf:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: servewaf
SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME: fsn1/servewaf
# The Actions runners ask for work all day; never count them.
SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS: 10.0.4.0/24
# gitea never serves these; a request for one bans the client.
SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS: /wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php,/wp-admin/
volumes:
- servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf
networks:
- site
networks:
site:
traefik:
external: true
volumes:
gitea-data:
servewaf-state:
```
`deploy/gitea` holds a complete setup of gitea, traefik included, as a Docker
Compose file. [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md) explains it, and records what the
defaults do in front of gitea, request by request.
### `rproxy` beside the app
The app is built on the `smallwebwaf` image, with `rproxy` inside its container.
`app/` holds the `Dockerfile` and `app.run` from "`rproxy` in the app's
container". `rproxy` answers `503` to every request while `servewaf` is down,
and `servewaf`:
- observes before it enforces;
- looks addresses up in a local database rather than GeoJS;
- sends alerts to ntfy;
- reads its ntfy token from a file.
```yaml
services:
app:
# A Dockerfile built FROM the smallwebwaf image, with rproxy inside.
build: ./app
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://servewaf:8080
# Answer 503 rather than pass a request on while servewaf is down.
SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION: deny
ports:
- "8080:8080"
servewaf:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: servewaf
SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME: fsn1/servewaf
# Refuse nothing yet; log what enforce mode would have done.
SWWAF_MODE: observe
# Look addresses up in a local IPinfo Lite database, never GeoJS.
SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE: file
SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH: /var/lib/ipinfo/ipinfo_lite.mmdb
# Alerts to an ntfy topic, with its token read from a file.
SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL: https://ntfy.example/smallwebwaf
SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/smallwebwaf/tokens/ntfy
SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS: ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,source_failure,file_error
volumes:
- servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf
- /srv/ipinfo:/var/lib/ipinfo:ro
- /srv/smallwebwaf/tokens:/etc/smallwebwaf/tokens:ro
volumes:
servewaf-state:
```
The database is mounted by its directory, not by file, so that a replaced
database is seen. A token file belongs to uid 65532, the `smallwebwaf` user,
with mode `0400`. This one holds an access token the ntfy server issued, which
`ntfy token add <user>` prints there:
```sh
mkdir -p /srv/smallwebwaf/tokens
# <token> is the access token that ntfy printed.
echo '<token>' > /srv/smallwebwaf/tokens/ntfy
chown 65532:65532 /srv/smallwebwaf/tokens/ntfy
chmod 0400 /srv/smallwebwaf/tokens/ntfy
```
## Design
How it works inside. [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) gives every rule in full, and why.
### What happens to a request
A request goes through these steps, in this order. Once `servewaf` refuses a
request, the steps after that are skipped, apart from the report, and nothing of
the request reaches the app.
`rproxy` takes the first two:
1. The health check, `GET /_smallwebwaf/healthz`, is answered at once.
2. The visitor's address is worked out, and `servewaf` is asked about the
request.
2. The visitor's address is worked out from `X-Forwarded-For`, believed only
from `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES`. `rproxy` sends `servewaf` the request as the
visitor sent it, with the first 64 KiB of its body.
`servewaf` takes the checks:
@@ -232,7 +593,8 @@ nothing of the request reaches the app. "What happens to a request" in
5. The lookup of the client's AS number and country.
6. The country lists.
7. The reputation sources.
8. The client's limit percentage.
8. The client's limit percentage, from its AS number, its country or a
reputation hit.
9. The rate limits.
10. The trap paths.
11. The rule files.
@@ -242,85 +604,117 @@ nothing of the request reaches the app. "What happens to a request" in
`rproxy` takes the rest, with `servewaf` counting at the end:
14. The request is passed to the app.
15. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `servewaf` a report. For an allowed
request, `servewaf` counts the byte limits and adds the request to the
client's history.
14. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
15. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `servewaf` a report with the status and the
bytes each way. For an allowed request, `servewaf` counts the bytes toward
the byte limits and adds the request to the client's history.
A refused visitor is answered with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE`, `403` by default (see
"Ban lengths, response and scope" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)). A `block` rule or a
Core Rule Set match answers `403`. `rproxy` itself answers `405` to a method it
does not pass on, and the status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a
body too large (see "`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)).
A refused visitor is answered with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a
Core Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has
false positives; such refusals count toward `SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`
instead. A request over the header limits of step 12 is answered `431`, and bans
nobody either. `rproxy` itself answers `405` to a method it does not pass on,
and the status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
## Settings you are likely to touch
### Clients and bans
Each setting is an environment variable, read at start. Those of `servewaf`
start with `SWWAF_`, and those of `rproxy` with `SWRP_`.
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) lists every setting, its default and the
values it takes. The ones most deployments touch:
- A client is one IPv4 address or one IPv6 netblock of
`SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX`, since one abuser usually controls a whole /64.
- Each limit is counted over a sliding window with a few integers per client.
The table of clients and the table of bans each have a bound
(`SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, `SWWAF_MAX_BANS`), so memory is bounded too.
- A ban refuses every request from its netblock until it ends. Requests refused
under a ban count toward no limit. A permanent ban ends only when an admin
lifts it.
- Every ban carries notes: the client's AS number and country, the limit it
broke or the rule it matched, the request that caused it, and its earlier
bans. An admin adds, keeps or lifts a ban by editing `bans.json` or through
the ban endpoints (see [`docs/admin-endpoints.md`](docs/admin-endpoints.md)).
- `SWWAF_MODE=observe`: `servewaf` refuses nothing and makes no ban of its own.
A request it would have refused is passed to the app, and its log line says
what `enforce` mode would have done. For trying a configuration before
enforcing it. The limits of `rproxy` still apply.
- `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`: netblocks you trust, such as your monitoring. Their
clients skip `servewaf`'s checks.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`: netblocks exempt from rate limiting and the
byte limits, such as a machine that talks to the app all day.
- `SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS`: paths only scanners ask for, such as
`/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php` in front of a code forge. A request for one bans
the client.
- `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES`: Core Rule Set rule ids to switch off when a rule
refuses your app's ordinary requests. The log line names the rules a request
matched. Keep the six default ids in a list you give (see
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md)).
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` and `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`: raise them for an app
that takes uploads over 100 MiB or slower than 60 seconds.
- `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`: `allow` (the default) or `deny`, as above.
- `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES`: the netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy`
believes, by default the private address ranges.
- `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE`: `geojs` (the default), `file` or `off`, as above.
- `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` and `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN`: switch on the ban endpoints and
the metrics, at `servewaf`'s own address.
- `SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL`, `SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` or
`SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL`: where alerts go.
- `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME`: the name in every line `servewaf` logs, and in every
alert and metric, such as `fsn1/servewaf`.
### Attack detection
## Checking that it works
- The Core Rule Set reads the method, the URL with its query string, and the
headers of every request, and no body unless `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` is set. In
front of a code forge, bodies carry what people write and publish, which the
rules take for attacks.
- `smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set in seven ways so that it lets ordinary
requests to a code forge through, such as git over HTTP and sign-in through
Git Credential Manager. No setting undoes them; "Attack detection" in
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists them.
- `SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` switches single rules off for an app's
own fields or paths. gitea's exclusions, in
`deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf`, let its searches, file names and branch
names through.
- Rule files are plain text, one rule to a line, edited by hand and read again
while `servewaf` runs. The image ships one file of probes no real visitor
sends (see [`docs/rules.md`](docs/rules.md)).
- `docker inspect --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' <container>` says
`healthy` for each container of `smallwebwaf`:
- for `rproxy`, once it answers and the app accepts connections, whether or
not `servewaf` answers;
- for `servewaf`, once it answers.
- A log line with `"msg":"starting"` gives the version, the address and every
setting in effect, with secrets masked.
- A request to the site through traefik gets the app's answer.
`https://<site>/_smallwebwaf/healthz` answers `ok`. `servewaf`'s log lines
about the request have `"action":"forward"`.
- To see a refusal without banning yourself, run `servewaf` with
`SWWAF_MODE=observe` and ask for `/.env`. The request reaches the app.
`servewaf`'s log lines have `"would_action":"banned"` and
`"rule_ids":["env-file"]`. In `enforce` mode the same request bans your
address for seven days, and your next request makes the ban permanent. Lift
the ban by editing `bans.json` (see "Bans" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)).
- With `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` set, this answers with the metrics, from a host on
`servewaf`'s network:
`curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://servewaf:8080/_smallwebwaf/metrics`.
- `make example-app` builds the image and the example app on it, runs the app
with `rproxy` in its container and `servewaf` in another, and checks them. It
needs network access. It checks:
- the health checks;
- a request passed to the app;
- a ban for a broken limit, and a ban for a probe made permanent;
- that only `servewaf`'s container changes the state directory's owner;
- with `servewaf` stopped, the app still answering through `rproxy`;
- with `servewaf` started again, bans applying again;
- orderly stops with `sv stop` and `docker stop`;
- bans surviving a new container on the same volume;
- a setting given as a file.
### State files
`servewaf` keeps everything in memory, and the five JSON files in
`SWWAF_STATE_DIR` hold a copy: `bans.json`, `clients.json`, `lookups.json`,
`reputation.json` and `alerts.json`. Each is written whole, to a temporary file
renamed over the real one, so a crash leaves a complete file. `servewaf` notices
a file edited on disk and takes the edit in; an edit that does not parse is set
aside as `<name>.bad`, and never stops the running process (see
[`docs/state-files.md`](docs/state-files.md)).
### The image and its processes
- The image is built on Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, pinned by digest. Its Ubuntu packages
come from Ubuntu's archive, and nixpkgs is fixed at one release. An app's
`Dockerfile` installs a package with `nix-env -iA nixpkgs.<name>` and gets the
same package each time it is built (see [`docs/image.md`](docs/image.md)).
- runit, a service supervisor, runs `smallwebwaf` as the `smallwebwaf` user (uid
and gid 65532) and starts it again when it exits. The `run` script of
`servewaf` gives the state directory to the `smallwebwaf` user at each start,
so a volume needs no change of owner.
- `rproxy` and `servewaf` use no token between them. `servewaf`'s own endpoints,
under `/_smallwebwaf/`, are for your admin tools and your metrics collector,
at its own address on the private network; nothing routes the internet there.
- `docker stop` gives requests in progress five seconds to finish. With `rproxy`
in the app's container, the app must keep answering for five seconds after
`SIGTERM` for that to help them.
- Only faults found at start stop a process: an invalid setting, a rule file or
state file that does not parse, a lookup database that cannot be read, or an
address it cannot listen on. Once running, a failing lookup service,
reputation source or alert destination never takes `servewaf` down.
### Packages
- `cmd/smallwebwaf`: the binary, which only calls `internal/smallwebwaf`.
- `internal/smallwebwaf`: the process, as the command it is given, and the
health check.
- `internal/config`: reads the settings, the one place they are read.
- `internal/rproxy`: the reverse proxy in front of one app.
- `internal/servewaf`: `servewaf`'s server, which runs the checks and answers
its own endpoints.
- `internal/ratelimit`, `internal/bans`, `internal/rules`, `internal/waf`,
`internal/lookup`, `internal/reputation`, `internal/anomaly` and
`internal/alerts`: one check or source each.
- `internal/state`, `internal/requestlog`, `internal/remotelog` and
`internal/metrics`: the state files, the log lines, the syslog sender and the
metrics.
## Rationale
Small self-hosted sites receive a great deal of traffic nobody asked for:
- scrapers that ignore `robots.txt` and crawl every commit of every repository
on a public git server;
- scanners walking through lists of WordPress and `.env` paths;
- credential-guessing bots.
Most of it comes from a small number of hosting networks and countries. A
single-person operation has no abuse desk and no CDN contract. It needs
something small that can be put in front of its services and left alone.
The existing tools each solve part of this. Rule-based firewalls catch attack
payloads but do not limit request rates. Rate limiters count requests but cannot
tell a residential visitor from a rented server farm. The products that do most
of it want a database and a web console. None of them can say "clients from
these networks are banned after half as many requests as anyone else".
[`EVALUATION.md`](EVALUATION.md) goes through the candidates one by one.
## Entrypoints
@@ -368,83 +762,32 @@ on the host.
- `servewaf` listens on port 8090;
- its state files go in `bin/state`;
- its rule files are those of `share/rules.d`.
- `script/example-app`: builds the image and the example app on it, runs them
with a volume, and checks them as "Checking that it works" above describes.
Then it removes the containers, the network, the volumes and the images. Needs
network access. `make example-app`.
- `script/example-app`: builds the image and the example app
(`deploy/example-app`) on it, runs the app with `rproxy` in its container and
`servewaf` in another, and checks them. Then it removes the containers, the
network, the volumes and the images. Needs network access. `make example-app`.
It checks:
- the health checks;
- a request passed to the app;
- a ban for a broken limit, and a ban for a probe made permanent;
- that only `servewaf`'s container changes the state directory's owner;
- with `servewaf` stopped, the app still answering through `rproxy`;
- with `servewaf` started again, bans applying again;
- orderly stops with `sv stop` and `docker stop`;
- bans surviving a new container on the same volume;
- a setting given as a file.
- `script/gitea-requests`: builds the image and runs gitea 1.27.3 behind
`rproxy` and `servewaf`, three containers on one network. Every setting is at
its default, but for those that join the containers and the header that labels
each request. It sends through them a sample of gitea's ordinary use and the
requests the Core Rule Set is known to refuse, and prints what `servewaf` did
with each. Needs network access, and a docker daemon that pushes to a registry
on `localhost` over plain HTTP. [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md) records the
results. `make gitea-requests`.
## Rationale
Small self-hosted sites receive a great deal of traffic nobody asked for:
- scrapers that ignore `robots.txt` and crawl every commit of every repository
on a public git server;
- scanners walking through lists of WordPress and `.env` paths;
- credential-guessing bots.
Most of it comes from a small number of hosting networks and countries. A
single-person operation has no abuse desk and no CDN contract. It needs
something small that can be put in front of its services and left alone.
The existing tools each solve part of this. Rule-based firewalls catch attack
payloads but do not limit request rates. Rate limiters count requests but cannot
tell a residential visitor from a rented server farm. The products that do most
of it want a database and a web console. None of them can say "clients from
these networks are banned after half as many requests as anyone else". That is
the useful thing to say when nearly all abuse comes from a known list of AS
numbers. [`EVALUATION.md`](EVALUATION.md) goes through the candidates one by
one.
`smallwebwaf` fills that gap with:
- per-client limits that ban;
- lower limits for the networks and countries abuse comes from;
- bans that grow with repetition;
- a log that is easy to search and ship;
- a site that keeps answering while the part that decides is down;
- one binary, with no database and one required setting.
## Design
The `smallwebwaf` image is built on Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, pinned by digest, with
nixpkgs fixed at one release. An app's `Dockerfile` installs a package with
`nix-env -iA nixpkgs.<name>` and gets the same package each time it is built.
[`docs/image.md`](docs/image.md) lists what the image holds and how each part is
pinned.
- runit, a service supervisor, runs `smallwebwaf` and starts it again when it
exits. In an app's image built on the `smallwebwaf` image, it runs `rproxy`
and the app side by side, each as its own user.
- `rproxy` listens on port 8080 and passes requests to the app at
`SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`. It answers the health check itself, and the refusals and
errors "`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists.
- `servewaf` listens on port 8080 of its own container. Nothing should route the
internet there. Its own endpoints, under `/_smallwebwaf/`, are for your admin
tools and your metrics collector.
- `rproxy` and `servewaf` use no token between them. Anything on their private
network can ask `servewaf` a question, or send it a report.
- The app sees the headers traefik sent, with traefik's address added to
`X-Forwarded-For`, from a TCP peer that is `rproxy`. So the app must trust
`rproxy`'s address for forwarded headers. With `rproxy` in the app's
container, that address is `127.0.0.1` or `::1`, which the private address
ranges leave out.
- The state files live in `/var/lib/smallwebwaf` in `servewaf`'s container. A
volume mounted there keeps them across a deploy.
- `docker stop` gives requests in progress five seconds to finish. With `rproxy`
in the app's container, the app must keep answering for five seconds after
`SIGTERM` for that to help them.
"Deployment" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) has the rest: the health checks, what
happens when a process stops, moving a port, and the forwarded headers.
"Architecture" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists the packages and what each does.
its default, but for those that join the containers and
`SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS`, which adds the header that labels each request.
It sends through them a sample of gitea's ordinary use and the requests the
Core Rule Set is known to refuse, and prints what `servewaf` did with each.
Needs network access, and a docker daemon that pushes to a registry on
`localhost` over plain HTTP. `make gitea-requests`.
- `script/gitea-setup`: builds the image, brings up the setup in `deploy/gitea`,
and checks it as [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md) describes. Then it removes
the containers, the network, the volumes and the image it built. Needs network
access. `make gitea-setup`.
## TODO
@@ -457,8 +800,7 @@ happens when a process stops, moving a port, and the forwarded headers.
- [`EVALUATION.md`](EVALUATION.md): what already exists, what each tool covers
and misses, and why none was adopted.
- [`REPO_POLICIES.md`](REPO_POLICIES.md): the policies this repository follows.
- [`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md): every setting, its default and the
values it takes.
- [`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md): every setting and the values it takes.
- [`docs/rules.md`](docs/rules.md): the rule file format and the default file.
- [`docs/admin-endpoints.md`](docs/admin-endpoints.md): the endpoints under
`/_smallwebwaf/`, with examples.
@@ -469,7 +811,8 @@ happens when a process stops, moving a port, and the forwarded headers.
- [`docs/state-files.md`](docs/state-files.md): the state files and what each
holds.
- [`docs/image.md`](docs/image.md): what the image holds and how it is pinned.
- [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md): `smallwebwaf` in front of gitea.
- [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md): `smallwebwaf` in front of gitea: the setup
in `deploy/gitea`, and what the defaults do there.
## License
+63 -51
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ to them.
- the state files;
- a lookup database;
- a `SWWAF_` setting given as a file;
- the file `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` names.
- the file `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` names;
- the file `SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` names.
## Non-goals
@@ -66,10 +67,10 @@ to them.
one it does not know, the binary prints the commands and exits with
status 2.
- `internal/config`: reads the settings, the one place they are read.
- `internal/proxy`: `servewaf`'s server. It runs the checks in `check`, and
holds `servewaf`'s question, answer and report. It answers `servewaf`'s
own endpoints in `answerOwnEndpoint`. It counts bytes, refusals and
anomalies, and writes the log lines.
- `internal/servewaf`: `servewaf`'s server. It runs the checks in `check`,
and holds `servewaf`'s question, answer and report. It answers
`servewaf`'s own endpoints in `answerOwnEndpoint`. It counts bytes,
refusals and anomalies, and writes the log lines.
- `internal/rproxy`: the reverse proxy in front of one app that asks
`servewaf` about each request. It passes a request to the app with the
standard library's `httputil.ReverseProxy`, within the time and size
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ to them.
of bans is full.
- `internal/rules`: reads the rule files at start and again when they
change, and tells which rules a request matches.
- `internal/waf`: the Core Rule Set, with the six changes listed under
- `internal/waf`: the Core Rule Set, with the seven changes listed under
"Attack detection", as Coraza directives.
- `internal/lookup`: looks clients up through GeoJS or in the lookup
database.
@@ -325,9 +326,10 @@ Conventions:
lists: `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE` names the file that holds `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN`.
The file's contents are the value, less one newline at the end, and are
checked as the value itself would be. Setting both forms stops the start, and
so does naming a file that cannot be read. `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE`
already holds a file name, so it has no `_FILE` form. No `SWRP_` setting has
one, since `rproxy` never touches disk.
so does naming a file that cannot be read. `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` and
`SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` already hold a file name, so they have
no `_FILE` form. No `SWRP_` setting has one, since `rproxy` never touches
disk.
- Settings, files included, are read once at start. Changing one means
restarting the container. The files `servewaf` watches while it runs are its
state files, its rule files and the lookup database.
@@ -397,32 +399,31 @@ Conventions:
### Request rate limits, per client
Breaking one bans the client. The defaults suit programmatic use of an API, such
as an automation fleet on another host, and still stop abusive bots. A fleet of
20 agents, each making a request every 10 seconds at its busiest, makes 120
requests a minute and 7,200 an hour. Working around the clock, it makes 172,800
a day. It stays under all three limits.
Breaking one bans the client. The defaults let people read a site and stop
scrapers that send many requests slowly over hours or days. The hour limit is
the main one.
- Per minute: 500, about 8 requests a second. It leaves room for the fleet's 120
a minute and a few quick first visits with an empty cache. A gitea page opened
with an empty cache loads about 40 files. A client firing requests as fast as
it can passes the limit within seconds.
- Per hour: 20,000, about 5.5 requests a second for a whole hour. A client that
keeps up 6 a second makes 21,600 in an hour, and passes it, at 360 a minute,
under the minute limit. The fleet's 7,200 an hour is about a third of it.
- Per day: 300,000, about 3.5 requests a second around the clock. A scraper that
keeps up 4 a second makes 345,600 a day, and passes it. At 240 a minute and
14,400 an hour, it stays under the other two limits.
- Per minute: 120, 2 requests a second. It leaves room for a person opening two
pages at once with an empty cache. A gitea page opened with an empty cache
loads 20 to 60 files, and a handful once cached.
- Per hour: 1,500. A person reading code in gitea for a whole hour, a page every
20 seconds, makes about 900 requests. A scraper making one request every 2
seconds makes 1,800 an hour, more than the limit.
- Per day: 6,000, four hours at the hour limit. A scraper making one request
every 10 seconds makes 8,640 a day, more than the limit.
Counting cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits, such as one
that keeps up 3 requests a second. Only the other checks can catch an abuser
Counting cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits, about 4
requests a minute around the clock. Only the other checks can catch an abuser
that slow. They include the trap paths, the rule files, the Core Rule Set and
the blocklists. An abuser that trips none of them is not caught. A machine that
keeps up more than 500 requests a minute passes the minute limit. One that keeps
up more than about 5.5 a second for an hour passes the hour limit. One that
keeps up more than about 3.5 a second all day passes the day limit, as two busy
Actions runners on one address do. Such a machine's address belongs in
`SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
the blocklists. An abuser that trips none of them is not caught.
Some legitimate clients pass the limits:
- An Actions runner asks gitea for work all day and can pass the limits.
- Everyone behind one shared address, such as an office, shares one client's
limits.
Their addresses belong in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
`SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` takes path prefixes out of the count, such as
static assets or health checks; their bytes are not counted either. A prefix is
@@ -435,12 +436,10 @@ matched the same way.
### Byte limits, per client
The hour and day limits sit about twice above what 40 people busy with heavy web
apps move together on one address. Each moves about 256 MiB an hour, for ten
hours a day. A response's bytes are counted when it ends (see step 15). So the
minute limit holds three of the largest responses, with their requests, ending
in the same minute. No single download then breaks a limit. An operator who
raises `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` must raise the byte limits too.
By default there is no minute limit, so a client can download in a burst at full
speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB and the day limit to 100 GiB. They
allow several downloads of a few GiB each. A response's bytes are counted when
it ends (see step 15).
### Lookup of AS number and country
@@ -586,6 +585,24 @@ sends it.
probes these rules caught (see "Rule files"). A list you give replaces the
default, so name these six ids in it to keep them off.
- `SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` names a file of exclusions, written as
Coraza directives. An exclusion switches one rule off for some fields or paths
only, where `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` switches it off everywhere.
`deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf` holds gitea's.
- `servewaf` loads the file after `smallwebwaf`'s own setup rules and before
the Core Rule Set's rules. The Core Rule Set puts its own file of
exclusions that run before the rules in the same place.
- So the file holds only `SecAction` and `SecRule` lines that exclude with
`ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById` or `ctl:ruleRemoveById`. These run with each
request, before the rules they exclude, those of phase 1 included.
- A rule that `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` switches off and the file names is
simply off.
- The start stops on a file that cannot be read or does not parse, whatever
`SWWAF_WAF_MODE` is.
- It stops too on a file that names a number from 900000 to 900999, the ids
of `smallwebwaf`'s own rules, alone or in a range. Comment lines are not
checked.
- `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` switches body inspection on, up to that size. It takes
at most `64K`, since `servewaf` gets no more of a body than that (see "The
answer"). Form data and multipart bodies are read up to the size. JSON and XML
@@ -615,7 +632,7 @@ sends it.
scanner from an ordinary client. In front of gitea, registry and git clients
get `404` and `401` by design, hundreds of times a minute.
`smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set 4.25.0 in six ways, since in front of
`smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set 4.25.0 in seven ways, since in front of
gitea it would otherwise refuse ordinary requests. The changes hold in front of
every app, and no setting undoes them:
@@ -672,6 +689,10 @@ every app, and no setting undoes them:
must check it itself.
6. Responses are not inspected. A raw file from a repository, such as a shell
script, looks to the response rules like source code leaking from the server.
7. The `from` parameter of a container registry's upload path,
`/v2/<image>/blobs/uploads/`, is not checked for command names (932260). When
a push reuses a layer, `from` names the image the layer comes from. An image
such as `owner/python3-app` would have that push refused.
The parameter and cookie names in these changes are matched without regard to
case, as Coraza matches them.
@@ -1544,20 +1565,11 @@ It sets no `ENTRYPOINT` or `USER` of its own. The container must start
- The image is Ubuntu's newest long-term support release, pinned by digest, and
moves to the next LTS release when that ships. Its packages come from Ubuntu's
snapshot service, the archive as it was at the moment the Dockerfile names,
rather than the live archive, whose packages change with every update. The
snapshot is never older than the pinned Ubuntu image, since older packages can
need older versions of packages the image holds, and it moves forward with the
image's digest. The Dockerfile names the hash of each of the snapshot's
`InRelease` files, which cover every package list and so every package, and
the build checks them before installing. The live archive's `InRelease` files,
which `apt-get update` also fetches and the install does not use, are left out
of the check. The hashes are the amd64 archive's, so the image is built for
amd64 only.
archive, whose packages change with every update.
- The Ubuntu image has no CA certificates. Without them Nix cannot download
packages and `servewaf` cannot reach GeoJS, so `ca-certificates` is installed
by name. The snapshot itself is fetched over HTTPS with the CA certificates of
the Go image that builds `smallwebwaf`, itself pinned by digest.
by name. apt fetches the packages over plain HTTP and checks each one against
the archive's signed package lists, so the install needs no CA certificates.
- nixpkgs comes from a release file on `releases.nixos.org`, named with its
hash, not from a GitHub archive, whose bytes can change. Root uses Nix
directly; no Nix daemon runs. `nix-bin` creates no build users, so
+136
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
# Gitea behind traefik, with rproxy and servewaf in front of it.
# docs/gitea.md says what each setting here does and why. Before starting it:
# - set SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE to the smallwebwaf image, named by digest;
# - replace git.example.org with the site's host name;
# - replace each 10.99.0 with the first three numbers of a /24 subnet that
# no other network on the host uses. The /24 must lie inside 10.0.0.0/8,
# 172.16.0.0/12 or 192.168.0.0/16, because rproxy believes
# X-Forwarded-For only from those by default. Replace each fd10:99 with
# the first two hextets of an unused /64 subnet whose third and fourth
# hextets are 0, as in fd10:99::/64;
# - set GITEA_SECRET_KEY to the output of
# `docker run --rm <gitea's image below> gitea generate secret SECRET_KEY`,
# once per install, and keep it.
# Then run `docker compose up --detach` in this directory.
# script/gitea-setup checks this setup.
name: gitea
x-logging: &logging
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: 10m
max-file: "5"
services:
traefik:
# traefik v3.7.17, 2026-11-03
image: traefik@sha256:68ae5fe5b64ca166704b746a9e8afcd385e36b3f569a5691401bf652d57b3748
# traefik replaces the X-Forwarded-For header a visitor sends. Keep it
# so: otherwise a visitor could name an address on the shared network,
# and skip servewaf's checks.
command:
- --providers.docker.exposedbydefault=false
- --entrypoints.web.address=:80
- --entrypoints.web.http.redirections.entrypoint.to=websecure
- --entrypoints.websecure.address=:443
# Until a certificate resolver is added here, as for your other
# sites, traefik answers with a certificate it made itself.
- --entrypoints.websecure.http.tls=true
# traefik's own limit of 60 seconds for a whole request would cut
# off an upload long before rproxy's limit of 30 minutes.
- --entrypoints.websecure.transport.respondingTimeouts.readTimeout=30m
ports:
- 80:80
- 443:443
volumes:
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
networks:
shared:
# Containers on the shared network find traefik under the
# site's name, and so reach it from their own address.
aliases:
- git.example.org
restart: unless-stopped
gitea:
# gitea 1.27.3, 2026-08-29
image: gitea/gitea@sha256:87a67ee09d3ae0d1df5fda5dcda3e2a1f9236a45b0a59025d6e00e46adc43bef
environment:
GITEA__server__ROOT_URL: https://git.example.org/
# Gitea starts at its defaults, with SQLite, instead of showing its
# install page to whoever opens it first.
GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK: "true"
GITEA__security__SECRET_KEY: ${GITEA_SECRET_KEY:?set GITEA_SECRET_KEY, see docs/gitea.md}
# Accounts are made with `gitea admin user create`.
GITEA__service__DISABLE_REGISTRATION: "true"
# rproxy's addresses. Gitea then takes each visitor's address from
# the X-Real-Ip header traefik sets and rproxy passes on.
GITEA__security__REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES: 10.99.0.2,fd10:99::2
volumes:
- gitea-data:/data
networks:
- shared
restart: unless-stopped
rproxy:
image: ${SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE:?set SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE to the smallwebwaf image}
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://servewaf:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://gitea:3000
# Pushes, LFS objects, packages and release attachments of up to
# 2 GiB, sent in up to 30 minutes.
SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE: 2G
SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS: "1800000"
# 15 minutes for a clone or a download, half the default.
SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS: "900000"
labels:
traefik.enable: "true"
traefik.http.routers.gitea.rule: Host(`git.example.org`)
traefik.http.routers.gitea.entrypoints: websecure
traefik.http.services.gitea.loadbalancer.server.port: "8080"
networks:
shared:
ipv4_address: 10.99.0.2
ipv6_address: fd10:99::2
logging: *logging
restart: unless-stopped
servewaf:
image: ${SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE:?set SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE to the smallwebwaf image}
environment:
SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: servewaf
# The containers on the shared network skip the checks. Add the
# address of an automation fleet on another host here too; without
# that, it is counted like any client.
SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS: 10.99.0.128/25,fd10:99:0:0:8000::/65
# The Core Rule Set's exclusions for Gitea's searches, file names
# and branch names.
SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: /etc/smallwebwaf/crs-exclusions.conf
volumes:
- servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf
- ./crs-exclusions.conf:/etc/smallwebwaf/crs-exclusions.conf:ro
networks:
- shared
logging: *logging
restart: unless-stopped
networks:
# The network traefik and Gitea share. Its containers get addresses in the
# upper half of each subnet, which servewaf lets skip the checks. Each
# subnet's gateway, the host's own address on it, stays out of that half:
# requests docker passes on from a published port can come from it.
shared:
enable_ipv6: true
ipam:
config:
- subnet: 10.99.0.0/24
ip_range: 10.99.0.128/25
gateway: 10.99.0.1
- subnet: fd10:99::/64
ip_range: fd10:99:0:0:8000::/65
gateway: fd10:99::1
volumes:
gitea-data:
servewaf-state:
+150
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@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
# The Core Rule Set's exclusions for Gitea, which servewaf loads from
# SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE. servewaf loads this file before the Core
# Rule Set's rules, so it holds only exclusions made while a request is checked:
# SecAction and SecRule lines with ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById or
# ctl:ruleRemoveById. Each switches one rule off for the Gitea fields or paths
# where it refused ordinary Gitea requests. A SecAction applies on every path, a
# SecRule on the paths it matches. Gitea sends these in the query string:
# - q: the text of every search;
# - file, path, template, body and redirect_to: a file name, alone or in
# JSON or a link;
# - name, tag, rule_name and refSubUrl: a branch or tag name.
# docs/gitea.md says how to add an exclusion.
# Searches.
# 930110: a search for ../
SecAction "id:10001,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930110;ARGS:q"
# 931100: a search for http://127.0.0.1:8080
SecAction "id:10002,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931100;ARGS:q"
# 932140: a search for if (a == b) {
SecAction "id:10003,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932140;ARGS:q"
# 932235: a search for `make check`
SecAction "id:10004,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:q"
# 932250: a search for ls -la
SecAction "id:10005,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:q"
# 932380: a search for `whoami`
SecAction "id:10006,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:q"
# 933100: a search for <?php echo
SecAction "id:10007,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=933100;ARGS:q"
# 933130: a search for $_GET[
SecAction "id:10008,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=933130;ARGS:q"
# 933135: a search for ${VAR}
SecAction "id:10009,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=933135;ARGS:q"
# 934110: a search for http://127.0.0.1:8080
SecAction "id:10010,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934110;ARGS:q"
# 941100: a search for <script>
SecAction "id:10011,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941100;ARGS:q"
# 941110: a search for <script>, or a page opened from its results
SecAction "id:10012,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941110;ARGS:q,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941110;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# 941120: a page opened from the results of a search for onClick={
SecAction "id:10013,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941120;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# 941160: a search for <img src=, or a page opened from its results
SecAction "id:10014,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941160;ARGS:q,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941160;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# 941390: a search for fetch(
SecAction "id:10015,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941390;ARGS:q"
# 942100: a search for SELECT * FROM users WHERE, or a page opened from the
# results of a search for LIKE '%foo%'
SecAction "id:10016,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;ARGS:q,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# 942190: a search for union select
SecAction "id:10017,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942190;ARGS:q"
# 942230: a search for if (a == b) {
SecAction "id:10018,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942230;ARGS:q"
# 944100: a search for java.lang.Runtime, or a page opened from its results
SecAction "id:10019,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944100;ARGS:q,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944100;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# Searches, and file, branch and tag names.
# 930120: a search for package.json, or the commit graph of .gitignore
SecAction "id:10020,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|template|body|refsuburl|name|tag|rule_name)$/"
# 932160: a search for /bin/sh, or the API's contents of bin/docker-entrypoint
SecAction "id:10021,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|template|body|refsuburl|name|tag|rule_name)$/"
# 932260: a search for python3, or deleting the branch docker-build
SecAction "id:10022,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|template|body|refsuburl|name|tag|rule_name)$/"
# Searches, and file names in the query string.
# 932120: a search for Invoke-WebRequest, or the commits of install-script.sh
SecAction "id:10023,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 932130: a search for $(pwd), or an issue opened from the template [draft].md
SecAction "id:10024,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932130;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 934100: a search for process.env, or the commits of process.env.d.ts
SecAction "id:10025,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 934130: a search for __proto__, or the commits of __proto__.json
SecAction "id:10026,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934130;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 941130: the commits of index.xhtml
SecAction "id:10027,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;\
ARGS:/^(?:file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 941180: a search for document.cookie, or the commits of document.write.js
SecAction "id:10028,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941180;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 942140: a search for information_schema, or the commits of
# information_schema.sql
SecAction "id:10029,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942140;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 944110: a search for java.lang.Runtime, or the commits of Runtime.java
SecAction "id:10030,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944110;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/"
# 944130: a search for java.lang.Runtime, the commits of java.lang.String.md,
# or any page opened from that file's page, which names it in the Referer
SecAction "id:10031,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;\
ARGS:/^(?:q|file|path|template|body|redirect_to)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# File names in the path of a file's page, raw file, blame, history and edit
# page, and of the API's calls for its contents.
# 920500: the page of notes.txt~
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:api/v1/repos/)?[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:src|raw|media|blame|commits|_edit|_delete|contents)/" \
"id:10032,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920500;REQUEST_FILENAME"
# 934100: the page of process.env.d.ts
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:api/v1/repos/)?[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:src|raw|media|blame|commits|_edit|_delete|contents)/" \
"id:10033,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;REQUEST_FILENAME"
# 941130: the page of docs/a b.xhtml
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:api/v1/repos/)?[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:src|raw|media|blame|commits|_edit|_delete|contents)/" \
"id:10034,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;REQUEST_FILENAME"
# 944130: the page of java.lang.String.md
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:api/v1/repos/)?[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:src|raw|media|blame|commits|_edit|_delete|contents)/" \
"id:10035,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;REQUEST_FILENAME"
# The file name, in name, of an attachment uploaded through the API to a
# release, an issue or a comment.
# 932120: the attachment install-script.sh
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10036,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:name"
# 934100: the attachment process.env.d.ts
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10037,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;ARGS:name"
# 934130: the attachment __proto__.json
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10038,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934130;ARGS:name"
# 941130: the attachment index.xhtml
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10039,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;ARGS:name"
# 941180: the attachment document.write.js
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10040,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941180;ARGS:name"
# 942140: the attachment information_schema.sql
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10041,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942140;ARGS:name"
# 944130: the attachment java.lang.String.md
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
"id:10042,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;ARGS:name"
# The header Content-Range of an artifact upload.
# 920450: an artifact upload from actions/upload-artifact@v3
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/actions_pipeline/_apis/pipelines/workflows/[0-9]+/artifacts/[^/]+/upload$" \
"id:10043,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920450;REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES:Content-Range"
+164 -178
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@@ -1,220 +1,206 @@
# smallwebwaf in front of gitea
These notes record what `smallwebwaf` does in front of gitea at the default
settings. They are observations, not requirements; the requirements are in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md). `script/gitea-requests` runs gitea behind `rproxy` and
`servewaf`, and sends through them a sample of gitea's ordinary use and the
requests named below. It reports each request the Core Rule Set refuses, so that
these notes can be checked again when gitea or the Core Rule Set changes
version.
`deploy/gitea/compose.yaml` runs gitea behind traefik, with `rproxy` and
`servewaf` in front of it. This document says what that setup sets and why, and
what the defaults would do without it. [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how
`smallwebwaf` behaves.
## What the defaults cover
## The setup
- SSH access to gitea does not pass through `smallwebwaf` and is not protected
by it.
- A clone is a response. It fits the defaults of 30 minutes and 1 GiB unless the
repository is large or the link slow. A repository whose clone is larger than
1 GiB needs `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` raised, and the byte limits with it
("Byte limits, per client" in `SPEC.md`).
- A push is a request, and so is every other upload:
- a git push;
- an LFS object;
- a container image layer;
- a package file;
- a release attachment.
Four containers share one Docker network, the shared network:
At the defaults, an upload larger than 100 MiB or taking more than 60
seconds is cut off ("`rproxy`'s limits" in `SPEC.md`). A gitea that takes
large uploads needs `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` and `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`
raised to fit.
- traefik, which routes the site's HTTPS requests to `rproxy`, and redirects
plain HTTP to HTTPS;
- `rproxy`, in front of gitea;
- gitea 1.27.3, as its image comes;
- `servewaf`, with a volume for its state files, and with
`deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf` mounted read-only.
- Archive download and blame or history pages are what scrapers hammer. The
request limits do most of the work there.
- An Actions runner that reaches gitea through `smallwebwaf` sends requests all
day. One older than version 0.4 (April 2026) asks for work every 2 seconds,
43,200 requests a day. While it runs a job, it reports the job's log and state
every second instead, two requests a second. So one runner busy all day sends
120 requests a minute and 172,800 a day, under the request limits. Two such
runners on one address, each busy all day, make 345,600 and pass the day limit
of 300,000. Three busy at once make 21,600 an hour and pass the hour limit of
20,000. Five busy at once make 600 a minute and pass the minute limit of 500.
Their address is then banned, their running jobs fail, and each repeat within
a day makes the ban longer. Newer runners ask for work less often. Put the
runners' addresses in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
To start it:
## What the Core Rule Set lets through
1. In `deploy/gitea/compose.yaml`, replace `git.example.org` with the site's
host name.
2. Replace each `10.99.0` with the first three numbers of a `/24` subnet that no
other network on the host uses. The `/24` must lie inside `10.0.0.0/8`,
`172.16.0.0/12` or `192.168.0.0/16`, because `rproxy` believes
`X-Forwarded-For` only from those by default. Replace each `fd10:99` with the
first two hextets of an unused `/64` subnet whose third and fourth hextets
are 0, as in `fd10:99::/64`.
3. Set `SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE` to the `smallwebwaf` image, named by digest.
4. Set `GITEA_SECRET_KEY` to the output of
`docker run --rm <gitea's image> gitea generate secret SECRET_KEY`, with
gitea's image as `deploy/gitea/compose.yaml` names it. Do this once per
install, and keep the key.
5. Run `docker compose up --detach` in `deploy/gitea`, with
`crs-exclusions.conf` beside `compose.yaml`.
6. Make gitea's first user with `gitea admin user create`, in gitea's container,
as the user `git`.
At the defaults, the Core Rule Set lets gitea's ordinary use through, apart from
the refusals in the next section:
Sign-up is off: accounts are made with `gitea admin user create`. gitea starts
at its defaults, with SQLite. traefik answers with a certificate it made itself
until you add a certificate resolver, as for your other sites. SSH to gitea does
not pass through `smallwebwaf`; publish gitea's SSH port yourself if you use it.
- browsing and views of files in a repository, with their history, blame and the
file tree;
- diffs, including their hidden lines and large files, and pull request review;
- git's clone, fetch and push over HTTP;
- signing in, including the return to the page a visitor came from, and sign-in
with Git Credential Manager, git-credential-oauth or tea;
- the API's calls for a file and its commits;
- pushing and pulling container images and packages;
- Actions runners, and artifacts uploaded with `actions/upload-artifact@v4`;
- posting issues, pull requests, comments, wiki pages and files saved in the web
editor, code included, since no body is read;
- the page gitea shows after a change, with its message naming what was done.
`make gitea-setup` checks the setup. It builds the image, brings the setup up
under a name of its own, and checks:
## What the Core Rule Set still refuses
- that a page load, a push and a clone sent through traefik pass through
`rproxy`, and that `servewaf` checks them;
- that gitea logs the visitor's address, not `rproxy`'s;
- that a request from a container on the shared network skips the checks;
- that the Core Rule Set refuses none of the ordinary gitea requests in
`internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt`, sent by a signed-in user;
- that it refuses none of the API calls with JSON bodies;
- that it refuses no fetch;
- that it refuses SQL injection, path traversal and script injection in a query
string;
- that with `servewaf` stopped, gitea still answers through `rproxy`.
Each refusal answers only that request ("Bans" in `SPEC.md` says what it counts
toward). The request log names the rule in `waf_rule_ids`, which
`SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` can switch off.
## Uploads and downloads
### A query string that reads as an attack
An upload is a request:
Most often this is a search. A search term is a query parameter, which the Core
Rule Set checks against its lists of system files and commands (see the fourth
change under "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A release attachment uploaded
through the API as `docker-compose.yml` is refused the same way. Examples:
- a git push;
- an LFS object;
- a container image layer;
- a package file;
- a release attachment.
- a name on those lists, such as `package.json`, `.gitignore` or
`docker-compose.yml`;
- text that starts with a command name, such as `python3` or `ssh key`, or has
one right after a `/` in its first word, such as `feat/docker-support`;
- a shell command with its options or a system path (`ls -la`, `sed -i`,
`/bin/sh`), or a command in backticks;
- script code (`fetch(`, `${VAR}`, `process.env`), HTML (`<img src=`) or an SQL
statement (`SELECT * FROM users WHERE`);
- a URL naming an IP address or `localhost`.
The setup lets an upload of up to 2 GiB, sent in up to 30 minutes, through:
### A branch, tag or file name that starts with a command name
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` is `2G`. At the default, an upload over 100 MiB is cut
off.
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` is `1800000`, 30 minutes. At the default, an upload
that takes over 60 seconds is cut off.
- traefik's `readTimeout` is 30 minutes. traefik's own default of 60 seconds for
a whole request would cut off an upload first.
The Core Rule Set's list of commands (932260) holds names such as `docker-`,
`python3`, `ansible`, `base64` and `whoami`. A query parameter holding a branch,
tag or file name that starts with one is refused. So is one that has such a name
right after a `/`, such as `feat/docker-support`, `fix/docker-build` or
`renovate/docker-build-push-action-6.x`. gitea's own pages send the name in a
query parameter that 930120, 932160 and 932260 still check:
A clone or a download is a response:
- `refSubUrl`, the branch or tag of a directory listing. A listing sends it when
it asks for its entries' last commits in a second request. It does so whenever
gitea takes more than a second to work them out;
- `name`, when a branch is deleted or restored on the branches page;
- `tag`, when a release is started from a tag;
- `template`, the file of an issue template, when an issue is opened from it;
- `rule_name`, when a branch protection rule is opened for editing in the
repository's settings or has just been saved.
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` is `900000`, 15 minutes, half the default. A clone
or download that takes longer is cut off.
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` stays at its default, 1 GiB. A repository whose clone
is larger needs it raised.
What a visitor sees, for a branch named `docker-build`:
The byte limits stay at their defaults: no minute limit, 50 GiB an hour and 100
GiB a day.
- A directory listing that makes that second request leaves those last commits
out and shows an error.
- The branches page shows an error instead of deleting or restoring the branch.
- A release started from such a tag gets the `403` answer of `smallwebwaf` in
place of its form. So does an issue opened from such a template, and such a
rule opened for editing.
- Saving such a rule stores it. gitea then returns to the branch settings page,
which gets the `403` answer, so the save looks as if it failed.
## The checks
### A file name in a query parameter that trips the code rules
The Core Rule Set runs in `block` mode, the default, with gitea's exclusions
(see "The Core Rule Set's exclusions" below).
The Core Rule Set's rules for Java, script, PowerShell and SQL find what they
look for in some file names. This holds too in the ten query parameters that
930120, 932160 and 932260 do not check (see the fourth change under "Attack
detection" in `SPEC.md`). Examples:
Every other check stays at its default. A client may make 120 requests a minute,
1,500 an hour and 6,000 a day. Archive downloads and blame and history pages are
what scrapers hammer, and these limits do most of the work there.
- `runtime` in OpenJDK's `src/java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java`
(944110);
- a Java class, as in `java.lang.String.md` (944130);
- `document.write.js` (941180);
- `process.env.d.ts` (934100);
- `__proto__` (934130);
- the PowerShell command `Install-Script`, as in `install-script.sh` (932120);
- a database's name, as in PostgreSQL's `information_schema.sql` (942140).
## The shared network
For such a file, these requests are refused:
Containers on the shared network skip `servewaf`'s checks:
- the API's list of its commits (`path`);
- the API's call for the contents of files that names it in its query (`body`);
- the commit graph of that file alone (`file`);
- the hidden lines of its diff (`path`), which stay hidden;
- the sign-in page, for a visitor who opens a page of the file that needs
signing in, such as its edit page (`redirect_to`). The visitor can still sign
in by opening the sign-in page itself.
- The shared network's subnets are `10.99.0.0/24` and `fd10:99::/64`. Docker
gives its containers addresses in the upper half of each, `10.99.0.128/25` and
`fd10:99:0:0:8000::/65`, which `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` names.
- traefik is known on the shared network by the site's host name. So a container
there that asks for the site reaches traefik from its own address. An
automation fleet in such a container skips the checks.
- Each subnet's gateway, `10.99.0.1` and `fd10:99::1`, is the host's own address
on it. Requests docker passes on from a published port can come from the
gateway, so the gateways are left out of `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`. The network has
IPv6, so a visitor over IPv6 reaches traefik from its own address, and
`servewaf` checks it as itself.
- A container on the shared network that asks for the site at the host's public
address arrives from the gateway. It is checked like any visitor.
- A fleet on another host can have its address added to `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`.
Without that, it is counted like any client.
- traefik replaces the `X-Forwarded-For` a visitor sends, by default. Keep it
so: otherwise a visitor could name an address on the shared network, and skip
the checks.
- Anything on the shared network can reach gitea and `servewaf` around `rproxy`.
Put only containers you trust on it.
### A path
## gitea's settings
- A file name ending in `~`, or an `.xhtml` file whose path holds a space.
- A path that holds what the Core Rule Set takes for a Java class (944130), as
`java.lang.String.md` and
`META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory` do.
- A path that holds what it takes for Node.js code (934100), as
`process.env.d.ts` does.
- A path with a directory named `...` (930100, 930110), such as `.../notes.txt`.
- `REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` names `rproxy`'s fixed addresses, `10.99.0.2`
and `fd10:99::2`. gitea then takes each visitor's address from the `X-Real-Ip`
header, which traefik sets and `rproxy` passes on. Without it, gitea logs
every visitor as `rproxy`.
- `INSTALL_LOCK` is `true`, as "The setup" above says.
For such a file, these are refused:
## Methods
- the page of the file;
- its raw file;
- its history and its blame;
- its edit page.
`rproxy` passes on only these methods: `GET`, `HEAD`, `POST`, `OPTIONS`, `PUT`,
`DELETE`, `PATCH` and `QUERY`. gitea 1.27.3 needs no other. Its routes use:
The directory that holds it lists it, and a clone carries it.
- pages and the API: `GET`, `HEAD`, `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH` and `DELETE`;
- git's push, clone and fetch over HTTP: `GET`, `POST` and `OPTIONS`;
- LFS: `GET`, `POST` and `PUT`;
- the container registry and the other package registries: `GET`, `HEAD`,
`POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH` and `DELETE`;
- Actions runners: `POST`.
### A container image push that reuses a layer
## The log
A push can reuse a layer of an image docker has pushed to that gitea before.
docker then asks gitea to take the layer from that image, naming it in the query
parameter `from`, which 932260 checks. The request is refused when the image's
owner starts with an entry on the list of commands. It is refused too when the
image's name after the owner starts with one. Examples are `owner/python3-app`,
`owner/docker-base`, and any image of an owner named `ansible` or `docker-team`.
`rproxy` and `servewaf` write each query string to the log whole. A token sent
in the query string, as `?token=`, is then in the log. Send it in the
`Authorization` header instead.
What happens next depends on docker's image store. A docker that keeps its
images in containerd's image store fails the push, and fails each new try the
same way. A new install of Docker Engine 29 does this. A docker that keeps them
in its own older image store uploads the layer instead. The push then succeeds
after one refusal for each layer it reuses, and each of those refusals counts
toward the error burst ("Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
## Actions runners
### Artifact uploads from `actions/upload-artifact@v3`
A runner on the shared network skips the checks. One on another host is counted
like any client. A runner older than version 0.4 (April 2026) asks for work
every 2 seconds, 1,800 requests an hour. While it runs a job, it reports the
job's log and state every second instead, two requests a second.
This action sends the header `Content-Range`, which the Core Rule Set refuses
(920450). The action sends two files at a time, does not retry a `403`, and
sends no further file once one is refused. So an upload is refused once or
twice, however many files it holds, and the step fails. One upload does not ban
the runner. The error burst ("Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`) bans it after more
than 30 such refusals from its address in a minute, as when many jobs upload at
once. `actions/upload-artifact@v4` does not send the header.
So one idle runner makes 1,800 requests an hour, more than the hour limit of
1,500. A busy one, at two requests a second, passes the minute limit of 120
within two minutes. Its address is then banned, its running jobs fail, and each
repeat within a day makes the ban longer. Newer runners ask for work less often.
Put the runners' addresses in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
## What body inspection refuses
## The Core Rule Set's exclusions
With `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` set, the Core Rule Set reads request bodies too. In
front of gitea it then refuses these, until their rule ids, named in the request
log, are added to `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES`:
`deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf` switches single Core Rule Set rules off where
they refused ordinary gitea requests. `servewaf` loads it from
`SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE`, before the Core Rule Set's rules. Each
exclusion covers one rule, in these places only:
- issue and comment text, wiki pages and files saved in the web editor that hold
shell commands or code (932125, 932235, 932250 and others);
- package descriptions that show code;
- PyPI uploads (922130);
- attachments named like `debug.log` or `config.yml` (932180).
- `q`, the text of every search;
- the query parameters that hold a file name: `file`, `path`, `template`, `body`
and `redirect_to`;
- the query parameters that hold a branch or tag name: `name`, `tag`,
`rule_name` and `refSubUrl`;
- `Referer`, on a page opened from search results or from a file's page;
- the path of a file's page, raw file, blame, history and edit page, and of the
API's call for its contents;
- `name`, the file name of an attachment uploaded through the API;
- the header `Content-Range` of an Actions artifact upload.
## What `script/gitea-requests` sends
gitea reads these as text to search for, as names in a repository, or, for
`Content-Range`, as the part of a file an upload carries. It never runs them as
SQL, a command or a page's script. So an attack that only the excluded rules
would catch there reaches gitea and does nothing. Every other field and path
keeps every rule.
Of the requests above, the script sends:
To add an exclusion for a request the Core Rule Set refuses:
- for each file named under "A file name in a query parameter that trips the
code rules", the API's list of its commits;
- for `Runtime.java` alone, the commit graph of that file, the hidden lines of
its diff, and the API's call for the contents of files that names it;
- the sign-in page for a visitor who opens the edit page of `document.write.js`;
- the pages of `java.lang.String.md`,
`META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory`, `process.env.d.ts`
and `.../notes.txt`;
- one container image push that reuses a layer, which it does not try again.
1. Find the request in `servewaf`'s log. Its line gives the path and query, and
names the rules in `waf_rule_ids`.
2. For each rule, add a line with `ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById` for the field it
matched. For a field on every path, copy one of the file's `SecAction` lines.
For some paths only, copy one of its `SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME` lines. Give
it a new id. An id from 900000 to 900999 stops the start.
3. Above it, write a one-line comment naming the request it refused.
4. Add the request to `internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt`, and run
`make check`.
5. Restart `servewaf`.
It does not send the raw file, history, blame or edit page of those four files,
or the pages of the directories `META-INF/services` and `...`. It also sends a
short sample of gitea's ordinary use:
The Core Rule Set still refuses the page of a file in a directory named `...`,
which reads as path traversal.
- signing in;
- pages of files and commits, and a diff;
- the API;
- a push, and clone and fetch over HTTP;
- two container image pushes.
With `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` set, it also refuses issue text, comments, wiki
pages and files saved in the web editor that hold shell commands or code.
`make gitea-requests` runs gitea behind `rproxy` and `servewaf` at the defaults,
without these exclusions. It reports each request the Core Rule Set refuses
there.
+3 -6
View File
@@ -8,8 +8,7 @@ is pinned that way.
## Contents
- Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, pinned by digest.
- `ca-certificates`, `nix-bin` and `runit` from Ubuntu, from the snapshot of its
archive at `20261001T000000Z`.
- `ca-certificates`, `nix-bin` and `runit` from Ubuntu's archive.
- Nix, with nixpkgs `nixos-26.05.11045.774debe7a0d1` set up for root as
`nixpkgs`. No Nix daemon; `build-users-group =` in `/etc/nix/nix.conf`. Root's
Nix profile, `/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin`, last on the `PATH`.
@@ -26,10 +25,8 @@ is pinned that way.
## Pins
- Ubuntu's packages: the snapshot service, `--snapshot 20261001T000000Z` on both
`apt-get update` and `apt-get install`. The SHA-256 hash of each of the
snapshot's `InRelease` files is named in the `Dockerfile` and checked after
`apt-get update`. The hashes are the amd64 archive's.
- Ubuntu's packages are not pinned: they come from the live archive, whose
packages change with every update.
- nixpkgs: the release file `nixexprs.tar.xz` of
`nixos-26.05.11045.774debe7a0d1` on `releases.nixos.org`, named with its
SHA-256 hash.
+25 -15
View File
@@ -99,19 +99,22 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Request rate limits, per client
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `500`, about 8 a second): the most
requests a client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default catches,
within seconds, a client firing requests as fast as it can. It leaves room for
a fleet of about 20 agents at its busiest, about 120 requests a minute. It
also leaves room for a few quick first visits to gitea with an empty cache,
about 40 files each.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `20000`, about 5.5 a second): the most
requests a client may make in an hour. A count or `off`. The default leaves
room for an automation fleet at work. It catches a client that keeps up more
than about 5.5 a second for an hour.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `300000`, about 3.5 a second): the most
requests a client may make in a day. A count or `off`. The default catches a
scraper that keeps up 4 a second around the clock.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
person opening two gitea pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files
each.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `1500`): the most requests a client may
make in an hour. A count or `off`. It is the main limit against scrapers. A
person reading code in gitea for an hour, a page every 20 seconds, makes
about 900. A scraper making one request every 2 seconds makes 1,800 an hour,
more than the limit.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `6000`): the most requests a client may
make in a day. A count or `off`. The default is four hours at the hour limit.
A scraper making one request every 10 seconds makes 8,640 a day, more than the
limit.
- An Actions runner asks gitea for work all day and can pass the limits. Put the
runners' addresses in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`. Do the same for a
network where many people share one address, such as an office.
- Counting cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits (see "Request
rate limits, per client" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes exempt from
@@ -119,8 +122,8 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Byte limits, per client
- `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `4G`), `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `20G`) and `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `200G`): the most
- `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `50G`) and `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most
bytes counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
- `SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
`response`, `request` or `both`.
@@ -189,6 +192,13 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
the Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `64K`. A question carries no more
of a body than 64 KiB, and the Core Rule Set reads at most 64 KiB less one
byte of it, whatever the value (see "The answer" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` (default unset): a file of Core Rule Set
exclusions, written as Coraza directives. It is loaded before the Core Rule
Set's rules, so it holds only `SecAction` and `SecRule` lines that exclude
with `ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById` or `ctl:ruleRemoveById`. A file that cannot be
read or does not parse stops the start, whatever `SWWAF_WAF_MODE` is. So does
a file that names a number from 900000 to 900999 outside a comment, alone or
in a range. It has no `_FILE` form.
- `SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client
in a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
+29 -14
View File
@@ -221,12 +221,15 @@ type Config struct {
// WAFExemptPaths the path prefixes it does not inspect
// (SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS), and WAFBodyLimit the most of a request body
// it reads (SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
WAFMode string
WAFParanoiaLevel int
WAFAnomalyThreshold int
WAFDisabledRules []int
WAFExemptPaths []string
WAFBodyLimit int64
// CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile is the path of the file of its exclusions
// (SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE), "" while there is none.
WAFMode string
WAFParanoiaLevel int
WAFAnomalyThreshold int
WAFDisabledRules []int
WAFExemptPaths []string
WAFBodyLimit int64
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile string
// TrapPaths are the paths a request for which is a clear sign of
// attack (SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS), each starting with / and without a ?.
TrapPaths []string
@@ -468,13 +471,13 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
AllowNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS", ""),
RateLimitExemptNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS", ""),
DenyNets: env.netblocks("SWWAF_DENY_NETS", ""),
RateLimitPerMinute: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "500"),
RateLimitPerHour: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "20000"),
RateLimitPerDay: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "300000"),
RateLimitPerMinute: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "120"),
RateLimitPerHour: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "1500"),
RateLimitPerDay: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "6000"),
RateLimitExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
BytesLimitPerMinute: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "4G"),
BytesLimitPerHour: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "20G"),
BytesLimitPerDay: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "200G"),
BytesLimitPerMinute: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "off"),
BytesLimitPerHour: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "50G"),
BytesLimitPerDay: env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "100G"),
BytesCount: env.bytesCount("SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT", "both"),
LookupSource: env.lookupSource("SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE", "geojs"),
LookupDBPath: env.value("SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH", ""),
@@ -523,8 +526,10 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
WAFAnomalyThreshold: env.numberOrOff("SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD", "5"),
WAFDisabledRules: env.ruleIDs("SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES",
"920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140"),
WAFExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
WAFBodyLimit: env.wafBodyLimit("SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT", off),
WAFExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
WAFBodyLimit: env.wafBodyLimit("SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT", off),
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile: env.filePath(
"SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"),
TrapPaths: env.trapPaths("SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS"),
ErrorBurstThreshold: env.count("SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD", "30"),
LogRemoteURL: env.logRemoteURL("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"),
@@ -1189,6 +1194,16 @@ func (e *environment) logRemoteURL(name string) *url.URL {
return remote
}
// filePath reads a setting that is the path of a file, "" while it is
// unset. Its value names a file already, so, unlike the other settings,
// it has no _FILE form. Whoever uses the file reads it.
func (e *environment) filePath(name string) string {
path, _ := e.lookupEnv(name)
e.settings = append(e.settings, slog.String(name, path))
return path
}
// certificates reads a setting that is the path of a file of PEM
// certificates. Unset or empty, it is nil. Its value names a file
// already, so, unlike the other settings, it has no _FILE form.
+20 -16
View File
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ const (
wafDisabledRules = "SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
exclusionsFile = "SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"
trapPaths = "SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS"
errorBurstThreshold = "SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
logRemoteURL = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
@@ -244,9 +245,9 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
wantSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
ListenAddr: ":8080",
Observe: false,
RateLimitPerMinute: 500,
RateLimitPerHour: 20000,
RateLimitPerDay: 300000,
RateLimitPerMinute: 120,
RateLimitPerHour: 1500,
RateLimitPerDay: 6000,
BanResponse: 403,
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: 24 * time.Hour,
@@ -266,8 +267,8 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
LookupSource: defaultLookupSource, LookupTimeout: 800 * time.Millisecond,
})
wantByteLimitSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
BytesLimitPerMinute: 4 << 30, BytesLimitPerHour: 20 << 30,
BytesLimitPerDay: 200 << 30, BytesCount: "both",
BytesLimitPerMinute: 0, BytesLimitPerHour: 50 << 30,
BytesLimitPerDay: 100 << 30, BytesCount: "both",
})
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.AllowNets)
@@ -308,7 +309,7 @@ func TestNoSingleRequestBreaksAByteLimitAtTheDefaults(t *testing.T) {
for _, limit := range []int64{
cfg.BytesLimitPerMinute, cfg.BytesLimitPerHour, cfg.BytesLimitPerDay,
} {
if largest > limit {
if limit != 0 && largest > limit { // 0 is off
t.Errorf("a request of %d bytes breaks the byte limit of %d", largest, limit)
}
}
@@ -539,13 +540,14 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetSettings(t *testing.T) {
environment{
wafMode: config.WAFModeDetect, wafParanoiaLevel: "4", wafAnomalyThreshold: "10",
wafDisabledRules: "942100, 920350", wafExemptPaths: "/api/, /static/",
wafBodyLimit: "32K",
wafBodyLimit: "32K", exclusionsFile: "/etc/smallwebwaf/crs-exclusions.conf",
},
config.Config{
WAFMode: config.WAFModeDetect, WAFParanoiaLevel: 4, WAFAnomalyThreshold: 10,
WAFDisabledRules: []int{942100, 920350},
WAFExemptPaths: []string{"/api/", "/static/"},
WAFBodyLimit: 32 << 10,
WAFDisabledRules: []int{942100, 920350},
WAFExemptPaths: []string{"/api/", "/static/"},
WAFBodyLimit: 32 << 10,
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile: "/etc/smallwebwaf/crs-exclusions.conf",
},
},
{
@@ -565,7 +567,8 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetSettings(t *testing.T) {
WAFMode: cfg.WAFMode, WAFParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel,
WAFAnomalyThreshold: cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold,
WAFDisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules, WAFExemptPaths: cfg.WAFExemptPaths,
WAFBodyLimit: cfg.WAFBodyLimit,
WAFBodyLimit: cfg.WAFBodyLimit,
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, tc.want) {
t.Errorf("%v gave\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", tc.env, got, tc.want)
@@ -2271,12 +2274,12 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
denyNets: "",
rateLimitPerMinute: "45",
rateLimitPerHour: "20000",
rateLimitPerDay: "300000",
rateLimitPerHour: "1500",
rateLimitPerDay: "6000",
rateLimitExemptPaths: "",
bytesLimitPerMinute: "4G",
bytesLimitPerHour: "20G",
bytesLimitPerDay: "200G",
bytesLimitPerMinute: "off",
bytesLimitPerHour: "50G",
bytesLimitPerDay: "100G",
bytesCount: "both",
lookupSource: defaultLookupSource,
lookupDBPath: "",
@@ -2327,6 +2330,7 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
wafDisabledRules: defaultWAFDisabledRules,
wafExemptPaths: "",
wafBodyLimit: off,
exclusionsFile: "",
trapPaths: "",
errorBurstThreshold: "30",
logRemoteURL: "",
+88 -68
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
package rproxy_test
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"errors"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
@@ -14,9 +16,9 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// post is the start of a POST whose headers end with what follows it.
@@ -69,11 +71,11 @@ func TestABodyAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefusedOnceServeWAFAllowsIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Error("the app was asked")
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestSize: tc.limit,
})
@@ -83,11 +85,11 @@ func TestABodyAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefusedOnceServeWAFAllowsIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want 413", got)
}
if asked := servewaf.question(t); len(asked.body) != tc.asked {
if asked := standIn.question(t); len(asked.body) != tc.asked {
t.Errorf("the question carries %d bytes, want %d", len(asked.body), tc.asked)
}
report := servewaf.report(t)
report := standIn.report(t)
if report.Status != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 413", report)
}
@@ -98,9 +100,9 @@ func TestABodyAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefusedOnceServeWAFAllowsIt(t *testing.T) {
func TestADenyOutranksTheBodySizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestSize: "1K",
})
@@ -130,12 +132,12 @@ func TestABodyNotAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
var asked atomic.Bool
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
asked.Store(true)
greet(w, r)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestSize: tc.limit,
})
@@ -163,12 +165,12 @@ func TestAResponseOverItsLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("announced, is refused", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set(contentLengthHeader, strconv.Itoa(len(large)))
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, large)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseSize: "1K",
})
@@ -177,7 +179,7 @@ func TestAResponseOverItsLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("answered %d, want 502", got.status)
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusBadGateway {
if report := standIn.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 502", report)
}
})
@@ -185,13 +187,13 @@ func TestAResponseOverItsLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("not announced, is cut off", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, large[:1])
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, large[1:])
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseSize: "1K",
})
@@ -203,7 +205,7 @@ func TestAResponseOverItsLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("read %d bytes (%v), want the answer cut off", len(text), err)
}
report := servewaf.report(t)
report := standIn.report(t)
if report.Status != http.StatusOK || report.ResponseBytes > 1<<10 {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 200 and at most 1K of the answer", report)
}
@@ -215,11 +217,11 @@ func TestAHeadWhoseAnswerAnnouncesMoreThanTheResponseLimitIsPassedOn(t *testing.
const announced = "2048"
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set(contentLengthHeader, announced)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseSize: "1K",
})
@@ -238,9 +240,9 @@ func TestASettingOfOffSetsNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
setting: "off",
})
@@ -249,7 +251,7 @@ func TestASettingOfOffSetsNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/",
strings.NewReader("a body"))))
if got := get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath); got.status != http.StatusOK {
if got := get(t, addr, servewaf.HealthPath); got.status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want rproxy's own 200", got)
}
})
@@ -268,9 +270,9 @@ func TestAVisitorTooSlowToSendTheFirstPartIsAnswered408(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "500",
})
@@ -286,11 +288,11 @@ func TestAVisitorTooSlowToSendTheFirstPartIsAnswered408(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("line %v, want no disposition and 10 bytes", line)
}
if len(servewaf.questions) != 0 {
if len(standIn.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
servewaf.wantNoReport(t)
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
})
}
}
@@ -298,9 +300,9 @@ func TestAVisitorTooSlowToSendTheFirstPartIsAnswered408(t *testing.T) {
func TestAVisitorThatGoesAwayBeforeTheFirstPartIsNotAsked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+announcedLength(100)+"some of it")
@@ -311,7 +313,7 @@ func TestAVisitorThatGoesAwayBeforeTheFirstPartIsNotAsked(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("line %v, want no answer and no disposition", line)
}
if len(servewaf.questions) != 0 {
if len(standIn.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
}
@@ -332,9 +334,9 @@ func TestABodyThatCannotBeReadClosesTheConnectionWithoutAnAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, tc.request)
@@ -362,7 +364,7 @@ func TestABodyThatCannotBeReadClosesTheConnectionWithoutAnAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("line %v, want no answer and no disposition", line)
}
if len(servewaf.questions) != 0 {
if len(standIn.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
})
@@ -402,11 +404,11 @@ func TestABodyLeftUnreadIsReadOnlyUntilTheRequestTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
announced = 100 * questionBodyMaxBytes
)
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
})
_, _, server := startServer(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
_, _, server := startServer(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: strconv.FormatInt(limit.Milliseconds(), 10),
})
@@ -452,9 +454,9 @@ func TestAnAnswerRProxyGivesItselfHasTheResponseTimeToBeSent(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
_, _, server := startServer(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
_, _, server := startServer(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: strconv.FormatInt(limit.Milliseconds(), 10),
})
@@ -482,9 +484,9 @@ func TestAnAnswerRProxyGivesItselfHasTheResponseTimeToBeSent(t *testing.T) {
func TestAVisitorTooSlowToSendTheRestIsAnswered408(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "3000",
})
@@ -496,11 +498,11 @@ func TestAVisitorTooSlowToSendTheRestIsAnswered408(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 408", status)
}
if asked := servewaf.question(t); len(asked.body) != questionBodyMaxBytes {
if asked := standIn.question(t); len(asked.body) != questionBodyMaxBytes {
t.Errorf("the question carries %d bytes", len(asked.body))
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusRequestTimeout {
if report := standIn.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusRequestTimeout {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 408", report)
}
}
@@ -551,8 +553,8 @@ func TestAnAppTooSlowToTakeTheRequestIsAnswered504(t *testing.T) {
writeSize = 32 << 10
)
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, startAppThatTakesNothing(t),
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, startAppThatTakesNothing(t),
map[string]string{maxRequestTime: "3000"})
conn := dial(t, addr)
@@ -578,14 +580,14 @@ func TestAnAppTooSlowToAnswerIsAnswered504(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
release := make(chan struct{})
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
<-release
})
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: "300",
})
@@ -594,7 +596,7 @@ func TestAnAppTooSlowToAnswerIsAnswered504(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("answered %d, want 504", got.status)
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusGatewayTimeout {
if report := standIn.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusGatewayTimeout {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 504", report)
}
}
@@ -602,10 +604,12 @@ func TestAnAppTooSlowToAnswerIsAnswered504(t *testing.T) {
func TestAnAppTooSlowToFinishItsAnswerIsCutOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const start = "the start"
release := make(chan struct{})
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "the start")
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, start)
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
<-release
@@ -613,20 +617,32 @@ func TestAnAppTooSlowToFinishItsAnswerIsCutOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: "300",
// The time limit is long enough for a loaded host to pass on the start of the
// answer before it runs out.
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: "3000",
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
// dial's deadline ends this read with an error if the connection stays open.
_, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
res, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(conn), nil)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("read: %v, want the connection closed", err)
t.Fatalf("read the answer: %v", err)
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusOK {
// The body breaks off when rproxy closes the connection. If the connection
// stays open, dial's deadline ends this read with a timeout instead.
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK || string(body) != start ||
!errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
t.Errorf("answered %d %q (%v), want the app's 200 %q, then the connection closed",
res.StatusCode, body, err, start)
}
if report := standIn.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want the status the visitor got", report)
}
}
@@ -640,7 +656,7 @@ func TestAVisitorTooSlowToTakeTheAnswerIsCutOff(t *testing.T) {
writeSize = 32 << 10
)
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
part := make([]byte, writeSize)
@@ -651,8 +667,10 @@ func TestAVisitorTooSlowToTakeTheAnswerIsCutOff(t *testing.T) {
}
}
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: "500",
// The time limit is long enough for a loaded host to start passing on the
// answer before it runs out.
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxResponseTime: "3000",
})
// The visitor asks, and never reads the answer.
@@ -666,7 +684,7 @@ func TestAVisitorTooSlowToTakeTheAnswerIsCutOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 200 and the answer cut off", line)
}
report := servewaf.report(t)
report := standIn.report(t)
if report.Status != http.StatusOK || report.ResponseBytes >= bodySize {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 200 and the answer cut off", report)
}
@@ -675,15 +693,15 @@ func TestAVisitorTooSlowToTakeTheAnswerIsCutOff(t *testing.T) {
func TestAnAppThatCannotBeReachedIsAnswered502WithAReport(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, nowhere, nil)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, nowhere, nil)
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if got.status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("answered %d, want 502", got.status)
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusBadGateway {
if report := standIn.report(t); report.Status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want status 502", report)
}
}
@@ -691,11 +709,11 @@ func TestAnAppThatCannotBeReachedIsAnswered502WithAReport(t *testing.T) {
func TestAVisitorThatStopsSendingAfterTheAppHasAnsweredGetsTheAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, greeting)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "3000",
})
@@ -714,12 +732,12 @@ func TestAVisitorThatStopsSendingWhileTheAppWorksGetsNoAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
working := make(chan struct{})
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
close(working)
<-r.Context().Done()
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
@@ -755,7 +773,7 @@ func TestTheRequestTimeLimitDoesNotCutAnAnswerOnceTheAppHasTheRequest(t *testing
const answer = "the end of a long answer"
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
@@ -764,7 +782,7 @@ func TestTheRequestTimeLimitDoesNotCutAnAnswerOnceTheAppHasTheRequest(t *testing
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, answer)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "2000",
})
@@ -784,17 +802,19 @@ func TestAVisitorThatStopsSendingGetsAnAnswerRProxyGivesByTheDeadline(t *testing
{"a deny", post, http.StatusForbidden},
{
"the health check",
"GET " + proxy.HealthPath + " HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n",
"GET " + servewaf.HealthPath + " HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n",
http.StatusOK,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "500",
// The time limit is long enough for a loaded host to read the first part of
// the body before it runs out.
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "3000",
})
// Go's server waits for a little of the body left before it sends an answer,
+51 -51
View File
@@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// questionBodyMaxBytes is the most of a body a question carries.
const questionBodyMaxBytes = proxy.QuestionBodyMaxBytes
const questionBodyMaxBytes = servewaf.QuestionBodyMaxBytes
// chunked is the encoding of a body whose length the visitor did not announce.
const chunked = "chunked"
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ const pathGoReencodes = "/some%2Fpath/with%20space|pipe"
func TestQuestionIsTheVisitorsRequestWithRProxysHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
const target = pathGoReencodes + "?b=2&a=1&bad=%zz;x"
@@ -42,16 +42,16 @@ func TestQuestionIsTheVisitorsRequestWithRProxysHeaders(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedForHeader, "198.51.100.1")
req.Header.Set(forwardedProtoHeader, "gopher")
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-visitor's")
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, "198.51.100.2")
req.Header.Set(proxy.PeerHeader, "198.51.100.3")
req.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, "12345")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, "198.51.100.2")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.PeerHeader, "198.51.100.3")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader, "12345")
// Go's client then sends no User-Agent, so that one in the question would be
// Go's own.
req.Header["User-Agent"] = nil
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
asked := servewaf.question(t)
asked := standIn.question(t)
if asked.method != http.MethodDelete || asked.target != target ||
asked.host != site {
t.Errorf("asked about %s %s at %s", asked.method, asked.target, asked.host)
@@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ func TestQuestionIsTheVisitorsRequestWithRProxysHeaders(t *testing.T) {
want.Set(forwardedForHeader, "198.51.100.1")
want.Set(forwardedProtoHeader, "http")
want.Set(requestIDHeader, asked.header.Get(requestIDHeader))
want.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, localhost)
want.Set(proxy.PeerHeader, localhost)
want.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, localhost)
want.Set(servewaf.PeerHeader, localhost)
if !maps.EqualFunc(asked.header, want, slices.Equal) {
t.Errorf("the question's headers are %v, want %v", asked.header, want)
@@ -93,14 +93,14 @@ func TestQuestionNamesTheVisitorATrustedProxySpeaksFor(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
forwarded := make(chan http.Header, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
forwarded <- r.Header.Clone()
greet(w, r)
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: tc.trusted,
})
@@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ func TestQuestionNamesTheVisitorATrustedProxySpeaksFor(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedProtoHeader, "https")
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
asked := servewaf.question(t)
if asked.header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader) != tc.client ||
asked.header.Get(proxy.PeerHeader) != localhost ||
asked := standIn.question(t)
if asked.header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader) != tc.client ||
asked.header.Get(servewaf.PeerHeader) != localhost ||
asked.header.Get(forwardedForHeader) != visitor ||
asked.header.Get(forwardedProtoHeader) != tc.proto {
t.Errorf("the question's headers are %v", asked.header)
@@ -157,9 +157,9 @@ func TestQuestionNamesTheClientAsTheForwardedAddressesSay(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32,10.0.0.0/8",
})
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ func TestQuestionNamesTheClientAsTheForwardedAddressesSay(t *testing.T) {
req.Header[forwardedForHeader] = tc.header
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
if got := servewaf.question(t).header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader); got != tc.client {
if got := standIn.question(t).header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader); got != tc.client {
t.Errorf("the question names %s, want %s", got, tc.client)
}
})
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ func TestFirst64KiBReachServeWAFAndTheWholeBodyTheApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := randomBytes(size)
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
received := make(chan []byte, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
whole, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ func TestFirst64KiBReachServeWAFAndTheWholeBodyTheApp(t *testing.T) {
greet(w, r)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", bytes.NewReader(body))
if !announced {
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ func TestFirst64KiBReachServeWAFAndTheWholeBodyTheApp(t *testing.T) {
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
asked := servewaf.question(t)
asked := standIn.question(t)
want := body[:min(size, questionBodyMaxBytes)]
wantQuestionBody(t, asked, want, size, announced)
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ func TestFirst64KiBReachServeWAFAndTheWholeBodyTheApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("the app did not get the whole body")
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.RequestBytes != int64(size) {
if report := standIn.report(t); report.RequestBytes != int64(size) {
t.Errorf("report %+v, of %d bytes", report, size)
}
})
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ func wantQuestionBody(
len(want))
}
values := asked.header.Values(proxy.ContentLengthHeader)
values := asked.header.Values(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader)
if announced {
if !slices.Equal(values, []string{strconv.Itoa(size)}) ||
@@ -264,9 +264,9 @@ func wantQuestionBody(
func TestDenyNeedsOnlyTheFirstPartOfALargeBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
// Far more announced than sent. Go's server does not wait for that much, so
// the answer comes at once.
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ func TestDenyNeedsOnlyTheFirstPartOfALargeBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("status %d, want servewaf's 403", status)
}
if report := servewaf.report(t); report.RequestBytes != questionBodyMaxBytes {
if report := standIn.report(t); report.RequestBytes != questionBodyMaxBytes {
t.Errorf("report %+v, want the first part's bytes", report)
}
}
@@ -306,8 +306,8 @@ func TestAQuestionCarriesItsBodyWhateverTheMethod(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(method+" "+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, nowhere, nil)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, nowhere, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, method+" /x HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"+tc.framing)
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ func TestAQuestionCarriesItsBodyWhateverTheMethod(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("status %d, want servewaf's 403", status)
}
asked := servewaf.question(t)
asked := standIn.question(t)
if string(asked.body) != tc.body ||
!slices.Equal(asked.transferEncoding, tc.encoding) {
t.Errorf("the question carries %q, encoded %v, want %q, encoded %v",
@@ -334,11 +334,11 @@ func TestAMethodNotPassedOnIsAnswered405(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(method, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Error("the app was asked")
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, method, addr, "/", http.NoBody))
if got.status != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed ||
@@ -352,11 +352,11 @@ func TestAMethodNotPassedOnIsAnswered405(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 405 and no disposition", line)
}
if len(servewaf.questions) != 0 {
if len(standIn.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
servewaf.wantNoReport(t)
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
})
}
}
@@ -372,18 +372,18 @@ func TestEachMethodPassedOnReachesServeWAFAndTheApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
reached := make(chan string, 1)
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
reached <- r.Method
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, method, addr, "/", http.NoBody))
if got.status != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want the app's 200", got)
}
if asked := servewaf.question(t); asked.method != method {
if asked := standIn.question(t); asked.method != method {
t.Errorf("servewaf was asked about %s", asked.method)
}
@@ -416,9 +416,9 @@ func TestARequestThatCannotGoToServeWAFAsSentIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, request)
@@ -433,11 +433,11 @@ func TestARequestThatCannotGoToServeWAFAsSentIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 400 and no disposition", line)
}
if len(servewaf.questions) != 0 {
if len(standIn.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked")
}
servewaf.wantNoReport(t)
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
})
}
}
@@ -447,9 +447,9 @@ func TestAHostWithAPercentSignButNoBracketGoesToServeWAF(t *testing.T) {
const host = "a%b"
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+host+"\r\n\r\n")
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ func TestAHostWithAPercentSignButNoBracketGoesToServeWAF(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("status %d, want the app's 200", status)
}
if asked := servewaf.question(t); asked.host != host {
if asked := standIn.question(t); asked.host != host {
t.Errorf("asked about the host %q, want %q", asked.host, host)
}
}
@@ -468,15 +468,15 @@ func TestATrustedPeerWithNoForwardedProtoIsAskedAboutAsHTTP(t *testing.T) {
const want = "http"
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
})
wantGreeting(t, get(t, addr, "/"))
asked := servewaf.question(t)
asked := standIn.question(t)
if got := asked.header.Get(forwardedProtoHeader); got != want {
t.Errorf("the question's %s is %q, want %s", forwardedProtoHeader, got, want)
}
@@ -497,9 +497,9 @@ func TestAQuestionNamesNoZone(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
_, out, server := startServer(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
_, out, server := startServer(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
})
@@ -509,9 +509,9 @@ func TestAQuestionNamesNoZone(t *testing.T) {
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
asked := servewaf.question(t)
if asked.header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader) != tc.client ||
asked.header.Get(proxy.PeerHeader) != tc.peer {
asked := standIn.question(t)
if asked.header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader) != tc.client ||
asked.header.Get(servewaf.PeerHeader) != tc.peer {
t.Errorf("the question's headers are %v", asked.header)
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// flushAfterEachWrite has ReverseProxy pass on each part of the app's answer as
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ func (rq *request) readFirstPartOfBody() bool {
}
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(rq.requestDeadline())
held, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(rq.body, proxy.QuestionBodyMaxBytes))
held, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(rq.body, servewaf.QuestionBodyMaxBytes))
// From here on, the request timer ends a read of the rest of the body, so that
// the answer can name the side rproxy was waiting on.
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ func (rq *request) finish(ctx context.Context) {
return
}
report := &proxy.Report{
report := &servewaf.Report{
RequestID: rq.id,
Status: min(rq.out.status, reportStatusMax),
RequestBytes: requestBytes,
+5 -5
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// How rproxy keeps connections to the app and to servewaf open between
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Server {
transport: newTransport(),
serveWAFTransport: newServeWAFTransport(),
reportURL: (&url.URL{
Scheme: backend.Scheme, Host: backend.Host, Path: proxy.ReportPath,
Scheme: backend.Scheme, Host: backend.Host, Path: servewaf.ReportPath,
}).String(),
}
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
rq := h.newRequest(w, r)
defer rq.finish(r.Context())
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == proxy.HealthPath {
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == servewaf.HealthPath {
rq.answerHealth()
return
@@ -199,9 +199,9 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
rq.noteAnswer(answer)
switch rq.disposition {
case proxy.DispositionAllow:
case servewaf.DispositionAllow:
rq.passToApp(r.Context())
case proxy.DispositionClose:
case servewaf.DispositionClose:
// This panic has Go's server close the connection without an answer,
// and log nothing; the deferred finish still runs.
panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
+83 -81
View File
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ const (
// The headers the tests set and look at.
const (
dispositionHeader = proxy.DispositionHeader
dispositionHeader = servewaf.DispositionHeader
forwardedForHeader = "X-Forwarded-For"
forwardedProtoHeader = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
@@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ const (
// What the stand-in for servewaf answers.
const (
dispositionAllow = proxy.DispositionAllow
dispositionDeny = proxy.DispositionDeny
dispositionClose = proxy.DispositionClose
dispositionAllow = servewaf.DispositionAllow
dispositionDeny = servewaf.DispositionDeny
dispositionClose = servewaf.DispositionClose
// deniedBody is the body of a deny.
deniedBody = "refused by servewaf"
)
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ type serveWAF struct {
*httptest.Server
questions chan question
reports chan proxy.Report
reports chan servewaf.Report
}
// startServeWAF starts a stand-in for servewaf.
@@ -182,11 +182,11 @@ func startServeWAF(t *testing.T, answer http.HandlerFunc) *serveWAF {
s := &serveWAF{
questions: make(chan question, 10),
reports: make(chan proxy.Report, 10),
reports: make(chan servewaf.Report, 10),
}
s.Server = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader) == "" {
if r.Header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader) == "" {
s.takeReport(t, w, r)
return
@@ -213,10 +213,10 @@ func startServeWAF(t *testing.T, answer http.HandlerFunc) *serveWAF {
func (s *serveWAF) takeReport(t *testing.T, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Helper()
var report proxy.Report
var report servewaf.Report
err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&report)
if err != nil || r.Method != http.MethodPost || r.URL.Path != proxy.ReportPath {
if err != nil || r.Method != http.MethodPost || r.URL.Path != servewaf.ReportPath {
t.Errorf("%s %s is no report: %v", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)
}
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ func (s *serveWAF) wantNoReport(t *testing.T) {
}
// report waits for a report.
func (s *serveWAF) report(t *testing.T) proxy.Report {
func (s *serveWAF) report(t *testing.T) servewaf.Report {
t.Helper()
select {
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ func (s *serveWAF) report(t *testing.T) proxy.Report {
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("no report")
return proxy.Report{}
return servewaf.Report{}
}
}
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ func startServeWAFAnsweringReports(
backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader) != "" {
if r.Header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader) != "" {
answer(w, r)
return
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ func readStatus(t *testing.T, conn net.Conn) int {
func TestPassesAnAllowedRequestToTheAppAndItsAnswerBack(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
standIn := startServeWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set(asnHeader, "AS64496")
w.Header().Set(countryHeader, "DE")
allow(w, r)
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ func TestPassesAnAllowedRequestToTheAppAndItsAnswerBack(t *testing.T) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTeapot)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, greeting)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
const target = pathGoReencodes + "?b=2&a=1&bad=%zz;x"
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ func TestPassesAnAllowedRequestToTheAppAndItsAnswerBack(t *testing.T) {
}
received := <-seen
asked := servewaf.question(t)
asked := standIn.question(t)
if received.RequestURI != target || received.Host != site {
t.Errorf("the app saw %s for %s", received.RequestURI, received.Host)
@@ -557,14 +557,14 @@ func TestAPeerNotTrustedHasItsForwardedHeadersReplaced(t *testing.T) {
"X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert-Info", "X-Real-Ip",
}
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
seen := make(chan http.Header, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
seen <- r.Header.Clone()
greet(w, r)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: "10.0.0.0/8",
})
@@ -602,14 +602,14 @@ func TestAPeerNotTrustedHasItsForwardedHeadersReplaced(t *testing.T) {
func TestATrustedProxysForwardedHeadersPassOn(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
seen := make(chan http.Header, 1)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
seen <- r.Header.Clone()
greet(w, r)
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
})
@@ -641,12 +641,12 @@ func TestATrustedProxysForwardedHeadersPassOn(t *testing.T) {
func TestAnAnswerWithoutAContentTypeGetsNone(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header()["Content-Type"] = nil
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "<html>")
})
_, _, server := startServer(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
_, _, server := startServer(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", http.NoBody)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -704,11 +704,11 @@ func TestRemovesTheVisitorsLookupHeadersWhenServeWAFGivesNone(t *testing.T) {
func TestDenyGivesTheVisitorServeWAFsAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Error("the app was asked")
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if got.status != http.StatusForbidden || got.body != deniedBody ||
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ func TestDenyGivesTheVisitorServeWAFsAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("the visitor got %s", dispositionHeader)
}
report := servewaf.report(t)
report := standIn.report(t)
if report.Status != http.StatusForbidden ||
report.ResponseBytes != int64(len(deniedBody)) ||
report.DurationUpstreamTotal != 0 {
@@ -736,9 +736,9 @@ func TestDenyGivesTheVisitorServeWAFsAnswer(t *testing.T) {
func TestADeniedHeadKeepsServeWAFsContentLength(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodHead, addr, "/", http.NoBody))
if got.status != http.StatusForbidden ||
@@ -758,15 +758,15 @@ func TestAnAnswerRProxyHoldsWholeIsSentBeforeItsLogLine(t *testing.T) {
}{
{"a deny", "GET /" + host, deniedBody, http.StatusForbidden},
{"rproxy's own answer", "GET x:admin" + host, "Bad Request\n", http.StatusBadRequest},
{"the health check", "GET " + proxy.HealthPath + host, "ok\n", http.StatusOK},
{"the health check", "GET " + servewaf.HealthPath + host, "ok\n", http.StatusOK},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
log := heldLog{release: make(chan struct{})}
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, deny)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, deny)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startServerLogging(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil, log, io.Discard)
addr, _ := startServerLogging(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil, log, io.Discard)
t.Cleanup(func() { close(log.release) })
@@ -794,9 +794,9 @@ func TestAnAnswerRProxyHoldsWholeIsSentBeforeItsLogLine(t *testing.T) {
func TestRProxysOwnAnswerIsPlainText(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET x:admin HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
@@ -817,14 +817,14 @@ func TestRProxysOwnAnswerIsPlainText(t *testing.T) {
func TestCloseClosesTheConnectionWithoutAnAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
standIn := startServeWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set(dispositionHeader, dispositionClose)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Error("the app was asked")
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ func TestCloseClosesTheConnectionWithoutAnAnswer(t *testing.T) {
text, err)
}
report := servewaf.report(t)
report := standIn.report(t)
if report.Status != 0 || report.ResponseBytes != 0 {
t.Errorf("report %+v, of a visitor sent nothing", report)
}
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ func TestAnAnswerOtherThanAllowGoesToTheVisitorAsServeWAFGaveIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+" with the default "+setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
standIn := startServeWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
if tc.disposition != "" {
w.Header().Set(dispositionHeader, tc.disposition)
}
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ func TestAnAnswerOtherThanAllowGoesToTheVisitorAsServeWAFGaveIt(t *testing.T) {
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Error("the app was asked")
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
defaultDisposition: setting,
})
@@ -977,11 +977,11 @@ func TestAnAnswerOtherThanAllowGoesToTheVisitorAsServeWAFGaveIt(t *testing.T) {
func TestAnAnswerWithoutAValidDispositionGetsNoReport(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
standIn := startServeWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "refused", http.StatusBadRequest)
})
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
if got := get(t, addr, "/"); got.status != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want servewaf's 400", got)
@@ -991,18 +991,18 @@ func TestAnAnswerWithoutAValidDispositionGetsNoReport(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("line %v, want no disposition", line)
}
servewaf.wantNoReport(t)
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
}
func TestAnAnswerWithoutAContentTypeGoesToTheVisitorWithNone(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
standIn := startServeWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header()["Content-Type"] = nil
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "<html>broken")
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, nowhere, nil)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, nowhere, nil)
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if contentType, sent := got.header["Content-Type"]; sent {
@@ -1015,11 +1015,11 @@ func TestAnAnswerOf1MiBGoesToTheVisitor(t *testing.T) {
const size = 1 << 20
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
standIn := startServeWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
_, _ = w.Write(make([]byte, size))
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, nowhere, nil)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, nowhere, nil)
got := get(t, addr, "/")
if got.status != http.StatusInternalServerError || len(got.body) != size {
@@ -1135,15 +1135,15 @@ func TestAnAnswerThatCannotBePassedOnIsAnswered502(t *testing.T) {
func TestAnAnswerThatCannotBePassedOnGetsNoReport(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, overOneMiB(dispositionDeny))
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, nowhere, nil)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, overOneMiB(dispositionDeny))
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, nowhere, nil)
if got := get(t, addr, "/"); got.status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want 502", got)
}
out.requestLine(t)
servewaf.wantNoReport(t)
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
}
func TestWithoutAnAnswerTheDefaultDispositionDecides(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1199,20 +1199,20 @@ func TestAVisitorThatGoesAwayWhileServeWAFIsAskedGetsNoDefault(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("with the default "+disposition, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
standIn := startServeWAF(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
<-r.Context().Done()
})
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Error("the app was asked")
})
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
timeoutSetting: "60000",
defaultDisposition: disposition,
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n\r\n")
servewaf.question(t)
standIn.question(t)
_ = conn.Close()
@@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ func TestAVisitorThatGoesAwayWhileServeWAFIsAskedGetsNoDefault(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("rproxy warned that servewaf gave no answer")
}
servewaf.wantNoReport(t)
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
})
}
}
@@ -1244,17 +1244,17 @@ func TestRProxyWarnsWhenTheDefaultDecides(t *testing.T) {
func TestSendsNoReportWithoutAnAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
standIn := startServeWAF(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
<-r.Context().Done()
})
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
timeoutSetting: "200",
})
wantGreeting(t, get(t, addr, "/"))
out.requestLine(t)
servewaf.wantNoReport(t)
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
}
func TestAPathUnderOwnPrefixNeverReachesTheApp(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1274,25 +1274,25 @@ func TestAPathUnderOwnPrefixNeverReachesTheApp(t *testing.T) {
func TestHealthCheckIsAnsweredWhileServeWAFIsDown(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, nowhere, app.URL, nil)
got := get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath)
got := get(t, addr, servewaf.HealthPath)
if got.status != http.StatusOK || got.body != "ok\n" {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want ok", got)
}
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["path"] != proxy.HealthPath || line["disposition"] != nil {
if line["path"] != servewaf.HealthPath || line["disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want one with no disposition", line)
}
// With servewaf up too, it is not asked.
addr, _ = startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath)
addr, _ = startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
get(t, addr, servewaf.HealthPath)
if len(servewaf.questions) != 0 {
if len(standIn.questions) != 0 {
t.Error("servewaf was asked about the health check")
}
}
@@ -1353,8 +1353,10 @@ func TestAReportServeWAFLeavesUnansweredIsDroppedAtTheTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
})
app := startApp(t, greet)
// The time limit is long enough for a loaded host to answer the question before
// it runs out.
addr, out := startRProxy(t, backend, app.URL, map[string]string{
timeoutSetting: "1000",
timeoutSetting: "3000",
})
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
@@ -1394,15 +1396,15 @@ func TestAReportAnswered101IsDroppedAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
func TestAReportDueAfterWaitForReportsIsDropped(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out, server := startServer(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, out, server := startServer(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
server.WaitForReports()
wantGreeting(t, get(t, addr, "/"))
out.requestLine(t)
servewaf.wantNoReport(t)
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
}
func TestReportGivesWhatHappened(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1410,14 +1412,14 @@ func TestReportGivesWhatHappened(t *testing.T) {
const body = "the visitor's body"
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/",
strings.NewReader(body))))
report := servewaf.report(t)
report := standIn.report(t)
if report.RequestID == "" || report.Status != http.StatusOK ||
report.RequestBytes != int64(len(body)) ||
@@ -1440,7 +1442,7 @@ func TestWaitForReportsWaitsForAReportBeingSent(t *testing.T) {
release := make(chan struct{})
backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader) != "" {
if r.Header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader) != "" {
allow(w, r)
return
@@ -1495,9 +1497,9 @@ func TestWaitForReportsWaitsForAReportBeingSent(t *testing.T) {
func TestReportOfAWebSocketCountsWhatItCarried(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, echoAfterUpgrade)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "2000",
maxResponseTime: "2000",
})
@@ -1533,7 +1535,7 @@ func TestReportOfAWebSocketCountsWhatItCarried(t *testing.T) {
_ = conn.Close()
report := servewaf.report(t)
report := standIn.report(t)
if report.Status != http.StatusSwitchingProtocols ||
report.RequestBytes != int64(len(message)) ||
report.ResponseBytes != int64(len(message)) {
@@ -1550,7 +1552,7 @@ func TestAWebSocketPassesOnThatTheVisitorStoppedSending(t *testing.T) {
const goodbye = "sent after the visitor stopped sending\n"
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
conn, buffered, err := http.NewResponseController(w).Hijack()
if err != nil {
@@ -1570,7 +1572,7 @@ func TestAWebSocketPassesOnThatTheVisitorStoppedSending(t *testing.T) {
_, _ = buffered.WriteString(goodbye)
_ = buffered.Flush()
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET /socket HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n"+
@@ -1608,7 +1610,7 @@ func TestAWebSocketPassesOnThatTheVisitorStoppedSending(t *testing.T) {
//nolint:paralleltest // see above
func TestASwitchNotPassedOnClosesTheAppsConnection(t *testing.T) {
closed := make(chan error, 1)
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
conn, buffered, err := http.NewResponseController(w).Hijack()
if err != nil {
@@ -1631,7 +1633,7 @@ func TestASwitchNotPassedOnClosesTheAppsConnection(t *testing.T) {
_, err = buffered.ReadByte()
closed <- err
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET /socket HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n"+
@@ -1679,9 +1681,9 @@ func TestEachRequestGetsAFreshID(t *testing.T) {
const fromTraefik = "an-id-from-traefik"
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
})
@@ -1692,7 +1694,7 @@ func TestEachRequestGetsAFreshID(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, fromTraefik)
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
ids = append(ids, servewaf.question(t).header.Get(requestIDHeader))
ids = append(ids, standIn.question(t).header.Get(requestIDHeader))
}
if slices.Contains(ids, fromTraefik) || ids[0] == "" || ids[0] == ids[1] {
@@ -1709,16 +1711,16 @@ func TestLogLineGivesTheRequestAsSent(t *testing.T) {
body = "the visitor's body"
)
servewaf := startServeWAF(t, allow)
standIn := startServeWAF(t, allow)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, servewaf.URL, app.URL, nil)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, nil)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, path+"?"+query, strings.NewReader(body))
req.Host = site
wantGreeting(t, visit(t, req))
line := out.requestLine(t)
asked := servewaf.question(t)
asked := standIn.question(t)
for name, want := range map[string]any{
"type": "request",
+11 -11
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// answerBodyMaxBytes is the most of the body of servewaf's answer that is read.
@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ type servewafAnswer struct {
// notes nothing, and no report is due for it: servewaf holds no decision to report
// on.
func (rq *request) noteAnswer(answer *servewafAnswer) {
disposition := answer.header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader)
disposition := answer.header.Get(servewaf.DispositionHeader)
switch disposition {
case proxy.DispositionAllow, proxy.DispositionDeny, proxy.DispositionClose:
case servewaf.DispositionAllow, servewaf.DispositionDeny, servewaf.DispositionClose:
rq.disposition = disposition
rq.answered = true
rq.asn = answer.header.Get(asnHeader)
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ func (rq *request) handleNoUsableAnswer(ctx context.Context, err error) {
rq.disposition = rq.h.config.DefaultDisposition
rq.byDefault = true
if rq.disposition == proxy.DispositionAllow {
if rq.disposition == servewaf.DispositionAllow {
rq.passToApp(ctx)
} else {
rq.answer(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
@@ -169,13 +169,13 @@ func (rq *request) newQuestion(ctx context.Context) (*http.Request, error) {
question.TransferEncoding = in.TransferEncoding
question.Header = in.Header.Clone()
question.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, rq.client.String())
question.Header.Set(proxy.PeerHeader, rq.peer.String())
question.Header.Del(proxy.ContentLengthHeader)
question.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, rq.client.String())
question.Header.Set(servewaf.PeerHeader, rq.peer.String())
question.Header.Del(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader)
announced := in.Header.Get("Content-Length")
if announced != "" {
question.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, announced)
question.Header.Set(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader, announced)
}
question.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, rq.id)
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ func (rq *request) answerWith(answer *servewafAnswer) {
header := rq.out.Header()
maps.Copy(header, answer.header)
header.Del(proxy.DispositionHeader)
header.Del(servewaf.DispositionHeader)
// Go's server adds a Content-Type it guesses from the body to a response whose
// headers have no Content-Type key. The key with no value sends none.
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ func (rq *request) answerWith(answer *servewafAnswer) {
// sendReport sends servewaf report on a goroutine of its own, so that the
// visitor does not wait for it. The report goes on after ctx, the request's own
// context, has ended.
func (h *handler) sendReport(ctx context.Context, report *proxy.Report) {
func (h *handler) sendReport(ctx context.Context, report *servewaf.Report) {
h.reportsMu.Lock()
defer h.reportsMu.Unlock()
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ func (h *handler) sendReport(ctx context.Context, report *proxy.Report) {
// postReport posts report to servewaf, and waits for its answer for up to
// SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS.
func (h *handler) postReport(ctx context.Context, report *proxy.Report) error {
func (h *handler) postReport(ctx context.Context, report *servewaf.Report) error {
body, err := json.Marshal(report)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encode the report: %w", err)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy
package servewaf
import (
"bytes"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"encoding/json"
@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state"
)
@@ -88,11 +88,11 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
// Any other request under /_smallwebwaf/ is not found.
for _, e := range []adminEndpoint{
{http.MethodPut, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient},
{http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath, ""},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodPost, proxy.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodGet, strings.TrimSuffix(proxy.ClientsPath, "/"), ""},
{http.MethodPut, servewaf.BansPath, banOtherClient},
{http.MethodDelete, servewaf.BansPath, ""},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodPost, servewaf.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodGet, strings.TrimSuffix(servewaf.ClientsPath, "/"), ""},
} {
s.admin(e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusNotFound)
}
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
Reason: "probes for logins",
}
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK),
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, servewaf.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK),
want)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
// Its notes count the request it refused.
want.Notes.Requests, want.Notes.Refused = 1, 1
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, servewaf.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
// Ten minutes on, lifting the bans on client lifts that one, which is
// kept, marked lifted.
@@ -138,13 +138,13 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
lifted := clk.Now()
want.Lifted = &lifted
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath+"/"+client, "",
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodDelete, servewaf.BansPath+"/"+client, "",
http.StatusOK), want)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, servewaf.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
// No ban on it is active any more.
s.admin(http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath+"/"+client, "", http.StatusNotFound)
s.admin(http.MethodDelete, servewaf.BansPath+"/"+client, "", http.StatusNotFound)
}
func TestBanToAddGivesItsNetblockAndDuration(t *testing.T) {
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func TestBanToAddGivesItsNetblockAndDuration(t *testing.T) {
want.Expires = &expires
}
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, body, http.StatusOK), want)
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, servewaf.BansPath, body, http.StatusOK), want)
}
}
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ func TestBanToAddThatCannotBeReadIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
"request body too large",
},
} {
got := s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, tc.body, http.StatusBadRequest)
got := s.admin(http.MethodPost, servewaf.BansPath, tc.body, http.StatusBadRequest)
if !strings.Contains(string(got.body), tc.want) {
t.Errorf("%.80s was answered %q, want it to say %q", tc.body, got.body, tc.want)
}
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
Bans []state.BanEntry `json:"bans"`
}
decode(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath+addr, "", http.StatusOK), &got)
decode(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, servewaf.ClientsPath+addr, "", http.StatusOK), &got)
if got.Client == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: no client", addr)
@@ -305,13 +305,13 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
// Of an address no request came from and no ban covers, nothing is
// known.
got := s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath+"198.51.100.99", "", http.StatusOK)
got := s.admin(http.MethodGet, servewaf.ClientsPath+"198.51.100.99", "", http.StatusOK)
if string(got.body) != "{\n \"client\": null,\n \"bans\": []\n}\n" {
t.Errorf("an unknown client is answered\n%s", got.body)
}
s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath+"203.0.113", "", http.StatusBadRequest)
s.admin(http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath+"/203.0.113.0/24", "",
s.admin(http.MethodGet, servewaf.ClientsPath+"203.0.113", "", http.StatusBadRequest)
s.admin(http.MethodDelete, servewaf.BansPath+"/203.0.113.0/24", "",
http.StatusBadRequest)
}
@@ -342,10 +342,10 @@ type adminEndpoint struct {
// bans on otherClient, and asking about otherClient.
func adminEndpoints() []adminEndpoint {
return []adminEndpoint{
{http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, ""},
{http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient},
{http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.BansPath, ""},
{http.MethodPost, servewaf.BansPath, banOtherClient},
{http.MethodDelete, servewaf.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
}
}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"maps"
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ func TestObserveModeWorksOutABanOnlyWhenItsAlertWouldBeSent(t *testing.T) {
// never sent them, and returns the queue they wait in as well.
func startWithAlerts(
t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
) (*sender, *clock, *servewaf.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
return startAppWithAlerts(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {}, env)
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ func startWithAlerts(
// startAppWithAlerts is startWithAlerts in front of the app handler.
func startAppWithAlerts(
t *testing.T, handler http.HandlerFunc, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
) (*sender, *clock, *servewaf.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
app := startApp(t, handler)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy
package servewaf
import (
"net/netip"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"maps"
@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// The anomaly thresholds: the prefix of a scope followed by the end of a
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ func TestRequestCountsForTheASNumberGeoJSGivesBeforeItEnds(t *testing.T) {
// kept.
geojsURL, _, release := startHeldGeoJS(t)
var server atomic.Pointer[proxy.Server]
var server atomic.Pointer[servewaf.Server]
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
release()
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"fmt"
@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ func TestSixteenThousandCookiesAreRefusedWellWithinTheTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("answered after %s, want well within %s", took, answerTimeLimit)
}
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
@@ -144,13 +144,13 @@ func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if tc.refused {
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
return
}
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if line.DurationWAF == nil {
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ func TestHeaderLimitsHoldWhateverTheCoreRuleSetSettingsSay(t *testing.T) {
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
})
}
}
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ func TestClientInTheAllowNetsSkipsTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}
func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsUnread(t *testing.T) {
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsUnread(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("answered after %s, want well within %s", took, answerTimeLimit)
}
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionTooLarge || line.DurationWAF != nil {
@@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ func TestRequestsOverTheHeaderLimitsCountTowardTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
return do(t, req)
}
wantDisposition(t, ask(), tooLarge, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, ask(), http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, ask(), tooLarge, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, ask(), http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeAfterTheTrapPathsAndTheRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
req := s.question(siteA, client, tc.path)
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, tc.action)
})
}
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) {
req := s.question(siteA, fromDE, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) {
}
// The client is under no ban, and GeoJS places it in a country.
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromDE, "/"), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromDE, "/"), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}
func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(t *testing.T) {
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(t *testing.T
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
}
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ func TestObserveModeWaitsForGeoJSForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
got := do(t, req)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
asn, country := got.header.Get("X-Client-Asn"), got.header.Get("X-Client-Country")
if asn != asnDE || country != "DE" {
@@ -318,7 +318,9 @@ func TestObserveModeWaitsForGeoJSForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
// newServeWAFInBubble makes a servewaf for a synctest bubble: GeoJS never
// answers, a setting needs its answer, and everything is at its default but
// for env. No request to it may use the network.
func newServeWAFInBubble(t *testing.T, env map[string]string) (*proxy.Server, *output) {
func newServeWAFInBubble(
t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
) (*servewaf.Server, *output) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{deniedCountries: "KP"}
@@ -332,13 +334,13 @@ func newServeWAFInBubble(t *testing.T, env map[string]string) (*proxy.Server, *o
// askDirectly hands a question about a request from client straight to server,
// as change leaves it, and returns the answer's status and how long it took.
func askDirectly(
t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, change func(*http.Request),
t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, change func(*http.Request),
) (int, time.Duration) {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", http.NoBody)
req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(rproxyPeer, "1234")
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, client)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, client)
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-id")
change(req)
@@ -351,17 +353,17 @@ func askDirectly(
}
// banClient bans client at now.
func banClient(_ *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time) {
func banClient(_ *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, now time.Time) {
server.Ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix(client+"/32"), now, bans.Notes{})
}
// countClient counts one request from client at now for the rate limits.
func countClient(_ *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time) {
func countClient(_ *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, now time.Time) {
server.Limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(client+"/32"), now, wholeLimit)
}
// listClient puts client on the blocklist at dropURL.
func listClient(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time) {
func listClient(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, now time.Time) {
t.Helper()
err := server.Lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
@@ -373,13 +375,13 @@ func listClient(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time) {
}
// decideOnClient puts client on the CrowdSec decision list.
func decideOnClient(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time) {
func decideOnClient(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, now time.Time) {
t.Helper()
loadDecisions(t, server, now, clientsDecision)
}
// leaveAsItIs prepares nothing.
func leaveAsItIs(*testing.T, *proxy.Server, time.Time) {}
func leaveAsItIs(*testing.T, *servewaf.Server, time.Time) {}
func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -390,7 +392,7 @@ func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
name string
env map[string]string
// prepare gets the server ready, at now, before the question.
prepare func(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time)
prepare func(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, now time.Time)
// cookie is the request's Cookie header.
cookie string
status int
@@ -461,7 +463,7 @@ func TestAQuestionWaitsForASlowGeoJSOnlyAsLongAsTheDefaultSays(t *testing.T) {
name string
env map[string]string
// prepare gets the server ready, at now, before the question.
prepare func(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, now time.Time)
prepare func(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, now time.Time)
status int
action string
}{
@@ -519,10 +521,10 @@ func TestServeWAFAnswersWithinTheTimeLimitWhileEveryOutsideSourceHangs(t *testin
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = resolver.Close() })
server, out, _ := newServeWAFWith(t, func(params proxy.Params) *proxy.Server {
server, out, _ := newServeWAFWith(t, func(params servewaf.Params) *servewaf.Server {
params.AbuseIPDBURL = silentAbuseIPDBURL
return proxy.NewServeWAF(params)
return servewaf.New(params)
}, held, time.Now, map[string]string{
deniedCountries: "KP", wafMode: block,
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: resolver.LocalAddr().String(),
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy
package servewaf
import (
"net/http"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"bufio"
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ func (c *clock) advance(d time.Duration) {
// window.
func startWithClock(
t *testing.T, geojsURL string, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server) {
) (*sender, *clock, *servewaf.Server) {
t.Helper()
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy
package servewaf
import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"fmt"
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup/lookuptest"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// The biased thresholds.
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ func TestBanForALoweredLimitGivesThePercentageInItsNotesAndItsAlert(t *testing.T
// clock.
func startWithLookups(
t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
) (*sender, *servewaf.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
s, _, server, queue := startWithLookupsAndClock(t, env)
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ func startWithLookups(
// country, and no other address.
func startWithLookupsAndClock(
t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
) (*sender, *clock, *servewaf.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ipinfo_lite.mmdb")
@@ -463,11 +463,11 @@ func (s *sender) uploadFrom(from string) logLine {
// serveFromDE hands a question about a request from fromDE with method and body
// straight to server's handler, without the network, and returns once it is
// answered.
func serveFromDE(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, method string, body io.Reader) {
func serveFromDE(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, method string, body io.Reader) {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), method, "/", body)
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, fromDE)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, fromDE)
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-id")
server.Handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"bufio"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy
package servewaf
import (
"crypto/rand"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy
package servewaf
import (
"time"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"io"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy
package servewaf
import (
"slices"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"encoding/json"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"net/http"
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// The CrowdSec settings, and the tests' engine, which is never asked: each
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsAndAlertsTheBan(
// decisionsURL, answer, the engine's answer, fetched at fetched, as
// reputation.json would at start.
func loadDecisions(
t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, fetched time.Time, answer string,
t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, fetched time.Time, answer string,
) {
t.Helper()
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"maps"
@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const errorBurstThreshold = "SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
// SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD at threshold, and the settings in env.
func startForErrorBurst(
t *testing.T, threshold string, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server) {
) (*sender, *clock, *servewaf.Server) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
func TestHealthEndpointCountsTowardNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ func TestHealthEndpointCountsTowardNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
)
for range healthChecks {
got := s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, proxy.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
got := s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, servewaf.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
if string(got.body) != "ok\n" || got.header.Get("Content-Type") != contentType {
t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q with Content-Type %q, want ok "+
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"io"
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ func TestOwnEndpointsAreNotInTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, proxy.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized)
s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, servewaf.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized)
s.scrape()
if clients := server.Limiter.Snapshot(); len(clients) != 0 {
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ func TestPathUnderTheOwnPrefixIsNeitherForwardedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
}
// historyOf returns the history of the client at addr.
func historyOf(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, addr string) ratelimit.History {
func historyOf(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, addr string) ratelimit.History {
t.Helper()
client := netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32")
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy
package servewaf
import (
"context"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"net/http"
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays(t *testing.T) {
// clock of the test's own: the wait lasts exactly as long as it should,
// however slowly the test process runs. Nothing in it may wait on the
// network, which would keep that clock from moving on: the request is
// handed to the proxy's handler, and GeoJS is one that never answers.
// handed to servewaf's handler, and GeoJS is one that never answers.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
// Not the default. The exclusive list needs the answer, and the app
// is never reached.
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"io"
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ func TestMetricsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
for _, authorization := range []string{bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
s.adminRequest(authorization, http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "",
s.adminRequest(authorization, http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "",
http.StatusNotFound)
}
}
@@ -46,18 +46,18 @@ func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
method, path, authorization string
status int
}{
{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
{
http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(token),
http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(token),
http.StatusUnauthorized,
},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "Basic " + token, http.StatusUnauthorized},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusOK},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "bearer " + token, http.StatusOK},
{http.MethodPost, proxy.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath + "/", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "Basic " + token, http.StatusUnauthorized},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusOK},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "bearer " + token, http.StatusOK},
{http.MethodPost, servewaf.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath + "/", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodGet, "/_smallwebwaf/bans", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodPost, proxy.HealthPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodPost, servewaf.HealthPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
} {
got := s.adminRequest(tc.authorization, tc.method, tc.path, "", tc.status)
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountTheBansAnAdminMakes(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 1)
// And a ban made through the endpoint.
s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
s.admin(http.MethodPost, servewaf.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 2)
}
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ func keptAnswer(addr, country string) lookup.Answer {
func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
t.Helper()
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, servewaf.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", bearer)
got := do(t, req)
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
func (s *sender) scrape() string {
s.t.Helper()
return string(s.adminRequest(bearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "",
return string(s.adminRequest(bearer, http.MethodGet, servewaf.MetricsPath, "",
http.StatusOK).body)
}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"net/http"
@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
// Package proxy is servewaf's server. It runs the checks on the request each of
// rproxy's questions carries, and answers rproxy what to do with that request. It
// takes rproxy's report once the visitor's answer has ended, which counts the
// request's bytes and writes its last log line. It answers servewaf's own
// endpoints: the health check, the metrics, the bans and the clients. It passes
// nothing to an app: internal/rproxy does that.
package proxy
// Package servewaf is the server the servewaf command runs. It answers rproxy's
// questions, takes rproxy's reports and answers its own endpoints, and writes a
// log line for each.
package servewaf
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
@@ -46,7 +44,7 @@ const BansPath = "/_smallwebwaf/bans"
// client's address after it, with SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
const ClientsPath = "/_smallwebwaf/clients/"
// Params are what NewServeWAF needs.
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
Config *config.Config
// RequestLog receives two JSON lines per question, one at its decision and
@@ -63,6 +61,9 @@ type Params struct {
// LookupFile is the lookup database they are looked up in while
// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and nil otherwise.
LookupFile *lookup.File
// CoreRuleSet is what NewCoreRuleSet returns: what inspects requests
// while SWWAF_WAF_MODE is not off, and nil while it is.
CoreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
// Now tells the time by which requests are counted for the rate
// limits, bans are made and run out, and GeoJS's answers are kept,
// normally time.Now in UTC, the time the state files give.
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
dnsbl: dnsbl,
abuseIPDB: abuseIPDB,
rules: params.Rules,
coreRuleSet: newCoreRuleSet(params.Config),
coreRuleSet: params.CoreRuleSet,
alerts: params.Alerts,
}
h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{
@@ -205,29 +206,35 @@ func newReputation(
return lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB
}
// newCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
// NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
// without the rules SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
// up to SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, or nil while SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off. It reads at
// most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
// up to SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, with the exclusions in
// SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, or nil while SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off. It
// reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the Core Rule Set does not read a
// JSON or XML body over its limit.
func newCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff {
return nil
// JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that cannot be read, does
// not parse or names an id of smallwebwaf's own rules is an error in every
// mode. While the mode is off, a set file is loaded with the Core Rule Set only
// to check it.
func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) (*waf.CoreRuleSet, error) {
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff && cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile == "" {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // off is no Core Rule Set, and no error
}
coreRuleSet, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel, DisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules,
BodyLimit: min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1),
BodyLimit: min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1),
ExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
})
if err != nil {
// The Core Rule Set is built in, and the settings cannot break it:
// the paranoia level is from 1 to 4, and the id of no rule switches
// nothing off.
panic(err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: %w", err)
}
return coreRuleSet
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // off is no Core Rule Set, and no error
}
return coreRuleSet, nil
}
// handler is servewaf's handler. It holds what every request shares; what
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"bufio"
@@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ func startProxyWithGeoJS(
func startProxyWithClock(
t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
env map[string]string,
) (string, *output, *proxy.Server) {
) (string, *output, *servewaf.Server) {
t.Helper()
addr, out, server, _ := startProxyWithAlerts(t, appURL, geojsURL, now, env)
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ func startProxyWithClock(
func startProxyWithAlerts(
t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
env map[string]string,
) (string, *output, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
) (string, *output, *servewaf.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
server, out, alertQueue := newServeWAF(t, geojsURL, now, env)
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ func startProxyWithAlerts(
// serve serves server on a port of its own until the test ends, and sets its
// Addr to where it listens.
func serve(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server) {
func serve(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server) {
t.Helper()
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
@@ -401,17 +401,17 @@ func startRProxy(
// inspected by it.
func newServeWAF(
t *testing.T, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
) (*proxy.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
) (*servewaf.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
return newServeWAFWith(t, proxy.NewServeWAF, geojsURL, now, env)
return newServeWAFWith(t, servewaf.New, geojsURL, now, env)
}
// newServeWAFWith is newServeWAF for the server build makes.
func newServeWAFWith(
t *testing.T, build func(proxy.Params) *proxy.Server,
t *testing.T, build func(servewaf.Params) *servewaf.Server,
geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
) (*proxy.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
) (*servewaf.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
@@ -463,13 +463,19 @@ func newServeWAFWith(
}
}
server := build(proxy.Params{
coreRuleSet, err := servewaf.NewCoreRuleSet(cfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Core Rule Set: %v", err)
}
server := build(servewaf.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: out,
ProcessLog: processLog,
GeoJSURL: geojsURL,
AbuseIPDBURL: abuseIPDBURL,
LookupFile: lookupFile,
CoreRuleSet: coreRuleSet,
Now: now,
Rules: ruleFiles,
Alerts: alertQueue,
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"net/http"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy
package servewaf
import (
"context"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"fmt"
@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// The reputation settings.
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ const (
// AbuseIPDB.
const abuseipdb = reputation.AbuseIPDBSource
// abuseIPDBURL is where newProxy has clients checked with AbuseIPDB: at
// abuseIPDBURL is where newServeWAF has clients checked with AbuseIPDB: at
// abuseIPDBStandIn, which TestMain registers with Go's default transport,
// through which AbuseIPDB is asked.
const abuseIPDBURL = "abuseipdb://stand-in/api/v2/check"
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ func verdictsFetched() time.Time {
// verdictsFetched, as reputation.json would at start: one that lists the
// client from each zone listedBy gives for it, and one that does not from
// each other zone.
func loadVerdicts(server *proxy.Server, listedBy map[string][]string) {
func loadVerdicts(server *servewaf.Server, listedBy map[string][]string) {
verdicts := make([]reputation.Verdict, 0, len(listedBy)*len(server.DNSBL.Zones()))
for client, zones := range listedBy {
@@ -993,7 +993,7 @@ func loadVerdicts(server *proxy.Server, listedBy map[string][]string) {
// loadScores puts into server's AbuseIPDB the score scores gives each
// client, an IPv4 address, fetched at verdictsFetched, as reputation.json
// would at start.
func loadScores(server *proxy.Server, scores map[string]int64) {
func loadScores(server *servewaf.Server, scores map[string]int64) {
kept := make([]reputation.Score, 0, len(scores))
for client, score := range scores {
kept = append(kept, reputation.Score{
@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ func loadScores(server *proxy.Server, scores map[string]int64) {
// wantAbuseIPDBChecks checks how many clients server has checked with
// AbuseIPDB.
func wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, want int) {
func wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, want int) {
t.Helper()
if got := server.AbuseIPDB.Checked(); got != want {
@@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ func wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, want int) {
// loadLists puts copies of lists into server's lists, by URL, each with
// its lines, fetched at listsFetched, as reputation.json would at start.
func loadLists(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, copies map[string][]string) {
func loadLists(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server, copies map[string][]string) {
t.Helper()
lists := make([]reputation.List, 0, len(copies))
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy
package servewaf
import (
"context"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"io"
@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
refused := out.endedLines(t, 2)[1]
wantStatus(t, get(t, server.Addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
wantStatus(t, get(t, server.Addr, servewaf.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
health := out.endedLines(t, 3)[2]
// A request passed to the app has every timing; one refused, none of
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"net/http"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy
package servewaf
import (
"slices"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy
package servewaf
import (
"bytes"
@@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ type Report struct {
DurationUpstreamTotal float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total"`
}
// NewServeWAF returns the server `smallwebwaf servewaf` runs. It answers
// New returns the server `smallwebwaf servewaf` runs. It answers
// rproxy's questions, takes rproxy's reports and answers its own endpoints. It
// passes nothing to an app. rproxy applies the size and time limits to the
// visitor. Go's default limit on a request's line and headers, 1 MiB, stays: it
// is far above rproxy's, and a question refused for its size would have rproxy
// let the request through.
func NewServeWAF(params Params) *Server {
func New(params Params) *Server {
h := newHandler(params)
return &Server{
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"context"
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
const (
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ type serveWAF struct {
t *testing.T
addr string
out *output
server *proxy.Server
server *servewaf.Server
clock *clock
queue *alerts.Queue
}
@@ -67,13 +67,13 @@ type serveWAF struct {
func startServeWAF(t *testing.T, geojsURL string, env map[string]string) *serveWAF {
t.Helper()
return startServeWAFWith(t, geojsURL, env, func(*proxy.Server) {})
return startServeWAFWith(t, geojsURL, env, func(*servewaf.Server) {})
}
// startServeWAFWith is startServeWAF with change applied to the server before
// it starts.
func startServeWAFWith(
t *testing.T, geojsURL string, env map[string]string, change func(*proxy.Server),
t *testing.T, geojsURL string, env map[string]string, change func(*servewaf.Server),
) *serveWAF {
t.Helper()
@@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ func (s *serveWAF) questionWith(
req := newRequest(s.t, method, s.addr, path, body)
req.Host = host
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, from)
req.Header.Set(proxy.PeerHeader, rproxyPeer)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, from)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.PeerHeader, rproxyPeer)
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, rand.Text())
return req
@@ -131,13 +131,13 @@ func (s *serveWAF) allowed(from string) string {
s.t.Helper()
req := s.question(siteA, from, "/")
wantDisposition(s.t, do(s.t, req), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(s.t, do(s.t, req), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
return req.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
}
// report sends rproxy's report and returns the answer.
func (s *serveWAF) report(report proxy.Report) answer {
func (s *serveWAF) report(report servewaf.Report) answer {
s.t.Helper()
body, err := json.Marshal(report)
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ func (s *serveWAF) report(report proxy.Report) answer {
func (s *serveWAF) reportBody(body string) answer {
s.t.Helper()
return do(s.t, newRequest(s.t, http.MethodPost, s.addr, proxy.ReportPath,
return do(s.t, newRequest(s.t, http.MethodPost, s.addr, servewaf.ReportPath,
strings.NewReader(body)))
}
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ func (s *serveWAF) reportBody(body string) answer {
func (s *serveWAF) passedOn(from string) {
s.t.Helper()
got := s.report(proxy.Report{
got := s.report(servewaf.Report{
RequestID: s.allowed(from),
Status: http.StatusOK,
RequestBytes: bodyBytes,
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ func (s *serveWAF) history() ratelimit.History {
func (s *serveWAF) metrics() string {
s.t.Helper()
req := newRequest(s.t, http.MethodGet, s.addr, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
req := newRequest(s.t, http.MethodGet, s.addr, servewaf.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", bearer)
got := do(s.t, req)
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ func wantDisposition(t *testing.T, got answer, status int, disposition string) {
t.Helper()
wantStatus(t, got, status)
if answered := got.header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader); answered != disposition {
if answered := got.header.Get(servewaf.DispositionHeader); answered != disposition {
t.Errorf("answered with disposition %q, want %q", answered, disposition)
}
}
@@ -248,10 +248,10 @@ func TestQuestionAllowedIsAnsweredAndLogged(t *testing.T) {
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/page?q=1&token=visible")
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-id")
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
req.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, "1234")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader, "1234")
got := do(t, req)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
wantBody(t, got, "")
if id := got.header.Get(requestIDHeader); id != "" {
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ func TestIPv6VisitorIsCountedInItsGroup(t *testing.T) {
s.allowed("2001:db8::1")
got := s.ask("2001:db8::2", "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
}
func TestIPv4VisitorInIPv6FormIsTheIPv4Client(t *testing.T) {
@@ -287,9 +287,9 @@ func TestIPv4VisitorInIPv6FormIsTheIPv4Client(t *testing.T) {
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{denyNets: client})
req := s.question(siteA, "::ffff:"+client, "/")
req.Header.Set(proxy.PeerHeader, "::ffff:"+rproxyPeer)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.PeerHeader, "::ffff:"+rproxyPeer)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if line.ClientIP != client || line.PeerIP != rproxyPeer {
@@ -305,13 +305,13 @@ func TestMalformedQuestionGets400AndAWarningAndNoLine(t *testing.T) {
change func(*http.Request)
}{
{"client not an address", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, "not an address")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, "not an address")
}},
{"client empty", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, "")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, "")
}},
{"client address with a zone", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, "2001:db8::1%eth0")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, "2001:db8::1%eth0")
}},
{"id absent", func(req *http.Request) {
req.Header.Del(requestIDHeader)
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ func TestLongestValidIDIsTaken(t *testing.T) {
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, strings.Repeat("x", 128))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}
func TestQuestionWithABodyOver64KiBGets400(t *testing.T) {
@@ -361,15 +361,15 @@ func TestQuestionWithABodyOver64KiBGets400(t *testing.T) {
s := startServeWAF(t, "", nil)
over := strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("x", proxy.QuestionBodyMaxBytes+1))
over := strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("x", servewaf.QuestionBodyMaxBytes+1))
got := do(t, s.questionWith(http.MethodPost, siteA, client, "/", over))
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusBadRequest, "")
wantProcessMessages(t, s, "a question is refused", 1)
wantNoRequestLines(t, s)
whole := strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("x", proxy.QuestionBodyMaxBytes))
whole := strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("x", servewaf.QuestionBodyMaxBytes))
got = do(t, s.questionWith(http.MethodPost, siteA, client, "/", whole))
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}
func TestQuestionWithAHeldIDIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
@@ -385,15 +385,15 @@ func TestQuestionWithAHeldIDIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
wantProcessMessages(t, s, "a question is refused", 1)
// A denied request's id is held as well.
denied := s.question(siteA, otherClient, proxy.HealthPath)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, denied), http.StatusNotFound, proxy.DispositionDeny)
denied := s.question(siteA, otherClient, servewaf.HealthPath)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, denied), http.StatusNotFound, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
again = s.question(siteA, client, "/")
again.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, denied.Header.Get(requestIDHeader))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, again), http.StatusBadRequest, "")
// The report ends the holding, and the refused questions changed nothing.
got := s.report(proxy.Report{RequestID: id, ResponseBytes: answerBytes})
got := s.report(servewaf.Report{RequestID: id, ResponseBytes: answerBytes})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
if history := s.history(); history.ResponseBytes != answerBytes {
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ func TestQuestionWithAHeldIDIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
again = s.question(siteA, client, "/")
again.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, id)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, again), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, again), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}
func TestReportNeverReachesAQuestionStillBeingHandled(t *testing.T) {
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ func TestReportNeverReachesAQuestionStillBeingHandled(t *testing.T) {
// A report for a question not yet answered is ignored, and that question's
// id is taken.
got := s.report(proxy.Report{RequestID: id, ResponseBytes: 1000})
got := s.report(servewaf.Report{RequestID: id, ResponseBytes: 1000})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
// This would wait on the same lookup were the id not taken.
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ func TestReportNeverReachesAQuestionStillBeingHandled(t *testing.T) {
select {
case got := <-answered:
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
case <-time.After(waitLimit):
t.Fatal("the question got no answer")
}
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ func TestReportNeverReachesAQuestionStillBeingHandled(t *testing.T) {
}
// The true report comes after, and is the one that counts.
got = s.report(proxy.Report{RequestID: id, ResponseBytes: answerBytes})
got = s.report(servewaf.Report{RequestID: id, ResponseBytes: answerBytes})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
if history := s.history(); history.ResponseBytes != answerBytes {
@@ -484,13 +484,13 @@ func TestPeerAbsentOrUnreadableIsAnsweredAndLoggedInvalid(t *testing.T) {
s := startServeWAF(t, "", nil)
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Del(proxy.PeerHeader)
req.Header.Del(servewaf.PeerHeader)
if peer != "" {
req.Header.Set(proxy.PeerHeader, peer)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.PeerHeader, peer)
}
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
if line := s.out.requestLine(t); line.PeerIP != "invalid IP" {
t.Errorf("log line has peer_ip %q, want invalid IP", line.PeerIP)
@@ -511,8 +511,8 @@ func TestContentLengthUnreadableOrNegativeCountsAsAbsent(t *testing.T) {
})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, announced)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader, announced)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
if line := s.out.requestLine(t); line.ContentLength != 0 {
t.Errorf("log line has content_length %d, want none", line.ContentLength)
@@ -527,13 +527,13 @@ func TestHeaderSentTwiceUsesItsFirstValue(t *testing.T) {
s := startServeWAF(t, "", nil)
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Add(proxy.ClientHeader, otherClient)
req.Header.Add(proxy.PeerHeader, "172.18.0.3")
req.Header.Add(servewaf.ClientHeader, otherClient)
req.Header.Add(servewaf.PeerHeader, "172.18.0.3")
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "first")
req.Header.Add(requestIDHeader, "second")
req.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, "1234")
req.Header.Add(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, "5678")
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader, "1234")
req.Header.Add(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader, "5678")
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if line.ClientIP != client || line.PeerIP != rproxyPeer ||
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ func sendQuestionWithPartOfItsBody(t *testing.T, conn net.Conn) {
_, err := fmt.Fprintf(conn,
"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\n%s: %s\r\n%s: an-id\r\n"+
"Content-Length: 100\r\n\r\npart",
siteA, proxy.ClientHeader, client, requestIDHeader)
siteA, servewaf.ClientHeader, client, requestIDHeader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("send the question: %v", err)
}
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ func TestQuestionWhoseBodyStopsArrivingGetsNoAnswer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startServeWAFWith(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token},
func(server *proxy.Server) { server.ReadTimeout = readTimeout })
func(server *servewaf.Server) { server.ReadTimeout = readTimeout })
conn := dial(t, s.addr)
sendQuestionWithPartOfItsBody(t, conn)
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ func TestQuestionWhoseBodyStopsArrivingGetsNoAnswer(t *testing.T) {
// The id was not taken.
again := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
again.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "an-id")
wantDisposition(t, do(t, again), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, again), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
})
}
}
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ func TestQuestionDeniedGetsTheBanResponse(t *testing.T) {
})
got := s.ask(client, "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, status, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, status, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
wantBody(t, got, http.StatusText(status)+"\n")
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
})
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ func TestBanResponseCloseIsAnAnswerOfItsOwn(t *testing.T) {
})
got := s.ask(client, "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionClose)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionClose)
wantBody(t, got, "")
// The visitor is sent nothing.
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
@@ -664,12 +664,12 @@ func TestBlockRuleIsDeniedWith403AndABanRuleWithTheBanResponse(t *testing.T) {
})
got := s.ask(client, "/blocked")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
got = s.ask(client, "/.env")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusTooManyRequests, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusTooManyRequests, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLines(t, 2)[1], http.StatusTooManyRequests,
requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
@@ -681,15 +681,17 @@ func TestQuestionUnderTheOwnPrefixIsDeniedWith404AfterTheChecks(t *testing.T) {
metricsToken: token, denyNets: otherClient,
})
for _, path := range []string{proxy.HealthPath, proxy.MetricsPath, proxy.ReportPath} {
for _, path := range []string{
servewaf.HealthPath, servewaf.MetricsPath, servewaf.ReportPath,
} {
got := s.ask(client, path)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusNotFound, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusNotFound, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
}
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
got := s.ask(otherClient, proxy.MetricsPath)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
got := s.ask(otherClient, servewaf.MetricsPath)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
}
func TestObserveModeAllowsAndLogsWhatEnforceModeWouldHaveDone(t *testing.T) {
@@ -698,7 +700,7 @@ func TestObserveModeAllowsAndLogsWhatEnforceModeWouldHaveDone(t *testing.T) {
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{mode: observe, denyNets: client})
got := s.ask(client, "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
@@ -714,7 +716,7 @@ func TestObserveModeRefusalAnsweredAllowCountsForTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
for range 2 {
got := s.ask(client, "/blocked")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
@@ -733,7 +735,7 @@ func TestDeniedQuestionCountsForTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
for range 2 {
got := s.ask(client, "/blocked")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
}
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
@@ -762,7 +764,7 @@ func TestAllowCarriesTheLookupHeadersWhileTheSettingIsSet(t *testing.T) {
})
got := s.ask(fromDE, "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
asn, country := got.header.Get("X-Client-Asn"), got.header.Get("X-Client-Country")
if asn != tc.wantASN || country != tc.wantCountry {
@@ -787,7 +789,7 @@ func TestReportCountsTowardAByteLimitWhichThenBans(t *testing.T) {
}
// 100 bytes are over the limit of 99.
got := s.report(proxy.Report{
got := s.report(servewaf.Report{
RequestID: id, Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
RequestBytes: bodyBytes, ResponseBytes: answerBytes,
})
@@ -811,7 +813,7 @@ func TestReportCountsTowardAByteLimitWhichThenBans(t *testing.T) {
}
got = s.ask(client, "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
}
func TestReportCountsAtThePercentageItsQuestionWasGiven(t *testing.T) {
@@ -825,10 +827,10 @@ func TestReportCountsAtThePercentageItsQuestionWasGiven(t *testing.T) {
})
s.passedOn(fromKP)
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromKP, "/"), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromKP, "/"), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
s.passedOn(fromDE)
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromDE, "/"), http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromDE, "/"), http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
}
func TestReportAddsTheRequestToItsClientsHistoryAndTheAnomalyCounters(t *testing.T) {
@@ -846,7 +848,7 @@ func TestReportAddsTheRequestToItsClientsHistoryAndTheAnomalyCounters(t *testing
t.Errorf("anomaly counters %v before the report, want none", counters)
}
got := s.report(proxy.Report{
got := s.report(servewaf.Report{
RequestID: id, Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
RequestBytes: bodyBytes, ResponseBytes: answerBytes,
})
@@ -874,7 +876,7 @@ func TestDeniedRequestIsFinishedAtItsDecision(t *testing.T) {
s.allowed(client)
denied := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
wantDisposition(t, do(t, denied), http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, denied), http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
counters := s.server.Anomalies.Snapshot()
if len(counters) != 1 || counters[0].Minute.Current != 1 {
@@ -891,7 +893,7 @@ func TestDeniedRequestIsFinishedAtItsDecision(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, s.metrics(), series, 1)
got := s.report(proxy.Report{
got := s.report(servewaf.Report{
RequestID: denied.Header.Get(requestIDHeader), Status: http.StatusForbidden,
ResponseBytes: 1000, DurationTotal: 2,
})
@@ -924,7 +926,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountAnAllowedRequestFromItsReport(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="`+alertInstance+`"}`,
1) // the scrape itself
got := s.report(proxy.Report{
got := s.report(servewaf.Report{
RequestID: id, Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
RequestBytes: bodyBytes, ResponseBytes: answerBytes,
DurationTotal: 5, DurationUpstreamTotal: 4,
@@ -942,7 +944,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountAnAllowedRequestFromItsReport(t *testing.T) {
// check needs a server that has not been scraped yet.
unscraped := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
got = unscraped.report(proxy.Report{
got = unscraped.report(servewaf.Report{
RequestID: unscraped.allowed(client), Status: http.StatusBadGateway, DurationTotal: 5,
})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
@@ -955,7 +957,7 @@ func TestReportForARequestNotHeldIsIgnored(t *testing.T) {
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit})
got := s.report(proxy.Report{RequestID: "no-such-request", ResponseBytes: 1000})
got := s.report(servewaf.Report{RequestID: "no-such-request", ResponseBytes: 1000})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
if clients := s.server.Limiter.Snapshot(); len(clients) != 0 {
@@ -972,7 +974,7 @@ func TestReportForARequestNotHeldIsIgnored(t *testing.T) {
// A second report of the same request does not count it twice.
id := s.allowed(client)
for range 2 {
got = s.report(proxy.Report{RequestID: id, ResponseBytes: answerBytes})
got = s.report(servewaf.Report{RequestID: id, ResponseBytes: answerBytes})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
}
@@ -1160,7 +1162,7 @@ func TestBytesAtTheirMostEachWayBanRatherThanOverflow(t *testing.T) {
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit})
got := s.report(proxy.Report{
got := s.report(servewaf.Report{
RequestID: s.allowed(client), Status: http.StatusOK,
RequestBytes: reportedBytesLimit, ResponseBytes: reportedBytesLimit,
})
@@ -1245,9 +1247,9 @@ func TestReportWritesTheLastLineWithTheDecisionsAndTheReportsFields(t *testing.T
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
id := req.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
got := s.report(proxy.Report{
got := s.report(servewaf.Report{
RequestID: id, Status: http.StatusCreated,
RequestBytes: bodyBytes, ResponseBytes: answerBytes,
DurationTotal: 12.5, DurationUpstreamTotal: 10.25,
@@ -1294,7 +1296,7 @@ func TestEveryDeniedRequestsReportGetsItsLastLine(t *testing.T) {
"close", map[string]string{denyNets: client, banResponse: banResponseClose}, "/",
0, requestlog.ActionDenied,
},
{"own prefix", nil, proxy.HealthPath, http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionAdmin},
{"own prefix", nil, servewaf.HealthPath, http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionAdmin},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -1305,7 +1307,7 @@ func TestEveryDeniedRequestsReportGetsItsLastLine(t *testing.T) {
id := req.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
do(t, req)
got := s.report(proxy.Report{
got := s.report(servewaf.Report{
RequestID: id, Status: tc.status, ResponseBytes: 8, DurationTotal: 3,
})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
@@ -1341,18 +1343,18 @@ func TestOldestAnsweredRequestIsDroppedPastTheBound(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("question: %v", err)
}
wantDisposition(t, readAnswer(res), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, readAnswer(res), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}
// The table is full again with next and those, without oldest.
got := s.report(proxy.Report{RequestID: oldest, ResponseBytes: answerBytes})
got := s.report(servewaf.Report{RequestID: oldest, ResponseBytes: answerBytes})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
if counted := s.history().Requests; counted != 0 {
t.Errorf("history holds %d requests, want the dropped one not counted", counted)
}
got = s.report(proxy.Report{RequestID: next, ResponseBytes: answerBytes})
got = s.report(servewaf.Report{RequestID: next, ResponseBytes: answerBytes})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
if counted := s.history().Requests; counted != 1 {
@@ -1366,10 +1368,10 @@ func TestBanMadeThroughOneHostRefusesTheClientOnAnother(t *testing.T) {
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules)})
got := do(t, s.question(siteA, client, "/.env"))
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
got = do(t, s.question(siteB, client, "/"))
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
if lines[0].Host != siteA || lines[1].Host != siteB {
@@ -1395,7 +1397,7 @@ func TestRequestsOnEverySiteCountTowardOneSetOfLimits(t *testing.T) {
s.allowed(client)
got := do(t, s.question(siteB, client, "/"))
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
}
func TestOwnEndpointsAnswerOnlyWithoutTheClientHeader(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1410,13 +1412,13 @@ func TestOwnEndpointsAnswerOnlyWithoutTheClientHeader(t *testing.T) {
path, authorization string
want int
}{
{proxy.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK},
{proxy.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusOK},
{proxy.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
{proxy.BansPath, adminBearer, http.StatusOK},
{proxy.BansPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
{proxy.ClientsPath + client, adminBearer, http.StatusOK},
{proxy.ReportPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
{servewaf.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK},
{servewaf.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusOK},
{servewaf.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
{servewaf.BansPath, adminBearer, http.StatusOK},
{servewaf.BansPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
{servewaf.ClientsPath + client, adminBearer, http.StatusOK},
{servewaf.ReportPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
{"/_smallwebwaf/other", "", http.StatusNotFound},
{"/", "", http.StatusNotFound},
} {
@@ -1429,9 +1431,9 @@ func TestOwnEndpointsAnswerOnlyWithoutTheClientHeader(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.authorization)
if strings.HasPrefix(tc.path, "/_smallwebwaf/") {
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusNotFound, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusNotFound, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
} else {
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}
}
}
@@ -1441,10 +1443,11 @@ func TestOwnEndpointsLinesDoNotSayWhichOfTheTwoTheyAre(t *testing.T) {
s := startServeWAF(t, "", nil)
wantStatus(t, get(t, s.addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
wantStatus(t, get(t, s.addr, servewaf.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if _, there := line.fields["servewaf_line"]; there || line.Path != proxy.HealthPath {
if _, there := line.fields["servewaf_line"]; there ||
line.Path != servewaf.HealthPath {
t.Errorf("the health check's log line is %+v", line.fields)
}
}
@@ -1456,12 +1459,12 @@ func TestALargeBodyAnnouncedAndLongHeadersAreNoReasonToRefuse(t *testing.T) {
req := s.questionWith(http.MethodPost, siteA, client, "/",
strings.NewReader("a body"))
req.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, "1073741824")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader, "1073741824")
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, otherClient)
req.Header.Set("X-Long", strings.Repeat("x", 40<<10))
got := do(t, req)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if line.ClientIP != client || line.ContentLength != 1<<30 {
@@ -1529,7 +1532,7 @@ carried header:Content-Length block ^6$
strings.NewReader("a body"))
if tc.announced != "" {
req.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, tc.announced)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader, tc.announced)
}
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), tc.want)
@@ -1547,19 +1550,19 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetReadsTheBodyAQuestionCarries(t *testing.T) {
req := s.questionWith(http.MethodPost, siteA, client, "/",
strings.NewReader(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
req.Header.Set(proxy.ContentLengthHeader, "100000")
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ContentLengthHeader, "100000")
return do(t, req)
}
got := ask(formData, "id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
// The first 64 KiB of a longer JSON body cannot be parsed, which is no
// attack, so the Core Rule Set does not read it.
cut := `{"text":"` + strings.Repeat("x", proxy.QuestionBodyMaxBytes)
got = ask("application/json", cut[:proxy.QuestionBodyMaxBytes])
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
cut := `{"text":"` + strings.Repeat("x", servewaf.QuestionBodyMaxBytes)
got = ask("application/json", cut[:servewaf.QuestionBodyMaxBytes])
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}
func TestCoreRuleSetAlertNamesTheSite(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1568,7 +1571,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetAlertNamesTheSite(t *testing.T) {
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
got := s.ask(client, sqlInjection)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
waiting := s.queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventWAFBlock ||
@@ -1583,7 +1586,7 @@ func TestReputationHitAlertNamesTheSite(t *testing.T) {
s := startServeWAF(t, "", map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL})
loadLists(t, s.server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {client}})
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(client, "/"), http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(client, "/"), http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
waiting := s.queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventReputationHit ||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"net/http"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package proxy_test
package servewaf_test
import (
"net/http"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
)
// healthCheckTimeout bounds the whole health check.
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ func checkRProxyAndApp(
// listenAddr, which the settings have checked has one.
func askHealthEndpoint(ctx context.Context, listenAddr string) error {
_, port, _ := net.SplitHostPort(listenAddr)
health := "http://" + net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", port) + proxy.HealthPath
health := "http://" + net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", port) + servewaf.HealthPath
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, health, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
+10 -10
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
)
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ func TestABanThroughOneSiteRefusesTheClientOnTheOther(t *testing.T) {
// One request's three lines carry one id, rproxy's with servewaf's answer.
line := firstOut.line(t, "path", bannedProbe)
if line["disposition"] != proxy.DispositionDeny || line["client_ip"] != placed {
if line["disposition"] != servewaf.DispositionDeny || line["client_ip"] != placed {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v", line)
}
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ func TestTheSiteAnswersWhileServeWAFIsStoppedAndStartedAgain(t *testing.T) {
wantStatus(t, site+"/after-stop", placed, http.StatusOK)
line := out.line(t, "path", "/after-stop")
if line["disposition"] != proxy.DispositionAllow ||
if line["disposition"] != servewaf.DispositionAllow ||
line["default_disposition"] != true {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v", line)
}
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ func TestAChunkedBodyStaysABodyAtServeWAF(t *testing.T) {
const smuggledID = "smuggled-request"
smuggled := "GET " + bannedProbe + " HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n" +
proxy.ClientHeader + ": " + otherClient + "\r\n" +
servewaf.ClientHeader + ": " + otherClient + "\r\n" +
"X-Request-ID: " + smuggledID + "\r\n\r\n"
status := sendRaw(t, site, "POST /upload HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"+
@@ -459,10 +459,10 @@ func TestRProxyAsksAServeWAFThatSpeaksHTTP2OverHTTP1(t *testing.T) {
protocols := make(chan string, 10)
backend := httptest.NewUnstartedServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader) != "" {
if r.Header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader) != "" {
protocols <- r.Proto
w.Header().Set(proxy.DispositionHeader, proxy.DispositionDeny)
w.Header().Set(servewaf.DispositionHeader, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
}
}))
@@ -532,8 +532,8 @@ func TestRProxyStoppingWaitsForAReportBeingSent(t *testing.T) {
release := make(chan struct{})
backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get(proxy.ClientHeader) != "" {
w.Header().Set(proxy.DispositionHeader, proxy.DispositionAllow)
if r.Header.Get(servewaf.ClientHeader) != "" {
w.Header().Set(servewaf.DispositionHeader, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
return
}
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ func TestRProxyStoppingCutsOffARequestAfterFiveSeconds(t *testing.T) {
backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set(proxy.DispositionHeader, proxy.DispositionAllow)
w.Header().Set(servewaf.DispositionHeader, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
}))
t.Cleanup(backend.Close)
@@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ func TestMainRunsRProxy(t *testing.T) {
addr, cmd, out := startRProxyProcess(t, wafBackend+"=http://127.0.0.1:9")
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"http://"+addr+proxy.HealthPath, http.NoBody)
"http://"+addr+servewaf.HealthPath, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
+8 -8
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
)
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ func TestMainRunsServeWAF(t *testing.T) {
})
addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
err = cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.SIGTERM)
if err != nil {
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ func ask(t *testing.T, addr, path string, status int, disposition string) {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, placed)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, placed)
req.Header.Set("X-Request-ID", rand.Text())
transport := &http.Transport{}
@@ -147,9 +147,9 @@ func ask(t *testing.T, addr, path string, status int, disposition string) {
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != status ||
res.Header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader) != disposition {
res.Header.Get(servewaf.DispositionHeader) != disposition {
t.Errorf("answered %d with disposition %q, want %d with %q", res.StatusCode,
res.Header.Get(proxy.DispositionHeader), status, disposition)
res.Header.Get(servewaf.DispositionHeader), status, disposition)
}
}
@@ -193,12 +193,12 @@ func TestServeWAFKeepsItsBansAcrossARestartAndNeedsNoApp(t *testing.T) {
}
runServeWAF(t, env, func(addr string) {
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusOK, proxy.DispositionAllow)
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusOK, servewaf.DispositionAllow)
// The default rule file bans a probe for this.
ask(t, addr, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
ask(t, addr, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
})
runServeWAF(t, env, func(addr string) {
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusForbidden, proxy.DispositionDeny)
ask(t, addr, "/", http.StatusForbidden, servewaf.DispositionDeny)
})
}
+17 -8
View File
@@ -23,12 +23,13 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
)
// shutdownTimeout is how long requests in progress may take to finish
@@ -150,7 +151,14 @@ func RunServeWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
return 1
}
server, err := newServer(cfg, stdout, processLog, now, ruleFiles, alertQueue)
crs, err := servewaf.NewCoreRuleSet(cfg)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("cannot use the Core Rule Set", "error", err.Error())
return 1
}
server, err := newServer(cfg, stdout, processLog, now, ruleFiles, alertQueue, crs)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("cannot use the lookup database", "error", err.Error())
@@ -170,8 +178,7 @@ func RunServeWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(ctx, "tcp", cfg.ListenAddr)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("cannot listen on SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR",
"error", err.Error())
processLog.Error("cannot listen on SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR", "error", err.Error())
return 1
}
@@ -190,7 +197,8 @@ func RunServeWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
func newServer(
cfg *config.Config, stdout io.Writer, processLog *slog.Logger,
now func() time.Time, ruleFiles *rules.Files, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
) (*proxy.Server, error) {
crs *waf.CoreRuleSet,
) (*servewaf.Server, error) {
var lookupFile *lookup.File
if cfg.LookupSource == "file" {
@@ -207,13 +215,14 @@ func newServer(
}
}
server := proxy.NewServeWAF(proxy.Params{
server := servewaf.New(servewaf.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: stdout,
ProcessLog: processLog,
GeoJSURL: lookup.URL,
AbuseIPDBURL: reputation.AbuseIPDBURL,
LookupFile: lookupFile,
CoreRuleSet: crs,
Now: now,
Rules: ruleFiles,
Alerts: alertQueue,
@@ -230,7 +239,7 @@ func newServer(
// loadStateFiles reads the state files into the parts of server and into
// alertQueue, as state.Load does.
func loadStateFiles(
cfg *config.Config, server *proxy.Server, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
cfg *config.Config, server *servewaf.Server, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
now func() time.Time, processLog *slog.Logger,
) (*state.Files, error) {
return state.Load(state.Params{
@@ -316,7 +325,7 @@ func startSending(
// shutdownTimeout to finish, and writes every state file, alerts.json with
// the alerts still waiting.
func serve(
ctx context.Context, server *proxy.Server, listener net.Listener,
ctx context.Context, server *servewaf.Server, listener net.Listener,
files *state.Files, ruleFiles *rules.Files, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
processLog *slog.Logger,
) int {
+56 -5
View File
@@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup/lookuptest"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/servewaf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
)
@@ -551,6 +552,56 @@ func TestRulesDirThatDoesNotExistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
": no such file or directory")
}
func TestCoreRuleSetExclusionsFileThatCannotBeReadStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "crs-exclusions.conf")
out := &output{}
status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE": path,
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
}
line := out.line(t, "msg", "cannot use the Core Rule Set")
want := "SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: read the exclusions file: open " +
path + ": no such file or directory"
if line["error"] != want {
t.Errorf("start refused with %v, want the error %q", line, want)
}
}
func TestCoreRuleSetExclusionsFileThatCannotBeUsedStopsTheStartWhileTheCoreRuleSetIsOff(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
broken := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "broken.conf")
err := os.WriteFile(broken, []byte("SecNoSuchDirective On\n"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, path := range []string{filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing.conf"), broken} {
out := &output{}
status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWWAF_WAF_MODE": config.WAFModeOff, "SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE": path,
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%s: exit status %d, want 1", path, status)
}
out.line(t, "msg", "cannot use the Core Rule Set")
}
}
func TestLookupDatabaseReplacedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -1225,9 +1276,9 @@ func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, dir string) {
"SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS": "",
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
"SWWAF_DENY_NETS": "",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "500",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR": "20000",
rateLimitPerDay: "300000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "120",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR": "1500",
rateLimitPerDay: "6000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS": "",
"SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES": "",
@@ -1627,7 +1678,7 @@ func statusFrom(t *testing.T, url, from string) int {
}
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", from)
req.Header.Set(proxy.ClientHeader, from)
req.Header.Set(servewaf.ClientHeader, from)
req.Header.Set("X-Request-ID", rand.Text())
transport := &http.Transport{}
+337
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
# Ordinary gitea requests that the Core Rule Set must let through with
# deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf. Each line is a path and query, and may end
# with one header after a space. The tests of internal/waf inspect each as a GET,
# and script/gitea-setup sends each to gitea through the setup as a GET. The Core
# Rule Set reads the query and the headers the same way for any method.
# Searches with ordinary words and symbols.
/owner/repo/search?q=package.json
/owner/repo/search?q=.gitignore
/owner/repo/search?q=docker-compose.yml
/owner/repo/search?q=python3
/owner/repo/search?q=ssh%20key
/owner/repo/search?q=feat%2Fdocker-support
/owner/repo/search?q=ls%20-la
/owner/repo/search?q=sed%20-i
/owner/repo/search?q=%2Fbin%2Fsh
/owner/repo/search?q=%60make%20check%60
/owner/repo/search?q=%60whoami%60
/owner/repo/search?q=fetch%28
/owner/repo/search?q=%24%7BVAR%7D
/owner/repo/search?q=%24%28pwd%29
/owner/repo/search?q=process.env
/owner/repo/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/search?q=%3Cscript%3E
/owner/repo/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/search?q=union%20select
/owner/repo/search?q=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A8080
/owner/repo/search?q=..%2F
/owner/repo/search?q=%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
/owner/repo/search?q=eval%28
/owner/repo/search?q=chmod%20%2Bx
/owner/repo/search?q=echo%20%24PATH
/owner/repo/search?q=java.lang.Runtime
/owner/repo/search?q=document.cookie
/owner/repo/search?q=alert%281%29
/owner/repo/search?q=__proto__
/owner/repo/search?q=C%3A%5CWindows%5CSystem32
/owner/repo/search?q=Invoke-WebRequest
/owner/repo/search?q=if%20%28a%20%3D%3D%20b%29%20%7B
/owner/repo/search?q=sudo%20apt%20install
/owner/repo/search?q=~%2F.ssh%2Fconfig
/owner/repo/search?q=.htaccess
/owner/repo/search?q=%24_GET%5B
/owner/repo/search?q=%24_POST
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/owner/repo/search?q=%3C%3Fphp%20echo
/owner/repo/search?q=information_schema
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/owner/repo/search?q=onClick%3D%7B
/explore/repos?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/explore/repos?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/explore/code?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/explore/code?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/issues?type=all&state=open&q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/issues?type=all&state=open&q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/pulls?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/pulls?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/issues?type=your_repositories&q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/issues?type=your_repositories&q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/commits/branch/main/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/commits/branch/main/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/wiki/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/wiki/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/branches?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/branches?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/repo/releases?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/repo/releases?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/owner/-/packages?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/owner/-/packages?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/user/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/user/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/api/v1/repos/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/api/v1/repos/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
# Pages, raw files and edit pages of files, and the API's call for their
# contents.
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/package.json
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/package.json
/owner/repo/_edit/main/package.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/package.json
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.gitignore
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/.gitignore
/owner/repo/_edit/main/.gitignore
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/.gitignore
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/docker-compose.yml
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/docker-compose.yml
/owner/repo/_edit/main/docker-compose.yml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/docker-compose.yml
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/Dockerfile
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/Dockerfile
/owner/repo/_edit/main/Dockerfile
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/Dockerfile
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.htaccess
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/.htaccess
/owner/repo/_edit/main/.htaccess
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/.htaccess
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/rootfs/etc/passwd
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/rootfs/etc/passwd
/owner/repo/_edit/main/rootfs/etc/passwd
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/rootfs/etc/passwd
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/bin/docker-entrypoint
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/bin/docker-entrypoint
/owner/repo/_edit/main/bin/docker-entrypoint
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/bin/docker-entrypoint
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/scripts/python3-setup.sh
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/scripts/python3-setup.sh
/owner/repo/_edit/main/scripts/python3-setup.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/scripts/python3-setup.sh
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/src/java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/src/java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java
/owner/repo/_edit/main/src/java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/src/java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/java.lang.String.md
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/java.lang.String.md
/owner/repo/_edit/main/java.lang.String.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/java.lang.String.md
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/owner/repo/_edit/main/META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/META-INF/services/org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/process.env.d.ts
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/process.env.d.ts
/owner/repo/_edit/main/process.env.d.ts
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/process.env.d.ts
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/document.write.js
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/document.write.js
/owner/repo/_edit/main/document.write.js
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/document.write.js
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/test/fixtures/__proto__.json
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/test/fixtures/__proto__.json
/owner/repo/_edit/main/test/fixtures/__proto__.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/test/fixtures/__proto__.json
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/install-script.sh
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/install-script.sh
/owner/repo/_edit/main/install-script.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/install-script.sh
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/src/backend/catalog/information_schema.sql
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/src/backend/catalog/information_schema.sql
/owner/repo/_edit/main/src/backend/catalog/information_schema.sql
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/src/backend/catalog/information_schema.sql
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/docs/a%20b.xhtml
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/docs/a%20b.xhtml
/owner/repo/_edit/main/docs/a%20b.xhtml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/docs/a%20b.xhtml
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/%5Bdraft%5D.md
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/%5Bdraft%5D.md
/owner/repo/_edit/main/%5Bdraft%5D.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/%5Bdraft%5D.md
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/notes.txt~
/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/notes.txt~
/owner/repo/_edit/main/notes.txt~
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/notes.txt~
# File names in the query string: the commit graph of a file, the API's lists
# of its commits and of its contents, an issue opened from a template, and the
# sign-in page on the way to its edit page.
/owner/repo/graph?file=package.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=package.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22package.json%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fpackage.json
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fpackage.json
/owner/repo/graph?file=.gitignore
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=.gitignore
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22.gitignore%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2F.gitignore
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2F.gitignore
/owner/repo/graph?file=docker-compose.yml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=docker-compose.yml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22docker-compose.yml%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fdocker-compose.yml
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fdocker-compose.yml
/owner/repo/graph?file=.htaccess
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=.htaccess
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22.htaccess%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2F.htaccess
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2F.htaccess
/owner/repo/graph?file=rootfs%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=rootfs%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22rootfs%2Fetc%2Fpasswd%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Frootfs%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Frootfs%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
/owner/repo/graph?file=bin%2Fdocker-entrypoint
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=bin%2Fdocker-entrypoint
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22bin%2Fdocker-entrypoint%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fbin%2Fdocker-entrypoint
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fbin%2Fdocker-entrypoint
/owner/repo/graph?file=scripts%2Fpython3-setup.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=scripts%2Fpython3-setup.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22scripts%2Fpython3-setup.sh%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fscripts%2Fpython3-setup.sh
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fscripts%2Fpython3-setup.sh
/owner/repo/graph?file=src%2Fjava.base%2Fshare%2Fclasses%2Fjava%2Flang%2FRuntime.java
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=src%2Fjava.base%2Fshare%2Fclasses%2Fjava%2Flang%2FRuntime.java
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22src%2Fjava.base%2Fshare%2Fclasses%2Fjava%2Flang%2FRuntime.java%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fsrc%2Fjava.base%2Fshare%2Fclasses%2Fjava%2Flang%2FRuntime.java
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fsrc%2Fjava.base%2Fshare%2Fclasses%2Fjava%2Flang%2FRuntime.java
/owner/repo/graph?file=java.lang.String.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=java.lang.String.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22java.lang.String.md%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fjava.lang.String.md
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/owner/repo/graph?file=META-INF%2Fservices%2Forg.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=META-INF%2Fservices%2Forg.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22META-INF%2Fservices%2Forg.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2FMETA-INF%2Fservices%2Forg.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2FMETA-INF%2Fservices%2Forg.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/owner/repo/graph?file=process.env.d.ts
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=process.env.d.ts
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22process.env.d.ts%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fprocess.env.d.ts
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fprocess.env.d.ts
/owner/repo/graph?file=document.write.js
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=document.write.js
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22document.write.js%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fdocument.write.js
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fdocument.write.js
/owner/repo/graph?file=test%2Ffixtures%2F__proto__.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=test%2Ffixtures%2F__proto__.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22test%2Ffixtures%2F__proto__.json%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Ftest%2Ffixtures%2F__proto__.json
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Ftest%2Ffixtures%2F__proto__.json
/owner/repo/graph?file=install-script.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=install-script.sh
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/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Finstall-script.sh
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/owner/repo/graph?file=src%2Fbackend%2Fcatalog%2Finformation_schema.sql
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=src%2Fbackend%2Fcatalog%2Finformation_schema.sql
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22src%2Fbackend%2Fcatalog%2Finformation_schema.sql%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fsrc%2Fbackend%2Fcatalog%2Finformation_schema.sql
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fsrc%2Fbackend%2Fcatalog%2Finformation_schema.sql
/owner/repo/graph?file=docs%2Fa%20b.xhtml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=docs%2Fa%20b.xhtml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22docs%2Fa%20b.xhtml%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2Fdocs%2Fa%20b.xhtml
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2Fdocs%2Fa%20b.xhtml
/owner/repo/graph?file=%5Bdraft%5D.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/commits?path=%5Bdraft%5D.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/file-contents?body=%7B%22files%22%3A%5B%22%5Bdraft%5D.md%22%5D%7D
/owner/repo/issues/new?template=.gitea%2FISSUE_TEMPLATE%2F%5Bdraft%5D.md
/user/login?redirect_to=%2Fowner%2Frepo%2F_edit%2Fmain%2F%5Bdraft%5D.md
# File names of attachments uploaded through the API, to a release, an issue and
# a comment.
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=package.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=.gitignore
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=docker-compose.yml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=.htaccess
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=docker-entrypoint
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=python3-setup.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=Runtime.java
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=%5Bdraft%5D.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=notes.txt~
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=install-script.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=install-script.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=install-script.sh
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=process.env.d.ts
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=process.env.d.ts
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=process.env.d.ts
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=java.lang.String.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=java.lang.String.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=java.lang.String.md
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=information_schema.sql
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=information_schema.sql
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=information_schema.sql
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=document.write.js
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=document.write.js
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=document.write.js
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=__proto__.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=__proto__.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=__proto__.json
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=index.xhtml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/assets?name=index.xhtml
/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/comments/1/assets?name=index.xhtml
# An artifact upload from actions/upload-artifact@v3, which sends Content-Range.
/api/actions_pipeline/_apis/pipelines/workflows/1/artifacts/9b7c1f3a/upload?itemPath=artifact%2Freport.txt Content-Range: bytes 0-9/10
# Branch and tag names in the query string: deleting a branch, starting a
# release from a tag, a branch protection rule, a directory listing's last
# commits, and a container image push that reuses a layer.
/owner/repo/branches?name=docker-build
/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=docker-build
/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=docker-build
/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Fdocker-build
/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Fdocker-build
/owner/repo/branches?name=feat%2Fdocker-support
/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=feat%2Fdocker-support
/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=feat%2Fdocker-support
/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Ffeat%2Fdocker-support
/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Ffeat%2Fdocker-support
/owner/repo/branches?name=renovate%2Fdocker-build-push-action-6.x
/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=renovate%2Fdocker-build-push-action-6.x
/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=renovate%2Fdocker-build-push-action-6.x
/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Frenovate%2Fdocker-build-push-action-6.x
/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Frenovate%2Fdocker-build-push-action-6.x
/owner/repo/branches?name=python3-migration
/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=python3-migration
/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=python3-migration
/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Fpython3-migration
/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Fpython3-migration
/owner/repo/branches?name=ansible-roles
/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=ansible-roles
/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=ansible-roles
/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Fansible-roles
/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Fansible-roles
/owner/repo/branches?name=whoami
/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=whoami
/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=whoami
/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Fwhoami
/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Fwhoami
# Pages a signed-in user opens.
/
/owner/repo
/owner/repo/issues
/owner/repo/pulls
/owner/repo/releases
/owner/repo/wiki
/owner/repo/activity
/owner/repo/branches
/owner/repo/tags
/owner/repo/settings
/owner/repo/actions
/owner/repo/compare/main...main
/owner/repo/commits/branch/main
/owner/repo/archive/main.zip
/notifications
/user/settings
/user/settings/applications
/explore/repos
/-/admin
+94 -13
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
// Package waf runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
// method, the URL with its query and the headers of a request, and on its
// body while SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the six changes smallwebwaf
// makes to it, as "Attack detection" under "Settings" in SPEC.md describes
// them. It reads no response.
// body while SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the seven changes smallwebwaf
// makes to it and the exclusions in SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as
// "Attack detection" under "Settings" in SPEC.md describes them. It reads no
// response.
//
// smallwebwaf writes only to its state directory, so Coraza is built with
// its no_fs_access tag, as the Dockerfile and script/build build it: of a
@@ -11,10 +12,13 @@
package waf
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"os"
"regexp"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -26,12 +30,13 @@ import (
)
// directives are the Core Rule Set as smallwebwaf runs it, with the
// paranoia level for %d, and bodyDirectives for %s while
// SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set. Each rule smallwebwaf adds has an id from
// 900000 to 900999, the ids the Core Rule Set keeps for the rules that set
// it up, which SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES refuses, so that no setting
// switches one off. Coraza joins a line ending in \ to the next, without
// the spaces at the start of the next.
// paranoia level for %d, bodyDirectives for the first %s while
// SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, and the exclusions file for the second.
// Each rule smallwebwaf adds has an id from 900000 to 900999, the ids the
// Core Rule Set keeps for the rules that set it up, which
// SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES and the exclusions file refuse, so that no
// setting switches one off. Coraza joins a line ending in \ to the next,
// without the spaces at the start of the next.
const directives = `
# The engine only detects. smallwebwaf compares the request's anomaly
# score with SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD itself, in block and detect mode
@@ -69,6 +74,11 @@ SecArgumentsLimit 1000
SecRule ARGUMENTS_LIMIT_REACHED "@eq 1" "id:900300,phase:2,pass,\
severity:'CRITICAL',setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+5'"
# The exclusions file comes before the rules, where the Core Rule Set puts
# its own file of exclusions that run before the rules, so that they run
# before the rules of phase 1 too.
%s
# The sixth: only the rules for requests are loaded, and no response is
# inspected.
Include @owasp_crs/REQUEST-*.conf
@@ -100,6 +110,13 @@ SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932260 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
# Inspect.
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932340 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 944110 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# The seventh: a container image push that reuses a layer names the image
# it takes the layer from in the query parameter from, which is not
# checked for command names. 932260 refused the push of a layer from
# owner/python3-app.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/v2/.+/blobs/uploads/$" \
"id:900500,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:from"
`
// bodyDirectives have the Core Rule Set read the part of a request body
@@ -160,6 +177,51 @@ type Params struct {
// BodyLimit is the most of a request body the Core Rule Set reads
// (SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
BodyLimit int64
// ExclusionsFile is the path of a file of exclusions loaded before the
// Core Rule Set's rules (SWWAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE), "" while
// there is none.
ExclusionsFile string
}
// The ids of smallwebwaf's own rules, which an exclusions file may not
// name.
const (
firstOwnRuleID = 900000
lastOwnRuleID = 900999
)
// numberOrRange matches a number, or a range of numbers such as
// 900000-900999.
var numberOrRange = regexp.MustCompile(`(\d+)(?:-(\d+))?`)
// errSmallwebwafRuleID is the error of an exclusions file that names an
// id of smallwebwaf's own rules.
var errSmallwebwafRuleID = errors.New("an id of smallwebwaf's own rules")
// ownRuleNamed returns the first number or range in exclusions, the text
// of an exclusions file, that takes in an id of smallwebwaf's own rules,
// or "" if none does. Comment lines are skipped, as Coraza skips them.
func ownRuleNamed(exclusions string) string {
for line := range strings.Lines(exclusions) {
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(line), "#") {
continue
}
for _, match := range numberOrRange.FindAllStringSubmatch(line, -1) {
first, _ := strconv.Atoi(match[1])
last := first
if match[2] != "" {
last, _ = strconv.Atoi(match[2])
}
if first <= lastOwnRuleID && last >= firstOwnRuleID {
return match[0]
}
}
}
return ""
}
// CoreRuleSet is the Core Rule Set, ready to inspect requests. It is safe
@@ -169,16 +231,35 @@ type CoreRuleSet struct {
bodyLimit int64
}
// New returns the Core Rule Set with the six changes, at params'
// paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, and reading request
// bodies up to params' limit.
// New returns the Core Rule Set with the seven changes, at params'
// paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, reading request
// bodies up to params' limit, and with params' exclusions file loaded
// before the Core Rule Set's rules. An exclusions file that cannot be
// read, does not parse or names an id of smallwebwaf's own rules is an
// error.
func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
body := ""
if params.BodyLimit > 0 {
body = fmt.Sprintf(bodyDirectives, params.BodyLimit)
}
text := fmt.Sprintf(directives, params.ParanoiaLevel, body)
exclusions := ""
if params.ExclusionsFile != "" {
file, err := os.ReadFile(params.ExclusionsFile)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read the exclusions file: %w", err)
}
exclusions = string(file)
if named := ownRuleNamed(exclusions); named != "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("the exclusions file names %s: %w", named,
errSmallwebwafRuleID)
}
}
text := fmt.Sprintf(directives, params.ParanoiaLevel, body, exclusions)
if len(params.DisabledRules) > 0 {
ids := make([]string, len(params.DisabledRules))
+163 -1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"strconv"
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ func atDefaults(t *testing.T) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
}
// wantChange checks that crs lets through passes, a gitea request one of
// the six changes is for, and still finds result in refused, a request
// the seven changes is for, and still finds result in refused, a request
// like it that the change is not for.
func wantChange(
t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, passes, refused request, result waf.Result,
@@ -362,6 +363,167 @@ func TestEachDisabledRuleIsSwitchedOff(t *testing.T) {
wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, 920350, 911100), r, waf.Result{})
}
func TestImagePushThatReusesALayerIsNotCheckedForCommandNames(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := atDefaults(t)
reuse := "?mount=sha256:0000&from=owner/python3-app"
wantChange(t, crs, get("/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/"+reuse), get("/upload/"+reuse),
matched(932260))
// A command after the image's name is still refused.
wantResult(t, crs,
get("/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?from=owner/app;cat%20/etc/passwd"),
matched(930120, 932160))
}
// withExclusions returns the Core Rule Set at the defaults, with the
// exclusions file at path.
func withExclusions(path string) (*waf.CoreRuleSet, error) {
return waf.New(waf.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, ExclusionsFile: path,
})
}
// exclusionsFile writes text to a file of exclusions and returns its path.
func exclusionsFile(t *testing.T, text string) string {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "exclusions.conf")
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(text), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return path
}
// backupFileExclusion is an exclusions file that switches 920500, a rule
// of phase 1, off for the path of a backup file under /files/.
const backupFileExclusion = `SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /files/" ` +
`"id:1,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920500;REQUEST_FILENAME"` + "\n"
func TestExclusionsFileIsLoadedBeforeTheRules(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs, err := withExclusions(exclusionsFile(t, backupFileExclusion))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the exclusions: %v", err)
}
wantChange(t, crs, get("/files/notes.txt~"), get("/notes.txt~"), matched(920500))
}
func TestRuleSwitchedOffAndNamedInTheExclusionsFileIsOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: []int{920500},
ExclusionsFile: exclusionsFile(t, backupFileExclusion),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the exclusions: %v", err)
}
wantResult(t, crs, get("/notes.txt~"), waf.Result{})
}
func TestExclusionsFileMayNameAnyNumberInAComment(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := withExclusions(exclusionsFile(t,
"# 942100: GET /issues/900123\n"+backupFileExclusion))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("the exclusions did not load: %v", err)
}
}
func TestExclusionsFileThatCannotBeUsedIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, path := range []string{
filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing.conf"),
exclusionsFile(t, "SecNoSuchDirective On\n"),
// The Core Rule Set's rules are not loaded yet.
exclusionsFile(t, "SecRuleUpdateTargetById 942100 \"!ARGS:id\"\n"),
// smallwebwaf's own rules may not be switched off or changed, by
// id or in a range.
exclusionsFile(t, "SecRuleRemoveById 900300\n"),
exclusionsFile(t, "SecRuleRemoveById 899999-901000\n"),
exclusionsFile(t, "SecAction \"id:1,phase:1,pass,nolog,"+
"ctl:ruleRemoveById=899999-901000\"\n"),
exclusionsFile(t, "SecAction \"id:1,phase:1,pass,nolog,"+
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=900500;ARGS:from\"\n"),
} {
_, err := withExclusions(path)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s loaded", path)
}
}
}
// giteaRequests returns the recorded ordinary gitea requests in testdata,
// which script/gitea-setup sends too. Each has the Referer of a page that
// names the same, as a page opened from it has.
func giteaRequests(t *testing.T) []request {
t.Helper()
text, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("testdata", "gitea-requests.txt"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var requests []request
for line := range strings.Lines(string(text)) {
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
continue
}
target, header, _ := strings.Cut(line, " ")
headers := []string{"Referer: http://git.example" + target}
if header != "" {
headers = append(headers, header)
}
requests = append(requests, get(target, headers...))
}
return requests
}
func TestGiteaExclusionsLetOrdinaryGiteaRequestsThroughAndRefuseAttacks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs, err := withExclusions(filepath.Join("..", "..", "deploy", "gitea",
"crs-exclusions.conf"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load gitea's exclusions: %v", err)
}
const threshold = 5 // SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
for _, r := range giteaRequests(t) {
if got := inspect(t, crs, r); got.Score >= threshold {
t.Errorf("%s %q refused: %+v", r.target, r.headers[1:], got)
}
}
for _, attack := range []string{
"/owner/repo?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1",
"/owner/repo?id=..%2Fcustom%2Fconf%2Fapp.ini",
"/owner/repo?id=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E",
} {
if got := inspect(t, crs, get(attack)); got.Score < threshold {
t.Errorf("%s let through: %+v", attack, got)
}
}
}
// bodyLimit is SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies.
const bodyLimit = 8 << 10
+2 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
# default but these: SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL names gitea's container, SWRP_WAF_BACKEND
# names servewaf's, and SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS adds the header that labels a
# request. Then send through rproxy the gitea requests that reading gitea's
# source found the Core Rule Set refuses, which docs/gitea.md records, and a
# source found the Core Rule Set refuses without the exclusions in
# deploy/gitea/crs-exclusions.conf, and a
# short sample of gitea's ordinary use: signing in, pages of files and commits,
# a diff, the API, a push, clone and fetch over HTTP, and two container image
# pushes. Last, print each request servewaf logged, with what it did with it and
+293
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/gitea-setup: build the image, bring up deploy/gitea under a project
# name of its own, and check it:
# - that a page load, a push and a clone sent through traefik pass through
# rproxy, and that servewaf checks them;
# - that gitea logs the visitor's address, not rproxy's;
# - that a request from a container on the shared network skips the checks;
# - that the Core Rule Set refuses none of the ordinary gitea requests in
# internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt;
# - that it refuses none of the API calls with JSON bodies;
# - that it refuses no fetch;
# - that it refuses SQL injection, path traversal and script injection in a
# query string;
# - that with servewaf stopped, gitea still answers through rproxy.
# It publishes no port of traefik's, since this host's ports 80 and 443 may be
# taken. It reaches traefik at its address on the shared network instead, so
# its own requests come from the network's gateway, which servewaf checks like
# any visitor. Two runs at once on one docker host cannot both start, since
# both would use the subnet compose.yaml names. The containers, the network,
# the volumes, the image and the files the script makes are removed however it
# ends; the gitea and traefik images stay, as the base images of a build do.
# It needs network access. script/check does not run this.
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
# Named after this run, so that runs in other clones on the same host
# never touch each other's.
NAME="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-gitea-setup-$$"
IMAGE="$NAME-image"
NETWORK="${NAME}_shared"
VISITOR="$NAME-visitor"
# The site's host name and gitea's image, as deploy/gitea/compose.yaml names
# them. gitea's image also runs the container on the shared network.
SITE="git.example.org"
# gitea 1.27.3, 2026-08-29
GITEA_IMAGE="gitea/gitea@sha256:87a67ee09d3ae0d1df5fda5dcda3e2a1f9236a45b0a59025d6e00e46adc43bef"
# gitea's one user, who owns the repository.
PASSWORD="owner-password"
# The files the script makes, gitea's secret key for this run, and traefik's
# and the gateway's addresses on the shared network once the setup runs.
WORK=""
secret_key=""
traefik=""
gateway=""
cleanup() {
# So that a signal cannot stop it partway through.
trap '' HUP INT TERM
docker rm --force "$VISITOR" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if [ -n "$WORK" ]; then
compose down --volumes --remove-orphans --timeout 5 >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
rm -rf "$WORK"
fi
docker rmi --force "$IMAGE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
# compose <argument>...: docker compose on the setup, under this run's project
# name, with the image built here, this run's secret key and no port of
# traefik's published.
compose() {
SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE="$IMAGE" GITEA_SECRET_KEY="$secret_key" \
docker compose --project-name "$NAME" \
--file "$ROOT/deploy/gitea/compose.yaml" --file "$WORK/no-ports.yaml" "$@"
}
fail() {
echo "gitea-setup: $*; the last lines of each container's output:" >&2
compose logs --no-color --tail 30 >&2 || true
exit 1
}
# wait_for <what fails> <command>...: run the command every second until
# it succeeds, for at most a minute.
wait_for() {
failure="$1"
shift
tries=0
until "$@"; do
tries=$((tries + 1))
[ "$tries" -lt 60 ] || fail "$failure"
sleep 1
done
}
# logged <service> <text>...: a line of the service's output holds every text,
# in any order.
logged() {
lines="$(compose logs --no-color --no-log-prefix "$1" 2>&1)"
shift
for text in "$@"; do
lines="$(printf '%s\n' "$lines" | grep -F -e "$text")" || return 1
done
}
# send <path> <curl option>...: send a request for path to the site, at
# traefik's address, and print the status of the answer, 000 for none. traefik
# answers with a certificate it made itself, since the setup names no
# certificate resolver.
send() {
path="$1"
shift
curl --silent --show-error --insecure --max-time 30 --output /dev/null \
--write-out '%{http_code}' --resolve "$SITE:443:$traefik" "$@" \
"https://$SITE$path" || true
}
# routed: traefik passes a request for the site's front page on to gitea.
routed() {
[ "$(send / 2>/dev/null)" = 200 ]
}
# site_git <git argument>...: run git as the owner, without the host's own git
# settings, reaching the site at traefik's address. git gives up on a transfer
# slower than 1000 bytes a second for 30 seconds.
site_git() {
GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=/dev/null GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM=1 git \
-c user.name=owner -c user.email=owner@example.invalid \
-c http.sslVerify=false -c "http.curloptResolve=$SITE:443:$traefik" \
-c http.lowSpeedLimit=1000 -c http.lowSpeedTime=30 "$@"
}
# address_of <service>: print the service's address on the shared network.
address_of() {
docker inspect --format "{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks \"$NETWORK\").IPAddress}}" \
"$(compose ps --quiet "$1")"
}
# passed_through <method> <path>: rproxy passed a request from the gateway for
# path to gitea on servewaf's allow, and servewaf checked it: its report line
# gives the client's counts and the Core Rule Set's score.
passed_through() {
wait_for "rproxy logged no $1 $2 that servewaf allowed" logged rproxy \
"\"method\":\"$1\"" "\"path\":\"$2\"" "\"client_ip\":\"$gateway\"" \
'"disposition":"allow"'
wait_for "servewaf logged no check of $1 $2" logged servewaf \
'"servewaf_line":"report"' "\"method\":\"$1\"" "\"path\":\"$2\"" \
"\"client_ip\":\"$gateway\"" '"action":"forward"' '"counts":' '"waf_score":'
}
# refused: print each request servewaf logged as refused, for any reason.
refused() {
compose logs --no-color --no-log-prefix servewaf 2>&1 |
grep -F '"servewaf_line":"report"' | grep -v -F '"action":"forward"' || true
}
# ordinary_requests: sign in as the owner, save a file and open an issue
# through the API with JSON bodies, then send, signed in, each request in
# internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt, with the header its line ends with,
# if any, and that request's own address as its Referer, as a page opened from it
# has. One a second keeps them under the default limit of 120 requests a minute,
# since a request refused for a limit is never inspected. Fail if servewaf
# refuses any of them.
ordinary_requests() {
send /user/login --cookie-jar "$WORK/cookies" >/dev/null
status="$(send /user/login --cookie "$WORK/cookies" --cookie-jar "$WORK/cookies" \
--header "Origin: https://$SITE" --data-urlencode user_name=owner \
--data-urlencode "password=$PASSWORD")"
[ "$status" = 303 ] || fail "signing in was answered $status"
content="$(printf 'declare const env: Record<string, string>;\n' | base64)"
status="$(send /api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/process.env.d.ts \
--user "owner:$PASSWORD" --header "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data "{\"message\":\"Add process.env.d.ts\",\"content\":\"$content\"}")"
[ "$status" = 201 ] || fail "saving a file through the API was answered $status"
status="$(send /api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues --user "owner:$PASSWORD" \
--header "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{"title":"ls -la fails","body":"SELECT * FROM users; <img src=x>"}')"
[ "$status" = 201 ] || fail "opening an issue through the API was answered $status"
grep -v -e '^#' -e '^$' "$ROOT/internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt" |
while read -r target header; do
if [ -n "$header" ]; then
send "$target" --globoff --cookie "$WORK/cookies" \
--header "Referer: https://$SITE$target" --header "$header" >/dev/null
else
send "$target" --globoff --cookie "$WORK/cookies" \
--header "Referer: https://$SITE$target" >/dev/null
fi
sleep 1
done
# The last request's report is logged once its answer has ended.
send /api/v1/settings/api >/dev/null
wait_for "servewaf logged no report of the last ordinary request" logged servewaf \
'"servewaf_line":"report"' '"path":"/api/v1/settings/api"'
refusals="$(refused)"
[ -z "$refusals" ] || fail "servewaf refused ordinary requests:
$refusals"
}
# attacks: send SQL injection, path traversal and script injection in a query
# string, and fail unless the Core Rule Set refuses each.
attacks() {
# The traversal climbs one directory: the default rule file refuses two or
# more first, before the Core Rule Set runs.
for query in "id=1'%20OR%20'1'%3D'1" "id=..%2Fcustom%2Fconf%2Fapp.ini" \
"id=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E"; do
status="$(send "/owner/repo?$query")"
[ "$status" = 403 ] || fail "the attack ?$query was answered $status"
wait_for "servewaf logged no refusal of ?$query" logged servewaf \
'"servewaf_line":"report"' '"action":"waf_blocked"' "\"query\":\"$query\""
done
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
trap cleanup EXIT
trap 'exit 1' HUP INT TERM
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
printf 'services:\n traefik:\n ports: !reset []\n' >"$WORK/no-ports.yaml"
docker build --no-cache -t "$IMAGE" .
secret_key="$(docker run --rm "$GITEA_IMAGE" gitea generate secret SECRET_KEY)"
# rproxy is healthy once gitea takes connections.
compose up --detach --quiet-pull --wait --wait-timeout 120 ||
fail "the setup did not start"
traefik="$(address_of traefik)"
gateway="$(docker network inspect --format '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Gateway}}' "$NETWORK")"
wait_for "traefik did not route the site to rproxy" routed
compose exec --user git gitea gitea admin user create --admin \
--username owner --password "$PASSWORD" --email owner@example.invalid \
--must-change-password=false >/dev/null || fail "creating gitea's user failed"
status="$(send /api/v1/user/repos --user "owner:$PASSWORD" \
--header "Content-Type: application/json" --data '{"name":"repo"}')"
[ "$status" = 201 ] || fail "creating the repository was answered $status"
status="$(send /owner/repo)"
[ "$status" = 200 ] || fail "the repository's page was answered $status"
passed_through GET /owner/repo
echo "gitea-setup: a page load passes through rproxy, and servewaf checks it"
wait_for "gitea did not log the visitor's address" logged gitea \
"GET /owner/repo for $gateway:"
echo "gitea-setup: gitea logs the visitor's address, not rproxy's"
site_git init --quiet --initial-branch=main "$WORK/repo"
echo "hello" >"$WORK/repo/README.md"
site_git -C "$WORK/repo" add README.md
site_git -C "$WORK/repo" commit --quiet --message "Add a README"
site_git -C "$WORK/repo" push --quiet \
"https://owner:$PASSWORD@$SITE/owner/repo.git" main ||
fail "the push failed"
passed_through POST /owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack
echo "gitea-setup: a push passes through rproxy, and servewaf checks it"
site_git clone --quiet "https://owner:$PASSWORD@$SITE/owner/repo.git" \
"$WORK/clone" || fail "the clone failed"
[ "$(cat "$WORK/clone/README.md")" = hello ] || fail "the clone lacks the README"
passed_through POST /owner/repo.git/git-upload-pack
echo "gitea-setup: a clone passes through rproxy, and servewaf checks it"
# A container on the shared network, as sandcastle is, asks for the site
# by its name, and so reaches traefik from its own address.
status="$(docker run --rm --name "$VISITOR" --network "$NETWORK" \
--entrypoint curl "$GITEA_IMAGE" --silent --insecure --max-time 30 \
--output /dev/null --write-out '%{http_code}' "https://$SITE/api/v1/version" ||
true)"
[ "$status" = 200 ] || fail "the request from the shared network was answered $status"
wait_for "servewaf logged no request from the shared network" logged servewaf \
'"servewaf_line":"report"' '"path":"/api/v1/version"' '"action":"forward"'
line="$(compose logs --no-color --no-log-prefix servewaf |
grep -F '"servewaf_line":"report"' | grep -F '"path":"/api/v1/version"')"
case "$line" in
*"\"client_ip\":\"$gateway\""*)
fail "the request from the shared network came from the gateway" ;;
*'"counts":'* | *'"waf_score":'*)
fail "servewaf checked the request from the shared network" ;;
esac
echo "gitea-setup: a request from the shared network skips the checks"
site_git -C "$WORK/clone" fetch --quiet || fail "the fetch failed"
ordinary_requests
echo "gitea-setup: the Core Rule Set refuses no ordinary gitea request"
attacks
echo "gitea-setup: the Core Rule Set refuses the attacks"
compose stop servewaf >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "servewaf did not stop"
status="$(send /owner/repo)"
[ "$status" = 200 ] ||
fail "with servewaf stopped, the repository's page was answered $status"
wait_for "rproxy logged no request SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION decided" \
logged rproxy '"path":"/owner/repo"' '"default_disposition":true'
echo "gitea-setup: with servewaf stopped, gitea answers through rproxy"
}
main "$@"