secret/TODO.md

# Workflow

- branch from `next`
- do the Next Step: the next open issue in the `1.0.0` milestone
- log it at the top of Completed Steps
- commit (`TODO.md` changes in the same commit as the work)
- push, and open a PR against `next`

# Status

pre-1.0. No git tags. Open work is tracked on the issue tracker, which is
authoritative.

# Next Step

Take the next open issue in the `1.0.0` milestone:
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/milestone/12

# Completed Steps

- 2026-10-05: The Go module path is `sneak.berlin/go/secret`, as
  `REPO_POLICIES.md` requires, not `git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret`
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/43). Every import uses it, as do the
  `-X` flags in `script/build` that stamp the version and commit shown by
  `secret info`, and the examples in `pkg/agehd/README.md` and
  `pkg/bip85/README.md`. `go mod tidy` now lists `github.com/dustin/go-humanize`
  and `github.com/fatih/color`, which `internal/cli` imports, as direct
  requirements. Code that imported the old path must switch to the new one.
- 2026-10-04: `make fmt` formats every markdown file with prettier (4-space
  tabs, `proseWrap: always`) as well as the Go code, and `make fmt-check` checks
  both, as the model scripts in the `prompts` repo do
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/110). Prettier is pinned by hash in
  `package.json` and `yarn.lock`, and `script/bootstrap` installs node, yarn and
  prettier. The `Dockerfile` lint stage copies node and yarn from a node image
  pinned by hash and runs `script/bootstrap`, so its `make fmt-check` fails the
  build on an unformatted markdown file. Every markdown file was formatted once,
  wording unchanged.
- 2026-10-04: A mnemonic that cannot be read, in `secret init` and
  `secret vault create`, gives an error that names the mnemonic only
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/115). It is read with
  `secret.ReadMnemonic`, whose every error wraps the new
  `secret.ErrMnemonicNotRead`; before, it was read with `ReadPassphrase`, so the
  message said "failed to read mnemonic: failed to read passphrase:" and advised
  setting `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE`. Without a terminal it now says "failed to read
  mnemonic: stdin is not a terminal (piped input or script). Please set the
  SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC environment variable or run interactively". The passphrase
  messages no longer repeat "cannot read passphrase" after "failed to read
  passphrase:", and empty input gives "nothing was entered".
- 2026-10-04: A failure returns the same error value whichever command hits it
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/113). `internal/cli` no longer keeps
  its own copies of `vault.ErrSecretNotFound`, `ErrVaultNotFound`,
  `ErrVersionNotFound` and `ErrSecretExists`: `secret mv`, `rm`, `decrypt`,
  `vault import`, `vault remove` and `version list`, `promote` and `rm` wrap the
  `vault` errors. `errUnsupportedUnlockerType` is removed: `secret unlocker add`
  gives `errInvalidUnlockerType` for an unknown type, whichever check rejects
  it. Off macOS, adding a keychain or Secure Enclave unlocker returns the
  `secret` package's error for it, not an `internal/cli` copy; on macOS, the
  check that the system is macOS is gone, as it could never fail.
  `secret vault import` gives `errInvalidMnemonicPhrase` for an invalid
  mnemonic, as `init` and `vault create` do. `secret generate secret` gives
  `errLengthTooSmall` for a length below 1 wherever it is checked, and
  `errUnsupportedSecretType` for `--type mnemonic` too. `secret import` of a
  file over 100MB wraps `errSecretTooLarge`, as `secret add` returns it.
  `vault.ErrNilValueBuffer` is replaced by `secret.ErrNilValueBuffer`, which
  `secret` already returned under another name. Messages are unchanged, except
  that `secret decrypt` of a missing secret says "not found", as `secret get`
  does, not "does not exist"; `vault import` of an invalid mnemonic says
  "invalid BIP39 mnemonic phrase"; `--type mnemonic` says "unsupported type:
  mnemonic (use 'secret generate mnemonic' instead)"; and a file too large to
  import says
  `failed to read secret from file <path>: secret too large: exceeds 100MB limit`.
  Every error of `secret.ReadPassphrase` wraps `secret.ErrPassphraseNotRead`,
  which supplies the words "failed to read passphrase" that its callers used to
  add themselves; so two passphrases that differ now give only "passphrases do
  not match", the words now follow "failed to read mnemonic:" and "failed to
  read passphrase confirmation:", and a terminal read error no longer repeats
  them. A GPG key the keyring does not hold gives `secret.ErrGPGKeyNotFound`,
  found by gpg's status line for "No public key"; before, the message repeated
  "failed to resolve GPG key fingerprint" and ended in gpg's exit status. The
  keychain unlocker returns `errNilDataBuffer` for nil data; this and its test
  build only on macOS with cgo and were only read. `bip85.ErrPasswordTooShort`
  and `ErrEncodedTooShort` are removed with their checks: 64 bytes of entropy
  always give 86 Base64 or 80 Base85 characters, the most a password length may
  ask for. Tests that matched these errors' text use `errors.Is`.
- 2026-10-04: Tests check which error a failure returns with `errors.Is`, not by
  matching words of its message (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/49).
  Every exported error that can be returned has a test that the function returns
  it, and errors wrapping a cause are checked through the wrapping. Checks that
  still match text, because the error has no exported value the test can name,
  are listed on the issue.
- 2026-10-04: When a vault cannot be opened through its current unlocker,
  because a file the unlocker needs is missing or damaged, its keychain item or
  Secure Enclave key is gone, or the passphrase is wrong, the error now ends by
  naming the vault, saying that it still opens with its mnemonic, and that
  `secret unlocker add passphrase`, run with `SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC` set to it,
  gives the vault a new unlocker; for a vault that is not the current one, as in
  `secret move` between vaults, it says to run `secret vault select` first
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/47). Before, it ended with the bare
  cause. The advice is given only when the vault metadata records the key the
  mnemonic derives, so not for a vault created without a mnemonic, and not when
  the passphrase could not be read at all. `secret vault import` is not named:
  it refuses a vault that has a long-term key. `secret encrypt` and
  `secret decrypt` now read the key secret through `vault.GetSecret`, as
  `secret get` does, so they give the same advice; `Secret.GetValue`, the other
  way to get the long-term key, is removed. When a secret's `current` file
  cannot be read, the error says that `secret version list` lists its versions
  and `secret version promote` makes one current. The causes stay wrapped.
- 2026-10-04: An unlocker's ID is the name of its directory in `unlockers.d`, so
  no two unlockers of a vault share one
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/98). Before, a keychain or Secure
  Enclave unlocker's ID was its creation time to the minute and the host name,
  and a passphrase unlocker's the time to the minute, so two created within a
  minute shared an ID, and `unlocker select`, `unlocker remove` and the
  selection `unlocker add` makes acted on the older one. A PGP unlocker's ID was
  `pgp-` and its key's fingerprint; a second PGP unlocker for a key is still
  refused, now by comparing the fingerprint in the other unlockers' metadata.
  `unlocker list` and the shell completion of `unlocker select` and
  `unlocker remove` take each ID from the directory the unlocker was read from,
  no longer by matching metadata, so two unlockers with the same metadata are
  listed apart; an unlocker of an unknown type is listed under its directory
  name, and completion now offers Secure Enclave unlockers too. The keychain and
  Secure Enclave code was type-checked by `script/lint-darwin`, never run; a
  test on Linux lists, completes, selects and removes each of two passphrase
  unlockers with the same metadata by its own ID.
- 2026-10-04: README's Storage Architecture, `secret version promote`, Technical
  Details and Testing text matches the code
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/102). `current` and `currentvault`
  are plain files holding a name, not symbolic links; a version's metadata is
  the encrypted `metadata.age`; the state directory is `berlin.sneak.pkg.secret`
  in the user's configuration directory, not `~/.local/share/secret`, and holds
  the `lock` file. Also corrected: the code sets up no Touch ID for the keychain
  or Secure Enclave unlocker, and the Secure Enclave only decrypts; per-version
  keys give no forward secrecy; `pub.age` is not age-encrypted; vault metadata
  holds no vault name. Testing lists only `make test`.
- 2026-10-04: `secret init` and `secret vault create` create a vault whole or
  not at all (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/105). `vault.CreateVault`
  now takes the unlocker passphrase too, writes the vault directory with its
  metadata, long-term public key and passphrase unlocker, `longterm.age`
  included, into a temporary directory, renames that into `vaults.d` once it is
  complete, and only then makes the vault current. Before, either command killed
  after the passphrase prompt but before the unlocker was written left a vault
  with no unlocker, which `vault create` had already made current and which
  neither command would create again. Killed part-way now, it leaves no vault,
  and the next command that takes the lock deletes the temporary directory; or,
  killed between the rename and making the vault current, a complete vault that
  is not current, which `secret vault select` makes current.
- 2026-10-04: A failed `secret unlocker add keychain` or
  `secret unlocker add secure-enclave` no longer leaves its keychain item or
  Secure Enclave key behind (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/89).
  `CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker` gets the long-term key before it creates the
  Secure Enclave key, so that a wrong passphrase creates none, and deletes the
  key again if encrypting with it or writing the unlocker then fails.
  `macse.CreateKey` finds the new key's hash right after `sc_auth` creates it,
  and fails with an error naming the key's label if it cannot; it deletes the
  key again if getting its public key then fails. The Objective-C was only read,
  never compiled or run, and so was `macse_darwin.go`, which is cgo only.
  `CreateKeychainUnlocker` writes all of the unlocker's files, the metadata
  among them, before it stores the item in the keychain, and deletes the item
  again if moving the unlocker into place then fails. A failure to delete is
  reported along with the first error. The tests of this run only on macOS: the
  Secure Enclave one in a build with cgo on a Mac with a Secure Enclave, the
  keychain one in a build with cgo.
- 2026-10-04: What a command killed part-way left under a `.tmp-` name
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/75), the temporary directories of
  `secret.TempDirFor` and the temporary files of `secret.WriteFileAtomic`,
  encrypted keys included, is deleted by the next command that takes the state
  directory lock. Before, it stayed until deleted by hand. A command writes
  `finished` into the lock file just before it releases the lock; the next one
  to take the lock searches only when it does not find that, so after a command
  that finished nothing is searched, however many secrets and versions there
  are. The search looks in the state directory, each vault, each secret and each
  version, the only directories those helpers make them in. A command that only
  reads takes no lock and deletes nothing. A failure to delete is warned about
  and the command goes on. An unlocker directory with no metadata file was
  already removed by `secret unlocker remove` given its directory name; a test
  now shows it.
- 2026-10-04: An age identity's private key goes into a locked buffer through
  `secret.IdentityToLockedBuffer` everywhere
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/38): the vault's long-term key when a
  passphrase, PGP, keychain or Secure Enclave unlocker is created, the new
  unlocker's own key, a new secret version's key, and the key `secret encrypt`
  generates. Before, each place converted the string age returns to bytes and
  left the string in ordinary memory. The function moves the string's own bytes
  into the buffer, which overwrites them; the copies age makes while writing the
  string remain, as its comment says. The 1.0 memory-security entry below no
  longer lists these places, `internal/cli/crypto.go` among them, nor
  `version.go:155`, which was `internal/secret/version.go`, not
  `internal/cli/version.go`.
- 2026-10-04: `script/lint-darwin` (`make lint-darwin`) runs `go vet` and
  `golangci-lint` in docker on the code as a macOS build compiles it
  (`GOOS=darwin`), with cgo off (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/50).
  `script/check` runs it, and the `Dockerfile` lint stage runs its commands, so
  `script/cibuild` does too. Before, CI on Linux never compiled the files built
  only for macOS. Compiling cgo code for macOS needs Apple's SDK headers, and
  both `internal/macse` and `github.com/keybase/go-keychain` are cgo on macOS.
  So the three functions that call `go-keychain` moved from
  `keychainunlocker.go` to `keychainunlocker_cgo.go`, built only with cgo on
  macOS like `macse_darwin.go`. A macOS build without cgo, which before did not
  compile, gets `keychainunlocker_nocgo.go` and the `macse` stub instead, whose
  errors say the keychain or Secure Enclave needs a macOS build with cgo. The
  check covers the rest of the keychain unlocker, the Secure Enclave unlocker
  and the macOS-only tests other than `keychainunlocker_test.go`, whose lint
  findings are fixed. For the length and complexity limits, parts of
  `GetIdentity`, `getLongTermPrivateKey` and `CreateKeychainUnlocker` moved into
  functions of their own, and the Secure Enclave unlocker derives the long-term
  key from the mnemonic through the same function as the keychain unlocker
  instead of a copy of it. Lines over 88 columns in the files the check cannot
  see are wrapped.
- 2026-10-04: `secret rm`, `secret version rm`, `secret vault remove` and
  `secret unlocker remove` ask `[y/N]` before removing anything
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/39), naming what they remove: the
  secret, its vault and its version count; the version, secret and vault; the
  vault and its secret count; the unlocker, its vault and whether it is the
  last, and for the last the vault's secret count and that the vault then opens
  only with its mnemonic. Only `y` or `yes` goes ahead. Without `--force`, a
  command whose stdin is not a terminal fails at once. `--force` (now also on
  `rm` and `version rm`) removes without asking; it replaces the old refusals to
  remove a vault with secrets or the last unlocker of one without `--force`,
  which the question now covers. The checks run, and the question is asked,
  before the state directory lock is taken; under the lock the checks run again,
  and if they would ask a different question, nothing is removed. `secret rm`
  fails when it cannot count the versions.
- 2026-10-04: A crash while an unlocker is being replaced no longer leaves a
  current unlocker that cannot open the vault
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/71). Every new unlocker gets a
  directory of its own, named with the time to the nanosecond:
  `passphrase-<time>`, `<host>-pgp-<time>`, and for a keychain or Secure Enclave
  unlocker the keychain item or Secure Enclave key, which names the directory,
  carries the time instead of the day. `secret.WriteDir` fails on a directory
  that exists instead of writing into it. `unlocker add passphrase` writes the
  new unlocker, makes it current, and only then removes the vault's other
  passphrase unlockers; a crash between the last two steps leaves the old one
  beside the new, and the old passphrase still opens the vault through it until
  the next `unlocker add passphrase` or an `unlocker remove` removes it. A PGP,
  keychain or Secure Enclave unlocker added on the same host and day as another
  of its type is added beside it instead of replacing it.
- 2026-10-04: `SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC` and `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE` are read once per
  command, in its `RunE`, into locked buffers on the CLI `Instance`, and unset
  at once, so that no program the command runs, `gpg` included, inherits them
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/60). Nothing below the command reads
  the environment; the buffers are passed down: `vault.CreateVault` takes the
  mnemonic (nil for none), a `Vault` derives its long-term key from its
  `Mnemonic` and gives its `UnlockPassphrase` to a passphrase unlocker, and the
  PGP, keychain and Secure Enclave unlocker constructors take both.
  `CreatePGPUnlocker` sets both on the vault it loads, through `SetMnemonic` and
  `SetUnlockPassphrase`, now part of `VaultInterface`, before calling its
  `GetOrDeriveLongTermKey`. `init` and `vault create` no longer put the mnemonic
  into the environment. Unsetting erases nothing: the starting environment
  (`/proc/<pid>/environ`) and memory still hold the value. The README warns
  against both variables.
- 2026-10-04: `.golangci.yml` is again the canonical file from `sneak/prompts`,
  byte for byte (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/66). It runs
  `gomodguard_v2` in place of the deprecated `gomodguard`, so the lint no longer
  warns, and enables `depguard` with a rule that keeps `net/http/httptest` out
  of non-test files. Neither raised a finding in this repo.
- 2026-10-04: `secret unlocker add pgp` works on Linux
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/88). `CreatePGPUnlocker` gets the
  vault's long-term key as adding a passphrase unlocker does, with the vault's
  `GetOrDeriveLongTermKey`, now part of `VaultInterface`: from the mnemonic,
  checked against the vault, or else from the current unlocker. Before, it used
  the keychain unlocker's helper, which on every platform but macOS always
  failed. A test adds a PGP unlocker for a throwaway GPG key, getting the
  long-term key once from the mnemonic and once from a passphrase unlocker, and
  reads a secret through the new unlocker.
- 2026-10-04: A vault name may use only lowercase ASCII letters, digits, `.`,
  `-` and `_`, and must not be empty, `.` or `..`
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/68); the error and `README.md` state
  the rule. `vault create`, `vault import`, `vault select`, `vault remove`, both
  vault names of `mv` and shell completion of a `vault:secret` argument check
  the name as typed with `vault.ValidateVaultName` before building any path from
  it. Before, `vault import ..` wrote a long-term key and an unlocker into the
  state directory itself, and `vault select ..` made that the current vault.
- 2026-10-04: `script/cibuild` runs the checks again on an unchanged tree
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/54). It passes the current time as
  the `CHECK_EPOCH` build argument, which both the lint and the build stage of
  the `Dockerfile` declare after their module download, so the `RUN` steps below
  the argument run again on each build while the base images and module
  downloads stay cached. Before, a second run on the same tree took every check
  from the build cache and reported success having run nothing.
- 2026-10-04: A failed unlocker add no longer leaves a partial unlocker
  directory (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/48).
  `secret unlocker add pgp` resolves the GPG key's fingerprint once, for its
  duplicate check, and passes it to `CreatePGPUnlocker` to record.
  `CreatePGPUnlocker` and `CreateKeychainUnlocker` get the long-term key and
  encrypt everything before writing anything. All four unlocker types write
  their files through `secret.WriteDir`: a new unlocker is built in a temporary
  directory, renamed into place when complete and removed on a failure.
- 2026-10-04: `secret unlocker select` and `secret unlocker remove` skip, with
  the warning `unlocker list` gives, an unlocker directory whose metadata file
  cannot be checked for, read or parsed, instead of failing when it sorts before
  the unlocker asked for. Such a directory, or one without a metadata file, is
  removed by its directory name, the name the warning gives; only the directory
  is removed, since its type is unknown. Removing one whose metadata file is
  missing or corrupt never counts as removing the last unlocker. Removing one
  whose metadata file cannot be checked for or read always does, since it may be
  the only working unlocker, so in a vault with secrets it needs `--force`.
- 2026-10-04: A failed command prints its error once, without the usage text
  after it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/41). Usage is still printed
  for a command called wrongly: wrong number of arguments, unknown flag, bad
  flag value, missing required flag, or flags that break a flag group (mutually
  exclusive, required together, one required). The root command's
  `PersistentPreRunE` turns usage off. Cobra checks arguments and flag values
  before that hook but required flags and flag groups only after it, so the hook
  checks those two first. Root `SilenceUsage` would have hidden usage for all of
  these.
- 2026-10-04: `secret get` keeps the secret in locked memory until it writes it
  out (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/37): `Vault.GetSecret` and
  `Vault.GetSecretVersion` return a `*memguard.LockedBuffer`, which every caller
  destroys, and `secret get` writes its bytes straight to stdout, still with no
  trailing newline. Before, the value was copied into ordinary memory that
  nothing wiped, and `get --version` also wrote it to the debug log.
- 2026-10-04: The `Makefile` no longer sets `DOCKER_HOST`, so its docker targets
  use the local docker daemon, or whatever `DOCKER_HOST` the environment sets.
  `make build` calls the new `script/build`, which stamps the version (`VERSION`
  from the environment, else `git describe`) and the git commit as before.
  `build`, `clean`, `install` and `docker-run` are in `.PHONY`; `make install`
  depends on `build`. The `vet` target is gone: `script/test` runs `go vet`
  first.
- 2026-10-04: `.gitignore` is the org's standard file, which ignores `.env`,
  `.env.*`, `*.pem` and `*.key` and editor and OS files, plus this repo's
  `/secret`, `*.log`, `*.test` and `settings.local.json`
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/40). `.dockerignore` also leaves out
  `node_modules`; `.git` stays in the build context for the version stamp.
- 2026-10-04: `secret init` refuses when the default vault exists, and
  `secret vault create NAME` when `NAME` does, with "vault NAME already exists",
  before writing anything. The check is in `vault.CreateVault`, which both
  commands call while holding the state directory lock, so two creates of one
  vault at once cannot both pass the check. Before, either command replaced the
  vault's metadata, passphrase unlocker and `longterm.age`, so none of its
  secrets could be decrypted any more. Both commands now ask for the unlocker
  passphrase before creating the vault, so one stopped at that prompt leaves no
  vault behind.
- 2026-10-04: The `internal/cli` tests are back to about their time before the
  state directory lock (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/80). The test
  that each changing command waits for the lock releases it as soon as it sees
  the command waiting there, instead of after a fixed 100 ms. The two vaults
  with passphrase unlockers that the path and move tests start from are made
  once and copied for each test.
- 2026-10-04: `secret mv` rejects a move whose destination is the source under
  another name, such as `foo` for `Foo` on a case-insensitive filesystem (the
  macOS default) or a name reached through a symbolic link, before changing
  anything, with or without `--force`, within a vault and between vaults;
  before, `--force` removed the destination and so deleted the secret. A rename
  that changes only letter case works on a case-sensitive filesystem as before.
- 2026-10-04: Lint runs only in docker: `script/lint` builds `Dockerfile.lint`,
  where golangci-lint is a build step rebuilt on every run
  (`--no-cache-filter`), so an unchanged tree is linted too; the module download
  stays cached. `script/bootstrap` no longer installs golangci-lint, and the
  `Dockerfile` lint stage calls it directly instead of `make lint`.
  `golangci-lint config verify` is not run: it fetches its schema live over
  unpinned HTTPS.
- 2026-10-04: A PGP unlocker whose metadata has no usable GPG key ID no longer
  panics: `GetID()` warns with the unlocker's directory and returns
  `pgp-unknown`. `ListUnlockers` skips, with a warning, an unlocker whose
  metadata file cannot be checked for, read or parsed instead of failing, so
  `secret unlocker list` still lists the others; the listing's ID lookup no
  longer warns about that directory again.
- 2026-10-03: `secret mv` rejects a move whose destination is the source
  (`mv --force x x`, `mv --force work:x work:`, or an empty destination, which
  defaults to the source name) before changing anything; before, `--force`
  removed the destination first and so deleted the secret. Every vault name
  given with `vault:` must be one of the existing vaults by exact name, so
  `work:x work/:x` is rejected instead of being taken for a move between two
  vaults. A move within a named vault no longer makes that vault the current
  one, whether it succeeds or fails.
- 2026-10-03: Commands that change the state directory hold one lock (`flock` on
  `lock` in the state directory; a mutex on the in-memory test filesystem), so
  concurrent commands no longer lose versions or race on the current pointers.
  Every file is written through `secret.WriteFileAtomic` (temporary file, sync,
  rename), so no file is ever half-written and `current`, `currentvault` and
  `current-unlocker` never go missing. New versions, new secrets and cross-vault
  copies are built in a temporary directory and renamed into place, and removals
  rename out of the way first, so a version or secret is never half-added and
  never half-removed.
- 2026-10-03: The checks run before changing a vault now stop with an error
  naming the path and cause when they cannot read what they inspect, instead of
  reading the failure as "nothing there": the duplicate check before
  `unlocker add pgp` (an unreadable `unlockers.d` or unlocker metadata file),
  the secret count that guards removing the last unlocker and removing a vault,
  and the existing long-term key check before `vault import`.
- 2026-10-03: `version rm`, `version promote` and `get --version` accept a
  version only if it is one of the versions `version list` lists for that
  secret, compared as typed before any path is built (`secret.VersionExists`),
  and touch nothing otherwise. An empty `--version` is rejected instead of
  meaning the current version. Before, `secret version rm x ../../..` deleted
  the whole vault, `secret version rm x ..` the secret, and `.` or `""` every
  version.
- 2026-10-03: Key material is wiped on every exit: `Entry()` returns the exit
  code after its deferred `memguard.Purge()` has run, and only `main` calls
  `os.Exit`. SIGINT and SIGTERM go through memguard's handler, which wipes every
  buffer before exiting; when the process is in the terminal's foreground
  process group it first restores the terminal settings from startup, so an
  interrupted passphrase prompt no longer leaves echo off.
- 2026-10-03: Every command that builds a path from a secret name checks the
  name first with `vault.ValidateSecretName` and touches nothing when it is
  invalid: `rm`, `mv` (both names, within a vault and between vaults, before
  switching the current vault), `import`, `version list`/`promote`/`rm`,
  `encrypt` and `decrypt`. The error and `README.md` state the naming rule.
  Before, `secret rm ..` deleted the whole vault and `secret rm .` every secret
  in it.
- 2026-10-03: The keychain unlocker's age key passphrase stays in locked memory:
  it is generated into a locked buffer, and the keychain JSON is written and
  read by `KeychainData` code in `internal/secret/keychaindata.go` (tested on
  Linux) without `encoding/json` holding it; the JSON field names are unchanged.
- 2026-10-02: A plain `docker build .` builds again: the size tests skip a case
  that needs more locked memory than the process can lock, and run every case
  under `script/cibuild`. The image stamps the `VERSION` build argument, else
  `git describe --tags --always`, into `Version`, and fails if `.git` is present
  but yields no version; `make build` stamps `git describe` too, not a fixed
  `0.1.0`. `.dockerignore` keeps `.git/config` out; `script/docker` is the
  canonical copy.
- 2026-08-07: Updated golangci-lint to v2.12.2 with the canonical
  `.golangci.yml` (all linters enabled minus the standard disable list, `lll`
  88, tests linted); bumped the `Dockerfile` lint-stage image to the tagged
  v2.12.2 Debian digest; fixed all ~1550 new findings across `internal/` and
  `pkg/` (line wrapping, `wsl_v5` blank lines, sentinel errors for `err113`,
  `t.Parallel()` where safe, `_test` package conversions, complexity/`dupl`
  helper extraction) on branch `golangci-v2.12.2`. Reworked after review: the
  `err113` sentinels in `internal/vault`, `internal/secret`, `internal/cli` and
  `pkg/bip85` were reshaped so every composed error message is byte-identical to
  `main`, and `findUnlockerIDByMetadata` now returns an error so `unlocker list`
  skips an unreadable `unlockers.d` entry with a warning instead of emitting a
  fabricated fallback ID.
- 2026-08-07: Added `.editorconfig`
  (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/27).
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints, Makefile
  shims, README Entrypoints section
- 2026-07-07: Added `REPO_POLICIES.md` and the `make hooks` target;
  `.gitea/workflows/check.yml` now runs `script/cibuild`.
- 2026-03-30: Added the `make fmt-check` target and
  `.gitea/workflows/check.yml`, which runs `docker build` on every push; the
  `Dockerfile` base images are pinned by sha256.
- 2026-03-11: Secure Enclave unlocker for hardware-backed secret protection,
  plus review fixes (stub panics, derivation index, tests, README) on branch
  secure-enclave-unlocker.
- 2026-02-28: Repo cleanup, removed stale .cursorrules and coverage.out.
- Audit fix wave (issues #1, #2, #3, #13, #14): skip unlockers with missing
  metadata, allow uppercase secret names, fix hardcoded derivation index,
  validate names in GetSecretVersion against path traversal, return errors
  instead of panicking, add Warn() on silent anomalies.
- Memory security hardening: LockedBuffer used through encrypt/decrypt paths
  (Save/EncryptWithPassphrase/GetValue/gpg helpers), deprecated bare-[]byte APIs
  removed.
- Per-secret keypair architecture, vault package refactor, versioning with
  --version, comprehensive test suite with in-memory filesystem.
- Debug logging system (slog, GODEBUG flag, TTY-aware output).
- Renamed SEP unlocker to Keychain, reorganized import commands.
- 2025-05-28: Initial implementation (vault, age encryption, mnemonic, CLI).

# Future Steps

- Implement version-number shell completion for the second arg of
  `secret version promote` and `secret version rm` (`internal/cli/version.go`;
  was an in-code TODO removed for godox).
- Cover mnemonic-vs-xprv identity consistency in `pkg/agehd/agehd_test.go`
  `TestMnemonicVsXPRVConsistency` (was an in-code FIXME removed for godox).
- CI does not compile, lint or test the files built only with cgo on macOS,
  since compiling them needs Apple's SDK:
  `internal/secret/keychainunlocker_cgo.go` (the three functions that call
  `go-keychain`) with `keychainunlocker_test.go`, and `internal/macse`
  (`macse_darwin.go`, `macse_test.go`, the Objective-C sources). Lint has never
  run on them, so it would likely find more there than the line lengths. No
  macOS test runs in CI. A macOS runner would cover all of it (asked on
  https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/50).
- 1.0 critical security blockers (from repo TODO.md):
    - Memory security: age writes an identity's private key out as a string in
      ordinary memory, and the copies it makes on the way stay there
      (`secret.IdentityToLockedBuffer` overwrites only the string itself).
- Medium priority:
    - Standardize error messages; stop leaking internals.
    - Split oversized CLI functions.
- Cleanups: read statedir from environment or default instead of passing it
  around.
- Enhancements: help examples, colored output, --quiet flag, name suggestions on
  miss, audit logging, hardware integration tests (Keychain, GPG), naming
  consistency, vault export/import, batch operations, search, secret metadata
  (descriptions, tags).