Files
routewatch/internal/server/middleware.go
T
clawbot 89bdda18a5
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Add the HTTP hardening the policy requires before 1.0 (closes #108)
Every answer carries the six security headers REPO_POLICIES.md lists.
The Content-Security-Policy allows inline content only with a nonce made
for that answer; the pages put it on their style and script blocks and
drop their four style attributes.

The request log and /ip/ take a forwarded address only from a proxy
listed in TRUSTED_PROXIES, which stops the start when set but invalid:
the last X-Forwarded-For entry that is not a trusted proxy. X-Real-IP
and True-Client-IP are no longer read.

The JSON routes and the health check send fixed messages in place of
database, parser and resolver errors, and log the detail.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-20 01:36:18 +02:00

409 lines
12 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)
// responseWriter wraps http.ResponseWriter to capture the response
type responseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
body *bytes.Buffer
statusCode int
written bool
mu sync.Mutex
}
func (rw *responseWriter) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
rw.mu.Lock()
defer rw.mu.Unlock()
if !rw.written {
rw.written = true
}
return rw.body.Write(b)
}
func (rw *responseWriter) WriteHeader(statusCode int) {
rw.mu.Lock()
defer rw.mu.Unlock()
if !rw.written {
rw.statusCode = statusCode
rw.written = true
}
}
func (rw *responseWriter) Header() http.Header {
return rw.ResponseWriter.Header()
}
// JSONResponseMiddleware is an HTTP middleware that wraps all JSON responses
// with a @meta field containing execution metadata. The metadata includes the
// time zone (always UTC), API version, and request execution time in milliseconds.
//
// Endpoints "/" and "/status" are excluded from this processing and passed through
// unchanged. Non-JSON responses and empty responses are also passed through unchanged.
func JSONResponseMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Skip non-JSON endpoints
if r.URL.Path == "/" || r.URL.Path == "/status" {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
startTime := time.Now()
// Create a custom response writer to capture the response
rw := &responseWriter{
ResponseWriter: w,
body: &bytes.Buffer{},
statusCode: http.StatusOK,
}
// Serve the request
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
// Calculate execution time
execTime := time.Since(startTime)
// Only process JSON responses
contentType := rw.Header().Get("Content-Type")
if contentType != "application/json" || rw.body.Len() == 0 {
// Write the original response
w.WriteHeader(rw.statusCode)
_, _ = w.Write(rw.body.Bytes())
return
}
// Parse the original response
var originalResponse map[string]any
err := json.Unmarshal(rw.body.Bytes(), &originalResponse)
if err != nil {
// If we can't parse it, just write original
w.WriteHeader(rw.statusCode)
_, _ = w.Write(rw.body.Bytes())
return
}
// Add @meta field
originalResponse["@meta"] = map[string]any{
"time_zone": "UTC",
"api_version": 1,
"execution_time": fmt.Sprintf("%d ms", execTime.Milliseconds()),
}
// Write the enhanced response
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(rw.statusCode)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(originalResponse)
})
}
// requestTimeoutMessage is the error message sent with 504 Gateway Timeout.
const requestTimeoutMessage = "Request timeout"
// internalErrorMessage is the error message sent with 500 Internal Server
// Error, whatever went wrong; the handler logs the detail.
const internalErrorMessage = "Internal server error"
// deadlinePassed reports whether ctx ended because its deadline passed.
//
// A handler calls it right after each database read or host name lookup,
// before it looks at what came back, error or not, and answers 504 if it
// reports true. A read cut off by the time limit can return an error, or part
// of its rows or none of them without one, so only this check tells a cut-off
// read from a complete one.
func deadlinePassed(ctx context.Context) bool {
return errors.Is(ctx.Err(), context.DeadlineExceeded)
}
// JSONValidationMiddleware is an HTTP middleware that validates JSON API responses.
// It ensures that responses with Content-Type "application/json" contain valid JSON.
//
// If a response is not valid JSON or is empty when JSON is expected, the middleware
// returns a properly formatted JSON error response. If the request's time limit
// has passed, it answers 504 with the error message "Request timeout". For other
// errors, it returns "Internal server error" with status 500 if the original
// status was 200.
//
// Non-JSON responses are passed through unchanged.
func JSONValidationMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Create a custom response writer to capture the response
rw := &responseWriter{
ResponseWriter: w,
body: &bytes.Buffer{},
statusCode: http.StatusOK,
}
// Serve the request
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
// Check if it's meant to be a JSON response
contentType := rw.Header().Get("Content-Type")
isJSON := contentType == "application/json" || contentType == ""
// If it's not JSON or has content, pass through
if !isJSON && rw.body.Len() > 0 {
w.WriteHeader(rw.statusCode)
_, _ = w.Write(rw.body.Bytes())
return
}
// For JSON responses, validate the JSON
if rw.body.Len() > 0 {
var testParse any
err := json.Unmarshal(rw.body.Bytes(), &testParse)
if err == nil {
// Valid JSON, write it out
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(rw.statusCode)
_, _ = w.Write(rw.body.Bytes())
return
}
}
// If we get here, either there's no body or invalid JSON
// Write a proper error response
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
// Determine appropriate status code
statusCode := rw.statusCode
if statusCode == http.StatusOK {
statusCode = http.StatusInternalServerError
}
if deadlinePassed(r.Context()) {
statusCode = http.StatusGatewayTimeout
}
w.WriteHeader(statusCode)
errorMsg := internalErrorMessage
if statusCode == http.StatusGatewayTimeout {
errorMsg = requestTimeoutMessage
}
response := map[string]any{
jsonKeyStatus: jsonStatusError,
jsonKeyError: map[string]any{
jsonKeyMsg: errorMsg,
jsonKeyCode: statusCode,
},
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response)
})
}
// statusWriter wraps http.ResponseWriter to capture the status code
type statusWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
statusCode int
written bool
}
func (sw *statusWriter) WriteHeader(statusCode int) {
if !sw.written {
sw.statusCode = statusCode
sw.written = true
}
sw.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(statusCode)
}
func (sw *statusWriter) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
if !sw.written {
sw.statusCode = http.StatusOK
sw.written = true
}
return sw.ResponseWriter.Write(b)
}
// RequestLoggerMiddleware creates a structured logging middleware using slog.
func RequestLoggerMiddleware(logger *slog.Logger) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
start := time.Now()
// Wrap response writer to capture status
sw := &statusWriter{ResponseWriter: w, statusCode: http.StatusOK}
// Log request start
logger.Debug("HTTP request started",
"method", r.Method,
"path", r.URL.Path,
"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
"user_agent", r.UserAgent(),
)
// Serve the request
next.ServeHTTP(sw, r)
// Log request completion
duration := time.Since(start)
logLevel := slog.LevelInfo
// Slow query threshold (1 second)
const slowQueryThreshold = 1 * time.Second
switch {
case sw.statusCode >= http.StatusInternalServerError:
logLevel = slog.LevelError
case sw.statusCode >= http.StatusBadRequest:
logLevel = slog.LevelWarn
case duration >= slowQueryThreshold:
logLevel = slog.LevelWarn
}
logger.Log(r.Context(), logLevel, "HTTP request completed",
"method", r.Method,
"path", r.URL.Path,
"status", sw.statusCode,
"duration_ms", duration.Milliseconds(),
"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
"slow", duration >= slowQueryThreshold,
)
})
}
}
// DecodedPathMiddleware makes the router match routes against the decoded
// path, so that the handlers read their URL parameters decoded. Without it,
// chi matches against the escaped path whenever the request has one and hands
// the handlers their parameters still escaped: /ip/2001%3Adb8%3A%3A1 would
// look up "2001%3Adb8%3A%3A1".
func DecodedPathMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
chi.RouteContext(r.Context()).RoutePath = r.URL.Path
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// The values of the headers SecurityHeadersMiddleware sets.
const (
// strictTransportSecurity tells browsers to reach this host and its
// subdomains only over HTTPS for a year. The server listens on plain
// HTTP behind a TLS-terminating proxy, which passes the header on.
strictTransportSecurity = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
// contentSecurityPolicy lets a page load content only from this server,
// and run or apply an inline script or style block only when the block
// carries the nonce made for that answer, which replaces %[1]s. No other
// site may frame the pages.
contentSecurityPolicy = "default-src 'self'; " +
"script-src 'nonce-%[1]s'; style-src 'nonce-%[1]s'; " +
"frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'"
frameOptions = "DENY"
contentTypeOptions = "nosniff"
referrerPolicy = "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
// permissionsPolicy turns off browser features the pages do not use.
permissionsPolicy = "accelerometer=(), camera=(), geolocation=(), " +
"gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), microphone=(), payment=(), usb=()"
)
// cspNonceKey is the request context key of the nonce SecurityHeadersMiddleware
// made for the answer.
type cspNonceKey struct{}
// SecurityHeadersMiddleware sets the security headers REPO_POLICIES.md requires
// on every answer. Each answer's Content-Security-Policy names a nonce of its
// own; a page reads it with cspNonce and writes it on its script and style
// blocks.
func SecurityHeadersMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
nonce := rand.Text()
header := w.Header()
header.Set("Strict-Transport-Security", strictTransportSecurity)
header.Set("Content-Security-Policy",
fmt.Sprintf(contentSecurityPolicy, nonce))
header.Set("X-Frame-Options", frameOptions)
header.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", contentTypeOptions)
header.Set("Referrer-Policy", referrerPolicy)
header.Set("Permissions-Policy", permissionsPolicy)
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), cspNonceKey{}, nonce)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
// cspNonce returns the nonce SecurityHeadersMiddleware made for the answer to
// the request with ctx.
func cspNonce(ctx context.Context) string {
nonce, _ := ctx.Value(cspNonceKey{}).(string)
return nonce
}
// RealIPMiddleware gives a request from one of trustedProxies the address of
// the client the proxies forwarded it for as its RemoteAddr: the last
// X-Forwarded-For entry that is not a trusted proxy. Each proxy appends the
// address it took the request from, so the entries left of that one are
// whatever the client sent. A request from any other peer keeps the peer's
// address, whatever headers it carries.
func RealIPMiddleware(trustedProxies []netip.Prefix) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
isTrusted := func(addr netip.Addr) bool {
return slices.ContainsFunc(trustedProxies, func(proxy netip.Prefix) bool {
return proxy.Contains(addr.Unmap())
})
}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
peer, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil || !isTrusted(peer.Addr()) {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// A header sent on several lines is one list.
entries := strings.Split(
strings.Join(r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"), ","), ",")
for _, entry := range slices.Backward(entries) {
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.TrimSpace(entry))
if err != nil {
break
}
r.RemoteAddr = addr.String()
if !isTrusted(addr) {
break
}
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}