secret/TODO.md

Workflow

• branch (from main)
• do the work in Next Step
• move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
• move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
• commit (TODO.md changes in the same commit as the work)
• merge to main if the branch is not protected, otherwise open a PR
• push

Status

pre-1.0. No git tags. TODO.md carries open 1.0 security blockers. Work in flight on branch secure-enclave-unlocker (clean tree as of 2026-07-06).

Next Step

Bring the repo into policy compliance in one commit:

• Add fmt-check and hooks targets to the Makefile (test/lint/fmt/check/ docker already exist).
• Add REPO_POLICIES.md and .editorconfig.
• Add .gitea/workflows/check.yml running make check.
• Verify Dockerfile base images are pinned by sha256.

Completed Steps

• 2026-10-04: The internal/cli tests are back to about their time before the state directory lock (#80). The test that each changing command waits for the lock releases it as soon as it sees the command waiting there, instead of after a fixed 100 ms. The two vaults with passphrase unlockers that the path and move tests start from are made once and copied for each test.
• 2026-10-04: secret mv rejects a move whose destination is the source under another name, such as foo for Foo on a case-insensitive filesystem (the macOS default) or a name reached through a symbolic link, before changing anything, with or without --force, within a vault and between vaults; before, --force removed the destination and so deleted the secret. A rename that changes only letter case works on a case-sensitive filesystem as before.
• 2026-10-04: Lint runs only in docker: script/lint builds Dockerfile.lint, where golangci-lint is a build step rebuilt on every run (--no-cache-filter), so an unchanged tree is linted too; the module download stays cached. script/bootstrap no longer installs golangci-lint, and the Dockerfile lint stage calls it directly instead of make lint. golangci-lint config verify is not run: it fetches its schema live over unpinned HTTPS.
• 2026-10-04: A PGP unlocker whose metadata has no usable GPG key ID no longer panics: GetID() warns with the unlocker's directory and returns pgp-unknown. ListUnlockers skips, with a warning, an unlocker whose metadata file cannot be checked for, read or parsed instead of failing, so secret unlocker list still lists the others; the listing's ID lookup no longer warns about that directory again.
• 2026-10-03: secret mv rejects a move whose destination is the source (mv --force x x, mv --force work:x work:, or an empty destination, which defaults to the source name) before changing anything; before, --force removed the destination first and so deleted the secret. Every vault name given with vault: must be one of the existing vaults by exact name, so work:x work/:x is rejected instead of being taken for a move between two vaults. A move within a named vault no longer makes that vault the current one, whether it succeeds or fails.
• 2026-10-03: Commands that change the state directory hold one lock (flock on lock in the state directory; a mutex on the in-memory test filesystem), so concurrent commands no longer lose versions or race on the current pointers. Every file is written through secret.WriteFileAtomic (temporary file, sync, rename), so no file is ever half-written and current, currentvault and current-unlocker never go missing. New versions, new secrets and cross-vault copies are built in a temporary directory and renamed into place, and removals rename out of the way first, so a version or secret is never half-added and never half-removed. An interrupted command can still leave:
  • a broken unlocker, when it was replacing one: an unlocker added under the directory name of an existing one is rewritten file by file. That happens to a passphrase unlocker added to a vault that has one, and to a PGP, keychain or Secure Enclave unlocker added on the same host and day as another of its type (#71);
  • from vault create stopped at the passphrase prompt, a new vault with no unlocker that is already the current vault; from init stopped there, the default vault with no unlocker;
  • from an unlocker add stopped before its metadata is written, a directory that unlocker list warns about and unlocker rm cannot remove;
  • data under a .tmp- name in the state directory: a secret or version being added, or the secret, version, unlocker or vault being removed, encrypted keys included. Nothing deletes it; it must be deleted by hand (#75).
• 2026-10-03: The checks run before changing a vault now stop with an error naming the path and cause when they cannot read what they inspect, instead of reading the failure as "nothing there": the duplicate check before unlocker add pgp (an unreadable unlockers.d), the secret count that guards removing the last unlocker and removing a vault, and the existing long-term key check before vault import.
• 2026-10-03: version rm, version promote and get --version accept a version only if it is one of the versions version list lists for that secret, compared as typed before any path is built (secret.VersionExists), and touch nothing otherwise. An empty --version is rejected instead of meaning the current version. Before, secret version rm x ../../.. deleted the whole vault, secret version rm x .. the secret, and . or "" every version.
• 2026-10-03: Key material is wiped on every exit: Entry() returns the exit code after its deferred memguard.Purge() has run, and only main calls os.Exit. SIGINT and SIGTERM go through memguard's handler, which wipes every buffer before exiting; when the process is in the terminal's foreground process group it first restores the terminal settings from startup, so an interrupted passphrase prompt no longer leaves echo off.
• 2026-10-03: Every command that builds a path from a secret name checks the name first with vault.ValidateSecretName and touches nothing when it is invalid: rm, mv (both names, within a vault and between vaults, before switching the current vault), import, version list/promote/rm, encrypt and decrypt. The error and README.md state the naming rule. Before, secret rm .. deleted the whole vault and secret rm . every secret in it.
• 2026-10-03: The keychain unlocker's age key passphrase stays in locked memory: it is generated into a locked buffer, and the keychain JSON is written and read by KeychainData code in internal/secret/keychaindata.go (tested on Linux) without encoding/json holding it; the JSON field names are unchanged.
• 2026-10-02: A plain docker build . builds again: the size tests skip a case that needs more locked memory than the process can lock, and run every case under script/cibuild. The image stamps the VERSION build argument, else git describe --tags --always, into Version, and fails if .git is present but yields no version; make build stamps git describe too, not a fixed 0.1.0. .dockerignore keeps .git/config out; script/docker is the canonical copy.
• 2026-08-07: Updated golangci-lint to v2.12.2 with the canonical .golangci.yml (all linters enabled minus the standard disable list, lll 88, tests linted); bumped the Dockerfile lint-stage image to the tagged v2.12.2 Debian digest; fixed all ~1550 new findings across internal/ and pkg/ (line wrapping, wsl_v5 blank lines, sentinel errors for err113, t.Parallel() where safe, _test package conversions, complexity/dupl helper extraction) on branch golangci-v2.12.2. Reworked after review: the err113 sentinels in internal/vault, internal/secret, internal/cli and pkg/bip85 were reshaped so every composed error message is byte-identical to main, and findUnlockerIDByMetadata now returns an error so unlocker list skips an unreadable unlockers.d entry with a warning instead of emitting a fabricated fallback ID.
• 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: script/ entrypoints, Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
• 2026-03-11: Secure Enclave unlocker for hardware-backed secret protection, plus review fixes (stub panics, derivation index, tests, README) on branch secure-enclave-unlocker.
• 2026-02-28: Repo cleanup, removed stale .cursorrules and coverage.out.
• Audit fix wave (issues #1, #2, #3, #13, #14): skip unlockers with missing metadata, allow uppercase secret names, fix hardcoded derivation index, validate names in GetSecretVersion against path traversal, return errors instead of panicking, add Warn() on silent anomalies.
• Memory security hardening: LockedBuffer used through encrypt/decrypt paths (Save/EncryptWithPassphrase/GetValue/gpg helpers), deprecated bare-[]byte APIs removed.
• Per-secret keypair architecture, vault package refactor, versioning with --version, comprehensive test suite with in-memory filesystem.
• Debug logging system (slog, GODEBUG flag, TTY-aware output).
• Renamed SEP unlocker to Keychain, reorganized import commands.
• 2025-05-28: Initial implementation (vault, age encryption, mnemonic, CLI).

Future Steps

• Compliance (after Next Step lands): keep main green under the new .gitea workflow; run make check before every merge.
• Implement version-number shell completion for the second arg of secret version promote and secret version rm (internal/cli/version.go; was an in-code TODO removed for godox).
• Cover mnemonic-vs-xprv identity consistency in pkg/agehd/agehd_test.go TestMnemonicVsXPRVConsistency (was an in-code FIXME removed for godox).
• Darwin-gated files (internal/secret/keychainunlocker.go, seunlocker_darwin.go, internal/macse/macse_darwin.go, related tests) are not linted on the Linux CI runner and still contain lines over the new 88-column limit; they will surface if lint ever runs on macOS.
• Merge secure-enclave-unlocker to main once review is done.
• 1.0 critical security blockers (from repo TODO.md):
  • Command injection: GPG key IDs passed unescaped to exec.Command (pgpunlocker.go:323-327); data.String() passed unescaped to the security command (keychainunlocker.go:472-476).
  • Memory security: age identity .String() creates unprotected copies (keychainunlocker.go:356, pgpunlocker.go:256, version.go:155); age secret key held in a plain string in cli/crypto.go:86,91,113; private keys exposed via buffer.Bytes() to GPGEncryptFunc and EncryptWithPassphrase.
  • Input validation: no maximum secret size (DoS).
  • Timing attacks: bytes.Equal passphrase compare (cli/init.go: 209-216); non-constant-time public key compare (vault.go:95-100).
• High priority:
  • Secure temporary file handling and cleanup.
  • Print cobra usage only for argument errors, not internal failures.
  • Initialize a default unlock key at vault creation.
  • Confirmation prompts for destructive operations (keys rm, vault deletion).
  • Add secret rm and vault deletion commands.
• Medium priority:
  • Standardize error messages; stop leaking internals.
  • Graceful handling of corrupted or missing key files with recovery suggestions.
  • Validate GPG key existence before creating PGP unlock keys.
  • Split oversized CLI functions.
  • Document env var security (SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE, SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC); clear after use.
  • mlock/munlock for sensitive allocations.
• Cleanups: read statedir from environment or default instead of passing it around.
• Enhancements: help examples, shell completion, colored output, --quiet flag, name suggestions on miss, audit logging, hardware integration tests (Keychain, GPG), naming consistency, vault export/import, batch operations, search, secret metadata (descriptions, tags).