Say which bytes the byte limits count, and what passing one does (closes #203)
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Documents only. The byte limits and byte anomaly thresholds count body bytes, as SWW_BYTES_COUNT chooses them, with WebSocket traffic each way, once a response has ended; the request that passes a limit is not cut off and the client is banned. README.md, SPEC.md and docs/ now say so, and no longer call a response's bytes the request's. Also made plain: rate limits and their exemptions, the refusal threshold, SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS, SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE, SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE, SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW, the metrics' byte series, and the SPEC.md claim about answering within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. EVALUATION.md is audited too; its survey facts and date are unchanged. Model: fable-5-1 (first audit); opus-5-5 (rework)
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@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
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- R1: rate limits per minute, per hour and per day
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- R2: netblocks that bypass rate limiting
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- R3: alerts on attacks through webhook, Slack or ntfy
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- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests or bytes per minute or hour, for given IPs
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or netblocks, crossing a threshold
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- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests made or bytes transferred per minute or
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hour, for given IPs or netblocks, crossing a threshold
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- R5: temporary blocks for abusers, permanent bans for repeat offenders
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- R6: one or more RBLs or IP reputation APIs
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- R7: AS number lookup
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@@ -24,14 +24,19 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
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## Verdict
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Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8 (scaling limits by AS
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number or country) or the bytes half of R4 at all, and the tools that come
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closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML or a web UI.
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The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar; `SPEC.md` in this
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directory begins that spec. It reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field as
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libraries and data sources (Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set for attack
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detection, DNSBLs, AbuseIPDB, optionally a CrowdSec decision feed) instead of
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reimplementing them.
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Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8, which asks for limits
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scaled by AS number or country. None meets R4's alerts on bytes transferred. The
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tools that come closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML
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or a web UI. The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar;
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`SPEC.md` in this directory begins that spec.
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The sidecar reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field instead of
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reimplementing them. It takes these as libraries and data sources:
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- Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set, for attack detection
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- DNSBLs
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- AbuseIPDB
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- optionally, a CrowdSec decision feed
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Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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@@ -45,13 +50,16 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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external blacklist URLs, optional CrowdSec), R7 partly (AS number used for
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blacklist and whitelist decisions), R9 (ModSecurity with the Core Rule
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Set, or Coraza plugin), env-var settings.
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- Fails: R8 (AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a
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limit), R4 (no volume or byte threshold alerts in the free edition;
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reporting is a paid feature), R5 escalation, and R10 in spirit: since 1.6
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it needs a `bunkerweb` container plus a `bw-scheduler` container and a
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database, or the all-in-one image that bundles nginx, scheduler, UI and
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Redis in one container. It is designed to be the front door for many
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sites, not a per-app sidecar. AGPL-3.0.
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- Fails:
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- R8: AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a limit.
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- R4: no alerts on request-count or byte thresholds in the free edition;
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reporting is a paid feature.
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- R5: no escalation for repeat offenders.
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- R10: since 1.6 it is not one plain sidecar. It needs a `bunkerweb`
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container, a `bw-scheduler` container and a database, or the
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all-in-one image that bundles nginx, the scheduler, the UI and Redis.
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- It is designed as the proxy in front of many sites, not as a sidecar for
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one app. AGPL-3.0.
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- Unverified: whether several rates (minute, hour, day) can be stacked on
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the same URL pattern; the documented design is one rate per URL pattern.
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- CrowdSec is the strongest detection and ban engine, but it is not a proxy.
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@@ -66,16 +74,20 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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listed AS numbers is possible, but each is a hand-written YAML scenario,
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it reacts after the fact by banning, and it is not an inline limiter that
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answers 429.
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- Fails: R10 (needs the security engine container with persistent state, log
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acquisition from traefik, a bouncer such as the traefik plugin, and YAML
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for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications), bytes half of R4.
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- Fails:
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- R10, because it needs:
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- the security engine container with persistent state
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- log acquisition from traefik
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- a bouncer such as the traefik plugin
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- YAML for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications
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- R4's alerts on bytes.
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- CrowdSec plus traefik's own `rateLimit` middleware is the best combination
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with no new code. It gives inline limiting (one window per middleware, keyed
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by IP, with `sourceCriterion` exclusions), bans with escalation, alerts and
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reputation. It still fails R8, the bytes half of R4, R1's three stacked
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windows only by chaining three middlewares per router, and R10 entirely: the
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configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not in
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one sidecar's environment.
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reputation lookups. It still fails R8, R4's alerts on bytes, and R10 entirely:
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the configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not
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in one sidecar's environment. It meets R1's three windows only by chaining
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three middlewares per router.
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## Candidate by candidate
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@@ -87,10 +99,10 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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cached, streamed decision list (recommended), standalone against the
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central API, or AppSec only. Supports captcha remediation.
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- Covers: R5, R6, R9, R3 and R7 through the engine (see Verdict).
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- Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4 bytes.
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- Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4's alerts on bytes.
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- Configuration: traefik static config to load the plugin, dynamic config or
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labels for the middleware, CrowdSec YAML for everything else.
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- Sidecar fit: no. It lives inside traefik, plus a separate engine
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- Sidecar fit: no. It runs inside traefik and needs a separate engine
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container.
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- Maturity: widely used (about 900 stars, listed in the traefik plugin
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catalog, documented by CrowdSec itself), actively maintained. Traefik
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@@ -115,7 +127,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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- What it is: nginx-derived (Tengine) reverse proxy with a proprietary
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semantic detection engine and a web console. About 22,000 stars.
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- Covers: R9 well, basic per-IP rate limiting with block duration, bot
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challenge, authentication gate.
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challenge, authentication in front of the app.
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- Misses: R8, R7, R4; R1 has one window per rule. Country blocking, alert
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messages, syslog forwarding and the better reputation database are paid
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(Lite about 10 USD per month, Pro about 100 USD per month); the free
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@@ -128,7 +140,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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- Coraza (`corazawaf/coraza`) and Coraza-based proxies
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- What it is: a Go library that implements the ModSecurity rule language and
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runs the OWASP Core Rule Set. OWASP project, actively maintained, the
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successor path now that ModSecurity is in maintenance only.
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successor to ModSecurity, which is now in maintenance only.
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- Packagings: `coraza-caddy` (Caddy module), `coraza-spoa` (HAProxy),
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`coraza-proxy-wasm` (Envoy), a traefik WASM plugin, and
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`coreruleset/coraza-crs-docker` (Caddy plus Coraza plus the Core Rule Set,
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@@ -142,7 +154,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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- ModSecurity Core Rule Set containers (`owasp/modsecurity-crs`)
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- What it is: official images of Apache or nginx with ModSecurity and the
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Core Rule Set, as a reverse proxy configured by env vars (`BACKEND`,
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paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images carry
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paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images contain
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ModSecurity 2.9.x on Apache and Core Rule Set 4.x.
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- Covers: R9, and R10 (single container, env vars, one backend).
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- Misses: R1 to R8.
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@@ -152,8 +164,8 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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- Anubis (`TecharoHQ/anubis`), 1.27 current
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- What it is: a single-binary reverse proxy that makes browsers solve a
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proof-of-work challenge before passing them to `TARGET`. Aimed at
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scrapers, which is likely a large share of unwanted traffic on a public
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code forge.
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scrapers, which are likely a large share of the unwanted traffic on a
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public code forge.
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- Covers: R10 well (one container, env vars for listener, target,
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difficulty, cookies). Policy rules can match on path, user agent, headers,
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IP ranges, and with the vendor's hosted data service also AS number and
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@@ -180,13 +192,13 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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temporary ban, no escalation, state lost on traefik restart) and R2
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(allowlist). Nothing else.
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- `juitde/traefik-plugin-fail2ban`, fail2ban connector plugins, GeoBlock
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plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): same
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shape, each one small feature, configured in traefik, state in memory.
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plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): each adds
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one small feature, is configured in traefik and keeps its state in memory.
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- Sidecar fit: no; they live inside traefik.
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- Traefik built-in middlewares
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- `rateLimit` (one average-and-burst window per middleware, optional Redis
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in traefik 3.x), `inFlightReq`, `ipAllowList`. No bans, alerts, reputation
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or AS number awareness.
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lookups or AS number lookups.
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- caddy-waf (`fabriziosalmi/caddy-waf`), 0.4.x
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- What it is: a Caddy module with regex rules and anomaly scoring, per-IP
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and per-path rate limiting with one configurable window, IP and DNS
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@@ -198,12 +210,12 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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- open-appsec (Check Point)
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- Machine-learning WAF agent attached to nginx, Kong, Envoy or similar, with
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a declarative policy file or the vendor's cloud console. Covers R9 only;
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rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. Not a sidecar in the
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required sense.
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rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. It attaches to an
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existing proxy, so it is not the sidecar R10 asks for.
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- iocaine
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- Serves generated garbage pages to clients the fronting proxy classifies as
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scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope except as a
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curiosity for scraper traffic.
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scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope, and only of
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passing interest for scraper traffic.
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- Pangolin
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- A tunnelled access platform that bundles traefik and optionally CrowdSec.
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Replaces the ingress rather than adding a sidecar; out of scope.
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@@ -214,17 +226,17 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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Everyone else offers one window per rule or none.
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- R2 bypass netblocks: BunkerWeb, CrowdSec, traefik, fail2ban plugins.
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- R3 alerts: CrowdSec (best), BunkerWeb (denied requests only), SafeLine (paid).
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- R4 volume and byte anomalies: none. CrowdSec can approximate request-count
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anomalies with a custom scenario; nothing handles bytes.
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- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb has fixed or permanent,
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not both by history.
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- R4 alerts on request counts and bytes: none. CrowdSec can approximate alerts
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on request counts with a custom scenario; no surveyed tool alerts on bytes.
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- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb's ban is either one
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fixed length or permanent, and does not change with a client's history.
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- R6 reputation: CrowdSec, BunkerWeb, go-away, caddy-waf (static lists).
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- R7 AS number lookup: CrowdSec (enrichment), BunkerWeb and caddy-waf (allow or
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deny), Anubis (hosted service).
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- R8 biased thresholds: none.
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- R9 attack detection: Coraza or ModSecurity with the Core Rule Set (open,
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standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps the
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first).
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standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps Coraza
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or ModSecurity).
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- R10 env-var sidecar: `owasp/modsecurity-crs`, `coraza-crs-docker`, Anubis.
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None of these covers anything beyond its one job.
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@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ without an answer in time, `rproxy` passes the request to the app.
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It protects against:
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- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Each client gets a limit on
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requests and on bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults leave
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room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that keeps up
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one request every 2 seconds. A client over a limit is refused and banned: for
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a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently when
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it keeps at it.
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requests and on body bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults
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leave room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that
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keeps up one request every 2 seconds. A client that breaks a limit is banned:
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for a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently
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when it keeps at it.
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- Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The
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default rule file bans such a client at its first probe, and its next request
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during the ban makes the ban permanent. Your own rules, or a list of trap
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@@ -210,128 +210,132 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
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percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100. A path prefix starts with `/`.
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- `off` switches a limit, a threshold or a timeout off where the table says a
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setting takes it.
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- The byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count only body bytes: the
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app's response bodies, the visitors' request bodies, or both, as
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`SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent over
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a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
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- An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
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variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged
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on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`.
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Every setting the code reads, with its default:
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| Variable | Default | What it does |
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| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
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| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
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| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
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| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
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| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
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| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
|
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| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
|
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| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `502`, or cut off once it has started. |
|
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| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | How long the visitor may take to send its request line and headers, and then the whole request to reach the app, in milliseconds or `off`. |
|
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| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
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| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
|
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| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
|
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| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
|
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| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
|
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| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
|
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| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
|
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| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse. |
|
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| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | Which body bytes the byte limits count: `response`, `request` or `both`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs`, a web service, `file`, or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
|
||||
| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| Variable | Default | What it does |
|
||||
| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
|
||||
| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
|
||||
| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
|
||||
| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
|
||||
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
|
||||
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
|
||||
@@ -527,8 +531,9 @@ of the request reaches the app.
|
||||
|
||||
17. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
|
||||
18. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `discriminator` a report with the status
|
||||
and the bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts the
|
||||
bytes toward the byte limits and adds the request to the client's history.
|
||||
and the body bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts
|
||||
the bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names toward the byte limits, bans the client if
|
||||
they take it past one, and adds the request to the client's history.
|
||||
|
||||
A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a Core
|
||||
Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has false
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ to them.
|
||||
key or a token stays off until the operator supplies it.
|
||||
- It keeps a site answering while the part that decides is down, slow or
|
||||
restarting (see "Without an answer from `discriminator`").
|
||||
- It limits each client's requests and bytes per minute, hour and day. It bounds
|
||||
the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
|
||||
- It limits each client's requests and body bytes per minute, hour and day. It
|
||||
bounds the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
|
||||
- It bans abusers: briefly at first, for seven days on a clear sign of attack,
|
||||
and permanently when they keep at it.
|
||||
- It looks up each client's AS number and country. It can refuse whole countries
|
||||
@@ -192,11 +192,12 @@ request log's `heuristic` field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and
|
||||
sent is removed.
|
||||
18. After the visitor's answer has ended, `rproxy` sends the report (see "The
|
||||
report"). `discriminator` then counts:
|
||||
- For a request it allowed, the response bytes, the request bytes or both
|
||||
are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. For a
|
||||
WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client whose
|
||||
total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit and
|
||||
is banned (`byte_limits`). The response in progress is not cut off.
|
||||
- For a request it allowed, the body bytes of the response, of the request
|
||||
or of both are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. For
|
||||
a WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client
|
||||
whose total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit
|
||||
and is banned (`byte_limits`). The request that broke it has already been
|
||||
passed on whole; nothing is cut off.
|
||||
- For a request it allowed, the client's history and the anomaly counters
|
||||
are updated, and the alert thresholds are evaluated.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -259,7 +260,8 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
|
||||
clear sign of attack bans it permanently at once.
|
||||
- A broken limit, one of:
|
||||
- a request over a rate limit;
|
||||
- a response that takes the client's byte total past a byte limit;
|
||||
- the bytes counted for a request and its response taking the client's total
|
||||
past a byte limit;
|
||||
- more than `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` refusals within a minute.
|
||||
|
||||
The bans for a broken limit:
|
||||
@@ -448,10 +450,15 @@ the same way.
|
||||
|
||||
### Byte limits, per client
|
||||
|
||||
By default there is no minute limit, so a client can download in a burst at full
|
||||
speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB and the day limit to 100 GiB. They
|
||||
allow several downloads of a few GiB each. A response's bytes are counted when
|
||||
it ends (see step 18).
|
||||
The byte limits count body bytes: the app's response bodies, the visitors'
|
||||
request bodies, or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted.
|
||||
What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app
|
||||
sent as response bytes. The bytes counted for a request and its response are
|
||||
added to the client's total once the response has ended (see step 18). So the
|
||||
request that takes a client past a limit is passed on whole, and the ban refuses
|
||||
the client's requests from then on. By default there is no minute limit, so a
|
||||
client can download in a burst at full speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB
|
||||
and the day limit to 100 GiB. They allow several downloads of a few GiB each.
|
||||
|
||||
### Lookup of AS number and country
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -953,7 +960,8 @@ which the metrics show. They reveal a widely distributed scraper, thousands of
|
||||
addresses at low rates each, which the per-client limits do not see. A low
|
||||
percentage for its `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` is the response.
|
||||
|
||||
- Requests and bytes are counted per minute and per hour, for each of:
|
||||
- Requests and body bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted per
|
||||
minute and per hour, for each of:
|
||||
- a client;
|
||||
- the surrounding netblock;
|
||||
- an AS number;
|
||||
@@ -1263,9 +1271,9 @@ short.
|
||||
### Answering in time
|
||||
|
||||
`rproxy` stops waiting for `discriminator` after `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, by default 2
|
||||
seconds, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. So at the defaults,
|
||||
`discriminator` answers a request well within that time, whatever the request
|
||||
and whatever its outside sources do.
|
||||
seconds, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. The longest a question
|
||||
waits on an outside source is `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800 milliseconds,
|
||||
well within that time.
|
||||
|
||||
GeoJS is the only outside source a question can wait on. A question waits only
|
||||
when step 6 says so, and for at most `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800
|
||||
@@ -1361,9 +1369,9 @@ answer.
|
||||
For a request it holds, `discriminator` writes the request's last log line (see
|
||||
"The log"). For a request it allowed, it first:
|
||||
|
||||
- counts the bytes as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says, toward the client's byte limits at
|
||||
the percentages it gave that request;
|
||||
- bans a client that passes a byte limit;
|
||||
- counts the body bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, toward the client's byte limits
|
||||
at the percentages it gave that request;
|
||||
- bans a client whose total passes a byte limit;
|
||||
- adds the request with its status to the client's history, the anomaly counters
|
||||
and the metrics.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ What `GET /_sww/metrics` answers with, at `discriminator`'s own address.
|
||||
keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
|
||||
`honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
|
||||
|
||||
Every `sww_*request_bytes_total` and `sww_*response_bytes_total` series counts
|
||||
body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says.
|
||||
|
||||
## Traffic
|
||||
|
||||
- `sww_requests_total`, `sww_request_bytes_total` and
|
||||
|
||||
+8
-6
@@ -145,20 +145,22 @@ Every one of these lines has:
|
||||
included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It
|
||||
holds:
|
||||
- `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
|
||||
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: bytes.
|
||||
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: the body bytes
|
||||
`SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, in that window.
|
||||
|
||||
A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
|
||||
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes of an allowed request are counted when
|
||||
its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the bytes are without this
|
||||
request's.
|
||||
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes counted for an allowed request and its
|
||||
response are added when its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the
|
||||
three byte totals leave them out.
|
||||
|
||||
- `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
|
||||
- `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
|
||||
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
|
||||
- `error_burst`.
|
||||
|
||||
A request whose bytes broke a limit was passed on whole, so its `action`
|
||||
stays `forward`. Only its `report` line gives that limit.
|
||||
When the bytes counted for a request and its response break a limit, the
|
||||
request has been passed on whole, so its `action` stays `forward`. Only its
|
||||
`report` line gives that limit.
|
||||
|
||||
- `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
|
||||
refused.
|
||||
|
||||
+23
-8
@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
|
||||
|
||||
## Request rate limits, per client
|
||||
|
||||
The request past one of these limits is refused, and the client is banned.
|
||||
|
||||
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
|
||||
client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
|
||||
person opening two pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files each.
|
||||
@@ -120,11 +122,22 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
|
||||
|
||||
## Byte limits, per client
|
||||
|
||||
These count body bytes, never headers. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
|
||||
counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. The bytes
|
||||
counted for a request and its response are added to the client's total once the
|
||||
response has ended. The request that takes a client's total past a limit is not
|
||||
cut off; the client is banned.
|
||||
|
||||
- `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
|
||||
(default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes
|
||||
counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
|
||||
- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
|
||||
`response`, `request` or `both`.
|
||||
counted for a client in each window, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says
|
||||
which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that
|
||||
passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response
|
||||
ends.
|
||||
- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte anomaly
|
||||
thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the
|
||||
visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
|
||||
counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Lookup of AS number and country
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -233,8 +246,9 @@ the request first.
|
||||
a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
|
||||
such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
|
||||
yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
|
||||
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client in
|
||||
a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
|
||||
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may get
|
||||
in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
|
||||
`off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
|
||||
|
||||
## Ban lengths, response and scope
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -311,9 +325,10 @@ the request first.
|
||||
|
||||
## Anomaly thresholds
|
||||
|
||||
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most bytes counted in
|
||||
a minute and in an hour. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by
|
||||
default. The four thresholds per client are:
|
||||
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most body bytes
|
||||
counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names.
|
||||
Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by default. The four
|
||||
thresholds per client are:
|
||||
|
||||
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
|
||||
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ since it was first seen:
|
||||
- the first and last time seen;
|
||||
- the AS number, AS name and country last looked up, and when;
|
||||
- total requests, and how many were forwarded and how many refused;
|
||||
- bytes in each direction;
|
||||
- body bytes of its requests, and of the responses it was sent;
|
||||
- responses by status class;
|
||||
- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`. A file
|
||||
may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which nothing adds to.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user