1 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 64d0c0763d A secret mv between vaults unlocks both vaults before taking the lock (closes #189)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
A move between two vaults unlocked them while holding the state directory
lock, and unlocking can ask for a passphrase, so every other changing
command waited at that prompt. moveSecretCrossVault now checks the move,
unlocks both vaults, and only then takes the lock. Under the lock,
copySecretAndRemoveSource checks again that the source and the destination
vault still exist, then copies. A move within a vault takes the lock in
moveSecretWithinVault, so MoveSecret takes none itself.

The two tests of a source that cannot be removed now call
copySecretAndRemoveSource, since the lock refuses their wrapped
filesystems.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 07:02:44 +00:00
8 changed files with 101 additions and 365 deletions
+4 -5
View File
@@ -440,11 +440,10 @@ in a CI job, the command fails and names the variable to set.
A command that changes anything locks the state directory, through its file
`lock`, and another such command waits until the lock is released.
`secret init`, `secret vault create`, `secret unlocker add`, `secret mv` from
one vault to another, and `secret add`, `secret import` and
`secret generate secret` with `--force`, ask for the mnemonic or passphrase
before they take the lock, so a prompt of theirs left open in one terminal holds
up no command in another.
`secret init`, `secret vault create`, `secret unlocker add`, and `secret add`,
`secret import` and `secret generate secret` with `--force`, ask for the
mnemonic or passphrase before they take the lock, so a prompt of theirs left
open in one terminal holds up no command in another.
## Security Features
+2 -178
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@
# Status
pre-1.0. Open work is tracked on the issue tracker, which is authoritative.
pre-1.0. No git tags. Open work is tracked on the issue tracker, which is
authoritative.
# Next Step
@@ -17,183 +18,6 @@ https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/milestone/12
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-15: `make test` no longer fails on some runs in `internal/cli`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/192). `cli.Entry()` set `time.Local`
to UTC and ended by wiping every memguard buffer, and a test ran it in the
same process as the other tests. A timer left by an earlier test could read
`time.Local` as it changed, which the race detector reported, and the wipe
could destroy a buffer still in use, the likeliest cause of a crash of the
test process on another run. `main()` in `cmd/secret` now sets `time.Local`
before it calls `cli.Entry()`, and that test runs `cli.Entry()` in a process
of its own.
- 2026-10-15: `secret mv` from one vault to another unlocks both vaults before
it takes the state directory lock
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/189). It unlocked them while holding
the lock, and unlocking can ask for a passphrase, so every other command that
changes anything waited at that prompt. `moveSecretCrossVault` now checks the
move, refusing an existing destination secret without `--force`, unlocks both
vaults, and only then takes the lock. Under the lock, it checks that the
destination vault still has the long-term key it unlocked, and
`copySecretAndRemoveSource` checks the move again before it copies. A move
within a vault takes the lock in `moveSecretWithinVault`, so `MoveSecret`
takes none itself. The error for a vault created again with another key, which
`secret unlocker add` shares, now ends "nothing was changed".
- 2026-10-15: `secret init`, `secret vault create`, `secret unlocker add`, and
`secret add`, `secret import` and `secret generate secret` with `--force` ask
for the mnemonic or passphrase, or unlock the vault, before they take the
state directory lock (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/152). They did
so while holding the lock, so every other command that changes anything waited
at the prompt. Under the lock, `secret unlocker add` fails if the vault was
removed, or created again with another key, and refuses a GPG key added
meanwhile; a forced add of a secret created meanwhile lets go of the lock,
gets the key and takes the lock again. `secret.CreatePGPUnlocker` takes the
unlocked vault; `SetMnemonic` and `SetUnlockPassphrase` are gone.
- 2026-10-15: A `secret mv` to another vault that copies the secret but cannot
remove the source fails (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/159). It
printed a warning and the usual "Moved" line and exited 0. If the source
secret's directory is still in place, the error says the copy holds all
versions and the source remains. If the source left its vault and only the
temporary directory it was moved into could not be deleted, the error says the
secret is moved and names that directory, which the error of `RemoveDirAtomic`
now does.
- 2026-10-15: `secret encrypt` and `secret decrypt` with `--output` hold the
result in memory and open the output file only once encryption or decryption
has succeeded (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/143). They emptied that
file before reading any input, so a failed command left it empty, and
encrypting a file onto itself gave the encryption of nothing. A failure to
encrypt or decrypt now leaves `--output` untouched, and `--input` can name the
same file. A failure while writing `--output`, such as a full disk, can still
leave it empty or partly written; an error from closing it is reported.
Without `--output` the result still goes to stdout as it is produced.
- 2026-10-15: A command that uses the current vault fails when `currentvault` is
empty or names no vault (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/156).
`secret list` reported an empty vault with exit status 0, and `secret add`
failed on a missing directory. `ResolveVaultSymlink` now refuses an empty or
invalid name, or one with no directory under `vaults.d`, with an error that
wraps `ErrVaultNotFound`, names the file and says to run
`secret vault select <name>`. `secret vault list` and `secret info` still run.
- 2026-10-15: `secret` prints every time in UTC, whatever the machine's time
zone (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/169). `secret list`,
`secret version list`, `secret unlocker list` and `secret info` printed times
in the local time zone without naming it, so one vault showed different times
on two machines. `Entry()` now sets `time.Local` to UTC before anything else,
as policy 6 in `AGENTS.md` asks, so every time the program prints or writes is
in UTC. `--json` times end in `Z`, and a new version's name takes the UTC
date. The README says so.
- 2026-10-15: `secret vault`, `secret unlocker`, `secret version` and
`secret generate` fail when given a subcommand they do not have
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/183). They printed their help and
exited 0, so a mistyped command looked like one that worked. Each now exits 1
with `unknown command "<name>" for "secret <parent>"`, and with no arguments
still prints its help. Cobra checks a command's `Args` only when it has a
`RunE`, so each gets `Args: cobra.NoArgs` and a `RunE` that prints its help;
their help now shows a `secret <parent> [flags]` usage line.
`secret vault help` fails as an unknown subcommand, while `secret help vault`
and `secret vault --help` still work.
- 2026-10-15: With `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE` set, `secret unlocker add passphrase`
asks on the terminal for the new unlocker's passphrase and uses the variable
to unlock the vault (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/154). It gave the
new unlocker the passphrase in the variable without asking. With no
controlling terminal, the new unlocker takes the variable's passphrase and the
output says so. `secret.ErrNoTerminal` is exported so that the command can
tell a missing terminal from other failures to read, such as nothing typed or
a confirmation that does not match, which still fail the command.
- 2026-10-15: `secret init` and `secret vault create` stop with an error naming
the file when a vault's `vault-metadata.json` cannot be read or parsed, and
leave the state directory as it was
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/140). `GetNextDerivationIndex` passed
over such a vault, so the next vault made from the same mnemonic could get its
derivation index and so the same long-term key. A vault directory with no
metadata file is still skipped.
- 2026-10-15: The README says that `secret add` drops one trailing newline from
stdin, that `secret import` stores a file's bytes unchanged, and that
`secret get` writes the value with no newline added
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/158). It said none of this, so a PEM
key piped into `secret add` came back one byte short with no hint why. A new
test stores `a\n\n` through `add` and through `import` and checks that `add`
kept two bytes and `import` three. No program code changes.
- 2026-10-15: When gpg fails to decrypt, to encrypt or to look up a key's
fingerprint, the error ends with what gpg wrote to stderr, trimmed
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/146). It gave only gpg's exit status,
so the user could not tell why. `cmd.Output` keeps gpg's stderr in the
`*exec.ExitError` it returns, and the three errors now use it. When gpg wrote
nothing to stderr the error is as before, and when gpg wrote several lines the
error has them all.
- 2026-10-15: `secret version list` no longer shows a version without
`NOT_AFTER` as expired (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/150). STATUS
was `expired` for every version other than the current one, so after a promote
the newest version, which has no `NOT_AFTER`, read `expired`. STATUS is now
`current` for the current version, `expired` for another version whose
`NOT_AFTER` has passed, and `inactive` for any other version. The README
describes the three.
- 2026-10-15: `secret unlocker list --json` for a vault with no unlockers, and
`secret vault list --json` when `vaults.d` holds no vaults, print the empty
list as `[]` instead of `null` (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/148).
Both lists were nil slices, which `encoding/json` writes as `null`; each is
now made as an empty slice before it is filled. `vault.ListVaults` therefore
returns an empty slice instead of nil for an empty `vaults.d`.
- 2026-10-15: `secret add`, `secret import` and `secret generate secret` fail
with an error, not memguard's panic, when a secret is too large for the
locked-memory limit (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/145). The value
was held twice, so half the usual 8 MiB limit was enough to crash them.
`secret` now raises the limit to the hard limit at startup, and each of the
three commands refuses, before its first locked allocation, a limit that
leaves fewer than 8 pages for its keys and buffers. The value is read a page
at a time into a `memguard.Stream`, which keeps it encrypted, and copied once
into locked memory after its size is checked against 100 MiB and the limit. It
leaves the stream through `Next`, not `Read`, because `Read` re-encrypts a
leftover piece and memguard hangs if that runs out of locked memory.
- 2026-10-15: Total Size in `secret info` counts every file of each version: the
value, the metadata and the version's two keys
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/147). It added up each version's
`data.age` and `metadata.age`, but a version keeps its value in `value.age`,
so no secret's value was counted. A version directory that cannot be read adds
nothing and gets a warning naming it.
- 2026-10-15: `secret vault import` is gone, with its tests and its README entry
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/139). It took only a vault without a
long-term key, and `secret init` and `secret vault create` give every vault
one, so it always failed; a mnemonic enters through those two commands. The
help and the note of `secret generate mnemonic` named `secret import`, which
imports a file as a secret, and now name `secret init` and
`secret vault create`.
- 2026-10-15: `secret version promote --help` says promote rewrites the
`current` file, not a "current symlink"
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/153). `current` is a plain file
holding the version name, as the README already said, and the comment in
`PromoteVersion` now says so too.
- 2026-10-14: `secret init` and `secret vault create` refuse a vault that
already exists before they ask for the mnemonic or the unlocker passphrase
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/151). They asked first, and
`secret init` printed "Initialized secrets manager at" before refusing. The
check `vault.CreateVault` made before writing is now
`vault.CheckNewVaultName`, which both commands call before the first prompt
and `CreateVault` still calls. It validates the name too, so
`secret vault create` with an invalid name also fails before the prompts.
`secret init` prints the "Initialized" line only once the vault is created.
- 2026-10-14: `secret get` fails when it cannot write the value
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/155). `GetSecret` and
`GetSecretWithVersion` discarded the result of writing it to stdout, so a full
disk or a failing stdout left an empty or cut-short file and exit status 0.
The write error is now returned, so the command prints it and exits 1. A
stdout the shell closed before `secret` started still exits 0, because the Go
runtime opens `/dev/null` in its place and the write there succeeds.
- 2026-10-14: `secret list` and `secret list --json` give each secret's own
creation and last-update times (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/142).
They gave the time of the listing for every secret, because
`Secret.LoadMetadata` set both to the current time. It now reads file
modification times, so listing still needs no passphrase. The last update is
when the secret's `current` file was written. The creation is when its oldest
version's `value.age` was written, not that version's directory, whose time
changes when the next add rewrites its `metadata.age`. A move to another vault
gives the copied files the times of the originals. `GetSecretObject` no longer
loads the times, so `secret get` keeps its error for a missing `current` file.
- 2026-10-14: `secret unlocker add pgp` without `--keyid` uses the `default-key`
in `gpg.conf` (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/141).
`getDefaultGPGKey` took that value from `gpgconf --list-options gpg` as
printed, with a leading `"` and percent-escaped, so gpg rejected the key ID.
The new `parseDefaultGPGKey` drops the `"` and percent-decodes the rest with
`url.PathUnescape`, which leaves `+` alone. A value that does not decode is an
error, not a fallback to the first secret key.
- 2026-10-14: A wrong passphrase, from `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE` or typed at the
prompt, gives the error `wrong passphrase for unlocker <id>`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/157). It used to be age's "no
-6
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@@ -3,16 +3,10 @@ package main
import (
"os"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
)
func main() {
// Every time secret prints or writes is in UTC, whatever TZ or the
// system's time zone is set to. It is set here, before cli.Entry starts
// any goroutine that could read time.Local while it changes.
time.Local = time.UTC //nolint:gosmopolitan // this makes local time UTC
os.Exit(cli.Entry())
}
+12 -51
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@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package cli_test
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
@@ -17,67 +16,29 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
const (
// envRunEntry, when set, makes this test binary run cli.Entry with its
// own arguments and exit, instead of running the tests.
envRunEntry = "SECRET_TEST_RUN_ENTRY"
// bufferWiped is what the test binary prints, run with envRunEntry set,
// when cli.Entry wiped the buffer made before it ran.
bufferWiped = "Entry wiped the buffer made before it ran"
)
// With envRunEntry set, the test binary makes a buffer, runs cli.Entry,
// says whether the buffer is wiped, and exits with Entry's exit code. This
// is done in init, not in a test, so that TestMain does not run in that
// process: it would build the secret binary again, and remove it at the end,
// while the other tests run it.
//
//nolint:gochecknoinits // must run before TestMain, as above
func init() {
if os.Getenv(envRunEntry) == "" {
return
}
buf := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("key material"))
code := cli.Entry()
if !buf.IsAlive() {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, bufferWiped)
}
os.Exit(code)
}
// Entry must return its exit code rather than exit, so that its deferred
// memguard purge runs on the success and the error path alike. Entry wipes
// every memguard buffer in the process, including those other tests are
// using, so it runs in a process of its own: this test binary, run again
// with envRunEntry set.
// memguard purge runs on the success and the error path alike.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // sets os.Args, and Entry wipes every buffer in the process
func TestEntryWipesBuffersAndReturnsExitCode(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
savedArgs := os.Args
t.Cleanup(func() { os.Args = savedArgs })
tests := []struct {
args []string
exitCode int
}{
{args: []string{"--help"}, exitCode: 0},
{args: []string{"no-such-command"}, exitCode: 1},
{args: []string{"secret", "--help"}, exitCode: 0},
{args: []string{"secret", "no-such-command"}, exitCode: 1},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
//nolint:gosec // G204: test runs its own test binary
cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), os.Args[0], tt.args...)
buf := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("key material"))
os.Args = tt.args
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), envRunEntry+"=1")
output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
require.NotNil(t, cmd.ProcessState, "%v did not run: %v", tt.args, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.exitCode, cmd.ProcessState.ExitCode(),
"exit code for %v: %s", tt.args, output)
assert.Contains(t, string(output), bufferWiped,
"Entry left a buffer unwiped for %v", tt.args)
assert.Equal(t, tt.exitCode, cli.Entry(), "exit code for %v", tt.args)
assert.False(t, buf.IsAlive(), "Entry left a buffer unwiped for %v", tt.args)
}
}
+52 -70
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ package cli
import (
"errors"
"path/filepath"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -229,87 +230,68 @@ func TestCrossVaultMoveUnlocksBeforeLocking(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestCrossVaultMoveChecksAgainOnceLocked runs a move between vaults, given
// the mnemonic, as TestCommandsCheckAgainOnceLocked runs the commands in its
// table: once the move waits for the state directory lock, the test removes
// the source secret or the destination vault, or creates the destination
// vault again from another mnemonic, and the move must then fail and change
// nothing.
// TestCrossVaultMoveChecksAgainOnceLocked starts a move between two vaults,
// given the mnemonic, while the test holds the state directory lock. Once
// the move waits for the lock, the test removes what another command could
// have removed in the meantime, then releases the lock. The move must fail
// with the error that says what is missing.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // waitingForLock sees any test's command waiting for the lock
func TestCrossVaultMoveChecksAgainOnceLocked(t *testing.T) {
mnemonic := testMnemonicBuffer(t)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
// removed is the directory, under the state directory, that the
// test removes
removed string
want error
}{
{"source", "/vaults.d/default/secrets.d/x", vault.ErrSecretNotFound},
{"destination vault", "/vaults.d/work", vault.ErrVaultNotFound},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
createCrossVaults(t, fs)
otherMnemonic := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("legal winner thank " +
"year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thank yellow"))
t.Cleanup(otherMnemonic.Destroy)
release, err := vault.LockStateDir(fs, testStateDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
move := func(cli *Instance) error {
cli.Mnemonic = mnemonic
// Released at most once, and also if the test fails while
// holding it, so that later tests can take it
release = sync.OnceFunc(release)
defer release()
return cli.MoveSecret(cli.cmd, "work:test/secret", "other:moved", false)
}
instance := NewCLIInstanceWithStateDir(fs, testStateDir)
instance.Mnemonic = testMnemonicBuffer(t)
t.Run("source removed", func(t *testing.T) {
requireChecksAgainOnceLocked(t, move, func(fs afero.Fs) error {
return fs.RemoveAll(testStateDir + "/vaults.d/work/secrets.d/test%secret")
}, vault.ErrSecretNotFound)
})
done := make(chan error, 1)
t.Run("destination vault removed", func(t *testing.T) {
requireChecksAgainOnceLocked(t, move, func(fs afero.Fs) error {
return fs.RemoveAll(testStateDir + "/vaults.d/other")
}, vault.ErrVaultNotFound)
})
go func() {
done <- instance.MoveSecret(&cobra.Command{},
"default:x", "work:y", false)
}()
t.Run("destination vault created again from another mnemonic", func(t *testing.T) {
// Set by the move, which has finished once
// requireChecksAgainOnceLocked returns
var moveErr error
timeout := time.After(lockWait)
requireChecksAgainOnceLocked(t, func(cli *Instance) error {
moveErr = move(cli)
return moveErr
}, func(fs afero.Fs) error {
err := fs.RemoveAll(testStateDir + "/vaults.d/other")
if err != nil {
return err
for !waitingForLock() {
select {
case err := <-done:
t.Fatalf("finished while the lock was held, with error %v",
err)
case <-timeout:
t.Fatal("never waited for the lock")
case <-time.After(time.Millisecond):
}
}
_, err = vault.CreateVault(fs, testStateDir, "other", otherMnemonic, nil)
require.NoError(t, fs.RemoveAll(testStateDir+tc.removed))
release()
return err
}, errVaultCreatedAgain)
// secret unlocker add fails with the same error, so its message
// must fit a move too
require.EqualError(t, moveErr, "vault 'other' was removed and "+
"created again with another key while it was being unlocked; "+
"nothing was changed")
})
}
// TestCrossVaultMoveRefusesExistingSecretBeforeUnlocking checks that a move
// between vaults onto a secret that exists, without --force, is refused
// before either vault is unlocked, since unlocking can ask for a
// passphrase. The vaults have no unlockers and the move is given no
// mnemonic, so unlocking either vault fails.
func TestCrossVaultMoveRefusesExistingSecretBeforeUnlocking(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
createCrossVaults(t, fs)
work := vault.NewVault(fs, testStateDir, "work")
work.Mnemonic = testMnemonicBuffer(t)
err := work.AddSecret("y",
memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("other")), false)
require.NoError(t, err)
instance := NewCLIInstanceWithStateDir(fs, testStateDir)
err = instance.MoveSecret(&cobra.Command{}, "default:x", "work:y", false)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, vault.ErrSecretExists)
select {
case err := <-done:
require.ErrorIs(t, err, tc.want)
case <-time.After(lockWait):
t.Fatal("did not finish once the lock was released")
}
})
}
}
+5
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package cli
import (
"os"
"time"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
@@ -14,6 +15,10 @@ import (
// every memguard buffer before it returns, so the caller must do nothing
// but exit with the code.
func Entry() int {
// Every time secret prints or writes is in UTC, whatever TZ or the
// system's time zone is set to.
time.Local = time.UTC //nolint:gosmopolitan // this makes local time UTC
raiseLockedMemoryLimit()
// On SIGINT or SIGTERM memguard runs this function, wipes every buffer
+17 -33
View File
@@ -1084,24 +1084,21 @@ func (cli *Instance) sameDirectory(dir, other string) (bool, error) {
// moveSecretCrossVault handles moving between two different vaults. Its
// caller, MoveSecret, has already checked both secret names and that both
// vaults exist. The copy needs the source vault's long-term key and is
// encrypted to the destination vault's long-term public key. The
// destination vault is unlocked to check that the copy will open with what
// the user gave, and, once the state directory lock is held, that it still
// has the key unlocked. Either unlock can ask for a passphrase, so both
// happen before the lock is taken, and no other command waits while the
// user answers.
// vaults exist. The copy needs the source vault's long-term key; the
// destination vault is unlocked only to check that it can be. Either can ask
// for a passphrase, so both happen before it takes the state directory lock,
// and no other command waits while the user answers.
func (cli *Instance) moveSecretCrossVault(
cmd *cobra.Command,
srcVault *vault.Vault, srcSecretName string,
destVault *vault.Vault, destSecretName string,
force bool,
) error {
// Before unlocking, check that the source secret exists, that the
// destination is not the source under another name, and, without
// --force, that the destination secret does not exist
// Before unlocking, check that the source secret and the destination
// vault exist, and that the destination is not the source under another
// name
_, err := cli.checkCrossVaultMove(
srcVault, srcSecretName, destVault, destSecretName, force)
srcVault, srcSecretName, destVault, destSecretName)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -1110,7 +1107,7 @@ func (cli *Instance) moveSecretCrossVault(
destVault.Mnemonic, destVault.UnlockPassphrase = cli.Mnemonic, cli.UnlockPassphrase
// Unlock destination vault (will fail if neither mnemonic nor unlocker available)
destIdentity, err := destVault.GetOrDeriveLongTermKey()
_, err = destVault.GetOrDeriveLongTermKey()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to unlock destination vault '%s': %w", destVault.Name, err)
}
@@ -1127,11 +1124,6 @@ func (cli *Instance) moveSecretCrossVault(
}
defer release()
err = cli.checkLongTermKey(destVault, destIdentity)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return cli.copySecretAndRemoveSource(
cmd, srcVault, srcSecretName, destVault, destSecretName, force)
}
@@ -1148,7 +1140,7 @@ func (cli *Instance) copySecretAndRemoveSource(
force bool,
) error {
srcSecretDir, err := cli.checkCrossVaultMove(
srcVault, srcSecretName, destVault, destSecretName, force)
srcVault, srcSecretName, destVault, destSecretName)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -1179,13 +1171,11 @@ func (cli *Instance) copySecretAndRemoveSource(
}
// checkCrossVaultMove checks that the secret srcSecretName exists in
// srcVault, that destSecretName in destVault is not the source under
// another name, and, unless force is set, that destSecretName does not
// exist in destVault. It returns the source's directory.
// srcVault, that destVault exists, and that destSecretName in destVault is
// not the source under another name. It returns the source's directory.
func (cli *Instance) checkCrossVaultMove(
srcVault *vault.Vault, srcSecretName string,
destVault *vault.Vault, destSecretName string,
force bool,
) (string, error) {
srcVaultDir, err := srcVault.GetDirectory()
if err != nil {
@@ -1202,6 +1192,11 @@ func (cli *Instance) checkCrossVaultMove(
srcSecretName, vault.ErrSecretNotFound, srcVault.Name)
}
_, err = cli.existingVault(destVault.Name)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// The source is removed after the copy, so a destination that is the
// source under another name would be lost with it.
destVaultDir, err := destVault.GetDirectory()
@@ -1223,17 +1218,6 @@ func (cli *Instance) checkCrossVaultMove(
destVault.Name, destSecretName)
}
exists, err = afero.DirExists(cli.fs, destSecretDir)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to check if destination secret exists: %w", err)
}
if exists && !force {
return "", fmt.Errorf(
"secret '%s' %w in vault '%s' (use --force to overwrite)",
destSecretName, vault.ErrSecretExists, destVault.Name)
}
return srcSecretDir, nil
}
+9 -22
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
@@ -43,7 +42,7 @@ var (
// errVaultCreatedAgain carries only the message tail; the caller
// composes "vault '<name>' was removed and created again ...".
errVaultCreatedAgain = errors.New("was removed and created again " +
"with another key while it was being unlocked; nothing was changed")
"with another key while it was being unlocked; nothing was added")
)
// UnlockerInfo represents unlocker information for display
@@ -443,41 +442,29 @@ func (cli *Instance) unlockThenLock(vlt *vault.Vault) (func(), error) {
return nil, err
}
err = cli.checkLongTermKey(vlt, ltIdentity)
_, err = cli.existingVault(vlt.GetName())
if err != nil {
release()
return nil, err
}
return release, nil
}
// checkLongTermKey checks, for the vault vlt unlocked as ltIdentity before
// the state directory lock was taken, that vlt still exists and that its
// long-term public key is still that of ltIdentity. Another command may have
// removed the vault in the meantime, or removed it and created it again with
// another long-term key. The caller holds the lock.
func (cli *Instance) checkLongTermKey(
vlt *vault.Vault, ltIdentity *age.X25519Identity,
) error {
_, err := cli.existingVault(vlt.GetName())
if err != nil {
return err
}
vaultDir, _ := vlt.GetDirectory()
ltPubKey, err := afero.ReadFile(cli.fs, filepath.Join(vaultDir, "pub.age"))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read long-term public key: %w", err)
release()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read long-term public key: %w", err)
}
if string(ltPubKey) != ltIdentity.Recipient().String() {
return fmt.Errorf("vault '%s' %w", vlt.GetName(), errVaultCreatedAgain)
release()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("vault '%s' %w", vlt.GetName(), errVaultCreatedAgain)
}
return nil
return release, nil
}
// autoSelectUnlocker selects the newly created unlocker as current,