Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 95c6ec16b4 fix(backend): report ingest correctness — propagate storage failure, 413 on oversize, global body cap (closes #23)
check / check (push) Failing after 1s
A buffer failure on POST /api/v1/reports now returns 500 instead of a
false {"status":"ok"}, so clients can retry. Decode errors are split:
an over-limit body returns 413 (via errors.As on *http.MaxBytesError),
malformed JSON stays 400. A new MaxBodyBytes middleware caps every
route (1 MiB default; rejects an oversized Content-Length up-front and
caps the read otherwise), replacing the per-route reader so the health
check and future routes are bounded too. The raw attacker-controlled
geo blob is no longer logged — only its byte length — and client_id and
timestamp are length-bounded before logging. A decodeJSON handler helper
is added per the HTTP server conventions. Panic recovery is now a local
middleware that routes the stack through slog as structured JSON rather
than chi's plain-text stderr. Error bodies still leak nothing internal.

Chosen failure code for a storage failure: 500, since a full buffer or
write error is server-side and retryable, not the client's fault.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-21 13:17:59 +00:00
clawbot f3895789d2 feat(backend): server hardening: timeouts, security headers, trusted-proxy client IP (closes #19)
check / check (push) Failing after 1s
Add ReadHeaderTimeout and IdleTimeout to the http.Server as named constants beside the existing timeouts. Add a SecurityHeaders middleware (HSTS, a JSON-API CSP of default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none', X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy), registered before CORS so preflight responses carry it. Resolve the client IP from X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP only when the direct peer is in the trusted-proxy allowlist (loopback plus RFC1918 by default, configurable via TRUSTED_PROXIES); an untrusted peer's forwarded headers are ignored. Uses net/netip; no new dependency.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation and review); claude-fable-5 (merge)
2026-09-21 15:05:25 +02:00
clawbot f7c7f92e27 fix(frontend): meet the 44x44 minimum tap target on every control (closes #43)
check / check (push) Successful in 10s
2026-08-10 16:12:00 +02:00
clawbot 852a11eec2 fix: wrap per-host status line so 320px viewport does not scroll (closes #42)
check / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-08-10 16:07:28 +02:00
clawbot 25a852d35c build: Dockerfile.backend multistage lint stage (closes #17)
check / check (push) Has been cancelled
2026-08-10 16:04:48 +02:00
clawbot a644efe9ff chore: root .editorconfig and hardened .gitignore (closes #15)
check / check (push) Successful in 45s
2026-08-10 15:47:49 +02:00
clawbotandsneak fbfe1df349 frontend: gate the Docker build on make check (closes #11) (#12)
check / check (push) Successful in 27s
Resolves #11. The frontend/root `Dockerfile` ran only `RUN yarn build`, so `script/lint` and `script/fmt-check` (prettier) never gated CI — only a broken build failed it. (`script/cibuild`'s comment even claimed "the Dockerfile runs make check", which was false.) The backend `Dockerfile.backend` already runs `make check`; nothing covered the frontend's lint/fmt-check.

Change (single file, `Dockerfile`):
- `apk add ... git` -> `apk add ... git make` (build stage needs `make`).
- `RUN yarn build` -> `RUN make check` — which runs `script/test` (`yarn build`, producing `dist/`) then `script/lint` + `script/fmt-check`. `dist/` is still produced in one build (no redundant rebuild); the final nginx runtime image is unchanged.

Verified via a fresh clone (a worktree's `.git` pointer breaks `vite`'s `git rev-parse`, so builds must come from a real checkout — as CI's `actions/checkout` provides): positive `docker build` succeeds with in-image `make check` green; a negative test (a prettier-violating but build-valid file) makes the build fail at `make check`, confirming CI now goes red on a check regression, not just a broken build.

Left open for review (not merged).

Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #12
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-08-07 17:46:37 +02:00
20 changed files with 942 additions and 134 deletions
+25 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,27 @@
node_modules/
dist/
# OS
.DS_Store
Thumbs.db
# Editors
*.swp
*.swo
*~
*.bak
.idea/
.vscode/
*.sublime-*
# Node
node_modules/
# Environment / secrets
.env
.env.*
*.pem
*.key
# Build output
dist/
# Logs
*.log
+5 -2
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,12 @@ FROM node@sha256:e4bf2a82ad0a4037d28035ae71529873c069b13eb0455466ae0bc13363826e3
WORKDIR /app
COPY package.json yarn.lock ./
RUN yarn install --frozen-lockfile
RUN apk add --no-cache git
RUN apk add --no-cache git make
COPY . .
RUN yarn build
# make check runs script/check (test + lint + fmt-check); its test step
# is the production yarn build, so this both produces dist/ and gates the
# image on lint/fmt-check/test regressions, not merely a broken build.
RUN make check
# nginx:stable-alpine as of 2026-02-22
FROM nginx@sha256:15e96e59aa3b0aada3a121296e3bce117721f42d88f5f64217ef4b18f458c6ab
+33 -8
View File
@@ -1,25 +1,50 @@
# Lint stage — fast feedback on formatting and lint issues. The
# golangci/golangci-lint image ships Go, gofmt, make and the linter, so
# nothing is installed here.
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.7.2 (2026-08-09)
FROM golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:5d6d5c70a61f1356adfd9dd6316ce286799fefc9d743421356ff1b00842368ba AS lint
WORKDIR /src
COPY backend/go.mod backend/go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY backend/ .
RUN make fmt-check
RUN make lint
# Build stage
# golang:1.25-alpine (2026-02-27)
FROM golang:1.25-alpine@sha256:f6751d823c26342f9506c03797d2527668d095b0a15f1862cddb4d927a7a4ced AS builder
RUN apk add --no-cache git make gcc musl-dev
RUN apk add --no-cache make
# golangci-lint v2.7.2 (2026-02-27)
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go install github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/golangci-lint@9f61b0f53f80672872fced07b6874397c3ed197b
WORKDIR /src
# Force BuildKit to run the lint stage before proceeding. BuildKit runs
# stages in parallel by default; without this no-op copy a lint failure
# would not gate compilation.
COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
WORKDIR /repo/backend
COPY backend/go.mod backend/go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY .git /repo/.git
COPY backend/ .
RUN make check
RUN make build
RUN make test
# The build is driven through the Makefile so there is exactly one
# definition of the build command; it expands to
# CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags "-s -w -X main.Version=... -X main.Buildarch=..."
# VERSION is handed over in the environment rather than as a make
# variable so it still reaches the build if the target is ever turned
# into a shim around a script.
ARG VERSION=dev
RUN VERSION="${VERSION}" make build
# Runtime stage
# alpine:3.23 (2026-02-27)
FROM alpine:3.23@sha256:25109184c71bdad752c8312a8623239686a9a2071e8825f20acb8f2198c3f659
RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates
COPY --from=builder /repo/backend/netwatch-server /usr/local/bin/netwatch-server
COPY --from=builder /src/netwatch-server /usr/local/bin/netwatch-server
EXPOSE 8080
ENTRYPOINT ["netwatch-server"]
-5
View File
@@ -125,9 +125,6 @@ dist/
false outage)
- Clickable service URLs
- Canvas-based sparkline rendering with devicePixelRatio scaling
- Mobile detection: viewports narrower than 768px show a friendly "not yet
available on mobile" message instead of the monitoring UI (no polling or
network requests on mobile)
- Zero runtime dependencies: all resources bundled into build artifacts
## Deployment
@@ -151,8 +148,6 @@ properties.
## Limitations
- **Mobile**: Viewports below 768px wide show a static "not yet available"
message. The full monitoring UI requires a desktop-width browser.
- **CORS**: Some hosts may block cross-origin HEAD requests. The app uses
`no-cors` mode which allows the request but provides opaque responses. Latency
is still measurable based on request timing.
+29
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,35 @@ files, so merging it also closes most compliance gaps.
# Completed Steps
- 2026-09-21: report ingest correctness (issue #23): a storage failure now
returns 500 instead of a false `ok`; oversize bodies return 413 (distinguished
from malformed JSON, which stays 400); a `MaxBodyBytes` middleware caps every
route, not just the report route; the raw attacker-controlled `geo` blob is no
longer logged (only its length) and `client_id`/`timestamp` are length-bounded
before logging; a `decodeJSON` handler helper was added; and panic recovery
now routes the stack through slog instead of chi's plain-text stderr
- 2026-09-21: backend HTTP hardening (issue #19): added `ReadHeaderTimeout` and
`IdleTimeout` to the server, a `SecurityHeaders` middleware (HSTS, tight CSP,
frame/sniff/referrer/permissions headers) registered before CORS, and
trusted-proxy client IP resolution honouring `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP`
only from a `TRUSTED_PROXIES` allowlist (loopback plus RFC1918 by default)
- 2026-08-10: every interactive control now meets the 44x44 CSS px minimum tap
target (`.pin-btn`, `#interval-select`, the debug-log label and, on narrow
viewports, `#pause-btn`). The pin button's hit area grows via matching
negative margins, so its layout footprint and row density are unchanged
- 2026-08-10: per-host status line wraps below the 768px breakpoint instead of
forcing horizontal page scroll at 320px
- 2026-08-09: `Dockerfile.backend` reworked to the mandated Go multistage
lint-stage pattern: separate `lint` stage on the hash-pinned
`golangci/golangci-lint` image, `COPY --from=lint` stage dependency,
`CGO_ENABLED=0` static build driven by `ARG VERSION`, and no more `COPY .git`
- 2026-08-09: dotfile compliance — lifted `backend/.editorconfig` to the repo
root so `root = true` covers the frontend too, and replaced `.gitignore` with
the org model (OS, editor, node, and environment/secrets sections) plus this
repo's `dist/` and `*.log`. `.env`, `.env.*`, `*.pem`, and `*.key` are now
ignored repo-wide, not just under `backend/`. Excluding `.git` from
`.dockerignore` stays deferred: both images read git metadata at build time
(`COPY .git` in `Dockerfile.backend`, `git rev-parse` in `vite.config.js`)
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints, Makefile
shims, README Entrypoints section
- 2026-02-27: backend with buffered zstd-compressed report storage; CI workflow
+9 -12
View File
@@ -1,25 +1,22 @@
UNAME_S := $(shell uname -s)
VERSION := $(shell git describe --always --dirty)
# VERSION is overridable (the Dockerfile passes its ARG VERSION in) and
# degrades to "dev" when git is unavailable or there is no .git — the
# build must not depend on the repository history being in the build
# context.
VERSION ?= $(shell { git describe --always --dirty; } 2>/dev/null || echo dev)
BUILDARCH := $(shell uname -m)
BINARY := netwatch-server
GOLDFLAGS += -s -w
GOLDFLAGS += -X main.Version=$(VERSION)
GOLDFLAGS += -X main.Buildarch=$(BUILDARCH)
ifeq ($(UNAME_S),Darwin)
GOFLAGS := -ldflags "$(GOLDFLAGS)"
else
GOFLAGS = -ldflags "-linkmode external -extldflags -static $(GOLDFLAGS)"
endif
.PHONY: all build test lint fmt fmt-check check docker hooks run clean
all: build
build: ./$(BINARY)
./$(BINARY): $(shell find . -name '*.go' -type f) go.mod go.sum
go build -o $@ $(GOFLAGS) ./cmd/netwatch-server/
build:
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags "$(GOLDFLAGS)" \
-o ./$(BINARY) ./cmd/netwatch-server/
test:
timeout 30 go test ./...
+7 -1
View File
@@ -43,10 +43,16 @@ Internal packages in `internal/` follow standard Go project layout:
### Configuration
| Variable | Default | Description |
| ---------- | ------------------ | --------------------------------- |
| ----------------- | -------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `PORT` | `8080` | HTTP listen port |
| `DATA_DIR` | `./data/reports` | Directory for compressed reports |
| `DEBUG` | `false` | Enable debug logging |
| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | loopback + RFC1918 | Comma-separated CIDRs whose `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` headers are trusted for client IP resolution |
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` defaults to `127.0.0.1/32,::1/128,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`.
The loopback entries cover the reverse proxy that shares the container; the
RFC1918 ranges match `nginx.conf`. A request whose direct peer is outside this
set has its forwarded headers ignored, and the direct peer is logged instead.
### Report storage
+28
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ package config
import (
"errors"
"log/slog"
"strings"
"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/logger"
@@ -14,6 +15,14 @@ import (
"go.uber.org/fx"
)
// defaultTrustedProxies lists the networks whose forwarded
// headers are honoured by default. It covers the RFC1918
// ranges (to match nginx.conf) plus IPv4 and IPv6 loopback,
// because the reverse proxy shares the container and reaches
// the backend over loopback.
const defaultTrustedProxies = "127.0.0.1/32,::1/128," +
"10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
// Params defines the dependencies for Config.
type Params struct {
fx.In
@@ -30,6 +39,7 @@ type Config struct {
MetricsUsername string
Port int
SentryDSN string
TrustedProxies []string
log *slog.Logger
params *Params
}
@@ -56,6 +66,7 @@ func New(
viper.SetDefault("SENTRY_DSN", "")
viper.SetDefault("METRICS_USERNAME", "")
viper.SetDefault("METRICS_PASSWORD", "")
viper.SetDefault("TRUSTED_PROXIES", defaultTrustedProxies)
err := viper.ReadInConfig()
if err != nil {
@@ -73,6 +84,7 @@ func New(
MetricsUsername: viper.GetString("METRICS_USERNAME"),
Port: viper.GetInt("PORT"),
SentryDSN: viper.GetString("SENTRY_DSN"),
TrustedProxies: splitList(viper.GetString("TRUSTED_PROXIES")),
log: log,
params: &params,
}
@@ -84,3 +96,19 @@ func New(
return s, nil
}
// splitList turns a comma-separated setting into a trimmed
// slice, dropping empty entries.
func splitList(raw string) []string {
parts := strings.Split(raw, ",")
out := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
for _, p := range parts {
p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
if p != "" {
out = append(out, p)
}
}
return out
}
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
package handlers
import "log/slog"
// NewForTest builds a Handlers around a report sink and logger,
// bypassing the fx graph so handler behaviour (including the
// storage failure path) is exercisable in unit tests.
func NewForTest(buf reportAppender, log *slog.Logger) *Handlers {
return &Handlers{buf: buf, log: log}
}
+20 -1
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,13 @@ import (
const jsonContentType = "application/json; charset=utf-8"
// reportAppender is the subset of the report buffer the handlers
// depend on. Defining it here keeps the storage failure path
// exercisable with a stub in tests.
type reportAppender interface {
Append(v any) error
}
// Params defines the dependencies for Handlers.
type Params struct {
fx.In
@@ -30,7 +37,7 @@ type Params struct {
// Handlers provides HTTP handler factories for all endpoints.
type Handlers struct {
buf *reportbuf.Buffer
buf reportAppender
hc *healthcheck.Healthcheck
log *slog.Logger
params *Params
@@ -72,3 +79,15 @@ func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(
}
}
}
// decodeJSON decodes the request body into v. The body is
// expected to already be bounded by the body-size middleware, so
// a caller can distinguish an over-limit body from malformed
// JSON by testing the returned error for *http.MaxBytesError.
func (s *Handlers) decodeJSON(
_ http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
v any,
) error {
return json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(v)
}
+55 -23
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,14 @@ package handlers
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
)
const maxReportBodyBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
// maxLoggedFieldBytes bounds untrusted string fields before they
// are logged, so a caller cannot inflate log volume with an
// oversized value.
const maxLoggedFieldBytes = 128
type reportSample struct {
T int64 `json:"t"`
@@ -35,48 +39,76 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleReport() http.HandlerFunc {
}
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
w, r.Body, maxReportBodyBytes,
)
var rpt report
err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&rpt)
err := s.decodeJSON(w, r, &rpt)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to decode report",
"error", err,
)
s.respondJSON(w, r,
&response{Status: "error"},
http.StatusBadRequest,
s.decodeErrorStatus(err),
)
return
}
s.logReportReceived(rpt)
err = s.buf.Append(rpt)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to buffer report", "error", err)
s.respondJSON(w, r,
&response{Status: "error"},
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
s.respondJSON(w, r, &response{Status: "ok"}, http.StatusOK)
}
}
// decodeErrorStatus logs a report decode failure and returns the
// status to send: 413 when the body exceeded the size limit,
// otherwise 400 for malformed JSON.
func (s *Handlers) decodeErrorStatus(err error) int {
var tooLarge *http.MaxBytesError
if errors.As(err, &tooLarge) {
s.log.Warn("report body too large", "limit_bytes", tooLarge.Limit)
return http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge
}
s.log.Error("failed to decode report", "error", err)
return http.StatusBadRequest
}
// logReportReceived logs an accepted report. Untrusted fields are
// bounded (client_id, timestamp) or reduced to a length
// (geo_bytes) so the raw attacker-controlled body never reaches
// the log.
func (s *Handlers) logReportReceived(rpt report) {
totalSamples := 0
for _, h := range rpt.Hosts {
totalSamples += len(h.History)
}
s.log.Info("report received",
"client_id", rpt.ClientID,
"timestamp", rpt.Timestamp,
"client_id", boundedForLog(rpt.ClientID),
"timestamp", boundedForLog(rpt.Timestamp),
"host_count", len(rpt.Hosts),
"total_samples", totalSamples,
"geo", string(rpt.Geo),
"geo_bytes", len(rpt.Geo),
)
}
bufErr := s.buf.Append(rpt)
if bufErr != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to buffer report",
"error", bufErr,
)
// boundedForLog truncates an untrusted string to a fixed byte
// bound so an attacker-controlled field cannot dominate the log.
func boundedForLog(s string) string {
if len(s) > maxLoggedFieldBytes {
return s[:maxLoggedFieldBytes]
}
s.respondJSON(w, r,
&response{Status: "ok"},
http.StatusOK,
)
}
return s
}
+141
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/handlers"
)
var errStorageFailed = errors.New("storage failed")
// stubAppender drives the storage success/failure path without a
// real buffer or disk.
type stubAppender struct {
err error
}
func (s stubAppender) Append(any) error { return s.err }
func newTestHandlers(buf stubAppender, out io.Writer) *handlers.Handlers {
return handlers.NewForTest(buf, slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(out, nil)))
}
func decodeStatus(t *testing.T, body []byte) string {
t.Helper()
var resp struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
}
err := json.Unmarshal(body, &resp)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("response body not JSON: %v (%q)", err, body)
}
return resp.Status
}
func TestHandleReportStorageFailureIsNon2xx(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newTestHandlers(stubAppender{err: errStorageFailed}, io.Discard)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest(
http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/reports",
strings.NewReader(`{"clientId":"c1","hosts":[]}`),
)
h.HandleReport().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code < 500 {
t.Fatalf("storage failure status = %d, want a 5xx", rec.Code)
}
if got := decodeStatus(t, rec.Body.Bytes()); got != "error" {
t.Fatalf("status field = %q, want %q", got, "error")
}
}
func TestHandleReportMalformedJSONIs400(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := newTestHandlers(stubAppender{}, io.Discard)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest(
http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/reports",
strings.NewReader(`{not json`),
)
h.HandleReport().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("malformed status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
}
func TestHandleReportOversizeIs413(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const limit = 32
h := newTestHandlers(stubAppender{}, io.Discard)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest(
http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/reports",
strings.NewReader(`{"clientId":"`+strings.Repeat("x", 200)+`"}`),
)
// Emulate the body-size middleware capping the body so the
// handler observes a *http.MaxBytesError while decoding.
req.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(rec, req.Body, limit)
h.HandleReport().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Fatalf("oversize status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
}
}
func TestHandleReportDoesNotLogRawGeo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const sentinel = "SENSITIVE-GEO-BLOB"
var logbuf bytes.Buffer
h := newTestHandlers(stubAppender{}, &logbuf)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest(
http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/reports",
strings.NewReader(
`{"clientId":"c1","geo":{"raw":"`+sentinel+`"},"hosts":[]}`,
),
)
h.HandleReport().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
if strings.Contains(logbuf.String(), sentinel) {
t.Fatal("raw geo bytes were written to the log")
}
if !strings.Contains(logbuf.String(), "geo_bytes") {
t.Fatal("expected a bounded geo_bytes field in the log")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
package middleware
import (
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
)
// Test-only wrappers exposing unexported helpers to the
// external middleware_test package.
// NewWithLogger builds a Middleware around a logger for tests
// that exercise the logging paths without the fx graph.
func NewWithLogger(log *slog.Logger) *Middleware {
return &Middleware{log: log}
}
func ClientIP(
remoteAddr string,
header http.Header,
trusted []netip.Prefix,
) string {
return clientIP(remoteAddr, header, trusted)
}
func ParseTrustedProxies(cidrs []string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
return parseTrustedProxies(cidrs)
}
+212 -1
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,15 @@
package middleware
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"runtime/debug"
"strings"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/config"
@@ -19,6 +25,23 @@ import (
const corsMaxAgeSec = 300
// jsonErrorBody is the body written for errors raised inside
// middleware, matching the {"status":"error"} shape the handlers
// return so clients see one error contract across the API.
const (
jsonContentType = "application/json; charset=utf-8"
jsonErrorBody = "{\"status\":\"error\"}\n"
)
// Security header values. The backend is a JSON API with no
// HTML surface, so the CSP forbids every resource type and
// framing outright.
const (
hstsValue = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
cspValue = "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'"
permissionsPolicyValue = "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()"
)
// Params defines the dependencies for Middleware.
type Params struct {
fx.In
@@ -32,6 +55,7 @@ type Params struct {
type Middleware struct {
log *slog.Logger
params *Params
trustedProxies []netip.Prefix
}
// New creates a Middleware instance.
@@ -39,13 +63,38 @@ func New(
_ fx.Lifecycle,
params Params,
) (*Middleware, error) {
trusted, err := parseTrustedProxies(params.Config.TrustedProxies)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s := new(Middleware)
s.params = &params
s.log = params.Logger.Get()
s.trustedProxies = trusted
return s, nil
}
// parseTrustedProxies converts CIDR strings into prefixes,
// failing fast on any malformed entry.
func parseTrustedProxies(cidrs []string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(cidrs))
for _, cidr := range cidrs {
prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(cidr)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"trusted proxy %q: %w", cidr, err,
)
}
prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix.Masked())
}
return prefixes, nil
}
type loggingResponseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
@@ -72,6 +121,70 @@ func ipFromHostPort(hostPort string) string {
return host
}
// clientIP resolves the caller's address. X-Forwarded-For and
// X-Real-IP are honoured only when the direct peer is a
// trusted proxy; otherwise the direct peer is returned so a
// spoofed header cannot forge the logged address.
func clientIP(
remoteAddr string,
header http.Header,
trusted []netip.Prefix,
) string {
peer := ipFromHostPort(remoteAddr)
if !addrInAny(peer, trusted) {
return peer
}
if xff := firstForwardedFor(header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")); xff != "" {
return xff
}
if xr := strings.TrimSpace(header.Get("X-Real-IP")); validIP(xr) {
return xr
}
return peer
}
// firstForwardedFor returns the left-most valid address in an
// X-Forwarded-For list (the original client), or "" if none.
func firstForwardedFor(value string) string {
for part := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ",") {
candidate := strings.TrimSpace(part)
if validIP(candidate) {
return candidate
}
}
return ""
}
func validIP(s string) bool {
_, err := netip.ParseAddr(s)
return err == nil
}
// addrInAny reports whether s parses as an address contained
// in any of the trusted prefixes.
func addrInAny(s string, trusted []netip.Prefix) bool {
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(s)
if err != nil {
return false
}
addr = addr.Unmap()
for _, prefix := range trusted {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// Logging returns middleware that logs each request with
// timing, status code, and client information.
func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
@@ -96,7 +209,11 @@ func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
"referer", r.Referer(),
"proto", r.Proto,
"remote_ip",
ipFromHostPort(r.RemoteAddr),
clientIP(
r.RemoteAddr,
r.Header,
s.trustedProxies,
),
"status", lrw.statusCode,
"latency_ms",
latency.Milliseconds(),
@@ -109,6 +226,100 @@ func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
}
}
// SecurityHeaders returns middleware that sets response
// security headers. It runs before CORS so the headers are
// present on preflight responses the CORS handler writes.
func (s *Middleware) SecurityHeaders() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
h := w.Header()
h.Set("Strict-Transport-Security", hstsValue)
h.Set("Content-Security-Policy", cspValue)
h.Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
h.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
h.Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
h.Set("Permissions-Policy", permissionsPolicyValue)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
},
)
}
}
// writeJSONError writes the shared JSON error body with the
// given status. Used where middleware must reject a request
// before it reaches a handler.
func writeJSONError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", jsonContentType)
w.WriteHeader(status)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, jsonErrorBody)
}
// MaxBodyBytes returns middleware that caps the request body at
// limit bytes. A declared Content-Length over the limit is
// rejected immediately with 413. Bodies without a declared
// length (or that understate it) are capped as they are read, so
// a handler that reads the body sees a *http.MaxBytesError it can
// map to 413. Mount it with a different limit on a route group
// that needs a different bound.
func (s *Middleware) MaxBodyBytes(
limit int64,
) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.ContentLength > limit {
writeJSONError(
w,
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
)
return
}
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, limit)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
},
)
}
}
// Recoverer returns middleware that recovers from a panic in a
// downstream handler, logs the panic and stack trace through
// slog, and responds 500 with no body. http.ErrAbortHandler is
// re-panicked so the server can abort the response as intended.
func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
defer func() {
rec := recover()
if rec == nil {
return
}
err, ok := rec.(error)
if ok && errors.Is(err, http.ErrAbortHandler) {
panic(rec)
}
s.log.ErrorContext(r.Context(),
"panic recovered",
"panic", fmt.Sprintf("%v", rec),
"stack", string(debug.Stack()),
)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
}()
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
},
)
}
}
// CORS returns middleware that adds permissive CORS headers.
func (s *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return cors.Handler(cors.Options{
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
package middleware_test
import (
"bytes"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/middleware"
)
func mustPrefixes(t *testing.T, cidrs ...string) []netip.Prefix {
t.Helper()
prefixes, err := middleware.ParseTrustedProxies(cidrs)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseTrustedProxies(%v): %v", cidrs, err)
}
return prefixes
}
func TestParseTrustedProxiesRejectsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := middleware.ParseTrustedProxies([]string{"not-a-cidr"})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for malformed CIDR, got nil")
}
}
type clientIPCase struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
xff string
xRealIP string
want string
}
func clientIPCases() []clientIPCase {
return []clientIPCase{
{
name: "trusted proxy uses forwarded-for",
remoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.7",
want: "203.0.113.7",
},
{
name: "trusted proxy uses left-most of chain",
remoteAddr: "10.1.2.3:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.7, 10.1.2.3",
want: "203.0.113.7",
},
{
name: "trusted proxy falls back to x-real-ip",
remoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:5000",
xRealIP: "203.0.113.9",
want: "203.0.113.9",
},
{
name: "untrusted peer ignores forwarded-for",
remoteAddr: "198.51.100.4:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.7",
want: "198.51.100.4",
},
{
name: "untrusted peer ignores x-real-ip",
remoteAddr: "198.51.100.4:5000",
xRealIP: "203.0.113.9",
want: "198.51.100.4",
},
{
name: "trusted proxy with no headers uses peer",
remoteAddr: "10.1.2.3:5000",
want: "10.1.2.3",
},
{
name: "trusted proxy with garbage header uses peer",
remoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "not-an-ip",
want: "127.0.0.1",
},
}
}
func TestClientIP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
trusted := mustPrefixes(t, "127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128", "10.0.0.0/8")
for _, tc := range clientIPCases() {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
header := http.Header{}
if tc.xff != "" {
header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", tc.xff)
}
if tc.xRealIP != "" {
header.Set("X-Real-IP", tc.xRealIP)
}
got := middleware.ClientIP(tc.remoteAddr, header, trusted)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("ClientIP() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestSecurityHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
handler := (&middleware.Middleware{}).SecurityHeaders()(
http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}),
)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", http.NoBody)
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
want := map[string]string{
"Strict-Transport-Security": "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains",
"Content-Security-Policy": "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'",
"X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
"Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer",
"Permissions-Policy": "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()",
}
for name, value := range want {
if got := rec.Header().Get(name); got != value {
t.Errorf("header %s = %q, want %q", name, got, value)
}
}
}
// TestMaxBodyBytesRejectsOversizeOnNonReadingRoute confirms the
// limit is enforced even for a handler that never reads the body
// (for example the health check), via the Content-Length check.
func TestMaxBodyBytesRejectsOversizeOnNonReadingRoute(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const limit = 16
called := false
handler := (&middleware.Middleware{}).MaxBodyBytes(limit)(
http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
called = true
}),
)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest(
http.MethodPost, "/.well-known/healthcheck",
strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("x", limit+1)),
)
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
}
if called {
t.Fatal("handler ran despite oversize body")
}
}
func TestMaxBodyBytesAllowsWithinLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const limit = 64
handler := (&middleware.Middleware{}).MaxBodyBytes(limit)(
http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}),
)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest(
http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/reports",
strings.NewReader(`{"clientId":"c1"}`),
)
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
}
func TestRecovererReturns500AndLogsThroughSlog(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var logbuf bytes.Buffer
mw := middleware.NewWithLogger(
slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logbuf, nil)),
)
handler := mw.Recoverer()(
http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
panic("boom")
}),
)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", http.NoBody)
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
out := logbuf.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "panic recovered") {
t.Fatalf("panic was not logged through slog: %q", out)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, `"level":"ERROR"`) {
t.Fatalf("panic log was not structured JSON at error level: %q", out)
}
}
+4
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ import (
const (
readTimeout = 10 * time.Second
readHeaderTimeout = 5 * time.Second
writeTimeout = 10 * time.Second
idleTimeout = 60 * time.Second
maxHeaderBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
)
@@ -21,7 +23,9 @@ func (s *Server) serveUntilShutdown() {
Handler: s,
MaxHeaderBytes: maxHeaderBytes,
ReadTimeout: readTimeout,
ReadHeaderTimeout: readHeaderTimeout,
WriteTimeout: writeTimeout,
IdleTimeout: idleTimeout,
}
s.SetupRoutes()
+11 -2
View File
@@ -7,17 +7,26 @@ import (
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)
const requestTimeout = 60 * time.Second
const (
requestTimeout = 60 * time.Second
// maxRequestBodyBytes caps every request body. A route that
// needs a different bound mounts s.mw.MaxBodyBytes with its
// own value on its group.
maxRequestBodyBytes int64 = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
)
// SetupRoutes configures the chi router with middleware and
// all application routes.
func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
s.router = chi.NewRouter()
s.router.Use(middleware.Recoverer)
s.router.Use(s.mw.Recoverer())
s.router.Use(middleware.RequestID)
s.router.Use(s.mw.Logging())
s.router.Use(s.mw.SecurityHeaders())
s.router.Use(s.mw.CORS())
s.router.Use(s.mw.MaxBodyBytes(maxRequestBodyBytes))
s.router.Use(middleware.Timeout(requestTimeout))
s.router.Get(
+39 -55
View File
@@ -537,6 +537,12 @@ class SparklineRenderer {
// --- UI Renderer -------------------------------------------------------------
// The per-host status line must stay wrappable: its populated content is
// wider than the host column at a 320px viewport, and `whitespace-nowrap`
// here overflows the element and forces the whole document to scroll
// horizontally.
const STATUS_TEXT_CLASS = "status-text text-xs text-right col-span-2 mt-5";
function hostRowHTML(host, index, showPin = true) {
const pinColor = host.pinned
? "text-blue-500"
@@ -562,7 +568,7 @@ function hostRowHTML(host, index, showPin = true) {
<span class="text-gray-500">---</span>
</div>
<a href="${host.url}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="text-xs text-gray-500 truncate block col-span-2 -mt-2">${host.url}</a>
<div class="status-text text-xs text-gray-500 whitespace-nowrap text-right col-span-2 mt-5" data-host="${index}">waiting...</div>
<div class="${STATUS_TEXT_CLASS} text-gray-500" data-host="${index}">waiting...</div>
</div>
<div class="flex-grow sparkline-container rounded overflow-hidden border border-gray-700/30">
<canvas class="sparkline-canvas w-full" data-host="${index}" height="${CONFIG.canvasHeight}"></canvas>
@@ -671,7 +677,7 @@ function buildUI(state) {
</p>
<p class="mt-2"><a href="https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/netwatch/commit/${__COMMIT_FULL__}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="text-gray-600 hover:text-gray-400">${__COMMIT_HASH__}</a></p>
<p class="mt-2">
<label class="cursor-pointer">
<label class="debug-toggle-label cursor-pointer">
<input type="checkbox" id="debug-toggle" class="mr-1">
<span>Debug log</span>
</label>
@@ -688,6 +694,26 @@ function buildUI(state) {
// --- UI Updaters -------------------------------------------------------------
// Renders `min 1ms / med 2ms / avg 3ms / max 4ms`. Each label, value and
// trailing separator is one unbreakable unit, so wrapping only ever happens
// between stats and a wrapped line never starts with a separator.
function statusStatsHTML(stats) {
return stats
.map(([label, value], i) => {
const sep =
i < stats.length - 1
? ` <span class="text-gray-500">/</span>`
: "";
return (
`<span class="whitespace-nowrap">` +
`<span class="text-gray-400">${label} </span>` +
`<span class="${latencyClass(value, "online")}">${value}ms</span>` +
`${sep}</span>`
);
})
.join(" ");
}
function updateHostRow(host, index) {
const latencyEl = document.querySelector(
`.latency-value[data-host="${index}"]`,
@@ -712,28 +738,22 @@ function updateHostRow(host, index) {
const min = host.minLatency();
const max = host.maxLatency();
if (host.status === "online" && avg !== null) {
statusEl.innerHTML =
`<span class="text-gray-400">min </span><span class="${latencyClass(min, "online")}">${min}ms</span>` +
` <span class="text-gray-500">/</span> ` +
`<span class="text-gray-400">med </span><span class="${latencyClass(med, "online")}">${med}ms</span>` +
` <span class="text-gray-500">/</span> ` +
`<span class="text-gray-400">avg </span><span class="${latencyClass(avg, "online")}">${avg}ms</span>` +
` <span class="text-gray-500">/</span> ` +
`<span class="text-gray-400">max </span><span class="${latencyClass(max, "online")}">${max}ms</span>`;
statusEl.className =
"status-text text-xs whitespace-nowrap text-right col-span-2 mt-5";
statusEl.innerHTML = statusStatsHTML([
["min", min],
["med", med],
["avg", avg],
["max", max],
]);
statusEl.className = STATUS_TEXT_CLASS;
} else if (host.status === "offline") {
statusEl.textContent = "unreachable";
statusEl.className =
"status-text text-xs text-red-400 whitespace-nowrap text-right col-span-2 mt-5";
statusEl.className = `${STATUS_TEXT_CLASS} text-red-400`;
} else if (host.status === "error") {
statusEl.textContent = "timeout";
statusEl.className =
"status-text text-xs text-orange-400 whitespace-nowrap text-right col-span-2 mt-5";
statusEl.className = `${STATUS_TEXT_CLASS} text-orange-400`;
} else {
statusEl.textContent = "connecting...";
statusEl.className =
"status-text text-xs text-gray-500 whitespace-nowrap text-right col-span-2 mt-5";
statusEl.className = `${STATUS_TEXT_CLASS} text-gray-500`;
}
SparklineRenderer.draw(canvas, host.history);
@@ -1044,8 +1064,7 @@ function greyOutUI(state) {
}
if (statusEl) {
statusEl.textContent = "paused";
statusEl.className =
"status-text text-xs text-gray-500 whitespace-nowrap text-right col-span-2 mt-5";
statusEl.className = `${STATUS_TEXT_CLASS} text-gray-500`;
}
// Grey out the status dot
const row = document.querySelector(`.host-row[data-index="${i}"]`);
@@ -1126,46 +1145,11 @@ function handleResize(state) {
});
}
// --- Mobile Detection --------------------------------------------------------
const MOBILE_BREAKPOINT = 768;
function isMobileViewport() {
return window.innerWidth < MOBILE_BREAKPOINT;
}
function buildMobileUI() {
const app = document.getElementById("app");
app.innerHTML = `
<div class="mx-auto px-[5%] py-8">
<header class="mb-8">
<h1 class="text-3xl font-bold text-white"><a href="https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/netwatch" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="underline decoration-dashed decoration-gray-500 underline-offset-4">NetWatch</a> by <a href="https://sneak.berlin" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="text-blue-400 underline hover:text-blue-300">@sneak</a></h1>
<p class="text-gray-400 text-sm mt-2">Real-time network latency monitor</p>
</header>
<div class="flex items-center justify-center min-h-[60vh]">
<div class="bg-gray-800/70 border border-gray-700/50 rounded-lg p-8 max-w-md text-center">
<p class="text-4xl mb-4">📡</p>
<p class="text-xl font-semibold text-white mb-2">Not yet available on mobile</p>
<p class="text-gray-400 text-sm">NetWatch requires a wider viewport to display latency charts and monitoring data. Please visit on a desktop browser.</p>
</div>
</div>
<footer class="mt-8 text-center text-gray-600 text-xs">
<p><a href="https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/netwatch/commit/${__COMMIT_FULL__}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="text-gray-600 hover:text-gray-400">${__COMMIT_HASH__}</a></p>
</footer>
</div>`;
}
// --- Bootstrap ---------------------------------------------------------------
async function init() {
log.info("NetWatch starting");
if (isMobileViewport()) {
log.info("Mobile viewport detected — skipping monitoring");
buildMobileUI();
return;
}
// Probe common gateway IPs to find the local router
const gateway = await detectGateway();
const localHosts = [LOCAL_CPE];
+34 -1
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,38 @@ body {
ui-monospace, SFMono-Regular, "SF Mono", Menlo, Consolas, monospace;
}
/* ---- Minimum tap targets ----------------------------------------------
Every interactive control is at least 44x44 CSS px (Apple HIG, WCAG 2.2
SC 2.5.5). Not scoped to a breakpoint or to `pointer: coarse`: a large
phone in landscape is above the 768px breakpoint and still a touch
device. */
/* The button grows to 44x44 while the negative margins keep its layout
footprint at the 16x16 of the icon inside it, so row height and the
icon's position are unchanged. */
.pin-btn {
display: flex;
align-items: center;
justify-content: center;
width: 2.75rem;
height: 2.75rem;
margin: -0.875rem;
}
/* A select paints its own background and border, so it has to actually be
44 tall rather than borrow the trick above. */
#interval-select {
min-height: 2.75rem;
}
/* The tappable target for #debug-toggle is the label wrapping it. */
.debug-toggle-label {
display: inline-flex;
align-items: center;
justify-content: center;
min-height: 2.75rem;
}
.sparkline-container {
background: linear-gradient(
to bottom,
@@ -38,9 +70,10 @@ body {
gap: 0.75rem;
}
/* Pause button: smaller on mobile */
/* Pause button: smaller on mobile, but not below the tap-target floor */
#pause-btn {
padding: 0.5rem 1rem;
min-height: 2.75rem;
}
#pause-btn svg {