Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 25a01e2345 Discard a cache whose list of what did not decrypt is damaged
check / check (push) Waiting to run
metadata.json's list of the albums and files the refresh could not
decrypt is read entry by entry, so a value that is not a list of records
discards the cache as other damage does, instead of failing every later
backup. "Backup layout" now says that an album, or a file's copy in an
album, that quak can no longer decrypt loses its folder, JSON or link as
a deleted one does, and the originals stay. It no longer mentions the
empty title in failures.json, which no test covers.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 04:15:47 +00:00
sneak 3f03689ae4 Test: a damaged list in metadata.json, and records that stop decrypting
check / check (push) Waiting to run
A metadata.json whose list of what the refresh could not decrypt is
damaged must load as an empty store. A backup after an album and a
file's copy stop decrypting removes the album's folder and JSON and the
file's link in its album, and keeps the originals.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 03:57:04 +00:00
sneak f75816a0da README and TODO: say only what the code does for records it cannot decrypt
check / check (push) Waiting to run
A file whose copy in another album decrypted is stored from that copy, and
the album where it does not decrypt neither links nor lists it. Only a run
without --json prints the line for an album. The exit-code and read-command
sentences no longer cover that file, and the failures.json sentence covers
only files in the backup's scope.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 03:04:59 +00:00
sneak c6bc1a6265 Test: the exit code when an album is the only record left out
check / check (push) Waiting to run
A backup whose only record quak cannot decrypt is an album exits 1 with
nothing in failures.json, and 0 once the album decrypts or is deleted.
The test of a file in two albums now also checks that the album where its
copy does not decrypt neither links the original nor lists the file.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 03:03:27 +00:00
sneak 1833009c08 README: say which records quak could not decrypt lib.backup() reports
It reports each such album, and each such file in its scope that has no
copy that decrypted, not every record the library left out.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 02:54:22 +00:00
sneak 564ec13b69 Back up from a copy that decrypted even outside a run's albums; README wording
A file whose copy in an album in scope does not decrypt is now backed up
from a copy that decrypted in any album, not only one in scope; with no
such copy it is still recorded as failed. The README now says the exit
code stays at 1 until the server sends a copy that decrypts or deletes it,
and that only a run without --json prints the FAILED album line.
StoredMetadata.undecryptable is required, like the other fields.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 02:54:21 +00:00
sneak cfb3d31047 Test: a backup limited to one album stores a file whose copy there does not decrypt
A run of lib.backup() limited to "Trip" must store a file whose copy in
Trip does not decrypt when its copy in an album the run skips does. Today
the run neither stores it nor records it as failed.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 02:54:21 +00:00
sneak 349e364109 One album or file quak cannot decrypt no longer stops a refresh or a backup (closes #181)
collectionsSince and filesSince put a row that does not decrypt or parse in
an undecryptable list with the reason instead of throwing. The refresh
leaves it out, an album with its files, and the store keeps the list in
metadata.json until the server sends a copy that decrypts or deletes it,
since the next refresh asks only for changes. lib.backup() records each
such file in failures.json as "could not be decrypted: <reason>", unless a
copy in another album decrypted, logs one line per such album and lists
their IDs in undecryptableAlbums; quak backup exits 1 while any remain.
Tests use a stand-in Ente server with real encryption.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 02:54:21 +00:00
clawbot 288825b11a quak backup no longer refreshes its library on a timer (closes #183)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
The backup opened its library with the default 3-second refresh interval,
so for its whole run it asked the server for changes every few seconds,
and each refresh started another ML data pass. It now opens it with
refreshIntervalSeconds: Infinity. The library takes Infinity as no
background timer, since setTimeout would turn it into 1 ms. A refresh
interval of 3600, as the read commands use, would still refresh once an
hour in a backup that runs for hours.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 04:10:14 +02:00
clawbot 54133cfa5f Test quak backup end to end against a fake Ente server (closes #186)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
test/cli/backup-end-to-end.test.ts runs backupCommand through run, as
bin/quak.ts does, with the real loadSession reading a session saved after
logging in, and every request answered by a fake of the Ente HTTP API serving
data encrypted with libsodium. It covers the backup tree of an account with
two albums of its own and one shared with it, a second run that downloads
nothing, a download that succeeds after two 503s, a 404 recorded in
failures.json with exit 1, a refresh answered 401 with exit 3, and --verify
putting back an original changed on disk.

The fake server and the account it logs in moved from the backup-metadata
test into test/ente-server.ts, unchanged, so both tests use them.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 03:38:38 +02:00
clawbot ab28d86aaa An ID on the command line is decimal digits only (closes #185)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
files --collection, get, get-thumb and helper fix-missing-thumbnails
--file read an ID with Number(), so 0x10 meant 16, 1e3 meant 1000 and
an empty string meant 0, and --file dropped an ID it could not read.
parseID in src/cli-commands.ts now takes an ID only when it is decimal
digits and a safe integer; anything else prints "Invalid file ID: ARG"
or "Invalid collection ID: ARG" and the command exits 1. The fixer
checks every --file ID before it opens the library, so one bad ID fails
the whole command before any request.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 03:06:35 +02:00
clawbot 2402ec97f7 README: running quak backup from cron, and its exit codes (closes #170)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m59s
A new README section shows how to run quak backup unattended: log in once
as the job's user, a crontab with a backup every night and --verify on
Sundays, output appended to a log file, and the HOME and XDG_DATA_HOME the
job needs to find the saved session. A table gives each exit code as the
code returns it, and says which failures the next run retries. The
introduction now lists everything the backup keeps for each file. It, the
backup layout tree and the lib.backup() entry say EXIF and XMP are kept for
an image only, and dimensions for a JPEG only.

Judgement call: the --verify run takes Sunday's slot rather than a second
job that night, since an overlapping run would exit 2.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-07 00:47:37 +02:00
clawbot ddf58af3cc quak backup --verify re-hashes stored originals and downloads again any that do not match (closes #168)
check / check (push) Failing after 1m22s
`--verify`, or `lib.backup({ verify: true })`, hashes each original already
at its save path as the download check does, streamed, a live photo as
`<imageHash>:<videoHash>`. A mismatch is logged, removed and put back in the
same run, and what is put back is hashed too, since a copy from the content
cache is not checked; one that still does not match, or a failed fetch, goes
into `failures.json`. A file with no recorded hash counts as unchecked. The
result, the summary and `--json` gain `verified`, `mismatched` and
`unchecked`.

Judgement call: a stored original that cannot be read for hashing is recorded as failed and left in place.
Judgement call: a copy put back that still does not match stays at its save path and is not counted as downloaded.
Judgement call: the summary prints the three counts only with `--verify`.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-06 22:47:26 +02:00
clawbot bd77422965 quak backup refuses to run while another backup of the same directory runs, exit 2 (closes #169)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m10s
lib.backup() takes a lock, backup.lock in its download directory, made
with proper-lockfile, before its refresh, and removes it when it ends. A
second backup of the directory fails at once with an error naming it.
quak backup takes the lock itself before it opens its library and passes
lockHeld to the backup, so a refused run sends no request; it prints the
error as one line and exits 2. A lock untouched for 10 seconds, left by a
run that could not remove it, is taken over.

Deviation: yarn.lock was regenerated by yarn add in the pinned node image.
Judgement call: a run failing at its refresh leaves the directory, empty.
Judgement call: a lock removed mid-run stops that run with an uncaught
error, the library's default.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-06 20:30:51 +02:00
18 changed files with 2539 additions and 352 deletions
+154 -26
View File
@@ -10,9 +10,12 @@ account into a deduplicated local directory tree, skipping files that already
exist on disk and continuing past individual download failures instead of
crashing. For each file it persists the basic metadata fields quak keeps (title,
file type, creation and modification time, latitude, longitude, content hash),
and the private and public magic metadata in full. A helper subcommand can
detect and regenerate missing thumbnails, encrypting and uploading them back to
the server.
its update time, the private and public magic metadata in full, Ente's ML data
for it when there is any, and, for an image (for a live photo, its image), its
original's EXIF and XMP, with its dimensions for a JPEG only; for a video it
keeps none of these three. It runs unattended from cron (see "Running the backup
from cron"). A helper subcommand can detect and regenerate missing thumbnails,
encrypting and uploading them back to the server.
## Getting Started
@@ -80,6 +83,66 @@ await lib.close();
The lower-level `Client` (login, session serialization, and the raw
enumeration/download calls) is exported too and documented under Design below.
## Running the backup from cron
`quak backup` never prompts, so cron can run it. `make install` builds quak as a
single binary and copies it to `~/bin/quak`. Log in once with it, as the user
the cron job will run as; the session is saved in that user's data directory
(see "Session handling"):
```bash
~/bin/quak login
```
Then add the backup to that user's crontab with `crontab -e`. These two lines
back up the account to `~/photos-backup` at 03:30 every night, with `--verify`
on Sundays, and append all output to `~/quak-backup.log`:
```
30 3 * * 1-6 $HOME/bin/quak backup $HOME/photos-backup >> $HOME/quak-backup.log 2>&1
30 3 * * 0 $HOME/bin/quak backup --verify $HOME/photos-backup >> $HOME/quak-backup.log 2>&1
```
A run with `--verify` does all a plain run does, and also checks each original
already in the backup against the content hash Ente records for it, and replaces
any that do not match (see "Backup layout"). Sunday's run is the `--verify` one,
not a second job that night, because a backup that starts while another backup
of the same directory is running exits 2 without backing anything up.
Cron runs the job with a short `PATH`, usually `/usr/bin:/bin`, so the crontab
names quak by its full path. To find the saved session, quak needs the same
`HOME` as when you logged in, which cron sets from the password file, and on
Linux the same `XDG_DATA_HOME`: quak looks for the session in
`$XDG_DATA_HOME/quak`, or in `~/.local/share/quak` when that is not set. Cron
does not set `XDG_DATA_HOME`, so if your login shell does, set it at the top of
the crontab too. Cron does not expand variables in such a line, so give the full
path:
```
XDG_DATA_HOME=/home/you/.data
```
On macOS the session is in `~/Library/Application Support/quak`, and only `HOME`
matters.
### Exit codes
| Code | Meaning |
| ---- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `0` | The backup is complete: every original is at its save path, and no file failed. |
| `1` | The run finished with files in `failures.json` or an album it could not decrypt, or it stopped on another error, printed as one line `quak: <message>`. The next run tries again. |
| `2` | Another backup of the same directory is running. This run sent no request and changed nothing. |
| `3` | There is no usable session: none is saved, the saved one is corrupt, or the server no longer accepts it. Run `quak login` as the user the cron job runs as. |
After a `1`, the next run fetches each missing original again, fetches the ML
data that is not cached, and rebuilds the album links. An album quak could not
decrypt, or a file in `failures.json` because quak could not decrypt it, keeps
the exit code at `1` until the server sends a copy that decrypts, or deletes it
(see "Backup layout"). An original that a `--verify` run could not read, or put
back with bytes that still do not match, stays at its save path. Only a later
`--verify` run checks it again: a run without `--verify` leaves it as it is and
takes the file out of `failures.json`, so that run can exit 0.
## Examples
`examples/download-albums.ts` downloads every album's photos and their metadata
@@ -524,10 +587,10 @@ stack trace. All three exit with status 3, which means the user must run
`quak login` again. `quak logout` is the exception: with no file it says there
is no session and exits 0, and it handles a corrupt file or a failed server call
as described below. `quak backup` meets an expired session on the refresh that
starts every run, before it touches any file. A session that stops working
partway through a backup instead fails each remaining file into `failures.json`,
so that run exits 1 and the next one stops at its refresh with status 3. No
command but `quak login` ever prompts.
starts every run, before it touches any file but its lock (see "Backup layout").
A session that stops working partway through a backup instead fails each
remaining file into `failures.json`, so that run exits 1 and the next one stops
at its refresh with status 3. No command but `quak login` ever prompts.
`quak logout` ends the session on the server, so the token in `session.json`
stops working even in a copy of the file, and then deletes the file. If the
@@ -562,8 +625,17 @@ library. The read commands — `collections`, `files`, `get`, `get-thumb`,
answer, so they report current account state rather than whatever the cache last
held. If that round-trip fails, the command prints the error on one line and
exits 1, or 3 when the server no longer accepts the saved session (see "Session
handling"). `--cache-dir` overrides where the cache lives; without it each
account gets its own directory under the per-user cache path.
handling"). An album or file quak cannot decrypt does not fail it; the command
answers from what did decrypt (see "Default reads vs. fresh reads").
`--cache-dir` overrides where the cache lives; without it each account gets its
own directory under the per-user cache path.
An ID given to `files --collection`, `get`, `get-thumb` or
`helper fix-missing-thumbnails --file` is written in decimal digits, no larger
than 9007199254740991. Anything else, such as `0x10`, `1e3` or `-1`, is refused
before any request with one line, `Invalid file ID: <arg>` or
`Invalid collection ID: <arg>`, and exit status 1. One bad `--file` ID refuses
the whole command, so nothing is fixed.
`get` and `get-thumb` resolve the file by ID directly, so `--collection` is
accepted for backward compatibility but ignored. For a live photo, `get` writes
@@ -615,8 +687,11 @@ the smallest does not.
below)
YYYY-MM-DD.<fileID>.json the file's basic metadata fields quak
keeps, its update time, its private and
public magic metadata, its ML data, and
its original's EXIF, XMP and dimensions
public magic metadata, its ML data, and,
for an image (for a live photo, its
image), its original's EXIF and XMP, with
dimensions for a JPEG only; none of these
three for a video
YYYY-MM-DD.<fileID>.livephoto.json
which of a live photo's two files is which
collections/
@@ -625,6 +700,7 @@ the smallest does not.
(symlink)
<name>.json collection metadata + file list
account.json the account's email and user ID
backup.lock the lock a running backup holds (see below)
failures.json files that failed and have not yet succeeded
```
@@ -669,6 +745,36 @@ succeeds, or once it is no longer in the library or in the backup's scope. The
library's `lib.backup({ includeThumbnails: true })` also writes
`thumbnails/<fileID>.jpg` beside `collections/`; `quak backup` does not.
A file in the backup's scope that the library could not decrypt (see "Default
reads vs. fresh reads") goes into `failures.json` with an error that starts
`could not be decrypted:` and gives the reason. If a copy of it in another album
decrypted, it does not: its original is stored from that copy, and the album
where it does not decrypt neither links nor lists it. An album the library could
not decrypt has no name quak can read and no files it can list. A run without
`--json` prints one line for it,
`FAILED album <id>: could not be decrypted: <reason>`, and `--json` and the
`BackupResult` list its ID in `undecryptableAlbums`. Such a file in
`failures.json`, or such an album, keeps the exit code at 1, run after run,
until the server sends a copy that decrypts or deletes it; the next run then
drops it.
`backup.lock` keeps two backups of the same directory from running at once, such
as a cron run that starts while the previous one is still going. A backup
creates `<dir>` if it is missing and takes the lock before its refresh, and
removes the lock when it ends, whether it succeeds or fails; `quak backup` takes
it before it opens its library, so a refused run sends no request. The lock is a
directory that
[proper-lockfile](https://github.com/moxystudio/node-proper-lockfile) creates
and keeps touching while the backup runs. A second backup of the directory, from
another process or the same one, fails at once: `quak backup` prints
`quak: another backup of <dir> is running` and exits with status 2. A run
stopped with Ctrl-C or `kill` removes the lock as it exits. Only a run that
cannot, such as one killed with SIGKILL or cut off by a crash or power loss,
leaves it behind; once it has gone 10 seconds untouched, the next run takes it
over, so nobody has to remove it. The lock is outside the date folders and
`collections/`, so it is never taken for an original, and the removal of old
album directories never touches it.
A collection's directory and JSON are named after the collection, and a symlink
after the file's title, both with unsafe characters replaced. When two
collections would get the same name, or two symlinks in one collection the same
@@ -688,9 +794,12 @@ both, each named after the title with that file's extension (`IMG_0001.heic` and
Each run removes the symlinks into the date folders that no longer belong in
their collection's directory, and the directories (and JSON) of collections that
were deleted or renamed. Nothing else in `collections/` is touched: a file or a
symlink you put there stays, and a directory that still holds one after its
symlinks are removed stays too, with its JSON.
were deleted or renamed. An album quak can no longer decrypt loses its directory
and JSON the same way, and a file whose copy in an album quak can no longer
decrypt loses its symlink there and its entry in that album's JSON; the
originals stay at their save paths. Nothing else in `collections/` is touched: a
file or a symlink you put there stays, and a directory that still holds one
after its symlinks are removed stays too, with its JSON.
Each file is downloaded exactly once regardless of how many collections it
appears in, and written once: straight to its save path, with no copy left in
@@ -699,7 +808,8 @@ subsequent runs, existing originals are skipped. If a download fails, the error
is logged and the backup continues with the next file. The exit code is non-zero
if any files failed. `quak backup` opens its library with the thumbnail and
originals precache off, so the only file content it fetches is the originals the
backup stores.
backup stores. It also opens it with no background timer, so it asks the server
for changes only as it starts, not again while it downloads.
With `--verify`, or `lib.backup({ verify: true })`, a run also hashes each
original already at its save path the way a download is checked (see "On-disk
@@ -761,7 +871,8 @@ The library's primary surface is the cache-backed `Library`; the lower-level
`Client` sits underneath it and is covered by the Design sections above. The
test suite is the canonical, executable documentation — `test/library/` and
`test/client/usage.test.ts` walk most operations, `test/cli/backup.test.ts`
walks `lib.backup()`, and `yarn test` verifies them.
walks `lib.backup()`, `test/cli/backup-end-to-end.test.ts` runs `quak backup`
against a fake of the Ente HTTP API, and `yarn test` verifies them.
### Opening a library
@@ -779,7 +890,7 @@ background, so an unreachable server does not block opening.
| `client` | required | the account client (a `Client`, or any `LibraryClient`) |
| `cacheDirectory` | `quak/<userID>` under the per-user cache directory | where `metadata.json` and the content cache live |
| `downloadDirectory` | `photos` in the working directory | root of the save paths; an original stored there counts as cached |
| `refreshIntervalSeconds` | `3` | background refresh cadence |
| `refreshIntervalSeconds` | `3` | background refresh cadence; `Infinity` for no background timer |
| `precacheThumbnails` | `true` | prefetch every thumbnail, newest first |
| `precacheOriginals` | `true` | prefetch the favorites album and the latest-window originals |
| `precacheOriginalsDays` | `7` | length in days of that latest window |
@@ -824,6 +935,16 @@ rejects the caller (default reads stay silent and keep serving the last good
copy). The CLI's read commands use fresh reads (issue
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/quak/issues/75).
An album or file in the server's answer that quak cannot decrypt, or whose
metadata is not JSON, does not fail the refresh. The refresh leaves it out, an
album with all its files, and drops any older copy the cache held, so reads
answer from what did decrypt. The library keeps a list of what it left out, with
the reason, in `metadata.json`: the next refresh asks the server only for what
changed, so it would not see the record again. A record stays on that list until
a later refresh gets a copy that decrypts or learns that the server deleted it.
`lib.backup()` reports each such album, and each such file in its scope that has
no copy that decrypted (see "Backup layout").
### Read surface
- `lib.albums.list()` → `Album[]`, newest-updated first.
@@ -935,18 +1056,25 @@ photos newest first). `lib.subscribe({ onChange })` delivers a `LibraryChange`
`SimilarResult[]` (`{ fileID, score }`, cosine similarity, most similar first,
default limit 20). quak bundles no text encoder, so `searchByEmbedding` takes
a query vector the caller produced elsewhere.
- `await lib.backup(opts?)` → `BackupResult`. It waits for a refresh as
- `await lib.backup(opts?)` → `BackupResult`. It takes the lock in the download
directory, and fails at once with an error whose `code` is `ELOCKED` while
another backup of it runs. A caller can instead take the lock itself, before
it opens its library, as `quak backup` does: `await lockBackupDirectory(dir)`
takes it, failing the same way, and returns the function that releases it, and
the caller passes `lockHeld: true` to the backup. It waits for a refresh as
`fresh()` does, puts every in-scope original not already at its save path
there as `photo.download()` does (and, with `includeThumbnails`, fetches
thumbnails) through the content cache, waits for an ML data fetch, and
rebuilds the on-disk backup tree, each file's JSON with its ML data and its
original's EXIF, XMP and dimensions, with a durable failure ledger. A fetched
original is written straight to its save path and not into the cache, which
then counts it as present; one the cache already held is copied from there.
`BackupOptions`: `downloadDirectory` (falls back to the library's),
`includeOriginals` (default `true`), `includeThumbnails` (default `false`),
`onlyAlbumNames`, `verify` (default `false`), and `onProgress`. See Backup
layout above for the tree it writes.
rebuilds the on-disk backup tree with a durable failure ledger. Each file's
JSON holds its ML data and, for an image (for a live photo, its image), its
original's EXIF and XMP, with its dimensions for a JPEG only; a video's JSON
holds none of these three. A fetched original is written straight to its save
path and not into the cache, which then counts it as present; one the cache
already held is copied from there. `BackupOptions`: `downloadDirectory` (falls
back to the library's), `includeOriginals` (default `true`),
`includeThumbnails` (default `false`), `onlyAlbumNames`, `verify` (default
`false`), `onProgress`, and `lockHeld` (default `false`). See Backup layout
above for the tree it writes.
### Request pools
+59
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,55 @@ declares one.
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-14: An album or file quak cannot decrypt, or whose metadata is not
JSON, no longer fails the refresh, so one bad record no longer stops
`quak backup` from storing anything (issue 181). The refresh leaves it out, an
album with its files, and the library keeps it with the reason in
`metadata.json` until the server sends a copy that decrypts or deletes it.
`quak backup` stores every other file, records each such file in
`failures.json` with an error starting `could not be decrypted:`, names each
such album's ID in a printed line, or with `--json` in `undecryptableAlbums`,
and exits 1 while any remain. A file whose copy in another album decrypts is
not recorded: its original is stored from that copy, and the album where it
does not decrypt neither links nor lists it. The read commands answer from
what decrypted.
- 2026-10-14: `quak backup` no longer asks the server for changes every 3
seconds while it runs (issue 183). It opens its library with
`refreshIntervalSeconds: Infinity`, which the library now takes as no
background timer, so the backup refreshes only as it starts and no timed
refresh starts another ML data pass during the run. A test holds a backup's
download open while two hours pass and counts its `/collections/v2` requests.
- 2026-10-14: `test/cli/backup-end-to-end.test.ts` runs `quak backup` as cron
does (issue 186): `backupCommand` and `run`, the real `loadSession` reading a
session saved after logging in, and every request answered by a fake of the
Ente HTTP API serving data encrypted with libsodium. It covers the backup tree
of an account with two albums of its own and one shared with it, a second run
that downloads nothing, a download that succeeds after two 503s, a 404 that
lands in `failures.json` with exit 1, a refresh answered 401 with exit 3, and
`--verify` putting back an original changed on disk. The fake server and the
account it logs in moved from the backup-metadata test into
`test/ente-server.ts`, unchanged.
- 2026-10-14: `files --collection`, `get`, `get-thumb` and
`helper fix-missing-thumbnails --file` take an ID only when it is written in
decimal digits and is a safe integer (issue 185). Before, `Number()` read
`0x10` as 16, `1e3` as 1000 and an empty string as 0, and `--file` dropped an
ID it could not read without a word. Anything else now prints
`Invalid file ID: <arg>` or `Invalid collection ID: <arg>` and exits 1 before
any request; one bad `--file` ID fails the whole command. `parseID` in
`src/cli-commands.ts` does the check for all four.
- 2026-10-06: The README says how to run `quak backup` from cron (issue 170):
log in once as the job's user, a crontab with a backup every night and
`--verify` on Sundays appending to a log file, and the `HOME` and
`XDG_DATA_HOME` the job needs to find the saved session. A table gives each
exit code: 0, the backup is complete; 1, files are in `failures.json` or
another error stopped the run; 2, another backup of the directory is running;
3, there is no usable session. The introduction lists everything the backup
keeps for each file.
- 2026-10-06: `quak backup --verify` and `lib.backup({ verify: true })` hash
each original already at its save path as the download check does, streamed, a
live photo as `<imageHash>:<videoHash>` (issue 168). One that does not match
@@ -35,6 +84,16 @@ declares one.
alone. The result, `--json` and the summary gain `verified`, `mismatched` and
`unchecked`. Without `--verify` nothing is hashed.
- 2026-10-06: Two backups of the same directory never run at once (issue 169).
`lib.backup()` takes a lock, `backup.lock` in its download directory, made
with `proper-lockfile`, before its refresh, and removes it when it ends,
whether it succeeds or fails. A second backup of the directory, from another
process or the same one, fails at once with an error naming the directory.
`quak backup` takes the lock before it opens its library, so a refused run
sends no request; it prints the error as one line and exits 2. A lock that has
gone 10 seconds untouched, left by a run that could not remove it, is taken
over by the next run.
- 2026-10-06: `quak backup` writes each original's EXIF, XMP and dimensions into
the file's JSON as `imageMetadata`, what `backup-metadata --exif` records
(issue 167): for a live photo from its image, for a video nothing, and `{}`
+3 -1
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
"devDependencies": {
"@eslint/js": "9.38.0",
"@types/node": "22.18.13",
"@types/proper-lockfile": "4.1.4",
"eslint": "9.38.0",
"prettier": "3.8.1",
"typescript": "5.9.3",
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@
"fast-srp-hap": "2.0.4",
"fflate": "0.8.3",
"jpeg-js": "0.4.4",
"libsodium-wrappers-sumo": "0.8.4"
"libsodium-wrappers-sumo": "0.8.4",
"proper-lockfile": "4.1.2"
}
}
+126 -32
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
// The backup command, rebuilt on the library API (issue #51).
//
// `lib.backup()` waits for a completed refresh of the library (a failed one
// fails the backup before any file is touched), then, for every file in scope,
// puts its original at its save path under `downloadDirectory`, as
// `Photo.download()` does, waits for an ML data fetch, and rebuilds the derived
// views (per-file sidecars, per-collection symlink trees, per-collection JSON)
// from the model. The on-disk layout:
// `lib.backup()` takes the lock in `downloadDirectory` (unless its caller
// already holds it), and fails at once when another backup of it holds the
// lock. It waits for a completed refresh of the library (a failed one fails the
// backup before any file is touched), then, for every file in scope, puts its
// original at its save path under `downloadDirectory`, as `Photo.download()`
// does, waits for an ML data fetch, and rebuilds the derived views (per-file
// sidecars, per-collection symlink trees, per-collection JSON) from the model.
// The on-disk layout:
//
// <downloadDirectory>/
// YYYY/YYYY-MM/YYYY-MM-DD/
@@ -17,6 +19,7 @@
// collections/<name>/<title> symlink to the original
// collections/<name>.json per-collection metadata
// account.json the account's email and user ID
// backup.lock the lock, while a backup runs
// failures.json durable ledger of unresolved failures
//
// A live photo's original is its image and its video, each with its own
@@ -44,6 +47,9 @@
// download, a failed symlink, or ML data missing because the ML data fetch
// failed is caught, recorded in `failures.json` with a classification, a
// running attempt count, and the last-tried time, and the run continues.
// A file the library could not decrypt is recorded there too, unless a copy of
// it in another album decrypted; an album it could not decrypt is logged by ID
// and listed in `result.undecryptableAlbums`, as its name is not known.
// `result.failed` — and thus the CLI's exit code — stays non-zero while any
// failure remains unresolved and clears once every one succeeds. Each run
// reconciles the ledger against the files it attempted, so an entry for a file
@@ -66,6 +72,7 @@ import {
} from "node:fs";
import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { dirname, extname, join, relative, resolve } from "node:path";
import lockfile from "proper-lockfile";
import {
chunkHashFinal,
@@ -82,6 +89,7 @@ import {
storedAtSavePath,
} from "./library/content.js";
import { representative } from "./library/records.js";
import type { Undecryptable } from "./library/store.js";
import { extractImageMetadata } from "./metadata-backup.js";
import type { MLData } from "./mldata-fetch.js";
import type { Collection, EnteFile, FileMetadata } from "./model/types.js";
@@ -104,6 +112,10 @@ export interface BackupOptions {
// bytes do not match the content hash its metadata records. Default false.
verify?: boolean;
onProgress?: ProgressCallback;
// The caller already holds the lock in `downloadDirectory`, taken with
// `lockBackupDirectory`, and releases it itself, so the backup does not
// take it. `quak backup` takes it before it opens its library.
lockHeld?: boolean;
}
export interface BackupError {
@@ -133,6 +145,9 @@ export interface BackupResult {
failed: number;
// This run's per-file errors, in encounter order.
errors: BackupError[];
// The IDs of the albums the library could not decrypt, whose files it
// could not list; the CLI exits non-zero while there are any.
undecryptableAlbums: number[];
}
// The slice of the library that backup drives. `Library` implements it; a test
@@ -143,6 +158,9 @@ export interface BackupLibrary {
refresh(): Promise<void>;
listCollections(): Collection[];
listFiles(collectionID: number): EnteFile[];
// The albums, and files in albums, that the library could not decrypt,
// which `listCollections` and `listFiles` leave out.
undecryptable(): Undecryptable[];
// Get an original's bytes onto disk through the content cache/pools,
// returning where they landed: `destination` when they were fetched now,
// otherwise wherever they already were (the cache, or the library's save
@@ -492,17 +510,12 @@ const writeAlbumJSON = (
writeFileSync(path, JSON.stringify(album, null, 2));
};
export const runBackup = async (
// The backup itself, which `runBackup` below runs while the lock is held.
const runLockedBackup = async (
lib: BackupLibrary,
opts: BackupOptions,
downloadDirectory: string,
): Promise<BackupResult> => {
const downloadDirectory = opts.downloadDirectory;
if (!downloadDirectory) {
throw new Error(
"backup requires a downloadDirectory (pass one to backup() or " +
"open the library with one)",
);
}
const includeOriginals = opts.includeOriginals ?? true;
const includeThumbnails = opts.includeThumbnails ?? false;
const log = opts.onProgress ?? (() => {});
@@ -571,33 +584,56 @@ export const runBackup = async (
let unchecked = 0;
const recordFailure = (
file: EnteFile,
fileID: number,
title: string,
collection: string,
err: unknown,
): void => {
// Count at most one attempt per file per run: a file whose original
// and thumbnail both fail this run must not double its attempt count
// or appear twice in errors.
if (failedThisRun.has(file.id)) return;
if (failedThisRun.has(fileID)) return;
const error = errorMessage(err);
errors.push({
fileID: file.id,
title: file.metadata.title,
collection,
error,
});
const prior = ledger.get(file.id);
ledger.set(file.id, {
fileID: file.id,
title: file.metadata.title,
errors.push({ fileID, title, collection, error });
const prior = ledger.get(fileID);
ledger.set(fileID, {
fileID,
title,
classification: classify(err),
attempts: (prior?.attempts ?? 0) + 1,
lastTriedAt: now,
error,
});
failedThisRun.add(file.id);
failedThisRun.add(fileID);
};
// What the library could not decrypt. An album is logged by its ID, as
// its name is not known, so a run limited to some albums logs it too. A
// file in an album in scope is backed up from a copy of it in another
// album that decrypted, even an album out of scope. With no such copy it
// is recorded as failed, with an empty title as its metadata is not known.
const scope = new Set(collections.map((c) => c.id));
const undecryptableAlbums: number[] = [];
for (const record of lib.undecryptable()) {
const error = `could not be decrypted: ${record.error}`;
if (record.fileID === undefined) {
log(`FAILED album ${record.collectionID}: ${error}`);
undecryptableAlbums.push(record.collectionID);
} else if (scope.has(record.collectionID)) {
const copies = memberships.get(record.fileID);
if (copies) {
distinct.set(record.fileID, representative(copies));
} else {
recordFailure(
record.fileID,
"",
collectionName.get(record.collectionID) ?? "",
new Error(error),
);
}
}
}
// Phase 1: get the bytes. Put each pending original at its save path
// through the content cache/pools, as `Photo.download()` does, and fetch
// the optional thumbnails; a present file is left as is. With `verify`, a
@@ -633,7 +669,8 @@ export const runBackup = async (
`FAILED verifying original ${file.metadata.title}: ${errorMessage(err)}`,
);
recordFailure(
file,
file.id,
file.metadata.title,
collectionName.get(file.collectionID) ?? "",
err,
);
@@ -673,7 +710,8 @@ export const runBackup = async (
`FAILED original ${file.metadata.title}: ${errorMessage(err)}`,
);
recordFailure(
file,
file.id,
file.metadata.title,
collectionName.get(file.collectionID) ?? "",
err,
);
@@ -690,7 +728,8 @@ export const runBackup = async (
await copyAtomic(path, dest);
} catch (err) {
recordFailure(
file,
file.id,
file.metadata.title,
collectionName.get(file.collectionID) ?? "",
err,
);
@@ -730,7 +769,8 @@ export const runBackup = async (
if (mlData === undefined && mlDataError !== undefined) {
writeSidecar(path, file, { mlDataError }, image);
recordFailure(
file,
file.id,
file.metadata.title,
collectionName.get(file.collectionID) ?? "",
new Error(`ML data: ${mlDataError}`),
);
@@ -803,7 +843,12 @@ export const runBackup = async (
log(
`FAILED symlink ${c.name}/${linkName}: ${errorMessage(err)}`,
);
recordFailure(link.file, c.name, err);
recordFailure(
link.file.id,
link.file.metadata.title,
c.name,
err,
);
}
}
@@ -834,5 +879,54 @@ export const runBackup = async (
unchecked,
failed: ledger.size,
errors,
undecryptableAlbums,
};
};
// Only one backup of a directory runs at a time, in this process or another.
// Creates `downloadDirectory` if it is missing, takes the lock in it and
// returns the function that releases it; while another backup holds the lock,
// fails at once with an error whose `code` is `ELOCKED`. The lock is the
// directory `backup.lock`, whose modification time proper-lockfile keeps
// current while it is held. One it has not touched for 10 seconds was left by
// a run that could not remove it, and is taken over.
export const lockBackupDirectory = async (
downloadDirectory: string,
): Promise<() => Promise<void>> => {
mkdirSync(downloadDirectory, { recursive: true });
try {
return await lockfile.lock(downloadDirectory, {
lockfilePath: join(downloadDirectory, "backup.lock"),
});
} catch (err) {
if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== "ELOCKED") throw err;
throw Object.assign(
new Error(`another backup of ${downloadDirectory} is running`),
{ code: "ELOCKED" },
);
}
};
// Runs the backup holding the lock, which it takes and releases itself unless
// the caller already holds it (`opts.lockHeld`).
export const runBackup = async (
lib: BackupLibrary,
opts: BackupOptions,
): Promise<BackupResult> => {
const downloadDirectory = opts.downloadDirectory;
if (!downloadDirectory) {
throw new Error(
"backup requires a downloadDirectory (pass one to backup() or " +
"open the library with one)",
);
}
if (opts.lockHeld) {
return runLockedBackup(lib, opts, downloadDirectory);
}
const release = await lockBackupDirectory(downloadDirectory);
try {
return await runLockedBackup(lib, opts, downloadDirectory);
} finally {
await release();
}
};
+85 -55
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import {
type ClientSnapshot,
type LoginOptions,
} from "./client.js";
import { lockBackupDirectory } from "./backup.js";
import { init } from "./crypto/index.js";
import {
defaultCacheDirectory,
@@ -96,6 +97,20 @@ const requireSession = (ctx: CliContext): Client | undefined => {
return client;
};
// `text` as an ID, or undefined after telling the user it is not one. An ID is
// written in decimal digits and is a safe integer; `Number()` alone would read
// `0x10` as 16, `1e3` as 1000 and "" as 0.
const parseID = (
ctx: CliContext,
kind: "file" | "collection",
text: string,
): number | undefined => {
const id = Number(text);
if (/^[0-9]+$/.test(text) && Number.isSafeInteger(id)) return id;
ctx.stderr.write(`Invalid ${kind} ID: ${text}\n`);
return undefined;
};
// A library client that omits `fetchMLData`, so the point commands below do not
// kick the library's background ML backfill: they read metadata, or fetch one
// file's content, and exit. `backup` and `backup-metadata` handle ML on their
@@ -246,11 +261,8 @@ export const filesCommand = async (
await init();
const client = requireSession(ctx);
if (!client) return 3;
const collectionID = Number(opts.collection);
if (!Number.isFinite(collectionID)) {
ctx.stderr.write("Invalid collection ID\n");
return 1;
}
const collectionID = parseID(ctx, "collection", opts.collection);
if (collectionID === undefined) return 1;
const lib = await openReadLibrary(ctx, client);
try {
@@ -288,11 +300,8 @@ export const getCommand = async (
await init();
const client = requireSession(ctx);
if (!client) return 3;
const fileID = Number(fileIDStr);
if (!Number.isFinite(fileID)) {
ctx.stderr.write("Invalid file ID\n");
return 1;
}
const fileID = parseID(ctx, "file", fileIDStr);
if (fileID === undefined) return 1;
const lib = await openReadLibrary(ctx, client);
try {
@@ -346,11 +355,8 @@ export const getThumbCommand = async (
await init();
const client = requireSession(ctx);
if (!client) return 3;
const fileID = Number(fileIDStr);
if (!Number.isFinite(fileID)) {
ctx.stderr.write("Invalid file ID\n");
return 1;
}
const fileID = parseID(ctx, "file", fileIDStr);
if (fileID === undefined) return 1;
const lib = await openReadLibrary(ctx, client);
try {
@@ -408,50 +414,70 @@ export const backupCommand = async (
if (!client) return 3;
ctx.stderr.write("Starting backup...\n");
// The precache is off: the backup fetches what it needs, and must not
// also fill the cache with every thumbnail and the recent originals.
const lib = await Library.open({
client,
downloadDirectory: dir,
cacheDirectory: ctx.cacheDir,
precacheThumbnails: false,
precacheOriginals: false,
});
// The lock is taken before the library opens and starts its refresh, so a
// run refused while another backup of `dir` runs sends no request.
let release: () => Promise<void>;
try {
const result = await lib.backup({
release = await lockBackupDirectory(dir);
} catch (err) {
if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== "ELOCKED") throw err;
ctx.stderr.write(`quak: ${(err as Error).message}\n`);
return 2;
}
try {
// The precache is off: the backup fetches what it needs, and must not
// also fill the cache with every thumbnail and the recent originals.
// No refresh starts on a timer: the backup lists its files once, from
// the refresh it waits for, and can run for hours.
const lib = await Library.open({
client,
downloadDirectory: dir,
verify: opts.verify,
onProgress: (msg) => {
if (!opts.json) ctx.stderr.write(msg + "\n");
},
cacheDirectory: ctx.cacheDir,
refreshIntervalSeconds: Infinity,
precacheThumbnails: false,
precacheOriginals: false,
});
try {
const result = await lib.backup({
downloadDirectory: dir,
lockHeld: true,
verify: opts.verify,
onProgress: (msg) => {
if (!opts.json) ctx.stderr.write(msg + "\n");
},
});
if (opts.json) {
ctx.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2) + "\n");
} else {
ctx.stderr.write("\n--- Backup complete ---\n");
ctx.stderr.write(` Total files: ${result.totalFiles}\n`);
ctx.stderr.write(` Downloaded: ${result.downloaded}\n`);
ctx.stderr.write(` Skipped: ${result.skipped}\n`);
if (opts.verify) {
ctx.stderr.write(` Verified: ${result.verified}\n`);
ctx.stderr.write(` Mismatched: ${result.mismatched}\n`);
ctx.stderr.write(` Unchecked: ${result.unchecked}\n`);
}
ctx.stderr.write(` Failed: ${result.failed}\n`);
if (result.errors.length > 0) {
ctx.stderr.write("\nFailed files:\n");
for (const e of result.errors) {
ctx.stderr.write(
` [${e.collection}] ${e.title} (id ${e.fileID}): ${e.error}\n`,
);
if (opts.json) {
ctx.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2) + "\n");
} else {
ctx.stderr.write("\n--- Backup complete ---\n");
ctx.stderr.write(` Total files: ${result.totalFiles}\n`);
ctx.stderr.write(` Downloaded: ${result.downloaded}\n`);
ctx.stderr.write(` Skipped: ${result.skipped}\n`);
if (opts.verify) {
ctx.stderr.write(` Verified: ${result.verified}\n`);
ctx.stderr.write(` Mismatched: ${result.mismatched}\n`);
ctx.stderr.write(` Unchecked: ${result.unchecked}\n`);
}
ctx.stderr.write(` Failed: ${result.failed}\n`);
if (result.errors.length > 0) {
ctx.stderr.write("\nFailed files:\n");
for (const e of result.errors) {
ctx.stderr.write(
` [${e.collection}] ${e.title} (id ${e.fileID}): ${e.error}\n`,
);
}
}
}
}
return result.failed > 0 ? 1 : 0;
return result.failed > 0 || result.undecryptableAlbums.length > 0
? 1
: 0;
} finally {
await lib.close();
}
} finally {
await lib.close();
await release();
}
};
@@ -500,15 +526,19 @@ export const fixMissingThumbnailsCommand = async (
await init();
const client = requireSession(ctx);
if (!client) return 3;
// One bad --file ID fails the whole command, before anything is fetched.
let fileIDs: number[] = [];
for (const text of opts.file ?? []) {
const fileID = parseID(ctx, "file", text);
if (fileID === undefined) return 1;
fileIDs.push(fileID);
}
const lib = await openReadLibrary(ctx, client);
try {
// Refresh first so files added since the cache was written are found;
// a failed refresh throws.
await lib.fresh();
let fileIDs: number[];
if (opts.file && opts.file.length > 0) {
fileIDs = opts.file.map(Number).filter(Number.isFinite);
} else {
if (fileIDs.length === 0) {
ctx.stderr.write("Scanning for missing thumbnails...\n");
const missing = await listMissingThumbnails(lib, client, (msg) => {
if (!opts.json) ctx.stderr.write(msg + "\n");
+53 -26
View File
@@ -44,20 +44,28 @@ export interface ClientSnapshot {
// The result of a resumable enumeration. Live decrypted records and deleted
// ids are kept apart on purpose: a tombstone carries no key or metadata to
// decrypt, so it is a bare id rather than a hollowed-out record. `cursor` is
// the max `updationTime` seen, to pass back into the next call.
// decrypt, so it is a bare id rather than a hollowed-out record. A live row
// that cannot be decrypted, or whose metadata cannot be parsed, is in
// `undecryptable` with the reason instead, so one bad row does not fail the
// call; absent means there was none. `cursor` is the max `updationTime` seen,
// those rows included, to pass back into the next call.
export interface CollectionsPage {
collections: Collection[];
deleted: number[];
undecryptable?: { id: number; error: string }[];
cursor: number;
}
export interface FilesPage {
files: EnteFile[];
deleted: number[];
undecryptable?: { id: number; error: string }[];
cursor: number;
}
const errorMessage = (err: unknown): string =>
err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
export class Client {
private readonly api: ApiClient;
private readonly email: string;
@@ -237,11 +245,12 @@ export class Client {
}
// Enumerate collections changed since `sinceTime`. Live collections are
// decrypted; tombstoned ones (isDeleted) are surfaced as bare ids. The
// returned cursor is the max `updationTime` seen — including tombstones, so
// the next sync resumes past them — falling back to `sinceTime` when the
// response is empty. `/collections/v2` returns the whole changed set in one
// response, so there is no pagination here.
// decrypted; tombstoned ones (isDeleted) are surfaced as bare ids, and
// ones that do not decrypt as ids with the reason. The returned cursor is
// the max `updationTime` seen — including tombstones, so the next sync
// resumes past them — falling back to `sinceTime` when the response is
// empty. `/collections/v2` returns the whole changed set in one response,
// so there is no pagination here.
async collectionsSince(args: {
sinceTime: number;
}): Promise<CollectionsPage> {
@@ -254,31 +263,40 @@ export class Client {
const collections: Collection[] = [];
const deleted: number[] = [];
const undecryptable: { id: number; error: string }[] = [];
let cursor = args.sinceTime;
for (const raw of raws) {
if (raw.isDeleted) {
deleted.push(raw.id);
} else {
collections.push(
decryptCollection(
raw,
{
masterKey: this.masterKey,
publicKey: this.publicKey,
secretKey: this.secretKey,
},
this.userID,
),
);
try {
collections.push(
decryptCollection(
raw,
{
masterKey: this.masterKey,
publicKey: this.publicKey,
secretKey: this.secretKey,
},
this.userID,
),
);
} catch (err) {
undecryptable.push({
id: raw.id,
error: errorMessage(err),
});
}
}
if (raw.updationTime > cursor) cursor = raw.updationTime;
}
return { collections, deleted, cursor };
return { collections, deleted, undecryptable, cursor };
}
// Enumerate a collection's files changed since `sinceTime`, paginating the
// diff from that cursor. Live rows are decrypted; tombstoned ones are
// surfaced as bare ids. Returns the final cursor to resume from.
// surfaced as bare ids, and ones that do not decrypt or parse as ids with
// the reason. Returns the final cursor to resume from.
async filesSince(args: {
collectionID: number;
collectionKey: Uint8Array;
@@ -288,6 +306,7 @@ export class Client {
const { collectionID, collectionKey } = args;
const files: EnteFile[] = [];
const deleted: number[] = [];
const undecryptable: { id: number; error: string }[] = [];
let cursor = args.sinceTime;
for (;;) {
const { diff, hasMore } = await this.api.getJSON<{
@@ -300,7 +319,14 @@ export class Client {
if (raw.isDeleted) {
deleted.push(raw.id);
} else {
files.push(decryptFile(raw, collectionKey));
try {
files.push(decryptFile(raw, collectionKey));
} catch (err) {
undecryptable.push({
id: raw.id,
error: errorMessage(err),
});
}
}
if (raw.updationTime > pageMax) pageMax = raw.updationTime;
}
@@ -321,18 +347,19 @@ export class Client {
}
cursor = pageMax;
}
return { files, deleted, cursor };
return { files, deleted, undecryptable, cursor };
}
// Whole-account listing: every live collection, deletions hidden. A thin
// wrapper over `collectionsSince` from the beginning of time.
// Whole-account listing: every live collection that decrypts, deletions
// hidden. A thin wrapper over `collectionsSince` from the beginning of
// time.
async listCollections(): Promise<Collection[]> {
const { collections } = await this.collectionsSince({ sinceTime: 0 });
return collections;
}
// Every live file in a collection, deletions hidden. A thin wrapper over
// `filesSince` from the beginning of time.
// Every live file in a collection that decrypts, deletions hidden. A thin
// wrapper over `filesSince` from the beginning of time.
async listFiles(
collectionID: number,
collectionKey: Uint8Array,
+1
View File
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ export {
type EnsureOptions,
type EnsureResult,
type EnsureEvent,
lockBackupDirectory,
runBackup,
type BackupOptions,
type BackupResult,
+42 -9
View File
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ import type { Collection, EnteFile } from "../model/types.js";
import { runBackup, type BackupOptions, type BackupResult } from "../backup.js";
export {
lockBackupDirectory,
runBackup,
type BackupOptions,
type BackupResult,
@@ -178,6 +179,9 @@ export interface LibraryOptions {
// directory at open. The content cache treats an original already stored
// at its save path as present.
downloadDirectory?: string;
// How long after one refresh ends the background timer starts the next.
// `Infinity` starts none: the library then refreshes only as it opens and
// when `fresh()` or `backup()` asks.
refreshIntervalSeconds?: number;
onProgress?: RefreshProgressCallback;
// The bounded request pools (issue #45), shared by the ML-data fetch (the
@@ -566,13 +570,16 @@ export class Library {
// Back up every in-scope file to `opts.downloadDirectory`, or else the
// library's, each original at its save path, with a durable failure
// ledger (issue #51). Waits for a completed refresh first, as `fresh()`
// does, joining one already running, and rejects before touching any file
// when it fails. Then puts pending originals at their save paths as
// `Photo.download()` does (and optional thumbnails) through the content
// cache and pools, waits for an ML data fetch, and rebuilds the derived
// symlink/JSON views from the model, each file's JSON with its ML data,
// beside an `account.json` with the account's email and user ID.
// ledger (issue #51). Takes the lock in that directory first, unless
// `opts.lockHeld` says the caller holds it, failing at once while another
// backup of it runs (see `runBackup`). Waits for a
// completed refresh, as `fresh()` does, joining one already running, and
// rejects before touching any file but the lock when it fails. Then puts
// pending originals at their save paths as `Photo.download()` does (and
// optional thumbnails) through the content cache and pools, waits for an
// ML data fetch, and rebuilds the derived symlink/JSON views from the
// model, each file's JSON with its ML data, beside an `account.json` with
// the account's email and user ID.
// Throws before any network work when no content cache backs the
// originals it must fetch.
backup(opts?: BackupOptions): Promise<BackupResult> {
@@ -594,6 +601,7 @@ export class Library {
refresh: () => this.refreshNow(),
listCollections: () => this.store.listCollections(),
listFiles: (id) => this.store.listFiles(id),
undecryptable: () => this.store.listUndecryptable(),
original: (fileID, destination) =>
cache!.backupOriginal(fileID, destination),
thumbnail: (fileID) => cache!.thumbnail(fileID),
@@ -623,7 +631,8 @@ export class Library {
}
private scheduleNext(): void {
if (this.closed) return;
// `setTimeout` would turn an infinite delay into 1 ms.
if (this.closed || this.intervalMs === Infinity) return;
this.timer = setTimeout(() => {
void this.runRefresh().then(() => this.scheduleNext());
}, this.intervalMs);
@@ -695,7 +704,10 @@ export class Library {
// Fetch every change since the stored cursor, then commit. All network
// reads happen before any store mutation, so a fetch that throws leaves the
// store untouched and the previous snapshot intact.
// store untouched and the previous snapshot intact. A collection or file
// that does not decrypt is left out instead, as if deleted, with the reason
// kept in the store: the cursor moves past it, so no later refresh sees it
// again until the server's copy changes.
private async refreshOnce(): Promise<void> {
const page = await this.client.collectionsSince({
sinceTime: this.store.collectionsSinceTime,
@@ -732,9 +744,17 @@ export class Library {
this.store.deleteCollection(id);
changed = true;
}
if (this.store.deleteUndecryptable(id)) changed = true;
}
// A collection left out takes its files with it.
for (const { id, error } of page.undecryptable ?? []) {
this.store.deleteCollection(id);
this.store.putUndecryptable({ collectionID: id, error });
changed = true;
}
for (const collection of page.collections) {
this.store.putCollection(collection);
this.store.deleteUndecryptable(collection.id);
changed = true;
}
@@ -744,9 +764,22 @@ export class Library {
this.store.deleteFile(collectionID, id);
changed = true;
}
if (this.store.deleteUndecryptable(collectionID, id)) {
changed = true;
}
}
for (const { id, error } of filePage.undecryptable ?? []) {
this.store.deleteFile(collectionID, id);
this.store.putUndecryptable({
collectionID,
fileID: id,
error,
});
changed = true;
}
for (const f of filePage.files) {
this.store.putFile(f);
this.store.deleteUndecryptable(collectionID, f.id);
changed = true;
}
}
+50 -5
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@
//
// The store keeps one `metadata.json` file holding the account's server
// state: the user id, a schema version, the cursor for the incremental
// collections listing, and the decrypted collection and file records. The
// whole file is read into RAM on load and rewritten as a whole on save; there
// is no partial update and no lock file. A separate refresh unit populates the
// store from the server — this module only stores what it is given.
// collections listing, the decrypted collection and file records, and the
// collections and files the refresh could not decrypt. The whole file is read
// into RAM on load and rewritten as a whole on save; there is no partial
// update and no lock file. A separate refresh unit populates the store from
// the server — this module only stores what it is given.
//
// The file is a cache, so it is never trusted to exist or to be intact: a
// missing or unreadable file loads as an empty store rather than an error, and
@@ -33,12 +34,22 @@ const FILE_MODE = 0o600;
type StoredCollection = Omit<Collection, "key"> & { key: string };
type StoredFile = Omit<EnteFile, "key"> & { key: string };
// A collection, or with `fileID` a file in it, that the last refresh to fetch
// it could not decrypt or parse, and why. It is kept until a later refresh
// fetches it again, because a refresh fetches only what changed.
export interface Undecryptable {
collectionID: number;
fileID?: number;
error: string;
}
interface StoredMetadata {
schemaVersion: number;
userID: number;
collectionsSinceTime: Microseconds;
collections: StoredCollection[];
files: StoredFile[];
undecryptable: Undecryptable[];
}
const encodeKey = (key: Uint8Array): string =>
@@ -67,6 +78,7 @@ export class MetadataStore {
private readonly collections = new Map<number, Collection>();
private readonly files = new Map<string, EnteFile>();
private undecryptable: Undecryptable[] = [];
private constructor(path: string) {
this.path = path;
@@ -107,6 +119,12 @@ export class MetadataStore {
};
store.files.set(fileKey(file.collectionID, file.id), file);
}
for (const record of parsed.undecryptable) {
if (typeof record.collectionID !== "number") {
throw new Error("damaged record of what did not decrypt");
}
store.undecryptable.push(record);
}
} catch {
// Any corruption discards the partial result: a half-read cache is
// worse than an empty one, since the refresh unit will rebuild it.
@@ -134,6 +152,7 @@ export class MetadataStore {
...f,
key: encodeKey(f.key),
})),
undecryptable: this.undecryptable,
};
const dir = dirname(this.path);
@@ -165,7 +184,8 @@ export class MetadataStore {
this.collections.set(collection.id, collection);
}
// Removing a collection also drops its file memberships: a file record is
// Removing a collection also drops its file memberships, and any record
// that it or one of its files could not be decrypted: a file record is
// only meaningful as part of a collection the cache still knows about.
deleteCollection(id: number): void {
this.collections.delete(id);
@@ -174,6 +194,9 @@ export class MetadataStore {
this.files.delete(key);
}
}
this.undecryptable = this.undecryptable.filter(
(record) => record.collectionID !== id,
);
}
getFile(collectionID: number, fileID: number): EnteFile | undefined {
@@ -205,4 +228,26 @@ export class MetadataStore {
deleteFile(collectionID: number, fileID: number): void {
this.files.delete(fileKey(collectionID, fileID));
}
listUndecryptable(): Undecryptable[] {
return [...this.undecryptable];
}
// Replaces any earlier record of the same collection or file.
putUndecryptable(record: Undecryptable): void {
this.deleteUndecryptable(record.collectionID, record.fileID);
this.undecryptable.push(record);
}
// Forgets the record of the collection, or with `fileID` of that file in
// it. Returns whether there was one.
deleteUndecryptable(collectionID: number, fileID?: number): boolean {
const before = this.undecryptable.length;
this.undecryptable = this.undecryptable.filter(
(record) =>
record.collectionID !== collectionID ||
record.fileID !== fileID,
);
return this.undecryptable.length < before;
}
}
+635
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,635 @@
/**
* `quak backup`, end to end.
*
* Each test runs the command as cron runs it: `backupCommand` reads the
* session file that logging in saved, opens the library on the real `Client`
* and backs the whole account up into a directory, and `run` turns the outcome
* into the exit code, as `bin/quak.ts` does. Only the server is a stand-in:
* `buildMetaFetch` from `test/ente-server.ts` answers the Ente HTTP API from
* data this file encrypts with libsodium, as Ente's clients encrypt it. So
* quak's own code fetches each original, decrypts it, checks it against the
* hash its uploader recorded and unpacks a live photo, and quak's own retries
* repeat a failed request.
*
* The account, user 42, has three albums:
*
* Trips its own: beach.jpg
* Family its own: beach.jpg and the live photo IMG_0002.HEIC
* Friend's Wedding shared with it by user 99: toast.mp4
*
* beach.jpg is one file in two albums. It holds EXIF (a Canon EOS R5), and
* Ente has ML data for it. All three files were taken at noon on 1 March 2024.
*/
import {
existsSync,
lstatSync,
mkdtempSync,
readdirSync,
readFileSync,
readlinkSync,
rmSync,
writeFileSync,
} from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { Writable } from "node:stream";
import { gzipSync } from "node:zlib";
import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers-sumo";
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
backupCommand,
saveSession,
type CliContext,
} from "../../src/cli-commands.js";
import { run } from "../../src/cli-run.js";
import { loadSession } from "../../src/cli-session.js";
import { Client } from "../../src/client.js";
import { init, toBase64 } from "../../src/crypto/index.js";
import { UNATTENDED_RETRY_OPTIONS } from "../../src/retry.js";
import {
buildAccount,
buildMetaFetch,
encryptSecretbox,
encryptStreamBlob,
} from "../ente-server.js";
import { HEIC_WITH_EXIF } from "../exif-heic.js";
import { JPEG_WITH_EXIF } from "../exif-jpeg.js";
import { blake2b, livePhotoHash, livePhotoZip, VIDEO } from "../live-photo.js";
const EMAIL = "backup@example.com";
const PASSWORD = "backup-password";
// The fake server logs every account in as user 42.
const USER_ID = 42;
const FRIEND_ID = 99;
// Noon on 1 March 2024 in the time zone of the machine running the test, the
// one quak dates save paths in, in microseconds, as Ente records times.
const TAKEN = new Date(2024, 2, 1, 12).getTime() * 1000;
// The date folder every original is saved in.
const DAY = "2024/2024-03/2024-03-01";
const TOAST = new TextEncoder().encode("a few seconds of the wedding toast");
// Ente's ML data for beach.jpg: a face it found, and the photo's CLIP
// embedding.
const ML_DATA = {
face: { faces: [{ faceID: "100_1", score: 0.98 }] },
clip: { embedding: [0.5, 0.6, 0.7] },
};
// Each file's ID, its owner, its original as uploaded, and the metadata its
// uploader recorded. `fileType` is Ente's number for the kind: 0 an image, 1 a
// video, 2 a live photo, whose original is a ZIP of its image and its video.
// `hash` is the content hash a download must match.
const BEACH = {
id: 100,
ownerID: USER_ID,
original: JPEG_WITH_EXIF,
metadata: {
title: "beach.jpg",
fileType: 0,
hash: blake2b(JPEG_WITH_EXIF),
},
};
const TOAST_VIDEO = {
id: 200,
ownerID: FRIEND_ID,
original: TOAST,
metadata: { title: "toast.mp4", fileType: 1, hash: blake2b(TOAST) },
};
const LIVE_PHOTO = {
id: 300,
ownerID: USER_ID,
original: livePhotoZip({
"image.heic": HEIC_WITH_EXIF,
"video.mov": VIDEO,
}),
metadata: {
title: "IMG_0002.HEIC",
fileType: 2,
hash: livePhotoHash(HEIC_WITH_EXIF, VIDEO),
},
};
// The fake Ente server, as the `fetch` quak sends its requests through.
let server: typeof globalThis.fetch;
let root: string;
let sessionDir: string;
// The fake server, holding the account encrypted as Ente's clients upload it.
const buildServer = async () => {
const account = await buildAccount(PASSWORD);
// An album as `/collections/v2` lists it, its name encrypted with its own
// key. An album of the account's own carries that key encrypted with the
// master key; an album shared with it carries the key sealed to its public
// key, and no nonce.
const album = (id: number, name: string, ownerID: number) => {
const key = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const encryptedName = encryptSecretbox(
new TextEncoder().encode(name),
key,
);
let keyFields: { encryptedKey: string; keyDecryptionNonce?: string };
if (ownerID === USER_ID) {
const encryptedKey = encryptSecretbox(key, account.masterKey);
keyFields = {
encryptedKey: toBase64(encryptedKey.ciphertext),
keyDecryptionNonce: toBase64(encryptedKey.nonce),
};
} else {
const sealedKey = sodium.crypto_box_seal(key, account.publicKey);
keyFields = { encryptedKey: toBase64(sealedKey) };
}
const row = {
id,
owner: { id: ownerID },
...keyFields,
encryptedName: toBase64(encryptedName.ciphertext),
nameDecryptionNonce: toBase64(encryptedName.nonce),
type: "album",
updationTime: TAKEN,
};
return { key, row };
};
const trips = album(10, "Trips", USER_ID);
const family = album(20, "Family", USER_ID);
const wedding = album(30, "Friend's Wedding", FRIEND_ID);
// Each file's original is encrypted with the file's own key, as one
// secretstream, which the server serves whole.
const encrypted = (file: typeof BEACH) => {
const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
return { file, key, content: encryptStreamBlob(file.original, key) };
};
const beach = encrypted(BEACH);
const toast = encrypted(TOAST_VIDEO);
const livePhoto = encrypted(LIVE_PHOTO);
// A file as an album's `/collections/v2/diff` lists it: its key encrypted
// with the album's key, its metadata encrypted with its own key, and the
// header that starts the decryption of its original.
const inAlbum = (
{ file, key, content }: ReturnType<typeof encrypted>,
collectionID: number,
albumKey: Uint8Array,
) => {
const encryptedKey = encryptSecretbox(key, albumKey);
const metadata = encryptStreamBlob(
new TextEncoder().encode(
JSON.stringify({
...file.metadata,
creationTime: TAKEN,
modificationTime: TAKEN,
}),
),
key,
);
return {
id: file.id,
collectionID,
ownerID: file.ownerID,
encryptedKey: toBase64(encryptedKey.ciphertext),
keyDecryptionNonce: toBase64(encryptedKey.nonce),
metadata: {
encryptedData: toBase64(metadata.ciphertext),
decryptionHeader: toBase64(metadata.header),
},
file: { decryptionHeader: toBase64(content.header) },
thumbnail: {
decryptionHeader: toBase64(sodium.randombytes_buf(24)),
},
updationTime: TAKEN,
};
};
// ML data is gzipped JSON, encrypted with the file's key.
const mlData = encryptStreamBlob(
gzipSync(JSON.stringify(ML_DATA)),
beach.key,
);
return buildMetaFetch({
verifier: account.verifier,
srpAttributes: account.srpAttributes,
keyAttributes: account.keyAttributes,
encryptedToken: account.encryptedToken,
collections: [trips.row, family.row, wedding.row],
filesByCollection: {
10: [inAlbum(beach, 10, trips.key)],
20: [
inAlbum(beach, 20, family.key),
inAlbum(livePhoto, 20, family.key),
],
30: [inAlbum(toast, 30, wedding.key)],
},
encryptedMLData: {
100: {
encryptedData: toBase64(mlData.ciphertext),
decryptionHeader: toBase64(mlData.header),
},
},
fileCiphertexts: {
100: beach.content.ciphertext,
200: toast.content.ciphertext,
300: livePhoto.content.ciphertext,
},
});
};
beforeAll(async () => {
await init();
await sodium.ready;
root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "quak-backup-end-to-end-"));
server = await buildServer();
// Log in once, as `quak login` does: the session file it saves is what
// every backup below reads.
sessionDir = join(root, "session");
const client = await Client.login({
email: EMAIL,
password: PASSWORD,
apiOptions: { fetch: server },
});
saveSession(sessionDir, client.toJSON());
});
afterAll(() => {
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
// Run `quak backup <dir>` as `bin/quak.ts` runs it, sending its requests
// through `fetch`, and return its exit code and everything it printed on
// stderr. Its requests are retried as those of `quak backup` are, except that
// a retry does not wait. Its cache is beside `dir`, so each run of one
// directory finds the cache the run before it left, as cron's runs find the
// user's.
const backup = async (
dir: string,
opts: { verify?: boolean } = {},
fetch = server,
): Promise<{ code: number; stderr: string }> => {
let printed = "";
const stderr = new Writable({
write(chunk: Buffer, _encoding, done) {
printed += chunk.toString();
done();
},
});
const stdout = new Writable({
write(_chunk, _encoding, done) {
done();
},
});
// A backup never prompts: any of these ends the run with exit 1.
const prompted = async (): Promise<never> => {
throw new Error("quak backup prompted");
};
const ctx: CliContext = {
stdout,
stderr,
sessionDir,
cacheDir: `${dir}-cache`,
loadSession: (path) =>
loadSession(path, {
fetch,
retry: { ...UNATTENDED_RETRY_OPTIONS, sleep: async () => {} },
}),
login: prompted,
prompt: prompted,
promptSecret: prompted,
};
const code = await new Promise<number>((resolve) => {
void run(backupCommand(ctx, dir, opts), stdout, stderr, resolve);
});
return { code, stderr: printed };
};
// The ID of the file whose original a request downloads, or undefined for any
// other request. quak downloads an original from
// `https://files.ente.io/?fileID=<id>`.
const downloadOf = (input: RequestInfo | URL): number | undefined => {
const url = new URL(String(input));
return url.hostname === "files.ente.io"
? Number(url.searchParams.get("fileID"))
: undefined;
};
// The fake server, pushing onto `downloads` the ID of each file whose original
// is downloaded.
const recordingDownloads =
(downloads: number[]): typeof globalThis.fetch =>
async (input, init) => {
const fileID = downloadOf(input);
if (fileID !== undefined) downloads.push(fileID);
return server(input, init);
};
// Every entry under `dir`, relative to it, sorted, a symlink as
// `name -> target`.
const listTree = (dir: string): string[] =>
readdirSync(dir, { recursive: true })
.sort()
.map((name) => {
const path = join(dir, name);
return lstatSync(path).isSymbolicLink()
? `${name} -> ${readlinkSync(path)}`
: name;
});
const readJSON = (path: string) => JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf-8"));
describe("the first backup of the account", () => {
let dir: string;
let code: number;
const downloads: number[] = [];
beforeAll(async () => {
dir = mkdtempSync(join(root, "backup-"));
({ code } = await backup(dir, {}, recordingDownloads(downloads)));
});
it("exits 0, having downloaded each file once", () => {
expect(code).toBe(0);
// beach.jpg is in two albums but is downloaded, and stored, once.
expect(downloads.sort()).toEqual([100, 200, 300]);
});
// The tree "Backup layout" in the README describes. Each original is at
// its save path, `YYYY/YYYY-MM/YYYY-MM-DD/YYYY-MM-DD.<fileID>.<ext>`, with
// the extension of its title; the live photo is its image and its video,
// each with the extension it had inside the ZIP, and a `.livephoto.json`
// naming the two. Beside each original is its JSON. Each album is a
// folder of links named after the files' titles, with a JSON file beside
// it. No file failed, so there is no `failures.json`, and the run removed
// its lock, `backup.lock`, as it ended.
it("lays the backup out as the README describes", () => {
expect(listTree(dir)).toEqual([
"2024",
"2024/2024-03",
"2024/2024-03/2024-03-01",
"2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.100.jpg",
"2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.100.json",
"2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.200.json",
"2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.200.mp4",
"2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.300.heic",
"2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.300.json",
"2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.300.livephoto.json",
"2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.300.mov",
"account.json",
"collections",
"collections/Family",
"collections/Family.json",
"collections/Family/IMG_0002.heic -> ../../2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.300.heic",
"collections/Family/IMG_0002.mov -> ../../2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.300.mov",
"collections/Family/beach.jpg -> ../../2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.100.jpg",
"collections/Friend's Wedding",
"collections/Friend's Wedding.json",
"collections/Friend's Wedding/toast.mp4 -> ../../2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.200.mp4",
"collections/Trips",
"collections/Trips.json",
"collections/Trips/beach.jpg -> ../../2024/2024-03/2024-03-01/2024-03-01.100.jpg",
]);
});
it("stores each original decrypted, a live photo as its image and its video", () => {
const day = join(dir, DAY);
expect(readFileSync(join(day, "2024-03-01.100.jpg"))).toEqual(
Buffer.from(JPEG_WITH_EXIF),
);
expect(readFileSync(join(day, "2024-03-01.200.mp4"))).toEqual(
Buffer.from(TOAST),
);
expect(readFileSync(join(day, "2024-03-01.300.heic"))).toEqual(
Buffer.from(HEIC_WITH_EXIF),
);
expect(readFileSync(join(day, "2024-03-01.300.mov"))).toEqual(
Buffer.from(VIDEO),
);
expect(readJSON(join(day, "2024-03-01.300.livephoto.json"))).toEqual({
image: "2024-03-01.300.heic",
video: "2024-03-01.300.mov",
});
});
// A file's JSON holds what Ente records for it, decrypted, and what quak
// read from its original: its ML data when Ente has any, and, for an
// image, its EXIF. A video gets no image metadata.
it("writes each file's JSON with its ML data and image metadata", () => {
const day = join(dir, DAY);
const beach = readJSON(join(day, "2024-03-01.100.json"));
expect(beach).toMatchObject({
id: 100,
ownerID: USER_ID,
metadata: {
title: "beach.jpg",
fileType: "image",
creationTime: TAKEN,
hash: BEACH.metadata.hash,
},
updationTime: TAKEN,
});
expect(beach.mlData).toEqual(ML_DATA);
expect(beach.imageMetadata.exif.Make.description).toBe("Canon");
expect(beach.imageMetadata.exif.Model.description).toBe("EOS R5");
const toast = readJSON(join(day, "2024-03-01.200.json"));
expect(toast).toMatchObject({
id: 200,
ownerID: FRIEND_ID,
metadata: { title: "toast.mp4", fileType: "video" },
});
expect(toast).not.toHaveProperty("mlData");
expect(toast).not.toHaveProperty("imageMetadata");
expect(toast).not.toHaveProperty("imageMetadataError");
// A live photo's image metadata is read from its image.
const livePhoto = readJSON(join(day, "2024-03-01.300.json"));
expect(livePhoto).toMatchObject({
id: 300,
ownerID: USER_ID,
metadata: {
title: "IMG_0002.HEIC",
fileType: "livePhoto",
hash: LIVE_PHOTO.metadata.hash,
},
});
expect(livePhoto.imageMetadata.exif.Make.description).toBe("Canon");
});
it("writes each album's JSON and the account's", () => {
const albumJSON = (name: string) =>
readJSON(join(dir, "collections", `${name}.json`));
const fileIDs = (album: { files: { id: number }[] }) =>
album.files.map((f) => f.id);
const trips = albumJSON("Trips");
expect(trips).toMatchObject({
id: 10,
name: "Trips",
type: "album",
ownerID: USER_ID,
isShared: false,
updationTime: TAKEN,
});
expect(fileIDs(trips)).toEqual([100]);
const family = albumJSON("Family");
expect(family).toMatchObject({ id: 20, isShared: false });
expect(fileIDs(family)).toEqual([100, 300]);
const wedding = albumJSON("Friend's Wedding");
expect(wedding).toMatchObject({
id: 30,
ownerID: FRIEND_ID,
isShared: true,
});
expect(fileIDs(wedding)).toEqual([200]);
expect(readJSON(join(dir, "account.json"))).toEqual({
email: EMAIL,
userID: USER_ID,
});
});
});
describe("quak backup", () => {
// An original already at its save path is complete, so a later run, such
// as the next night's from cron, only rewrites the JSON files and the
// album links.
it("downloads nothing on a second run, and exits 0", async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(root, "backup-"));
expect((await backup(dir)).code).toBe(0);
const firstTree = listTree(dir);
const downloads: number[] = [];
const { code } = await backup(dir, {}, recordingDownloads(downloads));
expect(code).toBe(0);
expect(downloads).toEqual([]);
expect(listTree(dir)).toEqual(firstTree);
});
// The files CDN is briefly unavailable for toast.mp4: its first two
// downloads answer 503. A 5xx is worth repeating, so quak tries again,
// here without waiting, and the third download succeeds.
it("stores a file whose download fails twice with 503 and then succeeds, and exits 0", async () => {
let attempts = 0;
const fetch: typeof globalThis.fetch = async (input, init) => {
if (downloadOf(input) === 200 && ++attempts <= 2) {
return new Response("unavailable", { status: 503 });
}
return server(input, init);
};
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(root, "backup-"));
const { code } = await backup(dir, {}, fetch);
expect(code).toBe(0);
expect(attempts).toBe(3);
expect(readFileSync(join(dir, DAY, "2024-03-01.200.mp4"))).toEqual(
Buffer.from(TOAST),
);
expect(existsSync(join(dir, "failures.json"))).toBe(false);
});
// The server answers 404 for toast.mp4 on every try. A 404 is an answer,
// not a hiccup, so quak does not repeat it: the file goes into
// `failures.json` with the kind of failure, how many times it has been
// tried and why, the backup goes on with the other files, and the exit
// code is 1, so the next run tries again.
it("records a file whose download always answers 404 in failures.json, stores the rest, and exits 1", async () => {
let attempts = 0;
const fetch: typeof globalThis.fetch = async (input, init) => {
if (downloadOf(input) === 200) {
attempts++;
return new Response("not found", { status: 404 });
}
return server(input, init);
};
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(root, "backup-"));
const { code, stderr } = await backup(dir, {}, fetch);
expect(code).toBe(1);
expect(attempts).toBe(1);
const failures = readJSON(join(dir, "failures.json"));
expect(Object.keys(failures.files)).toEqual(["200"]);
expect(failures.files["200"]).toMatchObject({
fileID: 200,
title: "toast.mp4",
classification: "permanent",
attempts: 1,
});
expect(failures.files["200"].error).toContain("404");
expect(stderr).toContain("[Friend's Wedding] toast.mp4 (id 200): ");
// The rest of the account is backed up; the video is not, and its
// album folder has no link to it.
expect(readFileSync(join(dir, DAY, "2024-03-01.100.jpg"))).toEqual(
Buffer.from(JPEG_WITH_EXIF),
);
expect(readFileSync(join(dir, DAY, "2024-03-01.300.heic"))).toEqual(
Buffer.from(HEIC_WITH_EXIF),
);
expect(existsSync(join(dir, DAY, "2024-03-01.200.mp4"))).toBe(false);
expect(
readdirSync(join(dir, "collections", "Friend's Wedding")),
).toEqual([]);
});
// The server no longer accepts the saved session's token, as after
// `quak logout` elsewhere, and answers every request with 401. The run
// stops at the refresh it starts with, says to log in again, and exits 3.
// It took its lock first, so every request was sent while the lock was
// there, and it removed the lock as it ended: the directory is left as it
// was, empty.
it("exits 3 when the refresh is answered with 401, writing nothing but the lock", async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(root, "backup-"));
const lockAtEachRequest: boolean[] = [];
const fetch: typeof globalThis.fetch = async () => {
lockAtEachRequest.push(existsSync(join(dir, "backup.lock")));
return new Response(null, { status: 401 });
};
const { code, stderr } = await backup(dir, {}, fetch);
expect(code).toBe(3);
expect(stderr).toBe(
"Starting backup...\n" +
"Refreshing library...\n" +
`quak: the saved session is no longer valid; run "quak login"\n`,
);
expect(lockAtEachRequest).not.toHaveLength(0);
expect(lockAtEachRequest).not.toContain(false);
expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual([]);
});
// Something changed beach.jpg on disk after it was backed up. A run with
// --verify hashes every stored original, finds that one no longer matches
// the hash Ente recorded, says so, and downloads it again; it put back the
// right bytes, so the exit code is 0.
it("--verify puts back an original that changed on disk, and exits 0", async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(root, "backup-"));
expect((await backup(dir)).code).toBe(0);
const beach = join(dir, DAY, "2024-03-01.100.jpg");
writeFileSync(beach, "not the photo any more");
const downloads: number[] = [];
const { code, stderr } = await backup(
dir,
{ verify: true },
recordingDownloads(downloads),
);
expect(code).toBe(0);
expect(downloads).toEqual([100]);
expect(readFileSync(beach)).toEqual(Buffer.from(JPEG_WITH_EXIF));
expect(stderr).toContain(
"MISMATCH original beach.jpg (100): its bytes do not match its content hash",
);
expect(stderr).toContain(" Verified: 2\n Mismatched: 1\n");
});
});
+554
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,554 @@
/**
* `quak backup` over an account holding an album or a file quak cannot decrypt
* (issue 181).
*
* The server sends every album and file encrypted, and a refresh decrypts each
* one it fetches. A record whose key no key of the account opens, or whose
* metadata is not JSON, must not fail the refresh: a refresh that fails commits
* nothing, so `quak backup` would store nothing, on every run, until the
* server's copy changed. Instead the refresh leaves that record out, and the
* library keeps a list of what it left out in its cache. It has to: the next
* refresh asks the server only for what changed since the last one, so it will
* not see the record again.
*
* The backup stores every other file. It records each file it could not
* decrypt in `failures.json`, prints one line for each album it could not
* decrypt, and exits 1 while any remain. Once the server sends a copy that
* decrypts, or deletes the record, the next run drops it and can exit 0. The
* read commands answer from what did decrypt.
*
* These tests run the commands with a real saved session over a stand-in Ente
* server, which serves albums, files and originals encrypted with libsodium as
* the real server does. A record is broken the way a corrupt one arrives: its
* key replaced by bytes no key opens, or its metadata text that is not JSON.
*/
import {
existsSync,
mkdtempSync,
readdirSync,
readFileSync,
rmSync,
} from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers-sumo";
import { afterEach, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
backupCommand,
collectionsCommand,
filesCommand,
saveSession,
type CliContext,
} from "../../src/cli-commands.js";
import { loadSession } from "../../src/cli-session.js";
import { Client, type ClientSnapshot } from "../../src/client.js";
import { encryptBlob, init, toBase64 } from "../../src/crypto/index.js";
import { Library } from "../../src/library/index.js";
const USER_ID = 42;
// Every file is taken at noon local time on 2026-03-01, in microseconds as Ente
// stores times, so its original is saved in the folder `DAY` whatever the time
// zone of the machine running the tests.
const TAKEN = new Date(2026, 2, 1, 12).getTime() * 1000;
const DAY = join("2026", "2026-03", "2026-03-01");
type Row = { id: number; updationTime: number } & Record<string, unknown>;
// `plaintext` sealed under `key` with a fresh nonce, both base64, as Ente
// sends a key or an album name.
const secretbox = (
plaintext: Uint8Array,
key: Uint8Array,
): { ciphertext: string; nonce: string } => {
const nonce = sodium.randombytes_buf(sodium.crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES);
return {
ciphertext: toBase64(
sodium.crypto_secretbox_easy(plaintext, nonce, key),
),
nonce: toBase64(nonce),
};
};
// What a corrupt row carries in place of its sealed key: random bytes of the
// same length, which no key opens.
const corruptKey = (): string =>
toBase64(
sodium.randombytes_buf(
sodium.crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES + sodium.crypto_secretbox_MACBYTES,
),
);
const json = (body: unknown): Response =>
new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
status: 200,
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
});
// A stand-in Ente server for one account. It holds each album, and each file in
// an album, as the row `/collections/v2` and `/collections/v2/diff` serve, and
// answers a request with the rows whose `updationTime` is past the request's
// `sinceTime`, as the real server does. A change to a file also moves its
// album's `updationTime`, which is what tells a client to list the album's
// files again. Originals are served by file ID, as the files CDN serves them.
class FakeEnte {
private readonly masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
private readonly keyPair = sodium.crypto_box_keypair();
private readonly albums = new Map<number, Row>();
private readonly albumKeys = new Map<number, Uint8Array>();
// Each album's file rows, by album ID and then file ID.
private readonly files = new Map<number, Map<number, Row>>();
// Each file's key and its original as served, by file ID. A file in two
// albums is one original under one key, sealed under each album's key.
private readonly originals = new Map<
number,
{ key: Uint8Array; header: string; body: Uint8Array }
>();
// The session `quak login` would have saved for the account.
snapshot(): ClientSnapshot {
return {
email: "user@example.com",
userID: USER_ID,
token: "token",
masterKey: toBase64(this.masterKey),
secretKey: toBase64(this.keyPair.privateKey),
publicKey: toBase64(this.keyPair.publicKey),
};
}
// Album `id`, named `name`, as of time `t`. With `corrupt`, its key cannot
// be decrypted. An album keeps its key from one call to the next, so its
// files' rows still decrypt once it is put back without `corrupt`.
putAlbum(id: number, name: string, t: number, corrupt = false): void {
const key = this.albumKeys.get(id) ?? sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
this.albumKeys.set(id, key);
const sealedKey = secretbox(key, this.masterKey);
const sealedName = secretbox(new TextEncoder().encode(name), key);
this.albums.set(id, {
id,
owner: { id: USER_ID },
encryptedKey: corrupt ? corruptKey() : sealedKey.ciphertext,
keyDecryptionNonce: sealedKey.nonce,
encryptedName: sealedName.ciphertext,
nameDecryptionNonce: sealedName.nonce,
type: "album",
updationTime: t,
});
if (!this.files.has(id)) this.files.set(id, new Map());
}
// File `id`, titled `photo-<id>.jpg`, in album `albumID` as of time `t`.
// With `corruptKey`, its key cannot be decrypted. With `metadata`, its
// metadata decrypts to that text instead of the JSON a client uploads.
putFile(
albumID: number,
id: number,
t: number,
opts: { corruptKey?: boolean; metadata?: string } = {},
): void {
const original = this.originalOf(id);
const sealedKey = secretbox(original.key, this.albumKeys.get(albumID)!);
const metadata =
opts.metadata ??
JSON.stringify({
title: `photo-${id}.jpg`,
fileType: 0,
creationTime: TAKEN,
modificationTime: TAKEN,
});
const sealedMetadata = encryptBlob(
new TextEncoder().encode(metadata),
original.key,
);
this.files.get(albumID)!.set(id, {
id,
collectionID: albumID,
ownerID: USER_ID,
encryptedKey: opts.corruptKey ? corruptKey() : sealedKey.ciphertext,
keyDecryptionNonce: sealedKey.nonce,
metadata: {
encryptedData: toBase64(sealedMetadata.ciphertext),
decryptionHeader: toBase64(sealedMetadata.header),
},
file: { decryptionHeader: original.header },
thumbnail: { decryptionHeader: original.header },
updationTime: t,
});
this.moveAlbum(albumID, t);
}
// A deleted record stays on the server as a tombstone holding only its
// ID, its time and `isDeleted`.
deleteFile(albumID: number, id: number, t: number): void {
this.files
.get(albumID)!
.set(id, { id, updationTime: t, isDeleted: true });
this.moveAlbum(albumID, t);
}
deleteAlbum(id: number, t: number): void {
this.albums.set(id, { id, updationTime: t, isDeleted: true });
}
// The `fetch` the saved session's client is given.
readonly fetch = (async (input: string | URL | Request) => {
const url = new URL(input instanceof Request ? input.url : input);
const since = Number(url.searchParams.get("sinceTime"));
const changed = (rows: Iterable<Row>): Row[] =>
[...rows].filter((row) => row.updationTime > since);
switch (url.pathname) {
case "/collections/v2":
return json({ collections: changed(this.albums.values()) });
case "/collections/v2/diff": {
const albumID = Number(url.searchParams.get("collectionID"));
const rows = this.files.get(albumID)?.values() ?? [];
return json({ diff: changed(rows), hasMore: false });
}
case "/files/data/fetch":
// No file has ML data.
return json({ data: [] });
default: {
const fileID = Number(url.searchParams.get("fileID"));
const original = this.originals.get(fileID);
return original
? new Response(original.body)
: new Response("not found", { status: 404 });
}
}
}) as typeof globalThis.fetch;
private originalOf(id: number): {
key: Uint8Array;
header: string;
body: Uint8Array;
} {
const known = this.originals.get(id);
if (known) return known;
const key = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const { header, ciphertext } = encryptBlob(
new TextEncoder().encode(`original of ${id}`),
key,
);
const original = { key, header: toBase64(header), body: ciphertext };
this.originals.set(id, original);
return original;
}
private moveAlbum(albumID: number, t: number): void {
this.albums.set(albumID, {
...this.albums.get(albumID)!,
updationTime: t,
});
}
}
// Album 1, "Trip", holds file 10, which decrypts, file 11, whose key does not,
// and file 12, whose metadata is not JSON. Album 2, "Family", holds file 20,
// but the album's own key does not decrypt. All of it as of time 1.
const brokenAccount = (): FakeEnte => {
const ente = new FakeEnte();
ente.putAlbum(1, "Trip", 1);
ente.putFile(1, 10, 1);
ente.putFile(1, 11, 1, { corruptKey: true });
ente.putFile(1, 12, 1, { metadata: "not json" });
ente.putAlbum(2, "Family", 1, true);
ente.putFile(2, 20, 1);
return ente;
};
// Album 1, "Trip", holds file 10, and album 2, "Family", holds file 20. Both
// files decrypt, but album 2's own key does not, so the album is the only
// record left out. All of it as of time 1.
const brokenAlbumAccount = (): FakeEnte => {
const ente = new FakeEnte();
ente.putAlbum(1, "Trip", 1);
ente.putFile(1, 10, 1);
ente.putAlbum(2, "Family", 1, true);
ente.putFile(2, 20, 1);
return ente;
};
// Collects everything written to it.
class Output {
text = "";
write(text: string): void {
this.text += text;
}
}
let root: string;
let stdout: Output;
let stderr: Output;
beforeAll(async () => {
await init();
await sodium.ready;
});
beforeEach(() => {
root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "quak-undecryptable-"));
});
afterEach(() => {
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
// A context for one command, with fresh output, whose saved session talks to
// `ente`. Every run shares one cache directory, as runs of `quak` do.
const context = (ente: FakeEnte): CliContext => {
stdout = new Output();
stderr = new Output();
saveSession(join(root, "session"), ente.snapshot());
return {
stdout,
stderr,
sessionDir: join(root, "session"),
cacheDir: join(root, "cache"),
loadSession: (path) =>
loadSession(path, { fetch: ente.fetch, retry: { attempts: 1 } }),
login: async () => {
throw new Error("login not expected");
},
prompt: async () => {
throw new Error("prompt not expected");
},
promptSecret: async () => {
throw new Error("prompt not expected");
},
};
};
const backupDir = (): string => join(root, "backup");
// Runs `quak backup` into the backup directory and returns its exit code.
const backup = (ente: FakeEnte, opts: { json?: boolean } = {}) =>
backupCommand(context(ente), backupDir(), opts);
// The backup's `failures.json` entries by file ID, or {} when it has none.
const failures = (): Record<string, { error: string; attempts: number }> => {
const path = join(backupDir(), "failures.json");
return existsSync(path)
? JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf-8")).files
: {};
};
// Whether file `id`'s original is at its save path in the backup.
const stored = (id: number): boolean =>
existsSync(join(backupDir(), DAY, `2026-03-01.${id}.jpg`));
// The IDs of the files that album `name`'s JSON lists.
const albumFiles = (name: string): number[] =>
JSON.parse(
readFileSync(join(backupDir(), "collections", `${name}.json`), "utf-8"),
).files.map((f: { id: number }) => f.id);
describe("quak backup with records it cannot decrypt", () => {
it("backs up every other file, records each file it cannot decrypt in failures.json, names each such album, and exits 1", async () => {
expect(await backup(brokenAccount())).toBe(1);
expect(stored(10)).toBe(true);
// Without its album's key, file 20 cannot even be listed.
expect(stored(20)).toBe(false);
expect(failures()).toEqual({
"11": expect.objectContaining({
fileID: 11,
error: expect.stringMatching(
/^could not be decrypted: .*wrong secret key/,
),
}),
"12": expect.objectContaining({
fileID: 12,
error: expect.stringMatching(/^could not be decrypted: .*JSON/),
}),
});
expect(stderr.text).toMatch(
/^FAILED album 2: could not be decrypted: .*wrong secret key/m,
);
expect(stderr.text).toContain(" Failed: 2\n");
});
it("names each album it cannot decrypt in the --json result", async () => {
expect(await backup(brokenAccount(), { json: true })).toBe(1);
expect(JSON.parse(stdout.text)).toMatchObject({
downloaded: 1,
failed: 2,
undecryptableAlbums: [2],
});
});
it("still reports them on the next run, though the server does not send them again", async () => {
const ente = brokenAccount();
await backup(ente);
// Nothing changed on the server, so this run's refresh gets no rows at
// all. What it reports, it remembered from the first run.
expect(await backup(ente)).toBe(1);
expect(Object.keys(failures())).toEqual(["11", "12"]);
expect(failures()["11"]!.attempts).toBe(2);
expect(stderr.text).toMatch(/^FAILED album 2: could not be decrypted/m);
});
it("drops each once the server sends a copy that decrypts, and then exits 0", async () => {
const ente = brokenAccount();
await backup(ente);
// At time 2 files 11 and 12 and album 2 change on the server, and now
// each decrypts. Album 2 brings file 20 with it.
ente.putFile(1, 11, 2);
ente.putFile(1, 12, 2);
ente.putAlbum(2, "Family", 2);
expect(await backup(ente)).toBe(0);
expect([11, 12, 20].map(stored)).toEqual([true, true, true]);
expect(existsSync(join(backupDir(), "failures.json"))).toBe(false);
expect(stderr.text).not.toContain("FAILED");
});
it("drops each once the server deletes it, and then exits 0", async () => {
const ente = brokenAccount();
await backup(ente);
ente.deleteFile(1, 11, 2);
ente.deleteFile(1, 12, 2);
ente.deleteAlbum(2, 2);
expect(await backup(ente)).toBe(0);
expect(existsSync(join(backupDir(), "failures.json"))).toBe(false);
expect(stderr.text).not.toContain("FAILED");
});
it("exits 1 when the only record it cannot decrypt is an album, and 0 once the album decrypts", async () => {
const ente = brokenAlbumAccount();
// No file is in `failures.json`: the album alone keeps the exit code
// at 1.
expect(await backup(ente)).toBe(1);
expect(failures()).toEqual({});
ente.putAlbum(2, "Family", 2);
expect(await backup(ente)).toBe(0);
expect(stored(20)).toBe(true);
});
it("exits 1 when the only record it cannot decrypt is an album, and 0 once the album is deleted", async () => {
const ente = brokenAlbumAccount();
expect(await backup(ente)).toBe(1);
expect(failures()).toEqual({});
ente.deleteAlbum(2, 2);
expect(await backup(ente)).toBe(0);
});
it("removes what an earlier run linked for an album or a file that no longer decrypts, and keeps the originals", async () => {
// At time 1 everything decrypts: the first run links files 10 and 11
// in Trip and file 20 in Family.
const ente = new FakeEnte();
ente.putAlbum(1, "Trip", 1);
ente.putFile(1, 10, 1);
ente.putFile(1, 11, 1);
ente.putAlbum(2, "Family", 1);
ente.putFile(2, 20, 1);
expect(await backup(ente)).toBe(0);
const collections = join(backupDir(), "collections");
expect(readdirSync(join(collections, "Trip")).sort()).toEqual([
"photo-10.jpg",
"photo-11.jpg",
]);
expect(readdirSync(join(collections, "Family"))).toEqual([
"photo-20.jpg",
]);
// At time 2 the server's copy of file 11 in Trip, and album 2 itself,
// no longer decrypt. A run builds the album folders, their JSON and
// their links from what the library holds, so it removes them as if
// the album and the file had been deleted: Family's folder and JSON
// go, and Trip neither links nor lists file 11. The originals stay at
// their save paths, and the run exits 1.
ente.putFile(1, 11, 2, { corruptKey: true });
ente.putAlbum(2, "Family", 2, true);
expect(await backup(ente)).toBe(1);
expect(readdirSync(collections).sort()).toEqual(["Trip", "Trip.json"]);
expect(readdirSync(join(collections, "Trip"))).toEqual([
"photo-10.jpg",
]);
expect(albumFiles("Trip")).toEqual([10]);
expect([10, 11, 20].map(stored)).toEqual([true, true, true]);
expect(Object.keys(failures())).toEqual(["11"]);
});
it("backs up a file that does not decrypt in one album but does in another, and does not report it", async () => {
// File 30 is in albums 1 and 3, each holding its key sealed under the
// album's own key. In album 1 that is corrupt; in album 3 it is not,
// and one copy that decrypts is all the backup needs.
const ente = new FakeEnte();
ente.putAlbum(1, "Trip", 1);
ente.putFile(1, 30, 1, { corruptKey: true });
ente.putAlbum(3, "Favorites", 1);
ente.putFile(3, 30, 1);
expect(await backup(ente)).toBe(0);
expect(stored(30)).toBe(true);
expect(failures()).toEqual({});
// Album 1 has no copy of file 30 that decrypts, so it neither links
// the original nor lists the file; album 3 lists it.
expect(readdirSync(join(backupDir(), "collections", "Trip"))).toEqual(
[],
);
expect(albumFiles("Trip")).toEqual([]);
expect(albumFiles("Favorites")).toEqual([30]);
});
it("backs up that file in a run limited to the album where it does not decrypt", async () => {
// The same account, backed up by `lib.backup()` limited to album 1,
// "Trip", as `quak backup` cannot be. File 30 is in Trip, so the run
// must store it, from its copy in album 3 that the run otherwise
// skips.
const ente = new FakeEnte();
ente.putAlbum(1, "Trip", 1);
ente.putFile(1, 30, 1, { corruptKey: true });
ente.putAlbum(3, "Favorites", 1);
ente.putFile(3, 30, 1);
const lib = await Library.open({
client: Client.fromJSON(ente.snapshot(), {
fetch: ente.fetch,
retry: { attempts: 1 },
}),
downloadDirectory: backupDir(),
cacheDirectory: join(root, "cache"),
precacheThumbnails: false,
precacheOriginals: false,
});
try {
const result = await lib.backup({
downloadDirectory: backupDir(),
onlyAlbumNames: ["Trip"],
});
expect(result).toMatchObject({ downloaded: 1, failed: 0 });
} finally {
await lib.close();
}
expect(stored(30)).toBe(true);
expect(failures()).toEqual({});
});
});
describe("the read commands with records quak cannot decrypt", () => {
it("quak collections and quak files answer from what decrypts", async () => {
const ente = brokenAccount();
expect(await collectionsCommand(context(ente), {})).toBe(0);
expect(stdout.text).toBe("1\talbum\tTrip\n");
expect(await filesCommand(context(ente), { collection: "1" })).toBe(0);
expect(stdout.text).toBe("10\timage\tphoto-10.jpg\n");
});
});
+77 -1
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ import {
readlinkSync,
rmSync,
symlinkSync,
utimesSync,
writeFileSync,
} from "node:fs";
import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
@@ -831,7 +832,81 @@ describe("the refresh before a backup", () => {
);
expect(source.originalCalls).toBe(0);
expect(existsSync(outDir)).toBe(false);
// The backup made the directory for its lock, and removed the lock.
expect(readdirSync(outDir)).toEqual([]);
await lib.close();
});
});
describe("the backup lock", () => {
const lockPath = (outDir: string): string => join(outDir, "backup.lock");
it("refuses a second backup of the directory while one runs", async () => {
await fillCache();
const client = new HeldClient();
const lib = await openLibrary(stubSource(), client);
const outDir = join(root, "backup");
// The first backup holds the lock once it starts its refresh, which
// `HeldClient` keeps from finishing.
let refreshing!: () => void;
const started = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
refreshing = resolve;
});
const first = lib.backup({
downloadDirectory: outDir,
onProgress: (msg) => {
if (msg === "Refreshing library...") refreshing();
},
});
await started;
await expect(lib.backup({ downloadDirectory: outDir })).rejects.toThrow(
`another backup of ${outDir} is running`,
);
client.release();
expect((await first).failed).toBe(0);
await lib.close();
});
it("releases the lock after a backup succeeds", async () => {
const lib = await openLibrary(stubSource());
const outDir = join(root, "backup");
await lib.backup({ downloadDirectory: outDir });
expect(existsSync(lockPath(outDir))).toBe(false);
// So the next backup of the directory runs.
expect((await lib.backup({ downloadDirectory: outDir })).skipped).toBe(
3,
);
await lib.close();
});
it("releases the lock after a backup fails", async () => {
const lib = await openLibrary(stubSource(), new FailingClient());
const outDir = join(root, "backup");
await expect(lib.backup({ downloadDirectory: outDir })).rejects.toThrow(
"HTTP 401 from server",
);
expect(existsSync(lockPath(outDir))).toBe(false);
await lib.close();
});
it("takes over a lock left by a run that was killed", async () => {
const outDir = join(root, "backup");
// A killed run's lock, last touched a minute ago.
mkdirSync(lockPath(outDir), { recursive: true });
const minuteAgo = new Date(Date.now() - 60_000);
utimesSync(lockPath(outDir), minuteAgo, minuteAgo);
const lib = await openLibrary(stubSource());
const result = await lib.backup({ downloadDirectory: outDir });
expect(result.downloaded).toBe(3);
expect(existsSync(lockPath(outDir))).toBe(false);
await lib.close();
});
});
@@ -1407,6 +1482,7 @@ describe("backup album folders", () => {
listCollections: () => albums.map((a) => a.collection),
listFiles: (id) =>
albums.find((a) => a.collection.id === id)?.files ?? [],
undecryptable: () => [],
original: async (fileID) => {
const path = join(root, `source-${fileID}`);
writeFileSync(path, `original ${fileID}`);
+304 -14
View File
@@ -18,12 +18,14 @@ import {
readFileSync,
rmSync,
statSync,
utimesSync,
writeFileSync,
} from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { PassThrough } from "node:stream";
import * as jpegJs from "jpeg-js";
import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers-sumo";
import {
describe,
it,
@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ import { loadSession } from "../../src/cli-session.js";
import type { Client, ClientSnapshot, LoginOptions } from "../../src/client.js";
import { savePath, type ContentSource } from "../../src/library/content.js";
import type { Collection, EnteFile } from "../../src/model/types.js";
import { init, toBase64 } from "../../src/crypto/index.js";
import { encryptBlob, init, toBase64 } from "../../src/crypto/index.js";
import { defaultCacheDirectory } from "../../src/library/index.js";
import { HEIC_WITH_EXIF } from "../exif-heic.js";
import {
@@ -510,11 +512,6 @@ describe("files", () => {
expect(await filesCommand(context(), { collection: "9" })).toBe(1);
expect(stderr.text).toBe("Collection 9 not found\n");
});
it("exits 1 for a collection ID that is not a number", async () => {
expect(await filesCommand(context(), { collection: "abc" })).toBe(1);
expect(stderr.text).toBe("Invalid collection ID\n");
});
});
describe("get and get-thumb", () => {
@@ -545,12 +542,6 @@ describe("get and get-thumb", () => {
expect(stderr.text).toBe("File 999 not found\n");
expect(existsSync(out)).toBe(false);
});
it("both exit 1 for a file ID that is not a number", async () => {
expect(await getCommand(context(), "abc", {})).toBe(1);
expect(await getThumbCommand(context(), "abc", {})).toBe(1);
expect(stderr.text).toBe("Invalid file ID\nInvalid file ID\n");
});
});
// A live photo, which Ente stores as one ZIP, is written as its image and its
@@ -704,6 +695,7 @@ describe("backup", () => {
" Failed: 0\n",
);
expect(stdout.text).toBe("");
expect(existsSync(join(dir, "backup.lock"))).toBe(false);
});
// The backup opens its library with the precache off: it fetches the
@@ -848,7 +840,7 @@ describe("backup", () => {
expect(code).toBe(1);
expect(runText).toBe("quak: HTTP 503 from server\n");
expect(stderr.text).toBe("Starting backup...\nRefreshing library...\n");
expect(existsSync(dir)).toBe(false);
expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual([]);
});
// A real saved session, read back by `loadSession`, whose server answers
@@ -879,7 +871,178 @@ describe("backup", () => {
`quak: the saved session is no longer valid; run "quak login"\n`,
);
expect(stderr.text).toBe("Starting backup...\nRefreshing library...\n");
expect(existsSync(dir)).toBe(false);
expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual([]);
});
it("exits 2 with one line naming the directory, sending no request, while another backup of it runs", async () => {
const dir = join(root, "backup");
// The lock another backup holds. Its modification time is set an hour
// ahead, so it stays current however long this test takes.
const lock = join(dir, "backup.lock");
mkdirSync(lock, { recursive: true });
const hourAhead = new Date(Date.now() + 3_600_000);
utimesSync(lock, hourAhead, hourAhead);
// A client whose refresh never finishes, so a run that started one
// before it exits would never return.
let requests = 0;
const never = (): Promise<never> => {
requests++;
return new Promise(() => {});
};
const client = {
...fakeClient(),
collectionsSince: never,
filesSince: never,
} as unknown as Client;
expect(await backupCommand(context(client), dir, {})).toBe(2);
expect(requests).toBe(0);
expect(stderr.text).toBe(
`Starting backup...\nquak: another backup of ${dir} is running\n`,
);
expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual(["backup.lock"]);
// Opening the library would have made its cache directory.
expect(existsSync(join(root, "cache"))).toBe(false);
});
// A backup runs for as long as its downloads take, hours on a large
// account. It lists its files from the refresh it waits for as it starts,
// so it must not ask the server for changes again on a timer while it
// runs: each refresh is a request, and each also starts a pass that asks
// again for the ML data of every file Ente holds none for.
//
// A saved session is read back by `loadSession`, its `fetch` a fake of the
// Ente HTTP API serving one album with one photo, encrypted as the server
// serves them. The fake holds the photo's download open while the clock
// moves on by two hours, then serves it. Only `setTimeout` and
// `clearTimeout` are faked: the library's refresh timer runs on them.
it("asks the server for changes only as it starts, however long it runs", async () => {
const masterKey = new Uint8Array(32).fill(1);
const albumKey = new Uint8Array(32).fill(2);
const photoKey = new Uint8Array(32).fill(3);
saveSession(join(root, "session"), {
email: "cli@example.com",
userID: USER_ID,
token: "token",
masterKey: toBase64(masterKey),
secretKey: toBase64(new Uint8Array(32)),
publicKey: toBase64(new Uint8Array(32)),
});
// A secretbox as the server sends one: ciphertext and nonce, base64.
const box = (plaintext: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array) => {
const nonce = sodium.randombytes_buf(
sodium.crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES,
);
return {
ciphertext: toBase64(
sodium.crypto_secretbox_easy(plaintext, nonce, key),
),
nonce: toBase64(nonce),
};
};
const albumKeyBox = box(albumKey, masterKey);
const albumName = box(new TextEncoder().encode("Vacation"), albumKey);
const photoKeyBox = box(photoKey, albumKey);
const metadata = encryptBlob(
new TextEncoder().encode(
JSON.stringify({
title: "beach.jpg",
fileType: 0,
creationTime: 1_700_000_000_000_000,
modificationTime: 1_700_000_000_000_000,
}),
),
photoKey,
);
const content = encryptBlob(
new TextEncoder().encode("the photo's bytes"),
photoKey,
);
const album = {
id: 1,
owner: { id: USER_ID },
encryptedKey: albumKeyBox.ciphertext,
keyDecryptionNonce: albumKeyBox.nonce,
encryptedName: albumName.ciphertext,
nameDecryptionNonce: albumName.nonce,
type: "album",
updationTime: 1,
};
const photo = {
id: 100,
collectionID: 1,
ownerID: USER_ID,
encryptedKey: photoKeyBox.ciphertext,
keyDecryptionNonce: photoKeyBox.nonce,
metadata: {
encryptedData: toBase64(metadata.ciphertext),
decryptionHeader: toBase64(metadata.header),
},
file: { decryptionHeader: toBase64(content.header) },
// The backup fetches no thumbnail.
thumbnail: { decryptionHeader: "" },
updationTime: 1,
};
// Each refresh starts with `collectionsSince`, which sends one
// `/collections/v2` request.
let refreshes = 0;
let downloadRequested!: () => void;
const requested = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
downloadRequested = resolve;
});
let releaseDownload!: () => void;
const released = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
releaseDownload = resolve;
});
const json = (body: unknown): Response =>
new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
});
const fetch = async (url: string | URL): Promise<Response> => {
const { hostname, pathname } = new URL(String(url));
if (hostname === "files.ente.io") {
downloadRequested();
await released;
return new Response(content.ciphertext);
}
if (pathname === "/collections/v2") {
refreshes++;
return json({ collections: [album] });
}
if (pathname === "/collections/v2/diff") {
return json({ diff: [photo], hasMore: false });
}
// Ente holds no ML data for the photo.
if (pathname === "/files/data/fetch") return json({ data: [] });
return new Response("not found", { status: 404 });
};
const ctx = {
...context(),
// The download's idle deadline is set past the two hours, or quak
// would give up the held download as stalled.
loadSession: (path: string) =>
loadSession(path, {
fetch: fetch as typeof globalThis.fetch,
downloadTimeoutMs: 3 * 3_600_000,
}),
};
vi.useFakeTimers({ toFake: ["setTimeout", "clearTimeout"] });
try {
const backup = backupCommand(ctx, join(root, "backup"), {});
await requested;
vi.advanceTimersByTime(2 * 3_600_000);
releaseDownload();
expect(await backup).toBe(0);
} finally {
vi.useRealTimers();
}
// Two refreshes, both before the download: the library opens onto the
// empty cache with one, and the backup waits for the other before it
// lists its files.
expect(refreshes).toBe(2);
});
});
@@ -1002,3 +1165,130 @@ describe("backup-metadata and the thumbnail helpers refresh first", () => {
expect(stdout.text).toBe("");
});
});
// `files --collection`, `get`, `get-thumb` and `helper fix-missing-thumbnails
// --file` take an ID only when it is written in decimal digits and is a safe
// integer. `Number()` alone reads `0x10` as 16, `1e3` as 1000 and an empty
// string as 0, so the command would act on a file the user never named.
// Anything else is refused with one line naming it, and exit 1, before any
// request.
//
// These run on a real client, read back from a saved session, over a fake Ente
// server holding an empty account, which records each request it receives. With
// a good ID the command goes on to ask the server, and finds nothing there.
describe("an ID given on the command line", () => {
const NOT_IDS = [
"0x10",
"1e3",
"1.5",
"-1",
"",
"abc",
// One past Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER: from here on a number cannot
// hold every integer, so two IDs could read as one.
"9007199254740992",
];
const requests: Request[] = [];
const emptyAccount = (): CliContext => {
const ctx = context();
const key = toBase64(new Uint8Array(32));
saveSession(ctx.sessionDir, {
email: "cli@example.com",
userID: USER_ID,
token: "token",
masterKey: key,
secretKey: key,
publicKey: key,
});
return {
...ctx,
loadSession: (path) =>
loadSession(path, {
fetch: async (url, init) => {
requests.push(new Request(url, init));
return new Response(
JSON.stringify({ collections: [] }),
{ headers: { "content-type": "application/json" } },
);
},
}),
};
};
beforeEach(() => {
requests.length = 0;
});
it("files looks up a decimal collection ID", async () => {
const ctx = emptyAccount();
expect(await filesCommand(ctx, { collection: "1" })).toBe(1);
expect(stderr.text).toBe("Collection 1 not found\n");
expect(requests).not.toHaveLength(0);
});
it.each(NOT_IDS)(
"files refuses --collection %j before any request",
async (arg) => {
const ctx = emptyAccount();
expect(await filesCommand(ctx, { collection: arg })).toBe(1);
expect(stderr.text).toBe(`Invalid collection ID: ${arg}\n`);
expect(stdout.text).toBe("");
expect(requests).toHaveLength(0);
},
);
it("get looks up a decimal file ID", async () => {
expect(await getCommand(emptyAccount(), "100", {})).toBe(1);
expect(stderr.text).toBe("File 100 not found\n");
expect(requests).not.toHaveLength(0);
});
it.each(NOT_IDS)("get refuses %j before any request", async (arg) => {
expect(await getCommand(emptyAccount(), arg, {})).toBe(1);
expect(stderr.text).toBe(`Invalid file ID: ${arg}\n`);
expect(stdout.text).toBe("");
expect(requests).toHaveLength(0);
});
it("get-thumb looks up a decimal file ID", async () => {
expect(await getThumbCommand(emptyAccount(), "100", {})).toBe(1);
expect(stderr.text).toBe("File 100 not found\n");
expect(requests).not.toHaveLength(0);
});
it.each(NOT_IDS)("get-thumb refuses %j before any request", async (arg) => {
expect(await getThumbCommand(emptyAccount(), arg, {})).toBe(1);
expect(stderr.text).toBe(`Invalid file ID: ${arg}\n`);
expect(stdout.text).toBe("");
expect(requests).toHaveLength(0);
});
// The fixer reports each file it was given; on this account neither is
// found, which is a failure, so it exits 1.
it("fix-missing-thumbnails looks up each decimal --file ID", async () => {
const ctx = emptyAccount();
const opts = { file: ["100", "200"], json: true };
expect(await fixMissingThumbnailsCommand(ctx, opts)).toBe(1);
expect(JSON.parse(stdout.text)).toMatchObject([
{ fileID: 100, reason: "file not found in any collection" },
{ fileID: 200, reason: "file not found in any collection" },
]);
expect(requests).not.toHaveLength(0);
});
// One bad ID fails the whole command, so the good one before it is not
// fixed either.
it.each(NOT_IDS)(
"fix-missing-thumbnails refuses --file 100 %j before any request",
async (arg) => {
const ctx = emptyAccount();
const opts = { file: ["100", arg] };
expect(await fixMissingThumbnailsCommand(ctx, opts)).toBe(1);
expect(stderr.text).toBe(`Invalid file ID: ${arg}\n`);
expect(stdout.text).toBe("");
expect(requests).toHaveLength(0);
},
);
});
+14 -173
View File
@@ -37,15 +37,8 @@ import {
import { join } from "node:path";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers-sumo";
import { SRP, SrpServer } from "fast-srp-hap";
import { beforeAll, afterAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import {
init,
toBase64,
deriveKEK,
deriveLoginSubkey,
encryptBlob,
} from "../../src/crypto/index.js";
import { init, toBase64, encryptBlob } from "../../src/crypto/index.js";
import * as jpegJs from "jpeg-js";
import { Client } from "../../src/client.js";
import { Library } from "../../src/library/index.js";
@@ -54,7 +47,13 @@ import {
type MetadataBackupOptions,
} from "../../src/metadata-backup.js";
import { backupMetadataCommand } from "../../src/cli-commands.js";
import type { KeyAttributes } from "../../src/auth/types.js";
import {
buildAccount,
buildMetaFetch,
encryptSecretbox,
encryptStreamBlob,
type MetaMockState,
} from "../ente-server.js";
// One file per ML data request, so the two files of the mock account are
// fetched in two requests and one of them can fail on its own.
@@ -65,80 +64,13 @@ vi.mock("../../src/mldata-fetch.js", async (importOriginal) => ({
const TEST_EMAIL = "metabackup@example.com";
const TEST_PASSWORD = "metapass";
const TEST_OPS = 2;
const TEST_MEM = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
interface MetaMockState {
verifier: Buffer;
srpAttributes: Record<string, unknown>;
keyAttributes: KeyAttributes;
encryptedToken: string;
collections: Record<string, unknown>[];
filesByCollection: Record<number, Record<string, unknown>[]>;
// For ML data and EXIF tests
encryptedMLData: Record<
number,
{ encryptedData: string; decryptionHeader: string }
>;
fileCiphertexts: Record<number, Uint8Array>;
}
let mock: MetaMockState;
let testDir: string;
const encryptSecretbox = (plaintext: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array) => {
const nonce = sodium.randombytes_buf(sodium.crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES);
const ciphertext = sodium.crypto_secretbox_easy(plaintext, nonce, key);
return { ciphertext, nonce };
};
const encryptStreamBlob = (plaintext: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array) => {
const push = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_push(key);
const ciphertext = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_push(
push.state,
plaintext,
null,
sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_TAG_FINAL,
);
return { ciphertext, header: push.header };
};
const buildMetaMock = async (): Promise<MetaMockState> => {
const kekSalt = sodium.randombytes_buf(sodium.crypto_pwhash_SALTBYTES);
const kek = await deriveKEK(TEST_PASSWORD, kekSalt, TEST_OPS, TEST_MEM);
const loginSubKeyBytes = deriveLoginSubkey(kek);
const srpUserID = "meta-srp";
const srpSalt = sodium.randombytes_buf(16);
const verifier = SRP.computeVerifier(
SRP.params["4096"],
Buffer.from(srpSalt),
Buffer.from(srpUserID),
Buffer.from(loginSubKeyBytes),
);
const masterKey = sodium.randombytes_buf(32);
const { ciphertext: encMK, nonce: mkNonce } = encryptSecretbox(
masterKey,
kek,
);
const kp = sodium.crypto_box_keypair();
const { ciphertext: encSK, nonce: skNonce } = encryptSecretbox(
kp.privateKey,
masterKey,
);
const tokenBytes = sodium.randombytes_buf(32);
const encToken = sodium.crypto_box_seal(tokenBytes, kp.publicKey);
const keyAttributes: KeyAttributes = {
kekSalt: toBase64(kekSalt),
encryptedKey: toBase64(encMK),
keyDecryptionNonce: toBase64(mkNonce),
publicKey: toBase64(kp.publicKey),
encryptedSecretKey: toBase64(encSK),
secretKeyDecryptionNonce: toBase64(skNonce),
memLimit: TEST_MEM,
opsLimit: TEST_OPS,
};
const account = await buildAccount(TEST_PASSWORD);
const masterKey = account.masterKey;
// Collection 1: "Vacation" with collection-level pubMagicMetadata
const ck1 = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
@@ -332,17 +264,10 @@ const buildMetaMock = async (): Promise<MetaMockState> => {
rawFile1.file.decryptionHeader = toBase64(filePush1.header);
return {
verifier,
srpAttributes: {
srpUserID,
srpSalt: toBase64(srpSalt),
memLimit: TEST_MEM,
opsLimit: TEST_OPS,
kekSalt: toBase64(kekSalt),
isEmailMFAEnabled: false,
},
keyAttributes,
encryptedToken: toBase64(encToken),
verifier: account.verifier,
srpAttributes: account.srpAttributes,
keyAttributes: account.keyAttributes,
encryptedToken: account.encryptedToken,
collections: [rawColl1, rawColl2],
filesByCollection: { 10: [rawFile1], 20: [rawFile2] },
encryptedMLData: {
@@ -355,90 +280,6 @@ const buildMetaMock = async (): Promise<MetaMockState> => {
};
};
// `failMLDataFor`: answer 500 to every ML data request that asks for this file.
const buildMetaFetch = (m: MetaMockState, failMLDataFor?: number) => {
let srpServer: SrpServer;
return (async (
input: RequestInfo | URL,
init?: RequestInit,
): Promise<Response> => {
const url =
typeof input === "string"
? input
: input instanceof URL
? input.href
: input.url;
const path = new URL(url).pathname;
const json = (body: unknown) =>
new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
status: 200,
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
});
if (path === "/users/srp/attributes")
return json({ attributes: m.srpAttributes });
if (path === "/users/srp/create-session") {
const body = JSON.parse(init?.body as string);
const serverKey = await SRP.genKey();
srpServer = new SrpServer(
SRP.params["4096"],
m.verifier,
serverKey,
);
const B = srpServer.computeB();
srpServer.setA(Buffer.from(body.srpA, "base64"));
return json({ sessionID: "s1", srpB: B.toString("base64") });
}
if (path === "/users/srp/verify-session") {
const body = JSON.parse(init?.body as string);
srpServer.checkM1(Buffer.from(body.srpM1, "base64"));
return json({
srpM2: srpServer.computeM2().toString("base64"),
id: 42,
keyAttributes: m.keyAttributes,
encryptedToken: m.encryptedToken,
});
}
if (path === "/collections/v2")
return json({ collections: m.collections });
if (path === "/collections/v2/diff") {
const collID = Number(
new URL(url).searchParams.get("collectionID"),
);
return json({
diff: m.filesByCollection[collID] ?? [],
hasMore: false,
});
}
if (path === "/files/data/fetch") {
const body = JSON.parse(init?.body as string);
if ((body.fileIDs as number[]).includes(failMLDataFor!))
return new Response("server error", { status: 500 });
const data = (body.fileIDs as number[])
.filter((id: number) => m.encryptedMLData[id])
.map((id: number) => ({
fileID: id,
...m.encryptedMLData[id],
updatedAt: 1700000000000000,
}));
return json({ data });
}
if (
url.includes("files.ente.io") ||
path.startsWith("/files/download/")
) {
const parsed = new URL(url);
const fileID = Number(
parsed.searchParams.get("fileID") ?? path.split("/").pop(),
);
const ct = m.fileCiphertexts[fileID];
if (ct) return new Response(ct, { status: 200 });
return new Response("not found", { status: 404 });
}
return new Response("not found", { status: 404 });
}) as typeof globalThis.fetch;
};
beforeAll(async () => {
await init();
await sodium.ready;
+126 -10
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@
* The return shape keeps live records and tombstones apart — `collections` /
* `files` are decrypted live records, `deleted` is a plain list of the ids the
* server tombstoned. A tombstone carries no decryptable key or metadata, so it
* is a bare id rather than a hollowed-out `Collection` / `EnteFile`.
* is a bare id rather than a hollowed-out `Collection` / `EnteFile`. A live row
* that does not decrypt, or whose metadata is not JSON, is listed under
* `undecryptable` with the reason, so one bad row does not fail the call.
*
* All tests inject a fake `fetch` and drive a real `Client` (built with
* `Client.fromJSON`) so the decryption path runs for real. Live rows are built
@@ -91,27 +93,38 @@ const ownedCollectionRow = (
};
};
/** A live file row inside a collection, keyed under that collection's key. */
/**
* A live file row inside a collection, keyed under that collection's key. Its
* metadata decrypts to `metadata` when given, otherwise to the JSON a client
* uploads for `title`.
*/
const fileRow = (
collectionKey: Uint8Array,
opts: { id: number; title: string; updationTime: number },
opts: {
id: number;
title: string;
updationTime: number;
metadata?: string;
},
): Record<string, unknown> => {
const fileKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const { ciphertext: encFileKey, nonce: fileKeyNonce } = secretboxEncrypt(
fileKey,
collectionKey,
);
const metadata = {
title: opts.title,
fileType: 0,
creationTime: opts.updationTime,
modificationTime: opts.updationTime,
};
const metadata =
opts.metadata ??
JSON.stringify({
title: opts.title,
fileType: 0,
creationTime: opts.updationTime,
modificationTime: opts.updationTime,
});
const push =
sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_push(fileKey);
const encMeta = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_push(
push.state,
new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(metadata)),
new TextEncoder().encode(metadata),
null,
sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_TAG_FINAL,
);
@@ -131,6 +144,21 @@ const fileRow = (
};
};
/**
* `row` with its sealed key replaced by random bytes of the same length, as a
* corrupt row arrives: no key opens it, so the row cannot be decrypted.
*/
const withCorruptKey = (
row: Record<string, unknown>,
): Record<string, unknown> => ({
...row,
encryptedKey: toBase64(
sodium.randombytes_buf(
sodium.crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES + sodium.crypto_secretbox_MACBYTES,
),
),
});
/** A tombstone row. Never decrypted, so only these fields are ever read. */
const tombstoneRow = (
id: number,
@@ -278,6 +306,58 @@ describe("Client.filesSince", () => {
// It gave up after the first page rather than looping.
expect(sinceTimes).toEqual(["50"]);
});
it("leaves out each file it cannot decrypt or parse, with the reason, and decrypts the rest", async () => {
const keys = buildKeys();
const collectionKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
// File 1002's key is sealed under no key quak holds, and file 1003's
// metadata decrypts to text that is not JSON. Neither may cost the
// caller file 1001: each is left out of `files` and reported under
// `undecryptable` with the reason instead of failing the call.
const { fetch } = recordingFetch(
jsonResponse({
diff: [
fileRow(collectionKey, {
id: 1001,
title: "fine.jpg",
updationTime: 100,
}),
withCorruptKey(
fileRow(collectionKey, {
id: 1002,
title: "bad-key.jpg",
updationTime: 200,
}),
),
fileRow(collectionKey, {
id: 1003,
title: "bad-metadata.jpg",
updationTime: 300,
metadata: "not json",
}),
],
hasMore: false,
}),
);
const client = Client.fromJSON(snapshotFor(keys), { fetch });
const { files, undecryptable, cursor } = await client.filesSince({
collectionID: 1,
collectionKey,
sinceTime: 0,
});
expect(files.map((f) => f.id)).toEqual([1001]);
expect(undecryptable).toEqual([
{ id: 1002, error: expect.stringContaining("wrong secret key") },
{ id: 1003, error: expect.stringContaining("JSON") },
]);
// The cursor moves past the two left out, as past any other row, so
// the server does not send them again until its copy changes. The
// caller has to keep what it was told here.
expect(cursor).toBe(300);
});
});
describe("Client.collectionsSince", () => {
@@ -331,6 +411,42 @@ describe("Client.collectionsSince", () => {
expect(result.cursor).toBe(150);
expect(sinceTimes).toEqual(["150"]);
});
it("leaves out an album it cannot decrypt, with the reason, and decrypts the rest", async () => {
const keys = buildKeys();
// Album 2's key is sealed under no key quak holds. Without its key
// neither its name nor its files can be read, so it is left out and
// reported under `undecryptable`; album 1 is unaffected.
const { fetch } = recordingFetch(
jsonResponse({
collections: [
ownedCollectionRow(keys.masterKey, {
id: 1,
name: "Vacation",
updationTime: 100,
}),
withCorruptKey(
ownedCollectionRow(keys.masterKey, {
id: 2,
name: "Broken",
updationTime: 200,
}),
),
],
}),
);
const client = Client.fromJSON(snapshotFor(keys), { fetch });
const { collections, undecryptable, cursor } =
await client.collectionsSince({ sinceTime: 0 });
expect(collections.map((c) => c.name)).toEqual(["Vacation"]);
expect(undecryptable).toEqual([
{ id: 2, error: expect.stringContaining("wrong secret key") },
]);
expect(cursor).toBe(200);
});
});
describe("Client list wrappers still hide deletions", () => {
+197
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
/**
* A fake of the Ente HTTP API, for tests that run quak's real `Client` against
* a server.
*
* `buildMetaFetch` is a `fetch` that answers the requests quak makes, from a
* `MetaMockState` the test builds: the SRP login, `/collections/v2`, each
* collection's `/collections/v2/diff`, the ML data of `/files/data/fetch`, and
* each file's content from the files CDN, a 404 for a file it holds none for.
* The test encrypts everything in that state with libsodium, as Ente's clients
* do, so quak decrypts it with its own code. Nothing hits the network.
*
* `buildAccount` builds what the server holds to log an account in, and the
* keys a test encrypts that account's collections with. Call `init()` from
* `src/crypto` and await `sodium.ready` before using either.
*/
import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers-sumo";
import { SRP, SrpServer } from "fast-srp-hap";
import { toBase64, deriveKEK, deriveLoginSubkey } from "../src/crypto/index.js";
import type { KeyAttributes } from "../src/auth/types.js";
const TEST_OPS = 2;
const TEST_MEM = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
export interface MetaMockState {
verifier: Buffer;
srpAttributes: Record<string, unknown>;
keyAttributes: KeyAttributes;
encryptedToken: string;
collections: Record<string, unknown>[];
filesByCollection: Record<number, Record<string, unknown>[]>;
// For ML data and EXIF tests
encryptedMLData: Record<
number,
{ encryptedData: string; decryptionHeader: string }
>;
fileCiphertexts: Record<number, Uint8Array>;
}
export const encryptSecretbox = (plaintext: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array) => {
const nonce = sodium.randombytes_buf(sodium.crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES);
const ciphertext = sodium.crypto_secretbox_easy(plaintext, nonce, key);
return { ciphertext, nonce };
};
export const encryptStreamBlob = (plaintext: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array) => {
const push = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_push(key);
const ciphertext = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_push(
push.state,
plaintext,
null,
sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_TAG_FINAL,
);
return { ciphertext, header: push.header };
};
// An account whose password is `password`. The first four fields are those of
// `MetaMockState`; with the master key the test encrypts the keys of the
// account's own collections, and to the public key it seals the keys of the
// collections other accounts share with it.
export const buildAccount = async (password: string) => {
const kekSalt = sodium.randombytes_buf(sodium.crypto_pwhash_SALTBYTES);
const kek = await deriveKEK(password, kekSalt, TEST_OPS, TEST_MEM);
const loginSubKeyBytes = deriveLoginSubkey(kek);
const srpUserID = "meta-srp";
const srpSalt = sodium.randombytes_buf(16);
const verifier = SRP.computeVerifier(
SRP.params["4096"],
Buffer.from(srpSalt),
Buffer.from(srpUserID),
Buffer.from(loginSubKeyBytes),
);
const masterKey = sodium.randombytes_buf(32);
const { ciphertext: encMK, nonce: mkNonce } = encryptSecretbox(
masterKey,
kek,
);
const kp = sodium.crypto_box_keypair();
const { ciphertext: encSK, nonce: skNonce } = encryptSecretbox(
kp.privateKey,
masterKey,
);
const tokenBytes = sodium.randombytes_buf(32);
const encToken = sodium.crypto_box_seal(tokenBytes, kp.publicKey);
const keyAttributes: KeyAttributes = {
kekSalt: toBase64(kekSalt),
encryptedKey: toBase64(encMK),
keyDecryptionNonce: toBase64(mkNonce),
publicKey: toBase64(kp.publicKey),
encryptedSecretKey: toBase64(encSK),
secretKeyDecryptionNonce: toBase64(skNonce),
memLimit: TEST_MEM,
opsLimit: TEST_OPS,
};
return {
verifier,
srpAttributes: {
srpUserID,
srpSalt: toBase64(srpSalt),
memLimit: TEST_MEM,
opsLimit: TEST_OPS,
kekSalt: toBase64(kekSalt),
isEmailMFAEnabled: false,
},
keyAttributes,
encryptedToken: toBase64(encToken),
masterKey,
publicKey: kp.publicKey,
};
};
// `failMLDataFor`: answer 500 to every ML data request that asks for this file.
export const buildMetaFetch = (m: MetaMockState, failMLDataFor?: number) => {
let srpServer: SrpServer;
return (async (
input: RequestInfo | URL,
init?: RequestInit,
): Promise<Response> => {
const url =
typeof input === "string"
? input
: input instanceof URL
? input.href
: input.url;
const path = new URL(url).pathname;
const json = (body: unknown) =>
new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
status: 200,
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
});
if (path === "/users/srp/attributes")
return json({ attributes: m.srpAttributes });
if (path === "/users/srp/create-session") {
const body = JSON.parse(init?.body as string);
const serverKey = await SRP.genKey();
srpServer = new SrpServer(
SRP.params["4096"],
m.verifier,
serverKey,
);
const B = srpServer.computeB();
srpServer.setA(Buffer.from(body.srpA, "base64"));
return json({ sessionID: "s1", srpB: B.toString("base64") });
}
if (path === "/users/srp/verify-session") {
const body = JSON.parse(init?.body as string);
srpServer.checkM1(Buffer.from(body.srpM1, "base64"));
return json({
srpM2: srpServer.computeM2().toString("base64"),
id: 42,
keyAttributes: m.keyAttributes,
encryptedToken: m.encryptedToken,
});
}
if (path === "/collections/v2")
return json({ collections: m.collections });
if (path === "/collections/v2/diff") {
const collID = Number(
new URL(url).searchParams.get("collectionID"),
);
return json({
diff: m.filesByCollection[collID] ?? [],
hasMore: false,
});
}
if (path === "/files/data/fetch") {
const body = JSON.parse(init?.body as string);
if ((body.fileIDs as number[]).includes(failMLDataFor!))
return new Response("server error", { status: 500 });
const data = (body.fileIDs as number[])
.filter((id: number) => m.encryptedMLData[id])
.map((id: number) => ({
fileID: id,
...m.encryptedMLData[id],
updatedAt: 1700000000000000,
}));
return json({ data });
}
if (
url.includes("files.ente.io") ||
path.startsWith("/files/download/")
) {
const parsed = new URL(url);
const fileID = Number(
parsed.searchParams.get("fileID") ?? path.split("/").pop(),
);
const ct = m.fileCiphertexts[fileID];
if (ct) return new Response(ct, { status: 200 });
return new Response("not found", { status: 404 });
}
return new Response("not found", { status: 404 });
}) as typeof globalThis.fetch;
};
+23
View File
@@ -172,6 +172,29 @@ describe("MetadataStore", () => {
expect(store.listCollections()).toEqual([]);
});
it("loads an empty store when the list of what the refresh could not decrypt is damaged", async () => {
// A backup reads that list on every run, so a damaged one that loaded
// would fail every backup until the cache was deleted. A string is
// damaged too, though JavaScript can loop over its characters.
mkdirSync(join(dir, "cache"), { recursive: true });
for (const undecryptable of [{}, "not a list", [1]]) {
writeFileSync(
path,
JSON.stringify({
schemaVersion: METADATA_SCHEMA_VERSION,
userID: 42,
collectionsSinceTime: 0,
collections: [],
files: [],
undecryptable,
}),
);
const store = await MetadataStore.load(path);
expect(store.userID).toBe(0);
expect(store.listUndecryptable()).toEqual([]);
}
});
it("creates the directory 0700 and the file 0600", async () => {
const store = await MetadataStore.load(path);
store.putCollection(sampleCollection());
+36
View File
@@ -535,6 +535,18 @@
dependencies:
undici-types "~6.21.0"
"@types/proper-lockfile@4.1.4":
version "4.1.4"
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/@types/proper-lockfile/-/proper-lockfile-4.1.4.tgz#cd9fab92bdb04730c1ada542c356f03620f84008"
integrity sha512-uo2ABllncSqg9F1D4nugVl9v93RmjxF6LJzQLMLDdPaXCUIDPeOJ21Gbqi43xNKzBi/WQ0Q0dICqufzQbMjipQ==
dependencies:
"@types/retry" "*"
"@types/retry@*":
version "0.12.5"
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/@types/retry/-/retry-0.12.5.tgz#f090ff4bd8d2e5b940ff270ab39fd5ca1834a07e"
integrity sha512-3xSjTp3v03X/lSQLkczaN9UIEwJMoMCA1+Nb5HfbJEQWogdeQIyVtTvxPXDQjZ5zws8rFQfVfRdz03ARihPJgw==
"@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin@8.46.2":
version "8.46.2"
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin/-/eslint-plugin-8.46.2.tgz#dc4ab93ee3d7e6c8e38820a0d6c7c93c7183e2dc"
@@ -1140,6 +1152,11 @@ globals@^14.0.0:
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/globals/-/globals-14.0.0.tgz#898d7413c29babcf6bafe56fcadded858ada724e"
integrity sha512-oahGvuMGQlPw/ivIYBjVSrWAfWLBeku5tpPE2fOPLi+WHffIWbuh2tCjhyQhTBPMf5E9jDEH4FOmTYgYwbKwtQ==
graceful-fs@^4.2.4:
version "4.2.11"
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/graceful-fs/-/graceful-fs-4.2.11.tgz#4183e4e8bf08bb6e05bbb2f7d2e0c8f712ca40e3"
integrity sha512-RbJ5/jmFcNNCcDV5o9eTnBLJ/HszWV0P73bc+Ff4nS/rJj+YaS6IGyiOL0VoBYX+l1Wrl3k63h/KrH+nhJ0XvQ==
graphemer@^1.4.0:
version "1.4.0"
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/graphemer/-/graphemer-1.4.0.tgz#fb2f1d55e0e3a1849aeffc90c4fa0dd53a0e66c6"
@@ -1414,6 +1431,15 @@ prettier@3.8.1:
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/prettier/-/prettier-3.8.1.tgz#edf48977cf991558f4fcbd8a3ba6015ba2a3a173"
integrity sha512-UOnG6LftzbdaHZcKoPFtOcCKztrQ57WkHDeRD9t/PTQtmT0NHSeWWepj6pS0z/N7+08BHFDQVUrfmfMRcZwbMg==
proper-lockfile@4.1.2:
version "4.1.2"
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/proper-lockfile/-/proper-lockfile-4.1.2.tgz#c8b9de2af6b2f1601067f98e01ac66baa223141f"
integrity sha512-TjNPblN4BwAWMXU8s9AEz4JmQxnD1NNL7bNOY/AKUzyamc379FWASUhc/K1pL2noVb+XmZKLL68cjzLsiOAMaA==
dependencies:
graceful-fs "^4.2.4"
retry "^0.12.0"
signal-exit "^3.0.2"
punycode@^2.1.0:
version "2.3.1"
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/punycode/-/punycode-2.3.1.tgz#027422e2faec0b25e1549c3e1bd8309b9133b6e5"
@@ -1429,6 +1455,11 @@ resolve-from@^4.0.0:
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/resolve-from/-/resolve-from-4.0.0.tgz#4abcd852ad32dd7baabfe9b40e00a36db5f392e6"
integrity sha512-pb/MYmXstAkysRFx8piNI1tGFNQIFA3vkE3Gq4EuA1dF6gHp/+vgZqsCGJapvy8N3Q+4o7FwvquPJcnZ7RYy4g==
retry@^0.12.0:
version "0.12.0"
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/retry/-/retry-0.12.0.tgz#1b42a6266a21f07421d1b0b54b7dc167b01c013b"
integrity sha512-9LkiTwjUh6rT555DtE9rTX+BKByPfrMzEAtnlEtdEwr3Nkffwiihqe2bWADg+OQRjt9gl6ICdmB/ZFDCGAtSow==
reusify@^1.0.4:
version "1.1.0"
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/reusify/-/reusify-1.1.0.tgz#0fe13b9522e1473f51b558ee796e08f11f9b489f"
@@ -1502,6 +1533,11 @@ siginfo@^2.0.0:
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/siginfo/-/siginfo-2.0.0.tgz#32e76c70b79724e3bb567cb9d543eb858ccfaf30"
integrity sha512-ybx0WO1/8bSBLEWXZvEd7gMW3Sn3JFlW3TvX1nREbDLRNQNaeNN8WK0meBwPdAaOI7TtRRRJn/Es1zhrrCHu7g==
signal-exit@^3.0.2:
version "3.0.7"
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/signal-exit/-/signal-exit-3.0.7.tgz#a9a1767f8af84155114eaabd73f99273c8f59ad9"
integrity sha512-wnD2ZE+l+SPC/uoS0vXeE9L1+0wuaMqKlfz9AMUo38JsyLSBWSFcHR1Rri62LZc12vLr1gb3jl7iwQhgwpAbGQ==
signal-exit@^4.1.0:
version "4.1.0"
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/signal-exit/-/signal-exit-4.1.0.tgz#952188c1cbd546070e2dd20d0f41c0ae0530cb04"