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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
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64d0c0763d |
@@ -440,11 +440,10 @@ in a CI job, the command fails and names the variable to set.
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A command that changes anything locks the state directory, through its file
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`lock`, and another such command waits until the lock is released.
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`secret init`, `secret vault create`, `secret unlocker add`, `secret mv` from
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one vault to another, and `secret add`, `secret import` and
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`secret generate secret` with `--force`, ask for the mnemonic or passphrase
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before they take the lock, so a prompt of theirs left open in one terminal holds
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up no command in another.
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`secret init`, `secret vault create`, `secret unlocker add`, and `secret add`,
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`secret import` and `secret generate secret` with `--force`, ask for the
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mnemonic or passphrase before they take the lock, so a prompt of theirs left
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open in one terminal holds up no command in another.
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## Security Features
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@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@
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# Status
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pre-1.0. Open work is tracked on the issue tracker, which is authoritative.
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pre-1.0. No git tags. Open work is tracked on the issue tracker, which is
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authoritative.
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# Next Step
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@@ -17,183 +18,6 @@ https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/milestone/12
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# Completed Steps
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- 2026-10-15: `make test` no longer fails on some runs in `internal/cli`
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(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/192). `cli.Entry()` set `time.Local`
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to UTC and ended by wiping every memguard buffer, and a test ran it in the
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same process as the other tests. A timer left by an earlier test could read
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`time.Local` as it changed, which the race detector reported, and the wipe
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could destroy a buffer still in use, the likeliest cause of a crash of the
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test process on another run. `main()` in `cmd/secret` now sets `time.Local`
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before it calls `cli.Entry()`, and that test runs `cli.Entry()` in a process
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of its own.
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- 2026-10-15: `secret mv` from one vault to another unlocks both vaults before
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it takes the state directory lock
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(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/189). It unlocked them while holding
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the lock, and unlocking can ask for a passphrase, so every other command that
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changes anything waited at that prompt. `moveSecretCrossVault` now checks the
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move, refusing an existing destination secret without `--force`, unlocks both
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vaults, and only then takes the lock. Under the lock, it checks that the
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destination vault still has the long-term key it unlocked, and
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`copySecretAndRemoveSource` checks the move again before it copies. A move
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within a vault takes the lock in `moveSecretWithinVault`, so `MoveSecret`
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takes none itself. The error for a vault created again with another key, which
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`secret unlocker add` shares, now ends "nothing was changed".
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- 2026-10-15: `secret init`, `secret vault create`, `secret unlocker add`, and
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`secret add`, `secret import` and `secret generate secret` with `--force` ask
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for the mnemonic or passphrase, or unlock the vault, before they take the
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state directory lock (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/152). They did
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so while holding the lock, so every other command that changes anything waited
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at the prompt. Under the lock, `secret unlocker add` fails if the vault was
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removed, or created again with another key, and refuses a GPG key added
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meanwhile; a forced add of a secret created meanwhile lets go of the lock,
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gets the key and takes the lock again. `secret.CreatePGPUnlocker` takes the
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unlocked vault; `SetMnemonic` and `SetUnlockPassphrase` are gone.
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- 2026-10-15: A `secret mv` to another vault that copies the secret but cannot
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remove the source fails (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/159). It
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printed a warning and the usual "Moved" line and exited 0. If the source
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secret's directory is still in place, the error says the copy holds all
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versions and the source remains. If the source left its vault and only the
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temporary directory it was moved into could not be deleted, the error says the
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secret is moved and names that directory, which the error of `RemoveDirAtomic`
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now does.
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- 2026-10-15: `secret encrypt` and `secret decrypt` with `--output` hold the
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result in memory and open the output file only once encryption or decryption
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has succeeded (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/143). They emptied that
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file before reading any input, so a failed command left it empty, and
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encrypting a file onto itself gave the encryption of nothing. A failure to
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encrypt or decrypt now leaves `--output` untouched, and `--input` can name the
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same file. A failure while writing `--output`, such as a full disk, can still
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leave it empty or partly written; an error from closing it is reported.
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Without `--output` the result still goes to stdout as it is produced.
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- 2026-10-15: A command that uses the current vault fails when `currentvault` is
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empty or names no vault (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/156).
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`secret list` reported an empty vault with exit status 0, and `secret add`
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failed on a missing directory. `ResolveVaultSymlink` now refuses an empty or
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invalid name, or one with no directory under `vaults.d`, with an error that
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wraps `ErrVaultNotFound`, names the file and says to run
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`secret vault select <name>`. `secret vault list` and `secret info` still run.
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- 2026-10-15: `secret` prints every time in UTC, whatever the machine's time
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zone (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/169). `secret list`,
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`secret version list`, `secret unlocker list` and `secret info` printed times
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in the local time zone without naming it, so one vault showed different times
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on two machines. `Entry()` now sets `time.Local` to UTC before anything else,
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as policy 6 in `AGENTS.md` asks, so every time the program prints or writes is
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in UTC. `--json` times end in `Z`, and a new version's name takes the UTC
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date. The README says so.
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- 2026-10-15: `secret vault`, `secret unlocker`, `secret version` and
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`secret generate` fail when given a subcommand they do not have
|
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(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/183). They printed their help and
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exited 0, so a mistyped command looked like one that worked. Each now exits 1
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with `unknown command "<name>" for "secret <parent>"`, and with no arguments
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still prints its help. Cobra checks a command's `Args` only when it has a
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`RunE`, so each gets `Args: cobra.NoArgs` and a `RunE` that prints its help;
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their help now shows a `secret <parent> [flags]` usage line.
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`secret vault help` fails as an unknown subcommand, while `secret help vault`
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and `secret vault --help` still work.
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- 2026-10-15: With `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE` set, `secret unlocker add passphrase`
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asks on the terminal for the new unlocker's passphrase and uses the variable
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to unlock the vault (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/154). It gave the
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new unlocker the passphrase in the variable without asking. With no
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controlling terminal, the new unlocker takes the variable's passphrase and the
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output says so. `secret.ErrNoTerminal` is exported so that the command can
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tell a missing terminal from other failures to read, such as nothing typed or
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a confirmation that does not match, which still fail the command.
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- 2026-10-15: `secret init` and `secret vault create` stop with an error naming
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the file when a vault's `vault-metadata.json` cannot be read or parsed, and
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leave the state directory as it was
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(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/140). `GetNextDerivationIndex` passed
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over such a vault, so the next vault made from the same mnemonic could get its
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derivation index and so the same long-term key. A vault directory with no
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metadata file is still skipped.
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- 2026-10-15: The README says that `secret add` drops one trailing newline from
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stdin, that `secret import` stores a file's bytes unchanged, and that
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`secret get` writes the value with no newline added
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(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/158). It said none of this, so a PEM
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key piped into `secret add` came back one byte short with no hint why. A new
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test stores `a\n\n` through `add` and through `import` and checks that `add`
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kept two bytes and `import` three. No program code changes.
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- 2026-10-15: When gpg fails to decrypt, to encrypt or to look up a key's
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fingerprint, the error ends with what gpg wrote to stderr, trimmed
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(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/146). It gave only gpg's exit status,
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so the user could not tell why. `cmd.Output` keeps gpg's stderr in the
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`*exec.ExitError` it returns, and the three errors now use it. When gpg wrote
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nothing to stderr the error is as before, and when gpg wrote several lines the
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error has them all.
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- 2026-10-15: `secret version list` no longer shows a version without
|
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`NOT_AFTER` as expired (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/150). STATUS
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was `expired` for every version other than the current one, so after a promote
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the newest version, which has no `NOT_AFTER`, read `expired`. STATUS is now
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`current` for the current version, `expired` for another version whose
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`NOT_AFTER` has passed, and `inactive` for any other version. The README
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describes the three.
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- 2026-10-15: `secret unlocker list --json` for a vault with no unlockers, and
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`secret vault list --json` when `vaults.d` holds no vaults, print the empty
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list as `[]` instead of `null` (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/148).
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Both lists were nil slices, which `encoding/json` writes as `null`; each is
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now made as an empty slice before it is filled. `vault.ListVaults` therefore
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returns an empty slice instead of nil for an empty `vaults.d`.
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- 2026-10-15: `secret add`, `secret import` and `secret generate secret` fail
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with an error, not memguard's panic, when a secret is too large for the
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locked-memory limit (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/145). The value
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was held twice, so half the usual 8 MiB limit was enough to crash them.
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`secret` now raises the limit to the hard limit at startup, and each of the
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three commands refuses, before its first locked allocation, a limit that
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leaves fewer than 8 pages for its keys and buffers. The value is read a page
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at a time into a `memguard.Stream`, which keeps it encrypted, and copied once
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into locked memory after its size is checked against 100 MiB and the limit. It
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leaves the stream through `Next`, not `Read`, because `Read` re-encrypts a
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leftover piece and memguard hangs if that runs out of locked memory.
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- 2026-10-15: Total Size in `secret info` counts every file of each version: the
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value, the metadata and the version's two keys
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||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/147). It added up each version's
|
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`data.age` and `metadata.age`, but a version keeps its value in `value.age`,
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so no secret's value was counted. A version directory that cannot be read adds
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nothing and gets a warning naming it.
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- 2026-10-15: `secret vault import` is gone, with its tests and its README entry
|
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(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/139). It took only a vault without a
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long-term key, and `secret init` and `secret vault create` give every vault
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one, so it always failed; a mnemonic enters through those two commands. The
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help and the note of `secret generate mnemonic` named `secret import`, which
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imports a file as a secret, and now name `secret init` and
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`secret vault create`.
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- 2026-10-15: `secret version promote --help` says promote rewrites the
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`current` file, not a "current symlink"
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||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/153). `current` is a plain file
|
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holding the version name, as the README already said, and the comment in
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`PromoteVersion` now says so too.
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- 2026-10-14: `secret init` and `secret vault create` refuse a vault that
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already exists before they ask for the mnemonic or the unlocker passphrase
|
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(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/151). They asked first, and
|
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`secret init` printed "Initialized secrets manager at" before refusing. The
|
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check `vault.CreateVault` made before writing is now
|
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`vault.CheckNewVaultName`, which both commands call before the first prompt
|
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and `CreateVault` still calls. It validates the name too, so
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`secret vault create` with an invalid name also fails before the prompts.
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`secret init` prints the "Initialized" line only once the vault is created.
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- 2026-10-14: `secret get` fails when it cannot write the value
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/155). `GetSecret` and
|
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`GetSecretWithVersion` discarded the result of writing it to stdout, so a full
|
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disk or a failing stdout left an empty or cut-short file and exit status 0.
|
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The write error is now returned, so the command prints it and exits 1. A
|
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stdout the shell closed before `secret` started still exits 0, because the Go
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runtime opens `/dev/null` in its place and the write there succeeds.
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- 2026-10-14: `secret list` and `secret list --json` give each secret's own
|
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creation and last-update times (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/142).
|
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They gave the time of the listing for every secret, because
|
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`Secret.LoadMetadata` set both to the current time. It now reads file
|
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modification times, so listing still needs no passphrase. The last update is
|
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when the secret's `current` file was written. The creation is when its oldest
|
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version's `value.age` was written, not that version's directory, whose time
|
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changes when the next add rewrites its `metadata.age`. A move to another vault
|
||||
gives the copied files the times of the originals. `GetSecretObject` no longer
|
||||
loads the times, so `secret get` keeps its error for a missing `current` file.
|
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- 2026-10-14: `secret unlocker add pgp` without `--keyid` uses the `default-key`
|
||||
in `gpg.conf` (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/141).
|
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`getDefaultGPGKey` took that value from `gpgconf --list-options gpg` as
|
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printed, with a leading `"` and percent-escaped, so gpg rejected the key ID.
|
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The new `parseDefaultGPGKey` drops the `"` and percent-decodes the rest with
|
||||
`url.PathUnescape`, which leaves `+` alone. A value that does not decode is an
|
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error, not a fallback to the first secret key.
|
||||
- 2026-10-14: A wrong passphrase, from `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE` or typed at the
|
||||
prompt, gives the error `wrong passphrase for unlocker <id>`
|
||||
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/157). It used to be age's "no
|
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|
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@@ -3,16 +3,10 @@ package main
|
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|
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import (
|
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"os"
|
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"time"
|
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|
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"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
|
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)
|
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|
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func main() {
|
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// Every time secret prints or writes is in UTC, whatever TZ or the
|
||||
// system's time zone is set to. It is set here, before cli.Entry starts
|
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// any goroutine that could read time.Local while it changes.
|
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time.Local = time.UTC //nolint:gosmopolitan // this makes local time UTC
|
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|
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os.Exit(cli.Entry())
|
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}
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|
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+12
-51
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package cli_test
|
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import (
|
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"bufio"
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"context"
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"fmt"
|
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"os"
|
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"os/exec"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
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@@ -17,67 +16,29 @@ import (
|
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"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
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)
|
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|
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const (
|
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// envRunEntry, when set, makes this test binary run cli.Entry with its
|
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// own arguments and exit, instead of running the tests.
|
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envRunEntry = "SECRET_TEST_RUN_ENTRY"
|
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|
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// bufferWiped is what the test binary prints, run with envRunEntry set,
|
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// when cli.Entry wiped the buffer made before it ran.
|
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bufferWiped = "Entry wiped the buffer made before it ran"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
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// With envRunEntry set, the test binary makes a buffer, runs cli.Entry,
|
||||
// says whether the buffer is wiped, and exits with Entry's exit code. This
|
||||
// is done in init, not in a test, so that TestMain does not run in that
|
||||
// process: it would build the secret binary again, and remove it at the end,
|
||||
// while the other tests run it.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//nolint:gochecknoinits // must run before TestMain, as above
|
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func init() {
|
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if os.Getenv(envRunEntry) == "" {
|
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return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
buf := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("key material"))
|
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code := cli.Entry()
|
||||
|
||||
if !buf.IsAlive() {
|
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, bufferWiped)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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os.Exit(code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Entry must return its exit code rather than exit, so that its deferred
|
||||
// memguard purge runs on the success and the error path alike. Entry wipes
|
||||
// every memguard buffer in the process, including those other tests are
|
||||
// using, so it runs in a process of its own: this test binary, run again
|
||||
// with envRunEntry set.
|
||||
// memguard purge runs on the success and the error path alike.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//nolint:paralleltest // sets os.Args, and Entry wipes every buffer in the process
|
||||
func TestEntryWipesBuffersAndReturnsExitCode(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
savedArgs := os.Args
|
||||
|
||||
t.Cleanup(func() { os.Args = savedArgs })
|
||||
|
||||
tests := []struct {
|
||||
args []string
|
||||
exitCode int
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{args: []string{"--help"}, exitCode: 0},
|
||||
{args: []string{"no-such-command"}, exitCode: 1},
|
||||
{args: []string{"secret", "--help"}, exitCode: 0},
|
||||
{args: []string{"secret", "no-such-command"}, exitCode: 1},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tt := range tests {
|
||||
//nolint:gosec // G204: test runs its own test binary
|
||||
cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), os.Args[0], tt.args...)
|
||||
buf := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("key material"))
|
||||
os.Args = tt.args
|
||||
|
||||
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), envRunEntry+"=1")
|
||||
|
||||
output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, cmd.ProcessState, "%v did not run: %v", tt.args, err)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, tt.exitCode, cmd.ProcessState.ExitCode(),
|
||||
"exit code for %v: %s", tt.args, output)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, string(output), bufferWiped,
|
||||
"Entry left a buffer unwiped for %v", tt.args)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, tt.exitCode, cli.Entry(), "exit code for %v", tt.args)
|
||||
assert.False(t, buf.IsAlive(), "Entry left a buffer unwiped for %v", tt.args)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ package cli
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -229,87 +230,68 @@ func TestCrossVaultMoveUnlocksBeforeLocking(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestCrossVaultMoveChecksAgainOnceLocked runs a move between vaults, given
|
||||
// the mnemonic, as TestCommandsCheckAgainOnceLocked runs the commands in its
|
||||
// table: once the move waits for the state directory lock, the test removes
|
||||
// the source secret or the destination vault, or creates the destination
|
||||
// vault again from another mnemonic, and the move must then fail and change
|
||||
// nothing.
|
||||
// TestCrossVaultMoveChecksAgainOnceLocked starts a move between two vaults,
|
||||
// given the mnemonic, while the test holds the state directory lock. Once
|
||||
// the move waits for the lock, the test removes what another command could
|
||||
// have removed in the meantime, then releases the lock. The move must fail
|
||||
// with the error that says what is missing.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//nolint:paralleltest // waitingForLock sees any test's command waiting for the lock
|
||||
func TestCrossVaultMoveChecksAgainOnceLocked(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mnemonic := testMnemonicBuffer(t)
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
// removed is the directory, under the state directory, that the
|
||||
// test removes
|
||||
removed string
|
||||
want error
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"source", "/vaults.d/default/secrets.d/x", vault.ErrSecretNotFound},
|
||||
{"destination vault", "/vaults.d/work", vault.ErrVaultNotFound},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
|
||||
createCrossVaults(t, fs)
|
||||
|
||||
otherMnemonic := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("legal winner thank " +
|
||||
"year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thank yellow"))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(otherMnemonic.Destroy)
|
||||
release, err := vault.LockStateDir(fs, testStateDir)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
move := func(cli *Instance) error {
|
||||
cli.Mnemonic = mnemonic
|
||||
// Released at most once, and also if the test fails while
|
||||
// holding it, so that later tests can take it
|
||||
release = sync.OnceFunc(release)
|
||||
defer release()
|
||||
|
||||
return cli.MoveSecret(cli.cmd, "work:test/secret", "other:moved", false)
|
||||
}
|
||||
instance := NewCLIInstanceWithStateDir(fs, testStateDir)
|
||||
instance.Mnemonic = testMnemonicBuffer(t)
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("source removed", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
requireChecksAgainOnceLocked(t, move, func(fs afero.Fs) error {
|
||||
return fs.RemoveAll(testStateDir + "/vaults.d/work/secrets.d/test%secret")
|
||||
}, vault.ErrSecretNotFound)
|
||||
})
|
||||
done := make(chan error, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("destination vault removed", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
requireChecksAgainOnceLocked(t, move, func(fs afero.Fs) error {
|
||||
return fs.RemoveAll(testStateDir + "/vaults.d/other")
|
||||
}, vault.ErrVaultNotFound)
|
||||
})
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
done <- instance.MoveSecret(&cobra.Command{},
|
||||
"default:x", "work:y", false)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("destination vault created again from another mnemonic", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Set by the move, which has finished once
|
||||
// requireChecksAgainOnceLocked returns
|
||||
var moveErr error
|
||||
timeout := time.After(lockWait)
|
||||
|
||||
requireChecksAgainOnceLocked(t, func(cli *Instance) error {
|
||||
moveErr = move(cli)
|
||||
|
||||
return moveErr
|
||||
}, func(fs afero.Fs) error {
|
||||
err := fs.RemoveAll(testStateDir + "/vaults.d/other")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
for !waitingForLock() {
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case err := <-done:
|
||||
t.Fatalf("finished while the lock was held, with error %v",
|
||||
err)
|
||||
case <-timeout:
|
||||
t.Fatal("never waited for the lock")
|
||||
case <-time.After(time.Millisecond):
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_, err = vault.CreateVault(fs, testStateDir, "other", otherMnemonic, nil)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fs.RemoveAll(testStateDir+tc.removed))
|
||||
release()
|
||||
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}, errVaultCreatedAgain)
|
||||
|
||||
// secret unlocker add fails with the same error, so its message
|
||||
// must fit a move too
|
||||
require.EqualError(t, moveErr, "vault 'other' was removed and "+
|
||||
"created again with another key while it was being unlocked; "+
|
||||
"nothing was changed")
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestCrossVaultMoveRefusesExistingSecretBeforeUnlocking checks that a move
|
||||
// between vaults onto a secret that exists, without --force, is refused
|
||||
// before either vault is unlocked, since unlocking can ask for a
|
||||
// passphrase. The vaults have no unlockers and the move is given no
|
||||
// mnemonic, so unlocking either vault fails.
|
||||
func TestCrossVaultMoveRefusesExistingSecretBeforeUnlocking(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
|
||||
createCrossVaults(t, fs)
|
||||
|
||||
work := vault.NewVault(fs, testStateDir, "work")
|
||||
work.Mnemonic = testMnemonicBuffer(t)
|
||||
|
||||
err := work.AddSecret("y",
|
||||
memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("other")), false)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
instance := NewCLIInstanceWithStateDir(fs, testStateDir)
|
||||
|
||||
err = instance.MoveSecret(&cobra.Command{}, "default:x", "work:y", false)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, vault.ErrSecretExists)
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case err := <-done:
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, tc.want)
|
||||
case <-time.After(lockWait):
|
||||
t.Fatal("did not finish once the lock was released")
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package cli
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
|
||||
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
|
||||
@@ -14,6 +15,10 @@ import (
|
||||
// every memguard buffer before it returns, so the caller must do nothing
|
||||
// but exit with the code.
|
||||
func Entry() int {
|
||||
// Every time secret prints or writes is in UTC, whatever TZ or the
|
||||
// system's time zone is set to.
|
||||
time.Local = time.UTC //nolint:gosmopolitan // this makes local time UTC
|
||||
|
||||
raiseLockedMemoryLimit()
|
||||
|
||||
// On SIGINT or SIGTERM memguard runs this function, wipes every buffer
|
||||
|
||||
+17
-33
@@ -1084,24 +1084,21 @@ func (cli *Instance) sameDirectory(dir, other string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
|
||||
// moveSecretCrossVault handles moving between two different vaults. Its
|
||||
// caller, MoveSecret, has already checked both secret names and that both
|
||||
// vaults exist. The copy needs the source vault's long-term key and is
|
||||
// encrypted to the destination vault's long-term public key. The
|
||||
// destination vault is unlocked to check that the copy will open with what
|
||||
// the user gave, and, once the state directory lock is held, that it still
|
||||
// has the key unlocked. Either unlock can ask for a passphrase, so both
|
||||
// happen before the lock is taken, and no other command waits while the
|
||||
// user answers.
|
||||
// vaults exist. The copy needs the source vault's long-term key; the
|
||||
// destination vault is unlocked only to check that it can be. Either can ask
|
||||
// for a passphrase, so both happen before it takes the state directory lock,
|
||||
// and no other command waits while the user answers.
|
||||
func (cli *Instance) moveSecretCrossVault(
|
||||
cmd *cobra.Command,
|
||||
srcVault *vault.Vault, srcSecretName string,
|
||||
destVault *vault.Vault, destSecretName string,
|
||||
force bool,
|
||||
) error {
|
||||
// Before unlocking, check that the source secret exists, that the
|
||||
// destination is not the source under another name, and, without
|
||||
// --force, that the destination secret does not exist
|
||||
// Before unlocking, check that the source secret and the destination
|
||||
// vault exist, and that the destination is not the source under another
|
||||
// name
|
||||
_, err := cli.checkCrossVaultMove(
|
||||
srcVault, srcSecretName, destVault, destSecretName, force)
|
||||
srcVault, srcSecretName, destVault, destSecretName)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1110,7 +1107,7 @@ func (cli *Instance) moveSecretCrossVault(
|
||||
destVault.Mnemonic, destVault.UnlockPassphrase = cli.Mnemonic, cli.UnlockPassphrase
|
||||
|
||||
// Unlock destination vault (will fail if neither mnemonic nor unlocker available)
|
||||
destIdentity, err := destVault.GetOrDeriveLongTermKey()
|
||||
_, err = destVault.GetOrDeriveLongTermKey()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("failed to unlock destination vault '%s': %w", destVault.Name, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1127,11 +1124,6 @@ func (cli *Instance) moveSecretCrossVault(
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer release()
|
||||
|
||||
err = cli.checkLongTermKey(destVault, destIdentity)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return cli.copySecretAndRemoveSource(
|
||||
cmd, srcVault, srcSecretName, destVault, destSecretName, force)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1148,7 +1140,7 @@ func (cli *Instance) copySecretAndRemoveSource(
|
||||
force bool,
|
||||
) error {
|
||||
srcSecretDir, err := cli.checkCrossVaultMove(
|
||||
srcVault, srcSecretName, destVault, destSecretName, force)
|
||||
srcVault, srcSecretName, destVault, destSecretName)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1179,13 +1171,11 @@ func (cli *Instance) copySecretAndRemoveSource(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// checkCrossVaultMove checks that the secret srcSecretName exists in
|
||||
// srcVault, that destSecretName in destVault is not the source under
|
||||
// another name, and, unless force is set, that destSecretName does not
|
||||
// exist in destVault. It returns the source's directory.
|
||||
// srcVault, that destVault exists, and that destSecretName in destVault is
|
||||
// not the source under another name. It returns the source's directory.
|
||||
func (cli *Instance) checkCrossVaultMove(
|
||||
srcVault *vault.Vault, srcSecretName string,
|
||||
destVault *vault.Vault, destSecretName string,
|
||||
force bool,
|
||||
) (string, error) {
|
||||
srcVaultDir, err := srcVault.GetDirectory()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -1202,6 +1192,11 @@ func (cli *Instance) checkCrossVaultMove(
|
||||
srcSecretName, vault.ErrSecretNotFound, srcVault.Name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_, err = cli.existingVault(destVault.Name)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The source is removed after the copy, so a destination that is the
|
||||
// source under another name would be lost with it.
|
||||
destVaultDir, err := destVault.GetDirectory()
|
||||
@@ -1223,17 +1218,6 @@ func (cli *Instance) checkCrossVaultMove(
|
||||
destVault.Name, destSecretName)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
exists, err = afero.DirExists(cli.fs, destSecretDir)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to check if destination secret exists: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if exists && !force {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf(
|
||||
"secret '%s' %w in vault '%s' (use --force to overwrite)",
|
||||
destSecretName, vault.ErrSecretExists, destVault.Name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return srcSecretDir, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"filippo.io/age"
|
||||
"github.com/spf13/afero"
|
||||
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
|
||||
@@ -43,7 +42,7 @@ var (
|
||||
// errVaultCreatedAgain carries only the message tail; the caller
|
||||
// composes "vault '<name>' was removed and created again ...".
|
||||
errVaultCreatedAgain = errors.New("was removed and created again " +
|
||||
"with another key while it was being unlocked; nothing was changed")
|
||||
"with another key while it was being unlocked; nothing was added")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// UnlockerInfo represents unlocker information for display
|
||||
@@ -443,41 +442,29 @@ func (cli *Instance) unlockThenLock(vlt *vault.Vault) (func(), error) {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = cli.checkLongTermKey(vlt, ltIdentity)
|
||||
_, err = cli.existingVault(vlt.GetName())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
release()
|
||||
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return release, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// checkLongTermKey checks, for the vault vlt unlocked as ltIdentity before
|
||||
// the state directory lock was taken, that vlt still exists and that its
|
||||
// long-term public key is still that of ltIdentity. Another command may have
|
||||
// removed the vault in the meantime, or removed it and created it again with
|
||||
// another long-term key. The caller holds the lock.
|
||||
func (cli *Instance) checkLongTermKey(
|
||||
vlt *vault.Vault, ltIdentity *age.X25519Identity,
|
||||
) error {
|
||||
_, err := cli.existingVault(vlt.GetName())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
vaultDir, _ := vlt.GetDirectory()
|
||||
|
||||
ltPubKey, err := afero.ReadFile(cli.fs, filepath.Join(vaultDir, "pub.age"))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read long-term public key: %w", err)
|
||||
release()
|
||||
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read long-term public key: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if string(ltPubKey) != ltIdentity.Recipient().String() {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("vault '%s' %w", vlt.GetName(), errVaultCreatedAgain)
|
||||
release()
|
||||
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("vault '%s' %w", vlt.GetName(), errVaultCreatedAgain)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
return release, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// autoSelectUnlocker selects the newly created unlocker as current,
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user