Files
netwatch/backend/internal/middleware/middleware_test.go
T
sneak 911dfbb825
check / check (push) Failing after 0s
feat(backend): server hardening — timeouts, security headers, trusted-proxy client IP (closes #19)
Add ReadHeaderTimeout and IdleTimeout to the http.Server (named
constants beside the existing timeouts) to close the slowloris and
idle-keep-alive gaps.

Add a SecurityHeaders middleware setting HSTS, a JSON-API CSP
(default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'), X-Frame-Options: DENY,
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy, and Permissions-Policy.
It is registered before CORS so the headers ride on preflight responses.

Resolve the client IP from X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP only when the
direct peer is in a trusted-proxy allowlist, defaulting to loopback plus
RFC1918 and configurable via TRUSTED_PROXIES; an untrusted peer's
forwarded headers are ignored and the direct peer is logged. Uses
net/netip; no new dependency.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-21 12:49:58 +00:00

140 lines
3.2 KiB
Go

package middleware_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/middleware"
)
func mustPrefixes(t *testing.T, cidrs ...string) []netip.Prefix {
t.Helper()
prefixes, err := middleware.ParseTrustedProxies(cidrs)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseTrustedProxies(%v): %v", cidrs, err)
}
return prefixes
}
func TestParseTrustedProxiesRejectsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := middleware.ParseTrustedProxies([]string{"not-a-cidr"})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for malformed CIDR, got nil")
}
}
type clientIPCase struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
xff string
xRealIP string
want string
}
func clientIPCases() []clientIPCase {
return []clientIPCase{
{
name: "trusted proxy uses forwarded-for",
remoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.7",
want: "203.0.113.7",
},
{
name: "trusted proxy uses left-most of chain",
remoteAddr: "10.1.2.3:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.7, 10.1.2.3",
want: "203.0.113.7",
},
{
name: "trusted proxy falls back to x-real-ip",
remoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:5000",
xRealIP: "203.0.113.9",
want: "203.0.113.9",
},
{
name: "untrusted peer ignores forwarded-for",
remoteAddr: "198.51.100.4:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.7",
want: "198.51.100.4",
},
{
name: "untrusted peer ignores x-real-ip",
remoteAddr: "198.51.100.4:5000",
xRealIP: "203.0.113.9",
want: "198.51.100.4",
},
{
name: "trusted proxy with no headers uses peer",
remoteAddr: "10.1.2.3:5000",
want: "10.1.2.3",
},
{
name: "trusted proxy with garbage header uses peer",
remoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "not-an-ip",
want: "127.0.0.1",
},
}
}
func TestClientIP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
trusted := mustPrefixes(t, "127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128", "10.0.0.0/8")
for _, tc := range clientIPCases() {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
header := http.Header{}
if tc.xff != "" {
header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", tc.xff)
}
if tc.xRealIP != "" {
header.Set("X-Real-IP", tc.xRealIP)
}
got := middleware.ClientIP(tc.remoteAddr, header, trusted)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("ClientIP() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestSecurityHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
handler := (&middleware.Middleware{}).SecurityHeaders()(
http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}),
)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", http.NoBody)
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
want := map[string]string{
"Strict-Transport-Security": "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains",
"Content-Security-Policy": "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'",
"X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
"Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer",
"Permissions-Policy": "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()",
}
for name, value := range want {
if got := rec.Header().Get(name); got != value {
t.Errorf("header %s = %q, want %q", name, got, value)
}
}
}