8 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 7dfb3b8c32 Merge branch 'main' into next
check / check (push) Successful in 2m6s
2026-09-29 12:04:10 +02:00
clawbot a5ca73c585 Container sets up its own data directory (closes #75) (#76)
check / check (push) Successful in 2m6s
Closes #75.

`bin/entrypoint.sh`, which already runs as root, now makes the data directory usable before the backend starts: it creates `DATA_DIR` if missing, gives it and `/data` to the `netwatch` user (`chown -R`), and sets mode 750 on both, the mode the backend gives a directory it creates. The backend still runs as `netwatch`. The README "Running under upaas" section loses its first-run step that created and chowned the host directory and names only the path to mount. The Dockerfile's build-time `mkdir` and `chown` of `/data` are gone, since the entrypoint now does this on every start.

What the diff does not show:

- The host directory mounted at `/data` ends up owned by uid 1000 with mode 750, and everything under `DATA_DIR` is chowned to uid 1000 on every start.
- If the directory cannot be created or chowned, the container stops with that tool's error before either process starts.

Recorded runs with `--mount type=bind`: an empty directory owned by root (mode 755, and again mode 700), and one holding a `reports` directory and report file owned by uid 1001 with mode 700. Each time the container turned healthy, `netwatch-server` ran as `netwatch`, and a posted report was written to `DATA_DIR`; a second start on the root-owned and the uid 1001 directories did the same.

Judgement call: `/data` itself is given to `netwatch` as well as `DATA_DIR`, so the backend can reach `DATA_DIR` inside a host directory with mode 700.

Model: opus-5-5
Reviewed-on: #76
Co-authored-by: clawbot <35+clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-09-29 12:03:59 +02:00
clawbot f423768975 cibuild: the org model, which runs every check uncached (closes #37)
check / check (push) Successful in 2m13s
script/cibuild was a plain docker build ., so on a tree Docker had
seen before every check step came from the build cache and the build
still passed. It is now the org model from sneak/prompts, byte for
byte: script/bootstrap, script/check, then docker build --no-cache
with the git describe version as the VERSION build argument.

The workflow puts ~/.local/bin, where bootstrap links what it
installs, on the step's PATH. Bootstrap now installs its pinned node
when the installed one is older than 22.12.0, the oldest the
frontend's dependencies accept (puppeteer-core's engines field), as
it already does for Go against backend/go.mod.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 11:55:52 +02:00
clawbot c226ceee01 chore(backend): re-vendor .golangci.yml with gomodguard_v2 (closes #41)
check / check (push) Successful in 24s
golangci-lint v2.12 deprecates gomodguard, which the org .golangci.yml
reached through "default: all", so every lint run printed a
deprecation warning. backend/.golangci.yml is now the current copy
from sneak/prompts, fetched unedited: gomodguard is disabled and
gomodguard_v2 enabled with the org block list. The new file also
turns depguard on with its test-support rule, which forbids
net/http/httptest outside test code. netwatch has no test-support
packages of its own to add to that rule, so the file is identical to
the canonical one. backend/script/lint checks the new sha256. The
backend raises no findings under the new rules.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 10:56:00 +02:00
sneak bd08e901ee next into main: netwatch as one container, ready for upaas (#49)
check / check (push) Successful in 12s
Reviewed-on: #49
2026-09-29 10:43:12 +02:00
clawbot d81da05748 nginx: security headers on every response (closes #18)
check / check (push) Successful in 21s
nginx sent none of the security headers REPO_POLICIES.md requires.
security-headers.conf now sets all six with always, included at server
level and again in /assets/, whose own add_header would otherwise drop
them. nginx hides the copies netwatch-server sets, so /api/ and the
health check carry each header once. The content security policy
allows no inline script or style; the host row's status dot took its
grey from a style attribute, now a class. connect-src is * because
several probed hosts redirect to other hosts and the browser checks
every redirect against it. Referrer-Policy is no-referrer, as the
backend already sends.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 10:22:12 +02:00
clawbot d74d1e311e fix(backend): cut request log fields to the log bound (closes #60)
check / check (push) Successful in 14s
The request log wrote the URL, User-Agent, Referer and other
request-supplied strings with no length limit, and the server accepts
headers up to 1 MiB, so one request could put about 1 MiB per field
into a log line. Every string the request log takes from the request,
including the request ID chi copies from X-Request-Id, is now cut to
the 128-byte bound the report handler already used. That bound and
its helper moved from the handlers package to the logger package so
both use the one copy.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 09:39:11 +02:00
clawbot 8833603eff nginx: trust X-Forwarded-For only from TRUSTED_PROXIES (closes #64)
check / check (push) Successful in 15s
nginx trusted X-Forwarded-For from every RFC1918 address, so a client
reaching it from one could write a new address on each request and
get a fresh rate-limit allowance. The container's TRUSTED_PROXIES now
names the reverse proxies nginx trusts, none by default.
bin/entrypoint.sh makes each entry a CIDR, checks it with the new
"netwatch-server check-cidr", which runs the server's own
TRUSTED_PROXIES parsing, and writes one set_real_ip_from line per
entry into /etc/nginx/trusted-proxies.conf, which nginx.conf includes.
The backend is started with TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1/32, since nginx
is its only client. The viewport test mounts an empty file there.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 08:55:47 +02:00
19 changed files with 361 additions and 79 deletions
+4 -2
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@@ -6,5 +6,7 @@ jobs:
steps: steps:
# actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-22 # actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-22
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 - uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
# script/cibuild builds the image, whose stages run every check. # script/cibuild bootstraps, runs every check and builds the
- run: script/cibuild # image. script/bootstrap links what it installs into
# ~/.local/bin, so that has to be on PATH for the rest.
- run: PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH" script/cibuild
+3 -1
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@@ -72,12 +72,14 @@ RUN addgroup -g 1000 -S netwatch && \
# conf.d; bin/entrypoint.sh says how. # conf.d; bin/entrypoint.sh says how.
RUN rm /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf RUN rm /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
COPY nginx.conf /etc/nginx/templates/netwatch.conf.template COPY nginx.conf /etc/nginx/templates/netwatch.conf.template
COPY security-headers.conf /etc/nginx/security-headers.conf
COPY --from=frontend /app/dist /usr/share/nginx/html COPY --from=frontend /app/dist /usr/share/nginx/html
COPY --from=builder /src/netwatch-server /usr/local/bin/netwatch-server COPY --from=builder /src/netwatch-server /usr/local/bin/netwatch-server
COPY bin/entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh COPY bin/entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh
# bin/entrypoint.sh creates DATA_DIR at start and gives it and /data to
# the netwatch user, whatever is mounted there.
ENV DATA_DIR=/data/reports ENV DATA_DIR=/data/reports
RUN mkdir -p /data/reports && chown -R netwatch:netwatch /data
VOLUME /data VOLUME /data
# The default public port; PORT changes it. # The default public port; PORT changes it.
+25 -25
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@@ -36,12 +36,12 @@ The Go backend in `backend/` has its own `script/` directory and shim Makefile
(see [backend/README.md](backend/README.md)). The root scripts cover both (see [backend/README.md](backend/README.md)). The root scripts cover both
halves, so the root `make check` fails if either one is broken. We provide: halves, so the root `make check` fails if either one is broken. We provide:
- `script/bootstrap` — install all dependencies (pinned node via nvm if needed, - `script/bootstrap` — install all dependencies (the pinned node via nvm unless
yarn via corepack, `yarn install --frozen-lockfile`, the pinned Go unless one one new enough for the frontend's dependencies is installed, yarn via
at least as new as `backend/go.mod` asks for is installed, and the Go corepack, `yarn install --frozen-lockfile`, the pinned Go unless one at least
modules), linking what it installs itself into `~/.local/bin`, which has to be as new as `backend/go.mod` asks for is installed, and the Go modules), linking
on `PATH`. It installs no Go linter and not Docker: `make lint` runs the what it installs itself into `~/.local/bin`, which has to be on `PATH`. It
linter in Docker installs no Go linter and not Docker: `make lint` runs the linter in Docker
- `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development: bootstrap plus the - `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development: bootstrap plus the
git pre-commit hook git pre-commit hook
- `script/projectname` — print the project name (used for the Docker image tag) - `script/projectname` — print the project name (used for the Docker image tag)
@@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ halves, so the root `make check` fails if either one is broken. We provide:
`script/check`: it needs Docker and takes minutes. `script/check`: it needs Docker and takes minutes.
- `script/docker` — build the image from `Dockerfile` without the build cache, - `script/docker` — build the image from `Dockerfile` without the build cache,
tagged `netwatch` via `script/projectname` tagged `netwatch` via `script/projectname`
- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: builds the image - `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: runs `script/bootstrap` and `script/check`,
then builds the image as `script/docker` does, without the build cache
- `script/precommit` — run by the git pre-commit hook; runs `script/check` - `script/precommit` — run by the git pre-commit hook; runs `script/check`
- `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook - `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook
@@ -184,13 +185,16 @@ container: nginx serves the built frontend and passes `/api/` and
only inside the container, on `127.0.0.1:8081`. The image: only inside the container, on `127.0.0.1:8081`. The image:
- Listens on port 8080 by default (override with `PORT` env var) - Listens on port 8080 by default (override with `PORT` env var)
- Trusts `X-Forwarded-For` from RFC1918 reverse proxies (10/8, 172.16/12, - Takes the client address from `X-Forwarded-For` only on requests from the
192.168/16) reverse proxies named in `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, and by default from none
- Sends access logs to stdout - Sends access logs to stdout
- Caches static assets with immutable headers - Caches static assets with immutable headers
- Sends the security headers `REPO_POLICIES.md` requires on every response, as
`security-headers.conf` sets them, in place of the backend's own
- Stores reports in `DATA_DIR`, `/data/reports` by default, on the `/data` - Stores reports in `DATA_DIR`, `/data/reports` by default, on the `/data`
volume. The backend runs as user `netwatch` (uid 1000), so a directory volume. Before the backend starts, the image creates `DATA_DIR` and gives it
bind-mounted at `/data` must be writable by uid 1000 and `/data` to user `netwatch` (uid 1000), which the backend runs as, so a
host directory bind-mounted at `/data` ends up owned by uid 1000
- Writes buffered reports to disk on `docker stop`, and exits non-zero if nginx - Writes buffered reports to disk on `docker stop`, and exits non-zero if nginx
or the backend exits on its own, so the platform restarts it or the backend exits on its own, so the platform restarts it
@@ -200,16 +204,6 @@ What the [upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) app for netwatch needs:
- **Port:** container port `8080`. - **Port:** container port `8080`.
- **Volume:** container path `/data`; the reports are kept in `/data/reports`. - **Volume:** container path `/data`; the reports are kept in `/data/reports`.
- **First run:** upaas bind-mounts the host directory it is given and does not
create it, and the backend, which runs as uid 1000, does not start unless it
can write there. Create the directory, owned by uid 1000, before the first
deploy:
```bash
mkdir -p /path/to/data
chown 1000:1000 /path/to/data
```
- **Environment variables:** none is required. An empty one counts as unset, and - **Environment variables:** none is required. An empty one counts as unset, and
one set to a value netwatch cannot use stops the container at start, with the one set to a value netwatch cannot use stops the container at start, with the
reason in its log. reason in its log.
@@ -224,10 +218,16 @@ What the [upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) app for netwatch needs:
- `DEBUG`, default `false`: debug logging - `DEBUG`, default `false`: debug logging
- `DATA_DIR`, default `/data/reports`: leave unset; reports kept outside - `DATA_DIR`, default `/data/reports`: leave unset; reports kept outside
`/data` do not survive a redeploy `/data` do not survive a redeploy
- `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, default loopback and RFC1918: leave unset. The - `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, default empty: set it to the address the reverse proxy
backend's only client is nginx, on loopback, which passes on the client in front of the container connects from, as an IP address or CIDR; several
address; nginx takes it from `X-Forwarded-For` only from RFC1918 are separated by commas. nginx takes the client address from
addresses. `X-Forwarded-For` only on a request from one of them, and the rate limit
counts that address. Unset, `X-Forwarded-For` is ignored and every client
behind the proxy shares the proxy's one allowance of `REPORTS_PER_MINUTE`.
Name only addresses nothing but the proxy connects from: any client that
connects from one can write its own `X-Forwarded-For`, and through a port
Docker publishes, every client may connect from the Docker network's
gateway, such as `172.17.0.1`.
- **Health check:** the image's `HEALTHCHECK` requests - **Health check:** the image's `HEALTHCHECK` requests
`/.well-known/healthcheck` through nginx every 30 seconds, so it fails unless `/.well-known/healthcheck` through nginx every 30 seconds, so it fails unless
both nginx and the backend answer. upaas reads the container's health 60 both nginx and the backend answer. upaas reads the container's health 60
+40 -6
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@@ -23,12 +23,52 @@ latest run passes.
# Completed Steps # Completed Steps
- 2026-09-29: the container sets up its own data directory (issue #75):
`bin/entrypoint.sh`, still as root, creates `DATA_DIR` if missing and gives it
and `/data` to the `netwatch` user with mode 750 before starting the backend
as that user, so an empty host directory owned by root, or one holding files
from another uid, works with no step on the host. It stops the start instead
when a symbolic link is on the path to `DATA_DIR`, since root would change
whatever the link points to. The `README.md` first-run step that created and
chowned the host directory is gone, and the image no longer sets that
ownership at build time
- 2026-09-29: CI can no longer pass on checks that did not run (issue #37):
`script/cibuild` is now the org model, byte for byte. It runs
`script/bootstrap` and `script/check`, then builds the image with `--no-cache`
and the version from `git describe` as the `VERSION` build argument, where it
used to be a plain `docker build .` whose check steps could come from the
build cache. The workflow puts `~/.local/bin`, where bootstrap links what it
installs, on the step's `PATH`, and bootstrap now installs its pinned node
when the installed one is older than the frontend's dependencies need
- 2026-09-29: `backend/.golangci.yml` re-vendored from `sneak/prompts` (issue
#41): `gomodguard`, deprecated in golangci-lint v2.12.0, is disabled and its
successor `gomodguard_v2` enabled with the org block list, so lint runs print
no deprecation warning. The new file also turns `depguard` on with its
`test-support` rule, which keeps `net/http/httptest` out of non-test code;
netwatch adds no entries of its own to that rule. `backend/script/lint` checks
the new sha256
- 2026-09-29: nginx sends the security headers `REPO_POLICIES.md` requires on
every response (issue #18), including errors, `/assets/` and what it passes on
from the backend, whose own copies it drops so each header goes out once. They
live in `security-headers.conf`, which `nginx.conf` includes. The content
security policy allows no inline script or style, so the status dot's grey in
`src/main.js` is now a class; `connect-src` is `*` because probed hosts
redirect to others, and the browser checks each redirect against it
- 2026-09-29: the request log is bounded (issue #60): the method, URL, protocol, - 2026-09-29: the request log is bounded (issue #60): the method, URL, protocol,
`User-Agent`, `Referer`, request ID (which chi takes from the client's `User-Agent`, `Referer`, request ID (which chi takes from the client's
`X-Request-Id` header) and client address it writes are each cut to 128 bytes, `X-Request-Id` header) and client address it writes are each cut to 128 bytes,
the bound the report handler already used, so one request can no longer put the bound the report handler already used, so one request can no longer put
about 1 MiB per field into a log line. That bound and its helper now live in about 1 MiB per field into a log line. That bound and its helper now live in
the `logger` package, shared by both the `logger` package, shared by both
- 2026-09-29: nginx takes the client address from `X-Forwarded-For` only on
requests from the reverse proxies named in the container's `TRUSTED_PROXIES`
(issue #64), and by default from none, where it trusted every RFC1918 address
before, so a client could write a new address on each request and escape the
rate limit. `bin/entrypoint.sh` writes one `set_real_ip_from` line per entry
into `/etc/nginx/trusted-proxies.conf`, which `nginx.conf` includes, refusing
an entry that is not an IP address or CIDR, as `netwatch-server check-cidr`
finds; it starts the backend with `TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1/32`, since nginx
is its only client
- 2026-09-29: report file names can no longer collide (issue #61): each is - 2026-09-29: report file names can no longer collide (issue #61): each is
`reports-<timestamp>-<number>.jsonl.zst`, where the number goes up by one for `reports-<timestamp>-<number>.jsonl.zst`, where the number goes up by one for
each file the server starts to write, so two flushes in the same millisecond, each file the server starts to write, so two flushes in the same millisecond,
@@ -175,9 +215,3 @@ latest run passes.
(main always green policy) (main always green policy)
- Decide what to do with untracked resume.sh: commit it, gitignore it, or delete - Decide what to do with untracked resume.sh: commit it, gitignore it, or delete
it it
- Upstream fix needed in `sneak/prompts`: the org-standard `.golangci.yml`
enables `gomodguard`, which golangci-lint v2.12.2 reports as deprecated since
v2.12.0 and replaced by `gomodguard_v2`, so every backend lint run prints a
deprecation warning. The file is standardized and must never be edited in this
repo, so nothing can be done here beyond tracking it — tracked at
<https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/netwatch/issues/41>
+66 -2
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@@ -10,14 +10,20 @@ run:
linters: linters:
default: all default: all
enable:
# Successor to the deprecated gomodguard. Named explicitly, rather than
# left to `default: all`, because it carries the module policy below.
- gomodguard_v2
disable: disable:
# Genuinely incompatible with project patterns # Genuinely incompatible with project patterns
- exhaustruct # Requires all struct fields - exhaustruct # Requires all struct fields
- depguard # Dependency allow/block lists
- godot # Requires comments to end with periods - godot # Requires comments to end with periods
- wsl # Deprecated, replaced by wsl_v5
- wrapcheck # Too verbose for internal packages - wrapcheck # Too verbose for internal packages
- varnamelen # Short names like db, id are idiomatic Go - varnamelen # Short names like db, id are idiomatic Go
# Deprecated: the warning is attached to the old name, so it is
# silenced by disabling that name, not by enabling the successor.
- wsl # Deprecated, replaced by wsl_v5
- gomodguard # Deprecated, replaced by gomodguard_v2
settings: settings:
lll: lll:
line-length: 88 line-length: 88
@@ -28,6 +34,64 @@ linters:
max-complexity: 15 max-complexity: 15
dupl: dupl:
threshold: 100 threshold: 100
depguard:
# Test-support code must not be compiled into the shipped binary. A
# test-support package exists to hand a test privileges the program
# itself must never have, so a file that is not a test must not import
# one. Test files, and the files inside a package whose directory name
# ends in `test`, are where that code belongs, and are exempt.
#
# The deny list below is the one part of this file a repository is
# expected to extend, and the only part it may. depguard matches an
# import path against a list of prefixes, so it cannot be told "any path
# whose last segment ends in test"; a repository's own test-support
# packages have to be named here one at a time, by full import path,
# under a module path that differs from repository to repository. Add
# them; change nothing else.
rules:
test-support:
list-mode: lax
files:
- "$all"
- "!$test"
- "!**/*test/**"
deny:
- pkg: net/http/httptest
desc: >-
Test-support code belongs in test files and in packages whose
directory name ends in test, not in the shipped binary.
# Only decisions already recorded in the Go package defaults are
# listed here. Every entry matches the module path exactly.
gomodguard_v2:
blocked:
- module: github.com/rs/zerolog
recommendations:
- log/slog
reason: "Structured logging is stdlib log/slog."
# One entry per pre-fork module path, because the later releases
# are separate paths. A prefix match would be shorter but would
# also reach github.com/go-redis/redismock, the test double for
# the successor these entries recommend.
- module: github.com/go-redis/redis
recommendations:
- github.com/redis/go-redis/v9
reason: "Pre-fork module; use the maintained go-redis v9."
- module: github.com/go-redis/redis/v7
recommendations:
- github.com/redis/go-redis/v9
reason: "Pre-fork module; use the maintained go-redis v9."
- module: github.com/go-redis/redis/v8
recommendations:
- github.com/redis/go-redis/v9
reason: "Pre-fork module; use the maintained go-redis v9."
- module: github.com/sergi/go-diff
recommendations:
- github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff
reason: "No unified diff output; use go-udiff."
- module: github.com/hexops/gotextdiff
recommendations:
- github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff
reason: "Unmaintained fork; use go-udiff."
issues: issues:
max-issues-per-linter: 0 max-issues-per-linter: 0
+20 -5
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@@ -87,9 +87,10 @@ Internal packages in `internal/` follow standard Go project layout:
| `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | empty | Comma-separated origins whose pages may call the API; see [CORS](#cors) | | `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | empty | Comma-separated origins whose pages may call the API; see [CORS](#cors) |
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` defaults to `127.0.0.1/32,::1/128,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`. `TRUSTED_PROXIES` defaults to `127.0.0.1/32,::1/128,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`.
The loopback entries cover the reverse proxy that shares the container; the The loopback entries cover a reverse proxy on the same host. A request whose
RFC1918 ranges match `nginx.conf`. A request whose direct peer is outside this direct peer is outside this set has its forwarded headers ignored, and the
set has its forwarded headers ignored, and the direct peer is logged instead. direct peer is logged and rate-limited instead. The container image does not use
this default; see [Container image](#container-image).
A variable set to a value the server cannot use, such as `PORT=abc`, A variable set to a value the server cannot use, such as `PORT=abc`,
`DEBUG=maybe` or a `BIND_ADDRESS` that is not an IP address, stops it from `DEBUG=maybe` or a `BIND_ADDRESS` that is not an IP address, stops it from
@@ -101,8 +102,22 @@ The root `Dockerfile` builds one image in which nginx listens on the public port
8080, serves the frontend, and proxies `/api/` and `/.well-known/healthcheck` to 8080, serves the frontend, and proxies `/api/` and `/.well-known/healthcheck` to
this server. The image's entrypoint, `bin/entrypoint.sh`, starts the server as this server. The image's entrypoint, `bin/entrypoint.sh`, starts the server as
user `netwatch` (uid 1000) with `BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1` and `PORT=8081`, so user `netwatch` (uid 1000) with `BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1` and `PORT=8081`, so
only nginx reaches it. `DATA_DIR` is `/data/reports`, on the `/data` volume, only nginx reaches it, and with `TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1/32`, so it takes the
which `netwatch` owns. client address nginx passes on and no other. `DATA_DIR` is `/data/reports`, on
the `/data` volume; the entrypoint creates it and gives it and `/data` to
`netwatch` before starting the server. nginx replaces the security headers
this server sets with those in the root `security-headers.conf`, so those are
what clients of the image see.
The container's own `TRUSTED_PROXIES` goes to nginx instead: IP addresses or
CIDRs, separated by commas, of the reverse proxies in front of the container.
nginx takes the client address from `X-Forwarded-For` only on a request from one
of them. Unset or empty, nginx trusts no proxy, and the client address is the
one each request comes from, so every client behind a proxy shares one rate
limit. An entry that is not an IP address or CIDR, such as a hostname or
`1.2.3`, stops the container at start with an error naming `TRUSTED_PROXIES`:
the entrypoint checks each entry with `netwatch-server check-cidr`, which parses
it as this server parses its own `TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
### Report storage ### Report storage
+16
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@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
package main package main
import ( import (
"fmt"
"os"
"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/config" "sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/globals" "sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/handlers" "sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/handlers"
@@ -22,6 +25,19 @@ var (
) )
func main() { func main() {
// "netwatch-server check-cidr CIDR" exits 1, with the error, if
// this server would refuse CIDR in its TRUSTED_PROXIES.
// bin/entrypoint.sh runs it on each entry it gives nginx.
if len(os.Args) == 3 && os.Args[1] == "check-cidr" {
_, err := middleware.ParseTrustedProxies(os.Args[2:])
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
os.Exit(1)
}
return
}
globals.Appname = Appname globals.Appname = Appname
globals.Version = Version globals.Version = Version
globals.Buildarch = Buildarch globals.Buildarch = Buildarch
+5 -4
View File
@@ -21,10 +21,11 @@ import (
) )
// defaultTrustedProxies lists the networks whose forwarded // defaultTrustedProxies lists the networks whose forwarded
// headers are honoured by default. It covers the RFC1918 // headers are honoured by default: IPv4 and IPv6 loopback,
// ranges (to match nginx.conf) plus IPv4 and IPv6 loopback, // for a reverse proxy on the same host, and the RFC1918
// because the reverse proxy shares the container and reaches // ranges. The container image does not use it:
// the backend over loopback. // bin/entrypoint.sh gives the server 127.0.0.1/32, since
// nginx is its only client there.
const defaultTrustedProxies = "127.0.0.1/32,::1/128," + const defaultTrustedProxies = "127.0.0.1/32,::1/128," +
"10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16" "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
@@ -29,7 +29,3 @@ func ClientIP(
) string { ) string {
return clientIP(remoteAddr, header, trusted) return clientIP(remoteAddr, header, trusted)
} }
func ParseTrustedProxies(cidrs []string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
return parseTrustedProxies(cidrs)
}
+6 -4
View File
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func New(
_ fx.Lifecycle, _ fx.Lifecycle,
params Params, params Params,
) (*Middleware, error) { ) (*Middleware, error) {
trusted, err := parseTrustedProxies(params.Config.TrustedProxies) trusted, err := ParseTrustedProxies(params.Config.TrustedProxies)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, err return nil, err
} }
@@ -77,9 +77,11 @@ func New(
return s, nil return s, nil
} }
// parseTrustedProxies converts the TRUSTED_PROXIES entries into // ParseTrustedProxies converts the TRUSTED_PROXIES entries into
// prefixes, failing fast on any malformed entry. // prefixes, failing fast on any malformed entry. Each entry must be
func parseTrustedProxies(cidrs []string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) { // a CIDR; a lone address is refused. "netwatch-server check-cidr"
// runs it too.
func ParseTrustedProxies(cidrs []string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(cidrs)) prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(cidrs))
for _, cidr := range cidrs { for _, cidr := range cidrs {
+20 -3
View File
@@ -39,15 +39,32 @@ func mustPrefixes(t *testing.T, cidrs ...string) []netip.Prefix {
return prefixes return prefixes
} }
// TestParseTrustedProxiesRejectsMalformed includes entries nginx would
// read as another address or look up as a hostname, in the CIDR form
// bin/entrypoint.sh gives "netwatch-server check-cidr".
func TestParseTrustedProxiesRejectsMalformed(t *testing.T) { func TestParseTrustedProxiesRejectsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
_, err := middleware.ParseTrustedProxies([]string{"not-a-cidr"}) for _, cidr := range []string{
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "TRUSTED_PROXIES") { "not-a-cidr", "10.0.0.1", "1.2.3/32", "172.30/32", "10/32",
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want one naming TRUSTED_PROXIES", err) "cafe/32", "999.1.1.1/32", "10.0.0.0/33", "::1/129",
"fe80::1%eth0/128",
} {
_, err := middleware.ParseTrustedProxies([]string{cidr})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "TRUSTED_PROXIES") {
t.Errorf("%q: error = %v, want one naming TRUSTED_PROXIES",
cidr, err)
}
} }
} }
func TestParseTrustedProxiesAcceptsCIDRs(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mustPrefixes(t, "172.17.0.1/32", "10.0.0.0/8", "2001:db8::1/128",
"2001:db8::/32", "::ffff:192.0.2.1/128")
}
type clientIPCase struct { type clientIPCase struct {
name string name string
remoteAddr string remoteAddr string
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)" ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
GOLANGCI_CONFIG_SHA256="021cc83f4e6fc7c31b95b34b846723dfcf20b66b7baeea1dc40406e643346bcb" GOLANGCI_CONFIG_SHA256="a79b63a254602a5318db5d0e9a06bc71b84bf0c1d896305229d8bfed1d1b1776"
main() { main() {
cd "$ROOT" cd "$ROOT"
+58 -4
View File
@@ -32,16 +32,70 @@ if [ "$PORT" -eq 8081 ]; then
exit 1 exit 1
fi fi
# TRUSTED_PROXIES names the reverse proxies in front of the container,
# as IP addresses or CIDRs separated by commas. nginx takes the client
# address from X-Forwarded-For only on a request from one of them, so
# unset or empty, it trusts no one. nginx.conf includes the file written
# here, one set_real_ip_from line per entry.
#
# nginx looks up an entry it cannot read as an address as a hostname,
# and trusts what it finds (1.2.3 is found as 1.2.0.3). So each entry
# is made a CIDR, a lone address getting /128 if it is IPv6 and /32 if
# not, and netwatch-server checks it with the parsing it gives its own
# TRUSTED_PROXIES. Its error, naming the CIDR, is dropped for the one
# below, naming the entry as written. set -f keeps a * in an entry from
# becoming a list of file names.
TRUSTED_PROXIES="${TRUSTED_PROXIES:-}"
set -f
for proxy in $(printf '%s' "$TRUSTED_PROXIES" | tr ',' ' '); do
case "$proxy" in
*/*) cidr="$proxy" ;;
*:*) cidr="$proxy/128" ;;
*) cidr="$proxy/32" ;;
esac
if ! netwatch-server check-cidr "$cidr" 2> /dev/null; then
echo "entrypoint: TRUSTED_PROXIES must be IP addresses or CIDRs" \
"separated by commas; '$proxy' is neither" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "set_real_ip_from $cidr;"
done > /etc/nginx/trusted-proxies.conf
# netwatch-server keeps its report files in DATA_DIR, on the /data
# volume, which may be a host directory owned by root or by another
# uid. Both are given to the netwatch user here, with the mode the
# server gives a directory it creates, so the host directory needs no
# preparing.
#
# chown and chmod, run as root, change whatever a symbolic link on the
# path points to, anywhere in the container, and the netwatch user can
# put one in /data. So the start stops unless readlink -f, which
# follows every link on a path, gives /data and DATA_DIR back as they
# are. It also writes a path in full, so a DATA_DIR with '.', '..' or
# an extra '/' in it is refused too.
export DATA_DIR="${DATA_DIR:-/data/reports}"
mkdir -p "$DATA_DIR" || exit 1
if [ "$(readlink -f /data)" != /data ] ||
[ "$(readlink -f "$DATA_DIR")" != "$DATA_DIR" ]; then
echo "entrypoint: DATA_DIR must be a full path with no '.', '..'," \
"extra '/' or symbolic link on it or on /data, not '$DATA_DIR'" >&2
exit 1
fi
chown -R netwatch:netwatch /data "$DATA_DIR" || exit 1
chmod 750 /data "$DATA_DIR" || exit 1
# A stop signal is only noted here; the loop below acts on it. # A stop signal is only noted here; the loop below acts on it.
stop_requested="" stop_requested=""
trap 'stop_requested=yes' TERM INT trap 'stop_requested=yes' TERM INT
# netwatch-server runs as the netwatch user and listens on loopback # netwatch-server runs as the netwatch user and listens on loopback
# only, on a port other than the public one; nginx.conf proxies to this # only, on a port other than the public one; nginx.conf proxies to this
# address. The netwatch user has no login shell, hence -s /bin/sh. # address. Its only client is nginx, so it takes the client address
# busybox su replaces itself with the command instead of staying on as # nginx passes on from 127.0.0.1 alone, whatever TRUSTED_PROXIES the
# its parent, so $! is the server's own PID. # container has. The netwatch user has no login shell, hence -s
BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 PORT=8081 \ # /bin/sh. busybox su replaces itself with the command instead of
# staying on as its parent, so $! is the server's own PID.
BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 PORT=8081 TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1/32 \
su -s /bin/sh netwatch -c 'exec netwatch-server' & su -s /bin/sh netwatch -c 'exec netwatch-server' &
backend=$! backend=$!
+22 -4
View File
@@ -8,13 +8,20 @@ server {
# Keep the nginx version out of the Server header and error pages. # Keep the nginx version out of the Server header and error pages.
server_tokens off; server_tokens off;
# The security headers, on every response. An add_header in a
# location drops every add_header from here, so a location with one
# of its own includes this file again.
include /etc/nginx/security-headers.conf;
root /usr/share/nginx/html; root /usr/share/nginx/html;
index index.html; index index.html;
# Trust RFC1918 reverse proxies for X-Forwarded-For # The client address comes from X-Forwarded-For only on a request
set_real_ip_from 10.0.0.0/8; # from the reverse proxies in TRUSTED_PROXIES: bin/entrypoint.sh
set_real_ip_from 172.16.0.0/12; # writes one set_real_ip_from line for each into this file, and
set_real_ip_from 192.168.0.0/16; # leaves it empty when TRUSTED_PROXIES is unset, so that by default
# the client address is the one each request comes from.
include /etc/nginx/trusted-proxies.conf;
real_ip_header X-Forwarded-For; real_ip_header X-Forwarded-For;
real_ip_recursive on; real_ip_recursive on;
@@ -30,6 +37,7 @@ server {
location /assets/ { location /assets/ {
expires 1y; expires 1y;
add_header Cache-Control "public, immutable"; add_header Cache-Control "public, immutable";
include /etc/nginx/security-headers.conf;
} }
# netwatch-server, the Go backend, runs in the same container and # netwatch-server, the Go backend, runs in the same container and
@@ -43,6 +51,16 @@ server {
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr; proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme; proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
# netwatch-server sets the same security headers on its own
# responses. Its copies are dropped so that each header goes out
# once, as security-headers.conf sets it.
proxy_hide_header Strict-Transport-Security;
proxy_hide_header Content-Security-Policy;
proxy_hide_header X-Frame-Options;
proxy_hide_header X-Content-Type-Options;
proxy_hide_header Referrer-Policy;
proxy_hide_header Permissions-Policy;
location /api/ { location /api/ {
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8081; proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8081;
} }
+25 -7
View File
@@ -3,12 +3,12 @@
# this repo. Idempotent: every install is guarded by a check so already # this repo. Idempotent: every install is guarded by a check so already
# installed tools are skipped. Base tooling comes from nix, apt, brew, # installed tools are skipped. Base tooling comes from nix, apt, brew,
# or apk (detected in that order); assumes nothing is present. Node is # or apk (detected in that order); assumes nothing is present. Node is
# used directly if installed; otherwise it is installed at a pinned # used directly if it is at least NODE_MIN_VERSION; otherwise it is
# version via nvm (installing nvm itself first, from a hash-verified # installed at a pinned version via nvm (installing nvm itself first,
# release archive, never curl | sh). Go, with its gofmt, is used # from a hash-verified release archive, never curl | sh). Go, with its
# directly if it is at least the version backend/go.mod asks for; # gofmt, is used directly if it is at least the version backend/go.mod
# otherwise the pinned Go release is installed from its hash-verified # asks for; otherwise the pinned Go release is installed from its
# archive. # hash-verified archive.
# #
# What this script installs outside the system package manager lives # What this script installs outside the system package manager lives
# under $HOME and is linked into ~/.local/bin, where make and the git # under $HOME and is linked into ~/.local/bin, where make and the git
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
# Pinned versions, 2026-07-07 # Pinned versions, 2026-07-07
NODE_VERSION="22.17.0" NODE_VERSION="22.17.0"
# The oldest node the frontend's dependencies accept: the "engines"
# field of puppeteer-core 25.5.0, the most demanding of them, asks for
# 22.12.0 or newer, 2026-09-29. An older installed node is not used.
NODE_MIN_VERSION="22.12.0"
NVM_VERSION="0.40.3" NVM_VERSION="0.40.3"
# sha256 of https://github.com/nvm-sh/nvm/archive/refs/tags/v0.40.3.tar.gz # sha256 of https://github.com/nvm-sh/nvm/archive/refs/tags/v0.40.3.tar.gz
NVM_SHA256="5f4d6aaa04a177dc93c985e31dbc411ab6b8c6e1e21d8015dbc1372625fcd1d0" NVM_SHA256="5f4d6aaa04a177dc93c985e31dbc411ab6b8c6e1e21d8015dbc1372625fcd1d0"
@@ -136,8 +140,22 @@ ensure_nvm() {
rm -rf "$tmp" rm -rf "$tmp"
} }
# node_ok: the node on PATH is at least NODE_MIN_VERSION. node itself
# compares the two: major, then minor, then patch.
node_ok() {
if missing node; then return 1; fi
node -e '
const have = process.versions.node.split(".").map(Number);
const want = process.argv[1].split(".").map(Number);
for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
if (have[i] !== want[i]) process.exit(have[i] > want[i] ? 0 : 1);
}
' "$NODE_MIN_VERSION"
}
# ensure_node: unless node_ok, install NODE_VERSION and link its node.
ensure_node() { ensure_node() {
if ! missing node; then return 0; fi if node_ok; then return 0; fi
ensure_nvm ensure_nvm
nvm_sh "nvm install $NODE_VERSION" nvm_sh "nvm install $NODE_VERSION"
link_bin "$HOME/.nvm/versions/node/v$NODE_VERSION/bin/node" node link_bin "$HOME/.nvm/versions/node/v$NODE_VERSION/bin/node" node
+20 -6
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,29 @@
#!/bin/sh #!/bin/sh
# script/cibuild: run the CI build: build the one image from Dockerfile, # script/cibuild: run the CI build. It bootstraps first: a CI runner
# whose stages run the checks as build steps (the backend's fmt-check, # checks out and runs this and nothing else, and script/fmt-check runs
# lint and tests, and the frontend's test, lint and fmt-check). This is # the formatter on the host, which a pristine checkout cannot do.
# the only build step the Gitea workflow runs. # --no-cache for the same reason as script/docker: the gate phases the
# final stage depends on are RUN steps, and a cached one is a check that
# did not run.
set -eu set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)" SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
main() { main() {
cd "$ROOT" cd "$ROOT"
timeout 300 docker build . "$SCRIPT_DIR/bootstrap"
"$SCRIPT_DIR/check"
# Own line: a failing command substitution inside an argument does
# not trip `set -e`, so the inline form degrades silently to an
# empty constant. VERSION is computed here because .dockerignore
# excludes .git, so `git describe` in a build stage yields an empty
# version without failing.
version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
docker build --no-cache \
--build-arg VERSION="$version" \
-t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
} }
main "$@" main "$@"
+5
View File
@@ -63,11 +63,16 @@ main() {
# nginx.conf is a template: the image renders it over its own # nginx.conf is a template: the image renders it over its own
# default.conf, with the same port and limit bin/entrypoint.sh uses. # default.conf, with the same port and limit bin/entrypoint.sh uses.
# The empty file it includes trusts no proxy, as bin/entrypoint.sh
# writes it when TRUSTED_PROXIES is unset. nginx.conf also includes
# the security headers, so the page runs under the shipped policy.
docker run -d --rm --name "$SERVER" \ docker run -d --rm --name "$SERVER" \
--network "$NETWORK" --network-alias netwatch \ --network "$NETWORK" --network-alias netwatch \
-e PORT=8080 -e NGINX_ENVSUBST_FILTER='^PORT$' \ -e PORT=8080 -e NGINX_ENVSUBST_FILTER='^PORT$' \
-v "$ROOT/dist:/usr/share/nginx/html:ro" \ -v "$ROOT/dist:/usr/share/nginx/html:ro" \
-v "$ROOT/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/templates/default.conf.template:ro" \ -v "$ROOT/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/templates/default.conf.template:ro" \
-v /dev/null:/etc/nginx/trusted-proxies.conf:ro \
-v "$ROOT/security-headers.conf:/etc/nginx/security-headers.conf:ro" \
"$SERVER_IMAGE" > /dev/null "$SERVER_IMAGE" > /dev/null
# The image's own entrypoint already exposes CDP on 9222 and passes # The image's own entrypoint already exposes CDP on 9222 and passes
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
# The security headers REPO_POLICIES.md requires on every response.
# nginx.conf includes this file, which Dockerfile copies to
# /etc/nginx/security-headers.conf. always sends each header on error
# responses too.
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
# Scripts and styles load only from the page's own origin. Inline ones
# are blocked, style attributes in markup included, so style elements
# through classes or element.style. data: images are for the favicon
# in index.html. connect-src is * because the browser checks each probe in
# src/main.js against it, and also every redirect the probe follows,
# and several of those hosts redirect to others; a list of hosts here
# would block those probes. It also covers the reports the page sends
# to its own origin.
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; connect-src *; img-src 'self' data:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'" always;
add_header X-Frame-Options DENY always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff always;
# The probed hosts are not told where the page is served from.
add_header Referrer-Policy no-referrer always;
add_header Permissions-Policy "accelerometer=(), camera=(), display-capture=(), geolocation=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), microphone=(), midi=(), payment=(), usb=()" always;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ function hostRowHTML(host, index, showPin = true) {
${pinBtn} ${pinBtn}
<div class="w-[420px] flex-shrink-0 grid grid-cols-[minmax(0,1fr)_auto] items-center"> <div class="w-[420px] flex-shrink-0 grid grid-cols-[minmax(0,1fr)_auto] items-center">
<div class="flex items-center gap-2 min-w-[200px]"> <div class="flex items-center gap-2 min-w-[200px]">
<div class="w-3 h-3 rounded-full flex-shrink-0" style="background-color: ${latencyHex(null)}"></div> <div class="w-3 h-3 rounded-full flex-shrink-0 bg-[#6b7280]"></div>
<span class="font-medium text-white truncate">${host.name}</span> <span class="font-medium text-white truncate">${host.name}</span>
</div> </div>
<div class="latency-value text-4xl font-bold tabular-nums text-right mt-3" data-host="${index}"> <div class="latency-value text-4xl font-bold tabular-nums text-right mt-3" data-host="${index}">