Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 3e6ff1d8cc Give each failure one error value (closes #113)
check / check (push) Failing after 2s
internal/cli drops its copies of vault.ErrSecretNotFound, ErrVaultNotFound,
ErrVersionNotFound and ErrSecretExists and of the secret package's keychain
and Secure Enclave errors, and its second error for an unknown unlocker
type, an invalid mnemonic, a length below 1, an unsupported secret type and
an oversized secret. vault.ErrNilValueBuffer becomes
secret.ErrNilValueBuffer. Every error of secret.ReadPassphrase wraps
ErrPassphraseNotRead. ResolveGPGKeyFingerprint returns ErrGPGKeyNotFound for
a key the keyring lacks. storeInKeychain returns errNilDataBuffer. bip85's
ErrPasswordTooShort and ErrEncodedTooShort go with their unreachable checks,
as does the macOS check in macOS-only code. Tests that matched these
errors' text use errors.Is.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-04 22:55:36 +00:00
125 changed files with 4301 additions and 5848 deletions
+19 -68
View File
@@ -1,78 +1,29 @@
# .dockerignore does NOT use .gitignore semantics. Docker matches with
# moby/patternmatcher: filepath.Match plus `**`, so `*` does not cross
# `/` and an unprefixed pattern is anchored at the context root. Every
# depth-independent pattern therefore needs `**/`, or `config/.env` and
# `certs/server.key` still ship while this file reads as solved. Only
# genuinely root-anchored entries go unprefixed. Never transplant these
# into .gitignore, where `**/` is wrong.
#
# Matching is case-sensitive, so secrets use character ranges rather
# than an ALL-CAPS twin, which would still miss `Server.Key`.
#
# Extend with this repo's own host-built artifacts, written anchored:
# `/myapp`, never `**/myapp`, which also matches `cmd/myapp/` and
# deletes the package directory from the context.
# .git is sent without its config. Without a VERSION build argument the
# stage that compiles runs `git describe --tags --always` on .git, which
# does not need .git/config; that file can hold a credential, such as a
# password in a remote URL or the token the CI checkout step stores there.
# Each submodule keeps a config with the same exposure in its git directory
# under .git/modules/, nested again for a submodule's own submodules, or in
# its own .git directory when it keeps one.
# KNOWN GAP: a submodule whose name has a `config` segment (`config`,
# `deploy/config`, `config/lib`) loses its whole git directory, because
# `**/.git/modules/**/config` also matches that segment's directory
# under .git/modules/. Go's version stamping then fails the build;
# nothing leaks. Name such a submodule without that segment:
# `git submodule add --name`.
**/.git/config
**/.git/modules/**/config
.git/config
# Agent scratch: one full checkout of the repo per in-flight agent.
# Anchored because it occurs once where agents run at the repo root.
# KNOWN GAP: a repo running agents in subdirectories still ships
# `services/api/.claude/` and must add its own anchored entry.
.claude
# Build artifacts
secret
coverage.out
*.test
# Environment files. `*.env` covers bare `.env` and the `prod.env`
# convention. Re-include a committed template with a negation if the
# build needs one: `!docs/example.env`.
**/*.[eE][nN][vV]
**/.[eE][nN][vV].*
**/.[eE][nN][vV][rR][cC]
# IDE and editor files
.vscode
.idea
*.swp
*.swo
*~
# Private keys and the bundles carrying them. Public certificates
# (*.crt, *.cer) are deliberately absent: they are legitimate inputs.
**/*.[pP][eE][mM]
**/*.[kK][eE][yY]
**/*.[pP]12
**/*.[pP][fF][xX]
**/[iI][dD]_[rR][sS][aA]
**/[iI][dD]_[dD][sS][aA]
**/[iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]
**/[iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]_[sS][kK]
**/[iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519
**/[iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519_[sS][kK]
# Dependencies
node_modules
# Dependencies: restored inside the image, never copied in.
**/node_modules
# macOS
.DS_Store
# OS metadata.
**/.DS_Store
**/Thumbs.db
# Claude files
.claude/
# Editor state: never a build input, and it churns COPY.
**/*.swp
**/*.swo
**/*~
**/*.bak
**/.idea
**/.vscode
**/*.sublime-*
# This repo's host-built artifacts: the binary script/build writes, test
# binaries and coverage output.
/secret
/*.test
/coverage.out
# Local settings
.claude/settings.local.json
-3
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,3 @@ insert_final_newline = true
[Makefile]
indent_style = tab
[*.go]
indent_style = tab
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,6 @@ jobs:
check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
# actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-22
# actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-28
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
- run: script/cibuild
+10 -30
View File
@@ -20,35 +20,15 @@ Thumbs.db
# Node
node_modules/
# Secrets. Unanchored like every entry above, so each matches at every
# depth. Matching is case-sensitive on Linux, so names use character
# ranges rather than a lowercase form that misses `Server.Key`.
# Environment / secrets
.env
.env.*
*.pem
*.key
# Environment files. `*.env` covers bare `.env` and the `prod.env`
# convention. Only the templates `example.env` and `sample.env` are
# re-included below. A repository that commits any other template adds
# its own negation after these lines, for example `!.env.example`.
*.[eE][nN][vV]
.[eE][nN][vV].*
.[eE][nN][vV][rR][cC]
!example.env
!sample.env
# Private keys and the bundles carrying them.
*.[pP][eE][mM]
*.[kK][eE][yY]
*.[pP]12
*.[pP][fF][xX]
[iI][dD]_[rR][sS][aA]
[iI][dD]_[dD][sS][aA]
[iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]
[iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]_[sS][kK]
[iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519
[iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519_[sS][kK]
# Go. /secret is the built binary, anchored so that it does not also match
# the internal/secret/ package directory.
*.log
*.out
*.test
# This repo. /secret is the built binary, anchored so that it does not
# also match the internal/secret/ package directory.
/secret
*.log
*.test
settings.local.json
-1
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ linters:
disable:
# Genuinely incompatible with project patterns
- exhaustruct # Requires all struct fields
- exhaustruct_v5 # Requires all struct fields (successor to exhaustruct)
- godot # Requires comments to end with periods
- wrapcheck # Too verbose for internal packages
- varnamelen # Short names like db, id are idiomatic Go
+2 -21
View File
@@ -100,18 +100,6 @@ Version: 2025-06-08
are acceptable in the root, but source code and other files should be
organized in appropriate subdirectories.
13. Commit messages carry no author or co-author attribution for the coding
agent. The agent is an inanimate tool and the owner is the sole author of
the code it writes; such a line is advertising, not attribution.
14. Never run part of the test suite: always run the whole thing with
`make test`.
15. Do not stop working on a task until you have reached the definition of done
it gives. Do all of the work, not part or most of it.
16. After each commit, push to the remote.
## Python-Specific Guidelines
1. **Type Annotations (UP006)**: Use built-in collection types directly for type
@@ -166,17 +154,10 @@ Version: 2025-06-08
3. **Wrap errors** with `fmt.Errorf("context: %w", err)` for debuggability.
4. **Never modify linter config** (`.golangci.yml`) to suppress findings, and do
not modify it at all unless specifically instructed. Fix the code.
4. **Never modify linter config** (`.golangci.yml`) to suppress findings. Fix
the code.
5. **All PRs must pass `make check` with zero failures.** No exceptions, no
"pre-existing issue" excuses.
6. **Pin external dependencies by commit hash**, not mutable tags.
7. **A program's `main.go` is `./cmd/<program_name>/main.go`** and only imports
and calls `<program_name>.CLIEntry()`; the implementation is in
`./internal/<program_name>/`. This keeps several programs in one repository
from cluttering the root directory.
8. **Log with `log/slog`.**
+95
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
# IMPORTANT RULES
* Claude is an inanimate tool. The spam that Claude attempts to insert into
commit messages (which it erroneously refers to as "attribution") is not
attribution, as I am the sole author of code created using Claude. It is
corporate advertising for Anthropic and is therefore completely
unacceptable in commit messages.
* Tests should always be run before committing code. No commits should be
made that do not pass tests.
* Code should always be formatted before committing. Do not commit
unformatted code.
* Code should always be linted and linter errors fixed before committing.
NEVER commit code that does not pass the linter. DO NOT modify the linter
config unless specifically instructed.
* The test suite is fast and local. When running tests, NEVER run
individual parts of the test suite, always run the whole thing by running
"make test".
* Do not stop working on a task until you have reached the definition of
done provided to you in the initial instruction. Don't do part or most of
the work, do all of the work until the criteria for done are met.
* When you complete each task, if the tests are passing and the code is
formatted and there are no linter errors, always commit and push your
work. Use a good commit message and don't mention any author or co-author
attribution.
* Do not create additional files in the root directory of the project
without asking permission first. Configuration files, documentation, and
build files are acceptable in the root, but source code and other files
should be organized in appropriate subdirectories.
* Do not use bare strings or numbers in code, especially if they appear
anywhere more than once. Always define a constant (usually at the top of
the file) and give it a descriptive name, then use that constant in the
code instead of the bare string or number.
* If you are fixing a bug, write a test first that reproduces the bug and
fails, and then fix the bug in the code, using the test to verify that the
fix worked.
* When implementing new features, be aware of potential side-effects (such
as state files on disk, data in the database, etc.) and ensure that it is
possible to mock or stub these side-effects in tests when designing an
API.
* When dealing with dates and times or timestamps, always use, display, and
store UTC. Set the local timezone to UTC on startup. If the user needs
to see the time in a different timezone, store the user's timezone in a
separate field and convert the UTC time to the user's timezone when
displaying it. For internal use and internal applications and
administrative purposes, always display UTC.
* When implementing programs, put the main.go in
./cmd/<program_name>/main.go and put the program's code in
./internal/<program_name>/. This allows for multiple programs to be
implemented in the same repository without cluttering the root directory.
main.go should simply import and call <program_name>.CLIEntry(). The
full implementation should be in ./internal/<program_name>/.
* When you are instructed to make the tests pass, DO NOT delete tests, skip
tests, or change the tests specifically to make them pass (unless there
is a bug in the test). This is cheating, and it is bad. You should only
be modifying the test if it is incorrect or if the test is no longer
relevant. In almost all cases, you should be fixing the code that is
being tested, or updating the tests to match a refactored implementation.
* Always write a `Makefile` with the default target being `test`, and with a
`fmt` target that formats the code. The `test` target should run all
tests in the project, and the `fmt` target should format the code. `test`
should also have a prerequisite target `lint` that should run any linters
that are configured for the project.
* After each completed bugfix or feature, the code must be committed. Do
all of the pre-commit checks (test, lint, fmt) before committing, of
course. After each commit, push to the remote.
* Always write tests, even if they are extremely simple and just check for
correct syntax (ability to compile/import). If you are writing a new
feature, write a test for it. You don't need to target complete coverage,
but you should at least test any new functionality you add.
* Always use structured logging. Log any relevant state/context with the
messages (but do not log secrets). If stdout is not a terminal, output
the structured logs in jsonl format. Use go's log/slog.
* You do not need to summarize your changes in the chat after making them.
Making the changes and committing them is sufficient. If anything out of
the ordinary happened, please explain it, but in the normal case where you
found and fixed the bug, or implemented the feature, there is no need for
the end-of-change summary.
+44 -52
View File
@@ -1,76 +1,68 @@
# Lint phase. The linter is invoked directly rather than through `make
# lint` or `script/lint`, which are themselves a docker build.
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.14.0 (Debian-based), 2026-09-24
FROM golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:ad862ba6b3798cbe0fd9fd7408d498fd74fbd2623a92406b2fd3898faf0bf98f AS lint
# Lint stage — fast feedback on formatting and lint issues
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2 (Debian-based), 2026-08-07
FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2@sha256:5cceeef04e53efe1470638d4b4b4f5ceefd574955ab3941b2d9a68a8c9ad5240 AS lint
WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
# script/cibuild sets CHECK_EPOCH to the current time, so the RUN steps
# below run again on each build, an unchanged tree included, while the
# steps above stay cached. ARG is per stage: the build stage declares it too.
ARG CHECK_EPOCH
COPY . .
RUN go vet ./...
RUN make fmt-check
# Not make lint or make lint-darwin: script/lint and script/lint-darwin are
# docker builds, which cannot run in here. These are their commands.
RUN golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
# The same checks on the code as a macOS build compiles it, which a Linux
# build never compiles. Cgo is off, because compiling cgo code for macOS
# needs Apple's SDK headers.
RUN GOOS=darwin CGO_ENABLED=0 go vet ./...
RUN GOOS=darwin CGO_ENABLED=0 golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
# Test phase. -race needs cgo and so a C compiler, which the Debian Go
# image ships and the alpine one does not.
# golang:1.24.13-trixie, 2026-02-04
FROM golang@sha256:5835f052b784aa39f2fe9070def3568605c8bc3fcd810f10402066348b61e716 AS test
ENV CGO_ENABLED=1
WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
# Go's build cache goes in a cache mount, not the image layer, which would
# take seconds longer to export. --no-cache, on every build in script/,
# starts the mount empty; -count=1 keeps a build without it from taking
# test results from there.
RUN --mount=type=cache,id=sneak/secret/go-build-test,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
go test -count=1 -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
go test -count=1 -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
# Build stage. Nothing is wanted from either phase above; the copies are
# what make BuildKit build them first, so this stage cannot run unless
# lint and test passed.
# golang 1.24.13-alpine, 2026-03-10
# Build stage — tests and compilation
# golang 1.24.13-alpine (2026-03-10)
FROM golang@sha256:8bee1901f1e530bfb4a7850aa7a479d17ae3a18beb6e09064ed54cfd245b7191 AS builder
# Force BuildKit to run the lint stage
COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
COPY --from=test /src/go.sum /dev/null
# script/build compiles with cgo, so it needs a C compiler too.
RUN apk add --no-cache gcc musl-dev make git
# A tar-stream context keeps the sender's file owners, which git refuses.
RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /src
WORKDIR /src
RUN apk add --no-cache gcc musl-dev make git gnupg
WORKDIR /build
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
# As in the lint stage: the RUN steps below run again on each script/cibuild.
ARG CHECK_EPOCH
COPY . .
# The VERSION build arg when one is given, otherwise
# `git describe --tags --always` on the .git in the build context. With
# .git present, a version that is still empty, dev or unknown fails the
# build: git is missing or could not read the checkout.
ARG VERSION
RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
if [ -e .git ]; then \
case "$VERSION" in ""|dev|unknown) \
echo "version is '$VERSION' although .git is present" >&2; \
exit 1 ;; \
esac; \
fi; \
make build VERSION="${VERSION:-dev}"
RUN make test
# Runtime stage, and the last one
# alpine 3.23, 2026-03-10
# The version stamped into the binary: the VERSION build argument when one
# is given, otherwise `git describe --tags --always` of the .git the build
# context carries: the tag on a tagged commit, tag-N-gHASH on a commit after
# one, the short commit when no tag is reachable. A context that carries .git
# and still yields no version fails the build.
ARG VERSION
RUN version="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
if [ -e .git ] && { [ -z "$version" ] || [ "$version" = dev ] || \
[ "$version" = unknown ]; }; then \
echo "no version could be derived although the build context carries .git" >&2; \
exit 1; \
fi; \
make build VERSION="${version:-dev}"
# Runtime stage
# alpine 3.23 (2026-03-10)
FROM alpine@sha256:25109184c71bdad752c8312a8623239686a9a2071e8825f20acb8f2198c3f659
RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates gnupg
RUN adduser -D -s /bin/sh secret
COPY --from=builder /src/secret /usr/local/bin/secret
COPY --from=builder /build/secret /usr/local/bin/secret
RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/secret
USER secret
+29
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@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
# Lint image, built by script/lint and script/lint-darwin: golangci-lint runs
# as a build step, so a successful build is a clean lint. Works where the
# docker daemon is remote and bind mounts are impossible.
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2 (Debian-based), 2026-08-07
FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2@sha256:5cceeef04e53efe1470638d4b4b4f5ceefd574955ab3941b2d9a68a8c9ad5240 AS deps
WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
# script/lint rebuilds this stage on every run, by this name; the module
# download above stays cached.
FROM deps AS lint
COPY . .
RUN golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
# script/lint-darwin rebuilds this stage on every run, by this name. It
# checks the code as a macOS build compiles it, but with cgo off, which
# leaves out the files that need cgo on macOS (see script/lint-darwin).
FROM deps AS lint-darwin
COPY . .
RUN GOOS=darwin CGO_ENABLED=0 go vet ./...
RUN GOOS=darwin CGO_ENABLED=0 golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
+6 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
export CGO_ENABLED=1
.PHONY: default bootstrap setup build test lint fmt fmt-check check docker \
docker-run clean install hooks
.PHONY: default bootstrap setup build test lint lint-darwin fmt fmt-check \
check docker docker-run clean install hooks
default: check
@@ -21,10 +21,13 @@ test:
fmt:
@script/fmt
# Vets and lints the Linux build, then the macOS build
lint:
@script/lint
# Type-check and lint the macOS build from Linux (see script/lint-darwin)
lint-darwin:
@script/lint-darwin
check:
@script/check
+54 -48
View File
@@ -150,13 +150,6 @@ Retrieves and outputs a secret value to stdout.
Lists all secrets in the current vault. Optional filter for substring matching.
The `LAST UPDATED` column, and `updated_at` in the `--json` output, give the
time the secret's `current` file was last written: every command that adds a
version replaces it, and so does `secret version promote`. `created_at` gives
the time the `value.age` of the secret's oldest version was written. Both are
the files' modification times, so listing asks for no passphrase. Moving a
secret to another vault keeps both times.
#### `secret remove <secret-name> [--force]` / `secret rm` ⚠️ 🛑
**DANGER**: Permanently removes a secret and ALL its versions. It first asks for
@@ -188,9 +181,7 @@ period.
#### `secret version promote <secret-name> <version>`
Promotes a specific version to current by rewriting the secret's `current` file
to name it. The versions' own times are left unchanged, allowing for rollback
scenarios; `secret list` then gives the time of the promote as the secret's last
update.
to name it. Does not modify any timestamps, allowing for rollback scenarios.
#### `secret version remove <secret-name> <version> [--force]` / `secret version rm` ⚠️ 🛑
@@ -206,8 +197,7 @@ for confirmation, naming the version, the secret and its vault (see
#### `secret generate mnemonic`
Generates a cryptographically secure BIP39 mnemonic phrase and prints it to
stdout. The warning to keep it safe goes to stderr.
Generates a cryptographically secure BIP39 mnemonic phrase.
#### `secret generate secret <name> [--length=16] [--type=base58] [--force]`
@@ -233,6 +223,8 @@ Creates a new unlocker of the specified type:
- `passphrase`: Traditional passphrase-protected unlocker
- `pgp`: Uses an existing GPG key for encryption/decryption
- `keychain`: macOS Keychain integration (macOS only)
- `secure-enclave`: Hardware-backed Secure Enclave protection (macOS only)
**Options:**
@@ -251,14 +243,6 @@ that the vault then opens only with its mnemonic (see
[Confirmation Before Removal](#confirmation-before-removal)). An unlocker
directory that `secret unlocker list` skips with a warning, because its metadata
cannot be read or parsed, is removed by the directory name the warning gives.
Removing the current unlocker makes the first of the vault's other unlockers
that `secret unlocker select` accepts, in the order `secret unlocker list` shows
them, the current one, and says which; when there is none, the vault is left
without a current unlocker. `secret unlocker select` refuses an unlocker whose
type is not `passphrase` or `pgp`. When `current-unlocker` names an unlocker
that does not exist and the vault has another that `secret unlocker select`
accepts, opening the vault fails with an error that says to select one with
`secret unlocker select`.
- `--force, -f`: Remove without asking, even the last unlocker
- **CRITICAL WARNING**: Without unlockers and without your mnemonic phrase,
@@ -361,6 +345,21 @@ Unlockers provide different authentication methods to access the long-term keys:
- Leverages existing key management workflows
- Strong authentication through GPG
3. **Keychain Unlockers** (macOS only):
- Stores unlock keys in macOS Keychain
- Kept on this Mac only: the keychain item is never synced to other devices
- Automatic unlocking when Keychain is unlocked
- Cross-application integration
4. **Secure Enclave Unlockers** (macOS):
- Hardware-backed key storage using Apple Secure Enclave
- Uses `sc_auth` / CryptoTokenKit for SE key management (no Apple Developer
Program required)
- ECIES encryption: the vault long-term key is encrypted directly to the SE
key, and only the SE can decrypt it
- The SE key cannot leave this Mac; using it asks for no Touch ID or
password
Each vault maintains its own set of unlockers and one long-term key. The
long-term key is encrypted to each unlocker, allowing any authorized unlocker to
access vault secrets.
@@ -390,11 +389,6 @@ which every command except `secret vault import` offers when the variable is not
set, is the safer default; `secret vault import` has no prompt and needs both
variables.
The prompt asks on the terminal the command runs in, not on stdin, so it also
asks when stdin is a pipe, as in `echo value | secret add name --force` or
`cat file | secret encrypt key`. With no controlling terminal, as under cron or
in a CI job, the command fails and names the variable to set.
## Security Features
### Encryption
@@ -418,6 +412,9 @@ in a CI job, the command fails and names the variable to set.
### Hardware Integration
- Hardware token support via PGP/GPG integration
- macOS Keychain integration for system-level security
- Secure Enclave integration for hardware-backed key protection (macOS, via
`sc_auth` / CryptoTokenKit)
## Examples
@@ -471,6 +468,8 @@ secret vault remove personal --force
# Add multiple unlock methods
secret unlocker add passphrase # Password-based
secret unlocker add pgp --keyid ABCD1234 # GPG key
secret unlocker add keychain # macOS Keychain (macOS only)
secret unlocker add secure-enclave # macOS Secure Enclave (macOS only)
# List unlockers
secret unlocker list
@@ -539,8 +538,12 @@ secret decrypt encryption/mykey --input document.txt.age --output document.txt
### Cross-Platform Support
- **macOS**: Full support
- **Linux**: Full support
- **macOS**: Full support including Keychain and Secure Enclave integration
- **Linux**: Full support (excluding macOS-specific features)
The keychain and Secure Enclave unlockers need a macOS build with cgo. A macOS
build without cgo, such as one cross-compiled from Linux, offers them but fails
to add or use them.
## Security Considerations
@@ -553,7 +556,7 @@ secret decrypt encryption/mykey --input document.txt.age --output document.txt
### Best Practices
1. Use strong, unique passphrases for unlockers
2. Enable hardware authentication (hardware tokens) when available
2. Enable hardware authentication (Keychain, hardware tokens) when available
3. Regularly audit unlockers and remove unused ones
4. Keep mnemonic phrases securely backed up offline
5. Use separate vaults for different security contexts
@@ -562,6 +565,7 @@ secret decrypt encryption/mykey --input document.txt.age --output document.txt
- Requires access to unlockers for secret retrieval
- Mnemonic phrases must be securely stored and backed up
- Hardware features limited to supported platforms
## Development
@@ -589,10 +593,8 @@ standard: normalized scripts in `script/` are the entrypoints for the
development workflow, and the Makefile targets are thin shims that call them. We
provide:
- `script/bootstrap` — install all dependencies (Go, Go module download, and
node, yarn and prettier for formatting markdown), idempotently; prettier is
pinned by hash in `package.json` and `yarn.lock`; golangci-lint is not
installed, it runs in docker
- `script/bootstrap` — install all dependencies (Go, Go module download),
idempotently; golangci-lint is not installed, it runs in docker
- `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development: runs
`script/bootstrap`, then `script/install-precommit`
- `script/projectname` — output the project name (`secret`); used by other
@@ -600,21 +602,24 @@ provide:
- `script/build` — build the `secret` binary into the repo root, stamping the
version (`VERSION` from the environment, else `git describe`) and the git
commit
- `script/test` — build the `test` phase of the `Dockerfile`, which runs the
test suite with the race detector, a 90-second timeout and coverage; on
failure it reruns the tests verbosely for the details and fails even when the
rerun passes
- `script/lint` — build the `lint` phase of the `Dockerfile`, which runs
`go vet` and `golangci-lint`, then both again on the code as a macOS build
compiles it (`GOOS=darwin`, with cgo off), which a Linux build never compiles
- `script/fmt` — format all Go code with `go fmt` and every markdown file with
prettier (4-space tabs, `proseWrap: always`) (writes)
- `script/fmt-check` — check the same formatting without writing, on the host
- `script/check` — run `script/test`, `script/lint` and `script/fmt-check`
- `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged with the project name; the
build runs the `lint` and `test` phases first
- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: runs `script/bootstrap`, `script/check`,
then builds the image as `script/docker` does
- `script/test` — run `go vet` and the test suite (verbose rerun on failure)
- `script/lint` — run `golangci-lint` in docker only: builds `Dockerfile.lint`,
where the linter is a build step that runs on every call, also on an unchanged
tree
- `script/lint-darwin` — run `go vet` and `golangci-lint` in docker on the code
as a macOS build compiles it (`GOOS=darwin`), which a Linux build never
compiles; cgo is off, so the keychain unlocker's calls into the keychain
(`internal/secret/keychainunlocker_cgo.go`, and `keychainunlocker_test.go`)
and the Secure Enclave bindings (`internal/macse`) are not checked
- `script/fmt` — format all Go code (writes)
- `script/fmt-check` — check formatting without writing
- `script/check` — run `script/test`, `script/lint`, `script/lint-darwin`, and
`script/fmt-check`
- `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged with the project name
- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: `docker build --ulimit memlock=-1:-1 .`
(memguard needs mlock; the Dockerfile runs the checks), with a new
`CHECK_EPOCH` build argument on every run so the checks run again on an
unchanged tree
- `script/precommit` — pre-commit checks: `go mod tidy` verification, then
`script/check`
- `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook that runs
@@ -622,7 +627,8 @@ provide:
## Features
- **Multiple Authentication Methods**: Supports passphrase and PGP unlockers
- **Multiple Authentication Methods**: Supports passphrase, PGP, macOS Keychain,
and Secure Enclave unlockers
- **Vault Isolation**: Complete separation between different vaults
- **Per-Secret Encryption**: Each secret has its own encryption key
- **BIP39 Mnemonic Support**: Keyless operation using mnemonic phrases
+84 -355
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Repository Policies
last_modified: 2026-10-04
last_modified: 2026-07-06
---
This document covers repository structure, tooling, and workflow standards. Code
@@ -60,28 +60,17 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
prerequisite since nvm requires bash. yarn is then pinned via
`corepack prepare yarn@<version> --activate`. Never install "latest" or "lts";
always exact versions. `script/cibuild` runs the CI build: it changes to the
repo root, runs `script/bootstrap`, runs `script/check`, and builds the image
with the version; the Gitea workflow calls it. **`script/cibuild` runs
`script/bootstrap` first**, because the workflow checks out the repo and runs
nothing else, while `script/fmt-check` runs the formatter on the host: on a
pristine checkout with nothing installed the run dies there, after the
containerised gates have passed. **The bootstrap alone is not enough**:
`script/bootstrap` installs node and yarn under nvm and leaves neither on the
`PATH` of the shell that called it, so a bare `yarn` still exits 127. The host
entrypoints that need yarn — `script/fmt` and `script/fmt-check` — therefore
source nvm for the pinned node version before invoking it, exactly as
`script/bootstrap`'s own install step does. A runner carrying nothing but
docker and git then gets through `script/check`. Four further scripts are our
own extensions to the standard: `script/check` runs `script/test`,
`script/lint` and `script/fmt-check`; `script/precommit` is what the git
pre-commit hook runs, and it calls `script/check`; `script/install-precommit`
installs the git pre-commit hook (the `make hooks` target shims to it); and
`script/projectname` (literally that filename) simply outputs the project's
name. Scripts that need the name call `script/projectname` — e.g.
`script/docker` assembles its image tag from it — so those scripts stay
byte-identical across all repos. Repo-type-specific pre-commit extras (e.g.
`go mod tidy` verification in Go repos) belong in `script/precommit`, not in
the hook itself. Model scripts are at
repo root and runs `docker build .`; the Gitea workflow calls it. Four further
scripts are our own extensions to the standard: `script/check` runs
`script/test`, `script/lint`, and `script/fmt-check`; `script/precommit` is
what the git pre-commit hook runs, and it calls `script/check`;
`script/install-precommit` installs the git pre-commit hook (the `make hooks`
target shims to it); and `script/projectname` (literally that filename) simply
outputs the project's name. Scripts that need the name call
`script/projectname` — e.g. `script/docker` assembles its image tag from it —
so those scripts stay byte-identical across all repos. Repo-type-specific
pre-commit extras (e.g. `go mod tidy` verification in Go repos) belong in
`script/precommit`, not in the hook itself. Model scripts are at
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/script/<name>`. The README
must document the provided scripts in an **Entrypoints** section (see the
README requirements below).
@@ -100,198 +89,87 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
contributor should be able to understand the entire development workflow by
reading the Makefile.
- Every repo should have a `Dockerfile`, and it carries the repo's gates: a
`lint` phase and a `test` phase, with the final stage depending on both so the
image cannot be built unless they pass. For non-server repos the final stage
brings up a development environment; for server repos it is the runtime image.
The gate phases and the build stage start from their pinned base images and
install what those images lack either inline, as the canonical Go `Dockerfile`
below does for `git`, or by running `script/bootstrap`, as the `prompts`
repo's own `Dockerfile` does for its yarn packages. The development
environment stage installs development prerequisites by running
`script/bootstrap` rather than duplicating its installs inline. A stage that
runs `script/bootstrap` COPYs `script/` and the dependency manifests
(`package.json` + `yarn.lock`, `go.mod` + `go.sum`, etc.) before running it.
- Every repo should have a `Dockerfile`. All Dockerfiles must run `make check`
as a build step so the build fails if the branch is not green. For non-server
repos, the Dockerfile should bring up a development environment and run
`make check`. For server repos, `make check` should run as an early build
stage before the final image is assembled. Dockerfiles install development
prerequisites by running `script/bootstrap` rather than duplicating installs
inline; COPY `script/` and the dependency manifests (`package.json` +
`yarn.lock`, `go.mod` + `go.sum`, etc.) before running it so the bootstrap
layer stays cached until dependencies change.
- **Linting and testing run in Docker, as phases of the `Dockerfile`.** There is
no separate lint file. `script/lint` and `script/test` each build one phase
and nothing else:
- **Dockerfiles must use a separate lint stage for fail-fast feedback.** Go
repos use a multistage build where linting runs in an independent stage based
on the `golangci/golangci-lint` image (pinned by hash). This stage runs
`make fmt-check` and `make lint` before the full build begins. The build stage
then declares an explicit dependency on the lint stage via
`COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null`, which forces BuildKit to complete
linting before proceeding to compilation and tests. This ensures lint failures
surface in seconds rather than minutes, without blocking on dependency
download or compilation in the build stage.
```sh
docker build --no-cache --target lint -t "$(script/projectname)-lint" .
docker build --no-cache --target test -t "$(script/projectname)-test" .
```
**A stage that is not the last one in the file is built only when the final
stage's chain depends on it, or when `--target` names it.** That is why the
two gates are always invoked by name here, and why the final stage carries a
`COPY --from=` of a harmless file from each of them: without that edge a
plain `docker build .` builds the last stage alone and exits 0 having linted
and tested nothing.
**Every `docker build` in `script/` is tagged**, here and in
`script/cibuild` and `script/docker`. An untagged build leaves a dangling
image behind on every invocation, on every developer host and every CI
runner; a tagged one replaces the previous image.
Inside a phase the tool is invoked directly — `golangci-lint`, `go test`,
`eslint`, `prettier` — never through `make lint` or `script/test`, which are
themselves a `docker build` and would recurse into a daemon that does not
exist in a build step. Formatting is the exception and stays on the host:
`script/fmt` writes the working tree, and `script/fmt-check` is its
read-only twin.
**No lint verdict may come from a host invocation of the linter.** On a
shared host golangci-lint reads a result cache keyed on file content rather
than location, so a second checkout of the same content is served the first
one's findings, and a host-global lock in `$TMPDIR` makes concurrent runs
exit non-zero with `parallel golangci-lint is running` — a status a caller
cannot tell from real findings. Both have produced wrong verdicts in this
org, in both directions. A container has its own cache, its own `TMPDIR` and
a digest-pinned binary, so neither is reachable.
- **Any build that runs checks is built with `--no-cache`.** Docker invalidates
a `COPY` layer only when the copied content changes, so on an unchanged tree
the check `RUN` is served from cache, nothing executes, and the build still
exits 0. Every `docker build` in `script/` therefore passes `--no-cache`:
`script/lint`, `script/test`, `script/cibuild` and `script/docker` are the
four, and there is no fifth — `script/check` runs the two gate phases and
`script/fmt-check`, and builds no image of its own. A bare `docker build .` is
not evidence that anything ran: a sub-second build reporting success is a
cache hit, not a result. Never invalidate by pruning — `docker builder prune`
and friends destroy a build cache shared with every other build on the host.
When a check is added or changed, prove it works by planting a defect it must
catch and watching the run fail on it, then revert the defect. A green run
alone shows neither that the check ran nor that it covers what it should.
- **The gate phases are separate stages, and the build stage depends on both.**
The lint phase is based on the `golangci/golangci-lint` image (pinned by
hash), so lint failures surface in seconds rather than after a full compile,
and the test phase is based on the Debian Go image. The canonical Go repo
`Dockerfile`:
The standard pattern for a Go repo Dockerfile is:
```dockerfile
# Lint phase
# Lint stage — fast feedback on formatting and lint issues
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.x.x, YYYY-MM-DD
FROM golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:... AS lint
WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
RUN golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
RUN make fmt-check
RUN make lint
# Test phase. -race needs cgo and so a C compiler, which the Debian Go
# image ships and the alpine one does not.
# golang:1.x, YYYY-MM-DD
FROM golang@sha256:... AS test
WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
RUN go test -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
go test -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
# Build stage. Nothing is wanted from either phase above; the copies
# are what make BuildKit build them first, so this stage cannot run
# unless lint and test passed.
# Build stage
# golang:1.x-alpine, YYYY-MM-DD
FROM golang@sha256:... AS builder
COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
COPY --from=test /src/go.sum /dev/null
RUN apk add --no-cache git
# A tar-stream context keeps the sender's file owners, which git refuses.
RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /src
WORKDIR /src
# Force BuildKit to run the lint stage before proceeding
COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
RUN make test
# The VERSION build arg when one is given, otherwise
# `git describe --tags --always` on the .git in the build context. With
# .git present, a version that is still empty, dev or unknown fails the
# build: git is missing or could not read the checkout.
ARG VERSION
RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
if [ -e .git ]; then \
case "$VERSION" in ""|dev|unknown) \
echo "version is '$VERSION' although .git is present" >&2; \
exit 1 ;; \
esac; \
fi; \
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-o /app ./cmd/app/
ARG VERSION=dev
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-o /app ./cmd/app/
# Runtime stage, and the last one
# Runtime stage
FROM alpine@sha256:...
COPY --from=builder /app /usr/local/bin/app
ENTRYPOINT ["app"]
```
Key points:
- The lint phase uses the `golangci/golangci-lint` image directly (it has
both Go and the linter), so nothing needs installing.
- `COPY --from=<phase> /src/go.sum /dev/null` is a no-op copy whose only
purpose is the ordering edge. BuildKit runs stages in parallel by default,
and a stage nothing depends on is not built at all, so without these two
lines a red gate would not fail the build.
- Keep the runtime stage last, and if you add a stage after it, give it the
same two copies. A plain `docker build .` builds the last stage's chain
and nothing else.
- The lint stage uses the `golangci/golangci-lint` image directly (it
includes both Go and the linter), so there is no need to install the
linter separately.
- `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null` is a no-op file copy that creates
a stage dependency. BuildKit runs stages in parallel by default; without
this line, the build stage would not wait for lint to finish and a lint
failure might not fail the overall build.
- If the project uses `//go:embed` directives that reference build artifacts
(e.g. a web frontend compiled in a separate stage), the lint phase must
(e.g. a web frontend compiled in a separate stage), the lint stage must
create placeholder files so the embed directives resolve. Example:
`RUN mkdir -p web/dist && touch web/dist/index.html web/dist/style.css`.
- If the project requires CGO or system libraries for linting, install them
in the lint phase. The `golangci/golangci-lint` image is Debian-based and
has no `apk`, so install with `apt-get` under the Debian package name
(`libvips-dev`, where alpine says `vips-dev`), and delete the package
lists in the same `RUN`, so the layer does not keep them:
```dockerfile
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libvips-dev \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
```
- `.dockerignore` lets `.git` into the build context. It keeps out every git
`config` at any depth (`**/.git/config`, `**/.git/modules/**/config`): the
repository's own, each submodule's under `.git/modules/`, and that of a
submodule keeping its own `.git` directory. `git describe` does not need
them, and each can hold a credential: a password in a remote URL, or the
token the CI checkout step stores there. A submodule whose name has a
`config` segment (`config`, `deploy/config`, `config/lib`) loses its whole
git directory to `**/.git/modules/**/config`, and Go's version stamping
then fails the build: give it a name without that segment
(`git submodule add --name`). The stage that compiles has `git` (the
Debian Go image has it; an alpine one needs `apk add --no-cache git`) and
takes the version from the `VERSION` build argument when one is given,
otherwise from `git describe --tags --always`. That gives the tag on a
tagged commit; on a later commit, the tag, the number of commits since it
and the short commit (`v1.2.3-4-gabc1234`); and the short commit when no
tag is reachable. The stage that compiles also marks its working directory
safe for git (`git config --system --add safe.directory /src`): a context
sent as a tar stream keeps the sender's file owners, and git refuses a
checkout owned by another user, so the version would come out empty.
`ARG VERSION` has no default, and the build fails if the context carries
`.git` and the version still comes out empty, `dev` or `unknown`. A plain
`docker build .` with no build arguments must succeed; a Dockerfile that
refuses an empty build argument drops that refusal and keeps the argument.
The lint stage should not depend on the actual build output — it exists to
fail fast.
- If the project requires CGO or system libraries for linting (e.g.
`vips-dev`), install them in the lint stage with `apk add`.
- The build stage runs `make test` after compilation setup. Tests run in the
build stage, not the lint stage, because they may require compiled
artifacts or heavier dependencies.
- Every repo should have a Gitea Actions workflow (`.gitea/workflows/`) that
runs `script/cibuild` on push, and checks out the repo as its only other step.
That script bootstraps, runs the gate phases, and then builds the image, so a
successful run means every check passed; a bare `docker build .` does not
carry the same guarantee, because its gate phases may come from the cache. The
image build is uncached and so runs the gate phases a second time. That is the
price of the rule above, and it is worth paying: the image that ships is built
from a run of its own gates rather than from a cache entry. A separate
workflow limited to `main` by a `branches` list under `on: push` cannot be
checked by review: to try a change to it, add the feature branch to that list
and push, then remove the branch from the list again before merging. Keep any
job in it that publishes behind `if: github.ref_name == 'main'`, so the run
from the feature branch publishes nothing.
runs `script/cibuild` (which runs `docker build .`) on push. Since the
Dockerfile already runs `make check`, a successful build implies all checks
pass.
- Use platform-standard formatters: `black` for Python, `prettier` for
JS/CSS/Markdown/HTML, `go fmt` for Go. Always use default configuration with
@@ -311,21 +189,14 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
module under test to verify it compiles/parses. There is no excuse for
`make test` to be a no-op.
- `make test` must complete in under 60 seconds. That is the hard cap, and a
suite that exceeds it fails. Under 20 seconds is the target. A suite between
20 and 60 seconds is still green, but the overage must be filed as an
improvement bug against that repo. Add a 90-second timeout to the test
invocation (`go test -timeout 90s`). The backstop deliberately sits above the
hard cap so that it catches a genuinely hung test rather than a merely slow
one.
- `make test` must complete in under 20 seconds. Add a 30-second timeout in the
Makefile.
- **The test command should use the conditional verbose rerun pattern.** Run
tests without `-v` (verbose) first. If tests fail, automatically rerun with
`-v` to show full output. This keeps CI logs and `docker build` output clean
on success (just package/suite summaries) while providing full diagnostic
detail on failure (every test case, every assertion). The command lives in the
`test` phase of the `Dockerfile`, since `script/test` builds that phase; the
Makefile form below is the same pattern for any repo-local invocation:
- **`make test` should use the conditional verbose rerun pattern.** Run tests
without `-v` (verbose) first. If tests fail, automatically rerun with `-v` to
show full output. This keeps CI logs and `docker build` output clean on
success (just package/suite summaries) while providing full diagnostic detail
on failure (every test case, every assertion). The general shell pattern:
```makefile
test:
@@ -338,26 +209,11 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
```makefile
test:
@go test -count=1 -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
@go test -timeout 30s -race -cover ./... || \
{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
go test -count=1 -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
go test -timeout 30s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
```
`-count=1` is required on both invocations: it defeats Go's test _result_
cache, so neither run can report a stored pass in place of running the
tests. It leaves the build cache alone, so it costs the runtime of the suite
and no recompilation.
That cache is Go's own, separate from Docker's layer cache. Go stores a
passing result in its cache directory (`GOCACHE`), and when the same tests
run again on unchanged code it prints that result, marked `(cached)`,
without running them. That matters on a developer's machine, where this
target runs and the directory lasts from one run to the next. The `test`
phase of the `Dockerfile` needs no `-count=1`: its base image holds no
result for this repo's tests and nothing before its `go test` step runs a
test, so there is nothing to replay. `--no-cache` (above) is what makes that
step run on an unchanged tree.
Python example:
```makefile
@@ -383,84 +239,10 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
must be in `.gitignore`. No exceptions.
- `.gitignore` should be comprehensive from the start: OS files (`.DS_Store`),
editor files (`.swp`, `*~`), in-repo agent scratch directories (`.claude/`),
language build artifacts, and `node_modules/`. Fetch the standard `.gitignore`
from `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.gitignore` when
setting up a new repo. These patterns are written to `.gitignore`'s own
semantics, in which an unanchored pattern already matches at every depth; they
are not a `.dockerignore` and must not be transplanted into one unmodified.
- **`.dockerignore` does not use `.gitignore` semantics, and copying patterns
across unmodified leaves secrets in the build context.** Docker matches with
`moby/patternmatcher`: `filepath.Match` semantics plus a `**` extension, so
`*` does not cross `/` and a pattern without a leading `**/` is anchored at
the build-context root. A `.dockerignore` listing `.env`, `*.pem` and `*.key`
therefore excludes only the copies at the repository root, while `config/.env`
and `certs/server.key` still reach the context and can land in an image layer
— which is more dangerous than a short file with no secret patterns at all,
because it reads as solved and stops anyone looking. Give every
depth-independent pattern the `**/` prefix and leave only genuinely
root-anchored entries unprefixed: `.claude`, and the repo's own host-built
binary, written `/myapp` and never `**/myapp`, which would also match
`cmd/myapp/` and delete the package directory from the context. Matching is
case-sensitive, and an ALL-CAPS twin per pattern still misses `Server.Key`, so
secret names use character ranges — `**/*.[kK][eE][yY]`, `**/*.[pP][eE][mM]`,
and likewise for `.envrc` and the extensionless SSH keys. Where such a pattern
also catches something the build needs, re-include it with a negation
(`!docs/example.env`); deleting the pattern reopens the exposure for every
other file it covers. Fetch the standard `.dockerignore` from
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.dockerignore` and extend
it with the repo's own artifacts.
- **In-repo agent scratch belongs in both files, written to each file's own
semantics.** `.claude/` holds one worktree per in-flight agent — an entire
additional checkout of the repo — so under `COPY . .` the build context
inflates by a multiple of the repo and another session's unreviewed work can
be copied into an image layer. In `.gitignore` the entry is `.claude/`,
unanchored. In `.dockerignore` it is `.claude`, anchored and with **no** `**/`
prefix, because the prefixed form would also delete any nested directory of
that name from the build. Anchoring carries a known gap that the canonical
`.dockerignore` states in its own comment, since consuming repos receive the
file and not the tracker: the directory is created in the agent's working
directory, so a repo running agents in subdirectories still ships
`services/api/.claude/` and must add its own anchored entry there.
- **A plain `docker build .` of a clone stamps the version that
`git describe --tags --always` gives**, derived from the `.git` in the build
context as the canonical `Dockerfile` above shows. Without its failure check,
a missing `git` or an unreadable checkout would leave `-X main.Version=` empty
and the build would still exit 0. `script/docker` and `script/cibuild` pass
the version they compute on the host; it takes precedence. They do this
byte-identically across repos:
```sh
# Own line: a failing command substitution inside an argument does not
# trip `set -e`, so the inline form degrades to an empty constant.
version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
docker build --no-cache \
--build-arg VERSION="$version" \
-t "$(script/projectname)" .
```
`--always` makes an untagged repo yield an abbreviated commit hash rather
than failing, and the `[ -n "$version" ]` line is the single place the
fallback is applied — a live check that fires on a build from an export with
no `.git` and on a repository with no commits yet. Do not fold it into the
substitution as `|| echo unknown`, which makes the guard unreachable. The
Dockerfile's side is `ARG VERSION` in the stage that compiles, declared
there because `ARG` is stage-scoped; passing `VERSION` to a repo whose
Dockerfile declares no such `ARG` is ignored and costs nothing, which is why
the scripts stay byte-identical. One consequence for CI: the standard
checkout action clones shallow and fetches no tags, so a repo that embeds a
tag-derived version must set `fetch-depth: 0` on its checkout step.
- **Verify `.dockerignore` by enumerating the image, not by reading the
patterns.** Plant files at the root _and_ at least two directories deep, build
a probe image that does `COPY . .`, and list what actually landed
(`docker run --rm --entrypoint find IMAGE /app`). The `transferring context`
size is not a substitute: a nested secret is a few bytes, and BuildKit
transfers only the delta from the previous build.
editor files (`.swp`, `*~`), language build artifacts, and `node_modules/`.
Fetch the standard `.gitignore` from
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.gitignore` when setting up
a new repo.
- **No build artifacts in version control.** Code-derived data (compiled
bundles, minified output, generated assets) must never be committed to the
@@ -476,56 +258,9 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
- Make all changes on a feature branch. You can do whatever you want on a
feature branch.
- `.golangci.yml` is standardized. The vendored copy in a consuming repo must
_NEVER_ be modified by an agent: fetch it from
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.golangci.yml` and keep it
byte-identical, so that no repo can quietly loosen its own linting. Linter
configuration changes are made to the canonical copy in the `prompts` repo and
reach consuming repos by re-vendoring; an agent may open a PR against
canonical, which only the user merges. One list is exempt from byte-identity,
because it cannot be written once for every repo: the `deny` list of the
`test-support` depguard rule, where a repo names its own test-support packages
by full import path. A repo adds entries there and changes nothing else, and a
re-vendor carries its entries forward. The canonical golangci-lint version is
v2.14.0 (released 2026-09-24), pinned as the digest of the lint phase's base
image
(`golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:ad862ba6b3798cbe0fd9fd7408d498fd74fbd2623a92406b2fd3898faf0bf98f`,
which reports `2.14.0 built with go1.27.0 from 114493f9`). A module's `go`
directive must not name a newer Go minor version than the one golangci-lint
was built with, or golangci-lint refuses to lint it: this release lints
`go 1.27.1` but not `go 1.28`. That digest is the only pin, since no repo
installs golangci-lint on the host. A repo sets the lint phase digest to the
one named here and re-vendors `.golangci.yml` in the same commit, whichever of
the two prompted the change: the canonical copy can name linters that an older
golangci-lint rejects, and a newer golangci-lint can add linters that
`default: all` switches on until the canonical copy disables them.
- **`script/bootstrap` installs a pinned tool by comparing versions, never by
testing presence.** An `if ! command -v <tool>; then install; fi` guard tests
`PATH` only, so on an already-provisioned machine the pin is inert and a
version bump is a silent no-op — while the Dockerfile, installing into a clean
image, gets the pinned version, so a local `make check` and `make docker` can
disagree about what the tool even is. The canonical form:
- compares the installed version against the pin over the **whole** version
token; a parser that stops at the first `-` reports `2.12.2` for a host
running `2.12.2-rc1` and skips the install;
- treats absent, non-zero, empty or unrecognised `--version` output as a
mismatch, so the failure direction is a redundant install and never a
skipped one;
- after installing, re-resolves the binary the way callers do — `hash -r`,
then through `PATH`, not through the directory the installer wrote to —
and fails naming the resolved path, since an install that a shadowing
binary hides succeeds while changing nothing any caller sees;
- is actually called, and prints the version on both success paths: a
function defined and never invoked has the same exit status and the same
empty output as one that worked.
Keep it POSIX sh: no arrays, no `[[`, no `grep -P`.
A Go tool a repo needs on the host is installed with `go install` pinned to
a commit hash (`go install <package>@<commit hash>`). It is never tracked as
a `go.mod` tool dependency or through a `tools.go` file, either of which
pulls the tool's own dependencies into the repo's `go.mod` and `go.sum`.
- `.golangci.yml` is standardized and must _NEVER_ be modified by an agent, only
manually by the user. Fetch from
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.golangci.yml`.
- When pinning images or packages by hash, add a comment above the reference
with the version and date (YYYY-MM-DD).
@@ -639,14 +374,12 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
settings.
- Avoid putting files in the repo root unless necessary. Root should contain
only project-level config files (`README.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `Makefile`,
`Dockerfile`, `LICENSE`, `.gitignore`, `.editorconfig`, `REPO_POLICIES.md`,
and language-specific config). Everything else goes in a subdirectory.
Canonical subdirectory names:
only project-level config files (`README.md`, `Makefile`, `Dockerfile`,
`LICENSE`, `.gitignore`, `.editorconfig`, `REPO_POLICIES.md`, and
language-specific config). Everything else goes in a subdirectory. Canonical
subdirectory names:
- `bin/` — executable scripts and tools
- `cmd/` — Go command entrypoints; thin only: one `main.go` per binary whose
body is a single call into `internal/` or `pkg/`, no project logic in
`cmd/`
- `cmd/` — Go command entrypoints
- `configs/` — configuration templates and examples
- `deploy/` — deployment manifests (k8s, compose, terraform)
- `docs/` — documentation and markdown (README.md stays in root)
@@ -673,7 +406,3 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
- Go: `go.mod`, `go.sum`, `.golangci.yml`
- JS: `package.json`, `yarn.lock`, `.prettierrc`, `.prettierignore`
- Python: `pyproject.toml`
- Guidance for coding agents lives in one `AGENTS.md` at the repository root. It
is never committed under a file or directory named after one agent tool, such
as `CLAUDE.md` or `.claude/`, and never split into separate memory files.
+386 -518
View File
@@ -18,582 +18,450 @@ https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/milestone/12
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-14: A wrong passphrase, from `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE` or typed at the
prompt, gives the error `wrong passphrase for unlocker <id>`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/157). It used to be age's "no
identity matched any of the recipients", followed by advice to give the vault
a new unlocker from its mnemonic, which would have replaced an unlocker that
works. The error now wraps `secret.ErrWrongPassphrase` and carries no advice
to use the mnemonic. A `priv.age` that is not an age file still gets that
advice.
- 2026-10-14: The passphrase and mnemonic prompts ask on the controlling
terminal (`/dev/tty`) instead of stdin, so `echo v | secret add s1 --force`,
`cat file | secret encrypt key` and `cat file.age | secret decrypt key` ask
for the passphrase at a terminal instead of failing
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/144). Only a process with no
controlling terminal gets the error that names the variable to set. On SIGINT
or SIGTERM, `Entry()` restores the settings of that terminal, not of stdin,
since that is where the prompt turns echo off. `secret init` and
`secret vault create` no longer write a newline to stderr after the mnemonic
is typed, since the prompt ends that line on the terminal.
- 2026-10-14: `secret generate mnemonic`, `secret vault list` and
`secret unlocker list` print their output to stdout, as `secret list` does, so
it can be piped or captured (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/138).
They printed with cobra's `cmd.Println` and `cmd.Printf`, which write to
stderr when no output writer is set, so `secret vault list --json | jq`
received nothing. "No versions found" from `secret version list` moved to
stdout too. Messages such as "Created vault", and the warning after the
mnemonic, stay on stderr.
- 2026-10-14: Removing the current unlocker no longer leaves the vault unable to
open through the unlockers it still has
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/137). `current-unlocker` went on
naming the removed unlocker, so every command that opened the vault failed,
with advice to use the mnemonic. `secret unlocker remove` of the current
unlocker now makes the first of the vault's other unlockers that
`secret unlocker select` accepts, in the order `secret unlocker list` shows,
current before removing it, and says so; when there is none, it also removes
`current-unlocker`. `vault.RemoveUnlocker` returns the ID of the unlocker it
made current. When `current-unlocker` names an unlocker that does not exist
and the vault has another that `secret unlocker select` accepts, the error
wraps `vault.ErrUnlockerNotFound` and says to run `secret unlocker select`,
without the advice to use the mnemonic.
- 2026-10-14: A `secret add --force` that cannot unlock the vault, given a wrong
passphrase or mnemonic, leaves the secret as it was
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/136). The new version used to be
written before the vault was unlocked to set `notAfter` on the version it
replaces, so each failed add left one more version that `secret version list`
showed. The vault is now unlocked, and that version's metadata read, before
anything is written. `generate secret --force` and `import --force` take the
same path.
- 2026-10-12: A mnemonic typed with extra spaces, tabs or line breaks gives the
same long-term key as its words separated by single spaces
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/135). The key was derived from the
text exactly as typed, so a vault made with a double or trailing space did not
open with the same words typed normally. `agehd.DeriveEntropy`, which every
use of the mnemonic goes through, now joins the words with single spaces and
puts them in Unicode NFKD, as BIP39 defines, before making the seed.
- 2026-10-12: The keychain and Secure Enclave unlockers are gone from the code
and the documents (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/132). They were
research: neither works without macOS code signing and entitlements, which
`secret` does not have. The last commit that has them is `ef0ae90`, tagged
`v1.0.0-rc1`. `secret unlocker add` takes only `passphrase` and `pgp` on every
platform, `internal/macse` and those unlockers' files in `internal/secret` are
deleted, and `github.com/keybase/go-keychain` left `go.mod` and `go.sum`.
`secret` still builds and runs on macOS.
- 2026-10-07: The part of `github.com/tyler-smith/go-bip39` v1.1.0 that `secret`
uses is copied into `internal/bip39`, with upstream's `LICENSE` beside it,
because its repository no longer exists
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/122). Every import moved there, and
the module left `go.mod` and `go.sum`. No derived key or mnemonic changes.
- 2026-10-07: The canonical files are re-vendored from `sneak/prompts` commit
`dd4027b` (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/121), with golangci-lint
v2.14.0 in the lint phase. Lint and test are phases of the `Dockerfile`, and
`script/lint` and `script/test` each build one with `--no-cache`;
`Dockerfile.lint` and `script/lint-darwin` are gone, and the lint phase runs
`go vet` and checks the macOS build too. The tests run on the Debian Go image
with cgo and the race detector, with the policy's 90-second timeout.
`script/cibuild` bootstraps, runs `script/check` and builds the image;
`CHECK_EPOCH` and the memlock ulimit are gone. `--no-cache` starts Go's build
cache mount empty, so `make test` compiles everything on every run. The rules
in `CLAUDE.md` that `AGENTS.md` lacked are in `AGENTS.md`, and `CLAUDE.md` is
deleted.
- 2026-10-06: `script/test` runs the tests with the race detector, a 30-second
timeout per package and coverage, as `REPO_POLICIES.md` requires
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/32). When they fail, it reruns them
verbosely for the details and then fails anyway, so a test that fails once and
passes on the retry no longer gives a green build. `go vet` still runs first,
and every `go test` keeps `-count=1`. The tests that gave the `secret` binary
a minute now give it 10 seconds, and the PGP unlocker test's 30-second timer
is 10 seconds, so a test that hangs fails with its own message before the
package's 30-second timeout ends every test in it.
- 2026-10-06: `make test` in `script/cibuild` no longer compiles the standard
library and every dependency from nothing on every build
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/124). The `Dockerfile` runs it and
`make build` with Go's build cache in a BuildKit cache mount, which docker
keeps between builds, so each compiles only what changed since the last build.
The mount has an id of its own, so other repositories' builds do not share it.
`script/test` passes `-count=1`, so every test runs on every build and no
result comes from Go's test cache. A build with an empty cache, such as the
first after docker's build cache is cleared, compiles everything in
`make test` as before.
- 2026-10-06: `TestRemoveIgnoresTerminalOnStdout` and
`TestRemoveAsksAtTerminalOnStdin` no longer wait until Go's test timeout
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/126). On Linux, `pty.Open` of
`github.com/creack/pty` v1.1.24 passed the address of a local variable to the
`ioctl` system call as a plain number, through a function call; when Go moved
the goroutine's stack in between, the kernel wrote the terminal's number to
the old place, and `pty.Open` opened `/dev/pts/0` instead of the terminal it
had created. `secret rm` then wrote to that other terminal, and the test read
a terminal no program had open, which never ends. `go.mod` now requires the
commit on that library's main branch that passes a pointer instead; no release
has it yet. Both tests stop reading the terminal when their one-minute context
ends and fail saying so.
- 2026-10-06: The tests run quickly with the race detector on
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/120). Most of their time went to
deriving keys from passphrases with scrypt, which is slow on purpose. The new
`secret.ScryptWorkFactor`, when not zero, replaces age's scrypt work factor
when a passphrase encrypts; the tests of `internal/secret`, `internal/vault`
and `internal/cli` set it to 1 before any test runs, and the program never
sets it; `TestGetCommandOutputsToStdout` checks that the passphrase unlocker
the built binary's `secret init` writes names age's work factor, 18.
`TestRemovalAsksWithoutHoldingLock` and `TestFailedCommandReleasesLock` no
longer run in parallel with other tests: each waits at most 10 seconds for the
in-memory lock that every test in the package shares, and other tests'
commands held it longer. `TestConcurrentAddsKeepEveryVersion`, which times
nothing, and `TestGetCommandOutputsToStdout`, which no longer sets an
environment variable its commands do not read, now run in parallel. The
`script/cibuild` comment no longer says that tests are skipped without its
memlock ulimit.
- 2026-10-05: No test stores a secret larger than 1 MiB
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/52). The size tests for `secret add`,
`secret import` and the stdin buffer no longer try 2 MB, 10 MB, 99 MB, 100 MB
or 101 MB secrets, and nothing tests that a secret over the 100 MB limit is
rejected; the limit itself is unchanged. With nothing large left, the size
tests no longer skip a case for want of locked memory.
- 2026-10-05: The Go module path is `sneak.berlin/go/secret`, as
`REPO_POLICIES.md` requires, not `git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/43). Every import uses it, as do the
`-X` flags in `script/build` that stamp the version and commit shown by
`secret info`, and the examples in `pkg/agehd/README.md` and
`pkg/bip85/README.md`. `go mod tidy` now lists `github.com/dustin/go-humanize`
and `github.com/fatih/color`, which `internal/cli` imports, as direct
requirements. Code that imported the old path must switch to the new one.
- 2026-10-04: `make fmt` formats every markdown file with prettier (4-space
tabs, `proseWrap: always`) as well as the Go code, and `make fmt-check` checks
both, as the model scripts in the `prompts` repo do
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/110). Prettier is pinned by hash in
`package.json` and `yarn.lock`, and `script/bootstrap` installs node, yarn and
prettier. The `Dockerfile` lint stage copies node and yarn from a node image
pinned by hash and runs `script/bootstrap`, so its `make fmt-check` fails the
build on an unformatted markdown file. Every markdown file was formatted once,
wording unchanged.
- 2026-10-04: A mnemonic that cannot be read, in `secret init` and
`secret vault create`, gives an error that names the mnemonic only
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/115). It is read with
`secret.ReadMnemonic`, whose every error wraps the new
`secret.ErrMnemonicNotRead`; before, it was read with `ReadPassphrase`, so the
message said "failed to read mnemonic: failed to read passphrase:" and advised
setting `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE`. Without a terminal it now says "failed to read
mnemonic: stdin is not a terminal (piped input or script). Please set the
SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC environment variable or run interactively". The passphrase
messages no longer repeat "cannot read passphrase" after "failed to read
passphrase:", and empty input gives "nothing was entered".
- 2026-10-04: A failure returns the same error value whichever command hits it
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/113). `internal/cli` no longer keeps
its own copies of `vault.ErrSecretNotFound`, `ErrVaultNotFound`,
- 2026-10-04: A failure returns the same error value whichever command hits
it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/113). `internal/cli` no longer
keeps its own copies of `vault.ErrSecretNotFound`, `ErrVaultNotFound`,
`ErrVersionNotFound` and `ErrSecretExists`: `secret mv`, `rm`, `decrypt`,
`vault import`, `vault remove` and `version list`, `promote` and `rm` wrap the
`vault` errors. `errUnsupportedUnlockerType` is removed: `secret unlocker add`
gives `errInvalidUnlockerType` for an unknown type, whichever check rejects
it. Off macOS, adding a keychain or Secure Enclave unlocker returns the
`secret` package's error for it, not an `internal/cli` copy; on macOS, the
check that the system is macOS is gone, as it could never fail.
`vault import`, `vault remove` and `version list`, `promote` and `rm` wrap
the `vault` errors. `errUnsupportedUnlockerType` is removed: `secret
unlocker add` gives `errInvalidUnlockerType` for an unknown type, whichever
check rejects it. Off macOS, adding a keychain or Secure Enclave unlocker
returns the `secret` package's error for it, not an `internal/cli` copy; on
macOS, the check that the system is macOS is gone, as it could never fail.
`secret vault import` gives `errInvalidMnemonicPhrase` for an invalid
mnemonic, as `init` and `vault create` do. `secret generate secret` gives
`errLengthTooSmall` for a length below 1 wherever it is checked, and
`errUnsupportedSecretType` for `--type mnemonic` too. `secret import` of a
file over 100MB wraps `errSecretTooLarge`, as `secret add` returns it.
`vault.ErrNilValueBuffer` is replaced by `secret.ErrNilValueBuffer`, which
`secret` already returned under another name. Messages are unchanged, except
that `secret decrypt` of a missing secret says "not found", as `secret get`
does, not "does not exist"; `vault import` of an invalid mnemonic says
"invalid BIP39 mnemonic phrase"; `--type mnemonic` says "unsupported type:
mnemonic (use 'secret generate mnemonic' instead)"; and a file too large to
import says
`secret` already returned under another name. Messages are unchanged,
except that `secret decrypt` of a missing secret says "not found", as
`secret get` does, not "does not exist"; `vault import` of an invalid
mnemonic says "invalid BIP39 mnemonic phrase"; `--type mnemonic` says
"unsupported type: mnemonic (use 'secret generate mnemonic' instead)"; and
a file too large to import says
`failed to read secret from file <path>: secret too large: exceeds 100MB limit`.
Every error of `secret.ReadPassphrase` wraps `secret.ErrPassphraseNotRead`,
which supplies the words "failed to read passphrase" that its callers used to
add themselves; so two passphrases that differ now give only "passphrases do
not match", the words now follow "failed to read mnemonic:" and "failed to
read passphrase confirmation:", and a terminal read error no longer repeats
them. A GPG key the keyring does not hold gives `secret.ErrGPGKeyNotFound`,
found by gpg's status line for "No public key"; before, the message repeated
"failed to resolve GPG key fingerprint" and ended in gpg's exit status. The
keychain unlocker returns `errNilDataBuffer` for nil data; this and its test
build only on macOS with cgo and were only read. `bip85.ErrPasswordTooShort`
and `ErrEncodedTooShort` are removed with their checks: 64 bytes of entropy
always give 86 Base64 or 80 Base85 characters, the most a password length may
ask for. Tests that matched these errors' text use `errors.Is`.
- 2026-10-04: Tests check which error a failure returns with `errors.Is`, not by
matching words of its message (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/49).
Every exported error that can be returned has a test that the function returns
it, and errors wrapping a cause are checked through the wrapping. Checks that
still match text, because the error has no exported value the test can name,
are listed on the issue.
which supplies the words "failed to read passphrase" that its callers used
to add themselves; so two passphrases that differ now give only
"passphrases do not match", the words now follow "failed to read mnemonic:"
and "failed to read passphrase confirmation:", and a terminal read error no
longer repeats them. A GPG key the keyring does not hold gives
`secret.ErrGPGKeyNotFound`, found by gpg's status line for "No public key";
before, the message repeated "failed to resolve GPG key fingerprint" and
ended in gpg's exit status. The keychain unlocker returns `errNilDataBuffer`
for nil data; this and its test build only on macOS with cgo and were only
read. `bip85.ErrPasswordTooShort` and `ErrEncodedTooShort` are removed with
their checks: 64 bytes of entropy always give 86 Base64 or 80 Base85
characters, the most a password length may ask for. Tests that matched
these errors' text use `errors.Is`.
- 2026-10-04: Tests check which error a failure returns with `errors.Is`,
not by matching words of its message
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/49). Every exported error that
can be returned has a test that the function returns it, and errors
wrapping a cause are checked through the wrapping. Checks that still match
text, because the error has no exported value the test can name, are
listed on the issue.
- 2026-10-04: When a vault cannot be opened through its current unlocker,
because a file the unlocker needs is missing or damaged, its keychain item or
Secure Enclave key is gone, or the passphrase is wrong, the error now ends by
naming the vault, saying that it still opens with its mnemonic, and that
`secret unlocker add passphrase`, run with `SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC` set to it,
gives the vault a new unlocker; for a vault that is not the current one, as in
`secret move` between vaults, it says to run `secret vault select` first
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/47). Before, it ended with the bare
cause. The advice is given only when the vault metadata records the key the
mnemonic derives, so not for a vault created without a mnemonic, and not when
the passphrase could not be read at all. `secret vault import` is not named:
it refuses a vault that has a long-term key. `secret encrypt` and
`secret decrypt` now read the key secret through `vault.GetSecret`, as
`secret get` does, so they give the same advice; `Secret.GetValue`, the other
way to get the long-term key, is removed. When a secret's `current` file
cannot be read, the error says that `secret version list` lists its versions
and `secret version promote` makes one current. The causes stay wrapped.
- 2026-10-04: An unlocker's ID is the name of its directory in `unlockers.d`, so
no two unlockers of a vault share one
because a file the unlocker needs is missing or damaged, its keychain item
or Secure Enclave key is gone, or the passphrase is wrong, the error now
ends by naming the vault, saying that it still opens with its mnemonic,
and that `secret unlocker add passphrase`, run with `SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC`
set to it, gives the vault a new unlocker; for a vault that is not the
current one, as in `secret move` between vaults, it says to run
`secret vault select` first (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/47).
Before, it ended with the bare cause. The advice is given only when the
vault metadata records the key the mnemonic derives, so not for a vault
created without a mnemonic, and not when the passphrase could not be read
at all. `secret vault import` is not named: it refuses a vault that has a
long-term key. `secret encrypt` and `secret decrypt` now read the key
secret through `vault.GetSecret`, as `secret get` does, so they give the
same advice; `Secret.GetValue`, the other way to get the long-term key, is
removed. When a secret's `current` file cannot be read, the error says
that `secret version list` lists its versions and `secret version promote`
makes one current. The causes stay wrapped.
- 2026-10-04: An unlocker's ID is the name of its directory in `unlockers.d`,
so no two unlockers of a vault share one
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/98). Before, a keychain or Secure
Enclave unlocker's ID was its creation time to the minute and the host name,
and a passphrase unlocker's the time to the minute, so two created within a
minute shared an ID, and `unlocker select`, `unlocker remove` and the
selection `unlocker add` makes acted on the older one. A PGP unlocker's ID was
`pgp-` and its key's fingerprint; a second PGP unlocker for a key is still
refused, now by comparing the fingerprint in the other unlockers' metadata.
`unlocker list` and the shell completion of `unlocker select` and
`unlocker remove` take each ID from the directory the unlocker was read from,
no longer by matching metadata, so two unlockers with the same metadata are
listed apart; an unlocker of an unknown type is listed under its directory
name, and completion now offers Secure Enclave unlockers too. The keychain and
Secure Enclave code was type-checked by `script/lint-darwin`, never run; a
test on Linux lists, completes, selects and removes each of two passphrase
unlockers with the same metadata by its own ID.
- 2026-10-04: README's Storage Architecture, `secret version promote`, Technical
Details and Testing text matches the code
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/102). `current` and `currentvault`
are plain files holding a name, not symbolic links; a version's metadata is
the encrypted `metadata.age`; the state directory is `berlin.sneak.pkg.secret`
in the user's configuration directory, not `~/.local/share/secret`, and holds
the `lock` file. Also corrected: the code sets up no Touch ID for the keychain
or Secure Enclave unlocker, and the Secure Enclave only decrypts; per-version
keys give no forward secrecy; `pub.age` is not age-encrypted; vault metadata
holds no vault name. Testing lists only `make test`.
selection `unlocker add` makes acted on the older one. A PGP unlocker's ID
was `pgp-` and its key's fingerprint; a second PGP unlocker for a key is
still refused, now by comparing the fingerprint in the other unlockers'
metadata. `unlocker list` and the shell completion of `unlocker select` and
`unlocker remove` take each ID from the directory the unlocker was read
from, no longer by matching metadata, so two unlockers with the same
metadata are listed apart; an unlocker of an unknown type is listed under
its directory name, and completion now offers Secure Enclave unlockers too.
The keychain and Secure Enclave code was type-checked by
`script/lint-darwin`, never run; a test on Linux lists, completes, selects
and removes each of two passphrase unlockers with the same metadata by its
own ID.
- 2026-10-04: README's Storage Architecture, `secret version promote`,
Technical Details and Testing text matches the code
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/102). `current` and
`currentvault` are plain files holding a name, not symbolic links; a
version's metadata is the encrypted `metadata.age`; the state directory is
`berlin.sneak.pkg.secret` in the user's configuration directory, not
`~/.local/share/secret`, and holds the `lock` file. Also corrected: the
code sets up no Touch ID for the keychain or Secure Enclave unlocker, and
the Secure Enclave only decrypts; per-version keys give no forward
secrecy; `pub.age` is not age-encrypted; vault metadata holds no vault
name. Testing lists only `make test`.
- 2026-10-04: `secret init` and `secret vault create` create a vault whole or
not at all (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/105). `vault.CreateVault`
now takes the unlocker passphrase too, writes the vault directory with its
metadata, long-term public key and passphrase unlocker, `longterm.age`
included, into a temporary directory, renames that into `vaults.d` once it is
complete, and only then makes the vault current. Before, either command killed
after the passphrase prompt but before the unlocker was written left a vault
with no unlocker, which `vault create` had already made current and which
neither command would create again. Killed part-way now, it leaves no vault,
and the next command that takes the lock deletes the temporary directory; or,
killed between the rename and making the vault current, a complete vault that
is not current, which `secret vault select` makes current.
not at all (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/105).
`vault.CreateVault` now takes the unlocker passphrase too, writes the vault
directory with its metadata, long-term public key and passphrase unlocker,
`longterm.age` included, into a temporary directory, renames that into
`vaults.d` once it is complete, and only then makes the vault current.
Before, either command killed after the passphrase prompt but before the
unlocker was written left a vault with no unlocker, which `vault create` had
already made current and which neither command would create again. Killed
part-way now, it leaves no vault, and the next command that takes the lock
deletes the temporary directory; or, killed between the rename and making
the vault current, a complete vault that is not current, which
`secret vault select` makes current.
- 2026-10-04: A failed `secret unlocker add keychain` or
`secret unlocker add secure-enclave` no longer leaves its keychain item or
Secure Enclave key behind (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/89).
`CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker` gets the long-term key before it creates the
Secure Enclave key, so that a wrong passphrase creates none, and deletes the
key again if encrypting with it or writing the unlocker then fails.
`macse.CreateKey` finds the new key's hash right after `sc_auth` creates it,
and fails with an error naming the key's label if it cannot; it deletes the
key again if getting its public key then fails. The Objective-C was only read,
never compiled or run, and so was `macse_darwin.go`, which is cgo only.
`macse.CreateKey` finds the new key's hash right after `sc_auth` creates
it, and fails with an error naming the key's label if it cannot; it deletes
the key again if getting its public key then fails. The Objective-C was only
read, never compiled or run, and so was `macse_darwin.go`, which is cgo only.
`CreateKeychainUnlocker` writes all of the unlocker's files, the metadata
among them, before it stores the item in the keychain, and deletes the item
again if moving the unlocker into place then fails. A failure to delete is
reported along with the first error. The tests of this run only on macOS: the
Secure Enclave one in a build with cgo on a Mac with a Secure Enclave, the
keychain one in a build with cgo.
reported along with the first error. The tests of this run only on macOS:
the Secure Enclave one in a build with cgo on a Mac with a Secure Enclave,
the keychain one in a build with cgo.
- 2026-10-04: What a command killed part-way left under a `.tmp-` name
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/75), the temporary directories of
`secret.TempDirFor` and the temporary files of `secret.WriteFileAtomic`,
encrypted keys included, is deleted by the next command that takes the state
directory lock. Before, it stayed until deleted by hand. A command writes
`finished` into the lock file just before it releases the lock; the next one
to take the lock searches only when it does not find that, so after a command
that finished nothing is searched, however many secrets and versions there
are. The search looks in the state directory, each vault, each secret and each
version, the only directories those helpers make them in. A command that only
reads takes no lock and deletes nothing. A failure to delete is warned about
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/75), the temporary directories
of `secret.TempDirFor` and the temporary files of
`secret.WriteFileAtomic`, encrypted keys included, is deleted by the next
command that takes the state directory lock. Before, it stayed until
deleted by hand. A command writes `finished` into the lock file just
before it releases the lock; the next one to take the lock searches only
when it does not find that, so after a command that finished nothing is
searched, however many secrets and versions there are. The search looks
in the state directory, each vault, each secret and each version, the
only directories those helpers make them in. A command that only reads
takes no lock and deletes nothing. A failure to delete is warned about
and the command goes on. An unlocker directory with no metadata file was
already removed by `secret unlocker remove` given its directory name; a test
now shows it.
- 2026-10-04: An age identity's private key goes into a locked buffer through
`secret.IdentityToLockedBuffer` everywhere
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/38): the vault's long-term key when a
passphrase, PGP, keychain or Secure Enclave unlocker is created, the new
unlocker's own key, a new secret version's key, and the key `secret encrypt`
generates. Before, each place converted the string age returns to bytes and
left the string in ordinary memory. The function moves the string's own bytes
into the buffer, which overwrites them; the copies age makes while writing the
string remain, as its comment says. The 1.0 memory-security entry below no
longer lists these places, `internal/cli/crypto.go` among them, nor
`version.go:155`, which was `internal/secret/version.go`, not
`internal/cli/version.go`.
already removed by `secret unlocker remove` given its directory name; a
test now shows it.
- 2026-10-04: An age identity's private key goes into a locked buffer
through `secret.IdentityToLockedBuffer` everywhere
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/38): the vault's long-term key
when a passphrase, PGP, keychain or Secure Enclave unlocker is created,
the new unlocker's own key, a new secret version's key, and the key
`secret encrypt` generates. Before, each place converted the string age
returns to bytes and left the string in ordinary memory. The function
moves the string's own bytes into the buffer, which overwrites them; the
copies age makes while writing the string remain, as its comment says.
The 1.0 memory-security entry below no longer lists these places,
`internal/cli/crypto.go` among them, nor `version.go:155`, which was
`internal/secret/version.go`, not `internal/cli/version.go`.
- 2026-10-04: `script/lint-darwin` (`make lint-darwin`) runs `go vet` and
`golangci-lint` in docker on the code as a macOS build compiles it
(`GOOS=darwin`), with cgo off (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/50).
`script/check` runs it, and the `Dockerfile` lint stage runs its commands, so
`script/cibuild` does too. Before, CI on Linux never compiled the files built
only for macOS. Compiling cgo code for macOS needs Apple's SDK headers, and
both `internal/macse` and `github.com/keybase/go-keychain` are cgo on macOS.
So the three functions that call `go-keychain` moved from
`keychainunlocker.go` to `keychainunlocker_cgo.go`, built only with cgo on
macOS like `macse_darwin.go`. A macOS build without cgo, which before did not
compile, gets `keychainunlocker_nocgo.go` and the `macse` stub instead, whose
errors say the keychain or Secure Enclave needs a macOS build with cgo. The
check covers the rest of the keychain unlocker, the Secure Enclave unlocker
and the macOS-only tests other than `keychainunlocker_test.go`, whose lint
(`GOOS=darwin`), with cgo off
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/50). `script/check` runs it, and
the `Dockerfile` lint stage runs its commands, so `script/cibuild` does too.
Before, CI on Linux never compiled the files built only for macOS. Compiling
cgo code for macOS needs Apple's SDK headers, and both `internal/macse` and
`github.com/keybase/go-keychain` are cgo on macOS. So the three functions
that call `go-keychain` moved from `keychainunlocker.go` to
`keychainunlocker_cgo.go`, built only with cgo on macOS like
`macse_darwin.go`. A macOS build without cgo, which before did not compile,
gets `keychainunlocker_nocgo.go` and the `macse` stub instead, whose errors
say the keychain or Secure Enclave needs a macOS build with cgo. The check
covers the rest of the keychain unlocker, the Secure Enclave unlocker and
the macOS-only tests other than `keychainunlocker_test.go`, whose lint
findings are fixed. For the length and complexity limits, parts of
`GetIdentity`, `getLongTermPrivateKey` and `CreateKeychainUnlocker` moved into
functions of their own, and the Secure Enclave unlocker derives the long-term
key from the mnemonic through the same function as the keychain unlocker
instead of a copy of it. Lines over 88 columns in the files the check cannot
see are wrapped.
`GetIdentity`, `getLongTermPrivateKey` and `CreateKeychainUnlocker` moved
into functions of their own, and the Secure Enclave unlocker derives the
long-term key from the mnemonic through the same function as the keychain
unlocker instead of a copy of it. Lines over 88 columns in the files the
check cannot see are wrapped.
- 2026-10-04: `secret rm`, `secret version rm`, `secret vault remove` and
`secret unlocker remove` ask `[y/N]` before removing anything
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/39), naming what they remove: the
secret, its vault and its version count; the version, secret and vault; the
vault and its secret count; the unlocker, its vault and whether it is the
last, and for the last the vault's secret count and that the vault then opens
only with its mnemonic. Only `y` or `yes` goes ahead. Without `--force`, a
command whose stdin is not a terminal fails at once. `--force` (now also on
`rm` and `version rm`) removes without asking; it replaces the old refusals to
remove a vault with secrets or the last unlocker of one without `--force`,
which the question now covers. The checks run, and the question is asked,
before the state directory lock is taken; under the lock the checks run again,
and if they would ask a different question, nothing is removed. `secret rm`
fails when it cannot count the versions.
last, and for the last the vault's secret count and that the vault then
opens only with its mnemonic. Only `y` or `yes` goes ahead. Without
`--force`, a command whose stdin is not a terminal fails at once. `--force`
(now also on `rm` and `version rm`) removes without asking; it replaces the
old refusals to remove a vault with secrets or the last unlocker of one
without `--force`, which the question now covers. The checks run, and the
question is asked, before the state directory lock is taken; under the
lock the checks run again, and if they would ask a different question,
nothing is removed. `secret rm` fails when it cannot count the versions.
- 2026-10-04: A crash while an unlocker is being replaced no longer leaves a
current unlocker that cannot open the vault
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/71). Every new unlocker gets a
directory of its own, named with the time to the nanosecond:
`passphrase-<time>`, `<host>-pgp-<time>`, and for a keychain or Secure Enclave
unlocker the keychain item or Secure Enclave key, which names the directory,
carries the time instead of the day. `secret.WriteDir` fails on a directory
that exists instead of writing into it. `unlocker add passphrase` writes the
new unlocker, makes it current, and only then removes the vault's other
passphrase unlockers; a crash between the last two steps leaves the old one
beside the new, and the old passphrase still opens the vault through it until
the next `unlocker add passphrase` or an `unlocker remove` removes it. A PGP,
keychain or Secure Enclave unlocker added on the same host and day as another
of its type is added beside it instead of replacing it.
- 2026-10-04: `SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC` and `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE` are read once per
command, in its `RunE`, into locked buffers on the CLI `Instance`, and unset
at once, so that no program the command runs, `gpg` included, inherits them
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/60). Nothing below the command reads
the environment; the buffers are passed down: `vault.CreateVault` takes the
mnemonic (nil for none), a `Vault` derives its long-term key from its
`Mnemonic` and gives its `UnlockPassphrase` to a passphrase unlocker, and the
PGP, keychain and Secure Enclave unlocker constructors take both.
`CreatePGPUnlocker` sets both on the vault it loads, through `SetMnemonic` and
`SetUnlockPassphrase`, now part of `VaultInterface`, before calling its
`GetOrDeriveLongTermKey`. `init` and `vault create` no longer put the mnemonic
into the environment. Unsetting erases nothing: the starting environment
(`/proc/<pid>/environ`) and memory still hold the value. The README warns
against both variables.
- 2026-10-04: `.golangci.yml` is again the canonical file from `sneak/prompts`,
byte for byte (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/66). It runs
`gomodguard_v2` in place of the deprecated `gomodguard`, so the lint no longer
warns, and enables `depguard` with a rule that keeps `net/http/httptest` out
of non-test files. Neither raised a finding in this repo.
`passphrase-<time>`, `<host>-pgp-<time>`, and for a keychain or Secure
Enclave unlocker the keychain item or Secure Enclave key, which names the
directory, carries the time instead of the day. `secret.WriteDir` fails on a
directory that exists instead of writing into it. `unlocker add passphrase`
writes the new unlocker, makes it current, and only then removes the vault's
other passphrase unlockers; a crash between the last two steps leaves the old
one beside the new, and the old passphrase still opens the vault through it
until the next `unlocker add passphrase` or an `unlocker remove` removes it.
A PGP, keychain or Secure Enclave unlocker added on the same host and day as
another of its type is added beside it instead of replacing it.
- 2026-10-04: `SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC` and `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE` are read once
per command, in its `RunE`, into locked buffers on the CLI `Instance`, and
unset at once, so that no program the command runs, `gpg` included,
inherits them (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/60). Nothing below
the command reads the environment; the buffers are passed down:
`vault.CreateVault` takes the mnemonic (nil for none), a `Vault` derives its
long-term key from its `Mnemonic` and gives its `UnlockPassphrase` to a
passphrase unlocker, and the PGP, keychain and Secure Enclave unlocker
constructors take both. `CreatePGPUnlocker` sets both on the vault it
loads, through `SetMnemonic` and `SetUnlockPassphrase`, now part of
`VaultInterface`, before calling its `GetOrDeriveLongTermKey`. `init` and
`vault create` no longer put the mnemonic into the environment. Unsetting
erases nothing: the starting environment (`/proc/<pid>/environ`) and
memory still hold the value. The README warns against both variables.
- 2026-10-04: `.golangci.yml` is again the canonical file from
`sneak/prompts`, byte for byte
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/66). It runs `gomodguard_v2`
in place of the deprecated `gomodguard`, so the lint no longer warns,
and enables `depguard` with a rule that keeps `net/http/httptest` out of
non-test files. Neither raised a finding in this repo.
- 2026-10-04: `secret unlocker add pgp` works on Linux
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/88). `CreatePGPUnlocker` gets the
vault's long-term key as adding a passphrase unlocker does, with the vault's
`GetOrDeriveLongTermKey`, now part of `VaultInterface`: from the mnemonic,
checked against the vault, or else from the current unlocker. Before, it used
the keychain unlocker's helper, which on every platform but macOS always
failed. A test adds a PGP unlocker for a throwaway GPG key, getting the
long-term key once from the mnemonic and once from a passphrase unlocker, and
reads a secret through the new unlocker.
- 2026-10-04: A vault name may use only lowercase ASCII letters, digits, `.`,
`-` and `_`, and must not be empty, `.` or `..`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/68); the error and `README.md` state
the rule. `vault create`, `vault import`, `vault select`, `vault remove`, both
vault names of `mv` and shell completion of a `vault:secret` argument check
the name as typed with `vault.ValidateVaultName` before building any path from
it. Before, `vault import ..` wrote a long-term key and an unlocker into the
state directory itself, and `vault select ..` made that the current vault.
- 2026-10-04: `script/cibuild` runs the checks again on an unchanged tree
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/54). It passes the current time as
the `CHECK_EPOCH` build argument, which both the lint and the build stage of
the `Dockerfile` declare after their module download, so the `RUN` steps below
the argument run again on each build while the base images and module
downloads stay cached. Before, a second run on the same tree took every check
from the build cache and reported success having run nothing.
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/88). `CreatePGPUnlocker` gets
the vault's long-term key as adding a passphrase unlocker does, with the
vault's `GetOrDeriveLongTermKey`, now part of `VaultInterface`: from the
mnemonic, checked against the vault, or else from the current unlocker.
Before, it used the keychain unlocker's helper, which on every platform
but macOS always failed. A test adds a PGP unlocker for a throwaway GPG
key, getting the long-term key once from the mnemonic and once from a
passphrase unlocker, and reads a secret through the new unlocker.
- 2026-10-04: A vault name may use only lowercase ASCII letters, digits,
`.`, `-` and `_`, and must not be empty, `.` or `..`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/68); the error and `README.md`
state the rule. `vault create`, `vault import`, `vault select`,
`vault remove`, both vault names of `mv` and shell completion of a
`vault:secret` argument check the name as typed with
`vault.ValidateVaultName` before building any path from it. Before,
`vault import ..` wrote a long-term key and an unlocker into the state
directory itself, and `vault select ..` made that the current vault.
- 2026-10-04: `script/cibuild` runs the checks again on an unchanged
tree (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/54). It passes the
current time as the `CHECK_EPOCH` build argument, which both the lint
and the build stage of the `Dockerfile` declare after their module
download, so the `RUN` steps below the argument run again on each
build while the base images and module downloads stay cached. Before,
a second run on the same tree took every check from the build cache
and reported success having run nothing.
- 2026-10-04: A failed unlocker add no longer leaves a partial unlocker
directory (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/48).
`secret unlocker add pgp` resolves the GPG key's fingerprint once, for its
duplicate check, and passes it to `CreatePGPUnlocker` to record.
`CreatePGPUnlocker` and `CreateKeychainUnlocker` get the long-term key and
encrypt everything before writing anything. All four unlocker types write
their files through `secret.WriteDir`: a new unlocker is built in a temporary
directory, renamed into place when complete and removed on a failure.
- 2026-10-04: `secret unlocker select` and `secret unlocker remove` skip, with
the warning `unlocker list` gives, an unlocker directory whose metadata file
cannot be checked for, read or parsed, instead of failing when it sorts before
the unlocker asked for. Such a directory, or one without a metadata file, is
removed by its directory name, the name the warning gives; only the directory
is removed, since its type is unknown. Removing one whose metadata file is
missing or corrupt never counts as removing the last unlocker. Removing one
whose metadata file cannot be checked for or read always does, since it may be
the only working unlocker, so in a vault with secrets it needs `--force`.
- 2026-10-04: A failed command prints its error once, without the usage text
after it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/41). Usage is still printed
for a command called wrongly: wrong number of arguments, unknown flag, bad
flag value, missing required flag, or flags that break a flag group (mutually
exclusive, required together, one required). The root command's
`PersistentPreRunE` turns usage off. Cobra checks arguments and flag values
before that hook but required flags and flag groups only after it, so the hook
checks those two first. Root `SilenceUsage` would have hidden usage for all of
these.
- 2026-10-04: `secret get` keeps the secret in locked memory until it writes it
out (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/37): `Vault.GetSecret` and
`Vault.GetSecretVersion` return a `*memguard.LockedBuffer`, which every caller
destroys, and `secret get` writes its bytes straight to stdout, still with no
trailing newline. Before, the value was copied into ordinary memory that
nothing wiped, and `get --version` also wrote it to the debug log.
- 2026-10-04: The `Makefile` no longer sets `DOCKER_HOST`, so its docker targets
use the local docker daemon, or whatever `DOCKER_HOST` the environment sets.
`make build` calls the new `script/build`, which stamps the version (`VERSION`
from the environment, else `git describe`) and the git commit as before.
`build`, `clean`, `install` and `docker-run` are in `.PHONY`; `make install`
depends on `build`. The `vet` target is gone: `script/test` runs `go vet`
first.
- 2026-10-04: `.gitignore` is the org's standard file, which ignores `.env`,
`.env.*`, `*.pem` and `*.key` and editor and OS files, plus this repo's
`/secret`, `*.log`, `*.test` and `settings.local.json`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/40). `.dockerignore` also leaves out
`node_modules`; `.git` stays in the build context for the version stamp.
`secret unlocker add pgp` resolves the GPG key's fingerprint once, for
its duplicate check, and passes it to `CreatePGPUnlocker` to record.
`CreatePGPUnlocker` and `CreateKeychainUnlocker` get the long-term key
and encrypt everything before writing anything. All four unlocker
types write their files through `secret.WriteDir`: a new unlocker is
built in a temporary directory, renamed into place when complete and
removed on a failure.
- 2026-10-04: `secret unlocker select` and `secret unlocker remove`
skip, with the warning `unlocker list` gives, an unlocker directory
whose metadata file cannot be checked for, read or parsed, instead of
failing when it sorts before the unlocker asked for. Such a directory,
or one without a metadata file, is removed by its directory name, the
name the warning gives; only the directory is removed, since its type
is unknown. Removing one whose metadata file is missing or corrupt
never counts as removing the last unlocker. Removing one whose metadata
file cannot be checked for or read always does, since it may be the
only working unlocker, so in a vault with secrets it needs `--force`.
- 2026-10-04: A failed command prints its error once, without the usage
text after it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/41). Usage is
still printed for a command called wrongly: wrong number of arguments,
unknown flag, bad flag value, missing required flag, or flags that
break a flag group (mutually exclusive, required together, one
required). The root command's `PersistentPreRunE` turns usage off.
Cobra checks arguments and flag values before that hook but required
flags and flag groups only after it, so the hook checks those two
first. Root `SilenceUsage` would have hidden usage for all of these.
- 2026-10-04: `secret get` keeps the secret in locked memory until it
writes it out (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/37):
`Vault.GetSecret` and `Vault.GetSecretVersion` return a
`*memguard.LockedBuffer`, which every caller destroys, and `secret get`
writes its bytes straight to stdout, still with no trailing newline.
Before, the value was copied into ordinary memory that nothing wiped,
and `get --version` also wrote it to the debug log.
- 2026-10-04: The `Makefile` no longer sets `DOCKER_HOST`, so its docker
targets use the local docker daemon, or whatever `DOCKER_HOST` the
environment sets. `make build` calls the new `script/build`, which
stamps the version (`VERSION` from the environment, else
`git describe`) and the git commit as before. `build`, `clean`,
`install` and `docker-run` are in `.PHONY`; `make install` depends on
`build`. The `vet` target is gone: `script/test` runs `go vet` first.
- 2026-10-04: `.gitignore` is the org's standard file, which ignores
`.env`, `.env.*`, `*.pem` and `*.key` and editor and OS files, plus
this repo's `/secret`, `*.log`, `*.test` and `settings.local.json`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/40). `.dockerignore` also
leaves out `node_modules`; `.git` stays in the build context for the
version stamp.
- 2026-10-04: `secret init` refuses when the default vault exists, and
`secret vault create NAME` when `NAME` does, with "vault NAME already exists",
before writing anything. The check is in `vault.CreateVault`, which both
commands call while holding the state directory lock, so two creates of one
vault at once cannot both pass the check. Before, either command replaced the
vault's metadata, passphrase unlocker and `longterm.age`, so none of its
secrets could be decrypted any more. Both commands now ask for the unlocker
passphrase before creating the vault, so one stopped at that prompt leaves no
vault behind.
- 2026-10-04: The `internal/cli` tests are back to about their time before the
state directory lock (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/80). The test
that each changing command waits for the lock releases it as soon as it sees
the command waiting there, instead of after a fixed 100 ms. The two vaults
with passphrase unlockers that the path and move tests start from are made
once and copied for each test.
- 2026-10-04: `secret mv` rejects a move whose destination is the source under
another name, such as `foo` for `Foo` on a case-insensitive filesystem (the
macOS default) or a name reached through a symbolic link, before changing
anything, with or without `--force`, within a vault and between vaults;
before, `--force` removed the destination and so deleted the secret. A rename
that changes only letter case works on a case-sensitive filesystem as before.
- 2026-10-04: Lint runs only in docker: `script/lint` builds `Dockerfile.lint`,
where golangci-lint is a build step rebuilt on every run
(`--no-cache-filter`), so an unchanged tree is linted too; the module download
stays cached. `script/bootstrap` no longer installs golangci-lint, and the
`Dockerfile` lint stage calls it directly instead of `make lint`.
`golangci-lint config verify` is not run: it fetches its schema live over
unpinned HTTPS.
- 2026-10-04: A PGP unlocker whose metadata has no usable GPG key ID no longer
panics: `GetID()` warns with the unlocker's directory and returns
`pgp-unknown`. `ListUnlockers` skips, with a warning, an unlocker whose
metadata file cannot be checked for, read or parsed instead of failing, so
`secret unlocker list` still lists the others; the listing's ID lookup no
longer warns about that directory again.
- 2026-10-03: `secret mv` rejects a move whose destination is the source
(`mv --force x x`, `mv --force work:x work:`, or an empty destination, which
defaults to the source name) before changing anything; before, `--force`
removed the destination first and so deleted the secret. Every vault name
given with `vault:` must be one of the existing vaults by exact name, so
`work:x work/:x` is rejected instead of being taken for a move between two
vaults. A move within a named vault no longer makes that vault the current
one, whether it succeeds or fails.
- 2026-10-03: Commands that change the state directory hold one lock (`flock` on
`lock` in the state directory; a mutex on the in-memory test filesystem), so
concurrent commands no longer lose versions or race on the current pointers.
Every file is written through `secret.WriteFileAtomic` (temporary file, sync,
rename), so no file is ever half-written and `current`, `currentvault` and
`current-unlocker` never go missing. New versions, new secrets and cross-vault
copies are built in a temporary directory and renamed into place, and removals
rename out of the way first, so a version or secret is never half-added and
never half-removed.
- 2026-10-03: The checks run before changing a vault now stop with an error
naming the path and cause when they cannot read what they inspect, instead of
reading the failure as "nothing there": the duplicate check before
`unlocker add pgp` (an unreadable `unlockers.d` or unlocker metadata file),
the secret count that guards removing the last unlocker and removing a vault,
and the existing long-term key check before `vault import`.
- 2026-10-03: `version rm`, `version promote` and `get --version` accept a
version only if it is one of the versions `version list` lists for that
secret, compared as typed before any path is built (`secret.VersionExists`),
and touch nothing otherwise. An empty `--version` is rejected instead of
meaning the current version. Before, `secret version rm x ../../..` deleted
the whole vault, `secret version rm x ..` the secret, and `.` or `""` every
version.
- 2026-10-03: Key material is wiped on every exit: `Entry()` returns the exit
code after its deferred `memguard.Purge()` has run, and only `main` calls
`os.Exit`. SIGINT and SIGTERM go through memguard's handler, which wipes every
buffer before exiting; when the process is in the terminal's foreground
process group it first restores the terminal settings from startup, so an
interrupted passphrase prompt no longer leaves echo off.
- 2026-10-03: Every command that builds a path from a secret name checks the
name first with `vault.ValidateSecretName` and touches nothing when it is
invalid: `rm`, `mv` (both names, within a vault and between vaults, before
switching the current vault), `import`, `version list`/`promote`/`rm`,
`encrypt` and `decrypt`. The error and `README.md` state the naming rule.
Before, `secret rm ..` deleted the whole vault and `secret rm .` every secret
in it.
- 2026-10-03: The keychain unlocker's age key passphrase stays in locked memory:
it is generated into a locked buffer, and the keychain JSON is written and
read by `KeychainData` code in `internal/secret/keychaindata.go` (tested on
Linux) without `encoding/json` holding it; the JSON field names are unchanged.
- 2026-10-02: A plain `docker build .` builds again: the size tests skip a case
that needs more locked memory than the process can lock, and run every case
under `script/cibuild`. The image stamps the `VERSION` build argument, else
`git describe --tags --always`, into `Version`, and fails if `.git` is present
but yields no version; `make build` stamps `git describe` too, not a fixed
`0.1.0`. `.dockerignore` keeps `.git/config` out; `script/docker` is the
`secret vault create NAME` when `NAME` does, with "vault NAME already
exists", before writing anything. The check is in `vault.CreateVault`,
which both commands call while holding the state directory lock, so two
creates of one vault at once cannot both pass the check. Before, either
command replaced the vault's metadata, passphrase unlocker and
`longterm.age`, so none of its secrets could be decrypted any more. Both
commands now ask for the unlocker passphrase before creating the vault,
so one stopped at that prompt leaves no vault behind.
- 2026-10-04: The `internal/cli` tests are back to about their time
before the state directory lock
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/80). The test that each
changing command waits for the lock releases it as soon as it sees the
command waiting there, instead of after a fixed 100 ms. The two vaults
with passphrase unlockers that the path and move tests start from are
made once and copied for each test.
- 2026-10-04: `secret mv` rejects a move whose destination is the source
under another name, such as `foo` for `Foo` on a case-insensitive
filesystem (the macOS default) or a name reached through a symbolic
link, before changing anything, with or without `--force`, within a
vault and between vaults; before, `--force` removed the destination and
so deleted the secret. A rename that changes only letter case works on a
case-sensitive filesystem as before.
- 2026-10-04: Lint runs only in docker: `script/lint` builds
`Dockerfile.lint`, where golangci-lint is a build step rebuilt on
every run (`--no-cache-filter`), so an unchanged tree is linted too;
the module download stays cached. `script/bootstrap` no longer
installs golangci-lint, and the `Dockerfile` lint stage calls it
directly instead of `make lint`. `golangci-lint config verify` is not
run: it fetches its schema live over unpinned HTTPS.
- 2026-10-04: A PGP unlocker whose metadata has no usable GPG key ID
no longer panics: `GetID()` warns with the unlocker's directory and
returns `pgp-unknown`. `ListUnlockers` skips, with a warning, an
unlocker whose metadata file cannot be checked for, read or parsed
instead of failing, so `secret unlocker list` still lists the others;
the listing's ID lookup no longer warns about that directory again.
- 2026-10-03: `secret mv` rejects a move whose destination is the
source (`mv --force x x`, `mv --force work:x work:`, or an empty
destination, which defaults to the source name) before changing
anything; before, `--force` removed the destination first and so
deleted the secret. Every vault name given with `vault:` must be one
of the existing vaults by exact name, so `work:x work/:x` is rejected
instead of being taken for a move between two vaults. A move within a
named vault no longer makes that vault the current one, whether it
succeeds or fails.
- 2026-10-03: Commands that change the state directory hold one lock
(`flock` on `lock` in the state directory; a mutex on the in-memory
test filesystem), so concurrent commands no longer lose versions or
race on the current pointers. Every file is written through
`secret.WriteFileAtomic` (temporary file, sync, rename), so no file
is ever half-written and `current`, `currentvault` and
`current-unlocker` never go missing. New versions, new secrets and
cross-vault copies are built in a temporary directory and renamed
into place, and removals rename out of the way first, so a version
or secret is never half-added and never half-removed.
- 2026-10-03: The checks run before changing a vault now stop with an
error naming the path and cause when they cannot read what they
inspect, instead of reading the failure as "nothing there": the
duplicate check before `unlocker add pgp` (an unreadable
`unlockers.d` or unlocker metadata file), the secret count that
guards removing the last unlocker and removing a vault, and the
existing long-term key check before `vault import`.
- 2026-10-03: `version rm`, `version promote` and `get --version`
accept a version only if it is one of the versions `version list`
lists for that secret, compared as typed before any path is built
(`secret.VersionExists`), and touch nothing otherwise. An empty
`--version` is rejected instead of meaning the current version.
Before, `secret version rm x ../../..` deleted the whole vault,
`secret version rm x ..` the secret, and `.` or `""` every version.
- 2026-10-03: Key material is wiped on every exit: `Entry()` returns
the exit code after its deferred `memguard.Purge()` has run, and only
`main` calls `os.Exit`. SIGINT and SIGTERM go through memguard's
handler, which wipes every buffer before exiting; when the process is
in the terminal's foreground process group it first restores the
terminal settings from startup, so an interrupted passphrase prompt no
longer leaves echo off.
- 2026-10-03: Every command that builds a path from a secret name
checks the name first with `vault.ValidateSecretName` and touches
nothing when it is invalid: `rm`, `mv` (both names, within a vault
and between vaults, before switching the current vault), `import`,
`version list`/`promote`/`rm`, `encrypt` and `decrypt`. The error
and `README.md` state the naming rule. Before, `secret rm ..`
deleted the whole vault and `secret rm .` every secret in it.
- 2026-10-03: The keychain unlocker's age key passphrase stays in
locked memory: it is generated into a locked buffer, and the
keychain JSON is written and read by `KeychainData` code in
`internal/secret/keychaindata.go` (tested on Linux) without
`encoding/json` holding it; the JSON field names are unchanged.
- 2026-10-02: A plain `docker build .` builds again: the size tests
skip a case that needs more locked memory than the process can
lock, and run every case under `script/cibuild`. The image stamps the
`VERSION` build argument, else `git describe --tags --always`, into
`Version`, and fails if `.git` is present but yields no version;
`make build` stamps `git describe` too, not a fixed `0.1.0`.
`.dockerignore` keeps `.git/config` out; `script/docker` is the
canonical copy.
- 2026-08-07: Updated golangci-lint to v2.12.2 with the canonical
`.golangci.yml` (all linters enabled minus the standard disable list, `lll`
88, tests linted); bumped the `Dockerfile` lint-stage image to the tagged
v2.12.2 Debian digest; fixed all ~1550 new findings across `internal/` and
`pkg/` (line wrapping, `wsl_v5` blank lines, sentinel errors for `err113`,
`t.Parallel()` where safe, `_test` package conversions, complexity/`dupl`
helper extraction) on branch `golangci-v2.12.2`. Reworked after review: the
`err113` sentinels in `internal/vault`, `internal/secret`, `internal/cli` and
`pkg/bip85` were reshaped so every composed error message is byte-identical to
`main`, and `findUnlockerIDByMetadata` now returns an error so `unlocker list`
skips an unreadable `unlockers.d` entry with a warning instead of emitting a
fabricated fallback ID.
`.golangci.yml` (all linters enabled minus the standard disable
list, `lll` 88, tests linted); bumped the `Dockerfile` lint-stage
image to the tagged v2.12.2 Debian digest; fixed all ~1550 new
findings across `internal/` and `pkg/` (line wrapping, `wsl_v5`
blank lines, sentinel errors for `err113`, `t.Parallel()` where
safe, `_test` package conversions, complexity/`dupl` helper
extraction) on branch `golangci-v2.12.2`. Reworked after review:
the `err113` sentinels in `internal/vault`, `internal/secret`,
`internal/cli` and `pkg/bip85` were reshaped so every composed
error message is byte-identical to `main`, and
`findUnlockerIDByMetadata` now returns an error so `unlocker list`
skips an unreadable `unlockers.d` entry with a warning instead of
emitting a fabricated fallback ID.
- 2026-08-07: Added `.editorconfig`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/27).
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints, Makefile
shims, README Entrypoints section
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints,
Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
- 2026-07-07: Added `REPO_POLICIES.md` and the `make hooks` target;
`.gitea/workflows/check.yml` now runs `script/cibuild`.
- 2026-03-30: Added the `make fmt-check` target and
`.gitea/workflows/check.yml`, which runs `docker build` on every push; the
`Dockerfile` base images are pinned by sha256.
- 2026-03-11: Secure Enclave unlocker for hardware-backed secret protection,
plus review fixes (stub panics, derivation index, tests, README) on branch
secure-enclave-unlocker.
- 2026-03-11: Secure Enclave unlocker for hardware-backed secret
protection, plus review fixes (stub panics, derivation index, tests,
README) on branch secure-enclave-unlocker.
- 2026-02-28: Repo cleanup, removed stale .cursorrules and coverage.out.
- Audit fix wave (issues #1, #2, #3, #13, #14): skip unlockers with missing
metadata, allow uppercase secret names, fix hardcoded derivation index,
validate names in GetSecretVersion against path traversal, return errors
instead of panicking, add Warn() on silent anomalies.
- Memory security hardening: LockedBuffer used through encrypt/decrypt paths
(Save/EncryptWithPassphrase/GetValue/gpg helpers), deprecated bare-[]byte APIs
removed.
- Per-secret keypair architecture, vault package refactor, versioning with
--version, comprehensive test suite with in-memory filesystem.
- Audit fix wave (issues #1, #2, #3, #13, #14): skip unlockers with
missing metadata, allow uppercase secret names, fix hardcoded
derivation index, validate names in GetSecretVersion against path
traversal, return errors instead of panicking, add Warn() on silent
anomalies.
- Memory security hardening: LockedBuffer used through encrypt/decrypt
paths (Save/EncryptWithPassphrase/GetValue/gpg helpers), deprecated
bare-[]byte APIs removed.
- Per-secret keypair architecture, vault package refactor, versioning
with --version, comprehensive test suite with in-memory filesystem.
- Debug logging system (slog, GODEBUG flag, TTY-aware output).
- Renamed SEP unlocker to Keychain, reorganized import commands.
- 2025-05-28: Initial implementation (vault, age encryption, mnemonic, CLI).
- 2025-05-28: Initial implementation (vault, age encryption, mnemonic,
CLI).
# Future Steps
- Implement version-number shell completion for the second arg of
`secret version promote` and `secret version rm` (`internal/cli/version.go`;
was an in-code TODO removed for godox).
- Cover mnemonic-vs-xprv identity consistency in `pkg/agehd/agehd_test.go`
`TestMnemonicVsXPRVConsistency` (was an in-code FIXME removed for godox).
- CI does not compile, lint or test the files built only with cgo on macOS,
since compiling them needs Apple's SDK:
`secret version promote` and `secret version rm`
(`internal/cli/version.go`; was an in-code TODO removed for godox).
- Cover mnemonic-vs-xprv identity consistency in
`pkg/agehd/agehd_test.go` `TestMnemonicVsXPRVConsistency` (was an
in-code FIXME removed for godox).
- CI does not compile, lint or test the files built only with cgo on
macOS, since compiling them needs Apple's SDK:
`internal/secret/keychainunlocker_cgo.go` (the three functions that call
`go-keychain`) with `keychainunlocker_test.go`, and `internal/macse`
(`macse_darwin.go`, `macse_test.go`, the Objective-C sources). Lint has never
run on them, so it would likely find more there than the line lengths. No
macOS test runs in CI. A macOS runner would cover all of it (asked on
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/50).
(`macse_darwin.go`, `macse_test.go`, the Objective-C sources). Lint has
never run on them, so it would likely find more there than the line
lengths. No macOS test runs in CI. A macOS runner would cover all of it
(asked on https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/50).
- 1.0 critical security blockers (from repo TODO.md):
- Memory security: age writes an identity's private key out as a string in
ordinary memory, and the copies it makes on the way stay there
@@ -601,8 +469,8 @@ https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/milestone/12
- Medium priority:
- Standardize error messages; stop leaking internals.
- Split oversized CLI functions.
- Cleanups: read statedir from environment or default instead of passing it
around.
- Cleanups: read statedir from environment or default instead of
passing it around.
- Enhancements: help examples, colored output, --quiet flag, name suggestions on
miss, audit logging, hardware integration tests (Keychain, GPG), naming
consistency, vault export/import, batch operations, search, secret metadata
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ package main
import (
"os"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli"
)
func main() {
+7 -5
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
module sneak.berlin/go/secret
module git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret
go 1.24.1
@@ -9,17 +9,16 @@ require (
github.com/btcsuite/btcd/btcec/v2 v2.1.3
github.com/btcsuite/btcd/btcutil v1.1.6
github.com/btcsuite/btcutil v0.0.0-20190425235716-9e5f4b9a998d
github.com/creack/pty v1.1.25-0.20260601142114-9246436fffe8 // v1.1.24's Open can return another pty's terminal
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1
github.com/fatih/color v1.18.0
github.com/creack/pty v1.1.24
github.com/keybase/go-keychain v0.0.0-20230307172405-3e4884637dd1
github.com/oklog/ulid/v2 v2.1.1
github.com/spf13/afero v1.14.0
github.com/spf13/cobra v1.9.1
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4
github.com/tyler-smith/go-bip39 v1.1.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.38.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.33.0
golang.org/x/term v0.32.0
golang.org/x/text v0.25.0
)
require (
@@ -27,10 +26,13 @@ require (
github.com/btcsuite/btcd/chaincfg/chainhash v1.1.0 // indirect
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/decred/dcrd/dcrec/secp256k1/v4 v4.0.1 // indirect
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/fatih/color v1.18.0 // indirect
github.com/inconshreveable/mousetrap v1.1.0 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.1.13 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 // indirect
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.6 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.25.0 // indirect
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
)
+6 -2
View File
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ github.com/btcsuite/snappy-go v1.0.0/go.mod h1:8woku9dyThutzjeg+3xrA5iCpBRH8XEEg
github.com/btcsuite/websocket v0.0.0-20150119174127-31079b680792/go.mod h1:ghJtEyQwv5/p4Mg4C0fgbePVuGr935/5ddU9Z3TmDRY=
github.com/btcsuite/winsvc v1.0.0/go.mod h1:jsenWakMcC0zFBFurPLEAyrnc/teJEM1O46fmI40EZs=
github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 v2.0.6/go.mod h1:oOW0eioCTA6cOiMLiUPZOpcVxMig6NIQQ7OS05n1F4g=
github.com/creack/pty v1.1.25-0.20260601142114-9246436fffe8 h1:CY3gjC7naqYGLMiywvj3suPfa1i0p/QEr7o8ujxL/2M=
github.com/creack/pty v1.1.25-0.20260601142114-9246436fffe8/go.mod h1:08sCNb52WyoAwi2QDyzUCTgcvVFhUzewun7wtTfvcwE=
github.com/creack/pty v1.1.24 h1:bJrF4RRfyJnbTJqzRLHzcGaZK1NeM5kTC9jGgovnR1s=
github.com/creack/pty v1.1.24/go.mod h1:08sCNb52WyoAwi2QDyzUCTgcvVFhUzewun7wtTfvcwE=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v0.0.0-20171005155431-ecdeabc65495/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ github.com/inconshreveable/mousetrap v1.1.0/go.mod h1:vpF70FUmC8bwa3OWnCshd2FqLf
github.com/jessevdk/go-flags v0.0.0-20141203071132-1679536dcc89/go.mod h1:4FA24M0QyGHXBuZZK/XkWh8h0e1EYbRYJSGM75WSRxI=
github.com/jessevdk/go-flags v1.4.0/go.mod h1:4FA24M0QyGHXBuZZK/XkWh8h0e1EYbRYJSGM75WSRxI=
github.com/jrick/logrotate v1.0.0/go.mod h1:LNinyqDIJnpAur+b8yyulnQw/wDuN1+BYKlTRt3OuAQ=
github.com/keybase/go-keychain v0.0.0-20230307172405-3e4884637dd1 h1:yi1W8qcFJ2plmaGJFN1npm0KQviWPMCtQOYuwDT6Swk=
github.com/keybase/go-keychain v0.0.0-20230307172405-3e4884637dd1/go.mod h1:qDHUvIjGZJUtdPtuP4WMu5/U4aVWbFw1MhlkJqCGmCQ=
github.com/kkdai/bstream v0.0.0-20161212061736-f391b8402d23/go.mod h1:J+Gs4SYgM6CZQHDETBtE9HaSEkGmuNXF86RwHhHUvq4=
github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.1.13 h1:fFA4WZxdEF4tXPZVKMLwD8oUnCTTo08duU7wxecdEvA=
github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.1.13/go.mod h1:7S9/ev0klgBDR4GtXTXX8a3vIGJpMovkB8vQcUbaXHg=
@@ -105,6 +107,8 @@ github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.0/go.mod h1:yNjHg4UonilssWZ8iaSj1OCr/vHnekPRkoO
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4 h1:CcVxjf3Q8PM0mHUKJCdn+eZZtm5yQwehR5yeSVQQcUk=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4/go.mod h1:sz/lmYIOXD/1dqDmKjjqLyZ2RngseejIcXlSw2iwfAo=
github.com/syndtr/goleveldb v1.0.1-0.20210819022825-2ae1ddf74ef7/go.mod h1:q4W45IWZaF22tdD+VEXcAWRA037jwmWEB5VWYORlTpc=
github.com/tyler-smith/go-bip39 v1.1.0 h1:5eUemwrMargf3BSLRRCalXT93Ns6pQJIjYQN2nyfOP8=
github.com/tyler-smith/go-bip39 v1.1.0/go.mod h1:gUYDtqQw1JS3ZJ8UWVcGTGqqr6YIN3CWg+kkNaLt55U=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20170930174604-9419663f5a44/go.mod h1:6SG95UA2DQfeDnfUPMdvaQW0Q7yPrPDi9nlGo2tz2b4=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACkg1iLfiJU5Ep61QUkGW8qpdssI0+w=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200622213623-75b288015ac9/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto=
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
The MIT License (MIT)
Copyright (c) 2014-2018 Tyler Smith and contributors
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
SOFTWARE.
-285
View File
@@ -1,285 +0,0 @@
// Package bip39 is the Golang implementation of the BIP39 spec.
//
// The official BIP39 spec can be found at
// https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki
//
// It is a copy of github.com/tyler-smith/go-bip39 v1.1.0, trimmed to what
// secret uses.
//
//nolint:mnd // the numbers are BIP-39's own, written as upstream writes them
package bip39
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/sha512"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2"
)
var (
// ErrInvalidMnemonic is returned when trying to use a malformed mnemonic.
ErrInvalidMnemonic = errors.New("invalid mnenomic")
// ErrEntropyLengthInvalid is returned when trying to use an entropy set with
// an invalid size.
ErrEntropyLengthInvalid = errors.New(
"entropy length must be [128, 256] and a multiple of 32",
)
// ErrChecksumIncorrect is returned when entropy has the incorrect checksum.
ErrChecksumIncorrect = errors.New("checksum incorrect")
)
// NewEntropy will create random entropy bytes
// so long as the requested size bitSize is an appropriate size.
//
// bitSize has to be a multiple 32 and be within the inclusive range of {128, 256}
func NewEntropy(bitSize int) ([]byte, error) {
err := validateEntropyBitSize(bitSize)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
entropy := make([]byte, bitSize/8)
_, err = rand.Read(entropy)
return entropy, err
}
// EntropyFromMnemonic takes a mnemonic generated by this library,
// and returns the input entropy used to generate the given mnemonic.
// An error is returned if the given mnemonic is invalid.
func EntropyFromMnemonic(mnemonic string) ([]byte, error) {
mnemonicSlice, isValid := splitMnemonicWords(mnemonic)
if !isValid {
return nil, ErrInvalidMnemonic
}
// Some bitwise operands for working with big.Ints
shift11BitsMask := big.NewInt(2048)
bigOne := big.NewInt(1)
// used to isolate the checksum bits from the entropy+checksum byte array
wordLengthChecksumMasksMapping := map[int]*big.Int{
12: big.NewInt(15),
15: big.NewInt(31),
18: big.NewInt(63),
21: big.NewInt(127),
24: big.NewInt(255),
}
// used to use only the desired x of 8 available checksum bits.
// 256 bit (word length 24) requires all 8 bits of the checksum,
// and thus no shifting is needed for it (we would get a divByZero crash if we did)
wordLengthChecksumShiftMapping := map[int]*big.Int{
12: big.NewInt(16),
15: big.NewInt(8),
18: big.NewInt(4),
21: big.NewInt(2),
}
// wordMap is a reverse lookup map for the word list
wordMap := map[string]int{}
for i, v := range English() {
wordMap[v] = i
}
// Decode the words into a big.Int.
b := big.NewInt(0)
for _, v := range mnemonicSlice {
index, found := wordMap[v]
if !found {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: word `%v` not found in reverse map", ErrInvalidMnemonic, v,
)
}
var wordBytes [2]byte
//nolint:gosec // the index of a word in the list is below 2048
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(wordBytes[:], uint16(index))
b = b.Mul(b, shift11BitsMask)
b = b.Or(b, big.NewInt(0).SetBytes(wordBytes[:]))
}
// Build and add the checksum to the big.Int.
checksum := big.NewInt(0)
checksumMask := wordLengthChecksumMasksMapping[len(mnemonicSlice)]
checksum = checksum.And(b, checksumMask)
b.Div(b, big.NewInt(0).Add(checksumMask, bigOne))
// The entropy is the underlying bytes of the big.Int. Any upper bytes of
// all 0's are not returned so we pad the beginning of the slice with empty
// bytes if necessary.
entropy := b.Bytes()
entropy = padByteSlice(entropy, len(mnemonicSlice)/3*4)
// Generate the checksum and compare with the one we got from the mneomnic.
entropyChecksumBytes := computeChecksum(entropy)
entropyChecksum := big.NewInt(int64(entropyChecksumBytes[0]))
if l := len(mnemonicSlice); l != 24 {
checksumShift := wordLengthChecksumShiftMapping[l]
entropyChecksum.Div(entropyChecksum, checksumShift)
}
if checksum.Cmp(entropyChecksum) != 0 {
return nil, ErrChecksumIncorrect
}
return entropy, nil
}
// NewMnemonic will return a string consisting of the mnemonic words for
// the given entropy.
// If the provide entropy is invalid, an error will be returned.
func NewMnemonic(entropy []byte) (string, error) {
// Compute some lengths for convenience.
entropyBitLength := len(entropy) * 8
checksumBitLength := entropyBitLength / 32
sentenceLength := (entropyBitLength + checksumBitLength) / 11
// Validate that the requested size is supported.
err := validateEntropyBitSize(entropyBitLength)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Some bitwise operands for working with big.Ints
last11BitsMask := big.NewInt(2047)
shift11BitsMask := big.NewInt(2048)
// wordList is the set of words to use
wordList := English()
// Add checksum to entropy.
entropy = addChecksum(entropy)
// Break entropy up into sentenceLength chunks of 11 bits.
// For each word AND mask the rightmost 11 bits and find the word at that index.
// Then bitshift entropy 11 bits right and repeat.
// Add to the last empty slot so we can work with LSBs instead of MSB.
// Entropy as an int so we can bitmask without worrying about bytes slices.
entropyInt := new(big.Int).SetBytes(entropy)
// Slice to hold words in.
words := make([]string, sentenceLength)
// Throw away big.Int for AND masking.
word := big.NewInt(0)
for i := sentenceLength - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
// Get 11 right most bits and bitshift 11 to the right for next time.
word.And(entropyInt, last11BitsMask)
entropyInt.Div(entropyInt, shift11BitsMask)
// Get the bytes representing the 11 bits as a 2 byte slice.
wordBytes := padByteSlice(word.Bytes(), 2)
// Convert bytes to an index and add that word to the list.
words[i] = wordList[binary.BigEndian.Uint16(wordBytes)]
}
return strings.Join(words, " "), nil
}
// NewSeed creates a hashed seed output given a provided string and password.
// No checking is performed to validate that the string provided is a valid mnemonic.
func NewSeed(mnemonic string, password string) []byte {
return pbkdf2.Key([]byte(mnemonic), []byte("mnemonic"+password), 2048, 64, sha512.New)
}
// IsMnemonicValid attempts to verify that the provided mnemonic is valid.
// Validity is determined by both the number of words being appropriate,
// and that all the words in the mnemonic are present in the word list.
func IsMnemonicValid(mnemonic string) bool {
_, err := EntropyFromMnemonic(mnemonic)
return err == nil
}
// Appends to data the first (len(data) / 32)bits of the result of sha256(data)
// Currently only supports data up to 32 bytes
func addChecksum(data []byte) []byte {
// Some bitwise operands for working with big.Ints
bigOne := big.NewInt(1)
bigTwo := big.NewInt(2)
// Get first byte of sha256
hash := computeChecksum(data)
firstChecksumByte := hash[0]
// len() is in bytes so we divide by 4
checksumBitLength := uint(len(data) / 4)
// For each bit of check sum we want we shift the data one the left
// and then set the (new) right most bit equal to checksum bit at that index
// staring from the left
dataBigInt := new(big.Int).SetBytes(data)
for i := range checksumBitLength {
// Bitshift 1 left
dataBigInt.Mul(dataBigInt, bigTwo)
// Set rightmost bit if leftmost checksum bit is set
if firstChecksumByte&(1<<(7-i)) > 0 {
dataBigInt.Or(dataBigInt, bigOne)
}
}
return dataBigInt.Bytes()
}
func computeChecksum(data []byte) []byte {
hasher := sha256.New()
hasher.Write(data)
return hasher.Sum(nil)
}
// validateEntropyBitSize ensures that entropy is the correct size for being a
// mnemonic.
func validateEntropyBitSize(bitSize int) error {
if (bitSize%32) != 0 || bitSize < 128 || bitSize > 256 {
return ErrEntropyLengthInvalid
}
return nil
}
// padByteSlice returns a byte slice of the given size with contents of the
// given slice left padded and any empty spaces filled with 0's.
func padByteSlice(slice []byte, length int) []byte {
offset := length - len(slice)
if offset <= 0 {
return slice
}
newSlice := make([]byte, length)
copy(newSlice[offset:], slice)
return newSlice
}
func splitMnemonicWords(mnemonic string) ([]string, bool) {
// Create a list of all the words in the mnemonic sentence
words := strings.Fields(mnemonic)
// Get num of words
numOfWords := len(words)
// The number of words should be 12, 15, 18, 21 or 24
if numOfWords%3 != 0 || numOfWords < 12 || numOfWords > 24 {
return nil, false
}
return words, true
}
-456
View File
@@ -1,456 +0,0 @@
package bip39
import (
"encoding/hex"
"testing"
)
type vector struct {
entropy string
mnemonic string
seed string
}
func TestNewMnemonic(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, vector := range testVectors() {
entropy, err := hex.DecodeString(vector.entropy)
assertNil(t, err)
mnemonic, err := NewMnemonic(entropy)
assertNil(t, err)
assertEqualString(t, vector.mnemonic, mnemonic)
seed := NewSeed(mnemonic, "TREZOR")
assertEqualString(t, vector.seed, hex.EncodeToString(seed))
}
}
func TestNewMnemonicInvalidEntropy(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := NewMnemonic([]byte{})
assertNotNil(t, err)
}
func TestIsMnemonicValid(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, vector := range badMnemonicSentences() {
assertFalse(t, IsMnemonicValid(vector.mnemonic))
}
for _, vector := range testVectors() {
assertTrue(t, IsMnemonicValid(vector.mnemonic))
}
}
func TestNewEntropy(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Good tests.
for i := 128; i <= 256; i += 32 {
_, err := NewEntropy(i)
assertNil(t, err)
}
// Bad Values
for i := range 257 {
if i%8 != 0 {
_, err := NewEntropy(i)
assertNotNil(t, err)
}
}
}
func TestPadByteSlice(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertEqualByteSlices(t, []byte{0}, padByteSlice([]byte{}, 1))
assertEqualByteSlices(t, []byte{0, 1}, padByteSlice([]byte{1}, 2))
assertEqualByteSlices(t, []byte{1, 1}, padByteSlice([]byte{1, 1}, 2))
assertEqualByteSlices(t, []byte{1, 1, 1}, padByteSlice([]byte{1, 1, 1}, 2))
}
//nolint:funlen // the test vectors, kept as upstream wrote them
func TestMnemonicToByteArrayForZeroLeadingSeeds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ms := []string{
"00000000000000000000000000000000",
"00a84c51041d49acca66e6160c1fa999",
"00ca45df1673c76537a2020bfed1dafd",
"0019d5871c7b81fd83d474ef1c1e1dae",
"00dcb021afb35ffcdd1d032d2056fc86",
"0062be7bd09a27288b6cf0eb565ec739",
"00dc705b5efa0adf25b9734226ba60d4",
"0017747418d54c6003fa64fade83374b",
"000d44d3ee7c3dfa45e608c65384431b",
"008241c1ef976b0323061affe5bf24b9",
"00a6aec77e4d16bea80b50a34991aaba",
"0011527b8c6ddecb9d0c20beccdeb58d",
"001c938c503c8f5a2bba2248ff621546",
"0002f90aaf7a8327698f0031b6317c36",
"00bff43071ed7e07f77b14f615993bac",
"00da143e00ef17fc63b6fb22dcc2c326",
"00ffc6764fb32a354cab1a3ddefb015d",
"0062ef47e0985e8953f24760b7598cdd",
"003bf9765064f71d304908d906c065f5",
"00993851503471439d154b3613947474",
"007ad0ffe9eae753a483a76af06dfa67",
"00091824db9ec19e663bee51d64c83cc",
"00f48ac621f7e3cb39b2012ac3121543",
"0072917415cdca24dfa66c4a92c885b4",
"0027ced2b279ea8a91d29364487cdbf4",
"00b9c0d37fb10ba272e55842ad812583",
"004b3d0d2b9285946c687a5350479c8c",
"00c7c12a37d3a7f8c1532b17c89b724c",
"00f400c5545f06ae17ad00f3041e4e26",
"001e290be10df4d209f247ac5878662b",
"00bf0f74568e582a7dd1ee64f792ec8b",
"00d2e43ecde6b72b847db1539ed89e23",
"00cecba6678505bb7bfec8ed307251f6",
"000aeed1a9edcbb4bc88f610d3ce84eb",
"00d06206aadfc25c2b21805d283f15ae",
"00a31789a2ab2d54f8fadd5331010287",
"003493c5f520e8d5c0483e895a121dc9",
"004706112800b76001ece2e268bc830e",
"00ab31e28bb5305be56e38337dbfa486",
"006872fe85df6b0fa945248e6f9379d1",
"00717e5e375da6934e3cfdf57edaf3bd",
"007f1b46e7b9c4c76e77c434b9bccd6b",
"00dc93735aa35def3b9a2ff676560205",
"002cd5dcd881a49c7b87714c6a570a76",
"0013b5af9e13fac87e0c505686cfb6bf",
"007ab1ec9526b0bc04b64ae65fd42631",
"00abb4e11d8385c1cca905a6a65e9144",
"00574fc62a0501ad8afada2e246708c3",
"005207e0a815bb2da6b4c35ec1f2bf52",
"00f3460f136fb9700080099cbd62bc18",
"007a591f204c03ca7b93981237112526",
"00cfe0befd428f8e5f83a5bfc801472e",
"00987551ac7a879bf0c09b8bc474d9af",
"00cadd3ce3d78e49fbc933a85682df3f",
"00bfbf2e346c855ccc360d03281455a1",
"004cdf55d429d028f715544ce22d4f31",
"0075c84a7d15e0ac85e1e41025eed23b",
"00807dddd61f71725d336cab844d2cb5",
"00422f21b77fe20e367467ed98c18410",
"00b44d0ac622907119c626c850a462fd",
"00363f5e7f22fc49f3cd662a28956563",
"000fe5837e68397bbf58db9f221bdc4e",
"0056af33835c888ef0c22599686445d3",
"00790a8647fd3dfb38b7e2b6f578f2c6",
"00da8d9009675cb7beec930e263014fb",
"00d4b384540a5bb54aa760edaa4fb2fe",
"00be9b1479ed680fdd5d91a41eb926d0",
"009182347502af97077c40a6e74b4b5c",
"00f5c90ee1c67fa77fd821f8e9fab4f1",
"005568f9a2dd6b0c0cc2f5ba3d9cac38",
"008b481f8678577d9cf6aa3f6cd6056b",
"00c4323ece5e4fe3b6cd4c5c932931af",
"009791f7550c3798c5a214cb2d0ea773",
"008a7baab22481f0ad8167dd9f90d55c",
"00f0e601519aafdc8ff94975e64c946d",
"0083b61e0daa9219df59d697c270cd31",
}
for _, m := range ms {
seed, _ := hex.DecodeString(m)
mnemonic, err := NewMnemonic(seed)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("%v", err)
}
_, err = EntropyFromMnemonic(mnemonic)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Failed for %x - %v", seed, mnemonic)
}
}
}
func TestEntropyFromMnemonic128(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
testEntropyFromMnemonic(t, 128)
}
func TestEntropyFromMnemonic160(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
testEntropyFromMnemonic(t, 160)
}
func TestEntropyFromMnemonic192(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
testEntropyFromMnemonic(t, 192)
}
func TestEntropyFromMnemonic224(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
testEntropyFromMnemonic(t, 224)
}
func TestEntropyFromMnemonic256(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
testEntropyFromMnemonic(t, 256)
}
//nolint:dupword,lll // the test vector, kept as upstream wrote it
func TestEntropyFromMnemonicInvalidChecksum(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := EntropyFromMnemonic("abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon yellow")
assertEqual(t, ErrChecksumIncorrect, err)
}
//nolint:dupword // the test vectors, kept as upstream wrote them
func TestEntropyFromMnemonicInvalidMnemonicSize(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, mnemonic := range []string{
"a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a", // Too many words
"a", // Too few
"a a a a a a a a a a a a a a", // Not multiple of 3
} {
_, err := EntropyFromMnemonic(mnemonic)
assertEqual(t, ErrInvalidMnemonic, err)
}
}
func testEntropyFromMnemonic(t *testing.T, bitSize int) {
t.Helper()
for range 512 {
expectedEntropy, err := NewEntropy(bitSize)
assertNil(t, err)
assertTrue(t, len(expectedEntropy) != 0)
mnemonic, err := NewMnemonic(expectedEntropy)
assertNil(t, err)
assertTrue(t, len(mnemonic) != 0)
actualEntropy, err := EntropyFromMnemonic(mnemonic)
assertNil(t, err)
assertEqualByteSlices(t, expectedEntropy, actualEntropy)
}
}
//nolint:dupword,funlen,lll // the BIP-39 test vectors, kept as upstream wrote them
func testVectors() []vector {
return []vector{
{
entropy: "00000000000000000000000000000000",
mnemonic: "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about",
seed: "c55257c360c07c72029aebc1b53c05ed0362ada38ead3e3e9efa3708e53495531f09a6987599d18264c1e1c92f2cf141630c7a3c4ab7c81b2f001698e7463b04",
},
{
entropy: "7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f",
mnemonic: "legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thank yellow",
seed: "2e8905819b8723fe2c1d161860e5ee1830318dbf49a83bd451cfb8440c28bd6fa457fe1296106559a3c80937a1c1069be3a3a5bd381ee6260e8d9739fce1f607",
},
{
entropy: "80808080808080808080808080808080",
mnemonic: "letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic avoid letter advice cage above",
seed: "d71de856f81a8acc65e6fc851a38d4d7ec216fd0796d0a6827a3ad6ed5511a30fa280f12eb2e47ed2ac03b5c462a0358d18d69fe4f985ec81778c1b370b652a8",
},
{
entropy: "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
mnemonic: "zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo wrong",
seed: "ac27495480225222079d7be181583751e86f571027b0497b5b5d11218e0a8a13332572917f0f8e5a589620c6f15b11c61dee327651a14c34e18231052e48c069",
},
{
entropy: "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
mnemonic: "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon agent",
seed: "035895f2f481b1b0f01fcf8c289c794660b289981a78f8106447707fdd9666ca06da5a9a565181599b79f53b844d8a71dd9f439c52a3d7b3e8a79c906ac845fa",
},
{
entropy: "7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f",
mnemonic: "legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal will",
seed: "f2b94508732bcbacbcc020faefecfc89feafa6649a5491b8c952cede496c214a0c7b3c392d168748f2d4a612bada0753b52a1c7ac53c1e93abd5c6320b9e95dd",
},
{
entropy: "808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080",
mnemonic: "letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic avoid letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic avoid letter always",
seed: "107d7c02a5aa6f38c58083ff74f04c607c2d2c0ecc55501dadd72d025b751bc27fe913ffb796f841c49b1d33b610cf0e91d3aa239027f5e99fe4ce9e5088cd65",
},
{
entropy: "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
mnemonic: "zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo when",
seed: "0cd6e5d827bb62eb8fc1e262254223817fd068a74b5b449cc2f667c3f1f985a76379b43348d952e2265b4cd129090758b3e3c2c49103b5051aac2eaeb890a528",
},
{
entropy: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
mnemonic: "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon art",
seed: "bda85446c68413707090a52022edd26a1c9462295029f2e60cd7c4f2bbd3097170af7a4d73245cafa9c3cca8d561a7c3de6f5d4a10be8ed2a5e608d68f92fcc8",
},
{
entropy: "7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f",
mnemonic: "legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thank year wave sausage worth title",
seed: "bc09fca1804f7e69da93c2f2028eb238c227f2e9dda30cd63699232578480a4021b146ad717fbb7e451ce9eb835f43620bf5c514db0f8add49f5d121449d3e87",
},
{
entropy: "8080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080",
mnemonic: "letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic avoid letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic avoid letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic bless",
seed: "c0c519bd0e91a2ed54357d9d1ebef6f5af218a153624cf4f2da911a0ed8f7a09e2ef61af0aca007096df430022f7a2b6fb91661a9589097069720d015e4e982f",
},
{
entropy: "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
mnemonic: "zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo vote",
seed: "dd48c104698c30cfe2b6142103248622fb7bb0ff692eebb00089b32d22484e1613912f0a5b694407be899ffd31ed3992c456cdf60f5d4564b8ba3f05a69890ad",
},
{
entropy: "77c2b00716cec7213839159e404db50d",
mnemonic: "jelly better achieve collect unaware mountain thought cargo oxygen act hood bridge",
seed: "b5b6d0127db1a9d2226af0c3346031d77af31e918dba64287a1b44b8ebf63cdd52676f672a290aae502472cf2d602c051f3e6f18055e84e4c43897fc4e51a6ff",
},
{
entropy: "b63a9c59a6e641f288ebc103017f1da9f8290b3da6bdef7b",
mnemonic: "renew stay biology evidence goat welcome casual join adapt armor shuffle fault little machine walk stumble urge swap",
seed: "9248d83e06f4cd98debf5b6f010542760df925ce46cf38a1bdb4e4de7d21f5c39366941c69e1bdbf2966e0f6e6dbece898a0e2f0a4c2b3e640953dfe8b7bbdc5",
},
{
entropy: "3e141609b97933b66a060dcddc71fad1d91677db872031e85f4c015c5e7e8982",
mnemonic: "dignity pass list indicate nasty swamp pool script soccer toe leaf photo multiply desk host tomato cradle drill spread actor shine dismiss champion exotic",
seed: "ff7f3184df8696d8bef94b6c03114dbee0ef89ff938712301d27ed8336ca89ef9635da20af07d4175f2bf5f3de130f39c9d9e8dd0472489c19b1a020a940da67",
},
{
entropy: "0460ef47585604c5660618db2e6a7e7f",
mnemonic: "afford alter spike radar gate glance object seek swamp infant panel yellow",
seed: "65f93a9f36b6c85cbe634ffc1f99f2b82cbb10b31edc7f087b4f6cb9e976e9faf76ff41f8f27c99afdf38f7a303ba1136ee48a4c1e7fcd3dba7aa876113a36e4",
},
{
entropy: "72f60ebac5dd8add8d2a25a797102c3ce21bc029c200076f",
mnemonic: "indicate race push merry suffer human cruise dwarf pole review arch keep canvas theme poem divorce alter left",
seed: "3bbf9daa0dfad8229786ace5ddb4e00fa98a044ae4c4975ffd5e094dba9e0bb289349dbe2091761f30f382d4e35c4a670ee8ab50758d2c55881be69e327117ba",
},
{
entropy: "2c85efc7f24ee4573d2b81a6ec66cee209b2dcbd09d8eddc51e0215b0b68e416",
mnemonic: "clutch control vehicle tonight unusual clog visa ice plunge glimpse recipe series open hour vintage deposit universe tip job dress radar refuse motion taste",
seed: "fe908f96f46668b2d5b37d82f558c77ed0d69dd0e7e043a5b0511c48c2f1064694a956f86360c93dd04052a8899497ce9e985ebe0c8c52b955e6ae86d4ff4449",
},
{
entropy: "eaebabb2383351fd31d703840b32e9e2",
mnemonic: "turtle front uncle idea crush write shrug there lottery flower risk shell",
seed: "bdfb76a0759f301b0b899a1e3985227e53b3f51e67e3f2a65363caedf3e32fde42a66c404f18d7b05818c95ef3ca1e5146646856c461c073169467511680876c",
},
{
entropy: "7ac45cfe7722ee6c7ba84fbc2d5bd61b45cb2fe5eb65aa78",
mnemonic: "kiss carry display unusual confirm curtain upgrade antique rotate hello void custom frequent obey nut hole price segment",
seed: "ed56ff6c833c07982eb7119a8f48fd363c4a9b1601cd2de736b01045c5eb8ab4f57b079403485d1c4924f0790dc10a971763337cb9f9c62226f64fff26397c79",
},
{
entropy: "4fa1a8bc3e6d80ee1316050e862c1812031493212b7ec3f3bb1b08f168cabeef",
mnemonic: "exile ask congress lamp submit jacket era scheme attend cousin alcohol catch course end lucky hurt sentence oven short ball bird grab wing top",
seed: "095ee6f817b4c2cb30a5a797360a81a40ab0f9a4e25ecd672a3f58a0b5ba0687c096a6b14d2c0deb3bdefce4f61d01ae07417d502429352e27695163f7447a8c",
},
{
entropy: "18ab19a9f54a9274f03e5209a2ac8a91",
mnemonic: "board flee heavy tunnel powder denial science ski answer betray cargo cat",
seed: "6eff1bb21562918509c73cb990260db07c0ce34ff0e3cc4a8cb3276129fbcb300bddfe005831350efd633909f476c45c88253276d9fd0df6ef48609e8bb7dca8",
},
{
entropy: "18a2e1d81b8ecfb2a333adcb0c17a5b9eb76cc5d05db91a4",
mnemonic: "board blade invite damage undo sun mimic interest slam gaze truly inherit resist great inject rocket museum chief",
seed: "f84521c777a13b61564234bf8f8b62b3afce27fc4062b51bb5e62bdfecb23864ee6ecf07c1d5a97c0834307c5c852d8ceb88e7c97923c0a3b496bedd4e5f88a9",
},
{
entropy: "15da872c95a13dd738fbf50e427583ad61f18fd99f628c417a61cf8343c90419",
mnemonic: "beyond stage sleep clip because twist token leaf atom beauty genius food business side grid unable middle armed observe pair crouch tonight away coconut",
seed: "b15509eaa2d09d3efd3e006ef42151b30367dc6e3aa5e44caba3fe4d3e352e65101fbdb86a96776b91946ff06f8eac594dc6ee1d3e82a42dfe1b40fef6bcc3fd",
},
}
}
//nolint:dupword,lll // the test vectors, kept as upstream wrote them
func badMnemonicSentences() []vector {
return []vector{
{mnemonic: "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon"},
{mnemonic: "legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thank yellow yellow"},
{mnemonic: "letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic avoid letter advice caged above"},
{mnemonic: "zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo, wrong"},
{mnemonic: "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon"},
{mnemonic: "legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal will will will"},
{mnemonic: "letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic avoid letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic avoid letter always."},
{mnemonic: "zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo why"},
{mnemonic: "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon art art"},
{mnemonic: "legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thanks year wave worth useful legal winner thank year wave sausage worth title"},
{mnemonic: "letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic avoid letters advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic avoid letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic bless"},
{mnemonic: "zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo zoo voted"},
{mnemonic: "jello better achieve collect unaware mountain thought cargo oxygen act hood bridge"},
{mnemonic: "renew, stay, biology, evidence, goat, welcome, casual, join, adapt, armor, shuffle, fault, little, machine, walk, stumble, urge, swap"},
{mnemonic: "dignity pass list indicate nasty"},
// From issue 32
{mnemonic: "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon letter"},
}
}
func assertNil(t *testing.T, object any) {
t.Helper()
if object != nil {
t.Errorf("Expected nil, got %v", object)
}
}
func assertNotNil(t *testing.T, object any) {
t.Helper()
if object == nil {
t.Error("Expected not nil")
}
}
func assertTrue(t *testing.T, a bool) {
t.Helper()
if !a {
t.Error("Expected true, got false")
}
}
func assertFalse(t *testing.T, a bool) {
t.Helper()
if a {
t.Error("Expected false, got true")
}
}
func assertEqual(t *testing.T, a, b any) {
t.Helper()
if a != b {
t.Errorf("Objects not equal, expected `%s` and got `%s`", a, b)
}
}
func assertEqualString(t *testing.T, a, b string) {
t.Helper()
if a != b {
t.Errorf("Strings not equal, expected `%s` and got `%s`", a, b)
}
}
func assertEqualByteSlices(t *testing.T, a, b []byte) {
t.Helper()
if len(a) != len(b) {
t.Errorf("Byte slices not equal, expected %v and got %v", a, b)
return
}
for i := range a {
if a[i] != b[i] {
t.Errorf("Byte slices not equal, expected %v and got %v", a, b)
return
}
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-19
View File
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
package bip39
import (
"hash/crc32"
"testing"
)
func TestEnglishChecksum(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Ensure word list is correct
// $ wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bitcoin/bips/master/bip-0039/english.txt
// $ crc32 english.txt
// c1dbd296
checksum := crc32.ChecksumIEEE([]byte(english))
if checksum != 0xc1dbd296 {
t.Error("english checksum invalid")
}
}
-30
View File
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
package bip39_test
import (
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/bip39"
)
//nolint:lll // the test vector and its output, kept as upstream wrote them
func ExampleNewMnemonic() {
// the entropy can be any byte slice, generated how pleased,
// as long its bit size is a multiple of 32 and is within
// the inclusive range of {128,256}
entropy, _ := hex.DecodeString("066dca1a2bb7e8a1db2832148ce9933eea0f3ac9548d793112d9a95c9407efad")
// generate a mnemomic
mnemomic, _ := bip39.NewMnemonic(entropy)
fmt.Println(mnemomic)
// output:
// all hour make first leader extend hole alien behind guard gospel lava path output census museum junior mass reopen famous sing advance salt reform
}
//nolint:lll // the test vector and its output, kept as upstream wrote them
func ExampleNewSeed() {
seed := bip39.NewSeed("all hour make first leader extend hole alien behind guard gospel lava path output census museum junior mass reopen famous sing advance salt reform", "TREZOR")
fmt.Println(hex.EncodeToString(seed))
// output:
// 26e975ec644423f4a4c4f4215ef09b4bd7ef924e85d1d17c4cf3f136c2863cf6df0a475045652c57eb5fb41513ca2a2d67722b77e954b4b3fc11f7590449191d
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ import (
"io"
"os"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
// Instance encapsulates all CLI functionality and state
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
func TestCLIInstanceStateDir(t *testing.T) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ import (
"slices"
"strings"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// getSecretNamesCompletionFunc returns a completion function that provides
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import (
"os"
"strings"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"golang.org/x/term"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// Sentinel errors for asking the user to confirm a removal
+4 -4
View File
@@ -24,12 +24,12 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
const (
@@ -353,9 +353,9 @@ func TestRemovalWithoutTerminalFailsAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
// for its answer, another command can take the state directory lock and
// change the secret, and that the removal then removes nothing, since the
// secret is no longer what the question named.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // times commands against the in-memory lock all tests share
func TestRemovalAsksWithoutHoldingLock(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := newRemoval(t, "rm")
answers, answerWriter := io.Pipe()
+3 -37
View File
@@ -5,19 +5,17 @@ import (
"io"
"maps"
"os"
"os/exec"
"slices"
"strings"
"syscall"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// TestCreateExistingVaultChangesNothing is a regression test for
@@ -196,38 +194,6 @@ func TestStopAtPassphrasePromptLeavesNothing(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestMnemonicNotReadNamesOnlyMnemonic is a regression test for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/115: `secret init` without
// SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC and with no terminal said "failed to read mnemonic:
// failed to read passphrase: ...". The error must wrap
// secret.ErrMnemonicNotRead and name the mnemonic only. The message is
// pinned on the built binary, run in a new session, which has no terminal.
func TestMnemonicNotReadNamesOnlyMnemonic(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c := cli.NewCLIInstanceWithStateDir(afero.NewMemMapFs(), testStateDir)
require.ErrorIs(t, c.Init(discardCmd()), secret.ErrMnemonicNotRead)
stateDir := t.TempDir()
//nolint:gosec // G204: test executes the freshly built secret binary
cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), secretBinaryPath(t), "init")
cmd.Env = []string{
secret.EnvStateDir + "=" + stateDir,
"PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH"),
"HOME=" + os.Getenv("HOME"),
}
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setsid: true}
output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
require.Error(t, err)
require.Equal(t, "Initialized secrets manager at: "+stateDir+"\n"+
"Error: failed to read mnemonic: there is no terminal to ask on. "+
"Please set the SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC environment variable or run "+
"interactively\n", string(output))
}
// TestStopDuringCreateLeavesWholeVaultOrNone is a regression test for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/105: `secret init` or `secret vault
// create` killed after the passphrase prompt but before the unlocker was
+2 -2
View File
@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ import (
"os"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// Sentinel errors for encrypt/decrypt operations
+4 -3
View File
@@ -8,12 +8,13 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
// Entry must return its exit code rather than exit, so that its deferred
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ func TestInterruptExitsThroughMemguard(t *testing.T) {
const waitingForValue = "Reading secret value from stdin"
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), commandWait)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
wd, err := filepath.Abs("../..")
+2 -2
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ package cli_test
import (
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// TestMissingSecretOrVaultErrors checks that a command that finds no such
+3 -3
View File
@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ import (
"math/big"
"os"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/bip39"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/tyler-smith/go-bip39"
)
const (
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ func (cli *Instance) GenerateMnemonic(cmd *cobra.Command) error {
}
// Output mnemonic to stdout
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), mnemonic)
cmd.Println(mnemonic)
// Output helpful information to stderr
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "")
+1 -1
View File
@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
"github.com/fatih/color"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// Version info - these are set at build time
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
// vaultStats accumulates statistics while walking vault directories
+9 -6
View File
@@ -5,13 +5,14 @@ import (
"fmt"
"log"
"log/slog"
"os"
"strings"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/bip39"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/tyler-smith/go-bip39"
)
// errPassphraseMismatch is returned when passphrase confirmation fails
@@ -54,13 +55,15 @@ func (cli *Instance) promptMnemonic() (*memguard.LockedBuffer, func(), error) {
secret.Debug("Prompting user for mnemonic phrase")
// Read mnemonic securely without echo
mnemonicBuffer, err := secret.ReadMnemonic("Enter your BIP39 mnemonic phrase: ")
mnemonicBuffer, err := secret.ReadPassphrase("Enter your BIP39 mnemonic phrase: ")
if err != nil {
secret.Debug("Failed to read mnemonic", "error", err)
secret.Debug("Failed to read mnemonic from stdin", "error", err)
return nil, nil, err
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read mnemonic: %w", err)
}
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr) // Add newline after hidden input
return mnemonicBuffer, mnemonicBuffer.Destroy, nil
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ package cli
import (
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// TestInvalidMnemonicError checks that every command that takes a mnemonic
+12 -42
View File
@@ -17,27 +17,21 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/creack/pty"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/pkg/agehd"
)
const (
// testMnemonic is a standard BIP39 mnemonic used for testing
//nolint:dupword // BIP39 test mnemonic intentionally repeats a word
testMnemonic = "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about"
// commandWait is how long a test lets the secret binary run before it
// kills it and fails. It stays well under the 30 seconds script/test
// gives the whole package, so a command that hangs fails the test with
// the test's own message instead of Go's timeout panic.
commandWait = 10 * time.Second
)
// errEmptyValue indicates a concurrent reader received an empty secret value.
@@ -58,12 +52,8 @@ func runSecretWithStdin(stdin string, env map[string]string, args ...string) (st
return cli.ExecuteCommandInProcess(args, stdin, env)
}
// TestMain runs before all tests and ensures the binary is built. It also
// makes passphrase encryption in the tests cheap (see
// secret.ScryptWorkFactor); the binary keeps age's work factor.
// TestMain runs before all tests and ensures the binary is built
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
secret.ScryptWorkFactor = 1
// Get the current working directory
wd, err := os.Getwd()
if err != nil {
@@ -2589,7 +2579,7 @@ func TestRemoveWithoutTerminalFailsAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
_ = stdin.Close()
}()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), commandWait)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
cmd, secretDir := secretRmCommand(ctx, t)
@@ -2607,13 +2597,7 @@ func TestRemoveWithoutTerminalFailsAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
// and stderr, not both: whether it asks must depend on stdin alone, where
// the answer is read from. pty.Open returns the two ends of a new terminal:
// tty is the end a program uses as its terminal, and ptmx the end the test
// reads what the terminal shows from and types into. Reading ptmx stops at
// the context's deadline, commandWait (10 seconds) after the test starts,
// when secret rm is killed too, so a terminal that stays open fails the test
// then with its own message instead of hanging it. The deadline works only
// while ptmx stays non-blocking, as pty.Open of the github.com/creack/pty
// commit in go.mod leaves it: calling ptmx.Fd() or going back to v1.1.24
// makes the read ignore the deadline, without any error.
// reads what the terminal shows from and types into.
// TestRemoveIgnoresTerminalOnStdout runs `echo y | secret rm x` at a
// terminal. stdin is a pipe, so nobody can answer there, and the command
@@ -2621,7 +2605,7 @@ func TestRemoveWithoutTerminalFailsAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
func TestRemoveIgnoresTerminalOnStdout(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), commandWait)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
cmd, secretDir := secretRmCommand(ctx, t)
@@ -2631,9 +2615,6 @@ func TestRemoveIgnoresTerminalOnStdout(t *testing.T) {
defer func() { _ = ptmx.Close() }()
deadline, _ := ctx.Deadline()
require.NoError(t, ptmx.SetReadDeadline(deadline))
cmd.Stdin = strings.NewReader("y\n")
cmd.Stdout = tty
cmd.Stderr = tty
@@ -2643,16 +2624,9 @@ func TestRemoveIgnoresTerminalOnStdout(t *testing.T) {
_ = tty.Close()
// The read ends once secret rm has exited and so closed the terminal.
shown, err := io.ReadAll(ptmx)
require.NotErrorIs(t, err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded,
"the terminal was still open %s after secret rm started: %s",
commandWait, shown)
shown, _ := io.ReadAll(ptmx)
err = cmd.Wait()
require.NoError(t, ctx.Err(), "secret rm did not exit within %s",
commandWait)
require.Error(t, err)
require.Error(t, cmd.Wait())
assert.Contains(t, string(shown), "pass --force")
assert.DirExists(t, secretDir)
}
@@ -2662,7 +2636,7 @@ func TestRemoveIgnoresTerminalOnStdout(t *testing.T) {
func TestRemoveAsksAtTerminalOnStdin(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), commandWait)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
cmd, secretDir := secretRmCommand(ctx, t)
@@ -2672,9 +2646,6 @@ func TestRemoveAsksAtTerminalOnStdin(t *testing.T) {
defer func() { _ = ptmx.Close() }()
deadline, _ := ctx.Deadline()
require.NoError(t, ptmx.SetReadDeadline(deadline))
cmd.Stdin = tty
// Not a file, so exec.Cmd connects stdout through a pipe.
cmd.Stdout = io.Discard
@@ -2692,8 +2663,7 @@ func TestRemoveAsksAtTerminalOnStdin(t *testing.T) {
terminal := bufio.NewReader(ptmx)
for !bytes.HasSuffix(shown, []byte("[y/N] ")) {
char, err = terminal.ReadByte()
require.NoError(t, err, "secret rm did not ask on the terminal: %s",
shown)
require.NoError(t, err, "secret rm ended without asking: %s", shown)
shown = append(shown, char)
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ import (
"io"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// TestLeftoversRemovedByNextChangingCommand is a regression test for
-161
View File
@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
package cli_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
const (
// listClockStep is how long TestListShowsWhenSecretWasWritten waits
// between its steps, so that a time read in one step cannot be the
// time read in the next.
listClockStep = 200 * time.Millisecond
// fileTimeSlack allows for the clock the kernel stamps files with,
// which advances only every few milliseconds: a file's modification
// time can be slightly earlier than a time.Now() read before the file
// was written.
fileTimeSlack = 100 * time.Millisecond
)
// TestListShowsWhenSecretWasWritten is a regression test for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/142, where `secret list` gave
// the time of the listing as every secret's creation and last-update time.
// Two listings with a clock step between must be the same, and give the
// time of the add; after a forced add, the creation time is unchanged and
// the last update is the time of that add. It runs on a real filesystem,
// where writing a file into a directory also changes the directory's time.
func TestListShowsWhenSecretWasWritten(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
stateDir := t.TempDir()
vlt, err := vault.CreateVault(fs, stateDir, "default", testMnemonicBuffer(t), nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
vlt.Mnemonic = testMnemonicBuffer(t)
c := cli.NewCLIInstanceWithStateDir(fs, stateDir)
beforeAdd := time.Now()
err = vlt.AddSecret("x", memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("one")), false)
require.NoError(t, err)
afterAdd := time.Now()
firstListing := listSecrets(t, c, true)
time.Sleep(listClockStep)
require.Equal(t, firstListing, listSecrets(t, c, true))
added := listedTimes(t, firstListing)
assert.WithinRange(t, added.CreatedAt, beforeAdd.Add(-fileTimeSlack), afterAdd)
assert.WithinRange(t, added.UpdatedAt, beforeAdd.Add(-fileTimeSlack), afterAdd)
time.Sleep(listClockStep)
beforeUpdate := time.Now()
err = vlt.AddSecret("x", memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("two")), true)
require.NoError(t, err)
afterUpdate := time.Now()
updated := listedTimes(t, listSecrets(t, c, true))
assert.True(t, added.CreatedAt.Equal(updated.CreatedAt),
"created %s, then %s", added.CreatedAt, updated.CreatedAt)
assert.WithinRange(t, updated.UpdatedAt,
beforeUpdate.Add(-fileTimeSlack), afterUpdate)
// The table's LAST UPDATED column gives the same time, to the minute
assert.Contains(t, listSecrets(t, c, false),
updated.UpdatedAt.Format("2006-01-02 15:04"))
}
// TestMovedSecretKeepsItsTimes checks that a secret moved to another vault
// is listed there with the times it was listed with before the move, and
// not with the time of the move.
func TestMovedSecretKeepsItsTimes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewOsFs()
stateDir := t.TempDir()
_, err := vault.CreateVault(fs, stateDir, "other", testMnemonicBuffer(t), nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
// "default" is created last, so it is the current vault
vlt, err := vault.CreateVault(fs, stateDir, "default", testMnemonicBuffer(t), nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
vlt.Mnemonic = testMnemonicBuffer(t)
// Two versions written apart, so that the creation and the last update
// are different times
err = vlt.AddSecret("x", memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("one")), false)
require.NoError(t, err)
time.Sleep(listClockStep)
err = vlt.AddSecret("x", memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("two")), true)
require.NoError(t, err)
c := cli.NewCLIInstanceWithStateDir(fs, stateDir)
c.Mnemonic = testMnemonicBuffer(t)
beforeMove := listedTimes(t, listSecrets(t, c, true))
time.Sleep(listClockStep)
require.NoError(t, c.MoveSecret(&cobra.Command{}, "default:x", "other", false))
require.NoError(t, vault.SelectVault(fs, stateDir, "other"))
afterMove := listedTimes(t, listSecrets(t, c, true))
assert.True(t, beforeMove.CreatedAt.Equal(afterMove.CreatedAt),
"created %s, then %s", beforeMove.CreatedAt, afterMove.CreatedAt)
assert.True(t, beforeMove.UpdatedAt.Equal(afterMove.UpdatedAt),
"updated %s, then %s", beforeMove.UpdatedAt, afterMove.UpdatedAt)
}
// listSecrets returns the output of `secret list`, or of
// `secret list --json` when jsonOutput is set.
func listSecrets(t *testing.T, c *cli.Instance, jsonOutput bool) string {
t.Helper()
var out bytes.Buffer
cmd := &cobra.Command{}
cmd.SetOut(&out)
require.NoError(t, c.ListSecrets(cmd, jsonOutput, false, ""))
return out.String()
}
// listedTimes returns the times that the output of `secret list --json`
// gives for the one secret in the vault.
func listedTimes(t *testing.T, listing string) secret.Metadata {
t.Helper()
var parsed struct {
Secrets []map[string]string `json:"secrets"`
}
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(listing), &parsed))
require.Len(t, parsed.Secrets, 1)
createdAt, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, parsed.Secrets[0]["created_at"])
require.NoError(t, err)
updatedAt, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, parsed.Secrets[0]["updated_at"])
require.NoError(t, err)
return secret.Metadata{CreatedAt: createdAt, UpdatedAt: updatedAt}
}
+6 -8
View File
@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
const (
@@ -94,9 +94,9 @@ func numbered(prefix string, count int) []string {
// lock, adds of a new secret all find it absent and replace each other, and
// forced adds read the same highest version number and overwrite each
// other's version. With it they behave as if run one after another.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // times commands against the in-memory lock all tests share
func TestConcurrentAddsKeepEveryVersion(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mnemonic := testMnemonicBuffer(t)
const adds = 8
@@ -110,8 +110,6 @@ func TestConcurrentAddsKeepEveryVersion(t *testing.T) {
{"real", afero.NewOsFs(), t.TempDir()},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := vault.CreateVault(tc.fs, tc.stateDir, "default", mnemonic, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -237,9 +235,9 @@ func TestEncryptPipedIntoAdd(t *testing.T) {
// TestFailedCommandReleasesLock checks that a command failing after it
// took the state directory lock leaves the lock free for the next command.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // times commands against the in-memory lock all tests share
func TestFailedCommandReleasesLock(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
cli := NewCLIInstanceWithStateDir(fs, testStateDir)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// TestRejectedMoveWithinVaultLeavesStateUnchanged is a regression test for
-204
View File
@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
package cli_test
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"context"
"io"
"os"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"syscall"
"testing"
"filippo.io/age"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/creack/pty"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// TestPassphraseAskedAtTerminalWithPipedStdin is a regression test for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/144: run at a terminal with stdin
// a pipe, as in `echo v2 | secret add s1 --force`, a command that needed
// the passphrase failed instead of asking for it. Each command here must ask
// on the terminal and succeed once the passphrase is typed there.
func TestPassphraseAskedAtTerminalWithPipedStdin(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
stateDir := t.TempDir()
passphrase := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(testPassphrase))
defer passphrase.Destroy()
vlt, err := vault.CreateVault(afero.NewOsFs(), stateDir, "default",
testMnemonicBuffer(t), passphrase)
require.NoError(t, err)
value := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("v1"))
defer value.Destroy()
require.NoError(t, vlt.AddSecret("s1", value, false))
identity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
require.NoError(t, err)
key := secret.IdentityToLockedBuffer(identity)
defer key.Destroy()
require.NoError(t, vlt.AddSecret("mykey", key, false))
runAtTerminal(t, stateDir, "v2\n", "add", "s1", "--force")
vlt.UnlockPassphrase = passphrase
added, err := vlt.GetSecret("s1")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer added.Destroy()
assert.Equal(t, "v2", added.String())
encrypted := runAtTerminal(t, stateDir, "a document\n", "encrypt", "mykey")
decrypted := runAtTerminal(t, stateDir, encrypted, "decrypt", "mykey")
assert.Equal(t, "a document\n", decrypted)
}
// TestInitWritesNoBlankLineAfterMnemonic runs `secret init 2>log` at a
// terminal: the terminal is its controlling terminal and none of stdin,
// stdout and stderr. The mnemonic is typed on the terminal and the prompt
// ends its line there, so stderr must not get a newline for it as well, a
// blank line in the log. pty.Open is described above
// TestRemoveIgnoresTerminalOnStdout.
func TestInitWritesNoBlankLineAfterMnemonic(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), commandWait)
defer cancel()
stateDir := t.TempDir()
//nolint:gosec // G204: test executes the freshly built secret binary
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, secretBinaryPath(t), "init")
cmd.Env = []string{
secret.EnvStateDir + "=" + stateDir,
secret.EnvUnlockPassphrase + "=" + testPassphrase,
"PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH"),
"HOME=" + os.Getenv("HOME"),
}
ptmx, tty, err := pty.Open()
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = ptmx.Close() }()
deadline, _ := ctx.Deadline()
require.NoError(t, ptmx.SetReadDeadline(deadline))
var stderr strings.Builder
cmd.Stderr = &stderr
cmd.ExtraFiles = []*os.File{tty}
// Ctty is a descriptor in the new process: 3, the first of ExtraFiles.
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setsid: true, Setctty: true, Ctty: 3}
require.NoError(t, cmd.Start())
_ = tty.Close()
var (
shown []byte
char byte
)
terminal := bufio.NewReader(ptmx)
for !bytes.HasSuffix(shown, []byte("Enter your BIP39 mnemonic phrase: ")) {
char, err = terminal.ReadByte()
require.NoError(t, err, "secret init did not ask on the terminal: %s",
shown)
shown = append(shown, char)
}
_, err = ptmx.WriteString(testMnemonic + "\n")
require.NoError(t, err)
// The read ends once the command has exited and so closed the terminal.
rest, _ := io.ReadAll(terminal)
err = cmd.Wait()
require.NoError(t, err, "secret init: %s%s%s", shown, rest, stderr.String())
assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(stderr.String(),
"Initialized secrets manager at: "+stateDir+"\n\n"+
"Default vault created and configured\n"),
"stderr: %q", stderr.String())
}
// runAtTerminal runs the secret binary with args and input on stdin, in a
// new session whose controlling terminal is a new terminal, which is also
// its stderr: a command typed at a terminal with its input piped. pty.Open
// is described above TestRemoveIgnoresTerminalOnStdout. runAtTerminal waits
// for the passphrase prompt on the terminal, types the passphrase there,
// and returns what the command wrote to stdout once it has succeeded.
func runAtTerminal(t *testing.T, stateDir, input string, args ...string) string {
t.Helper()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), commandWait)
defer cancel()
//nolint:gosec // G204: test executes the freshly built secret binary
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, secretBinaryPath(t), args...)
cmd.Env = []string{
secret.EnvStateDir + "=" + stateDir,
"PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH"),
"HOME=" + os.Getenv("HOME"),
}
ptmx, tty, err := pty.Open()
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = ptmx.Close() }()
deadline, _ := ctx.Deadline()
require.NoError(t, ptmx.SetReadDeadline(deadline))
var stdout strings.Builder
cmd.Stdin = strings.NewReader(input)
cmd.Stdout = &stdout
cmd.Stderr = tty
// Ctty is a descriptor in the new process: 2, its stderr.
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setsid: true, Setctty: true, Ctty: 2}
require.NoError(t, cmd.Start())
_ = tty.Close()
var (
shown []byte
char byte
)
terminal := bufio.NewReader(ptmx)
for !bytes.HasSuffix(shown, []byte("Enter unlock passphrase: ")) {
char, err = terminal.ReadByte()
require.NoError(t, err, "secret %v did not ask on the terminal: %s",
args, shown)
shown = append(shown, char)
}
_, err = ptmx.WriteString(testPassphrase + "\n")
require.NoError(t, err)
// The read ends once the command has exited and so closed the terminal.
rest, _ := io.ReadAll(terminal)
require.NoError(t, cmd.Wait(), "secret %v: %s%s", args, shown, rest)
return stdout.String()
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ import (
"sync"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
const (
+9 -22
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ package cli
import (
"os"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"golang.org/x/term"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
// Entry runs the secret CLI and returns the process exit code. It wipes
@@ -15,29 +15,16 @@ import (
// but exit with the code.
func Entry() int {
// On SIGINT or SIGTERM memguard runs this function, wipes every buffer
// and exits with status 1. The passphrase prompt turns echo off on the
// controlling terminal until the read finishes, so a signal there would
// leave echo off. Only a process in the terminal's foreground process
// group may reset it: one in the background that tries is stopped
// instead of exiting.
terminal, terminalErr := os.Open(secret.TerminalPath)
var terminalState *term.State
if terminalErr == nil {
defer func() { _ = terminal.Close() }()
terminalState, terminalErr = term.GetState(int(terminal.Fd()))
}
// and exits with status 1. The passphrase prompt turns terminal echo
// off until the read finishes, so a signal there would leave echo off.
// Only a process in the terminal's foreground process group may reset
// it: one in the background that tries is stopped instead of exiting.
terminalState, terminalErr := term.GetState(unix.Stdin)
memguard.CatchSignal(func(os.Signal) {
if terminalErr != nil {
return
}
foreground, err := unix.IoctlGetInt(int(terminal.Fd()), unix.TIOCGPGRP)
if err == nil && foreground == unix.Getpgrp() {
_ = term.Restore(int(terminal.Fd()), terminalState)
foreground, err := unix.IoctlGetInt(unix.Stdin, unix.TIOCGPGRP)
if terminalErr == nil && err == nil && foreground == unix.Getpgrp() {
_ = term.Restore(unix.Stdin, terminalState)
}
}, os.Interrupt, unix.SIGTERM)
+3 -11
View File
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ import (
"slices"
"strings"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
const (
@@ -541,12 +541,8 @@ func printSecretsJSON(
"name": secretName,
}
// A secret whose times cannot be read is listed without them
// Try to get metadata using GetSecretObject
secretObj, err := vlt.GetSecretObject(secretName)
if err == nil {
err = secretObj.LoadMetadata()
}
if err == nil {
metadata := secretObj.GetMetadata()
secretInfo["created_at"] = metadata.CreatedAt
@@ -622,10 +618,6 @@ func printSecretsTable(
lastUpdated := "unknown"
secretObj, err := vlt.GetSecretObject(secretName)
if err == nil {
err = secretObj.LoadMetadata()
}
if err == nil {
metadata := secretObj.GetMetadata()
lastUpdated = metadata.UpdatedAt.Format("2006-01-02 15:04")
+110 -15
View File
@@ -10,17 +10,57 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/pkg/agehd"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// testVaultName is the vault name used by the size tests.
const testVaultName = "test-vault"
// lockedBytesPerSecretByte bounds the locked memory that storing a secret
// holds at once: the buffers it is read into reach up to 1.5 times its
// size, and they are then copied into one more buffer of its size.
const lockedBytesPerSecretByte = 3
// skipIfLockedMemoryTooLow skips the test when this process cannot lock
// the memory a secret of size bytes needs, found by locking a buffer of
// that size and releasing it. memguard panics, ending the whole test run,
// when it cannot lock a buffer, and a plain `docker build .` runs the
// tests under an 8 MiB locked-memory limit (RLIMIT_MEMLOCK). A process
// allowed to lock past that limit runs every case.
func skipIfLockedMemoryTooLow(t *testing.T, size int) {
t.Helper()
need := lockedBytesPerSecretByte * size
buf, err := unix.Mmap(-1, 0, need,
unix.PROT_READ|unix.PROT_WRITE, unix.MAP_PRIVATE|unix.MAP_ANON)
require.NoError(t, err)
lockErr := unix.Mlock(buf)
// Unmapping the buffer also unlocks it.
err = unix.Munmap(buf)
require.NoError(t, err)
if lockErr != nil {
var limit unix.Rlimit
err = unix.Getrlimit(unix.RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &limit)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Skipf("a %d-byte secret needs up to %d bytes of locked memory, "+
"which could not be locked under the locked-memory limit "+
"(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) of %d bytes: %v",
size, need, limit.Cur, lockErr)
}
}
// newSizeTestVault creates an in-memory vault unlocked with the test
// mnemonic and returns the filesystem and vault.
//
@@ -53,9 +93,10 @@ func newSizeTestVault(t *testing.T) (afero.Fs, *vault.Vault) {
}
// runAddSecretSizeCase adds a secret of the given size through stdin and
// verifies that it is stored.
func runAddSecretSizeCase(t *testing.T, size int) {
// verifies the outcome: wantErr, or the secret stored when wantErr is nil.
func runAddSecretSizeCase(t *testing.T, size int, wantErr error) {
t.Helper()
skipIfLockedMemoryTooLow(t, size)
fs, vlt := newSizeTestVault(t)
@@ -86,6 +127,13 @@ func runAddSecretSizeCase(t *testing.T, size int) {
// Test adding the secret
secretName := fmt.Sprintf("test-secret-%d", size)
err = cli.AddSecret(secretName, false)
if wantErr != nil {
require.ErrorIs(t, err, wantErr)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
// Verify the secret was stored correctly
@@ -99,9 +147,10 @@ func runAddSecretSizeCase(t *testing.T, size int) {
}
// runImportSecretSizeCase imports a secret file of the given size and
// verifies that it is stored.
func runImportSecretSizeCase(t *testing.T, size int) {
// verifies the outcome: wantErr, or the secret stored when wantErr is nil.
func runImportSecretSizeCase(t *testing.T, size int, wantErr error) {
t.Helper()
skipIfLockedMemoryTooLow(t, size)
fs, vlt := newSizeTestVault(t)
@@ -130,6 +179,13 @@ func runImportSecretSizeCase(t *testing.T, size int) {
// Test importing the secret
secretName := fmt.Sprintf("imported-secret-%d", size)
err = cli.ImportSecret(cmd, secretName, testFile, false)
if wantErr != nil {
require.ErrorIs(t, err, wantErr)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
// Verify the secret was stored correctly
@@ -144,11 +200,12 @@ func runImportSecretSizeCase(t *testing.T, size int) {
// TestAddSecretVariousSizes tests adding secrets of various sizes through stdin
//
//nolint:paralleltest // in parallel, size tests could exceed the memlock limit
//nolint:paralleltest // together the subtests lock more than the memlock limit
func TestAddSecretVariousSizes(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
size int
name string
size int
wantErr error
}{
{
name: "1KB secret",
@@ -166,22 +223,40 @@ func TestAddSecretVariousSizes(t *testing.T) {
name: "1MB secret",
size: 1024 * 1024,
},
{
name: "10MB secret",
size: 10 * 1024 * 1024,
},
{
name: "99MB secret",
size: 99 * 1024 * 1024,
},
{
name: "100MB secret minus 1 byte",
size: 100*1024*1024 - 1,
},
{
name: "101MB secret - should fail",
size: 101 * 1024 * 1024,
wantErr: errSecretTooLarge,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
runAddSecretSizeCase(t, tt.size)
runAddSecretSizeCase(t, tt.size, tt.wantErr)
})
}
}
// TestImportSecretVariousSizes tests importing secrets of various sizes from files
//
//nolint:paralleltest // in parallel, size tests could exceed the memlock limit
//nolint:paralleltest // together the subtests lock more than the memlock limit
func TestImportSecretVariousSizes(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
size int
name string
size int
wantErr error
}{
{
name: "1KB file",
@@ -199,18 +274,35 @@ func TestImportSecretVariousSizes(t *testing.T) {
name: "1MB file",
size: 1024 * 1024,
},
{
name: "10MB file",
size: 10 * 1024 * 1024,
},
{
name: "99MB file",
size: 99 * 1024 * 1024,
},
{
name: "100MB file",
size: 100 * 1024 * 1024,
},
{
name: "101MB file - should fail",
size: 101 * 1024 * 1024,
wantErr: errSecretTooLarge,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
runImportSecretSizeCase(t, tt.size)
runImportSecretSizeCase(t, tt.size, tt.wantErr)
})
}
}
// TestAddSecretBufferGrowth tests that our buffer growth strategy works correctly
//
//nolint:paralleltest // in parallel, size tests could exceed the memlock limit
//nolint:paralleltest // together the subtests lock more than the memlock limit
func TestAddSecretBufferGrowth(t *testing.T) {
// Test various sizes that should trigger buffer growth
sizes := []int{
@@ -229,10 +321,13 @@ func TestAddSecretBufferGrowth(t *testing.T) {
131072, // 128KB
524288, // 512KB
1048576, // 1MB
2097152, // 2MB
}
for _, size := range sizes {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size_%d", size), func(t *testing.T) {
skipIfLockedMemoryTooLow(t, size)
fs, vlt := newSizeTestVault(t)
// Create test data of exactly the specified size
+5 -82
View File
@@ -2,27 +2,25 @@ package cli_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/bip39"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
// TestGetCommandOutputsToStdout tests that 'secret get' outputs the secret
// value to stdout, not stderr
func TestGetCommandOutputsToStdout(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Create a temporary directory for our vault; each command is given it
// in its environment
// Create a temporary directory for our vault
tempDir := t.TempDir()
// Set environment variables for the test
t.Setenv(secret.EnvStateDir, tempDir)
// Find the secret binary path
wd, err := filepath.Abs("../..")
require.NoError(t, err, "should get working directory")
@@ -43,18 +41,6 @@ func TestGetCommandOutputsToStdout(t *testing.T) {
output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
require.NoError(t, err, "init should succeed: %s", string(output))
// The binary, unlike these tests, encrypts the passphrase unlocker's key
// at age's scrypt work factor, 18. age writes the work factor last on the
// second line of priv.age: "-> scrypt <salt> <work factor>".
vaultDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "vaults.d", "default")
unlockerName := readFile(t, filepath.Join(vaultDir, "current-unlocker"))
unlockerDir := filepath.Join(vaultDir, "unlockers.d", string(unlockerName))
privAge := readFile(t, filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "priv.age"))
header := strings.SplitN(string(privAge), "\n", 3)
require.Len(t, header, 3, "priv.age should start with an age header")
assert.Regexp(t, `^-> scrypt \S+ 18$`, header[1],
"the passphrase unlocker should be encrypted at scrypt work factor 18")
// Add a secret
//nolint:gosec // G204: test executes the freshly built secret binary
cmd = exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), secretPath, "add", "test/secret")
@@ -92,66 +78,3 @@ func TestGetCommandOutputsToStdout(t *testing.T) {
// Nothing should be in stderr
assert.Empty(t, stderr.String(), "stderr should be empty")
}
// TestMnemonicAndListingsOutputToStdout tests that 'secret generate
// mnemonic', 'secret vault list' and 'secret unlocker list' print their
// output to stdout, so that it can be piped
func TestMnemonicAndListingsOutputToStdout(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tempDir := t.TempDir()
secretPath := secretBinaryPath(t)
// run runs the secret binary and returns what it wrote to stdout and to
// stderr
run := func(args ...string) (string, string) {
//nolint:gosec // G204: test executes the freshly built secret binary
cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), secretPath, args...)
cmd.Env = []string{
secret.EnvStateDir + "=" + tempDir,
secret.EnvMnemonic + "=" + testMnemonic,
secret.EnvUnlockPassphrase + "=test-passphrase",
"PATH=/usr/bin:/bin",
}
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout = &stdout
cmd.Stderr = &stderr
err := cmd.Run()
require.NoError(t, err, "%v should succeed: %s", args, stderr.String())
return stdout.String(), stderr.String()
}
stdout, stderr := run("generate", "mnemonic")
assert.True(t, bip39.IsMnemonicValid(strings.TrimSpace(stdout)),
"stdout should hold the mnemonic, not %q", stdout)
assert.Contains(t, stderr, "Save this mnemonic phrase securely",
"the warning should be on stderr")
run("init")
stdout, _ = run("vault", "list", "--json")
var vaults map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(stdout), &vaults),
"stdout should hold the vaults as JSON, not %q", stdout)
assert.Equal(t, "default", vaults["currentVault"])
stdout, _ = run("unlocker", "list", "--json")
var unlockers map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(stdout), &unlockers),
"stdout should hold the unlockers as JSON, not %q", stdout)
assert.Len(t, unlockers["unlockers"], 1)
stdout, _ = run("vault", "list")
assert.Contains(t, stdout, "default (current)")
stdout, _ = run("unlocker", "list")
assert.Contains(t, stdout, "Total: 1 unlocker(s)")
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
"os"
"strings"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
)
// ExecuteCommandInProcess executes a CLI command in-process for testing
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ package cli_test
import (
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
)
//nolint:paralleltest // executes the CLI in-process against shared state
+25 -113
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,12 @@
// Unlock Failure Tests
//
// When a vault cannot be opened through its current unlocker, because a
// file the unlocker needs is missing, the error keeps its cause and ends by
// saying that the mnemonic still opens that vault, but only for a vault that
// the mnemonic does open, and not when the passphrase could not be read at
// all. A wrong passphrase gives an error that says so, without that advice.
// When the current unlocker does not exist and the vault has another that
// `secret unlocker select` accepts, the error says to select one instead.
// When a secret's current file is missing, the error says how to make a
// version current again. Each test that pins such advice also follows it.
// file the unlocker needs is missing or the passphrase is wrong, the error
// keeps its cause and ends by saying that the mnemonic still opens that
// vault, but only for a vault that the mnemonic does open, and not when the
// passphrase could not be read at all. When a secret's current file is
// missing, the error says how to make a version current again. Each test
// that pins such advice also follows it.
package cli_test
@@ -18,17 +16,17 @@ import (
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"syscall"
"testing"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
const (
@@ -164,48 +162,26 @@ func TestUnlockFailureNamesMnemonic(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestWrongPassphraseNamesPassphrase checks the error of `secret get` given
// a passphrase that does not decrypt the passphrase unlocker: it says that
// the passphrase is wrong, without the advice to use the mnemonic, since the
// unlocker still opens the vault with the right passphrase. The test then
// gives the right passphrase.
func TestWrongPassphraseNamesPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
// TestWrongPassphraseNamesMnemonic checks the error of `secret get` given a
// passphrase that does not decrypt the passphrase unlocker: it keeps age's
// error and ends with the advice that the mnemonic still opens the vault.
func TestWrongPassphraseNamesMnemonic(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
unlockerDir, c := newUnlockTestCLI(t, newTwoVaultFs(t))
_, c := newUnlockTestCLI(t, newTwoVaultFs(t))
c.UnlockPassphrase = memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("wrong passphrase"))
t.Cleanup(c.UnlockPassphrase.Destroy)
err := c.GetSecret(discardCmd(), "x")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, secret.ErrWrongPassphrase)
assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), mnemonicAdvice)
var noMatch *age.NoIdentityMatchError
require.ErrorAs(t, err, &noMatch)
require.EqualError(t, err, "failed to unlock vault: "+
"failed to get long-term key: failed to get unlocker identity: "+
"wrong passphrase for unlocker "+filepath.Base(unlockerDir))
c.UnlockPassphrase = memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(testPassphrase))
t.Cleanup(c.UnlockPassphrase.Destroy)
assert.Equal(t, "value", getSecret(t, c, "x"))
}
// TestDamagedUnlockerNamesMnemonic checks the error of `secret get` when the
// passphrase unlocker's priv.age is not an age file: the passphrase is not
// blamed, and the error ends with the advice that the mnemonic still opens
// the vault.
func TestDamagedUnlockerNamesMnemonic(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := newTwoVaultFs(t)
unlockerDir, c := newUnlockTestCLI(t, fs)
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "priv.age"),
[]byte("damaged"), secret.FilePerms))
err := c.GetSecret(discardCmd(), "x")
require.NotErrorIs(t, err, secret.ErrWrongPassphrase)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, mnemonicAdvice)
"failed to decrypt unlocker private key: failed to create decryptor: "+
noMatch.Error()+mnemonicAdvice)
}
// TestMoveUnlockFailureNamesVault checks the error of `secret move` into
@@ -246,71 +222,8 @@ func TestMoveUnlockFailureNamesVault(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, "value", getSecret(t, c, "y"))
}
// TestMissingCurrentUnlockerNamesSelect checks the error of `secret get`
// when current-unlocker names an unlocker that does not exist and the vault
// has another: it names the missing unlocker and says to select another
// one, without the advice to use the mnemonic. The test then follows that
// advice.
func TestMissingCurrentUnlockerNamesSelect(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := newTwoVaultFs(t)
unlockerDir, c := newUnlockTestCLI(t, fs)
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs,
filepath.Join(unlockTestVaultDir, "current-unlocker"),
[]byte("missing"), secret.FilePerms))
err := c.GetSecret(discardCmd(), "x")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, vault.ErrUnlockerNotFound)
require.EqualError(t, err, "failed to unlock vault: "+
"failed to get long-term key: failed to get current unlocker: "+
"unlocker with ID missing not found; the vault 'default' has other "+
"unlockers: run 'secret unlocker select' with the ID of one of them "+
"to make it the current unlocker")
require.NoError(t, c.UnlockerSelect(filepath.Base(unlockerDir)))
assert.Equal(t, "value", getSecret(t, c, "x"))
}
// TestMissingCurrentUnlockerNamesMnemonic checks the error of `secret get`
// when the unlocker that current-unlocker names does not exist and the
// vault's only other unlocker is the directory "odd", whose metadata names a
// type that `secret unlocker select` refuses: the error ends with the advice
// that the mnemonic still opens the vault, not with advice to select another
// unlocker. The test then follows that advice.
func TestMissingCurrentUnlockerNamesMnemonic(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := newTwoVaultFs(t)
unlockerDir, c := newUnlockTestCLI(t, fs)
require.NoError(t, fs.RemoveAll(unlockerDir))
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs,
filepath.Join(unlockTestVaultDir, "unlockers.d", "odd",
"unlocker-metadata.json"),
[]byte(`{"type": "odd"}`), secret.FilePerms))
err := c.GetSecret(discardCmd(), "x")
var cause *os.PathError
require.ErrorAs(t, err, &cause)
require.NotErrorIs(t, err, vault.ErrUnlockerNotFound)
require.EqualError(t, err, "failed to unlock vault: "+
"failed to get long-term key: failed to get current unlocker: "+
"failed to read unlocker metadata: "+cause.Error()+mnemonicAdvice)
c.Mnemonic = testMnemonicBuffer(t)
require.NoError(t, c.UnlockersAdd("passphrase", discardCmd()))
c.Mnemonic = nil
assert.Equal(t, "value", getSecret(t, c, "x"))
}
// TestPassphraseNotReadNamesNoMnemonic runs `secret get x` on the built
// binary without SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE and in a new session, which has no
// binary without SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE and with a stdin that is not a
// terminal, so the passphrase cannot be read. The unlocker was not tried,
// and adding one would need a passphrase read the same way, so the error
// is the cause alone, without the advice to use the mnemonic.
@@ -341,16 +254,15 @@ func TestPassphraseNotReadNamesNoMnemonic(t *testing.T) {
"PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH"),
"HOME=" + os.Getenv("HOME"),
}
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setsid: true}
output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "Error: failed to unlock vault: "+
"failed to get long-term key: failed to get unlocker identity: "+
"failed to read passphrase: there is no terminal to ask on. Please "+
"set the SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE environment variable or run "+
"interactively\n", string(output))
"failed to read passphrase: cannot read passphrase from non-terminal "+
"stdin (piped input or script). Please set the SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE "+
"environment variable or run interactively\n", string(output))
}
// TestCryptoUnlockFailureNamesMnemonic checks that `secret encrypt` and
+121 -57
View File
@@ -7,24 +7,28 @@ import (
"fmt"
"log"
"maps"
"net/url"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"slices"
"strings"
"time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// Unlocker type names shared across the CLI
// Unlocker type names and platform identifiers shared across the CLI
const (
unlockerTypePassphrase = "passphrase"
unlockerTypePGP = "pgp"
unlockerTypePassphrase = "passphrase"
unlockerTypeKeychain = "keychain"
unlockerTypePGP = "pgp"
unlockerTypeSecureEnclave = "secure-enclave"
platformDarwin = "darwin"
cmdUseList = "list"
)
@@ -67,13 +71,12 @@ func getDefaultGPGKey() (string, error) {
output, err := cmd.Output()
if err == nil {
defaultKey, parseErr := parseDefaultGPGKey(string(output))
if parseErr != nil {
return "", parseErr
}
if defaultKey != "" {
return defaultKey, nil
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(string(output), "\n") {
fields := strings.Split(line, ":")
if len(fields) > 9 && fields[0] == "default-key" && fields[9] != "" {
// The default key is in field 10 (index 9)
return fields[9], nil
}
}
}
@@ -100,27 +103,6 @@ func getDefaultGPGKey() (string, error) {
return "", errNoGPGSecretKeys
}
// parseDefaultGPGKey returns the default-key value in the output of
// `gpgconf --list-options gpg`, or "" when gpg.conf sets none. gpgconf(1)
// prints a string value with a leading `"` and percent-escaped.
func parseDefaultGPGKey(gpgconfOutput string) (string, error) {
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(gpgconfOutput, "\n") {
fields := strings.Split(line, ":")
if len(fields) > 9 && fields[0] == "default-key" && fields[9] != "" {
// The default key is in field 10 (index 9)
keyID, err := url.PathUnescape(strings.TrimPrefix(fields[9], `"`))
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to decode gpgconf default-key %s: %w",
fields[9], err)
}
return keyID, nil
}
}
return "", nil
}
func newUnlockerCmd() *cobra.Command {
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "unlocker",
@@ -161,8 +143,9 @@ func newUnlockerListCmd() *cobra.Command {
}
// unlockerAddHelp returns the supported unlocker types list and their
// descriptions
// descriptions for the current platform
func unlockerAddHelp() (string, string) {
// Build the supported types list based on platform
supportedTypes := "passphrase, pgp"
typeDescriptions := "Available unlocker types:\n" +
"\n" +
@@ -179,6 +162,43 @@ func unlockerAddHelp() (string, string) {
" Use --keyid to specify a particular key, " +
"otherwise uses your default GPG key."
if runtime.GOOS == platformDarwin {
supportedTypes = "passphrase, keychain, pgp, secure-enclave"
typeDescriptions = "Available unlocker types:\n" +
"\n" +
" passphrase - Traditional password-based encryption\n" +
" Prompts for a passphrase that will be " +
"used to encrypt/decrypt the vault's master key.\n" +
" The passphrase is never stored in " +
"plaintext.\n" +
"\n" +
" keychain - macOS Keychain integration (macOS only)\n" +
" Stores the vault's master key in the " +
"macOS Keychain, protected by your login password.\n" +
" Automatically unlocks when your Keychain " +
"is unlocked (e.g., after login).\n" +
" Provides seamless integration with macOS " +
"security features like Touch ID.\n" +
"\n" +
" pgp - GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) key-based " +
"encryption\n" +
" Uses your existing GPG key to " +
"encrypt/decrypt the vault's master key.\n" +
" Requires gpg to be installed and " +
"configured with at least one secret key.\n" +
" Use --keyid to specify a particular key, " +
"otherwise uses your default GPG key.\n" +
"\n" +
" secure-enclave - Apple Secure Enclave hardware protection " +
"(macOS only)\n" +
" Stores the vault's master key encrypted " +
"by a non-exportable P-256 key\n" +
" held in the Secure Enclave. The key " +
"never leaves the hardware.\n" +
" Uses ECIES encryption; decryption is " +
"performed inside the SE."
}
return supportedTypes, typeDescriptions
}
@@ -245,11 +265,8 @@ func newUnlockerRemoveCmd() *cobra.Command {
Long: `Remove an unlocker from the current vault. Asks for ` +
`confirmation first, saying whether it is the vault's last ` +
`unlocker; when stdin is not a terminal, fails unless --force ` +
`is given. Removing the current unlocker makes another of the ` +
`vault's unlockers current, if it has one that ` +
`'secret unlocker select' accepts. Warning: Without ` +
`unlockers and without your mnemonic, vault data will be ` +
`permanently inaccessible.`,
`is given. Warning: Without unlockers and without your ` +
`mnemonic, vault data will be permanently inaccessible.`,
Args: cobra.ExactArgs(1),
ValidArgsFunction: getUnlockerIDsCompletionFunc(cli.fs, cli.stateDir),
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
@@ -314,8 +331,7 @@ func (cli *Instance) UnlockersList(jsonOutput bool) error {
return err
}
// Not nil, so that a vault with no unlockers prints [] in JSON, not null
unlockers := make([]UnlockerInfo, 0, len(unlockerMetadata))
var unlockers []UnlockerInfo
for _, unlockerID := range slices.Sorted(maps.Keys(unlockerMetadata)) {
metadata := unlockerMetadata[unlockerID]
@@ -350,25 +366,22 @@ func (cli *Instance) printUnlockersJSON(
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal JSON: %w", err)
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(cli.cmd.OutOrStdout(), string(jsonBytes))
cli.cmd.Println(string(jsonBytes))
return nil
}
// printUnlockersTable prints unlockers in a formatted table
func (cli *Instance) printUnlockersTable(unlockers []UnlockerInfo) error {
out := cli.cmd.OutOrStdout()
if len(unlockers) == 0 {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(out, "No unlockers found in current vault.")
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(out, "Run 'secret unlocker add passphrase' to create one.")
cli.cmd.Println("No unlockers found in current vault.")
cli.cmd.Println("Run 'secret unlocker add passphrase' to create one.")
return nil
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, " %-40s %-12s %-20s %s\n",
"UNLOCKER ID", "TYPE", "CREATED", "FLAGS")
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, " %-40s %-12s %-20s %s\n",
cli.cmd.Printf(" %-40s %-12s %-20s %s\n", "UNLOCKER ID", "TYPE", "CREATED", "FLAGS")
cli.cmd.Printf(" %-40s %-12s %-20s %s\n",
strings.Repeat("-", unlockerIDWidth), strings.Repeat("-", unlockerTypeWidth),
strings.Repeat("-", unlockerDateWidth), strings.Repeat("-", unlockerFlagsWidth))
@@ -383,7 +396,7 @@ func (cli *Instance) printUnlockersTable(unlockers []UnlockerInfo) error {
prefix = "* "
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, "%s%-40s %-12s %-20s %s\n",
cli.cmd.Printf("%s%-40s %-12s %-20s %s\n",
prefix,
unlocker.ID,
unlocker.Type,
@@ -391,7 +404,7 @@ func (cli *Instance) printUnlockersTable(unlockers []UnlockerInfo) error {
flags)
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, "\nTotal: %d unlocker(s)\n", len(unlockers))
cli.cmd.Printf("\nTotal: %d unlocker(s)\n", len(unlockers))
return nil
}
@@ -407,10 +420,18 @@ func (cli *Instance) UnlockersAdd(unlockerType string, cmd *cobra.Command) error
switch unlockerType {
case unlockerTypePassphrase:
return cli.addPassphraseUnlocker(cmd)
case unlockerTypeKeychain:
return cli.addKeychainUnlocker(cmd)
case unlockerTypeSecureEnclave:
return cli.addSecureEnclaveUnlocker(cmd)
case unlockerTypePGP:
return cli.addPGPUnlocker(cmd)
default:
// Build the supported types list based on platform
supportedTypes := "passphrase, pgp"
if runtime.GOOS == platformDarwin {
supportedTypes = "passphrase, keychain, pgp, secure-enclave"
}
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s (supported: %s)",
errInvalidUnlockerType, unlockerType, supportedTypes)
@@ -466,6 +487,53 @@ func (cli *Instance) addPassphraseUnlocker(cmd *cobra.Command) error {
return nil
}
// addKeychainUnlocker creates a macOS Keychain unlocker in the current vault
func (cli *Instance) addKeychainUnlocker(cmd *cobra.Command) error {
keychainUnlocker, err := secret.CreateKeychainUnlocker(
cli.fs, cli.stateDir, cli.Mnemonic, cli.UnlockPassphrase)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create macOS Keychain unlocker: %w", err)
}
cmd.Printf("Created macOS Keychain unlocker: %s\n", keychainUnlocker.GetID())
keyName, err := keychainUnlocker.GetKeychainItemName()
if err == nil {
cmd.Printf("Keychain Item Name: %s\n", keyName)
}
// Auto-select the newly created unlocker
vlt, err := vault.GetCurrentVault(cli.fs, cli.stateDir)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get current vault: %w", err)
}
autoSelectUnlocker(cmd, vlt, keychainUnlocker.GetID())
return nil
}
// addSecureEnclaveUnlocker creates a Secure Enclave unlocker in the
// current vault
func (cli *Instance) addSecureEnclaveUnlocker(cmd *cobra.Command) error {
seUnlocker, err := secret.CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker(
cli.fs, cli.stateDir, cli.Mnemonic, cli.UnlockPassphrase)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create Secure Enclave unlocker: %w", err)
}
cmd.Printf("Created Secure Enclave unlocker: %s\n", seUnlocker.GetID())
vlt, err := vault.GetCurrentVault(cli.fs, cli.stateDir)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get current vault: %w", err)
}
autoSelectUnlocker(cmd, vlt, seUnlocker.GetID())
return nil
}
// addPGPUnlocker creates a PGP unlocker in the current vault
func (cli *Instance) addPGPUnlocker(cmd *cobra.Command) error {
// Get GPG key ID from flag, environment, or default key
@@ -642,17 +710,13 @@ func (cli *Instance) removeUnlocker(
"have your mnemonic phrase to access this vault again!")
}
newCurrentID, err := found.vlt.RemoveUnlocker(unlockerID)
err := found.vlt.RemoveUnlocker(unlockerID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
cmd.Printf("Removed unlocker '%s'\n", unlockerID)
if newCurrentID != "" {
cmd.Printf("Switched current unlocker to '%s'\n", newCurrentID)
}
return nil
}
+2 -113
View File
@@ -2,18 +2,15 @@
package cli
import (
"bytes"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// unknownTestGPGUserID is a GPG user ID that no key in the test keyring has.
@@ -85,77 +82,6 @@ func TestAddPGPUnlocker(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestAddPGPUnlockerDefaultKey is a regression test for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/141: with default-key set in
// gpg.conf and no --keyid, `secret unlocker add pgp` uses that key.
// gpg.conf names the key by its user ID, and the printed key ID must be that
// user ID. The first secret key, which is used when gpg.conf sets no
// default-key, prints as a hex key ID.
func TestAddPGPUnlockerDefaultKey(t *testing.T) {
newTestGPGKey(t)
// The key comes from neither --keyid nor the environment.
t.Setenv(secret.EnvGPGKeyID, "")
gpgConf := filepath.Join(os.Getenv("GNUPGHOME"), "gpg.conf")
//nolint:gosec // G703: GNUPGHOME is the directory newTestGPGKey made
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(gpgConf,
[]byte("default-key "+unreadableTestGPGUserID+"\n"), 0o600))
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
_, err := vault.CreateVault(fs, listTestStateDir, listTestVaultName,
testMnemonicBuffer(t), nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
instance, cmd := newTestInstance(fs)
instance.Mnemonic = testMnemonicBuffer(t)
var output bytes.Buffer
cmd.SetOut(&output)
require.NoError(t, instance.UnlockersAdd(unlockerTypePGP, cmd))
assert.Contains(t, output.String(),
"Using default GPG key: "+unreadableTestGPGUserID+"\n")
}
// TestParseDefaultGPGKey is a regression test for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/141: gpgconf prints the
// default-key value with a leading `"` and percent-escaped, and the key ID
// is that value decoded.
func TestParseDefaultGPGKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// gpgconfLine is the default-key line of `gpgconf --list-options gpg`
// up to the value, its last field.
const gpgconfLine = "default-key:0:0:use NAME as default secret key:" +
"1:1:NAME:::"
tests := []struct {
name string
value string
want string
}{
{
"fingerprint", `"56163D7F3FAFF709608855BEC1A360216D007F41`,
"56163D7F3FAFF709608855BEC1A360216D007F41",
},
{
"user ID with a comma", `"Doe%2c Alice <alice@example.com>`,
"Doe, Alice <alice@example.com>",
},
{"no default-key in gpg.conf", "", ""},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
keyID, err := parseDefaultGPGKey(gpgconfLine + test.value + "\n")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, test.want, keyID)
})
}
}
// TestAddPGPUnlockerUnknownKey asserts that adding a PGP unlocker for a key
// the keyring does not hold fails at looking up the key's fingerprint and
// leaves no new unlocker directory. The error must come from the lookup: a
@@ -178,40 +104,3 @@ func TestAddPGPUnlockerUnknownKey(t *testing.T) {
filepath.Join(testVaultDir(listTestVaultName), listTestUnlockersDirName),
listTestUnlockerDirOne)
}
// TestUnlockerAddKnowsOnlyPassphraseAndPGP is a regression test for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/132: `secret unlocker add` takes
// only passphrase and pgp, on every platform. keychain and secure-enclave
// fail as unknown types, and neither --help nor shell completion offers
// them.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // executes the CLI in-process and sets the environment
func TestUnlockerAddKnowsOnlyPassphraseAndPGP(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{secret.EnvStateDir: t.TempDir()}
removedTypes := []string{"keychain", "secure-enclave"}
for _, unlockerType := range removedTypes {
_, err := ExecuteCommandInProcess(
[]string{"unlocker", "add", unlockerType}, "", env)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInvalidUnlockerType)
instance, cmd := newTestInstance(newListTestVault(t, 1))
require.ErrorIs(t, instance.UnlockersAdd(unlockerType, cmd),
errInvalidUnlockerType)
}
// --help prints the command's Long text, and shell completion offers
// its ValidArgs.
addCmd := newUnlockerAddCmd()
help := addCmd.Long
completions := strings.Join(addCmd.ValidArgs, " ")
for _, offered := range []string{help, completions} {
assert.Contains(t, offered, unlockerTypePassphrase)
assert.Contains(t, offered, unlockerTypePGP)
for _, unlockerType := range removedTypes {
assert.NotContains(t, offered, unlockerType)
}
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// newCorruptUnlockerVault returns the two-unlocker test vault with the
+4 -3
View File
@@ -7,11 +7,11 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// TestSameMetadataUnlockersHaveTheirOwnIDs writes two passphrase unlockers
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ import (
// copying an unlocker directory leaves them. It asserts that `unlocker
// list` and the shell completion of `unlocker select` and `unlocker remove`
// give each its own ID, and that each is selected and removed by its ID
// alone.
// alone. Keychain and Secure Enclave unlockers, which only macOS can add,
// get their IDs the same way.
func TestSameMetadataUnlockersHaveTheirOwnIDs(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+1 -36
View File
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
// - TestUnlockersListSkipsUnreadableMetadata: an unlocker whose metadata
// file cannot be checked for or read is left out, and the other is
// still listed.
// - TestUnlockersListEmptyJSON: a vault with no unlockers lists them as
// an empty JSON list.
//nolint:testpackage // white-box test of unexported internals
package cli
@@ -23,11 +21,11 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
const (
@@ -323,36 +321,3 @@ func TestUnlockersListSkipsUnreadableMetadata(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// TestUnlockersListEmptyJSON is a regression test for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/148: listing the unlockers of a
// vault that has none, as after its last unlocker is removed, printed
// "unlockers": null in JSON form instead of an empty list.
func TestUnlockersListEmptyJSON(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
vaultDir := filepath.Join(listTestStateDir, "vaults.d", listTestVaultName)
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(
fs, filepath.Join(listTestStateDir, "currentvault"),
[]byte(listTestVaultName), listTestFilePerm,
))
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(
filepath.Join(vaultDir, listTestUnlockersDirName), listTestDirPerm,
))
var buf bytes.Buffer
cmd := &cobra.Command{}
cmd.SetOut(&buf)
instance := &Instance{fs: fs, stateDir: listTestStateDir, cmd: cmd}
require.NoError(t, instance.UnlockersList(true))
var decoded map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(buf.Bytes(), &decoded))
assert.Equal(t, []any{}, decoded["unlockers"],
"no unlockers must be printed as [], not %s", buf.String())
}
-94
View File
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
//nolint:testpackage // white-box test of unexported internals
package cli
import (
"bytes"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// TestUnlockerRemoveCurrent is a regression test for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/137. A vault has a passphrase
// unlocker and a PGP unlocker, the current one. Removing the PGP unlocker
// makes the passphrase unlocker current and says so, and the vault then
// opens through it. Removing the passphrase unlocker too removes
// current-unlocker.
//
// The second case also gives the vault the unlocker directory "odd", whose
// metadata names a type that `secret unlocker select` refuses, and which
// sorts before the passphrase unlocker: neither removal makes it current.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // t.Setenv (GNUPGHOME) forbids parallel tests
func TestUnlockerRemoveCurrent(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
withOdd bool
}{
{name: "two unlockers", withOdd: false},
{name: "and the directory odd", withOdd: true},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
newTestGPGKey(t)
passphrase := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(testPassphrase))
t.Cleanup(passphrase.Destroy)
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
vlt, err := vault.CreateVault(fs, listTestStateDir,
listTestVaultName, testMnemonicBuffer(t), nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
passphraseUnlocker, err := vlt.CreatePassphraseUnlocker(passphrase)
require.NoError(t, err)
if tt.withOdd {
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs,
filepath.Join(testVaultDir(listTestVaultName), "unlockers.d",
"odd", "unlocker-metadata.json"),
[]byte(`{"type": "odd"}`), secret.FilePerms))
}
instance, cmd := newTestInstance(fs)
instance.UnlockPassphrase = passphrase
cmd.Flags().String("keyid", unreadableTestGPGUserID, "")
require.NoError(t, instance.UnlockersAdd(unlockerTypePGP, cmd))
pgpUnlocker, err := vlt.GetCurrentUnlocker()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, unlockerTypePGP, pgpUnlocker.GetType())
var output bytes.Buffer
cmd.SetOut(&output)
require.NoError(t,
instance.UnlockersRemove(pgpUnlocker.GetID(), true, cmd))
assert.Contains(t, output.String(),
"Switched current unlocker to '"+passphraseUnlocker.GetID()+"'")
reopened := vault.NewVault(fs, listTestStateDir, listTestVaultName)
reopened.UnlockPassphrase = passphrase
_, err = reopened.GetOrDeriveLongTermKey()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t,
instance.UnlockersRemove(passphraseUnlocker.GetID(), true, cmd))
exists, err := afero.Exists(fs, filepath.Join(
testVaultDir(listTestVaultName), "current-unlocker"))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, exists,
"current-unlocker is left after the passphrase unlocker")
})
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
const (
+2 -2
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/cli"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
// usageHeading starts the usage text cobra prints after an error.
+9 -11
View File
@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/bip39"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/tyler-smith/go-bip39"
)
// Sentinel errors for vault operations
@@ -186,8 +186,6 @@ func (cli *Instance) ListVaults(cmd *cobra.Command, jsonOutput bool) error {
return err
}
out := cmd.OutOrStdout()
if jsonOutput { //nolint:nestif // Separate JSON and text output formatting logic
// Get current vault name for context
currentVault := ""
@@ -207,13 +205,13 @@ func (cli *Instance) ListVaults(cmd *cobra.Command, jsonOutput bool) error {
return err
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(out, string(jsonBytes))
cmd.Println(string(jsonBytes))
} else {
// Text output
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(out, "Available vaults:")
cmd.Println("Available vaults:")
if len(vaults) == 0 {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(out, " (none)")
cmd.Println(" (none)")
} else {
// Try to get current vault for marking
currentVault := ""
@@ -225,9 +223,9 @@ func (cli *Instance) ListVaults(cmd *cobra.Command, jsonOutput bool) error {
for _, vaultName := range vaults {
if vaultName == currentVault {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, " %s (current)\n", vaultName)
cmd.Printf(" %s (current)\n", vaultName)
} else {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, " %s\n", vaultName)
cmd.Printf(" %s\n", vaultName)
}
}
}
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
package cli_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/cli"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
// TestVaultListEmptyJSON is a regression test for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/148: listing the vaults when
// vaults.d holds none printed "vaults": null in JSON form instead of an
// empty list.
func TestVaultListEmptyJSON(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(
filepath.Join(testStateDir, "vaults.d"), secret.DirPerms,
))
var buf bytes.Buffer
cmd := &cobra.Command{}
cmd.SetOut(&buf)
c := cli.NewCLIInstanceWithStateDir(fs, testStateDir)
require.NoError(t, c.ListVaults(cmd, true))
var decoded map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(buf.Bytes(), &decoded))
assert.Equal(t, []any{}, decoded["vaults"],
"no vaults must be printed as [], not %s", buf.String())
}
+4 -6
View File
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ import (
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
const (
@@ -65,9 +65,7 @@ func VersionCommands(cli *Instance) *cobra.Command {
Use: "promote <secret-name> <version>",
Short: "Promote a specific version to current",
Long: "Updates the current symlink to point to the specified " +
"version. The versions' own times are left unchanged; secret " +
"list then gives the time of the promote as the secret's last " +
"update.",
"version without modifying timestamps",
Args: cobra.ExactArgs(2), //nolint:mnd // secret-name and version args
ValidArgsFunction: func(
cmd *cobra.Command, args []string, toComplete string,
@@ -169,7 +167,7 @@ func (cli *Instance) ListVersions(cmd *cobra.Command, secretName string) error {
}
if len(versions) == 0 {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "No versions found")
cmd.Println("No versions found")
return nil
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -26,13 +26,13 @@ import (
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/pkg/agehd"
)
const (
+152
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
//go:build darwin
// Package macse provides Go bindings for macOS Secure Enclave operations
// using CryptoTokenKit identities created via sc_auth.
// Key creation and deletion shell out to sc_auth (which has SE entitlements).
// Encrypt/decrypt use Security.framework ECIES directly (works unsigned).
package macse
/*
#cgo CFLAGS: -x objective-c -fobjc-arc
#cgo LDFLAGS: -framework Security -framework Foundation -framework CoreFoundation
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "secure_enclave.h"
*/
import "C"
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"unsafe"
)
const (
// p256UncompressedKeySize is the size of an uncompressed P-256 public key.
p256UncompressedKeySize = 65
// errorBufferSize is the size of the C error message buffer.
errorBufferSize = 512
// hashBufferSize is the size of the hash output buffer.
hashBufferSize = 128
// maxCiphertextSize is the max buffer for ECIES ciphertext.
// ECIES overhead for P-256: 65 (ephemeral pub) + 16 (GCM tag) + 16 (IV) + plaintext.
maxCiphertextSize = 8192
// maxPlaintextSize is the max buffer for decrypted plaintext.
maxPlaintextSize = 8192
)
// CreateKey creates a new P-256 non-exportable key in the Secure Enclave via sc_auth.
// Returns the uncompressed public key bytes (65 bytes) and the identity hash
// (for deletion). If getting the public key fails, CreateKey deletes the key
// again; a failure to delete is returned along with the first error.
func CreateKey(label string) (publicKey []byte, hash string, err error) {
var hashBuf [hashBufferSize]C.char
var errBuf [errorBufferSize]C.char
cLabel := C.CString(label)
defer C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cLabel)) //nolint:nlreturn // CGo free pattern
result := C.se_create_key(cLabel,
&hashBuf[0], C.int(hashBufferSize),
&errBuf[0], C.int(errorBufferSize))
if result != 0 {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("secure enclave: %s", C.GoString(&errBuf[0]))
}
h := C.GoString(&hashBuf[0])
pubKeyBuf := make([]C.uint8_t, p256UncompressedKeySize)
pubKeyLen := C.int(p256UncompressedKeySize)
result = C.se_copy_public_key(cLabel,
&pubKeyBuf[0], &pubKeyLen,
&errBuf[0], C.int(errorBufferSize))
if result != 0 {
err = fmt.Errorf("secure enclave: %s", C.GoString(&errBuf[0]))
deleteErr := DeleteKey(h)
if deleteErr != nil {
err = errors.Join(err,
fmt.Errorf("failed to delete key %s: %w", label, deleteErr))
}
return nil, "", err
}
//nolint:nlreturn // CGo result extraction
pk := C.GoBytes(unsafe.Pointer(&pubKeyBuf[0]), pubKeyLen)
return pk, h, nil
}
// Encrypt encrypts plaintext using the SE-backed public key via ECIES
// (eciesEncryptionStandardVariableIVX963SHA256AESGCM).
// Encryption uses only the public key; no SE interaction required.
func Encrypt(label string, plaintext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
ciphertextBuf := make([]C.uint8_t, maxCiphertextSize)
ciphertextLen := C.int(maxCiphertextSize)
var errBuf [errorBufferSize]C.char
cLabel := C.CString(label)
defer C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cLabel)) //nolint:nlreturn // CGo free pattern
result := C.se_encrypt(cLabel,
(*C.uint8_t)(unsafe.Pointer(&plaintext[0])), C.int(len(plaintext)),
&ciphertextBuf[0], &ciphertextLen,
&errBuf[0], C.int(errorBufferSize))
if result != 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("secure enclave: %s", C.GoString(&errBuf[0]))
}
//nolint:nlreturn // CGo result extraction
out := C.GoBytes(unsafe.Pointer(&ciphertextBuf[0]), ciphertextLen)
return out, nil
}
// Decrypt decrypts ECIES ciphertext using the SE-backed private key.
// The ECDH portion of decryption is performed inside the Secure Enclave.
func Decrypt(label string, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
plaintextBuf := make([]C.uint8_t, maxPlaintextSize)
plaintextLen := C.int(maxPlaintextSize)
var errBuf [errorBufferSize]C.char
cLabel := C.CString(label)
defer C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cLabel)) //nolint:nlreturn // CGo free pattern
result := C.se_decrypt(cLabel,
(*C.uint8_t)(unsafe.Pointer(&ciphertext[0])), C.int(len(ciphertext)),
&plaintextBuf[0], &plaintextLen,
&errBuf[0], C.int(errorBufferSize))
if result != 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("secure enclave: %s", C.GoString(&errBuf[0]))
}
//nolint:nlreturn // CGo result extraction
out := C.GoBytes(unsafe.Pointer(&plaintextBuf[0]), plaintextLen)
return out, nil
}
// DeleteKey removes a CTK identity from the Secure Enclave via sc_auth.
func DeleteKey(hash string) error {
var errBuf [errorBufferSize]C.char
cHash := C.CString(hash)
defer C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cHash)) //nolint:nlreturn // CGo free pattern
result := C.se_delete_key(cHash, &errBuf[0], C.int(errorBufferSize))
if result != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("secure enclave: %s", C.GoString(&errBuf[0]))
}
return nil
}
+28
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
//go:build !darwin || !cgo
// Package macse provides Go bindings for macOS Secure Enclave operations.
package macse
import "errors"
var errNotSupported = errors.New("secure enclave needs a macOS build with cgo")
// CreateKey fails: the Secure Enclave needs a macOS build with cgo.
func CreateKey(_ string) ([]byte, string, error) {
return nil, "", errNotSupported
}
// Encrypt fails: the Secure Enclave needs a macOS build with cgo.
func Encrypt(_ string, _ []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, errNotSupported
}
// Decrypt fails: the Secure Enclave needs a macOS build with cgo.
func Decrypt(_ string, _ []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, errNotSupported
}
// DeleteKey fails: the Secure Enclave needs a macOS build with cgo.
func DeleteKey(_ string) error {
return errNotSupported
}
+164
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
//go:build darwin && cgo
package macse
import (
"bytes"
"testing"
)
const testKeyLabel = "berlin.sneak.app.secret.test.se-key"
// testKeyHash stores the hash of the created test key for cleanup.
var testKeyHash string //nolint:gochecknoglobals
// skipIfNoSecureEnclave skips the test if SE access is unavailable.
func skipIfNoSecureEnclave(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
probeLabel := "berlin.sneak.app.secret.test.se-probe"
_, hash, err := CreateKey(probeLabel)
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("Secure Enclave unavailable (skipping): %v", err)
}
if hash != "" {
_ = DeleteKey(hash)
}
}
func TestCreateAndDeleteKey(t *testing.T) {
skipIfNoSecureEnclave(t)
if testKeyHash != "" {
_ = DeleteKey(testKeyHash)
}
pubKey, hash, err := CreateKey(testKeyLabel)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateKey failed: %v", err)
}
testKeyHash = hash
t.Logf("Created key with hash: %s", hash)
// Verify valid uncompressed P-256 public key
if len(pubKey) != p256UncompressedKeySize {
t.Fatalf("expected public key length %d, got %d",
p256UncompressedKeySize, len(pubKey))
}
if pubKey[0] != 0x04 {
t.Fatalf("expected uncompressed point prefix 0x04, got 0x%02x", pubKey[0])
}
if hash == "" {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty hash")
}
// Delete the key
if err := DeleteKey(hash); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeleteKey failed: %v", err)
}
testKeyHash = ""
t.Log("Key created, verified, and deleted successfully")
}
func TestEncryptDecryptRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
skipIfNoSecureEnclave(t)
_, hash, err := CreateKey(testKeyLabel)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateKey failed: %v", err)
}
testKeyHash = hash
defer func() {
if testKeyHash != "" {
_ = DeleteKey(testKeyHash)
testKeyHash = ""
}
}()
// Test data simulating an age private key
plaintext := []byte("AGE-SECRET-KEY-1" +
"QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ")
// Encrypt
ciphertext, err := Encrypt(testKeyLabel, plaintext)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Encrypt failed: %v", err)
}
t.Logf("Plaintext: %d bytes, Ciphertext: %d bytes", len(plaintext), len(ciphertext))
if bytes.Equal(ciphertext, plaintext) {
t.Fatal("ciphertext should differ from plaintext")
}
// Decrypt
decrypted, err := Decrypt(testKeyLabel, ciphertext)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Decrypt failed: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(decrypted, plaintext) {
t.Fatalf("decrypted data does not match original plaintext")
}
t.Log("ECIES encrypt/decrypt round-trip successful")
}
func TestEncryptProducesDifferentCiphertexts(t *testing.T) {
skipIfNoSecureEnclave(t)
_, hash, err := CreateKey(testKeyLabel)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateKey failed: %v", err)
}
testKeyHash = hash
defer func() {
if testKeyHash != "" {
_ = DeleteKey(testKeyHash)
testKeyHash = ""
}
}()
plaintext := []byte("test-secret-data")
ct1, err := Encrypt(testKeyLabel, plaintext)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Encrypt failed: %v", err)
}
ct2, err := Encrypt(testKeyLabel, plaintext)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second Encrypt failed: %v", err)
}
// ECIES uses a random ephemeral key each time, so ciphertexts should differ
if bytes.Equal(ct1, ct2) {
t.Fatal("two encryptions of same plaintext should produce different ciphertexts")
}
// Both should decrypt to the same plaintext
dec1, err := Decrypt(testKeyLabel, ct1)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Decrypt failed: %v", err)
}
dec2, err := Decrypt(testKeyLabel, ct2)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second Decrypt failed: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(dec1, plaintext) || !bytes.Equal(dec2, plaintext) {
t.Fatal("both ciphertexts should decrypt to original plaintext")
}
t.Log("ECIES correctly produces different ciphertexts that decrypt to same plaintext")
}
+69
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
//go:build darwin
#ifndef SECURE_ENCLAVE_H
#define SECURE_ENCLAVE_H
#include <stdint.h>
// se_create_key creates a new P-256 key in the Secure Enclave via sc_auth and
// finds its identity hash. If the hash cannot be found, the key exists but
// se_create_key fails, with an error naming the label.
// label: unique identifier for the CTK identity (UTF-8 C string)
// hash_out: output buffer for the identity hash (for deletion)
// hash_out_len: size of hash_out buffer
// error_out: output buffer for error message
// error_out_len: size of error_out buffer
// Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
int se_create_key(const char *label,
char *hash_out, int hash_out_len,
char *error_out, int error_out_len);
// se_copy_public_key copies the public key of a CTK identity.
// label: label of the CTK identity
// pub_key_out: output buffer for the uncompressed public key (65 bytes for P-256)
// pub_key_len: on input, size of pub_key_out; on output, actual size written
// error_out: output buffer for error message
// error_out_len: size of error_out buffer
// Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
int se_copy_public_key(const char *label,
uint8_t *pub_key_out, int *pub_key_len,
char *error_out, int error_out_len);
// se_encrypt encrypts data using the SE-backed public key (ECIES).
// label: label of the CTK identity whose public key to use
// plaintext: data to encrypt
// plaintext_len: length of plaintext
// ciphertext_out: output buffer for the ECIES ciphertext
// ciphertext_len: on input, size of buffer; on output, actual size written
// error_out: output buffer for error message
// error_out_len: size of error_out buffer
// Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
int se_encrypt(const char *label,
const uint8_t *plaintext, int plaintext_len,
uint8_t *ciphertext_out, int *ciphertext_len,
char *error_out, int error_out_len);
// se_decrypt decrypts ECIES ciphertext using the SE-backed private key.
// The ECDH portion of decryption is performed inside the Secure Enclave.
// label: label of the CTK identity whose private key to use
// ciphertext: ECIES ciphertext produced by se_encrypt
// ciphertext_len: length of ciphertext
// plaintext_out: output buffer for decrypted data
// plaintext_len: on input, size of buffer; on output, actual size written
// error_out: output buffer for error message
// error_out_len: size of error_out buffer
// Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
int se_decrypt(const char *label,
const uint8_t *ciphertext, int ciphertext_len,
uint8_t *plaintext_out, int *plaintext_len,
char *error_out, int error_out_len);
// se_delete_key removes a CTK identity from the Secure Enclave via sc_auth.
// hash: the identity hash returned by se_create_key
// error_out: output buffer for error message
// error_out_len: size of error_out buffer
// Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
int se_delete_key(const char *hash,
char *error_out, int error_out_len);
#endif // SECURE_ENCLAVE_H
+317
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
//go:build darwin
#import <Foundation/Foundation.h>
#import <Security/Security.h>
#include "secure_enclave.h"
#include <string.h>
// snprintf_error writes an error message string to the output buffer.
static void snprintf_error(char *error_out, int error_out_len, NSString *msg) {
if (error_out && error_out_len > 0) {
snprintf(error_out, error_out_len, "%s", msg.UTF8String);
}
}
// lookup_ctk_identity finds a CTK identity by label and returns the private key.
static SecKeyRef lookup_ctk_private_key(const char *label, char *error_out, int error_out_len) {
NSDictionary *query = @{
(id)kSecClass: (id)kSecClassIdentity,
(id)kSecAttrLabel: [NSString stringWithUTF8String:label],
(id)kSecMatchLimit: (id)kSecMatchLimitOne,
(id)kSecReturnRef: @YES,
};
SecIdentityRef identity = NULL;
OSStatus status = SecItemCopyMatching((__bridge CFDictionaryRef)query, (CFTypeRef *)&identity);
if (status != errSecSuccess || !identity) {
NSString *msg = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"CTK identity '%s' not found: OSStatus %d",
label, (int)status];
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, msg);
return NULL;
}
SecKeyRef privateKey = NULL;
status = SecIdentityCopyPrivateKey(identity, &privateKey);
CFRelease(identity);
if (status != errSecSuccess || !privateKey) {
NSString *msg = [NSString stringWithFormat:
@"failed to get private key from CTK identity '%s': OSStatus %d",
label, (int)status];
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, msg);
return NULL;
}
return privateKey;
}
int se_create_key(const char *label,
char *hash_out, int hash_out_len,
char *error_out, int error_out_len) {
@autoreleasepool {
NSString *labelStr = [NSString stringWithUTF8String:label];
// Shell out to sc_auth (which has SE entitlements) to create the key
NSTask *task = [[NSTask alloc] init];
task.executableURL = [NSURL fileURLWithPath:@"/usr/sbin/sc_auth"];
task.arguments = @[
@"create-ctk-identity",
@"-k", @"p-256-ne",
@"-t", @"none",
@"-l", labelStr,
];
NSPipe *stderrPipe = [NSPipe pipe];
task.standardOutput = [NSPipe pipe];
task.standardError = stderrPipe;
NSError *nsError = nil;
if (![task launchAndReturnError:&nsError]) {
NSString *msg = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"failed to launch sc_auth: %@",
nsError.localizedDescription];
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, msg);
return -1;
}
[task waitUntilExit];
if (task.terminationStatus != 0) {
NSData *stderrData = [stderrPipe.fileHandleForReading readDataToEndOfFile];
NSString *stderrStr = [[NSString alloc] initWithData:stderrData
encoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
NSString *msg = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"sc_auth failed: %@",
stderrStr ?: @"unknown error"];
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, msg);
return -1;
}
// Get the identity hash, which deleting the key needs, by parsing
// sc_auth list output
hash_out[0] = '\0';
NSTask *listTask = [[NSTask alloc] init];
listTask.executableURL = [NSURL fileURLWithPath:@"/usr/sbin/sc_auth"];
listTask.arguments = @[@"list-ctk-identities"];
NSPipe *listPipe = [NSPipe pipe];
listTask.standardOutput = listPipe;
listTask.standardError = [NSPipe pipe];
if ([listTask launchAndReturnError:&nsError]) {
[listTask waitUntilExit];
NSData *listData = [listPipe.fileHandleForReading readDataToEndOfFile];
NSString *listStr = [[NSString alloc] initWithData:listData
encoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
for (NSString *line in [listStr componentsSeparatedByString:@"\n"]) {
if ([line containsString:labelStr]) {
NSMutableArray *tokens = [NSMutableArray array];
for (NSString *part in [line componentsSeparatedByCharactersInSet:
[NSCharacterSet whitespaceCharacterSet]]) {
if (part.length > 0) {
[tokens addObject:part];
}
}
if (tokens.count > 1) {
snprintf(hash_out, hash_out_len, "%s", [tokens[1] UTF8String]);
}
break;
}
}
}
if (hash_out[0] == '\0') {
NSString *msg = [NSString stringWithFormat:
@"created key '%s' but found no hash for it in sc_auth list-ctk-identities",
label];
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, msg);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
}
int se_copy_public_key(const char *label,
uint8_t *pub_key_out, int *pub_key_len,
char *error_out, int error_out_len) {
@autoreleasepool {
SecKeyRef privateKey = lookup_ctk_private_key(label, error_out, error_out_len);
if (!privateKey) {
return -1;
}
SecKeyRef publicKey = SecKeyCopyPublicKey(privateKey);
CFRelease(privateKey);
if (!publicKey) {
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, @"failed to get public key");
return -1;
}
CFErrorRef cfError = NULL;
CFDataRef pubKeyData = SecKeyCopyExternalRepresentation(publicKey, &cfError);
CFRelease(publicKey);
if (!pubKeyData) {
NSError *err = (__bridge_transfer NSError *)cfError;
NSString *msg = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"failed to export public key: %@",
err.localizedDescription];
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, msg);
return -1;
}
const UInt8 *bytes = CFDataGetBytePtr(pubKeyData);
CFIndex length = CFDataGetLength(pubKeyData);
if (length > *pub_key_len) {
CFRelease(pubKeyData);
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, @"public key buffer too small");
return -1;
}
memcpy(pub_key_out, bytes, length);
*pub_key_len = (int)length;
CFRelease(pubKeyData);
return 0;
}
}
int se_encrypt(const char *label,
const uint8_t *plaintext, int plaintext_len,
uint8_t *ciphertext_out, int *ciphertext_len,
char *error_out, int error_out_len) {
@autoreleasepool {
SecKeyRef privateKey = lookup_ctk_private_key(label, error_out, error_out_len);
if (!privateKey) {
return -1;
}
SecKeyRef publicKey = SecKeyCopyPublicKey(privateKey);
CFRelease(privateKey);
if (!publicKey) {
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, @"failed to get public key for encryption");
return -1;
}
NSData *plaintextData = [NSData dataWithBytes:plaintext length:plaintext_len];
CFErrorRef cfError = NULL;
CFDataRef encrypted = SecKeyCreateEncryptedData(
publicKey,
kSecKeyAlgorithmECIESEncryptionStandardVariableIVX963SHA256AESGCM,
(__bridge CFDataRef)plaintextData,
&cfError
);
CFRelease(publicKey);
if (!encrypted) {
NSError *nsError = (__bridge_transfer NSError *)cfError;
NSString *msg = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"ECIES encryption failed: %@",
nsError.localizedDescription];
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, msg);
return -1;
}
const UInt8 *encBytes = CFDataGetBytePtr(encrypted);
CFIndex encLength = CFDataGetLength(encrypted);
if (encLength > *ciphertext_len) {
CFRelease(encrypted);
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, @"ciphertext buffer too small");
return -1;
}
memcpy(ciphertext_out, encBytes, encLength);
*ciphertext_len = (int)encLength;
CFRelease(encrypted);
return 0;
}
}
int se_decrypt(const char *label,
const uint8_t *ciphertext, int ciphertext_len,
uint8_t *plaintext_out, int *plaintext_len,
char *error_out, int error_out_len) {
@autoreleasepool {
SecKeyRef privateKey = lookup_ctk_private_key(label, error_out, error_out_len);
if (!privateKey) {
return -1;
}
NSData *ciphertextData = [NSData dataWithBytes:ciphertext length:ciphertext_len];
CFErrorRef cfError = NULL;
CFDataRef decrypted = SecKeyCreateDecryptedData(
privateKey,
kSecKeyAlgorithmECIESEncryptionStandardVariableIVX963SHA256AESGCM,
(__bridge CFDataRef)ciphertextData,
&cfError
);
CFRelease(privateKey);
if (!decrypted) {
NSError *nsError = (__bridge_transfer NSError *)cfError;
NSString *msg = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"ECIES decryption failed: %@",
nsError.localizedDescription];
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, msg);
return -1;
}
const UInt8 *decBytes = CFDataGetBytePtr(decrypted);
CFIndex decLength = CFDataGetLength(decrypted);
if (decLength > *plaintext_len) {
CFRelease(decrypted);
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, @"plaintext buffer too small");
return -1;
}
memcpy(plaintext_out, decBytes, decLength);
*plaintext_len = (int)decLength;
CFRelease(decrypted);
return 0;
}
}
int se_delete_key(const char *hash,
char *error_out, int error_out_len) {
@autoreleasepool {
NSTask *task = [[NSTask alloc] init];
task.executableURL = [NSURL fileURLWithPath:@"/usr/sbin/sc_auth"];
task.arguments = @[
@"delete-ctk-identity",
@"-h", [NSString stringWithUTF8String:hash],
];
NSPipe *stderrPipe = [NSPipe pipe];
task.standardOutput = [NSPipe pipe];
task.standardError = stderrPipe;
NSError *nsError = nil;
if (![task launchAndReturnError:&nsError]) {
NSString *msg = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"failed to launch sc_auth: %@",
nsError.localizedDescription];
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, msg);
return -1;
}
[task waitUntilExit];
if (task.terminationStatus != 0) {
NSData *stderrData = [stderrPipe.fileHandleForReading readDataToEndOfFile];
NSString *stderrStr = [[NSString alloc] initWithData:stderrData
encoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
NSString *msg = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"sc_auth delete failed: %@",
stderrStr ?: @"unknown error"];
snprintf_error(error_out, error_out_len, msg);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
}
+42 -2
View File
@@ -8,12 +8,13 @@ import (
"testing"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/macse"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
var errInjected = errors.New("injected failure")
@@ -899,3 +900,42 @@ func TestWriteDirRefusesExistingDir(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// TestSecureEnclaveUnlockerFailureDeletesKey makes moving a new Secure
// Enclave unlocker into place fail after its Secure Enclave key is created:
// the key must be deleted again. Skipped when the add fails before that, as
// it does everywhere but in a macOS build with cgo on a Mac with a Secure
// Enclave.
func TestSecureEnclaveUnlockerFailureDeletesKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mnemonic := testMnemonicBuffer(t)
base := afero.NewMemMapFs()
_, err := vault.CreateVault(base, testVaultStateDir, testVaultName, mnemonic, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
// The unlocker's directory is named se-<label of its Secure Enclave key>
var seKeyLabel string
fs := hookFs{Fs: base, before: func(op, path string) error {
if op == opRename && filepath.Base(filepath.Dir(path)) == "unlockers.d" {
seKeyLabel = strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.Base(path), "se-")
return errInjected
}
return nil
}}
_, err = secret.CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker(fs, testVaultStateDir, mnemonic,
nil)
if seKeyLabel == "" {
t.Skipf("the add failed before moving the unlocker into place: %v", err)
}
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInjected)
_, err = macse.Encrypt(seKeyLabel, []byte("test"))
assert.Error(t, err, "Secure Enclave key left behind")
}
+3 -7
View File
@@ -17,14 +17,10 @@ const (
// EnvGPGKeyID is the environment variable for providing the GPG key ID
EnvGPGKeyID = "SB_GPG_KEY_ID"
// TerminalPath opens the controlling terminal of the process that opens
// it, where the passphrase and mnemonic prompts ask.
TerminalPath = "/dev/tty"
// UnlockerTimeFormat is the layout of the time, in UTC, in the name of a
// new unlocker's directory. It runs to the nanosecond, so that every new
// unlocker, even one added right after another, gets a directory of its
// own.
// new unlocker's directory, keychain item and Secure Enclave key. It runs
// to the nanosecond, so that every new unlocker, even one added right
// after another, gets a directory of its own.
UnlockerTimeFormat = "2006-01-02.15.04.05.000000000"
)
+35 -59
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"syscall"
"unsafe"
"filippo.io/age"
@@ -15,25 +16,17 @@ import (
var (
errNilPassphraseBuffer = errors.New("passphrase buffer is nil")
errNoTerminal = errors.New("there is no terminal to ask on")
errNothingEntered = errors.New("nothing was entered")
errStdinNotTerminal = errors.New(
"cannot read passphrase from non-terminal stdin " +
"(piped input or script). Please set the SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE " +
"environment variable or run interactively")
errStderrNotTerminal = errors.New(
"cannot prompt for passphrase: stderr is not a terminal " +
"(running in non-interactive mode). Please set the " +
"SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE environment variable")
errEmptyPassphrase = errors.New("passphrase cannot be empty")
)
// ErrMnemonicNotRead is wrapped in every error of ReadMnemonic: there is no
// terminal to read the mnemonic from, reading it failed, or it was empty.
var ErrMnemonicNotRead = errors.New("failed to read mnemonic")
// ScryptWorkFactor is, when not zero, the scrypt work factor that
// EncryptWithPassphrase uses instead of age's, 18: log2 of scrypt's cost
// parameter N. Deriving a key with age's takes about a second and 256 MiB, on
// purpose, since so does every guess at the passphrase. Only tests set it,
// lower, before any test runs, so that the passphrase unlockers they create
// cost nothing; the program leaves it zero. Decryption takes the work factor
// from the encrypted data, so it needs no setting.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // set by the tests of the packages that use this one
var ScryptWorkFactor int
// EncryptToRecipient encrypts data to a recipient using age
// The data parameter should be a LockedBuffer for secure memory handling
func EncryptToRecipient(
@@ -148,10 +141,6 @@ func EncryptWithPassphrase(
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create scrypt recipient: %w", err)
}
if ScryptWorkFactor != 0 {
recipient.SetWorkFactor(ScryptWorkFactor)
}
return EncryptToRecipient(data, recipient)
}
@@ -180,53 +169,40 @@ func DecryptWithPassphrase(
// Returns a LockedBuffer containing the passphrase for secure memory handling.
// Every error it returns wraps ErrPassphraseNotRead.
func ReadPassphrase(prompt string) (*memguard.LockedBuffer, error) {
return readFromTerminal(prompt, ErrPassphraseNotRead, EnvUnlockPassphrase)
}
// Check if stdin is a terminal
if !term.IsTerminal(syscall.Stdin) {
// Not a terminal - never read passphrases from piped input
// for security reasons
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrPassphraseNotRead, errStdinNotTerminal)
}
// ReadMnemonic reads a mnemonic from the terminal as ReadPassphrase reads a
// passphrase. Every error it returns wraps ErrMnemonicNotRead.
func ReadMnemonic(prompt string) (*memguard.LockedBuffer, error) {
return readFromTerminal(prompt, ErrMnemonicNotRead, EnvMnemonic)
}
// stdin is a terminal, check if stderr is also a terminal for
// interactive prompting
if !term.IsTerminal(syscall.Stderr) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrPassphraseNotRead, errStderrNotTerminal)
}
// readFromTerminal asks on the controlling terminal and reads the answer
// there without echoing it, whatever stdin is: in
// `echo value | secret add name --force`, stdin is a pipe. Every error it
// returns wraps notRead; without a terminal, the error says to set envVar
// instead.
func readFromTerminal(
prompt string, notRead error, envVar string,
) (*memguard.LockedBuffer, error) {
terminal, err := os.OpenFile(TerminalPath, os.O_RDWR, 0)
// Both stdin and stderr are terminals - use secure password reading
fmt.Fprint(os.Stderr, prompt) // Write prompt to stderr, not stdout
passphrase, err := term.ReadPassword(syscall.Stdin)
if err != nil {
Debug("Failed to open the controlling terminal", "error", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %w. Please set the %s environment variable or run interactively",
notRead, errNoTerminal, envVar)
}
defer func() { _ = terminal.Close() }()
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(terminal, prompt)
input, err := term.ReadPassword(int(terminal.Fd()))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", notRead, err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrPassphraseNotRead, err)
}
// The newline typed after the input, which ReadPassword did not echo
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(terminal)
// Print newline to stderr since ReadPassword doesn't echo
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr)
if len(input) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", notRead, errNothingEntered)
if len(passphrase) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrPassphraseNotRead, errEmptyPassphrase)
}
// Create a secure buffer and copy the input
secureBuffer := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes(input)
// Create a secure buffer and copy the passphrase
secureBuffer := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes(passphrase)
// Clear the original input slice
for i := range input {
input[i] = 0
// Clear the original passphrase slice
for i := range passphrase {
passphrase[i] = 0
}
return secureBuffer, nil
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import (
"testing"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
// TestIdentityToLockedBuffer checks that the buffer holds the identity's
+118
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
//go:build darwin
//nolint:testpackage // white-box test of unexported getLongTermPrivateKey
package secret
import (
"encoding/json"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// realVault is a minimal VaultInterface backed by a real afero filesystem,
// using the same directory layout as vault.Vault.
type realVault struct {
name string
stateDir string
fs afero.Fs
}
func (v *realVault) GetDirectory() (string, error) {
return filepath.Join(v.stateDir, "vaults.d", v.name), nil
}
func (v *realVault) GetName() string { return v.name }
//nolint:ireturn // implements VaultInterface
func (v *realVault) GetFilesystem() afero.Fs { return v.fs }
// Unused by getLongTermPrivateKey — these satisfy VaultInterface.
func (v *realVault) AddSecret(string, *memguard.LockedBuffer, bool) error {
panic("not used")
}
//nolint:ireturn // implements VaultInterface
func (v *realVault) GetCurrentUnlocker() (Unlocker, error) {
panic("not used")
}
func (v *realVault) GetOrDeriveLongTermKey() (*age.X25519Identity, error) {
panic("not used")
}
func (v *realVault) SetMnemonic(*memguard.LockedBuffer) {
panic("not used")
}
func (v *realVault) SetUnlockPassphrase(*memguard.LockedBuffer) {
panic("not used")
}
func (v *realVault) CreatePassphraseUnlocker(
*memguard.LockedBuffer,
) (*PassphraseUnlocker, error) {
panic("not used")
}
// createRealVault sets up a complete vault directory structure on an in-memory
// filesystem, identical to what vault.CreateVault produces.
func createRealVault(
t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, stateDir, name string, derivationIndex uint32,
) *realVault {
t.Helper()
vaultDir := filepath.Join(stateDir, "vaults.d", name)
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(vaultDir, "secrets.d"), DirPerms))
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(vaultDir, "unlockers.d"), DirPerms))
metadata := VaultMetadata{
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
DerivationIndex: derivationIndex,
}
metaBytes, err := json.Marshal(metadata)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs,
filepath.Join(vaultDir, "vault-metadata.json"), metaBytes, FilePerms))
return &realVault{name: name, stateDir: stateDir, fs: fs}
}
func TestGetLongTermPrivateKeyUsesVaultDerivationIndex(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
//nolint:dupword // BIP39 test mnemonic repeats words by design
const testMnemonic = "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon " +
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about"
// Derive expected keys at two different indices to prove they differ.
key0, err := agehd.DeriveIdentity(testMnemonic, 0)
require.NoError(t, err)
key5, err := agehd.DeriveIdentity(testMnemonic, 5)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEqual(t, key0.String(), key5.String(),
"sanity check: different derivation indices must produce different keys")
// Build a real vault with DerivationIndex=5 on an in-memory filesystem.
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
vault := createRealVault(t, fs, "/state", "test-vault", 5)
mnemonic := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(testMnemonic))
defer mnemonic.Destroy()
result, err := getLongTermPrivateKey(fs, vault, mnemonic, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer result.Destroy()
assert.Equal(t, key5.String(), string(result.Bytes()),
"getLongTermPrivateKey should derive at vault's DerivationIndex (5)")
assert.NotEqual(t, key0.String(), string(result.Bytes()),
"getLongTermPrivateKey must not use hardcoded index 0")
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package secret_test
import (
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
)
func TestDetermineStateDir_ErrorsWhenHomeDirUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
+142
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
package secret
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
)
var (
errPassphraseLength = errors.New(
"passphrase length must be a positive even number")
errPassphraseNotHex = errors.New(
"keychain passphrase must be lowercase hex")
errNoKeychainPassphrase = errors.New(
"keychain data has no agePrivKeyPassphrase string")
)
// KeychainData is what a keychain unlocker stores in the macOS keychain.
// It is stored as JSON, but encode and decodeKeychainData keep the
// passphrase out of encoding/json, which would leave copies of it in
// ordinary memory.
type KeychainData struct {
AgePublicKey string
AgePrivKeyPassphrase *memguard.LockedBuffer
EncryptedLongtermKey string
}
// generateRandomPassphrase returns length random lowercase hex characters
// in a locked buffer. The caller must destroy it.
func generateRandomPassphrase(length int) (*memguard.LockedBuffer, error) {
// Each random byte becomes two hex characters.
randomBytes := hex.DecodedLen(length)
if length <= 0 || hex.EncodedLen(randomBytes) != length {
return nil, errPassphraseLength
}
random := memguard.NewBufferRandom(randomBytes)
defer random.Destroy()
passphrase := memguard.NewBuffer(length)
hex.Encode(passphrase.Bytes(), random.Bytes())
passphrase.Freeze()
return passphrase, nil
}
// encode returns d as JSON in a locked buffer:
// {"agePublicKey":"...","agePrivKeyPassphrase":"...","encryptedLongtermKey":"..."}.
// The passphrase is copied straight into the buffer, so it must be hex,
// which JSON does not escape. The caller must destroy the returned buffer.
func (d *KeychainData) encode() (*memguard.LockedBuffer, error) {
if d.AgePrivKeyPassphrase == nil {
return nil, errNilPassphraseBuffer
}
if d.AgePrivKeyPassphrase.Size() == 0 {
return nil, errEmptyPassphrase
}
for _, c := range d.AgePrivKeyPassphrase.Bytes() {
if strings.IndexByte("0123456789abcdef", c) < 0 {
return nil, errPassphraseNotHex
}
}
publicKey, err := json.Marshal(d.AgePublicKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encode age public key: %w", err)
}
longtermKey, err := json.Marshal(d.EncryptedLongtermKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encode long-term key: %w", err)
}
parts := [][]byte{
[]byte(`{"agePublicKey":`), publicKey,
[]byte(`,"agePrivKeyPassphrase":"`), d.AgePrivKeyPassphrase.Bytes(),
[]byte(`","encryptedLongtermKey":`), longtermKey,
[]byte(`}`),
}
size := 0
for _, part := range parts {
size += len(part)
}
encoded := memguard.NewBuffer(size)
written := 0
for _, part := range parts {
written += copy(encoded.Bytes()[written:], part)
}
encoded.Freeze()
return encoded, nil
}
// decodeKeychainData parses keychain data written by encode. The caller
// must destroy the returned AgePrivKeyPassphrase.
func decodeKeychainData(data *memguard.LockedBuffer) (*KeychainData, error) {
if data == nil {
return nil, errNilDataBuffer
}
// json.Unmarshal gives a json.RawMessage field the field's JSON text
// unchanged, in the one copy RawMessage makes; it is wiped on return.
var fields struct {
AgePublicKey string `json:"agePublicKey"`
AgePrivKeyPassphrase json.RawMessage `json:"agePrivKeyPassphrase"`
EncryptedLongtermKey string `json:"encryptedLongtermKey"`
}
defer func() { memguard.WipeBytes(fields.AgePrivKeyPassphrase) }()
err := json.Unmarshal(data.Bytes(), &fields)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse keychain data: %w", err)
}
// json.Unmarshal accepted the JSON, so text that starts with a quote is
// a whole string. The passphrase is hex, so it is the text between the
// quotes.
quoted := fields.AgePrivKeyPassphrase
if !bytes.HasPrefix(quoted, []byte(`"`)) {
return nil, errNoKeychainPassphrase
}
return &KeychainData{
AgePublicKey: fields.AgePublicKey,
// NewBufferFromBytes wipes the bytes it copies.
AgePrivKeyPassphrase: memguard.NewBufferFromBytes(
quoted[1 : len(quoted)-1]),
EncryptedLongtermKey: fields.EncryptedLongtermKey,
}, nil
}
+118
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
//nolint:testpackage // white-box test of unexported internals
package secret
import (
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestGenerateRandomPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
first, err := generateRandomPassphrase(64)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer first.Destroy()
second, err := generateRandomPassphrase(64)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer second.Destroy()
assert.Regexp(t, `^[0-9a-f]{64}$`, first.String())
assert.NotEqual(t, first.String(), second.String())
assert.False(t, first.IsMutable())
for _, length := range []int{0, -2, 63} {
_, err := generateRandomPassphrase(length)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errPassphraseLength, "length %d", length)
}
}
func TestKeychainDataEncodeDecode(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
passphrase := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("0a1b2c3d"))
defer passphrase.Destroy()
data := KeychainData{
AgePublicKey: "age1example",
AgePrivKeyPassphrase: passphrase,
EncryptedLongtermKey: "beef",
}
encoded, err := data.encode()
require.NoError(t, err)
defer encoded.Destroy()
assert.JSONEq(t,
`{"agePublicKey":"age1example",`+
`"agePrivKeyPassphrase":"0a1b2c3d",`+
`"encryptedLongtermKey":"beef"}`,
encoded.String())
assert.False(t, encoded.IsMutable())
decoded, err := decodeKeychainData(encoded)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer decoded.AgePrivKeyPassphrase.Destroy()
assert.Equal(t, "age1example", decoded.AgePublicKey)
assert.Equal(t, "0a1b2c3d", decoded.AgePrivKeyPassphrase.String())
assert.Equal(t, "beef", decoded.EncryptedLongtermKey)
}
func TestKeychainDataEncodeRejectsBadPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
passphrase *memguard.LockedBuffer
wantErr error
}{
{"nil", nil, errNilPassphraseBuffer},
{"empty", memguard.NewBuffer(0), errEmptyPassphrase},
{
"not hex",
memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(`abc"def`)),
errPassphraseNotHex,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
data := KeychainData{AgePrivKeyPassphrase: tt.passphrase}
_, err := data.encode()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.wantErr)
})
}
}
func TestDecodeKeychainDataRejectsBadData(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, text := range []string{
`{"agePublicKey":"age1example"}`,
`{"agePrivKeyPassphrase":42}`,
} {
data := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(text))
_, err := decodeKeychainData(data)
data.Destroy()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errNoKeychainPassphrase, text)
}
notJSON := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(`{"agePrivKeyPassphrase":`))
defer notJSON.Destroy()
_, err := decodeKeychainData(notJSON)
var syntaxError *json.SyntaxError
require.ErrorAs(t, err, &syntaxError)
}
+561
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,561 @@
//go:build darwin
package secret
import (
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
)
const (
agePrivKeyPassphraseLength = 64
// KEYCHAIN_APP_IDENTIFIER is the service name used for keychain items
//
//nolint:revive // ALL_CAPS is intentional for this constant
KEYCHAIN_APP_IDENTIFIER = "berlin.sneak.app.secret"
// keychainUnlockerType is the metadata type string for keychain unlockers.
keychainUnlockerType = "keychain"
// macOSFlag is the unlocker metadata flag of the macOS-only unlockers.
macOSFlag = "macos"
)
// keychainItemNameRegex validates keychain item names
// Allows alphanumeric characters, dots, hyphens, and underscores only
var keychainItemNameRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$`)
var (
errKeychainItemNameEmpty = errors.New("keychain item name cannot be empty")
errInvalidKeychainItemName = errors.New("invalid keychain item name format")
errUnsupportedCurrentUnlocker = errors.New(
"unsupported current unlocker type for keychain unlocker creation")
)
// KeychainUnlockerMetadata extends UnlockerMetadata with keychain-specific data
type KeychainUnlockerMetadata struct {
UnlockerMetadata
// Keychain item name
KeychainItemName string `json:"keychainItemName"`
}
// KeychainUnlocker represents a macOS Keychain-protected unlocker
type KeychainUnlocker struct {
Directory string
Metadata UnlockerMetadata
fs afero.Fs
}
// NewKeychainUnlocker creates a new KeychainUnlocker instance
func NewKeychainUnlocker(
fs afero.Fs, directory string, metadata UnlockerMetadata,
) *KeychainUnlocker {
return &KeychainUnlocker{
Directory: directory,
Metadata: metadata,
fs: fs,
}
}
// GetIdentity implements Unlocker interface for Keychain-based unlockers
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) GetIdentity() (*age.X25519Identity, error) {
DebugWith("Getting keychain unlocker identity",
slog.String("unlocker_id", k.GetID()),
slog.String("unlocker_type", k.GetType()),
)
keychainData, err := k.readKeychainData()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer keychainData.AgePrivKeyPassphrase.Destroy()
// Step 4: Read the encrypted age private key from filesystem
agePrivKeyPath := filepath.Join(k.Directory, "priv.age")
Debug("Reading encrypted age private key", "path", agePrivKeyPath)
encryptedAgePrivKeyData, err := afero.ReadFile(k.fs, agePrivKeyPath)
if err != nil {
Debug("Failed to read encrypted age private key",
"error", err, "path", agePrivKeyPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read encrypted age private key: %w", err)
}
DebugWith("Read encrypted age private key",
slog.String("unlocker_id", k.GetID()),
slog.Int("encrypted_length", len(encryptedAgePrivKeyData)),
)
// Step 5: Decrypt the age private key using the passphrase from keychain
Debug("Decrypting age private key with keychain passphrase",
"unlocker_id", k.GetID())
agePrivKeyBuffer, err := DecryptWithPassphrase(
encryptedAgePrivKeyData, keychainData.AgePrivKeyPassphrase)
if err != nil {
Debug("Failed to decrypt age private key with keychain passphrase",
"error", err, "unlocker_id", k.GetID())
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to decrypt age private key with keychain passphrase: %w", err)
}
defer agePrivKeyBuffer.Destroy()
DebugWith("Successfully decrypted age private key with keychain passphrase",
slog.String("unlocker_id", k.GetID()),
slog.Int("decrypted_length", agePrivKeyBuffer.Size()),
)
// Step 6: Parse the decrypted age private key
Debug("Parsing decrypted age private key", "unlocker_id", k.GetID())
ageIdentity, err := age.ParseX25519Identity(agePrivKeyBuffer.String())
if err != nil {
Debug("Failed to parse age private key", "error", err, "unlocker_id", k.GetID())
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse age private key: %w", err)
}
DebugWith("Successfully parsed keychain age identity",
slog.String("unlocker_id", k.GetID()),
slog.String("public_key", ageIdentity.Recipient().String()),
)
return ageIdentity, nil
}
// GetType implements Unlocker interface
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) GetType() string {
return keychainUnlockerType
}
// GetMetadata implements Unlocker interface
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) GetMetadata() UnlockerMetadata {
return k.Metadata
}
// GetDirectory implements Unlocker interface
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) GetDirectory() string {
return k.Directory
}
// GetID implements Unlocker interface: the name of the unlocker's directory
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) GetID() string {
return filepath.Base(k.Directory)
}
// Remove implements Unlocker interface - removes the keychain unlocker
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) Remove() error {
// Step 1: Get keychain item name
keychainItemName, err := k.GetKeychainItemName()
if err != nil {
Debug("Failed to get keychain item name during removal",
"error", err, "unlocker_id", k.GetID())
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get keychain item name: %w", err)
}
// Step 2: Remove from keychain
Debug("Removing keychain item", "keychain_item", keychainItemName)
err = deleteFromKeychain(keychainItemName)
if err != nil {
Debug("Failed to remove keychain item",
"error", err, "keychain_item", keychainItemName)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to remove keychain item: %w", err)
}
// Step 3: Remove directory
Debug("Removing keychain unlocker directory", "directory", k.Directory)
err = RemoveDirAtomic(k.fs, k.Directory)
if err != nil {
Debug("Failed to remove keychain unlocker directory",
"error", err, "directory", k.Directory)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to remove keychain unlocker directory: %w", err)
}
Debug("Successfully removed keychain unlocker",
"unlocker_id", k.GetID(), "keychain_item", keychainItemName)
return nil
}
// GetKeychainItemName returns the keychain item name from metadata
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) GetKeychainItemName() (string, error) {
// Load the metadata
metadataPath := filepath.Join(k.Directory, "unlocker-metadata.json")
metadataData, err := afero.ReadFile(k.fs, metadataPath)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to read keychain metadata: %w", err)
}
var keychainMetadata KeychainUnlockerMetadata
err = json.Unmarshal(metadataData, &keychainMetadata)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse keychain metadata: %w", err)
}
return keychainMetadata.KeychainItemName, nil
}
// readKeychainData reads and parses the data this unlocker keeps in the
// keychain (steps 1 to 3 of GetIdentity). The caller must destroy the
// returned AgePrivKeyPassphrase.
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) readKeychainData() (*KeychainData, error) {
// Step 1: Get keychain item name
keychainItemName, err := k.GetKeychainItemName()
if err != nil {
Debug("Failed to get keychain item name", "error", err, "unlocker_id", k.GetID())
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get keychain item name: %w", err)
}
// Step 2: Retrieve data from keychain
Debug("Retrieving data from macOS keychain", "keychain_item", keychainItemName)
keychainDataBytes, err := retrieveFromKeychain(keychainItemName)
if err != nil {
Debug("Failed to retrieve data from keychain",
"error", err, "keychain_item", keychainItemName)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to retrieve data from keychain: %w", err)
}
DebugWith("Retrieved data from keychain",
slog.String("unlocker_id", k.GetID()),
slog.Int("data_length", len(keychainDataBytes)),
)
// Move the keychain data into locked memory; this wipes keychainDataBytes
keychainDataBuffer := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes(keychainDataBytes)
defer keychainDataBuffer.Destroy()
// Step 3: Parse keychain data
keychainData, err := decodeKeychainData(keychainDataBuffer)
if err != nil {
Debug("Failed to parse keychain data", "error", err, "unlocker_id", k.GetID())
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse keychain data: %w", err)
}
Debug("Parsed keychain data successfully", "unlocker_id", k.GetID())
return keychainData, nil
}
// generateKeychainUnlockerName generates a unique name for the keychain unlocker
func generateKeychainUnlockerName(vaultName string) (string, error) {
hostname, err := os.Hostname()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get hostname: %w", err)
}
// Format: secret-<vault>-<hostname>-<time>
enrollmentTime := time.Now().UTC().Format(UnlockerTimeFormat)
return fmt.Sprintf("secret-%s-%s-%s", vaultName, hostname, enrollmentTime), nil
}
// getLongTermPrivateKey derives the long-term private key from mnemonic when
// it is not nil, else gets it through the current unlocker, which is given
// passphrase when it is a passphrase unlocker.
// Returns a LockedBuffer to ensure the private key is protected in memory
func getLongTermPrivateKey(
fs afero.Fs, vault VaultInterface, mnemonic, passphrase *memguard.LockedBuffer,
) (*memguard.LockedBuffer, error) {
if mnemonic != nil {
return deriveLongTermPrivateKey(fs, vault, mnemonic)
}
// Get the vault to access current unlocker
currentUnlocker, err := vault.GetCurrentUnlocker()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get current unlocker: %w", err)
}
if passphraseUnlocker, ok := currentUnlocker.(*PassphraseUnlocker); ok {
passphraseUnlocker.Passphrase = passphrase
}
// Get the current unlocker identity
currentUnlockerIdentity, err := currentUnlocker.GetIdentity()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get current unlocker identity: %w", err)
}
// Get encrypted long-term key from current unlocker, handling different types
var encryptedLtPrivKey []byte
switch currentUnlocker := currentUnlocker.(type) {
case *PassphraseUnlocker:
// Read the encrypted long-term private key from passphrase unlocker
encryptedLtPrivKey, err = afero.ReadFile(fs,
filepath.Join(currentUnlocker.GetDirectory(), "longterm.age"))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read encrypted long-term key "+
"from current passphrase unlocker: %w", err)
}
case *PGPUnlocker:
// Read the encrypted long-term private key from PGP unlocker
encryptedLtPrivKey, err = afero.ReadFile(fs,
filepath.Join(currentUnlocker.GetDirectory(), "longterm.age"))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read encrypted long-term key "+
"from current PGP unlocker: %w", err)
}
case *KeychainUnlocker:
// Read the encrypted long-term private key from another keychain
// unlocker
encryptedLtPrivKey, err = afero.ReadFile(fs,
filepath.Join(currentUnlocker.GetDirectory(), "longterm.age"))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read encrypted long-term key "+
"from current keychain unlocker: %w", err)
}
default:
return nil, errUnsupportedCurrentUnlocker
}
// Decrypt long-term private key using current unlocker
ltPrivKeyBuffer, err := DecryptWithIdentity(
encryptedLtPrivKey, currentUnlockerIdentity)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt long-term private key: %w", err)
}
// Return the decrypted key buffer
return ltPrivKeyBuffer, nil
}
// deriveLongTermPrivateKey derives the long-term private key from mnemonic at
// the vault's derivation index, for getLongTermPrivateKey and
// getLongTermKeyForSE.
func deriveLongTermPrivateKey(
fs afero.Fs, vault VaultInterface, mnemonic *memguard.LockedBuffer,
) (*memguard.LockedBuffer, error) {
// Read vault metadata to get the correct derivation index
vaultDir, err := vault.GetDirectory()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get vault directory: %w", err)
}
metadataPath := filepath.Join(vaultDir, "vault-metadata.json")
metadataBytes, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, metadataPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read vault metadata: %w", err)
}
var metadata VaultMetadata
err = json.Unmarshal(metadataBytes, &metadata)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse vault metadata: %w", err)
}
// Use mnemonic with the vault's actual derivation index
ltIdentity, err := agehd.DeriveIdentity(mnemonic.String(), metadata.DerivationIndex)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to derive long-term key from mnemonic: %w", err)
}
return IdentityToLockedBuffer(ltIdentity), nil
}
// CreateKeychainUnlocker creates a new keychain unlocker and stores it in the
// vault. The long-term key comes from mnemonic when it is not nil, else from
// the current unlocker, as getLongTermPrivateKey describes.
func CreateKeychainUnlocker(
fs afero.Fs, stateDir string, mnemonic, passphrase *memguard.LockedBuffer,
) (*KeychainUnlocker, error) {
// Get current vault using the GetCurrentVault function from the same package
vault, err := GetCurrentVault(fs, stateDir)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get current vault: %w", err)
}
// Generate the keychain item name
keychainItemName, err := generateKeychainUnlockerName(vault.GetName())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate keychain item name: %w", err)
}
// The unlocker directory is named after the keychain item
vaultDir, err := vault.GetDirectory()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get vault directory: %w", err)
}
unlockerDir := filepath.Join(vaultDir, "unlockers.d", keychainItemName)
// Step 1: Generate a new age keypair for the keychain unlocker
ageIdentity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate age keypair: %w", err)
}
ageRecipient := ageIdentity.Recipient().String()
// Step 2: Generate a random passphrase for encrypting the age private key
agePrivKeyPassphrase, err := generateRandomPassphrase(agePrivKeyPassphraseLength)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate age private key passphrase: %w", err)
}
defer agePrivKeyPassphrase.Destroy()
// Step 3: Encrypt age private key with the generated passphrase
agePrivKeyBuffer := IdentityToLockedBuffer(ageIdentity)
defer agePrivKeyBuffer.Destroy()
encryptedAgePrivKey, err := EncryptWithPassphrase(
agePrivKeyBuffer, agePrivKeyPassphrase)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt age private key with passphrase: %w", err)
}
// Step 4: Get or derive the long-term private key
ltPrivKeyData, err := getLongTermPrivateKey(fs, vault, mnemonic, passphrase)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer ltPrivKeyData.Destroy()
// Step 5: Encrypt long-term private key to the new age unlocker
encryptedLtPrivKeyToAge, err := EncryptToRecipient(
ltPrivKeyData, ageIdentity.Recipient())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to encrypt long-term private key to age unlocker: %w", err)
}
// Step 6: Prepare keychain data
keychainData := KeychainData{
AgePublicKey: ageRecipient,
AgePrivKeyPassphrase: agePrivKeyPassphrase,
EncryptedLongtermKey: hex.EncodeToString(encryptedLtPrivKeyToAge),
}
keychainDataBuffer, err := keychainData.encode()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encode keychain data: %w", err)
}
defer keychainDataBuffer.Destroy()
return writeKeychainUnlocker(fs, unlockerDir, keychainItemName, ageRecipient,
encryptedAgePrivKey, encryptedLtPrivKeyToAge, keychainDataBuffer)
}
// writeKeychainUnlocker writes a new keychain unlocker into unlockerDir and
// stores its data in the keychain (steps 7 and 8 of CreateKeychainUnlocker).
// The data is stored after the unlocker's files are written, and the keychain
// item is deleted again if moving the unlocker into place then fails.
func writeKeychainUnlocker(
fs afero.Fs, unlockerDir, keychainItemName, ageRecipient string,
encryptedAgePrivKey, encryptedLtPrivKey []byte,
keychainDataBuffer *memguard.LockedBuffer,
) (*KeychainUnlocker, error) {
// Step 7: Prepare enhanced metadata
keychainMetadata := KeychainUnlockerMetadata{
UnlockerMetadata: UnlockerMetadata{
Type: keychainUnlockerType,
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
Flags: []string{keychainUnlockerType, macOSFlag},
},
KeychainItemName: keychainItemName,
}
metadataBytes, err := json.MarshalIndent(keychainMetadata, "", " ")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal unlocker metadata: %w", err)
}
// Step 8: Write the unlocker's files, the metadata last, then store the
// data in the keychain
stored := false
err = WriteDir(fs, unlockerDir, func(dir string) error {
err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, filepath.Join(dir, "pub.txt"), []byte(ageRecipient))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write age recipient: %w", err)
}
err = WriteFileAtomic(fs, filepath.Join(dir, "priv.age"), encryptedAgePrivKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted age private key: %w", err)
}
err = WriteFileAtomic(fs, filepath.Join(dir, "longterm.age"), encryptedLtPrivKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted long-term private key: %w", err)
}
err = WriteFileAtomic(fs, filepath.Join(dir, "unlocker-metadata.json"),
metadataBytes)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write unlocker metadata: %w", err)
}
err = storeInKeychain(keychainItemName, keychainDataBuffer)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to store data in keychain: %w", err)
}
stored = true
return nil
})
if err != nil && stored {
deleteErr := deleteFromKeychain(keychainItemName)
if deleteErr != nil {
err = errors.Join(err, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to delete keychain item %s: %w", keychainItemName, deleteErr))
}
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &KeychainUnlocker{
Directory: unlockerDir,
Metadata: keychainMetadata.UnlockerMetadata,
fs: fs,
}, nil
}
// validateKeychainItemName validates that a keychain item name is safe for
// command execution
func validateKeychainItemName(itemName string) error {
if itemName == "" {
return errKeychainItemNameEmpty
}
if !keychainItemNameRegex.MatchString(itemName) {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errInvalidKeychainItemName, itemName)
}
return nil
}
+104
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
//go:build darwin && cgo
package secret
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
keychain "github.com/keybase/go-keychain"
)
// The keychain unlocker's only calls into go-keychain, which is cgo on macOS.
// A macOS build without cgo gets keychainunlocker_nocgo.go instead.
// storeInKeychain stores data in the macOS keychain using keybase/go-keychain
func storeInKeychain(itemName string, data *memguard.LockedBuffer) error {
if data == nil {
return errNilDataBuffer
}
if err := validateKeychainItemName(itemName); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid keychain item name: %w", err)
}
item := keychain.NewItem()
item.SetSecClass(keychain.SecClassGenericPassword)
item.SetService(KEYCHAIN_APP_IDENTIFIER)
item.SetAccount(itemName)
item.SetLabel(fmt.Sprintf("%s - %s", KEYCHAIN_APP_IDENTIFIER, itemName))
item.SetDescription("Secret vault keychain data")
item.SetData(data.Bytes())
item.SetSynchronizable(keychain.SynchronizableNo)
// Use AccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly for better security and to trigger auth
item.SetAccessible(keychain.AccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly)
// First try to delete any existing item
deleteItem := keychain.NewItem()
deleteItem.SetSecClass(keychain.SecClassGenericPassword)
deleteItem.SetService(KEYCHAIN_APP_IDENTIFIER)
deleteItem.SetAccount(itemName)
_ = keychain.DeleteItem(deleteItem) // Ignore error as item might not exist
// Add the new item
if err := keychain.AddItem(item); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to store item in keychain: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// retrieveFromKeychain retrieves data from the macOS keychain using keybase/go-keychain
func retrieveFromKeychain(itemName string) ([]byte, error) {
if err := validateKeychainItemName(itemName); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid keychain item name: %w", err)
}
query := keychain.NewItem()
query.SetSecClass(keychain.SecClassGenericPassword)
query.SetService(KEYCHAIN_APP_IDENTIFIER)
query.SetAccount(itemName)
query.SetMatchLimit(keychain.MatchLimitOne)
query.SetReturnData(true)
results, err := keychain.QueryItem(query)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to retrieve item from keychain: %w", err)
}
if len(results) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("keychain item not found: %s", itemName)
}
return results[0].Data, nil
}
// deleteFromKeychain removes an item from the macOS keychain using keybase/go-keychain
// If the item doesn't exist, this function returns nil (not an error) since the goal
// is to ensure the item is gone, and it already being gone satisfies that goal.
func deleteFromKeychain(itemName string) error {
if err := validateKeychainItemName(itemName); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid keychain item name: %w", err)
}
item := keychain.NewItem()
item.SetSecClass(keychain.SecClassGenericPassword)
item.SetService(KEYCHAIN_APP_IDENTIFIER)
item.SetAccount(itemName)
if err := keychain.DeleteItem(item); err != nil {
// If the item doesn't exist, that's not an error - the goal is to ensure
// the item is gone, and it already being gone satisfies that goal.
// This is important for cleaning up unlocker directories when the keychain
// item has already been removed (e.g., manually by user, or synced vault
// from a different machine).
if err == keychain.ErrorItemNotFound {
Debug("Keychain item not found during deletion, ignoring", "item_name", itemName)
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete item from keychain: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
+30
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
//go:build darwin && !cgo
package secret
import (
"errors"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
)
// In a macOS build without cgo, these take the place of the functions in
// keychainunlocker_cgo.go: go-keychain is cgo on macOS, so they can only fail.
var errKeychainNotSupported = errors.New(
"keychain unlockers need a macOS build with cgo")
// storeInKeychain fails: the keychain needs a macOS build with cgo.
func storeInKeychain(_ string, _ *memguard.LockedBuffer) error {
return errKeychainNotSupported
}
// retrieveFromKeychain fails: the keychain needs a macOS build with cgo.
func retrieveFromKeychain(_ string) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, errKeychainNotSupported
}
// deleteFromKeychain fails: the keychain needs a macOS build with cgo.
func deleteFromKeychain(_ string) error {
return errKeychainNotSupported
}
+84
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
//go:build !darwin
package secret
import (
"errors"
"path/filepath"
"filippo.io/age"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
)
// KeychainUnlockerMetadata is a stub for non-Darwin platforms
type KeychainUnlockerMetadata struct {
UnlockerMetadata
KeychainItemName string `json:"keychainItemName"`
}
// KeychainUnlocker is a stub for non-Darwin platforms
type KeychainUnlocker struct {
Directory string
Metadata UnlockerMetadata
fs afero.Fs
}
var errKeychainNotSupported = errors.New(
"keychain unlockers are only supported on macOS")
// NewKeychainUnlocker creates a stub KeychainUnlocker on non-Darwin
// platforms. The returned instance's methods that require macOS
// functionality will return errors.
func NewKeychainUnlocker(
fs afero.Fs, directory string, metadata UnlockerMetadata,
) *KeychainUnlocker {
return &KeychainUnlocker{
Directory: directory,
Metadata: metadata,
fs: fs,
}
}
// GetIdentity returns an error on non-Darwin platforms
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) GetIdentity() (*age.X25519Identity, error) {
return nil, errKeychainNotSupported
}
// GetType returns the unlocker type
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) GetType() string {
return "keychain"
}
// GetMetadata returns the unlocker metadata
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) GetMetadata() UnlockerMetadata {
return k.Metadata
}
// GetDirectory returns the unlocker directory
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) GetDirectory() string {
return k.Directory
}
// GetID returns the unlocker ID, the name of the unlocker's directory
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) GetID() string {
return filepath.Base(k.Directory)
}
// GetKeychainItemName returns an error on non-Darwin platforms
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) GetKeychainItemName() (string, error) {
return "", errKeychainNotSupported
}
// Remove returns an error on non-Darwin platforms
func (k *KeychainUnlocker) Remove() error {
return errKeychainNotSupported
}
// CreateKeychainUnlocker returns an error on non-Darwin platforms
func CreateKeychainUnlocker(
_ afero.Fs, _ string, _, _ *memguard.LockedBuffer,
) (*KeychainUnlocker, error) {
return nil, errKeychainNotSupported
}
+215
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
//go:build darwin && cgo
package secret
import (
"encoding/hex"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"testing"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestKeychainStoreRetrieveDelete(t *testing.T) {
// Skip test if not on macOS
if runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
t.Skip("Keychain tests only run on macOS")
}
// Test data
testItemName := "test-secret-keychain-item"
testData := "test-secret-data-12345"
testBuffer := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(testData))
defer testBuffer.Destroy()
// Clean up any existing item first
_ = deleteFromKeychain(testItemName)
// Test 1: Store data in keychain
err := storeInKeychain(testItemName, testBuffer)
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to store data in keychain")
// Test 2: Retrieve data from keychain
retrievedData, err := retrieveFromKeychain(testItemName)
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to retrieve data from keychain")
assert.Equal(t, testData, string(retrievedData),
"Retrieved data doesn't match stored data")
// Test 3: Update existing item (store again with different data)
newTestData := "updated-test-data-67890"
newTestBuffer := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(newTestData))
defer newTestBuffer.Destroy()
err = storeInKeychain(testItemName, newTestBuffer)
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to update data in keychain")
// Verify updated data
retrievedData, err = retrieveFromKeychain(testItemName)
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to retrieve updated data from keychain")
assert.Equal(t, newTestData, string(retrievedData),
"Retrieved data doesn't match updated data")
// Test 4: Delete from keychain
err = deleteFromKeychain(testItemName)
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to delete data from keychain")
// Test 5: Verify item is deleted (should fail to retrieve)
_, err = retrieveFromKeychain(testItemName)
assert.Error(t, err, "Expected error when retrieving deleted item")
}
func TestKeychainInvalidItemName(t *testing.T) {
// Skip test if not on macOS
if runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
t.Skip("Keychain tests only run on macOS")
}
testData := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("test"))
defer testData.Destroy()
// Test an empty item name
err := storeInKeychain("", testData)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errKeychainItemNameEmpty)
// Test invalid item names
invalidNames := []string{
"test space", // Contains space
"test/slash", // Contains slash
"test\\backslash", // Contains backslash
"test:colon", // Contains colon
"test;semicolon", // Contains semicolon
"test|pipe", // Contains pipe
"test@at", // Contains @
"test#hash", // Contains #
"test$dollar", // Contains $
"test&ampersand", // Contains &
"test*asterisk", // Contains *
"test?question", // Contains ?
"test!exclamation", // Contains !
"test'quote", // Contains single quote
"test\"doublequote", // Contains double quote
"test(paren", // Contains parenthesis
"test[bracket", // Contains bracket
}
for _, name := range invalidNames {
err := storeInKeychain(name, testData)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInvalidKeychainItemName,
"Expected error for invalid name: %s", name)
}
// Test valid names (should not error on validation)
validNames := []string{
"test-name",
"test_name",
"test.name",
"TestName123",
"TEST_NAME_123",
"com.example.test",
"secret-vault-hostname-2024-01-01",
}
for _, name := range validNames {
err := validateKeychainItemName(name)
assert.NoError(t, err, "Expected no error for valid name: %s", name)
// Clean up
_ = deleteFromKeychain(name)
}
}
func TestKeychainNilData(t *testing.T) {
// Skip test if not on macOS
if runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
t.Skip("Keychain tests only run on macOS")
}
// Test storing nil data
err := storeInKeychain("test-item", nil)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errNilDataBuffer)
}
func TestKeychainLargeData(t *testing.T) {
// Skip test if not on macOS
if runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
t.Skip("Keychain tests only run on macOS")
}
// Test with larger hex-encoded data (512 bytes of binary data = 1KB hex)
largeData := make([]byte, 512)
for i := range largeData {
largeData[i] = byte(i % 256)
}
// Convert to hex string for storage
hexData := hex.EncodeToString(largeData)
testItemName := "test-large-data"
testBuffer := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(hexData))
defer testBuffer.Destroy()
// Clean up first
_ = deleteFromKeychain(testItemName)
// Store hex data
err := storeInKeychain(testItemName, testBuffer)
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to store large data")
// Retrieve and verify
retrievedData, err := retrieveFromKeychain(testItemName)
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to retrieve large data")
// Decode hex and compare
decodedData, err := hex.DecodeString(string(retrievedData))
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to decode hex data")
assert.Equal(t, largeData, decodedData, "Large data mismatch")
// Clean up
_ = deleteFromKeychain(testItemName)
}
func TestDeleteNonExistentKeychainItem(t *testing.T) {
// Skip test if not on macOS
if runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
t.Skip("Keychain tests only run on macOS")
}
// Ensure item doesn't exist
testItemName := "test-nonexistent-keychain-item-12345"
_ = deleteFromKeychain(testItemName)
// Deleting a non-existent item should NOT return an error
// This is important for cleaning up unlocker directories when the keychain item
// has already been removed (e.g., manually by user, or on a different machine)
err := deleteFromKeychain(testItemName)
assert.NoError(t, err,
"Deleting non-existent keychain item should not return an error")
}
// TestWriteKeychainUnlockerFailureDeletesItem makes moving a new keychain
// unlocker into place fail after its data is stored in the keychain: the
// keychain item must be deleted again.
func TestWriteKeychainUnlockerFailureDeletesItem(t *testing.T) {
testItemName := "test-secret-keychain-unlocker-cleanup"
_ = deleteFromKeychain(testItemName)
// Moving the unlocker into a read-only directory fails
unlockersDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "unlockers.d")
require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(unlockersDir, 0o500))
testBuffer := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("test-keychain-data"))
defer testBuffer.Destroy()
_, err := writeKeychainUnlocker(afero.NewOsFs(),
filepath.Join(unlockersDir, testItemName), testItemName, "age1test",
[]byte("test-priv"), []byte("test-longterm"), testBuffer)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, os.ErrPermission,
"moving the unlocker into place should fail")
_, err = retrieveFromKeychain(testItemName)
assert.Error(t, err, "keychain item left behind")
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ type VaultMetadata struct {
// UnlockerMetadata contains information about an unlocker
type UnlockerMetadata struct {
Type string `json:"type"` // passphrase or pgp
Type string `json:"type"` // passphrase, pgp, keychain
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
Flags []string `json:"flags,omitempty"`
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ import (
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/pkg/agehd"
)
// testMnemonic is the standard BIP39 test vector mnemonic.
+1 -10
View File
@@ -16,10 +16,6 @@ import (
// empty. A passphrase unlocker that fails with it was not tried.
var ErrPassphraseNotRead = errors.New("failed to read passphrase")
// ErrWrongPassphrase is wrapped in the error of GetIdentity when the
// passphrase does not decrypt the unlocker's private key.
var ErrWrongPassphrase = errors.New("wrong passphrase")
// PassphraseUnlocker represents a passphrase-protected unlocker
type PassphraseUnlocker struct {
Directory string
@@ -77,12 +73,6 @@ func (p *PassphraseUnlocker) GetIdentity() (*age.X25519Identity, error) {
Debug("Failed to decrypt unlocker private key",
"error", err, "unlocker_id", p.GetID())
// age says that no identity matched when the passphrase is wrong
var noMatch *age.NoIdentityMatchError
if errors.As(err, &noMatch) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w for unlocker %s", ErrWrongPassphrase, p.GetID())
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt unlocker private key: %w", err)
}
defer privKeyBuffer.Destroy()
@@ -138,6 +128,7 @@ func (p *PassphraseUnlocker) Remove() error {
}
// For passphrase unlockers, we just need to remove the directory
// No external resources (like keychain items) to clean up
err := RemoveDirAtomic(p.fs, p.Directory)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to remove passphrase unlocker directory: %w", err)
+5 -5
View File
@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ import (
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/pkg/agehd"
)
// pgpUnlockerType is the type of a PGP unlocker.
@@ -317,8 +317,8 @@ func testCreatePGPUnlocker(
t.Helper()
// Set a limited test timeout to avoid hanging
timer := time.AfterFunc(10*time.Second, func() {
t.Fatalf("Test timed out after 10 seconds")
timer := time.AfterFunc(30*time.Second, func() {
t.Fatalf("Test timed out after 30 seconds")
})
defer timer.Stop()
+1
View File
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ func (p *PGPUnlocker) GetID() string {
// Remove implements Unlocker interface - removes the PGP unlocker
func (p *PGPUnlocker) Remove() error {
// For PGP unlockers, we just need to remove the directory
// No external resources (like keychain items) to clean up
err := RemoveDirAtomic(p.fs, p.Directory)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to remove PGP unlocker directory: %w", err)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
// The GPG key ID and fingerprint passed to CreatePGPUnlocker.
+15 -38
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,10 @@ package secret
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
@@ -67,53 +66,31 @@ func NewSecret(vault VaultInterface, name string) *Secret {
Name: name,
Directory: secretDir,
vault: vault,
Metadata: Metadata{
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
UpdatedAt: time.Now(),
},
}
}
// LoadMetadata sets the secret's times from the modification times of its
// files, which can be read without unlocking the vault. UpdatedAt is when
// the secret's current file was last written, by an add or a promote.
// CreatedAt is when its oldest version's value.age was written. That file
// is never rewritten; the version's directory is no use, as its time
// changes when the next add rewrites the version's metadata.age.
// LoadMetadata is deprecated - metadata is now per-version and encrypted
func (s *Secret) LoadMetadata() error {
fs := s.vault.GetFilesystem()
current, err := fs.Stat(filepath.Join(s.Directory, "current"))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read when secret %s was updated: %w",
s.Name, err)
}
versions, err := ListVersions(fs, s.Directory)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if len(versions) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("secret %s has no versions: %w", s.Name, os.ErrNotExist)
}
// ListVersions lists the newest version first
oldest := versions[len(versions)-1]
value, err := fs.Stat(
filepath.Join(s.Directory, "versions", oldest, "value.age"))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read when secret %s was created: %w",
s.Name, err)
}
Debug("LoadMetadata called but is deprecated in versioned model",
"secret_name", s.Name)
// For backward compatibility, we'll populate with basic info
now := time.Now()
s.Metadata = Metadata{
CreatedAt: value.ModTime(),
UpdatedAt: current.ModTime(),
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
}
return nil
}
// GetMetadata returns the times LoadMetadata read
// GetMetadata returns the secret metadata (deprecated)
func (s *Secret) GetMetadata() Metadata {
Debug("GetMetadata called but is deprecated in versioned model", "secret_name", s.Name)
return s.Metadata
}
+1 -9
View File
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ import (
"testing"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/pkg/agehd"
)
// testMnemonicValue is the standard BIP39 test vector mnemonic.
@@ -25,14 +25,6 @@ var (
errNotImplementedInMock = errors.New("not implemented in mock")
)
// TestMain makes passphrase encryption in the tests cheap; see
// ScryptWorkFactor.
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
ScryptWorkFactor = 1
os.Exit(m.Run())
}
// MockVault is a test implementation of the VaultInterface
type MockVault struct {
name string
+397
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
//go:build darwin
package secret
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/macse"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
)
const (
// seKeyLabelPrefix is the prefix for Secure Enclave CTK identity labels.
seKeyLabelPrefix = "berlin.sneak.app.secret.se"
// seUnlockerType is the metadata type string for Secure Enclave unlockers.
seUnlockerType = "secure-enclave"
// seLongtermFilename is the filename for the SE-encrypted vault long-term private key.
seLongtermFilename = "longterm.age.se"
)
// SecureEnclaveUnlockerMetadata extends UnlockerMetadata with SE-specific data.
type SecureEnclaveUnlockerMetadata struct {
UnlockerMetadata
SEKeyLabel string `json:"seKeyLabel"`
SEKeyHash string `json:"seKeyHash"`
}
// SecureEnclaveUnlocker represents a Secure Enclave-protected unlocker.
type SecureEnclaveUnlocker struct {
Directory string
Metadata UnlockerMetadata
fs afero.Fs
}
// NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker creates a new SecureEnclaveUnlocker instance.
func NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker(
fs afero.Fs,
directory string,
metadata UnlockerMetadata,
) *SecureEnclaveUnlocker {
return &SecureEnclaveUnlocker{
Directory: directory,
Metadata: metadata,
fs: fs,
}
}
// GetIdentity implements Unlocker interface for SE-based unlockers.
// Decrypts the vault's long-term private key directly using the Secure Enclave.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) GetIdentity() (*age.X25519Identity, error) {
DebugWith("Getting SE unlocker identity",
slog.String("unlocker_id", s.GetID()),
)
// Get SE key label from metadata
seKeyLabel, _, err := s.getSEKeyInfo()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get SE key info: %w", err)
}
// Read ECIES-encrypted long-term private key from disk
encryptedPath := filepath.Join(s.Directory, seLongtermFilename)
encryptedData, err := afero.ReadFile(s.fs, encryptedPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to read SE-encrypted long-term key: %w",
err,
)
}
DebugWith("Read SE-encrypted long-term key",
slog.Int("encrypted_length", len(encryptedData)),
)
// Decrypt using the Secure Enclave (ECDH happens inside SE hardware)
decryptedData, err := macse.Decrypt(seKeyLabel, encryptedData)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to decrypt long-term key with SE: %w",
err,
)
}
// Parse the decrypted long-term private key
ltIdentity, err := age.ParseX25519Identity(string(decryptedData))
// Clear sensitive data immediately
for i := range decryptedData {
decryptedData[i] = 0
}
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to parse long-term private key: %w",
err,
)
}
DebugWith("Successfully decrypted long-term key via SE",
slog.String("unlocker_id", s.GetID()),
)
return ltIdentity, nil
}
// GetType implements Unlocker interface.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) GetType() string {
return seUnlockerType
}
// GetMetadata implements Unlocker interface.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) GetMetadata() UnlockerMetadata {
return s.Metadata
}
// GetDirectory implements Unlocker interface.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) GetDirectory() string {
return s.Directory
}
// GetID implements Unlocker interface: the name of the unlocker's directory.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) GetID() string {
return filepath.Base(s.Directory)
}
// Remove implements Unlocker interface.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) Remove() error {
_, seKeyHash, err := s.getSEKeyInfo()
if err != nil {
Debug("Failed to get SE key info during removal", "error", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get SE key info: %w", err)
}
if seKeyHash != "" {
Debug("Deleting SE key", "hash", seKeyHash)
err = macse.DeleteKey(seKeyHash)
if err != nil {
Debug("Failed to delete SE key", "error", err, "hash", seKeyHash)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete SE key: %w", err)
}
}
Debug("Removing SE unlocker directory", "directory", s.Directory)
err = RemoveDirAtomic(s.fs, s.Directory)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to remove SE unlocker directory: %w", err)
}
Debug("Successfully removed SE unlocker", "unlocker_id", s.GetID())
return nil
}
// getSEKeyInfo reads the SE key label and hash from metadata.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) getSEKeyInfo() (string, string, error) {
metadataPath := filepath.Join(s.Directory, "unlocker-metadata.json")
metadataData, err := afero.ReadFile(s.fs, metadataPath)
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to read SE metadata: %w", err)
}
var seMetadata SecureEnclaveUnlockerMetadata
err = json.Unmarshal(metadataData, &seMetadata)
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse SE metadata: %w", err)
}
return seMetadata.SEKeyLabel, seMetadata.SEKeyHash, nil
}
// generateSEKeyLabel generates a unique label for the SE CTK identity.
func generateSEKeyLabel(vaultName string) (string, error) {
hostname, err := os.Hostname()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get hostname: %w", err)
}
enrollmentTime := time.Now().UTC().Format(UnlockerTimeFormat)
return fmt.Sprintf(
"%s.%s-%s-%s",
seKeyLabelPrefix,
vaultName,
hostname,
enrollmentTime,
), nil
}
// CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker creates a new SE unlocker.
// The vault's long-term private key is encrypted directly by the Secure Enclave
// using ECIES. No intermediate age keypair is used.
// The long-term key comes from mnemonic when it is not nil, else from the
// current unlocker, as getLongTermKeyForSE describes.
// The SE key is created once the long-term key is in hand and the unlocker's
// path is known, and is deleted again if a later step fails.
func CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker(
fs afero.Fs,
stateDir string,
mnemonic, passphrase *memguard.LockedBuffer,
) (*SecureEnclaveUnlocker, error) {
vault, err := GetCurrentVault(fs, stateDir)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get current vault: %w", err)
}
// Generate SE key label
seKeyLabel, err := generateSEKeyLabel(vault.GetName())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate SE key label: %w", err)
}
// Step 1: Get the vault's long-term private key
ltPrivKeyData, err := getLongTermKeyForSE(fs, vault, mnemonic, passphrase)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to get long-term private key: %w",
err,
)
}
defer ltPrivKeyData.Destroy()
// Step 2: Prepare the unlocker directory's path
vaultDir, err := vault.GetDirectory()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get vault directory: %w", err)
}
unlockerDirName := "se-" + filepath.Base(seKeyLabel)
unlockerDir := filepath.Join(vaultDir, "unlockers.d", unlockerDirName)
// Step 3: Create P-256 key in the Secure Enclave via sc_auth
Debug("Creating Secure Enclave key", "label", seKeyLabel)
_, seKeyHash, err := macse.CreateKey(seKeyLabel)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create SE key: %w", err)
}
Debug("Created SE key", "label", seKeyLabel, "hash", seKeyHash)
// Steps 4 and 5: Write the unlocker, or delete the SE key if that fails
unlocker, err := writeSEUnlocker(fs, unlockerDir, seKeyLabel, seKeyHash,
ltPrivKeyData)
if err != nil {
deleteErr := macse.DeleteKey(seKeyHash)
if deleteErr != nil {
err = errors.Join(err, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to delete SE key %s: %w", seKeyLabel, deleteErr))
}
return nil, err
}
return unlocker, nil
}
// writeSEUnlocker encrypts the long-term key with the SE key and writes the
// new unlocker into unlockerDir (steps 4 and 5 of
// CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker).
func writeSEUnlocker(
fs afero.Fs, unlockerDir, seKeyLabel, seKeyHash string,
ltPrivKeyData *memguard.LockedBuffer,
) (*SecureEnclaveUnlocker, error) {
// Step 4: Encrypt the long-term key directly with the SE (ECIES), and
// prepare the metadata
encryptedLtKey, err := macse.Encrypt(seKeyLabel, ltPrivKeyData.Bytes())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to encrypt long-term key with SE: %w",
err,
)
}
seMetadata := SecureEnclaveUnlockerMetadata{
UnlockerMetadata: UnlockerMetadata{
Type: seUnlockerType,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
Flags: []string{seUnlockerType, macOSFlag},
},
SEKeyLabel: seKeyLabel,
SEKeyHash: seKeyHash,
}
metadataBytes, err := json.MarshalIndent(seMetadata, "", " ")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal metadata: %w", err)
}
// Step 5: Write the SE-encrypted long-term key, then the metadata
err = WriteDir(fs, unlockerDir, func(dir string) error {
return writeSEUnlockerFiles(fs, dir, encryptedLtKey, metadataBytes)
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &SecureEnclaveUnlocker{
Directory: unlockerDir,
Metadata: seMetadata.UnlockerMetadata,
fs: fs,
}, nil
}
// writeSEUnlockerFiles writes the files of a new SE unlocker into dir: the
// SE-encrypted long-term key, then the metadata.
func writeSEUnlockerFiles(
fs afero.Fs, dir string, encryptedLtKey, metadataBytes []byte,
) error {
err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, filepath.Join(dir, seLongtermFilename),
encryptedLtKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"failed to write SE-encrypted long-term key: %w",
err,
)
}
err = WriteFileAtomic(fs,
filepath.Join(dir, "unlocker-metadata.json"), metadataBytes)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write metadata: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// getLongTermKeyForSE retrieves the vault's long-term private key, derived
// from mnemonic when it is not nil, else through the current unlocker, which
// is given passphrase when it is a passphrase unlocker.
func getLongTermKeyForSE(
fs afero.Fs,
vault VaultInterface,
mnemonic, passphrase *memguard.LockedBuffer,
) (*memguard.LockedBuffer, error) {
if mnemonic != nil {
return deriveLongTermPrivateKey(fs, vault, mnemonic)
}
currentUnlocker, err := vault.GetCurrentUnlocker()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get current unlocker: %w", err)
}
if passphraseUnlocker, ok := currentUnlocker.(*PassphraseUnlocker); ok {
passphraseUnlocker.Passphrase = passphrase
}
currentIdentity, err := currentUnlocker.GetIdentity()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to get current unlocker identity: %w",
err,
)
}
// All unlocker types store longterm.age in their directory
longtermPath := filepath.Join(
currentUnlocker.GetDirectory(),
"longterm.age",
)
encryptedLtKey, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, longtermPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to read encrypted long-term key: %w",
err,
)
}
ltPrivKeyBuffer, err := DecryptWithIdentity(
encryptedLtKey,
currentIdentity,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt long-term key: %w", err)
}
return ltPrivKeyBuffer, nil
}
+88
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
//go:build !darwin
package secret
import (
"errors"
"path/filepath"
"filippo.io/age"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
)
// seUnlockerType is the type string for Secure Enclave unlockers.
const seUnlockerType = "secure-enclave"
var errSENotSupported = errors.New(
"secure enclave unlockers are only supported on macOS",
)
// SecureEnclaveUnlockerMetadata is a stub for non-Darwin platforms.
type SecureEnclaveUnlockerMetadata struct {
UnlockerMetadata
SEKeyLabel string `json:"seKeyLabel"`
SEKeyHash string `json:"seKeyHash"`
}
// SecureEnclaveUnlocker is a stub for non-Darwin platforms.
type SecureEnclaveUnlocker struct {
Directory string
Metadata UnlockerMetadata
fs afero.Fs
}
// NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker creates a stub SecureEnclaveUnlocker on
// non-Darwin platforms. The returned instance's methods that require
// macOS functionality will return errors.
func NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker(
fs afero.Fs,
directory string,
metadata UnlockerMetadata,
) *SecureEnclaveUnlocker {
return &SecureEnclaveUnlocker{
Directory: directory,
Metadata: metadata,
fs: fs,
}
}
// GetIdentity returns an error on non-Darwin platforms.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) GetIdentity() (*age.X25519Identity, error) {
return nil, errSENotSupported
}
// GetType returns the unlocker type.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) GetType() string {
return seUnlockerType
}
// GetMetadata returns the unlocker metadata.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) GetMetadata() UnlockerMetadata {
return s.Metadata
}
// GetDirectory returns the unlocker directory.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) GetDirectory() string {
return s.Directory
}
// GetID returns the unlocker ID, the name of the unlocker's directory.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) GetID() string {
return filepath.Base(s.Directory)
}
// Remove returns an error on non-Darwin platforms.
func (s *SecureEnclaveUnlocker) Remove() error {
return errSENotSupported
}
// CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker returns an error on non-Darwin platforms.
func CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker(
_ afero.Fs,
_ string,
_, _ *memguard.LockedBuffer,
) (*SecureEnclaveUnlocker, error) {
return nil, errSENotSupported
}
+99
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
//go:build !darwin
//nolint:testpackage // white-box test asserting unexported sentinel errors
package secret
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestNewSecureEnclaveUnlocker(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
dir := "/tmp/test-se-unlocker"
metadata := UnlockerMetadata{
Type: seUnlockerType,
CreatedAt: time.Date(2026, 1, 15, 10, 30, 0, 0, time.UTC),
Flags: []string{seUnlockerType, "macos"},
}
unlocker := NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker(fs, dir, metadata)
require.NotNil(t, unlocker, "NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker should return a valid instance")
// Test GetType returns correct type
assert.Equal(t, seUnlockerType, unlocker.GetType())
// Test GetMetadata returns the metadata we passed in
assert.Equal(t, metadata, unlocker.GetMetadata())
// Test GetDirectory returns the directory we passed in
assert.Equal(t, dir, unlocker.GetDirectory())
// Test GetID returns the name of the unlocker's directory
assert.Equal(t, "test-se-unlocker", unlocker.GetID())
}
func TestSecureEnclaveUnlockerGetIdentityReturnsError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
metadata := UnlockerMetadata{
Type: seUnlockerType,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
unlocker := NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker(fs, "/tmp/test", metadata)
identity, err := unlocker.GetIdentity()
assert.Nil(t, identity)
require.Error(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errSENotSupported)
}
func TestSecureEnclaveUnlockerRemoveReturnsError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
metadata := UnlockerMetadata{
Type: seUnlockerType,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
unlocker := NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker(fs, "/tmp/test", metadata)
err := unlocker.Remove()
require.Error(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errSENotSupported)
}
func TestCreateSecureEnclaveUnlockerReturnsError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
unlocker, err := CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker(fs, "/tmp/test", nil, nil)
assert.Nil(t, unlocker)
require.Error(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errSENotSupported)
}
func TestSecureEnclaveUnlockerImplementsInterface(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
metadata := UnlockerMetadata{
Type: seUnlockerType,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
unlocker := NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker(fs, "/tmp/test", metadata)
// Verify the stub implements the Unlocker interface
var _ Unlocker = unlocker
}
+117
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
//go:build darwin
//nolint:testpackage // white-box test of unexported Secure Enclave helpers
package secret
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestNewSecureEnclaveUnlocker(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
dir := "/tmp/test-se-unlocker"
metadata := UnlockerMetadata{
Type: seUnlockerType,
CreatedAt: time.Date(2026, 1, 15, 10, 30, 0, 0, time.UTC),
Flags: []string{seUnlockerType, "macos"},
}
unlocker := NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker(fs, dir, metadata)
require.NotNil(t, unlocker, "NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker should return a valid instance")
// Test GetType returns correct type
assert.Equal(t, seUnlockerType, unlocker.GetType())
// Test GetMetadata returns the metadata we passed in
assert.Equal(t, metadata, unlocker.GetMetadata())
// Test GetDirectory returns the directory we passed in
assert.Equal(t, dir, unlocker.GetDirectory())
}
func TestSecureEnclaveUnlockerImplementsInterface(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
metadata := UnlockerMetadata{
Type: seUnlockerType,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
unlocker := NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker(fs, "/tmp/test", metadata)
// Verify the darwin implementation implements the Unlocker interface
var _ Unlocker = unlocker
}
func TestSecureEnclaveUnlockerGetIDFormat(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
metadata := UnlockerMetadata{
Type: seUnlockerType,
CreatedAt: time.Date(2026, 3, 10, 14, 30, 0, 0, time.UTC),
}
unlocker := NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker(fs, "/tmp/test", metadata)
// The ID is the name of the unlocker's directory
assert.Equal(t, "test", unlocker.GetID())
}
func TestGenerateSEKeyLabel(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
label, err := generateSEKeyLabel("test-vault")
require.NoError(t, err)
// Label should contain the prefix and vault name
assert.Contains(t, label, seKeyLabelPrefix)
assert.Contains(t, label, "test-vault")
}
func TestSecureEnclaveUnlockerGetIdentityMissingFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
dir := "/tmp/test-se-unlocker-missing"
// Create unlocker directory with metadata but no encrypted key file
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(dir, DirPerms))
metadataJSON := `{
"type": "secure-enclave",
"createdAt": "2026-01-15T10:30:00Z",
"seKeyLabel": "berlin.sneak.app.secret.se.test",
"seKeyHash": "abc123"
}`
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(
fs, dir+"/unlocker-metadata.json", []byte(metadataJSON), FilePerms,
))
metadata := UnlockerMetadata{
Type: seUnlockerType,
CreatedAt: time.Date(2026, 1, 15, 10, 30, 0, 0, time.UTC),
}
unlocker := NewSecureEnclaveUnlocker(fs, dir, metadata)
// GetIdentity should fail because the encrypted longterm key file is missing
identity, err := unlocker.GetIdentity()
assert.Nil(t, identity)
var cause *os.PathError
require.ErrorAs(t, err, &cause)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, os.ErrNotExist)
assert.Equal(t, filepath.Join(dir, seLongtermFilename), cause.Path)
}
+57
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
//go:build darwin
//nolint:testpackage // white-box test of unexported validateKeychainItemName
package secret
import (
"testing"
)
func TestValidateKeychainItemName(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
itemName string
wantErr bool
}{
// Valid cases
{name: "valid simple name", itemName: "my-secret-key", wantErr: false},
{name: "valid name with dots", itemName: "com.example.app.key", wantErr: false},
{name: "valid name with underscores", itemName: "my_secret_key_123", wantErr: false},
{name: "valid alphanumeric", itemName: "Secret123Key", wantErr: false},
{name: "valid with hyphen at start", itemName: "-my-key", wantErr: false},
{name: "valid with dot at start", itemName: ".hidden-key", wantErr: false},
// Invalid cases
{name: "empty item name", itemName: "", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with spaces", itemName: "my secret key", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with semicolon", itemName: "key;rm -rf /", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with pipe", itemName: "key|cat /etc/passwd", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with backticks", itemName: "key`whoami`", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with dollar sign", itemName: "key$(whoami)", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with quotes", itemName: "key\"name", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with single quotes", itemName: "key'name", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with backslash", itemName: "key\\name", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with newline", itemName: "key\nname", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with carriage return", itemName: "key\rname", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with ampersand", itemName: "key&echo test", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with redirect", itemName: "key>/tmp/test", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with null byte", itemName: "key\x00name", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with parentheses", itemName: "key(test)", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with brackets", itemName: "key[test]", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with asterisk", itemName: "key*", wantErr: true},
{name: "item name with question mark", itemName: "key?", wantErr: true},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := validateKeychainItemName(tt.itemName)
if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
t.Errorf("validateKeychainItemName() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
}
})
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -41,11 +41,11 @@ import (
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
const (
+3 -5
View File
@@ -4,11 +4,11 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
const (
@@ -81,9 +81,7 @@ func TestVaultErrors(t *testing.T) {
return vlt.CopySecretAllVersions(vlt, versionless, "copy", false)
}, vault.ErrNoVersions},
{"remove a missing unlocker", func(vlt *vault.Vault) error {
_, err := vlt.RemoveUnlocker(missingName)
return err
return vlt.RemoveUnlocker(missingName)
}, vault.ErrUnlockerNotFound},
{"select a missing unlocker", func(vlt *vault.Vault) error {
return vlt.SelectUnlocker(missingName)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ import (
"testing"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/pkg/agehd"
)
// deriveVaultIdentity derives the long-term identity for the given vault
+2 -2
View File
@@ -30,12 +30,12 @@ import (
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/pkg/agehd"
)
// errUnexpectedValue is returned by concurrent readers when a secret value
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ import (
"sync"
"syscall"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
)
// lockFileName is the file in the state directory that LockStateDir locks.
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/vault"
)
const (
+4 -5
View File
@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ import (
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/pkg/agehd"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/internal/secret"
"sneak.berlin/go/secret/pkg/agehd"
)
// Register the GetCurrentVault function with the secret package
@@ -140,9 +140,8 @@ func ListVaults(fs afero.Fs, stateDir string) ([]string, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read vaults directory: %w", err)
}
// Extract vault names. Not nil, so that no vaults prints [] in JSON,
// not null.
vaults := make([]string, 0, len(entries))
// Extract vault names
var vaults []string
for _, entry := range entries {
if entry.IsDir() {

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