next into main (#73)

Reviewed-on: #73

.gitea/workflows/check.yml

@@ -6,5 +6,7 @@ jobs:
         steps:
             # actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-22
             - uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
-            # script/cibuild builds the image, whose stages run every check.
-            - run: script/cibuild
+            # script/cibuild bootstraps, runs every check and builds the
+            # image. script/bootstrap links what it installs into
+            # ~/.local/bin, so that has to be on PATH for the rest.
+            - run: PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH" script/cibuild

Dockerfile

@@ -68,18 +68,29 @@ FROM nginx@sha256:15e96e59aa3b0aada3a121296e3bce117721f42d88f5f64217ef4b18f458c6
 RUN addgroup -g 1000 -S netwatch && \
     adduser -u 1000 -S netwatch -G netwatch
 
+# At start-up the nginx image renders every template here into
+# conf.d; bin/entrypoint.sh says how.
 RUN rm /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
-COPY nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/netwatch.conf
+COPY nginx.conf /etc/nginx/templates/netwatch.conf.template
+COPY security-headers.conf /etc/nginx/security-headers.conf
 COPY --from=frontend /app/dist /usr/share/nginx/html
 COPY --from=builder /src/netwatch-server /usr/local/bin/netwatch-server
 COPY bin/entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh
 
+# bin/entrypoint.sh creates DATA_DIR at start and gives it and /data to
+# the netwatch user, whatever is mounted there.
 ENV DATA_DIR=/data/reports
-RUN mkdir -p /data/reports && chown -R netwatch:netwatch /data
 VOLUME /data
 
+# The default public port; PORT changes it.
 EXPOSE 8080
 
+# Requests the backend's health check through nginx, on the port from
+# PORT, so it fails unless both answer. upaas reads the result 60
+# seconds after a deploy and fails the deploy unless it is healthy.
+HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
+    CMD wget -q -O /dev/null "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT:-8080}/.well-known/healthcheck"
+
 # The nginx image stops its container with SIGQUIT; the entrypoint
 # acts on TERM and INT.
 STOPSIGNAL SIGTERM

README.md

@@ -36,12 +36,12 @@ The Go backend in `backend/` has its own `script/` directory and shim Makefile
 (see [backend/README.md](backend/README.md)). The root scripts cover both
 halves, so the root `make check` fails if either one is broken. We provide:
 
-- `script/bootstrap` — install all dependencies (pinned node via nvm if needed,
-  yarn via corepack, `yarn install --frozen-lockfile`, the pinned Go unless one
-  at least as new as `backend/go.mod` asks for is installed, and the Go
-  modules), linking what it installs itself into `~/.local/bin`, which has to be
-  on `PATH`. It installs no Go linter and not Docker: `make lint` runs the
-  linter in Docker
+- `script/bootstrap` — install all dependencies (the pinned node via nvm unless
+  one new enough for the frontend's dependencies is installed, yarn via
+  corepack, `yarn install --frozen-lockfile`, the pinned Go unless one at least
+  as new as `backend/go.mod` asks for is installed, and the Go modules), linking
+  what it installs itself into `~/.local/bin`, which has to be on `PATH`. It
+  installs no Go linter and not Docker: `make lint` runs the linter in Docker
 - `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development: bootstrap plus the
   git pre-commit hook
 - `script/projectname` — print the project name (used for the Docker image tag)
@@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ halves, so the root `make check` fails if either one is broken. We provide:
   `script/check`: it needs Docker and takes minutes.
 - `script/docker` — build the image from `Dockerfile` without the build cache,
   tagged `netwatch` via `script/projectname`
-- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: builds the image
+- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: runs `script/bootstrap` and `script/check`,
+  then builds the image as `script/docker` does, without the build cache
 - `script/precommit` — run by the git pre-commit hook; runs `script/check`
 - `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook
 
@@ -184,16 +185,55 @@ container: nginx serves the built frontend and passes `/api/` and
 only inside the container, on `127.0.0.1:8081`. The image:
 
 - Listens on port 8080 by default (override with `PORT` env var)
-- Trusts `X-Forwarded-For` from RFC1918 reverse proxies (10/8, 172.16/12,
-  192.168/16)
+- Takes the client address from `X-Forwarded-For` only on requests from the
+  reverse proxies named in `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, and by default from none
 - Sends access logs to stdout
 - Caches static assets with immutable headers
+- Sends the security headers `REPO_POLICIES.md` requires on every response, as
+  `security-headers.conf` sets them, in place of the backend's own
 - Stores reports in `DATA_DIR`, `/data/reports` by default, on the `/data`
-  volume. The backend runs as user `netwatch` (uid 1000), so a directory
-  bind-mounted at `/data` must be writable by uid 1000
+  volume. Before the backend starts, the image creates `DATA_DIR` and gives it
+  and `/data` to user `netwatch` (uid 1000), which the backend runs as, so a
+  host directory bind-mounted at `/data` ends up owned by uid 1000
 - Writes buffered reports to disk on `docker stop`, and exits non-zero if nginx
   or the backend exits on its own, so the platform restarts it
 
+## Running under upaas
+
+What the [upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) app for netwatch needs:
+
+- **Port:** container port `8080`.
+- **Volume:** container path `/data`; the reports are kept in `/data/reports`.
+- **Environment variables:** none is required. An empty one counts as unset, and
+  one set to a value netwatch cannot use stops the container at start, with the
+  reason in its log.
+    - `PORT`, default `8080`: the container port, from 1 to 65535. `8081` cannot
+      be used: the backend listens on it inside the container
+    - `REPORTS_PER_MINUTE`, default `60`: reports each client address may send a
+      minute
+    - `DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES`, default `1073741824` (1 GiB): the most room the
+      report files may take
+    - `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`, default empty: other origins whose pages may call
+      the API
+    - `DEBUG`, default `false`: debug logging
+    - `DATA_DIR`, default `/data/reports`: leave unset; reports kept outside
+      `/data` do not survive a redeploy
+    - `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, default empty: set it to the address the reverse proxy
+      in front of the container connects from, as an IP address or CIDR; several
+      are separated by commas. nginx takes the client address from
+      `X-Forwarded-For` only on a request from one of them, and the rate limit
+      counts that address. Unset, `X-Forwarded-For` is ignored and every client
+      behind the proxy shares the proxy's one allowance of `REPORTS_PER_MINUTE`.
+      Name only addresses nothing but the proxy connects from: any client that
+      connects from one can write its own `X-Forwarded-For`, and through a port
+      Docker publishes, every client may connect from the Docker network's
+      gateway, such as `172.17.0.1`.
+- **Health check:** the image's `HEALTHCHECK` requests
+  `/.well-known/healthcheck` through nginx every 30 seconds, so it fails unless
+  both nginx and the backend answer. upaas reads the container's health 60
+  seconds after a deploy and fails the deploy unless it is `healthy`. The
+  container also stops when either process exits.
+
 ## Browser Compatibility
 
 Requires a modern browser with ES modules, Fetch API, Canvas API, and CSS custom

TODO.md

@@ -23,6 +23,85 @@ latest run passes.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
+- 2026-09-29: the container sets up its own data directory (issue #75):
+  `bin/entrypoint.sh`, still as root, creates `DATA_DIR` if missing and gives it
+  and `/data` to the `netwatch` user with mode 750 before starting the backend
+  as that user, so an empty host directory owned by root, or one holding files
+  from another uid, works with no step on the host. It stops the start instead
+  when a symbolic link is on the path to `DATA_DIR`, since root would change
+  whatever the link points to. The `README.md` first-run step that created and
+  chowned the host directory is gone, and the image no longer sets that
+  ownership at build time
+- 2026-09-29: CI can no longer pass on checks that did not run (issue #37):
+  `script/cibuild` is now the org model, byte for byte. It runs
+  `script/bootstrap` and `script/check`, then builds the image with `--no-cache`
+  and the version from `git describe` as the `VERSION` build argument, where it
+  used to be a plain `docker build .` whose check steps could come from the
+  build cache. The workflow puts `~/.local/bin`, where bootstrap links what it
+  installs, on the step's `PATH`, and bootstrap now installs its pinned node
+  when the installed one is older than the frontend's dependencies need
+- 2026-09-29: `backend/.golangci.yml` re-vendored from `sneak/prompts` (issue
+  #41): `gomodguard`, deprecated in golangci-lint v2.12.0, is disabled and its
+  successor `gomodguard_v2` enabled with the org block list, so lint runs print
+  no deprecation warning. The new file also turns `depguard` on with its
+  `test-support` rule, which keeps `net/http/httptest` out of non-test code;
+  netwatch adds no entries of its own to that rule. `backend/script/lint` checks
+  the new sha256
+- 2026-09-29: nginx sends the security headers `REPO_POLICIES.md` requires on
+  every response (issue #18), including errors, `/assets/` and what it passes on
+  from the backend, whose own copies it drops so each header goes out once. They
+  live in `security-headers.conf`, which `nginx.conf` includes. The content
+  security policy allows no inline script or style, so the status dot's grey in
+  `src/main.js` is now a class; `connect-src` is `*` because probed hosts
+  redirect to others, and the browser checks each redirect against it
+- 2026-09-29: the request log is bounded (issue #60): the method, URL, protocol,
+  `User-Agent`, `Referer`, request ID (which chi takes from the client's
+  `X-Request-Id` header) and client address it writes are each cut to 128 bytes,
+  the bound the report handler already used, so one request can no longer put
+  about 1 MiB per field into a log line. That bound and its helper now live in
+  the `logger` package, shared by both
+- 2026-09-29: nginx takes the client address from `X-Forwarded-For` only on
+  requests from the reverse proxies named in the container's `TRUSTED_PROXIES`
+  (issue #64), and by default from none, where it trusted every RFC1918 address
+  before, so a client could write a new address on each request and escape the
+  rate limit. `bin/entrypoint.sh` writes one `set_real_ip_from` line per entry
+  into `/etc/nginx/trusted-proxies.conf`, which `nginx.conf` includes, refusing
+  an entry that is not an IP address or CIDR, as `netwatch-server check-cidr`
+  finds; it starts the backend with `TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1/32`, since nginx
+  is its only client
+- 2026-09-29: report file names can no longer collide (issue #61): each is
+  `reports-<timestamp>-<number>.jsonl.zst`, where the number goes up by one for
+  each file the server starts to write, so two flushes in the same millisecond,
+  such as a flush for size and the final flush at shutdown, each get a file of
+  their own instead of the second one failing. A failed write uses up its
+  number, leaving a gap if the file could not be created and otherwise a file
+  under that number that may be incomplete.
+- 2026-09-29: ready to run under upaas (issue #59): the image has a
+  `HEALTHCHECK` that requests `/.well-known/healthcheck` through nginx on the
+  port from `PORT`. The backend no longer reads a bad `PORT` as 0 or a bad
+  `DEBUG` as false: those, and a `BIND_ADDRESS` that is not an IP address, stop
+  it from starting with an error naming the variable, as the limits,
+  `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` and, now by name, `TRUSTED_PROXIES` already did.
+  `bin/entrypoint.sh` also refuses a `PORT` outside 1 to 65535, and `8081`,
+  where the backend listens inside the container, naming `PORT`. `README.md` has
+  a "Running under upaas" section, whose first-run steps create the host
+  directory for `/data` owned by uid 1000; the image does not change its owner
+- 2026-09-29: nginx listens on `PORT` (issue #26), 8080 when unset or empty: the
+  nginx image renders `nginx.conf` as a template at container start, filling in
+  `PORT` and no other variable. `bin/entrypoint.sh` refuses to start when `PORT`
+  is not digits only. `server_tokens off` keeps the nginx version out of
+  responses. `script/frontend-viewport-test` renders the template the same way.
+  Gzip and a `50x.html` error page are not added
+- 2026-09-29: bounded the report endpoint (issue #20): `POST /api/v1/reports`
+  still needs no credentials, but each client address, as resolved through
+  `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, may send `REPORTS_PER_MINUTE` (default 60) reports a
+  minute, counted by `go-chi/httprate`, and past that gets 429 with
+  `Retry-After`; the report files in `DATA_DIR`, counted from start with those
+  already there, may total at most `DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES` (default 1 GiB), past
+  which reports get 507; and the wildcard CORS is gone: no CORS headers unless
+  `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` lists origins, and an entry that is not a plain
+  `scheme://host[:port]` origin, `*` included, stops the server from starting.
+  Deleting report files frees room only at the next start; pruning is issue #54
 - 2026-09-28: one container image (issue #52): the root `Dockerfile` builds the
   only image, and `Dockerfile.backend` is gone. nginx serves the frontend on
   port 8080 and proxies `/api/` and `/.well-known/healthcheck` to the backend,
@@ -136,9 +215,3 @@ latest run passes.
   (main always green policy)
 - Decide what to do with untracked resume.sh: commit it, gitignore it, or delete
   it
-- Upstream fix needed in `sneak/prompts`: the org-standard `.golangci.yml`
-  enables `gomodguard`, which golangci-lint v2.12.2 reports as deprecated since
-  v2.12.0 and replaced by `gomodguard_v2`, so every backend lint run prints a
-  deprecation warning. The file is standardized and must never be edited in this
-  repo, so nothing can be done here beyond tracking it — tracked at
-  <https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/netwatch/issues/41>

backend/.golangci.yml

@@ -10,14 +10,20 @@ run:
 
 linters:
   default: all
+  enable:
+    # Successor to the deprecated gomodguard. Named explicitly, rather than
+    # left to `default: all`, because it carries the module policy below.
+    - gomodguard_v2
   disable:
     # Genuinely incompatible with project patterns
     - exhaustruct      # Requires all struct fields
-    - depguard         # Dependency allow/block lists
     - godot            # Requires comments to end with periods
-    - wsl              # Deprecated, replaced by wsl_v5
     - wrapcheck        # Too verbose for internal packages
     - varnamelen       # Short names like db, id are idiomatic Go
+    # Deprecated: the warning is attached to the old name, so it is
+    # silenced by disabling that name, not by enabling the successor.
+    - wsl              # Deprecated, replaced by wsl_v5
+    - gomodguard       # Deprecated, replaced by gomodguard_v2
   settings:
     lll:
       line-length: 88
@@ -28,6 +34,64 @@ linters:
       max-complexity: 15
     dupl:
       threshold: 100
+    depguard:
+      # Test-support code must not be compiled into the shipped binary. A
+      # test-support package exists to hand a test privileges the program
+      # itself must never have, so a file that is not a test must not import
+      # one. Test files, and the files inside a package whose directory name
+      # ends in `test`, are where that code belongs, and are exempt.
+      #
+      # The deny list below is the one part of this file a repository is
+      # expected to extend, and the only part it may. depguard matches an
+      # import path against a list of prefixes, so it cannot be told "any path
+      # whose last segment ends in test"; a repository's own test-support
+      # packages have to be named here one at a time, by full import path,
+      # under a module path that differs from repository to repository. Add
+      # them; change nothing else.
+      rules:
+        test-support:
+          list-mode: lax
+          files:
+            - "$all"
+            - "!$test"
+            - "!**/*test/**"
+          deny:
+            - pkg: net/http/httptest
+              desc: >-
+                Test-support code belongs in test files and in packages whose
+                directory name ends in test, not in the shipped binary.
+    # Only decisions already recorded in the Go package defaults are
+    # listed here. Every entry matches the module path exactly.
+    gomodguard_v2:
+      blocked:
+        - module: github.com/rs/zerolog
+          recommendations:
+            - log/slog
+          reason: "Structured logging is stdlib log/slog."
+        # One entry per pre-fork module path, because the later releases
+        # are separate paths. A prefix match would be shorter but would
+        # also reach github.com/go-redis/redismock, the test double for
+        # the successor these entries recommend.
+        - module: github.com/go-redis/redis
+          recommendations:
+            - github.com/redis/go-redis/v9
+          reason: "Pre-fork module; use the maintained go-redis v9."
+        - module: github.com/go-redis/redis/v7
+          recommendations:
+            - github.com/redis/go-redis/v9
+          reason: "Pre-fork module; use the maintained go-redis v9."
+        - module: github.com/go-redis/redis/v8
+          recommendations:
+            - github.com/redis/go-redis/v9
+          reason: "Pre-fork module; use the maintained go-redis v9."
+        - module: github.com/sergi/go-diff
+          recommendations:
+            - github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff
+          reason: "No unified diff output; use go-udiff."
+        - module: github.com/hexops/gotextdiff
+          recommendations:
+            - github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff
+          reason: "Unmaintained fork; use go-udiff."
 
 issues:
   max-issues-per-linter: 0

backend/README.md

@@ -76,17 +76,25 @@ Internal packages in `internal/` follow standard Go project layout:
 ### Configuration
 
 | Variable               | Default              | Description                                                                                              |
-| ----------------- | -------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| ---------------------- | -------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | `BIND_ADDRESS`         | empty                | IP address to listen on; empty listens on every interface                                                |
 | `PORT`                 | `8080`               | HTTP listen port                                                                                         |
 | `DATA_DIR`             | `./data/reports`     | Directory for compressed reports                                                                         |
+| `DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES`   | `1073741824` (1 GiB) | Largest total size of the report files in `DATA_DIR`; see [Report limits](#report-limits)                |
 | `DEBUG`                | `false`              | Enable debug logging                                                                                     |
 | `TRUSTED_PROXIES`      | loopback + RFC1918   | Comma-separated CIDRs whose `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` headers are trusted for client IP resolution |
+| `REPORTS_PER_MINUTE`   | `60`                 | Reports each client address may send a minute; see [Report limits](#report-limits)                       |
+| `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | empty                | Comma-separated origins whose pages may call the API; see [CORS](#cors)                                  |
 
 `TRUSTED_PROXIES` defaults to `127.0.0.1/32,::1/128,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`.
-The loopback entries cover the reverse proxy that shares the container; the
-RFC1918 ranges match `nginx.conf`. A request whose direct peer is outside this
-set has its forwarded headers ignored, and the direct peer is logged instead.
+The loopback entries cover a reverse proxy on the same host. A request whose
+direct peer is outside this set has its forwarded headers ignored, and the
+direct peer is logged and rate-limited instead. The container image does not use
+this default; see [Container image](#container-image).
+
+A variable set to a value the server cannot use, such as `PORT=abc`,
+`DEBUG=maybe` or a `BIND_ADDRESS` that is not an IP address, stops it from
+starting, with an error naming the variable. An empty variable counts as unset.
 
 ### Container image
 
@@ -94,14 +102,68 @@ The root `Dockerfile` builds one image in which nginx listens on the public port
 8080, serves the frontend, and proxies `/api/` and `/.well-known/healthcheck` to
 this server. The image's entrypoint, `bin/entrypoint.sh`, starts the server as
 user `netwatch` (uid 1000) with `BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1` and `PORT=8081`, so
-only nginx reaches it. `DATA_DIR` is `/data/reports`, on the `/data` volume,
-which `netwatch` owns.
+only nginx reaches it, and with `TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1/32`, so it takes the
+client address nginx passes on and no other. `DATA_DIR` is `/data/reports`, on
+the `/data` volume; the entrypoint creates it and gives it and `/data` to
+`netwatch` before starting the server. nginx replaces the security headers
+this server sets with those in the root `security-headers.conf`, so those are
+what clients of the image see.
+
+The container's own `TRUSTED_PROXIES` goes to nginx instead: IP addresses or
+CIDRs, separated by commas, of the reverse proxies in front of the container.
+nginx takes the client address from `X-Forwarded-For` only on a request from one
+of them. Unset or empty, nginx trusts no proxy, and the client address is the
+one each request comes from, so every client behind a proxy shares one rate
+limit. An entry that is not an IP address or CIDR, such as a hostname or
+`1.2.3`, stops the container at start with an error naming `TRUSTED_PROXIES`:
+the entrypoint checks each entry with `netwatch-server check-cidr`, which parses
+it as this server parses its own `TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
 
 ### Report storage
 
-Reports are written as `reports-<timestamp>.jsonl.zst` files in `DATA_DIR`.
-Each file contains one JSON object per line, compressed with zstd. Files are
-created with `O_EXCL` to prevent overwrites.
+Reports are written as `reports-<timestamp>-<number>.jsonl.zst` files in
+`DATA_DIR`. The timestamp is in UTC to the millisecond, so the names sort by
+time. The number starts at 1 when the server starts and goes up by one for each
+file the server starts to write, so two files written in the same millisecond
+still get different names. A failed write uses up its number, leaving a gap in
+the numbers if the file could not be created and otherwise a file under that
+number that may be incomplete. Each file contains one JSON object per line,
+compressed with zstd. Files are created with `O_EXCL` to prevent overwrites.
+
+### Report limits
+
+`POST /api/v1/reports` takes reports from anyone who can reach it, without
+credentials, so it is bounded instead. Both refusals below answer with the same
+`{"status":"error"}` body as any other error.
+
+- **Rate limit.** Each client address, resolved through `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, may
+  send `REPORTS_PER_MINUTE` reports a minute; past that it gets 429 with
+  `Retry-After: 60`. The minute slides: reports from the minute before still
+  count, fading out over the current one, so an address is sure never to be
+  refused only while it sends at most half of `REPORTS_PER_MINUTE` in any 60
+  seconds. The page sends one report a minute from each open tab, so the default
+  of 60 refuses nothing from up to 30 tabs behind one address, such as a
+  household or an office sharing it, however their reports bunch up. Report
+  responses also carry `X-RateLimit-Limit`, `X-RateLimit-Remaining` and
+  `X-RateLimit-Reset` headers.
+- **Size cap.** The report files in `DATA_DIR` may total at most
+  `DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES`, counting the files already there at start. Reports
+  waiting in memory count at their uncompressed size until they are written, so
+  a report that would take the total past the cap is refused with 507, and
+  nothing of it is stored. Deleting report files frees room only at the next
+  start, when the files are counted again. The default of 1 GiB is small enough
+  for any host; set it to the space you can give `DATA_DIR`.
+
+### CORS
+
+The page calls the API from the origin it is served from, so by default the
+server sends no CORS headers, and browsers let no other origin's pages call it.
+To serve the page from elsewhere, list that origin in `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`
+(for example `https://netwatch.example.com`); pages from a listed origin may
+`GET` and `POST` with a `Content-Type` header. Each entry must be a plain
+origin, `scheme://host` with an optional `:port`, as browsers send it: no path,
+not even a trailing `/`, and no `*`. Any other entry stops the server from
+starting, with an error naming `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`.
 
 ## TODO
 

backend/cmd/netwatch-server/main.go

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 package main
 
 import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/globals"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/handlers"
@@ -22,6 +25,19 @@ var (
 )
 
 func main() {
+	// "netwatch-server check-cidr CIDR" exits 1, with the error, if
+	// this server would refuse CIDR in its TRUSTED_PROXIES.
+	// bin/entrypoint.sh runs it on each entry it gives nginx.
+	if len(os.Args) == 3 && os.Args[1] == "check-cidr" {
+		_, err := middleware.ParseTrustedProxies(os.Args[2:])
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
+			os.Exit(1)
+		}
+
+		return
+	}
+
 	globals.Appname = Appname
 	globals.Version = Version
 	globals.Buildarch = Buildarch

backend/go.mod

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ go 1.25.5
 require (
 	github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.5
 	github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.2
+	github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.16.0
 	github.com/joho/godotenv v1.5.1
 	github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.4
 	github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ require (
 require (
 	github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.9.0 // indirect
 	github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.4.0 // indirect
+	github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10 // indirect
 	github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.4 // indirect
 	github.com/sagikazarmark/locafero v0.11.0 // indirect
 	github.com/sourcegraph/conc v0.3.1-0.20240121214520-5f936abd7ae8 // indirect
@@ -21,10 +23,11 @@ require (
 	github.com/spf13/cast v1.10.0 // indirect
 	github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.10 // indirect
 	github.com/subosito/gotenv v1.6.0 // indirect
+	github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2 // indirect
 	go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0 // indirect
 	go.uber.org/multierr v1.10.0 // indirect
 	go.uber.org/zap v1.26.0 // indirect
 	go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/sys v0.29.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.30.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/text v0.28.0 // indirect
 )

backend/go.sum

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.5 h1:Eg4myHZBjyvJmAFjFvWgrqDTXFyOzjj7YIm3L3mu6Ug=
 github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.5/go.mod h1:X7Gx4mteadT3eDOMTsXzmI4/rwUpOwBHLpAfupzFJP0=
 github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.2 h1:Jmey33TE+b+rB7fT8MUy1u0I4L+NARQlK6LhzKPSyQE=
 github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.2/go.mod h1:sSbTewc+6wYHBBCW7ytsFSn836hqM7JxpglAy2Vzc58=
+github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.16.0 h1:8V5DH9j6pSK6UQoBsTpvMyFxycqaKEIToyPKzHJjUa8=
+github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.16.0/go.mod h1:A8lo+qRhk+s9LiuP5saS7XCGDXRXMcrueq0NfIuCa/I=
 github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.4.0 h1:EBsztssimR/CONLSZZ04E8qAkxNYq4Qp9LvH92wZUgs=
 github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.4.0/go.mod h1:oJDH3BJKyqBA2TXFhDsKDGDTlndYOZ6rGS0BRZIxGhM=
 github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0 h1:ofyhxvXcZhMsU5ulbFiLKl/XBFqE1GSq7atu8tAmTRI=
@@ -16,6 +18,8 @@ github.com/joho/godotenv v1.5.1 h1:7eLL/+HRGLY0ldzfGMeQkb7vMd0as4CfYvUVzLqw0N0=
 github.com/joho/godotenv v1.5.1/go.mod h1:f4LDr5Voq0i2e/R5DDNOoa2zzDfwtkZa6DnEwAbqwq4=
 github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.4 h1:RPhnKRAQ4Fh8zU2FY/6ZFDwTVTxgJ/EMydqSTzE9a2c=
 github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.4/go.mod h1:R0h/fSBs8DE4ENlcrlib3PsXS61voFxhIs2DeRhCvJ4=
+github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10 h1:tBs3QSyvjDyFTq3uoc/9xFpCuOsJQFNPiAhYdw2skhE=
+github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10/go.mod h1:hqwkgyIinND0mEev00jJYCxPNVRVXFQeu1XKlok6oO0=
 github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1 h1:flRD4NNwYAUpkphVc1HcthR4KEIFJ65n8Mw5qdRn3LE=
 github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1/go.mod h1:hoEshYVHaxMs3cyo3Yncou5ZscifuDolrwPKZanG3xk=
 github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 h1:5Nx0Ya0ZqY2ygV366QzturHI13Jq95ApcVaJBhpS+AY=
@@ -42,6 +46,10 @@ github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 h1:7s2iGBzp5EwR7/aIZr8ao5+dra3wiQyKjjFuvgVKu
 github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1/go.mod h1:wZwfW3scLgRK+23gO65QZefKpKQRnfz6sD981Nm4B6U=
 github.com/subosito/gotenv v1.6.0 h1:9NlTDc1FTs4qu0DDq7AEtTPNw6SVm7uBMsUCUjABIf8=
 github.com/subosito/gotenv v1.6.0/go.mod h1:Dk4QP5c2W3ibzajGcXpNraDfq2IrhjMIvMSWPKKo0FU=
+github.com/zeebo/assert v1.3.0 h1:g7C04CbJuIDKNPFHmsk4hwZDO5O+kntRxzaUoNXj+IQ=
+github.com/zeebo/assert v1.3.0/go.mod h1:Pq9JiuJQpG8JLJdtkwrJESF0Foym2/D9XMU5ciN/wJ0=
+github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2 h1:xZmwmqxHZA8AI603jOQ0tMqmBr9lPeFwGg6d+xy9DC0=
+github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2/go.mod h1:5NWz9Sef7zIDm2JHfFlcQvNekmcEl9ekUZQQKCYaDcA=
 go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0 h1:BACLhebsYdpQ7IROQ1AGPjrXcP5dF80U3gKoFzbaq/4=
 go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0/go.mod h1:Us0rSJiThwCv2GteUN0Q7OKvU7n5J4dxZ9JKUXozFdE=
 go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0 h1:wE8mruvpg2kiiL1Vqd0CC+tr0/24XIB10Iwp2lLWzkg=
@@ -54,8 +62,8 @@ go.uber.org/zap v1.26.0 h1:sI7k6L95XOKS281NhVKOFCUNIvv9e0w4BF8N3u+tCRo=
 go.uber.org/zap v1.26.0/go.mod h1:dtElttAiwGvoJ/vj4IwHBS/gXsEu/pZ50mUIRWuG0so=
 go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4 h1:tfq32ie2Jv2UxXFdLJdh3jXuOzWiL1fo0bu/FbuKpbc=
 go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4/go.mod h1:DhzuOOF2ATzADvBadXxruRBLzYTpT36CKvDb3+aBEFg=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.29.0 h1:TPYlXGxvx1MGTn2GiZDhnjPA9wZzZeGKHHmKhHYvgaU=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.29.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.30.0 h1:QjkSwP/36a20jFYWkSue1YwXzLmsV5Gfq7Eiy72C1uc=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.30.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
 golang.org/x/text v0.28.0 h1:rhazDwis8INMIwQ4tpjLDzUhx6RlXqZNPEM0huQojng=
 golang.org/x/text v0.28.0/go.mod h1:U8nCwOR8jO/marOQ0QbDiOngZVEBB7MAiitBuMjXiNU=
 gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=

backend/internal/config/config.go

@@ -4,7 +4,12 @@ package config
 
 import (
 	"errors"
+	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
+	"math"
+	"net/netip"
+	"net/url"
+	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/globals"
@@ -16,13 +21,31 @@ import (
 )
 
 // defaultTrustedProxies lists the networks whose forwarded
-// headers are honoured by default. It covers the RFC1918
-// ranges (to match nginx.conf) plus IPv4 and IPv6 loopback,
-// because the reverse proxy shares the container and reaches
-// the backend over loopback.
+// headers are honoured by default: IPv4 and IPv6 loopback,
+// for a reverse proxy on the same host, and the RFC1918
+// ranges. The container image does not use it:
+// bin/entrypoint.sh gives the server 127.0.0.1/32, since
+// nginx is its only client there.
 const defaultTrustedProxies = "127.0.0.1/32,::1/128," +
 	"10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
 
+// Default limits on stored reports; backend/README.md gives the
+// reasons for these values.
+const (
+	defaultReportsPerMinute = 60
+	defaultDataDirMaxBytes  = 1 << 30 // 1 GiB
+)
+
+var (
+	errNotPositive = errors.New("must be a positive whole number")
+	errNotOrigin   = errors.New(
+		"must be an origin, scheme://host with an optional port",
+	)
+	errNotPort = errors.New("must be a port number, 1 to 65535")
+	errNotBool = errors.New("must be true or false")
+	errNotIP   = errors.New("must be an IP address, or empty")
+)
+
 // Params defines the dependencies for Config.
 type Params struct {
 	fx.In
@@ -34,11 +57,14 @@ type Params struct {
 // Config holds the resolved application configuration.
 type Config struct {
 	BindAddress        string
+	CORSAllowedOrigins []string
 	DataDir            string
+	DataDirMaxBytes    int64
 	Debug              bool
 	MetricsPassword    string
 	MetricsUsername    string
 	Port               int
+	ReportsPerMinute   int
 	SentryDSN          string
 	TrustedProxies     []string
 	log                *slog.Logger
@@ -46,7 +72,8 @@ type Config struct {
 }
 
 // New loads configuration from env, .env files, and config
-// files, returning a fully resolved Config.
+// files, returning a fully resolved Config. It fails, with an error
+// naming the setting, on a value the server cannot use.
 func New(
 	_ fx.Lifecycle,
 	params Params,
@@ -61,11 +88,15 @@ func New(
 
 	viper.AutomaticEnv()
 
+	// An empty CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS allows no other origin.
+	viper.SetDefault("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS", "")
 	viper.SetDefault("DATA_DIR", "./data/reports")
+	viper.SetDefault("DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES", defaultDataDirMaxBytes)
 	viper.SetDefault("DEBUG", "false")
 	// An empty BIND_ADDRESS listens on every interface.
 	viper.SetDefault("BIND_ADDRESS", "")
 	viper.SetDefault("PORT", "8080")
+	viper.SetDefault("REPORTS_PER_MINUTE", defaultReportsPerMinute)
 	viper.SetDefault("SENTRY_DSN", "")
 	viper.SetDefault("METRICS_USERNAME", "")
 	viper.SetDefault("METRICS_PASSWORD", "")
@@ -80,19 +111,41 @@ func New(
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Read with strconv: viper's GetInt and GetBool would read a value
+	// they cannot parse as 0 or false instead of failing.
+	port, err := strconv.Atoi(viper.GetString("PORT"))
+	if err != nil || port < 1 || port > math.MaxUint16 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("PORT %q: %w",
+			viper.GetString("PORT"), errNotPort)
+	}
+
+	debug, err := strconv.ParseBool(viper.GetString("DEBUG"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("DEBUG %q: %w",
+			viper.GetString("DEBUG"), errNotBool)
+	}
+
 	s := &Config{
 		BindAddress:        viper.GetString("BIND_ADDRESS"),
+		CORSAllowedOrigins: splitList(viper.GetString("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS")),
 		DataDir:            viper.GetString("DATA_DIR"),
-		Debug:           viper.GetBool("DEBUG"),
+		DataDirMaxBytes:    viper.GetInt64("DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES"),
+		Debug:              debug,
 		MetricsPassword:    viper.GetString("METRICS_PASSWORD"),
 		MetricsUsername:    viper.GetString("METRICS_USERNAME"),
-		Port:            viper.GetInt("PORT"),
+		Port:               port,
+		ReportsPerMinute:   viper.GetInt("REPORTS_PER_MINUTE"),
 		SentryDSN:          viper.GetString("SENTRY_DSN"),
 		TrustedProxies:     splitList(viper.GetString("TRUSTED_PROXIES")),
 		log:                log,
 		params:             &params,
 	}
 
+	err = s.check()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
 	if s.Debug {
 		params.Logger.EnableDebugLogging()
 		s.log = params.Logger.Get()
@@ -101,6 +154,51 @@ func New(
 	return s, nil
 }
 
+// check fails with an error naming the first setting here whose value
+// the server cannot use. New checks PORT and DEBUG as it reads them,
+// and the middleware checks TRUSTED_PROXIES as it parses it.
+func (s *Config) check() error {
+	// viper reads a value that is not a number as 0, so this also
+	// catches a mistyped setting.
+	if s.ReportsPerMinute <= 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("REPORTS_PER_MINUTE %q: %w",
+			viper.GetString("REPORTS_PER_MINUTE"), errNotPositive)
+	}
+
+	if s.DataDirMaxBytes <= 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES %q: %w",
+			viper.GetString("DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES"), errNotPositive)
+	}
+
+	if s.BindAddress != "" {
+		_, err := netip.ParseAddr(s.BindAddress)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("BIND_ADDRESS %q: %w", s.BindAddress, errNotIP)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return checkOrigins(s.CORSAllowedOrigins)
+}
+
+// checkOrigins fails on the first CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS entry that is
+// not a plain origin, scheme://host with an optional port, as browsers
+// send it; anything more, such as a trailing "/", would match no page.
+// go-chi/cors reads a "*" anywhere in an entry as a wildcard, so no
+// entry may contain one.
+func checkOrigins(origins []string) error {
+	for _, origin := range origins {
+		u, err := url.Parse(origin)
+		if err != nil || u.Scheme == "" || u.Host == "" ||
+			strings.Contains(origin, "*") ||
+			origin != u.Scheme+"://"+u.Host {
+			return fmt.Errorf("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS %q: %w",
+				origin, errNotOrigin)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
 // splitList turns a comma-separated setting into a trimmed
 // slice, dropping empty entries.
 func splitList(raw string) []string {

backend/internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+package config_test
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/globals"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/logger"
+
+	"go.uber.org/fx"
+)
+
+// requireConfigError builds the config as main does and fails the
+// test unless that fails with an error naming setting. It uses
+// fx.New, because fxtest.New fails the test itself on an error.
+func requireConfigError(t *testing.T, setting string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	app := fx.New(
+		fx.NopLogger,
+		fx.Provide(globals.New, logger.New, config.New),
+		fx.Invoke(func(*config.Config) {}),
+	)
+
+	err := app.Err()
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), setting) {
+		t.Fatalf("config error = %v, want one naming %s", err, setting)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSettingsLoadAsGiven: valid values pass the checks and are used
+// as given. bin/entrypoint.sh starts the server with these
+// BIND_ADDRESS and PORT values.
+func TestSettingsLoadAsGiven(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("BIND_ADDRESS", "127.0.0.1")
+	t.Setenv("PORT", "8081")
+	t.Setenv("DEBUG", "true")
+
+	var cfg *config.Config
+
+	app := fx.New(
+		fx.NopLogger,
+		fx.Provide(globals.New, logger.New, config.New),
+		fx.Populate(&cfg),
+	)
+
+	err := app.Err()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("config error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.BindAddress != "127.0.0.1" || cfg.Port != 8081 || !cfg.Debug {
+		t.Fatalf("BindAddress, Port, Debug = %q, %d, %t; "+
+			"want \"127.0.0.1\", 8081, true",
+			cfg.BindAddress, cfg.Port, cfg.Debug)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPortMustBeAPortNumber: viper reads a value that is not a number
+// as 0, on which the server would listen on a random port.
+func TestPortMustBeAPortNumber(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, value := range []string{"abc", "0", "65536", "8080.5"} {
+		t.Run(value, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv("PORT", value)
+
+			requireConfigError(t, "PORT")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDebugMustBeTrueOrFalse: viper reads any other value, such as
+// "yes", as false.
+func TestDebugMustBeTrueOrFalse(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("DEBUG", "yes")
+
+	requireConfigError(t, "DEBUG")
+}
+
+// TestBindAddressMustBeAnIPAddress: a host name would be looked up
+// only once the server starts listening, and a mistyped one would stop
+// it then with an error that does not name the setting.
+func TestBindAddressMustBeAnIPAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("BIND_ADDRESS", "localhost")
+
+	requireConfigError(t, "BIND_ADDRESS")
+}
+
+// TestReportsPerMinuteMustBePositive: unchecked, zero would panic
+// when the routes are built, and a negative rate would lift the
+// limit.
+func TestReportsPerMinuteMustBePositive(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("REPORTS_PER_MINUTE", "0")
+
+	requireConfigError(t, "REPORTS_PER_MINUTE")
+}
+
+// TestDataDirMaxBytesMustBeANumber: viper reads a value that is not
+// a number, such as "1GB", as 0, which would refuse every report.
+func TestDataDirMaxBytesMustBeANumber(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES", "1GB")
+
+	requireConfigError(t, "DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES")
+}
+
+// TestCORSAllowedOriginsMustBeOrigins: "*" would let every origin in,
+// and an entry that is not a plain origin would match no page.
+func TestCORSAllowedOriginsMustBeOrigins(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, entry := range []string{
+		"*",
+		"https://*.netwatch.example",
+		"netwatch.example",
+		"https://netwatch.example/",
+	} {
+		t.Run(entry, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS", entry)
+
+			requireConfigError(t, "CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS")
+		})
+	}
+}

backend/internal/handlers/export_test.go

@@ -2,9 +2,6 @@ package handlers
 
 import "log/slog"
 
-// MaxLoggedFieldBytes exposes the log bound to the external tests.
-const MaxLoggedFieldBytes = maxLoggedFieldBytes
-
 // NewForTest builds a Handlers around a report sink and logger,
 // bypassing the fx graph so handler behaviour (including the
 // storage failure path) is exercisable in unit tests.

backend/internal/handlers/report.go

@@ -4,12 +4,10 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"net/http"
-)
 
-// maxLoggedFieldBytes bounds untrusted text (string fields,
-// decode error text) before it is logged, so a caller cannot
-// inflate log volume with an oversized value.
-const maxLoggedFieldBytes = 128
+	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/logger"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/reportbuf"
+)
 
 type reportSample struct {
 	T       int64   `json:"t"`
@@ -55,10 +53,9 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleReport() http.HandlerFunc {
 
 		err = s.buf.Append(rpt)
 		if err != nil {
-			s.log.Error("failed to buffer report", "error", err)
 			s.respondJSON(w, r,
 				&response{Status: "error"},
-				http.StatusInternalServerError,
+				s.appendErrorStatus(err),
 			)
 
 			return
@@ -82,12 +79,27 @@ func (s *Handlers) decodeErrorStatus(err error) int {
 	// The decoder's error text can quote request bytes (a whole
 	// oversized number, for example), so it is bounded too.
 	s.log.Error("failed to decode report",
-		"error", boundedForLog(err.Error()),
+		"error", logger.BoundedForLog(err.Error()),
 	)
 
 	return http.StatusBadRequest
 }
 
+// appendErrorStatus logs a failure to store a report and returns
+// the status to send: 507 when the report files are at their size
+// cap, otherwise 500.
+func (s *Handlers) appendErrorStatus(err error) int {
+	if errors.Is(err, reportbuf.ErrFull) {
+		s.log.Warn("report refused: report files at their size cap")
+
+		return http.StatusInsufficientStorage
+	}
+
+	s.log.Error("failed to buffer report", "error", err)
+
+	return http.StatusInternalServerError
+}
+
 // logReportReceived logs an accepted report. Untrusted fields are
 // bounded (client_id, timestamp) or reduced to a length
 // (geo_bytes) so the raw attacker-controlled body never reaches
@@ -99,20 +111,10 @@ func (s *Handlers) logReportReceived(rpt report) {
 	}
 
 	s.log.Info("report received",
-		"client_id", boundedForLog(rpt.ClientID),
-		"timestamp", boundedForLog(rpt.Timestamp),
+		"client_id", logger.BoundedForLog(rpt.ClientID),
+		"timestamp", logger.BoundedForLog(rpt.Timestamp),
 		"host_count", len(rpt.Hosts),
 		"total_samples", totalSamples,
 		"geo_bytes", len(rpt.Geo),
 	)
 }
-
-// boundedForLog truncates an untrusted string to a fixed byte
-// bound so an attacker-controlled field cannot dominate the log.
-func boundedForLog(s string) string {
-	if len(s) > maxLoggedFieldBytes {
-		return s[:maxLoggedFieldBytes]
-	}
-
-	return s
-}

backend/internal/handlers/report_test.go

@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/handlers"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/logger"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/middleware"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/reportbuf"
 )
 
 var errStorageFailed = errors.New("storage failed")
@@ -66,6 +68,32 @@ func TestHandleReportStorageFailureIsNon2xx(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestHandleReportFullIs507 checks the answer when the report files
+// are at their size cap: 507 and the usual error body, which tells
+// the client nothing more.
+func TestHandleReportFullIs507(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	h := newTestHandlers(stubAppender{err: reportbuf.ErrFull}, io.Discard)
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(),
+		http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/reports",
+		strings.NewReader(`{"clientId":"c1","hosts":[]}`),
+	)
+
+	h.HandleReport().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusInsufficientStorage {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d",
+			rec.Code, http.StatusInsufficientStorage)
+	}
+
+	if got := rec.Body.String(); got != "{\"status\":\"error\"}\n" {
+		t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", got, "{\"status\":\"error\"}\n")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestHandleReportMalformedJSONIs400(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
@@ -147,7 +175,7 @@ func TestHandleReportDoesNotLogRawGeo(t *testing.T) {
 func TestHandleReportLogsClientIDCutToBound(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	long := strings.Repeat("c", 2*handlers.MaxLoggedFieldBytes)
+	long := strings.Repeat("c", 2*logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes)
 
 	var logbuf bytes.Buffer
 
@@ -170,16 +198,16 @@ func TestHandleReportLogsClientIDCutToBound(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("log line not JSON: %v (%q)", err, logbuf.String())
 	}
 
-	want := long[:handlers.MaxLoggedFieldBytes]
+	want := long[:logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes]
 
 	if logged["client_id"] != want {
 		t.Fatalf("logged client_id not cut to %d bytes: %q",
-			handlers.MaxLoggedFieldBytes, logged["client_id"])
+			logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes, logged["client_id"])
 	}
 
 	if logged["timestamp"] != want {
 		t.Fatalf("logged timestamp not cut to %d bytes: %q",
-			handlers.MaxLoggedFieldBytes, logged["timestamp"])
+			logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes, logged["timestamp"])
 	}
 }
 
@@ -188,7 +216,7 @@ func TestHandleReportDecodeErrorLogIsBounded(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// A number too large for its int64 field makes the decoder's
 	// error text quote the whole number.
-	huge := strings.Repeat("9", 2*handlers.MaxLoggedFieldBytes)
+	huge := strings.Repeat("9", 2*logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes)
 
 	var logbuf bytes.Buffer
 

backend/internal/logger/logger.go

@@ -11,6 +11,21 @@ import (
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 )
 
+// MaxLoggedFieldBytes bounds untrusted text (request fields,
+// header values, decode error text) before it is logged, so a
+// caller cannot inflate log volume with an oversized value.
+const MaxLoggedFieldBytes = 128
+
+// BoundedForLog truncates an untrusted string to a fixed byte
+// bound so an attacker-controlled field cannot dominate the log.
+func BoundedForLog(s string) string {
+	if len(s) > MaxLoggedFieldBytes {
+		return s[:MaxLoggedFieldBytes]
+	}
+
+	return s
+}
+
 // Params defines the dependencies for Logger.
 type Params struct {
 	fx.In

backend/internal/middleware/export_test.go

@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ func NewWithLogger(log *slog.Logger) *Middleware {
 	return &Middleware{log: log}
 }
 
+// NewWithTrustedProxies builds a Middleware that honours forwarded
+// headers from the given networks, for tests of the client address
+// paths without the fx graph.
+func NewWithTrustedProxies(trusted []netip.Prefix) *Middleware {
+	return &Middleware{trustedProxies: trusted}
+}
+
 func ClientIP(
 	remoteAddr string,
 	header http.Header,
@@ -22,7 +29,3 @@ func ClientIP(
 ) string {
 	return clientIP(remoteAddr, header, trusted)
 }
-
-func ParseTrustedProxies(cidrs []string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
-	return parseTrustedProxies(cidrs)
-}

backend/internal/middleware/middleware.go

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
 	"github.com/go-chi/cors"
+	"github.com/go-chi/httprate"
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 )
 
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ func New(
 	_ fx.Lifecycle,
 	params Params,
 ) (*Middleware, error) {
-	trusted, err := parseTrustedProxies(params.Config.TrustedProxies)
+	trusted, err := ParseTrustedProxies(params.Config.TrustedProxies)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -76,16 +77,18 @@ func New(
 	return s, nil
 }
 
-// parseTrustedProxies converts CIDR strings into prefixes,
-// failing fast on any malformed entry.
-func parseTrustedProxies(cidrs []string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
+// ParseTrustedProxies converts the TRUSTED_PROXIES entries into
+// prefixes, failing fast on any malformed entry. Each entry must be
+// a CIDR; a lone address is refused. "netwatch-server check-cidr"
+// runs it too.
+func ParseTrustedProxies(cidrs []string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
 	prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(cidrs))
 
 	for _, cidr := range cidrs {
 		prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(cidr)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf(
-				"trusted proxy %q: %w", cidr, err,
+				"TRUSTED_PROXIES %q: %w", cidr, err,
 			)
 		}
 
@@ -186,7 +189,10 @@ func addrInAny(s string, trusted []netip.Prefix) bool {
 }
 
 // Logging returns middleware that logs each request with
-// timing, status code, and client information.
+// timing, status code, and client information. Every string
+// taken from the request is cut to logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes,
+// including the request ID, which chi takes from the client's
+// X-Request-Id header when one is sent.
 func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 		return http.HandlerFunc(
@@ -199,21 +205,19 @@ func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 					latency := time.Since(start)
 					s.log.InfoContext(ctx, "request",
 						"request_start", start,
-						"method", r.Method,
-						"url", r.URL.String(),
-						"useragent", r.UserAgent(),
+						"method", logger.BoundedForLog(r.Method),
+						"url", logger.BoundedForLog(r.URL.String()),
+						"useragent", logger.BoundedForLog(r.UserAgent()),
 						"request_id",
-						ctx.Value(
-							middleware.RequestIDKey,
-						),
-						"referer", r.Referer(),
-						"proto", r.Proto,
+						logger.BoundedForLog(middleware.GetReqID(ctx)),
+						"referer", logger.BoundedForLog(r.Referer()),
+						"proto", logger.BoundedForLog(r.Proto),
 						"remote_ip",
-						clientIP(
+						logger.BoundedForLog(clientIP(
 							r.RemoteAddr,
 							r.Header,
 							s.trustedProxies,
-						),
+						)),
 						"status", lrw.statusCode,
 						"latency_ms",
 						latency.Milliseconds(),
@@ -320,21 +324,43 @@ func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	}
 }
 
-// CORS returns middleware that adds permissive CORS headers.
-func (s *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+// CORS returns middleware that lets pages served from the given
+// origins call the API. With no origins it adds no CORS headers at
+// all, so only same-origin pages can use the API. That case must not
+// reach cors.Handler, which treats an empty origin list as "allow
+// every origin".
+func (s *Middleware) CORS(
+	origins []string,
+) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	if len(origins) == 0 {
+		return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler { return next }
+	}
+
 	return cors.Handler(cors.Options{
-		AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"},
-		AllowedMethods: []string{
-			"GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS",
-		},
-		AllowedHeaders: []string{
-			"Accept",
-			"Authorization",
-			"Content-Type",
-			"X-CSRF-Token",
-		},
-		ExposedHeaders:   []string{"Link"},
+		AllowedOrigins:   origins,
+		AllowedMethods:   []string{http.MethodGet, http.MethodPost},
+		AllowedHeaders:   []string{"Content-Type"},
 		AllowCredentials: false,
 		MaxAge:           corsMaxAgeSec,
 	})
 }
+
+// RateLimit returns middleware that allows each client address
+// perMinute requests a minute and answers the rest with 429, the
+// Retry-After header httprate sets, and the usual error body. The
+// address is the one clientIP resolves, so clients behind the reverse
+// proxy are limited one by one, not together as the proxy.
+func (s *Middleware) RateLimit(
+	perMinute int,
+) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return httprate.LimitBy(perMinute, time.Minute,
+		func(r *http.Request) (string, error) {
+			return clientIP(r.RemoteAddr, r.Header, s.trustedProxies), nil
+		},
+		httprate.WithLimitHandler(
+			func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+				writeJSONError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+			},
+		),
+	)
+}

backend/internal/middleware/middleware_test.go

@@ -10,8 +10,13 @@ import (
 	"net/netip"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"testing/synctest"
+	"time"
 
+	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/logger"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/middleware"
+
+	chimiddleware "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -34,13 +39,30 @@ func mustPrefixes(t *testing.T, cidrs ...string) []netip.Prefix {
 	return prefixes
 }
 
+// TestParseTrustedProxiesRejectsMalformed includes entries nginx would
+// read as another address or look up as a hostname, in the CIDR form
+// bin/entrypoint.sh gives "netwatch-server check-cidr".
 func TestParseTrustedProxiesRejectsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	_, err := middleware.ParseTrustedProxies([]string{"not-a-cidr"})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for malformed CIDR, got nil")
+	for _, cidr := range []string{
+		"not-a-cidr", "10.0.0.1", "1.2.3/32", "172.30/32", "10/32",
+		"cafe/32", "999.1.1.1/32", "10.0.0.0/33", "::1/129",
+		"fe80::1%eth0/128",
+	} {
+		_, err := middleware.ParseTrustedProxies([]string{cidr})
+		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "TRUSTED_PROXIES") {
+			t.Errorf("%q: error = %v, want one naming TRUSTED_PROXIES",
+				cidr, err)
 		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseTrustedProxiesAcceptsCIDRs(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	mustPrefixes(t, "172.17.0.1/32", "10.0.0.0/8", "2001:db8::1/128",
+		"2001:db8::/32", "::ffff:192.0.2.1/128")
 }
 
 type clientIPCase struct {
@@ -300,3 +322,250 @@ func TestRecovererRepanicsOnAbortHandler(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("abort was logged: %q", logbuf.String())
 	}
 }
+
+// TestLoggingCutsRequestStringsToBound sends an over-long URL and
+// over-long header values, and checks the request log writes each
+// one cut to logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes.
+func TestLoggingCutsRequestStringsToBound(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	long := strings.Repeat("a", 2*logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes)
+
+	var logbuf bytes.Buffer
+
+	mw := middleware.NewWithLogger(
+		slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logbuf, nil)),
+	)
+
+	handler := chimiddleware.RequestID(mw.Logging()(okHandler()))
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(),
+		http.MethodGet, "/"+long, http.NoBody)
+	req.Header.Set("User-Agent", long)
+	req.Header.Set("Referer", long)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Request-Id", long)
+
+	handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
+
+	var logged map[string]any
+
+	err := json.Unmarshal(logbuf.Bytes(), &logged)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("log line not JSON: %v (%q)", err, logbuf.String())
+	}
+
+	want := map[string]string{
+		"url":        ("/" + long)[:logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes],
+		"useragent":  long[:logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes],
+		"referer":    long[:logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes],
+		"request_id": long[:logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes],
+	}
+
+	for field, value := range want {
+		if logged[field] != value {
+			t.Errorf("logged %s = %q, want it cut to %d bytes",
+				field, logged[field], logger.MaxLoggedFieldBytes)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// okHandler stands in for the route a middleware guards.
+func okHandler() http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	})
+}
+
+// TestRateLimitRefusesPastAllowanceThenResets checks one client
+// address: it may use its whole allowance at once, the next request
+// is refused with 429, and later it may send again.
+func TestRateLimitRefusesPastAllowanceThenResets(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// synctest runs this on a fake clock: time.Sleep returns at once,
+	// with the clock moved on.
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		const perMinute = 2
+
+		handler := (&middleware.Middleware{}).RateLimit(perMinute)(okHandler())
+
+		post := func() *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(),
+				http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/reports", http.NoBody)
+			handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+			return rec
+		}
+
+		for i := range perMinute {
+			if code := post().Code; code != http.StatusOK {
+				t.Fatalf("request %d: status = %d, want %d",
+					i+1, code, http.StatusOK)
+			}
+		}
+
+		rec := post()
+		if rec.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+			t.Fatalf("request past the allowance: status = %d, want %d",
+				rec.Code, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+		}
+
+		if got := rec.Body.String(); got != "{\"status\":\"error\"}\n" {
+			t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", got, "{\"status\":\"error\"}\n")
+		}
+
+		if got := rec.Header().Get("Retry-After"); got != "60" {
+			t.Fatalf("Retry-After = %q, want %q", got, "60")
+		}
+
+		// httprate also counts the previous minute's requests, fading
+		// them out over the current one, so two minutes on the whole
+		// allowance is back.
+		time.Sleep(2 * time.Minute)
+
+		for i := range perMinute {
+			if code := post().Code; code != http.StatusOK {
+				t.Fatalf("two minutes later, request %d: status = %d, want %d",
+					i+1, code, http.StatusOK)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// postForwarded sends handler a report from peer that names client in
+// X-Forwarded-For, and returns the status.
+func postForwarded(
+	t *testing.T,
+	handler http.Handler,
+	peer, client string,
+) int {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(),
+		http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/reports", http.NoBody)
+	req.RemoteAddr = peer
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", client)
+	handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	return rec.Code
+}
+
+// TestRateLimitIsPerForwardedClient checks that clients behind a
+// trusted proxy each get their own allowance: the limit is keyed on
+// the client address clientIP resolves, not on the proxy's.
+func TestRateLimitIsPerForwardedClient(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const otherClient = "203.0.113.8"
+
+	mw := middleware.NewWithTrustedProxies(mustPrefixes(t, "127.0.0.1/32"))
+	handler := mw.RateLimit(1)(okHandler())
+
+	code := postForwarded(t, handler, loopbackPeer, forwardedIP)
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("first request: status = %d, want %d", code, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+
+	code = postForwarded(t, handler, loopbackPeer, forwardedIP)
+	if code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+		t.Fatalf("same client again: status = %d, want %d",
+			code, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+	}
+
+	code = postForwarded(t, handler, loopbackPeer, otherClient)
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("other client behind the same proxy: status = %d, want %d",
+			code, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRateLimitIgnoresForwardedForFromUntrustedPeer checks that a
+// peer that is not a trusted proxy cannot get a fresh allowance by
+// naming a different client in X-Forwarded-For on each request.
+func TestRateLimitIgnoresForwardedForFromUntrustedPeer(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const untrustedPeer = "198.51.100.4:5000"
+
+	mw := middleware.NewWithTrustedProxies(mustPrefixes(t, "127.0.0.1/32"))
+	handler := mw.RateLimit(1)(okHandler())
+
+	code := postForwarded(t, handler, untrustedPeer, "203.0.113.8")
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("first request: status = %d, want %d", code, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+
+	code = postForwarded(t, handler, untrustedPeer, "203.0.113.9")
+	if code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+		t.Fatalf("same peer naming another client: status = %d, want %d",
+			code, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+	}
+}
+
+// preflight sends cors the preflight request a browser makes before
+// it POSTs JSON from origin.
+func preflight(
+	t *testing.T,
+	cors func(http.Handler) http.Handler,
+	origin string,
+) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(),
+		http.MethodOptions, "/api/v1/reports", http.NoBody)
+	req.Header.Set("Origin", origin)
+	req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Method", http.MethodPost)
+	req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Headers", "content-type")
+	cors(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	return rec
+}
+
+// TestCORSWithoutOriginsAddsNoHeaders checks the default: with no
+// origins configured, no origin is given any CORS header.
+func TestCORSWithoutOriginsAddsNoHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	rec := preflight(t,
+		(&middleware.Middleware{}).CORS(nil), "https://elsewhere.example")
+
+	for name := range rec.Header() {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(name, "Access-Control-") {
+			t.Errorf("CORS header %s set with no origins configured", name)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCORSAllowsOnlyListedOrigins(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const listed = "https://netwatch.example"
+
+	cors := (&middleware.Middleware{}).CORS([]string{listed})
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		name   string
+		origin string
+		want   string
+	}{
+		{name: "listed origin allowed", origin: listed, want: listed},
+		{name: "other origin refused", origin: "https://elsewhere.example"},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			rec := preflight(t, cors, tc.origin)
+
+			got := rec.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")
+			if got != tc.want {
+				t.Errorf("Access-Control-Allow-Origin = %q, want %q",
+					got, tc.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

backend/internal/reportbuf/export_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+package reportbuf
+
+import "time"
+
+// Flush writes the buffered reports to a file now, as the periodic
+// flush does, so tests need not wait a minute for it.
+func (b *Buffer) Flush() error {
+	return b.flushLocked()
+}
+
+// StopClock makes every report file the buffer writes from now on
+// carry the timestamp at, as if all were written in one millisecond.
+func (b *Buffer) StopClock(at time.Time) {
+	b.now = func() time.Time { return at }
+}

backend/internal/reportbuf/reportbuf.go

@@ -6,12 +6,15 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io/fs"
 	"log/slog"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/config"
@@ -27,8 +30,17 @@ const (
 	defaultDataDir                 = "./data/reports"
 	dirPerms           fs.FileMode = 0o750
 	filePerms          fs.FileMode = 0o640
+
+	// Report files are named filePrefix + timestamp + "-" + number +
+	// fileSuffix; see writeFile.
+	filePrefix = "reports-"
+	fileSuffix = ".jsonl.zst"
 )
 
+// ErrFull is returned by Append when storing the report would
+// take the report files past the configured maximum size.
+var ErrFull = errors.New("report files at their size cap")
+
 // Params defines the dependencies for Buffer.
 type Params struct {
 	fx.In
@@ -44,8 +56,19 @@ type Buffer struct {
 	dataDir  string
 	done     chan struct{}
 	log      *slog.Logger
+	maxBytes int64
 	mu       sync.Mutex
+	// now is the clock report files are named by: time.Now, except
+	// in tests that need two flushes to share a timestamp.
+	now func() time.Time
+	// seq numbers the report files, so that two named in the same
+	// millisecond still get different names.
+	seq      atomic.Uint64
 	stopOnce sync.Once
+	// usedBytes is what Append checks against maxBytes: the size
+	// of the report files in dataDir, plus the reports not yet
+	// written to one at their uncompressed size.
+	usedBytes int64
 }
 
 // New creates a Buffer and registers lifecycle hooks to
@@ -63,6 +86,8 @@ func New(
 		dataDir:  dir,
 		done:     make(chan struct{}),
 		log:      params.Logger.Get(),
+		maxBytes: params.Config.DataDirMaxBytes,
+		now:      time.Now,
 	}
 
 	lc.Append(fx.Hook{
@@ -72,6 +97,12 @@ func New(
 				return fmt.Errorf("create data dir: %w", err)
 			}
 
+			// Report files left by earlier runs count too.
+			b.usedBytes, err = reportFilesSize(b.dataDir)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+
 			go b.flushLoop()
 
 			return nil
@@ -97,15 +128,27 @@ func New(
 }
 
 // Append marshals v as a single JSON line and appends it to
-// the buffer. If the buffer reaches the size threshold, it is
-// drained and written to disk asynchronously.
+// the buffer. It stores nothing and returns ErrFull if the line
+// would take usedBytes past maxBytes. If the buffer reaches the
+// size threshold, it is drained and written to disk
+// asynchronously.
 func (b *Buffer) Append(v any) error {
 	line, err := json.Marshal(v)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("marshal report: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	lineBytes := int64(len(line)) + 1 // with its newline
+
 	b.mu.Lock()
+
+	if b.usedBytes+lineBytes > b.maxBytes {
+		b.mu.Unlock()
+
+		return ErrFull
+	}
+
+	b.usedBytes += lineBytes
 	b.buf.Write(line)
 	b.buf.WriteByte('\n')
 
@@ -177,12 +220,14 @@ func (b *Buffer) drainBuf() []byte {
 // writeFile creates a timestamped zstd-compressed JSONL file
 // in the data directory.
 func (b *Buffer) writeFile(data []byte) error {
-	ts := time.Now().UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15-04-05.000Z")
-	name := fmt.Sprintf("reports-%s.jsonl.zst", ts)
+	// The timestamp comes first, so the names sort by time; the number
+	// after it tells apart files named in the same millisecond.
+	ts := b.now().UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15-04-05.000Z")
+	name := fmt.Sprintf("%s%s-%d%s", filePrefix, ts, b.seq.Add(1), fileSuffix)
 	path := filepath.Join(b.dataDir, name)
 
 	// path is built from the operator-supplied dataDir plus a
-	// generated timestamp, so it carries no external input.
+	// generated timestamp and number, so it carries no external input.
 	f, err := os.OpenFile( //nolint:gosec // see comment above
 		path,
 		os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL,
@@ -214,10 +259,51 @@ func (b *Buffer) writeFile(data []byte) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("close zstd encoder: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	info, err := f.Stat()
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("stat report file: %w", err)
+	}
+
 	err = f.Close()
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("close report file: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// The reports counted at their uncompressed size while they
+	// waited; now they count as the file. After a failed write they
+	// stay counted as they were, which errs toward refusing reports
+	// early rather than letting the files pass the cap.
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	b.usedBytes += info.Size() - int64(len(data))
+	b.mu.Unlock()
+
 	return nil
 }
+
+// reportFilesSize returns the total size of the report files in
+// dir.
+func reportFilesSize(dir string) (int64, error) {
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("read data dir: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var total int64
+
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		name := entry.Name()
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(name, filePrefix) ||
+			!strings.HasSuffix(name, fileSuffix) {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		info, err := entry.Info()
+		if err != nil {
+			return 0, fmt.Errorf("stat report file: %w", err)
+		}
+
+		total += info.Size()
+	}
+
+	return total, nil
+}

backend/internal/reportbuf/reportbuf_test.go

@@ -1,17 +1,26 @@
 package reportbuf_test
 
 import (
+	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
+	"fmt"
 	"io/fs"
 	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"slices"
+	"strconv"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/globals"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/logger"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/reportbuf"
 
+	"github.com/klauspost/compress/zstd"
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 	"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
 )
@@ -94,6 +103,319 @@ func TestFailedFinalFlushFailsStop(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// startBuffer starts a Buffer through fx, as main does, with the
+// DATA_DIR and DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES the calling test has set.
+func startBuffer(t *testing.T) *reportbuf.Buffer {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var buf *reportbuf.Buffer
+
+	app := fxtest.New(t,
+		fx.Provide(
+			globals.New,
+			logger.New,
+			config.New,
+			reportbuf.New,
+		),
+		fx.Populate(&buf),
+	)
+
+	app.RequireStart()
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	return buf
+}
+
+// lineBytes is what one report takes in the buffer: its JSON and a
+// newline.
+func lineBytes(t *testing.T, report any) int {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	line, err := json.Marshal(report)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("marshal report: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	return len(line) + 1
+}
+
+func TestAppendPastCapIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	report := map[string]string{"id": "cap"}
+
+	t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	t.Setenv("DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES", strconv.Itoa(lineBytes(t, report)))
+
+	buf := startBuffer(t)
+
+	err := buf.Append(report)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("report that fills the cap exactly: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	err = buf.Append(report)
+	if !errors.Is(err, reportbuf.ErrFull) {
+		t.Fatalf("report past the cap: error = %v, want ErrFull", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCapCountsReportFilesAlreadyInDataDir starts on a data
+// directory holding a report file from an earlier run, and a file
+// that is not a report, which must not count.
+func TestCapCountsReportFilesAlreadyInDataDir(t *testing.T) {
+	const earlierBytes = 100
+
+	report := map[string]string{"id": "cap"}
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	writeBytes(t, filepath.Join(dir, "reports-2026-01-01T00-00-00.000Z.jsonl.zst"),
+		earlierBytes)
+	writeBytes(t, filepath.Join(dir, "notes.txt"), 10*earlierBytes)
+
+	t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", dir)
+	t.Setenv("DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES",
+		strconv.Itoa(earlierBytes+lineBytes(t, report)))
+
+	buf := startBuffer(t)
+
+	err := buf.Append(report)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("report that fills the cap exactly: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	err = buf.Append(report)
+	if !errors.Is(err, reportbuf.ErrFull) {
+		t.Fatalf("report past the cap: error = %v, want ErrFull", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestWrittenReportsCountAtFileSize checks that once reports are
+// written, they count as their compressed file, not their
+// uncompressed size, which frees room under the cap.
+func TestWrittenReportsCountAtFileSize(t *testing.T) {
+	// Repetitive, so its file is far smaller than its JSON.
+	report := map[string]string{"id": strings.Repeat("a", 1000)}
+	size := lineBytes(t, report)
+
+	t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	// Room for the report twice over only if the first one counts
+	// at its file's size by the time the second arrives.
+	t.Setenv("DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES", strconv.Itoa(2*size-1))
+
+	buf := startBuffer(t)
+
+	err := buf.Append(report)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("first report: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	err = buf.Flush()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("flush: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	err = buf.Append(report)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("second report, after the first was written: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestWrittenReportsKeepCounting writes one report file after another
+// under a small cap: each report must be taken while the files on disk
+// leave room for it, and refused once they do not.
+func TestWrittenReportsKeepCounting(t *testing.T) {
+	const maxBytes = 200
+
+	report := map[string]string{"id": "written"}
+	size := int64(lineBytes(t, report))
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", dir)
+	t.Setenv("DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES", strconv.Itoa(maxBytes))
+
+	buf := startBuffer(t)
+
+	// Every file takes at least a byte, so they fill the cap within
+	// maxBytes rounds.
+	for range maxBytes {
+		used := reportFilesBytes(t, dir)
+
+		err := buf.Append(report)
+		if used+size > maxBytes {
+			if !errors.Is(err, reportbuf.ErrFull) {
+				t.Fatalf("with %d bytes of report files: error = %v, "+
+					"want ErrFull", used, err)
+			}
+
+			return
+		}
+
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("with %d bytes of report files: %v", used, err)
+		}
+
+		err = buf.Flush()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("flush: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	t.Fatal("the report files never filled the cap")
+}
+
+// TestConcurrentAppendsStopAtCap appends from many goroutines at once
+// with room for exactly roomFor reports: exactly that many must be
+// taken, which holds only if Append checks and counts each report
+// under one lock.
+func TestConcurrentAppendsStopAtCap(t *testing.T) {
+	const (
+		roomFor = 5
+		senders = 50
+	)
+
+	// Large, so each Append takes long enough for the senders to
+	// overlap while the cap is reached.
+	report := map[string]string{"id": strings.Repeat("a", 1_000_000)}
+
+	t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	t.Setenv("DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES",
+		strconv.Itoa(roomFor*lineBytes(t, report)))
+
+	buf := startBuffer(t)
+
+	var (
+		taken atomic.Int64
+		wg    sync.WaitGroup
+	)
+
+	start := make(chan struct{})
+
+	for range senders {
+		wg.Go(func() {
+			<-start
+
+			err := buf.Append(report)
+			if err == nil {
+				taken.Add(1)
+			} else if !errors.Is(err, reportbuf.ErrFull) {
+				t.Errorf("append: %v", err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+
+	close(start)
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	if got := taken.Load(); got != roomFor {
+		t.Fatalf("%d reports taken, want %d", got, roomFor)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTwoFlushesInOneMillisecond flushes twice within one millisecond,
+// as a flush for size and the final flush at shutdown can: each flush
+// must write a file of its own, and the files must hold every report.
+func TestTwoFlushesInOneMillisecond(t *testing.T) {
+	const flushes = 2
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", dir)
+
+	buf := startBuffer(t)
+	buf.StopClock(time.Date(2026, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC))
+
+	for id := 1; id <= flushes; id++ {
+		err := buf.Append(map[string]int{"id": id})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("append report %d: %v", id, err)
+		}
+
+		err = buf.Flush()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("flush %d: %v", id, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	files := readReportFiles(t, dir)
+	if len(files) != flushes {
+		t.Fatalf("%d report files after %d flushes", len(files), flushes)
+	}
+
+	for id := 1; id <= flushes; id++ {
+		want := fmt.Sprintf(`{"id":%d}`+"\n", id)
+		if !slices.Contains(files, want) {
+			t.Fatalf("no report file holds report %d alone", id)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// reportFilesBytes returns the total size of the report files in dir.
+func reportFilesBytes(t *testing.T, dir string) int64 {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	paths, err := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(dir, "reports-*.jsonl.zst"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("list report files: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	var total int64
+
+	for _, path := range paths {
+		info, statErr := os.Stat(path)
+		if statErr != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("stat %s: %v", path, statErr)
+		}
+
+		total += info.Size()
+	}
+
+	return total
+}
+
+// readReportFiles returns the decompressed contents of each report
+// file in dir.
+func readReportFiles(t *testing.T, dir string) []string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	files := os.DirFS(dir)
+
+	names, err := fs.Glob(files, "reports-*.jsonl.zst")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("list report files: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	dec, err := zstd.NewReader(nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create zstd decoder: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer dec.Close()
+
+	contents := make([]string, 0, len(names))
+
+	for _, name := range names {
+		compressed, readErr := fs.ReadFile(files, name)
+		if readErr != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", name, readErr)
+		}
+
+		data, decErr := dec.DecodeAll(compressed, nil)
+		if decErr != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("decompress %s: %v", name, decErr)
+		}
+
+		contents = append(contents, string(data))
+	}
+
+	return contents
+}
+
+func writeBytes(t *testing.T, path string, n int) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	err := os.WriteFile(path, make([]byte, n), 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", path, err)
+	}
+}
+
 func hasReportFile(t *testing.T, dir string) bool {
 	t.Helper()
 

backend/internal/server/routes.go

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
 	s.router.Use(middleware.RequestID)
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.Logging())
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.SecurityHeaders())
-	s.router.Use(s.mw.CORS())
+	s.router.Use(s.mw.CORS(s.params.Config.CORSAllowedOrigins))
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.MaxBodyBytes(maxRequestBodyBytes))
 	s.router.Use(middleware.Timeout(requestTimeout))
 
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
 	)
 
 	s.router.Route("/api/v1", func(r chi.Router) {
-		r.Post("/reports", s.h.HandleReport())
+		r.With(s.mw.RateLimit(s.params.Config.ReportsPerMinute)).
+			Post("/reports", s.h.HandleReport())
 	})
 }

backend/internal/server/routes_test.go

@@ -49,6 +49,64 @@ func newServer(t *testing.T) *server.Server {
 	return srv
 }
 
+// TestReportsAreRateLimited checks that POST /api/v1/reports is
+// behind the per-address rate limit, set here to two a minute.
+func TestReportsAreRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("REPORTS_PER_MINUTE", "2")
+
+	srv := newServer(t)
+	srv.SetupRoutes()
+
+	post := func() int {
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(),
+			http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/reports",
+			strings.NewReader(`{"clientId":"c1","hosts":[]}`),
+		)
+		srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+		return rec.Code
+	}
+
+	for i := range 2 {
+		if code := post(); code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("report %d: status = %d, want %d",
+				i+1, code, http.StatusOK)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if code := post(); code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+		t.Fatalf("third report in a minute: status = %d, want %d",
+			code, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCORSAllowedOriginsReachTheRouter checks that an origin listed in
+// CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS is allowed by the router, not only when handed
+// to the CORS middleware directly.
+func TestCORSAllowedOriginsReachTheRouter(t *testing.T) {
+	const origin = "https://netwatch.example:8443"
+
+	t.Setenv("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS", origin)
+
+	srv := newServer(t)
+	srv.SetupRoutes()
+
+	// The preflight a browser sends before it POSTs JSON from origin.
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(),
+		http.MethodOptions, "/api/v1/reports", http.NoBody)
+	req.Header.Set("Origin", origin)
+	req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Method", http.MethodPost)
+	req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Headers", "content-type")
+	srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	got := rec.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")
+	if got != origin {
+		t.Fatalf("Access-Control-Allow-Origin = %q, want %q", got, origin)
+	}
+}
+
 // TestHealthCheckRejectsOversizeBody sends the health check, which
 // never reads its body, a body one byte over the limit. Only the
 // router-wide body limit can reject it.

backend/script/lint

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ set -eu
 
 ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
 
-GOLANGCI_CONFIG_SHA256="021cc83f4e6fc7c31b95b34b846723dfcf20b66b7baeea1dc40406e643346bcb"
+GOLANGCI_CONFIG_SHA256="a79b63a254602a5318db5d0e9a06bc71b84bf0c1d896305229d8bfed1d1b1776"
 
 main() {
     cd "$ROOT"

bin/entrypoint.sh

@@ -8,23 +8,106 @@
 # No set -e: kill and wait return non-zero here in normal operation.
 set -u
 
+# PORT is the public port nginx listens on, 8080 when unset or empty.
+# nginx would take a value such as localhost or unix:/tmp/x.sock as an
+# address and start anyway, and reports a bad port without naming
+# PORT, so a value that is not a usable port stops the container here,
+# before either process starts.
+export PORT="${PORT:-8080}"
+case "$PORT" in
+    *[!0-9]*)
+        echo "entrypoint: PORT must be a port number, not '$PORT'" >&2
+        exit 1
+        ;;
+esac
+# The length is checked first because, for a number too big for it,
+# the shell's test prints an error and is false, so the range checks
+# alone would let it through.
+if [ "${#PORT}" -gt 5 ] || [ "$PORT" -lt 1 ] || [ "$PORT" -gt 65535 ]; then
+    echo "entrypoint: PORT must be from 1 to 65535, not '$PORT'" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if [ "$PORT" -eq 8081 ]; then
+    echo "entrypoint: PORT cannot be 8081, netwatch-server listens there" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# TRUSTED_PROXIES names the reverse proxies in front of the container,
+# as IP addresses or CIDRs separated by commas. nginx takes the client
+# address from X-Forwarded-For only on a request from one of them, so
+# unset or empty, it trusts no one. nginx.conf includes the file written
+# here, one set_real_ip_from line per entry.
+#
+# nginx looks up an entry it cannot read as an address as a hostname,
+# and trusts what it finds (1.2.3 is found as 1.2.0.3). So each entry
+# is made a CIDR, a lone address getting /128 if it is IPv6 and /32 if
+# not, and netwatch-server checks it with the parsing it gives its own
+# TRUSTED_PROXIES. Its error, naming the CIDR, is dropped for the one
+# below, naming the entry as written. set -f keeps a * in an entry from
+# becoming a list of file names.
+TRUSTED_PROXIES="${TRUSTED_PROXIES:-}"
+set -f
+for proxy in $(printf '%s' "$TRUSTED_PROXIES" | tr ',' ' '); do
+    case "$proxy" in
+        */*) cidr="$proxy" ;;
+        *:*) cidr="$proxy/128" ;;
+        *) cidr="$proxy/32" ;;
+    esac
+    if ! netwatch-server check-cidr "$cidr" 2> /dev/null; then
+        echo "entrypoint: TRUSTED_PROXIES must be IP addresses or CIDRs" \
+            "separated by commas; '$proxy' is neither" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    echo "set_real_ip_from $cidr;"
+done > /etc/nginx/trusted-proxies.conf
+
+# netwatch-server keeps its report files in DATA_DIR, on the /data
+# volume, which may be a host directory owned by root or by another
+# uid. Both are given to the netwatch user here, with the mode the
+# server gives a directory it creates, so the host directory needs no
+# preparing.
+#
+# chown and chmod, run as root, change whatever a symbolic link on the
+# path points to, anywhere in the container, and the netwatch user can
+# put one in /data. So the start stops unless readlink -f, which
+# follows every link on a path, gives /data and DATA_DIR back as they
+# are. It also writes a path in full, so a DATA_DIR with '.', '..' or
+# an extra '/' in it is refused too.
+export DATA_DIR="${DATA_DIR:-/data/reports}"
+mkdir -p "$DATA_DIR" || exit 1
+if [ "$(readlink -f /data)" != /data ] ||
+    [ "$(readlink -f "$DATA_DIR")" != "$DATA_DIR" ]; then
+    echo "entrypoint: DATA_DIR must be a full path with no '.', '..'," \
+        "extra '/' or symbolic link on it or on /data, not '$DATA_DIR'" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+chown -R netwatch:netwatch /data "$DATA_DIR" || exit 1
+chmod 750 /data "$DATA_DIR" || exit 1
+
 # A stop signal is only noted here; the loop below acts on it.
 stop_requested=""
 trap 'stop_requested=yes' TERM INT
 
 # netwatch-server runs as the netwatch user and listens on loopback
 # only, on a port other than the public one; nginx.conf proxies to this
-# address. The netwatch user has no login shell, hence -s /bin/sh.
-# busybox su replaces itself with the command instead of staying on as
-# its parent, so $! is the server's own PID.
-BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 PORT=8081 \
+# address. Its only client is nginx, so it takes the client address
+# nginx passes on from 127.0.0.1 alone, whatever TRUSTED_PROXIES the
+# container has. The netwatch user has no login shell, hence -s
+# /bin/sh. busybox su replaces itself with the command instead of
+# staying on as its parent, so $! is the server's own PID.
+BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 PORT=8081 TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1/32 \
     su -s /bin/sh netwatch -c 'exec netwatch-server' &
 backend=$!
 
 # nginx starts through the nginx image's own entrypoint, which applies
 # the image's start-up configuration and then replaces itself with
-# nginx.
-/docker-entrypoint.sh nginx -g 'daemon off;' &
+# nginx. Part of that start-up configuration renders nginx.conf into
+# conf.d with nginx listening on PORT. NGINX_ENVSUBST_FILTER limits
+# that rendering to PORT: a variable nginx itself uses, such as $uri,
+# would otherwise be replaced by an environment variable of the same
+# name.
+NGINX_ENVSUBST_FILTER='^PORT$' \
+    /docker-entrypoint.sh nginx -g 'daemon off;' &
 nginx=$!
 
 running() {

nginx.conf

@@ -1,14 +1,27 @@
+# A template: the nginx image renders it into conf.d at container start,
+# filling in PORT and nothing else. bin/entrypoint.sh sets PORT and that
+# limit.
 server {
-    listen 8080;
+    listen ${PORT};
     server_name _;
 
+    # Keep the nginx version out of the Server header and error pages.
+    server_tokens off;
+
+    # The security headers, on every response. An add_header in a
+    # location drops every add_header from here, so a location with one
+    # of its own includes this file again.
+    include /etc/nginx/security-headers.conf;
+
     root /usr/share/nginx/html;
     index index.html;
 
-    # Trust RFC1918 reverse proxies for X-Forwarded-For
-    set_real_ip_from 10.0.0.0/8;
-    set_real_ip_from 172.16.0.0/12;
-    set_real_ip_from 192.168.0.0/16;
+    # The client address comes from X-Forwarded-For only on a request
+    # from the reverse proxies in TRUSTED_PROXIES: bin/entrypoint.sh
+    # writes one set_real_ip_from line for each into this file, and
+    # leaves it empty when TRUSTED_PROXIES is unset, so that by default
+    # the client address is the one each request comes from.
+    include /etc/nginx/trusted-proxies.conf;
     real_ip_header X-Forwarded-For;
     real_ip_recursive on;
 
@@ -24,6 +37,7 @@ server {
     location /assets/ {
         expires 1y;
         add_header Cache-Control "public, immutable";
+        include /etc/nginx/security-headers.conf;
     }
 
     # netwatch-server, the Go backend, runs in the same container and
@@ -37,6 +51,16 @@ server {
     proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
     proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
 
+    # netwatch-server sets the same security headers on its own
+    # responses. Its copies are dropped so that each header goes out
+    # once, as security-headers.conf sets it.
+    proxy_hide_header Strict-Transport-Security;
+    proxy_hide_header Content-Security-Policy;
+    proxy_hide_header X-Frame-Options;
+    proxy_hide_header X-Content-Type-Options;
+    proxy_hide_header Referrer-Policy;
+    proxy_hide_header Permissions-Policy;
+
     location /api/ {
         proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8081;
     }

script/bootstrap

@@ -3,12 +3,12 @@
 # this repo. Idempotent: every install is guarded by a check so already
 # installed tools are skipped. Base tooling comes from nix, apt, brew,
 # or apk (detected in that order); assumes nothing is present. Node is
-# used directly if installed; otherwise it is installed at a pinned
-# version via nvm (installing nvm itself first, from a hash-verified
-# release archive, never curl | sh). Go, with its gofmt, is used
-# directly if it is at least the version backend/go.mod asks for;
-# otherwise the pinned Go release is installed from its hash-verified
-# archive.
+# used directly if it is at least NODE_MIN_VERSION; otherwise it is
+# installed at a pinned version via nvm (installing nvm itself first,
+# from a hash-verified release archive, never curl | sh). Go, with its
+# gofmt, is used directly if it is at least the version backend/go.mod
+# asks for; otherwise the pinned Go release is installed from its
+# hash-verified archive.
 #
 # What this script installs outside the system package manager lives
 # under $HOME and is linked into ~/.local/bin, where make and the git
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
 
 # Pinned versions, 2026-07-07
 NODE_VERSION="22.17.0"
+# The oldest node the frontend's dependencies accept: the "engines"
+# field of puppeteer-core 25.5.0, the most demanding of them, asks for
+# 22.12.0 or newer, 2026-09-29. An older installed node is not used.
+NODE_MIN_VERSION="22.12.0"
 NVM_VERSION="0.40.3"
 # sha256 of https://github.com/nvm-sh/nvm/archive/refs/tags/v0.40.3.tar.gz
 NVM_SHA256="5f4d6aaa04a177dc93c985e31dbc411ab6b8c6e1e21d8015dbc1372625fcd1d0"
@@ -136,8 +140,22 @@ ensure_nvm() {
     rm -rf "$tmp"
 }
 
+# node_ok: the node on PATH is at least NODE_MIN_VERSION. node itself
+# compares the two: major, then minor, then patch.
+node_ok() {
+    if missing node; then return 1; fi
+    node -e '
+        const have = process.versions.node.split(".").map(Number);
+        const want = process.argv[1].split(".").map(Number);
+        for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+            if (have[i] !== want[i]) process.exit(have[i] > want[i] ? 0 : 1);
+        }
+    ' "$NODE_MIN_VERSION"
+}
+
+# ensure_node: unless node_ok, install NODE_VERSION and link its node.
 ensure_node() {
-    if ! missing node; then return 0; fi
+    if node_ok; then return 0; fi
     ensure_nvm
     nvm_sh "nvm install $NODE_VERSION"
     link_bin "$HOME/.nvm/versions/node/v$NODE_VERSION/bin/node" node

script/cibuild

@@ -1,15 +1,29 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# script/cibuild: run the CI build: build the one image from Dockerfile,
-# whose stages run the checks as build steps (the backend's fmt-check,
-# lint and tests, and the frontend's test, lint and fmt-check). This is
-# the only build step the Gitea workflow runs.
+# script/cibuild: run the CI build. It bootstraps first: a CI runner
+# checks out and runs this and nothing else, and script/fmt-check runs
+# the formatter on the host, which a pristine checkout cannot do.
+# --no-cache for the same reason as script/docker: the gate phases the
+# final stage depends on are RUN steps, and a cached one is a check that
+# did not run.
 set -eu
 
-ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
+ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
 
 main() {
     cd "$ROOT"
-    timeout 300 docker build .
+    "$SCRIPT_DIR/bootstrap"
+    "$SCRIPT_DIR/check"
+    # Own line: a failing command substitution inside an argument does
+    # not trip `set -e`, so the inline form degrades silently to an
+    # empty constant. VERSION is computed here because .dockerignore
+    # excludes .git, so `git describe` in a build stage yields an empty
+    # version without failing.
+    version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
+    [ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
+    docker build --no-cache \
+        --build-arg VERSION="$version" \
+        -t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
 }
 
 main "$@"

script/frontend-viewport-test

@@ -61,10 +61,18 @@ main() {
     # host.
     docker network create --internal "$NETWORK" > /dev/null
 
+    # nginx.conf is a template: the image renders it over its own
+    # default.conf, with the same port and limit bin/entrypoint.sh uses.
+    # The empty file it includes trusts no proxy, as bin/entrypoint.sh
+    # writes it when TRUSTED_PROXIES is unset. nginx.conf also includes
+    # the security headers, so the page runs under the shipped policy.
     docker run -d --rm --name "$SERVER" \
         --network "$NETWORK" --network-alias netwatch \
+        -e PORT=8080 -e NGINX_ENVSUBST_FILTER='^PORT$' \
         -v "$ROOT/dist:/usr/share/nginx/html:ro" \
-        -v "$ROOT/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf:ro" \
+        -v "$ROOT/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/templates/default.conf.template:ro" \
+        -v /dev/null:/etc/nginx/trusted-proxies.conf:ro \
+        -v "$ROOT/security-headers.conf:/etc/nginx/security-headers.conf:ro" \
         "$SERVER_IMAGE" > /dev/null
 
     # The image's own entrypoint already exposes CDP on 9222 and passes

security-headers.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# The security headers REPO_POLICIES.md requires on every response.
+# nginx.conf includes this file, which Dockerfile copies to
+# /etc/nginx/security-headers.conf. always sends each header on error
+# responses too.
+
+add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
+
+# Scripts and styles load only from the page's own origin. Inline ones
+# are blocked, style attributes in markup included, so style elements
+# through classes or element.style. data: images are for the favicon
+# in index.html. connect-src is * because the browser checks each probe in
+# src/main.js against it, and also every redirect the probe follows,
+# and several of those hosts redirect to others; a list of hosts here
+# would block those probes. It also covers the reports the page sends
+# to its own origin.
+add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; connect-src *; img-src 'self' data:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'" always;
+
+add_header X-Frame-Options DENY always;
+add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff always;
+
+# The probed hosts are not told where the page is served from.
+add_header Referrer-Policy no-referrer always;
+
+add_header Permissions-Policy "accelerometer=(), camera=(), display-capture=(), geolocation=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), microphone=(), midi=(), payment=(), usb=()" always;

src/main.js

@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ function hostRowHTML(host, index, showPin = true) {
         ${pinBtn}
         <div class="w-[420px] flex-shrink-0 grid grid-cols-[minmax(0,1fr)_auto] items-center">
           <div class="flex items-center gap-2 min-w-[200px]">
-            <div class="w-3 h-3 rounded-full flex-shrink-0" style="background-color: ${latencyHex(null)}"></div>
+            <div class="w-3 h-3 rounded-full flex-shrink-0 bg-[#6b7280]"></div>
             <span class="font-medium text-white truncate">${host.name}</span>
           </div>
           <div class="latency-value text-4xl font-bold tabular-nums text-right mt-3" data-host="${index}">