Refuse fetch writes through a symlink in the destination (closes #86) #114

Merged
clawbot merged 1 commits from issue-86-fetch-symlink-escape into next 2026-10-03 16:08:10 +02:00
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Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak b9ef06f23d Refuse fetch writes through a symlink in the destination (closes #86)
check / check (push) Successful in 54s
sanitizePath checks manifest paths only as text, so a symlink already
inside the destination directory could send fetch's writes outside it.
checkNoSymlinks now looks at each existing part of a path with os.Lstat
and refuses the path if any part is a symlink, wherever it points.
fetch runs it immediately before each write: creating the parent
directories, creating the temp file, and renaming it into place. The new
test puts such a symlink at each of those three places, and once inside
a plain directory, and checks that the fetch fails and nothing outside
changes. The G304 comment now states what holds. A symlink swapped in
between a check and its write is not caught; os.Root closes that once
the Go version is raised.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-03 13:28:20 +00:00