Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 49a7b96e2c Fuzz NewManifestFromReader and cap the zstd decoder (closes #65)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
FuzzNewManifestFromReader fails when the parser returns both or neither
of a manifest and an error, or allocates more than sixteen times its
input and the decompressed data it may read, plus room for the decoder's
window. make test runs the committed seed corpus; make fuzz fuzzes for
one minute, by hand only.

Parser bug: MaxDecompressedSize did not bound decompression. The zstd
decoder decoded a payload under 128 KiB in full, each frame up to its
own 64 GiB limit, before the LimitReader read any of it. It now decodes
synchronously, only what the LimitReader reads, with MaxDecompressedSize
as its limit. Regression seeds: a frame claiming 8 GiB, and two frames
each under the limit and together over it.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-03 23:59:56 +00:00
clawbot c31796998f Pin CLI error messages by driving their real call sites (closes #87)
check / check (push) Successful in 58s
errmsg_test.go now calls the function that emits each user-visible CLI
error message and asserts on the full text it returns, instead of
rendering format strings copied from production, so rewording any pinned
message fails the suite. The unknown-command message is driven through
the root command's action.

The signer-mismatch case signs a manifest with a throwaway gpg key and
is skipped where gpg is absent, like the repo's other signing tests.

The freshen mtime-presence test gives the scanned file an epoch mtime,
so it fails if recordEntry reads an absent manifest mtime as the epoch.

Model: opus-4-8 (first implementation); opus-5-5 (completion, this message)
2026-10-03 18:24:30 +02:00
clawbot a3749e9e9b cibuild: build with --no-cache like script/docker (closes #89)
check / check (push) Successful in 1m1s
A bare `docker build .` served the Dockerfile's check steps from the
layer cache on an unchanged tree and exited 0 without running them.
script/cibuild now computes the version on its own line and runs the
same build command as script/docker and the shared policy, --no-cache
included, so every CI build runs the checks. README.md describes
script/cibuild accordingly.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-03 17:41:55 +02:00
clawbot fa97c4519c Never write fetch's temp file into an existing file (closes #115)
check / check (push) Successful in 53s
downloadFile opened the temp file with os.Create, which opens and
empties a file already at that name. If that file was a hard link to a
file outside the destination directory, fetch overwrote the outside
file. It now removes whatever is at the temp name, which removes only
that name, and creates the temp file with O_EXCL, so the create fails if
anything is still or again there. A leftover temp file from an
interrupted run is still replaced. The new test puts a hard link at the
temp name and checks that fetch succeeds and the outside file is
unchanged. The command name is now the constant cmdFetch, like the other
command names, because lint requires it once a third test uses it.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-03 16:58:35 +02:00
clawbot 7e601929c8 Refuse fetch writes through a symlink in the destination (closes #86)
check / check (push) Successful in 1m10s
sanitizePath checks manifest paths only as text, so a symlink already
inside the destination directory could send fetch's writes outside it.
checkNoSymlinks now looks at each existing part of a path with os.Lstat
and refuses the path if any part is a symlink, wherever it points.
fetch runs it immediately before each write: creating the parent
directories, creating the temp file, and renaming it into place. The new
test puts such a symlink at each of those three places, and once inside
a plain directory, and checks that the fetch fails and nothing outside
changes. The G304 comment now states what holds. A symlink swapped in
between a check and its write is not caught; os.Root closes that once
the Go version is raised.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-03 16:08:09 +02:00
clawbot c3b5fe651a Stamp the tag or short commit in a plain docker build (closes #112)
check / check (push) Successful in 48s
.dockerignore now sends .git but not .git/config, which can hold a
credential and which git describe does not need. The build stage stamps
main.Gitrev from the VERSION build argument when one is given, otherwise
from git describe --tags --always, and fails if .git is present and no
version comes out. git there trusts /src whoever owns it, since a
context sent as a tar archive keeps its files' owners. script/docker is
replaced by the canonical copy, which passes VERSION; bin/gitrev.sh uses
--tags too, so every entrypoint stamps the same value for a clean
commit.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-02 08:53:34 +02:00
clawbot 0deacfc7ed Validate manifest entry paths on deserialize (closes #61)
check / check (push) Failing after 1s
Untrusted .mf files were parsed with no path validation, so an entry like ../../etc/passwd reached filepath.Join against the checker's base path and mfer check could stat and read outside it. ValidatePath ran only when building a manifest. It now runs on every entry as the manifest loads, so every consumer is covered. The whole manifest is rejected on the first bad entry instead of dropping it, which could hide files from a check; the error wraps errInvalidManifestPath and names the path.

Disclosure: a path that is not valid UTF-8 is refused earlier, by the protobuf string decoder, so that error does not name the path.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation); fable-5-1 (summary)
2026-09-22 00:47:26 +02:00
clawbot 7de4d6ec1c Rewrite script/test to the canonical race-enabled pattern (closes #67)
check / check (push) Successful in 51s
script/test now runs go test -timeout 30s -race -cover ./..., quiet on success and rerunning verbose on failure. -race exposed a data race on the process-global apex/log logger: Init reconfigured it on every CLI run while other goroutines logged through it. internal/log now mutates the global under the write lock and reads it under the read lock; WithError is dropped because its Entry logged outside that lock, and run() reports a failed command's error via log.Errorf instead (still shown under -q). The corruption fuzz test is scaled to 1500 files / 100 iterations to fit the budget under -race; it pins the same claims at reduced breadth. Independent review ran the Docker lint gate uncached.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation, review)
model: claude-fable-5
2026-09-21 15:17:50 +02:00
36 changed files with 983 additions and 286 deletions
+62 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,64 @@
# .dockerignore does NOT use .gitignore semantics. Docker matches with
# moby/patternmatcher: filepath.Match plus `**`, so `*` does not cross
# `/` and an unprefixed pattern is anchored at the context root. Every
# depth-independent pattern therefore needs `**/`, or `config/.env` and
# `certs/server.key` still ship while this file reads as solved. Only
# genuinely root-anchored entries go unprefixed. Never transplant these
# into .gitignore, where `**/` is wrong.
#
# Matching is case-sensitive, so secrets use character ranges rather
# than an ALL-CAPS twin, which would still miss `Server.Key`.
#
# Extend with this repo's own host-built artifacts, written anchored:
# `/myapp`, never `**/myapp`, which also matches `cmd/myapp/` and
# deletes the package directory from the context.
# .git is sent without its config. Without a VERSION build argument the
# stage that compiles runs `git describe --tags --always` on .git, which
# does not need .git/config; that file can hold a credential, such as a
# password in a remote URL or the token the CI checkout step stores there.
.git/config
# Agent scratch: one full checkout of the repo per in-flight agent.
# Anchored because it occurs once where agents run at the repo root.
# KNOWN GAP: a repo running agents in subdirectories still ships
# `services/api/.claude/` and must add its own anchored entry.
.claude
# Environment files. `*.env` covers bare `.env` and the `prod.env`
# convention. Re-include a committed template with a negation if the
# build needs one: `!docs/example.env`.
**/*.[eE][nN][vV]
**/.[eE][nN][vV].*
**/.[eE][nN][vV][rR][cC]
# Private keys and the bundles carrying them. Public certificates
# (*.crt, *.cer) are deliberately absent: they are legitimate inputs.
**/*.[pP][eE][mM]
**/*.[kK][eE][yY]
**/*.[pP]12
**/*.[pP][fF][xX]
**/[iI][dD]_[rR][sS][aA]
**/[iI][dD]_[dD][sS][aA]
**/[iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]
**/[iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519
# Dependencies: restored inside the image, never copied in.
**/node_modules
# OS metadata.
**/.DS_Store
**/Thumbs.db
# Editor state: never a build input, and it churns COPY.
**/*.swp
**/*.swo
**/*~
**/*.bak
**/.idea
**/.vscode
**/*.sublime-*
# This repo's own host-built archives (Makefile).
*.tmp *.tmp
*.dockerimage *.dockerimage
.git
node_modules
+20 -1
View File
@@ -48,7 +48,26 @@ COPY . .
RUN touch mfer/mf.pb.go RUN touch mfer/mf.pb.go
RUN make test RUN make test
RUN cd cmd/mfer && go build -tags urfave_cli_no_docs -o /mfer .
# A build context sent as a tar archive, as upaas sends it, keeps its files'
# owners, and git refuses to read a checkout owned by another user.
RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /src
# The revision `mfer version` prints, stamped into main.Gitrev: the VERSION
# build argument when one is given (script/docker passes one), otherwise
# `git describe --tags --always` of the .git the build context carries: the
# tag on a tagged commit, tag-N-gHASH on a commit after one, the short commit
# when no tag is reachable. git ships in this base image. A context that
# carries .git and still yields no version fails the build.
ARG VERSION
RUN version="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
if [ -e .git ] && { [ -z "$version" ] || [ "$version" = dev ] || \
[ "$version" = unknown ]; }; then \
echo "no version could be derived although the build context carries .git" >&2; \
exit 1; \
fi; \
cd cmd/mfer && \
go build -tags urfave_cli_no_docs -ldflags "-X main.Gitrev=$version" -o /mfer .
FROM scratch FROM scratch
COPY --from=builder /mfer /mfer COPY --from=builder /mfer /mfer
+4 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ GOLDFLAGS += -X main.Version=$(VERSION)
GOLDFLAGS += -X main.Gitrev=$(GITREV_BUILD) GOLDFLAGS += -X main.Gitrev=$(GITREV_BUILD)
GOFLAGS := -ldflags "$(GOLDFLAGS)" GOFLAGS := -ldflags "$(GOLDFLAGS)"
.PHONY: bootstrap setup docker default run ci test check lint fmt fmt-check fmt-check-go fmt-check-md hooks fixme .PHONY: bootstrap setup docker default run ci test fuzz check lint fmt fmt-check fmt-check-go fmt-check-md hooks fixme
default: fmt test default: fmt test
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ ci: test
test: test:
@script/test @script/test
fuzz:
@script/fuzz
$(PROTOC_GEN_GO): $(PROTOC_GEN_GO):
test -e $(PROTOC_GEN_GO) || go install -v google.golang.org/protobuf/cmd/protoc-gen-go@v1.28.1 test -e $(PROTOC_GEN_GO) || go install -v google.golang.org/protobuf/cmd/protoc-gen-go@v1.28.1
+19 -68
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
# mfer # mfer
[mfer](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/mfer) is a [WTFPL](https://wtfpl.net)-licensed [mfer](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/mfer) is a reference implementation library and
(public domain) [Go](https://golang.org) library and command-line tool by thin wrapper command-line utility written in [Go](https://golang.org) and first
[@sneak](https://sneak.berlin) that specifies and generates `.mf` manifest files published in 2022 under the [WTFPL](https://wtfpl.net) (public domain) license.
over a directory tree to encapsulate metadata about the files — such as It specifies and generates `.mf` manifest files over a directory tree of files
cryptographic checksums and signatures over same — to aid in archiving, to encapsulate metadata about them (such as cryptographic checksums or
downloading, streaming, and mirroring. It was first published in 2022. The signatures over same) to aid in archiving, downloading, and streaming, or
manifest files' data is serialized with Google's mirroring. The manifest files' data is serialized with Google's
[protobuf serialization format](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers). [protobuf serialization format](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers).
The structure of these files can be found The structure of these files can be found
[in the format specification](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/mfer/src/branch/main/mfer/mf.proto) [in the format specification](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/mfer/src/branch/main/mfer/mf.proto)
@@ -21,40 +21,11 @@ This project was started by [@sneak](https://sneak.berlin) to scratch an itch in
as a de-facto standard and be incorporated into other software. A compatible as a de-facto standard and be incorporated into other software. A compatible
javascript library is planned. javascript library is planned.
# Getting Started
`mfer` builds from source with a Go 1.23+ toolchain. The generated protobuf code
is committed, so no `protoc` toolchain is required:
```sh
git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/mfer.git
cd mfer
go build -o bin/mfer ./cmd/mfer
```
Generate a manifest for a directory tree, verify it later, and fetch a published
tree by URL:
```sh
# Write .index.mf describing every file under the current directory.
bin/mfer gen .
# Verify the files on disk against the manifest. Exits nonzero if any file
# is missing or corrupted.
bin/mfer check .index.mf
# Download and cryptographically verify a tree published over HTTP: mfer
# fetches <url>/index.mf, then downloads every file it lists.
bin/mfer fetch https://example.com/tree/
```
Run `bin/mfer help` for the full command list, or `bin/mfer <command> --help`
for a single command's options.
# Build Status # Build Status
CI runs via `script/cibuild` (`docker build .`), which executes `make check` CI runs `script/cibuild`, which builds the Docker image with `--no-cache`, so
(formatting, linting, tests). The `main` branch must always be green. the formatting, lint and test steps in the `Dockerfile` run on every build. The
`main` branch must always be green.
# Entrypoints # Entrypoints
@@ -73,6 +44,9 @@ provide:
such as `script/docker` such as `script/docker`
- `script/test` — run the test suite (`go test`), regenerating the protobuf code - `script/test` — run the test suite (`go test`), regenerating the protobuf code
first if it is stale first if it is stale
- `script/fuzz` — fuzz the manifest parser for one minute; run by hand
(`make fuzz`), never by CI, while `script/test` runs its committed seed corpus
as ordinary tests
- `script/lint` — run `golangci-lint` and verify `gofmt` cleanliness - `script/lint` — run `golangci-lint` and verify `gofmt` cleanliness
- `script/fmt` — format all code and docs (writes): `gofumpt`, - `script/fmt` — format all code and docs (writes): `gofumpt`,
`golangci-lint run --fix`, and `script/prettier --write` `golangci-lint run --fix`, and `script/prettier --write`
@@ -86,8 +60,8 @@ provide:
Docker lint stage, whose image has no node Docker lint stage, whose image has no node
- `script/check` — run `script/test`, `script/lint`, and `script/fmt-check` - `script/check` — run `script/test`, `script/lint`, and `script/fmt-check`
- `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged with the project name - `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged with the project name
- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: `docker build .` (the Dockerfile runs the - `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: builds the image with the same command as
checks) `script/docker`, uncached, so the checks in the Dockerfile run every time
- `script/precommit` — pre-commit checks: `go mod tidy` verification, then - `script/precommit` — pre-commit checks: `go mod tidy` verification, then
`script/check` `script/check`
- `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook that runs - `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook that runs
@@ -111,9 +85,7 @@ Any changes submitted to this project must also be
See [`REPO_POLICIES.md`](REPO_POLICIES.md) for detailed coding standards, See [`REPO_POLICIES.md`](REPO_POLICIES.md) for detailed coding standards,
tooling requirements, and workflow conventions. tooling requirements, and workflow conventions.
# Rationale # Problem Statement
## The problem
Given a plain URL, there is no standard way to safely and programmatically Given a plain URL, there is no standard way to safely and programmatically
download everything "under" that URL path. `wget -r` can traverse directory download everything "under" that URL path. `wget -r` can traverse directory
@@ -137,7 +109,7 @@ Real issues I face:
- when I download a large file via HTTP, I have no way of knowing if the file - when I download a large file via HTTP, I have no way of knowing if the file
content is what it's supposed to be content is what it's supposed to be
## The solution # Proposed Solution
A standard, a manifest file format, and a tool for generating same. A standard, a manifest file format, and a tool for generating same.
@@ -169,27 +141,6 @@ The manifest file would do several important things:
- maybe a bittorrent chunklist for torrent client compatibility? perhaps a - maybe a bittorrent chunklist for torrent client compatibility? perhaps a
top-level infohash for the whole manifest? top-level infohash for the whole manifest?
# Design
The repository is split into a reusable library and a thin command-line wrapper
around it.
- `mfer/` is the reusable library and the heart of the project: it defines the
manifest format and implements building, scanning, checking, serialization,
and signing. The protobuf schema is `mfer/mf.proto`, and the generated code it
produces (`mfer/mf.pb.go`) is committed alongside it so the library builds
with `go get` and needs no `protoc` toolchain.
- `internal/cli/` holds the command implementations — `gen`, `check`, `freshen`,
`export`, `list`, and `fetch` — that wire the library to the command-line
interface.
- `internal/log/` provides the logging used across the commands.
- `internal/bork/` provides error-handling support.
- `cmd/mfer/` is the entrypoint: its `main` package assembles the pieces above
into the `mfer` binary.
Everything under `internal/` is private to this repository; only the `mfer/`
package is intended for import by other software.
# Design Goals # Design Goals
- Replace SHASUMS/SHASUMS.asc files - Replace SHASUMS/SHASUMS.asc files
@@ -515,9 +466,9 @@ proto `go_package` option. Which is canonical?
- Issues: - Issues:
[https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/mfer/issues](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/mfer/issues) [https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/mfer/issues](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/mfer/issues)
# Author # Authors
- [@sneak](https://sneak.berlin) - [@sneak &lt;sneak@sneak.berlin&gt;](mailto:sneak@sneak.berlin)
# License # License
+30 -7
View File
@@ -24,11 +24,35 @@ only thing left of the `chore/align-repo-policies` branch is the list below.
# Completed Steps # Completed Steps
- 2026-09-21: added the required README sections — named author, license, and - 2026-10-03: added `FuzzNewManifestFromReader` and its seed corpus, which
category in the Description first line; added Getting Started (verified `make test` runs, plus `make fuzz` for a one-minute run by hand; the zstd
install/usage block), Rationale (folding in Problem Statement and Proposed decoder now decodes only as many bytes as the parser reads, and has
Solution), and a Design section for the package layout; renamed Authors to `MaxDecompressedSize` as its limit, so neither a frame claiming a large size
Author (#75) nor several frames together can make the parser allocate past that limit (#65)
- 2026-10-03: pinned the CLI error messages by driving the functions that emit
them in `internal/cli/errmsg_test.go`, and made the freshen mtime-presence
test distinguish an absent mtime from the epoch (#87)
- 2026-10-03: `script/cibuild` builds the image with the same command as
`script/docker`, `--no-cache` included, so the checks in the Dockerfile run on
every build, also on an unchanged tree (#89)
- 2026-10-03: `fetch` removes whatever sits at a file's temp name and then
creates the temp file only if that name is free, so a hard link left there
cannot make it write into a file outside the destination directory (#115)
- 2026-10-03: `fetch` refuses any manifest path that runs through a symlink
already in the destination directory, checked before each of its writes
(directories, temp file, rename), so such a symlink cannot send a write
outside it (#86)
- 2026-10-02: a plain `docker build .` of a clone now stamps the tag or short
commit into `mfer version` instead of nothing: `.dockerignore` sends `.git`
(not `.git/config`), and the build stage takes the `VERSION` build argument,
otherwise `git describe --tags --always`, failing if `.git` is present and no
version comes out. `script/docker` is the canonical copy, which passes
`VERSION`; `bin/gitrev.sh` uses `--tags` too (#112)
- 2026-09-21: validate manifest entry paths on deserialize so untrusted `.mf`
files cannot make `Checker` stat or read outside `basePath` (#61)
- 2026-09-21: rewrote `script/test` to the canonical pattern (30s timeout,
`-race -cover`, quiet-first with verbose-on-failure rerun) and fixed the
process-global logger data race it surfaced (#67)
- 2026-09-21: added the canonical `.editorconfig`, made `.gitignore` cover - 2026-09-21: added the canonical `.editorconfig`, made `.gitignore` cover
secrets, OS, editor, and Go artifacts, and removed the dead Drone CI secrets, OS, editor, and Go artifacts, and removed the dead Drone CI
references from `.gitignore` and `bin/gitrev.sh` (#72) references from `.gitignore` and `bin/gitrev.sh` (#72)
@@ -70,7 +94,6 @@ only thing left of the `chore/align-repo-policies` branch is the list below.
- Move FORMAT.md from repo root to docs/ and update the AGENTS.md reference - Move FORMAT.md from repo root to docs/ and update the AGENTS.md reference
- Pin Makefile-installed Go tools (`protoc-gen-go@v1.28.1`, - Pin Makefile-installed Go tools (`protoc-gen-go@v1.28.1`,
`golangci-lint@v2.12.2`) by module hash, not mutable tag `golangci-lint@v2.12.2`) by module hash, not mutable tag
- Set `make test` timeout to 30s (currently 10s)
- Add explicit README "Rationale" heading (content exists under other - Add explicit README "Rationale" heading (content exists under other
names); name the author in the README Description first line names); name the author in the README Description first line
- Reconcile root-level AGENTS.md with directory-hygiene policy (keep or - Reconcile root-level AGENTS.md with directory-hygiene policy (keep or
@@ -108,7 +131,7 @@ only thing left of the `chore/align-repo-policies` branch is the list below.
rate-limit Checker progress output; add --deterministic flag or default; rate-limit Checker progress output; add --deterministic flag or default;
wire top-level --version properly wire top-level --version properly
- Testing: - Testing:
- Fuzz NewManifestFromReader; end-to-end tests for freshen and fetch - End-to-end tests for freshen and fetch
- Documentation: - Documentation:
- Promote docs/FORMAT.md as primary spec reference; audit error messages; - Promote docs/FORMAT.md as primary spec reference; audit error messages;
document the signature scheme fully document the signature scheme fully
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
if [[ ! -z "$GITREV" ]]; then if [[ ! -z "$GITREV" ]]; then
echo $GITREV echo $GITREV
else else
git describe --always --dirty=-dirty git describe --tags --always --dirty=-dirty
fi fi
+11 -9
View File
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ func TestHelpCommand(t *testing.T) {
stdout := testStdout(t, opts) stdout := testStdout(t, opts)
assert.Contains(t, stdout, cmdGenerate) assert.Contains(t, stdout, cmdGenerate)
assert.Contains(t, stdout, cmdCheck) assert.Contains(t, stdout, cmdCheck)
assert.Contains(t, stdout, "fetch") assert.Contains(t, stdout, cmdFetch)
} }
func TestGenerateCommand(t *testing.T) { func TestGenerateCommand(t *testing.T) {
@@ -679,11 +679,13 @@ func TestCheckDetectsManifestCorruption(t *testing.T) {
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs() fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(42)) //nolint:gosec // deterministic test data rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(42)) //nolint:gosec // deterministic test data
// Create many small files with random names to generate a ~1MB manifest // Create many small files with random names so the manifest has many
// Each manifest entry is roughly 50-60 bytes, so we need ~20000 files // entries and random single-byte flips land at varied offsets. Each
// manifest entry is roughly 50-60 bytes. Kept modest so the suite stays
// within its wall-clock budget under -race.
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(testDir, 0o755)) require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(testDir, 0o755))
numFiles := 20000 numFiles := 1500
for range numFiles { for range numFiles {
// Generate random filename // Generate random filename
filename := fmt.Sprintf("/testdir/%08x%08x%08x.dat", filename := fmt.Sprintf("/testdir/%08x%08x%08x.dat",
@@ -699,11 +701,11 @@ func TestCheckDetectsManifestCorruption(t *testing.T) {
exitCode := runCLI(opts) exitCode := runCLI(opts)
require.Equal(t, 0, exitCode, "generate should succeed") require.Equal(t, 0, exitCode, "generate should succeed")
// Read the valid manifest and verify it's approximately 1MB // Read the valid manifest and verify it has real size.
validManifest, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, testManifest) validManifest, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, testManifest)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(validManifest), 1024*1024, require.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(validManifest), 64*1024,
"manifest should be at least 1MB, got %d bytes", len(validManifest)) "manifest should be at least 64KB, got %d bytes", len(validManifest))
t.Logf("manifest size: %d bytes (%d files)", len(validManifest), numFiles) t.Logf("manifest size: %d bytes (%d files)", len(validManifest), numFiles)
// First corruption: truncate the manifest // First corruption: truncate the manifest
@@ -726,8 +728,8 @@ func TestCheckDetectsManifestCorruption(t *testing.T) {
exitCode = runCLI(opts) exitCode = runCLI(opts)
require.Equal(t, 0, exitCode, "check should pass with valid manifest") require.Equal(t, 0, exitCode, "check should pass with valid manifest")
// Now do 500 random corruption iterations // Now do 100 random corruption iterations
for i := range 500 { for i := range 100 {
// Corrupt: write a random byte at a random offset // Corrupt: write a random byte at a random offset
corrupted := make([]byte, len(validManifest)) corrupted := make([]byte, len(validManifest))
copy(corrupted, validManifest) copy(corrupted, validManifest)
+320 -135
View File
@@ -2,167 +2,352 @@
package cli package cli
import ( import (
"fmt" "bytes"
"context"
"flag"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"testing" "testing"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
urfcli "github.com/urfave/cli/v2"
"sneak.berlin/go/mfer/mfer"
) )
// errMsgCase is one pinned user-visible error message. // These tests pin the exact rendered text of the CLI's user-visible error
type errMsgCase struct { // messages. The messages are grepped for in CI pipelines and quoted in bug
name string // reports, so a reword is a deliberate change, never a refactoring side
err error // effect.
want string //
} // Every case drives the real function that emits the message and asserts on
// what it returns. No production format string is restated here: a test that
// only re-rendered a copied format string would keep passing after the real
// message changed, which is exactly the regression these tests exist to
// catch.
// Full 40-hex fingerprints used where a message embeds one.
const ( const (
msgFpA = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" msgFpA = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
msgFpB = "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB" msgFpB = "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
) )
func checkErrMsgCases(t *testing.T, cases []errMsgCase) { // runLocked runs fn while holding runMu, so operations that write to the
// process-global logger do not race the other CLI runs.
func runLocked(fn func() error) error {
runMu.Lock()
defer runMu.Unlock()
return fn()
}
// unsignedChecker builds a Checker over a freshly scanned, unsigned manifest.
func unsignedChecker(t *testing.T) *mfer.Checker {
t.Helper() t.Helper()
for _, tc := range cases { fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll("/d", 0o755))
t.Parallel() require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, "/d/f.txt", []byte("hi"), 0o644))
assert.Equal(t, tc.want, tc.err.Error())
}) s := mfer.NewScannerWithOptions(&mfer.ScannerOptions{Fs: fs})
} require.NoError(t, s.EnumeratePath("/d", nil))
var buf bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, s.ToManifest(context.Background(), &buf, nil))
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, "/d/index.mf", buf.Bytes(), 0o644))
chk, err := mfer.NewChecker("/d/index.mf", "/d", fs)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.False(t, chk.IsSigned())
return chk
} }
// TestErrorMessagesVerbatim pins the exact rendered text of the CLI's func TestNoManifestFoundMessage(t *testing.T) {
// user-visible error messages. t.Parallel()
_, err := findManifest(afero.NewMemMapFs(), "/tmp/x")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errNoManifestFound)
assert.EqualError(t, err,
"no manifest found in /tmp/x (looked for index.mf and .index.mf)")
}
func TestVerifyRequiredSignerMessages(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
t.Run("invalid fingerprint length", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := verifyRequiredSigner(unsignedChecker(t), "12345678")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInvalidFingerprint)
assert.EqualError(t, err,
"invalid fingerprint: must be exactly 40 hex characters, got 8")
})
t.Run("manifest not signed", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := verifyRequiredSigner(unsignedChecker(t), msgFpA)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errManifestNotSigned)
assert.EqualError(t, err,
"manifest is not signed, but signature from "+msgFpA+" is required")
})
}
// TestSignerMismatchMessage drives verifyRequiredSigner against a real signed
// manifest. The embedded fingerprint is whatever the generated key produced,
// so it is read back from the checker and substituted into the expected
// string; the required signer is a fixed value that cannot match it. Requires
// gpg and is skipped where it is absent, as the other signing tests are.
// //
// These strings are an interface: they are grepped for in CI pipelines //nolint:paralleltest // signedChecker calls t.Setenv, which bars t.Parallel
// and quoted in bug reports. The messages are assembled by wrapping func TestSignerMismatchMessage(t *testing.T) {
// static sentinels, and it is easy to change what a user sees while chk := signedChecker(t)
// only meaning to make an error matchable with errors.Is - which is
// precisely what happened once already. Any change to a string below is embeddedFP, err := chk.ExtractEmbeddedSigningKeyFP()
// therefore a deliberate, separately stated change, never a side effect require.NoError(t, err)
// of a refactor.
func TestErrorMessagesVerbatim(t *testing.T) { err = verifyRequiredSigner(chk, msgFpB)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errSignerMismatch)
assert.EqualError(t, err,
"embedded signing key fingerprint "+embeddedFP+
" does not match required "+msgFpB)
}
// signedChecker builds a Checker over a manifest signed by a throwaway GPG
// key generated in a temporary GNUPGHOME.
func signedChecker(t *testing.T) *mfer.Checker {
t.Helper()
_, err := exec.LookPath("gpg")
if err != nil {
t.Skip("gpg not installed, skipping signing test")
}
gpgHome := t.TempDir()
params := "%no-protection\n" +
"Key-Type: RSA\nKey-Length: 2048\n" +
"Name-Real: MFER Test Key\nName-Email: test@mfer.test\n" +
"Expire-Date: 0\n%commit\n"
paramsFile := filepath.Join(gpgHome, "key-params")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(paramsFile, []byte(params), 0o600))
//nolint:gosec // paramsFile is a test-controlled path inside t.TempDir()
cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "gpg",
"--batch", "--gen-key", paramsFile)
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "GNUPGHOME="+gpgHome)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("failed to generate test GPG key: %v: %s", err, out)
}
t.Setenv("GNUPGHOME", gpgHome)
b := mfer.NewBuilder()
b.SetSigningOptions(&mfer.SigningOptions{KeyID: mfer.GPGKeyID("test@mfer.test")})
content := []byte("signed file")
_, err = b.AddFile("f.txt", mfer.FileSize(len(content)), mfer.ModTime{},
bytes.NewReader(content), nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
var buf bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, b.Build(&buf))
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, "/index.mf", buf.Bytes(), 0o644))
chk, err := mfer.NewChecker("/index.mf", "/", fs)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.True(t, chk.IsSigned())
return chk
}
func TestPathDoesNotExistMessage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
checkErrMsgCases(t, []errMsgCase{ set := flag.NewFlagSet("gen", flag.ContinueOnError)
{ require.NoError(t, set.Parse([]string{"nope"}))
name: "check: no manifest found",
err: fmt.Errorf("%w in %s (looked for index.mf and .index.mf)", mfa := &CLIApp{Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs()}
errNoManifestFound, "/tmp/x"), ctx := urfcli.NewContext(nil, set, nil)
want: "no manifest found in /tmp/x " +
"(looked for index.mf and .index.mf)", _, err := mfa.collectInputPaths(ctx.Args())
}, require.ErrorIs(t, err, errPathNotExist)
{ assert.EqualError(t, err, "path does not exist: nope")
name: "check: invalid fingerprint length", }
err: fmt.Errorf("%w, got %d", errInvalidFingerprint, 8),
want: "invalid fingerprint: must be exactly 40 hex characters, got 8", func TestOutputFileExistsMessage(t *testing.T) {
}, t.Parallel()
{
name: "check: manifest not signed", fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
err: fmt.Errorf("%w, but signature from %s is required", require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll("/d", 0o755))
errManifestNotSigned, msgFpA), require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, "/d/f.txt", []byte("hi"), 0o644))
want: "manifest is not signed, but signature from " + msgFpA + require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, "/out.mf", []byte("old"), 0o644))
" is required",
}, set := flag.NewFlagSet("gen", flag.ContinueOnError)
{ set.String("output", "", "")
name: "check: signer mismatch", set.Bool("force", false, "")
err: fmt.Errorf("embedded signing key fingerprint %s %w %s", require.NoError(t, set.Parse([]string{"/d"}))
msgFpA, errSignerMismatch, msgFpB), require.NoError(t, set.Set("output", "/out.mf"))
want: "embedded signing key fingerprint " + msgFpA +
" does not match required " + msgFpB, mfa := &CLIApp{Fs: fs}
}, ctx := urfcli.NewContext(nil, set, nil)
{
name: "gen: path does not exist", // generateManifestOperation writes to the process-global logger during
err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errPathNotExist, "nope"), // enumeration, so serialize with the other CLI runs.
want: "path does not exist: nope", err := runLocked(func() error { return mfa.generateManifestOperation(ctx) })
}, require.ErrorIs(t, err, errOutputExists)
{ assert.EqualError(t, err,
name: "gen: output file exists", "output file /out.mf already exists (use --force to overwrite)")
err: fmt.Errorf("output file %s %w", "index.mf", errOutputExists), }
want: "output file index.mf already exists " +
"(use --force to overwrite)", // TestUnknownCommandMessage drives the root command's action. run only logs
}, // the error that action returns, so the test lets run build the app with no
{ // command given and then runs that same app on an unknown command to get the
name: "mfer: unknown command", // error itself.
err: fmt.Errorf("%w %q", errUnknownCommand, "bogus"), func TestUnknownCommandMessage(t *testing.T) {
want: `unknown command "bogus"`, t.Parallel()
},
mfa := &CLIApp{
appname: testApp,
Stdout: &bytes.Buffer{},
Stderr: &bytes.Buffer{},
Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs(),
}
// run points the process-global logger at this app's output, so
// serialize with the other CLI runs.
err := runLocked(func() error {
mfa.run([]string{testApp})
return mfa.app.Run([]string{testApp, "bogus"})
})
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errUnknownCommand)
assert.EqualError(t, err, `unknown command "bogus"`)
}
func TestManifestLoaderHTTPStatusMessage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
server := httptest.NewServer(
http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
}))
defer server.Close()
mfa := &CLIApp{Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs()}
_, err := mfa.openManifestReader(server.URL + "/foo.mf")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errHTTPStatus)
assert.EqualError(t, err,
"failed to fetch "+server.URL+"/foo.mf: HTTP 404")
}
func TestFetchManifestHTTPStatusMessage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
server := httptest.NewServer(
http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
}))
defer server.Close()
set := flag.NewFlagSet("fetch", flag.ContinueOnError)
require.NoError(t, set.Parse([]string{server.URL}))
mfa := &CLIApp{Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs()}
ctx := urfcli.NewContext(nil, set, nil)
// fetchManifestOperation logs to the process-global logger.
err := runLocked(func() error { return mfa.fetchManifestOperation(ctx) })
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errHTTPStatus)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "failed to fetch manifest: HTTP 404")
}
func TestFetchFileHTTPStatusMessage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
server := httptest.NewServer(
http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
}))
defer server.Close()
err := downloadFile(context.Background(), server.URL+"/x", "x",
&mfer.MFFilePath{}, nil)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errHTTPStatus)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "HTTP 500")
}
func TestURLRequiredMessage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
set := flag.NewFlagSet("fetch", flag.ContinueOnError)
require.NoError(t, set.Parse([]string{}))
mfa := &CLIApp{Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs()}
ctx := urfcli.NewContext(nil, set, nil)
// fetchManifestOperation logs to the process-global logger.
err := runLocked(func() error { return mfa.fetchManifestOperation(ctx) })
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errURLRequired)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "URL argument required")
}
func TestSanitizePathMessages(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
t.Run("empty", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := sanitizePath("")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errEmptyPath)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "empty path")
})
t.Run("absolute", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := sanitizePath("/etc/passwd")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errAbsolutePath)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "absolute path not allowed: /etc/passwd")
})
t.Run("traversal", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := sanitizePath("../x")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errPathTraversal)
assert.EqualError(t, err, "path traversal not allowed: ../x")
}) })
} }
// TestFetchErrorMessagesVerbatim pins the fetch and manifest-loader func TestSizeMismatchMessage(t *testing.T) {
// messages; see TestErrorMessagesVerbatim for why.
func TestFetchErrorMessagesVerbatim(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
checkErrMsgCases(t, []errMsgCase{ // finishDownload returns the size-mismatch error before it touches the
{ // paths, digest, or entry, so those can be zero here.
name: "manifest_loader: http status", err := finishDownload("", "", 9, 10, nil, nil, nil, nil)
err: fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch %s: %w %d", require.ErrorIs(t, err, errSizeMismatch)
"https://example.com/index.mf", errHTTPStatus, 404), assert.EqualError(t, err, "size mismatch: expected 10 bytes, got 9")
want: "failed to fetch https://example.com/index.mf: HTTP 404",
},
{
name: "fetch: manifest http status",
err: fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch manifest: %w %d",
errHTTPStatus, 404),
want: "failed to fetch manifest: HTTP 404",
},
{
name: "fetch: file http status",
err: fmt.Errorf("%w %d", errHTTPStatus, 500),
want: "HTTP 500",
},
{
name: "fetch: empty path",
err: errEmptyPath,
want: "empty path",
},
{
name: "fetch: absolute path",
err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errAbsolutePath, "/etc/passwd"),
want: "absolute path not allowed: /etc/passwd",
},
{
name: "fetch: path traversal",
err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errPathTraversal, "../x"),
want: "path traversal not allowed: ../x",
},
{
name: "fetch: size mismatch",
err: fmt.Errorf("%w: expected %d bytes, got %d",
errSizeMismatch, 10, 9),
want: "size mismatch: expected 10 bytes, got 9",
},
{
name: "fetch: url required",
err: errURLRequired,
want: "URL argument required",
},
{
name: "fetch: hash mismatch",
err: errHashMismatch,
want: "hash mismatch",
},
})
} }
// TestSentinelsAreMatchable checks that the wrapped forms of the func TestHashMismatchMessage(t *testing.T) {
// messages above remain matchable with errors.Is, which is the reason
// the sentinels exist at all.
func TestSentinelsAreMatchable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
wrapped := fmt.Errorf("embedded signing key fingerprint %s %w %s", // A 32-byte digest that matches none of the (empty) manifest hashes.
"a", errSignerMismatch, "b") err := verifyDownloadedHash(make([]byte, 32), &mfer.MFFilePath{})
require.ErrorIs(t, wrapped, errSignerMismatch) require.ErrorIs(t, err, errHashMismatch)
require.NotErrorIs(t, err, errSizeMismatch)
wrapped = fmt.Errorf("output file %s %w", "index.mf", errOutputExists) assert.EqualError(t, err, "hash mismatch")
require.ErrorIs(t, wrapped, errOutputExists)
wrapped = fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch manifest: %w %d", errHTTPStatus, 404)
require.ErrorIs(t, wrapped, errHTTPStatus)
assert.NotErrorIs(t, errHashMismatch, errSizeMismatch)
} }
+66 -9
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ const (
// traversal bit for group and other must stay set. // traversal bit for group and other must stay set.
dirPerms os.FileMode = 0o755 dirPerms os.FileMode = 0o755
// filePerms is the permission mode, before the umask, for downloaded
// files. It is the mode os.Create uses; like dirPerms, it keeps group
// and other read access.
filePerms os.FileMode = 0o666
// Bitrate unit thresholds in bits per second. // Bitrate unit thresholds in bits per second.
bpsPerGbps = 1e9 bpsPerGbps = 1e9
bpsPerMbps = 1e6 bpsPerMbps = 1e6
@@ -53,6 +58,9 @@ var (
// errPathTraversal indicates a manifest path escaping the target // errPathTraversal indicates a manifest path escaping the target
// directory. // directory.
errPathTraversal = errors.New("path traversal not allowed") errPathTraversal = errors.New("path traversal not allowed")
// errSymlinkInPath indicates a manifest path running through a
// symlink that already exists in the target directory.
errSymlinkInPath = errors.New("symlink in path not allowed")
// errSizeMismatch indicates a downloaded file with an unexpected // errSizeMismatch indicates a downloaded file with an unexpected
// size. // size.
errSizeMismatch = errors.New("size mismatch") errSizeMismatch = errors.New("size mismatch")
@@ -274,6 +282,35 @@ func sanitizePath(p string) (string, error) {
return cleaned, nil return cleaned, nil
} }
// checkNoSymlinks returns an error if any part of the relative path p
// already exists as a symlink. sanitizePath checks p only as text, so
// without this a symlink inside the target directory could send a write
// to p outside of it. Parts that do not exist yet are fine: fetch creates
// them as plain directories and files. Call it immediately before each
// write: a symlink created after it returns is not caught.
func checkNoSymlinks(p string) error {
current := ""
for _, part := range strings.Split(p, string(filepath.Separator)) {
current = filepath.Join(current, part)
info, err := os.Lstat(current)
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return nil
}
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check %s for a symlink: %w", current, err)
}
if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errSymlinkInPath, current)
}
}
return nil
}
// resolveManifestURL takes a URL and returns the manifest URL. // resolveManifestURL takes a URL and returns the manifest URL.
// If the URL already ends with .mf, it's returned as-is. // If the URL already ends with .mf, it's returned as-is.
// Otherwise, index.mf is appended. // Otherwise, index.mf is appended.
@@ -419,7 +456,12 @@ func downloadFile(
// Create parent directories if needed // Create parent directories if needed
dir := filepath.Dir(localPath) dir := filepath.Dir(localPath)
if dir != "" && dir != "." { if dir != "" && dir != "." {
err := os.MkdirAll(dir, dirPerms) err = checkNoSymlinks(dir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = os.MkdirAll(dir, dirPerms)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create directory %s: %w", dir, err) return fmt.Errorf("failed to create directory %s: %w", dir, err)
} }
@@ -447,15 +489,25 @@ func downloadFile(
totalBytes = expectedSize totalBytes = expectedSize
} }
// Create temp file. err = checkNoSymlinks(tmpPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Remove whatever is at tmpPath, such as a leftover from an
// interrupted run, rather than write into it: it may be a hard link
// to a file outside the target directory, and removing a hard link
// removes only this name. If the removal fails, O_EXCL below makes
// the create fail.
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
// Create the temp file only if nothing is at tmpPath (O_EXCL).
// //
// G304: tmpPath is derived from localPath, which sanitizePath above // G304: tmpPath is a relative path that sanitizePath keeps inside the
// constrains lexically to a relative path that does not escape the // target directory as text, and checkNoSymlinks just found no symlink
// destination directory. That is a purely lexical guarantee: it does // in it.
// not resolve symlinks, so a pre-existing symlink inside the out, err := os.OpenFile( //nolint:gosec // G304: see comment above
// destination tree can still redirect this write outside of it tmpPath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, filePerms)
// (tracked in issue #86).
out, err := os.Create(tmpPath) //nolint:gosec // G304: see comment above
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp file: %w", err) return fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp file: %w", err)
} }
@@ -519,6 +571,11 @@ func finishDownload(
return err return err
} }
err = checkNoSymlinks(localPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Rename temp file to final path // Rename temp file to final path
err = os.Rename(tmpPath, localPath) err = os.Rename(tmpPath, localPath)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
+83
View File
@@ -440,3 +440,86 @@ func TestFetchProgress(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, content, downloaded) assert.Equal(t, content, downloaded)
} }
// TestFetchRefusesSymlinks runs fetch into a destination directory that
// holds a symlink pointing outside it, in each of the three places fetch
// writes: a parent directory, the temp file, and the file itself, which
// the temp file is renamed onto; and once as a directory inside a plain
// directory. The fetch must fail and nothing outside may change.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // changes the process-global working directory
func TestFetchRefusesSymlinks(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
entry string // the manifest's only file
link string // symlink placed in the destination directory
target string // what link points to, relative to the outside directory
}{
{"parent directory", "sub/deeper/file.txt", "sub", "."},
{"directory inside a plain directory", "docs/data/passwd", "docs/data", "."},
{"temp file", testFileTxt, ".file.txt.tmp", "new.txt"},
{"file", testFileTxt, testFileTxt, "new.txt"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
content := []byte("fetched")
sourceFs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
require.NoError(t, sourceFs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir("/"+tt.entry), 0o755))
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(sourceFs, "/"+tt.entry, content, 0o644))
server := httptest.NewServer(fetchTestHandler(
scanToManifest(t, sourceFs), map[string][]byte{tt.entry: content}))
defer server.Close()
outside := t.TempDir()
chdirTemp(t)
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(tt.link), 0o750))
require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(filepath.Join(outside, tt.target), tt.link))
opts := testOpts([]string{testApp, cmdFetch, "-q", server.URL}, afero.NewOsFs())
assert.Equal(t, 1, runCLI(opts))
assert.Contains(t, testStderr(t, opts), "failed to download "+tt.entry+
": symlink in path not allowed: "+tt.link)
written, err := os.ReadDir(outside)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, written, "fetch wrote outside the destination")
})
}
}
// TestFetchReplacesHardLinkAtTempName runs fetch into a destination
// directory that holds, at the temp file's name, a hard link to a file
// outside it. To fetch that is an ordinary leftover from an interrupted
// earlier run: it must replace it and succeed, and the outside file must
// not change.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // changes the process-global working directory
func TestFetchReplacesHardLinkAtTempName(t *testing.T) {
content := []byte("fetched")
sourceFs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(sourceFs, "/"+testFileTxt, content, 0o644))
server := httptest.NewServer(fetchTestHandler(
scanToManifest(t, sourceFs), map[string][]byte{testFileTxt: content}))
defer server.Close()
outsideFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret.txt")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(outsideFile, []byte("outside"), 0o600))
chdirTemp(t)
require.NoError(t, os.Link(outsideFile, ".file.txt.tmp"))
opts := testOpts([]string{testApp, cmdFetch, "-q", server.URL}, afero.NewOsFs())
require.Equal(t, 0, runCLI(opts), testStderr(t, opts))
fetched, err := os.ReadFile(testFileTxt)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, content, fetched)
outside, err := os.ReadFile(outsideFile) //nolint:gosec // test-controlled path
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "outside", string(outside), "fetch wrote outside the destination")
}
+4 -1
View File
@@ -110,7 +110,10 @@ func TestFreshenRecordEntryMtimePresence(t *testing.T) {
const relPath = "file1.txt" const relPath = "file1.txt"
mtime := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0) // The scanned file's mtime is the Unix epoch. If recordEntry ever misreads
// an absent manifest mtime as the epoch, the "absent" case below would
// compare equal to this and be classified unchanged, so the test fails.
mtime := time.Unix(0, 0)
info := stubFileInfo{size: 8, mtime: mtime} info := stubFileInfo{size: 8, mtime: mtime}
for _, tc := range []struct { for _, tc := range []struct {
+3 -2
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ const (
cmdGenerate = "generate" cmdGenerate = "generate"
cmdCheck = "check" cmdCheck = "check"
cmdExport = "export" cmdExport = "export"
cmdFetch = "fetch"
flagProgress = "progress" flagProgress = "progress"
@@ -300,7 +301,7 @@ func (mfa *CLIApp) listCommand() *cli.Command {
func (mfa *CLIApp) fetchCommand() *cli.Command { func (mfa *CLIApp) fetchCommand() *cli.Command {
return &cli.Command{ return &cli.Command{
Name: "fetch", Name: cmdFetch,
Usage: "fetch manifest and referenced files", Usage: "fetch manifest and referenced files",
Action: func(c *cli.Context) error { Action: func(c *cli.Context) error {
mfa.setVerbosity(c) mfa.setVerbosity(c)
@@ -357,6 +358,6 @@ func (mfa *CLIApp) run(args []string) {
if err != nil { if err != nil {
mfa.exitCode = 1 mfa.exitCode = 1
log.WithError(err).Debugf("exiting") log.Errorf("%s", err)
} }
} }
+34 -41
View File
@@ -112,13 +112,16 @@ func DisableStyling() {
} }
// Init initializes the logger with the CLI handler and default log level. // Init initializes the logger with the CLI handler and default log level.
//
// It reconfigures the process-global apex/log logger under the write lock so
// the global is never mutated while another goroutine holds the read lock to
// read it in emit. Without this, parallel callers (e.g. the test suite) race
// Init's SetLevel/SetHandler against concurrent log calls.
func Init() { func Init() {
mu.RLock() mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
w := stderr log.SetHandler(acli.New(stderr))
mu.RUnlock()
log.SetHandler(acli.New(w))
log.SetLevel(log.DebugLevel) // Let apex/log pass everything; we filter ourselves log.SetLevel(log.DebugLevel) // Let apex/log pass everything; we filter ourselves
} }
@@ -130,74 +133,66 @@ func isEnabled(l Level) bool {
return l >= currentLevel return l >= currentLevel
} }
// emit calls fn while holding the read lock if messages at level l are
// enabled. Holding the read lock across the apex/log call keeps the global
// logger from being read while Init reconfigures it under the write lock.
func emit(l Level, fn func()) {
mu.RLock()
defer mu.RUnlock()
if l >= currentLevel {
fn()
}
}
// Fatalf logs a formatted message at fatal level. // Fatalf logs a formatted message at fatal level.
func Fatalf(format string, args ...any) { func Fatalf(format string, args ...any) {
if isEnabled(FatalLevel) { emit(FatalLevel, func() { log.Fatalf(format, args...) })
log.Fatalf(format, args...)
}
} }
// Fatal logs a message at fatal level. // Fatal logs a message at fatal level.
func Fatal(arg string) { func Fatal(arg string) {
if isEnabled(FatalLevel) { emit(FatalLevel, func() { log.Fatal(arg) })
log.Fatal(arg)
}
} }
// Errorf logs a formatted message at error level. // Errorf logs a formatted message at error level.
func Errorf(format string, args ...any) { func Errorf(format string, args ...any) {
if isEnabled(ErrorLevel) { emit(ErrorLevel, func() { log.Errorf(format, args...) })
log.Errorf(format, args...)
}
} }
// Error logs a message at error level. // Error logs a message at error level.
func Error(arg string) { func Error(arg string) {
if isEnabled(ErrorLevel) { emit(ErrorLevel, func() { log.Error(arg) })
log.Error(arg)
}
} }
// Warnf logs a formatted message at warn level. // Warnf logs a formatted message at warn level.
func Warnf(format string, args ...any) { func Warnf(format string, args ...any) {
if isEnabled(WarnLevel) { emit(WarnLevel, func() { log.Warnf(format, args...) })
log.Warnf(format, args...)
}
} }
// Warn logs a message at warn level. // Warn logs a message at warn level.
func Warn(arg string) { func Warn(arg string) {
if isEnabled(WarnLevel) { emit(WarnLevel, func() { log.Warn(arg) })
log.Warn(arg)
}
} }
// Infof logs a formatted message at info level. // Infof logs a formatted message at info level.
func Infof(format string, args ...any) { func Infof(format string, args ...any) {
if isEnabled(InfoLevel) { emit(InfoLevel, func() { log.Infof(format, args...) })
log.Infof(format, args...)
}
} }
// Info logs a message at info level. // Info logs a message at info level.
func Info(arg string) { func Info(arg string) {
if isEnabled(InfoLevel) { emit(InfoLevel, func() { log.Info(arg) })
log.Info(arg)
}
} }
// Verbosef logs a formatted message at verbose level. // Verbosef logs a formatted message at verbose level.
func Verbosef(format string, args ...any) { func Verbosef(format string, args ...any) {
if isEnabled(VerboseLevel) { emit(VerboseLevel, func() { log.Infof(format, args...) })
log.Infof(format, args...)
}
} }
// Verbose logs a message at verbose level. // Verbose logs a message at verbose level.
func Verbose(arg string) { func Verbose(arg string) {
if isEnabled(VerboseLevel) { emit(VerboseLevel, func() { log.Info(arg) })
log.Info(arg)
}
} }
// Debugf logs a formatted message at debug level with caller location. // Debugf logs a formatted message at debug level with caller location.
@@ -216,7 +211,10 @@ func Debug(arg string) {
// DebugReal logs at debug level with caller info from the specified stack depth. // DebugReal logs at debug level with caller info from the specified stack depth.
func DebugReal(arg string, cs int) { func DebugReal(arg string, cs int) {
if !isEnabled(DebugLevel) { mu.RLock()
defer mu.RUnlock()
if DebugLevel < currentLevel {
return return
} }
@@ -275,11 +273,6 @@ func GetLevel() Level {
return currentLevel return currentLevel
} }
// WithError returns a log entry with the error attached.
func WithError(e error) *log.Entry {
return log.Log.WithError(e)
}
// Progressf prints a progress message that overwrites the current line. // Progressf prints a progress message that overwrites the current line.
// Use ProgressDone() when progress is complete to move to the next line. // Use ProgressDone() when progress is complete to move to the next line.
func Progressf(format string, args ...any) { func Progressf(format string, args ...any) {
+4
View File
@@ -312,6 +312,10 @@ func (c *Checker) FindExtraFiles(ctx context.Context, results chan<- Result) err
} }
func (c *Checker) checkFile(entry *MFFilePath, checkedBytes *FileSize) Result { func (c *Checker) checkFile(entry *MFFilePath, checkedBytes *FileSize) Result {
// entry.GetPath() is safe to join here: a manifest's entry paths are
// validated against the path invariants when it is loaded (see
// deserializeInner) or built (see Builder.AddFile), so a traversal or
// absolute path can never reach this point.
absPath := filepath.Join(string(c.basePath), entry.GetPath()) absPath := filepath.Join(string(c.basePath), entry.GetPath())
relPath := RelFilePath(entry.GetPath()) relPath := RelFilePath(entry.GetPath())
+23 -1
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ var (
errDecompressedTooLarge = errors.New("decompressed data exceeds maximum allowed size") errDecompressedTooLarge = errors.New("decompressed data exceeds maximum allowed size")
errUUIDMismatch = errors.New("outer and inner UUID mismatch") errUUIDMismatch = errors.New("outer and inner UUID mismatch")
errInvalidFileFormat = errors.New("invalid file format") errInvalidFileFormat = errors.New("invalid file format")
errInvalidManifestPath = errors.New("manifest contains invalid path")
) )
// validateUUID checks that the byte slice is a valid UUID (16 bytes, parseable). // validateUUID checks that the byte slice is a valid UUID (16 bytes, parseable).
@@ -110,7 +111,15 @@ func (m *manifest) verifyOuterIntegrity() error {
func (m *manifest) decompressInner() ([]byte, error) { func (m *manifest) decompressInner() ([]byte, error) {
bb := bytes.NewBuffer(m.pbOuter.GetInnerMessage()) bb := bytes.NewBuffer(m.pbOuter.GetInnerMessage())
zr, err := zstd.NewReader(bb) // By default the decoder decodes a payload under 128 KiB in full,
// each frame up to the decoder's limit, before the LimitReader below
// reads any of it. Decoding synchronously and never in full makes it decode
// only what the LimitReader asks for. Its limit caps the window that
// a frame header can make it set aside.
zr, err := zstd.NewReader(bb,
zstd.WithDecoderConcurrency(1),
zstd.WithDecodeBuffersBelow(0),
zstd.WithDecoderMaxMemory(uint64(MaxDecompressedSize)))
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("deserialize: zstd reader: %w", err) return nil, fmt.Errorf("deserialize: zstd reader: %w", err)
} }
@@ -181,6 +190,19 @@ func (m *manifest) deserializeInner() error {
return errUUIDMismatch return errUUIDMismatch
} }
// Enforce the manifest path invariants on every entry as it is loaded,
// so that no consumer of a manifest — Checker today, any restore or
// extract path tomorrow — acts on a traversal or absolute path from an
// untrusted .mf. Reject loudly on the first offender rather than
// dropping entries, which would let a hostile manifest hide files from a
// check.
for _, f := range m.pbInner.GetFiles() {
err = ValidatePath(f.GetPath())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errInvalidManifestPath, err)
}
}
log.Infof("loaded manifest with %d files", len(m.pbInner.GetFiles())) log.Infof("loaded manifest with %d files", len(m.pbInner.GetFiles()))
return nil return nil
+75
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
//nolint:testpackage // white-box tests exercise unexported internals
package mfer
import (
"bytes"
"runtime"
"testing"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
)
// FuzzNewManifestFromReader feeds arbitrary bytes to the manifest parser.
// `make test` runs it on the seed corpus in
// testdata/fuzz/FuzzNewManifestFromReader; `make fuzz` searches for new
// inputs.
//
// For every input the parser must return a manifest or an error, not both
// and not neither, and must not allocate more than a fixed multiple of its
// input and of the decompressed data it may read, plus room for the
// decoder's window. A panic or a hang fails the test on its own.
func FuzzNewManifestFromReader(f *testing.F) {
// A signed manifest makes the parser write the key and signature to a
// temporary directory and run gpg on them. With gpg off the PATH and
// temporary files kept in the test's own directory, no process is
// started and nothing is written elsewhere; such input ends in an
// error instead.
f.Setenv("PATH", "")
f.Setenv("TMPDIR", f.TempDir())
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, data []byte) {
var before, after runtime.MemStats
runtime.ReadMemStats(&before)
m, err := NewManifestFromReader(bytes.NewReader(data))
runtime.ReadMemStats(&after)
if (m == nil) == (err == nil) {
t.Fatalf("got manifest %p and error %v, want exactly one", m, err)
}
// The parser reads at most the declared size plus one byte of
// decompressed data, and never more than MaxDecompressedSize.
decompressed := uint64(MaxDecompressedSize)
outer := new(MFFileOuter)
if validateMagic(data) &&
proto.Unmarshal(data[len(MAGIC):], outer) == nil {
size := outer.GetSize()
if size > 0 && size < MaxDecompressedSize {
decompressed = uint64(size) + 1
}
}
// It also keeps a few copies of its input, and the decoder sets
// aside a window that a frame header sizes, up to a little over
// MaxDecompressedSize. Buffers grow by copying, so reaching those
// sizes allocates a few times them in total: sixteen times the
// input and the decompressed data, plus twice MaxDecompressedSize
// for the window, leaves room for that. The seed whose frame
// claims 8 GiB fails if the decoder sets that size aside; the seed
// whose two frames together exceed MaxDecompressedSize fails if
// the decoder decodes them in full instead of stopping at the
// declared size.
limit := 16*(uint64(len(data))+decompressed) +
2*uint64(MaxDecompressedSize)
allocated := after.TotalAlloc - before.TotalAlloc
if allocated > limit {
t.Fatalf("allocated %d bytes for %d bytes of input, limit %d",
allocated, len(data), limit)
}
})
}
+145
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
//nolint:testpackage // white-box tests exercise unexported internals
package mfer
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/klauspost/compress/zstd"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protowire"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
)
// craftInnerBytes builds the wire bytes of an inner MFFile holding a single
// file entry whose path is exactly pathBytes. It writes the wire form by hand
// so a hostile path — including one that is not valid UTF-8 — can be embedded
// without proto.Marshal's own UTF-8 enforcement rejecting it first.
func craftInnerBytes(id uuid.UUID, pathBytes string) []byte {
entry := protowire.AppendTag(nil, 1, protowire.BytesType) // MFFilePath.path
entry = protowire.AppendString(entry, pathBytes)
inner := protowire.AppendTag(nil, 100, protowire.VarintType) // MFFile.version
inner = protowire.AppendVarint(inner, uint64(MFFile_VERSION_ONE))
inner = protowire.AppendTag(inner, 101, protowire.BytesType) // MFFile.files
inner = protowire.AppendBytes(inner, entry)
inner = protowire.AppendTag(inner, 102, protowire.BytesType) // MFFile.uuid
inner = protowire.AppendBytes(inner, id[:])
return inner
}
// wrapInner wraps inner MFFile wire bytes in a complete, well-formed .mf
// envelope (magic prefix, zstd-compressed payload, matching hash and UUID) so
// that deserialization reaches path validation rather than failing earlier on
// an integrity check.
func wrapInner(t *testing.T, id uuid.UUID, innerData []byte) []byte {
t.Helper()
var cbuf bytes.Buffer
zw, err := zstd.NewWriter(&cbuf, zstd.WithEncoderLevel(zstd.SpeedBestCompression))
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = zw.Write(innerData)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, zw.Close())
compressed := cbuf.Bytes()
sum := sha256.Sum256(compressed)
outer := &MFFileOuter{
InnerMessage: compressed,
Size: int64(len(innerData)),
Sha256: sum[:],
Uuid: id[:],
Version: MFFileOuter_VERSION_ONE,
CompressionType: MFFileOuter_COMPRESSION_ZSTD,
}
ob, err := proto.Marshal(outer)
require.NoError(t, err)
return append([]byte(MAGIC), ob...)
}
func TestDeserializeRejectsInvalidEntryPaths(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
path string
}{
{"parent traversal", "../escape"},
{"interior traversal", "a/../../escape"},
{"absolute path", "/etc/passwd"},
{"backslash path", `a\b`},
{"double slash", "a//b"},
{"empty path", ""},
{"invalid utf-8", "abc\xff"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
id := uuid.New()
data := wrapInner(t, id, craftInnerBytes(id, tt.path))
_, err := NewManifestFromReader(bytes.NewReader(data))
require.Error(t, err)
if tt.path == "abc\xff" {
// A path that is not valid UTF-8 cannot survive the proto3
// string decoder, which rejects it before path validation
// runs; the manifest is still refused at load time.
return
}
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInvalidManifestPath)
if tt.path != "" {
// ValidatePath quotes the path with %q; assert against the
// same rendering so escaped characters (e.g. a backslash)
// still match.
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), fmt.Sprintf("%q", tt.path),
"error must name the offending path")
}
})
}
}
func TestDeserializeValidManifestRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
hash := make([]byte, 34) // multihash: 2-byte prefix + 32-byte SHA-256
b := NewBuilder()
require.NoError(t, b.AddFileWithHash("dir/file.txt", 123, ModTime{}, hash))
var buf bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, b.Build(&buf))
m, err := NewManifestFromReader(bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes()))
require.NoError(t, err)
files := m.Files()
require.Len(t, files, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "dir/file.txt", files[0].GetPath())
assert.Equal(t, int64(123), files[0].GetSize())
}
// TestValidatePathRejectsInvalidUTF8 pins the ValidatePath rule that a manifest
// path must be valid UTF-8, independent of the proto decoder that also enforces
// it on the wire.
func TestValidatePathRejectsInvalidUTF8(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := ValidatePath("abc\xff")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errPathNotUTF8)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "UTF-8")
}
+2
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("")
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("ZNAVSRFGy[i\x04\xe5O\x82A\x1d\xf4\xb0\xe2z7:U\xee\xa3\xf9\xd6m\xacZ\x9b\xce\x1d\xd9/{@\x1d\xa5y[i\x04\xe5O\x82A\x1d\xf4\xb0\xe2z7:U\xee\xa3\xf9\xd6m\xacZ\x9b\xce\x1d\xd9/{@\x1d\xa5")
+2
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("ZNAVSRFG\xa8\x06\x01\xb0\x06\x01\xb8\x06V\xc2\x06 \xa3\xf7\x97\xa7\xf3\x87:\x90)\\ӊj\xb9\xf7\xfaTJ\x1b\xe7:\xee\xbe\"V\xe0:\x8d(Z\xd6%\xca\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3\xba\fc(\xb5/\xfd\x04\x00\xb1\x02\x00\xa0\x06\x01\xaa\x06=\n\x05a.txt\x10\x01\x1a$\n\"\x12 ʗ\x81\x12\xca\x1b\xbd\xca\xfa\xc21\xb3\x9a#\xdcM\xa7\x86\xef\xf8\x14|Nr\xb9\x80w\x85\xaf\xeeH\xbb\xf2\x12\v\b\x80\x92\xb8Ø\xfe\xff\xff\xff\x01\xb2\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3s\xeeG\x80")
+2
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("ZNAVSRFG\xa8\x06\x01\xb0\x06\x01\xb8\x06V\xc2\x06 \xa3\xf7\x97\xa7\xf3\x87:\x90)\\ӊj\xb9\xf7\xfaTJ\x1b\xe7:\xee\xbe\"V\xe0:\x8d(Z\xd6%\xca\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3\xba\fc(\xb5/\xfd\x04\x00\xb1\x02\x00\xa0\x06\x01\xaa\x06=\n\x05a.txt\x10\x01\x1a$\n\"\x12 ʗ\x81\x12\xca\x1b\xbd\xca\xfa\xc21\xb3\x9a#\xdcM\xa7\x86\xef\xf8\x14|Nr\xb9\x80w\x85\xaf\xeeH\xbb\xf2\x12\v\b\x80\x92\xb8Ø\xfe\xff\xff\xff\x01\xb2\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3s\xeeG\x80\xca\f\xe8\x03-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\niQEzBAABCgAdFiEET1Yr+4Y/3GtRtO6IhypRF2zvI64FAmrBIXAACgkQhypRF2zv\nI67BQAf/QrpX2MjY15YGMGkjR5oIhnx/YV96aGYZyZThzb+l/R/N75iVFVkhX21d\nZhQqdCsORrodTPAXic2g2UGVXP9PhNMh7n6Wm3LsvQYjrRQGrQnqtCkut+3tUt8K\n7pt4OAnnwRSieaVImA1COmzxIrQQKNOs6UkgmAstGuPV0XZoeDiSG8TUYJ/vieCn\np5hC0FFXtzfw4NtkxSmkewE0xBxIwFCA/RfSHCGH3m5K+tRz41vMEgGbL1iEp6+V\nuBaoEc4hqCgEt+Af2pA8VHfqeu2vKiwggOpYpaILXZKVqH9+tWHL1EBv9t0vTsYE\n9D57euuR9+kOdngYNPieP1yn5dOSHg==\n=kvgL\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\xd2\f(4F562BFB863FDC6B51B4EE88872A51176CEF23AE\xda\f\xb5\a-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----\n\nmQENBGrBIW8BCADESetN5EdxIe7Fafgxl99Yoo5cOexf7wJyYT0wfUYlRaxt3neR\nhir7LOfH4PZWWoDx7qghxCS4+vs7yGypl6JOm7jnJlhn4HneDa2zeIlgGW2TamyE\nua9KPWBQqkFOYmKPmzp+KnL6ncnBLR5mDkNKFyON812KVvteu6Dp/DNk4Meufe44\nWWr49LSFZa9gEbmRCoQGKby9F0H0yIi4FAc74VdQudy0+fMKcfkKjEvByMzlbBEK\n92Hq3sRFzWd3kvPliNjZTmlh5n5m9aBhMpoy3GkKy8gpDdFc6NLA9iAJe7oNMriR\nkVoa5EjQL1xCXAiAWTYA9NScFfU/574sCTxZABEBAAG0Hk1GRVIgVGVzdCBLZXkg\nPHRlc3RAbWZlci50ZXN0PokBTwQTAQoAORYhBE9WK/uGP9xrUbTuiIcqURds7yOu\nBQJqwSFvAxsvBAULCQgHAgYVCgkICwIEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRCHKlEXbO8jrjml\nCAC8wUK9wmvxq0+NZUpFyP+P29klLZYzBDaBrLPJFs0GjnG4kvfUAktWx0Ro80F7\ncjTJ4f44XjDj4glvSjbe2VaDnZl9FTfzUfG+xjD4462NgntQ4fHk/uG4F6d1ikWx\nkEoMpIn1PlSMas1jTQSGlxUr+zFwWuUbGq4n6hRxEnwLlwJlwQt/Aw1vPDYuPDE3\nOYDhJIAJyP+6e9W8ToaAG9byg/22KA1u1qxnNQqsx5Tped2VltAzdYub+yeCuNc8\nIUo5ILo/fQq3GM5sUEaHjPolv88WlDm3vcdbSbDoh5m2inDtg5zuUKJwu32UGu8l\nKoTjp4nxgQGy5WmeBzs4Hdm/\n=TCB8\n-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----\n")
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("ZNAVSRFG\xa8\x06\x01\xb0\x06\x01\xb8\x06!\xc2\x06 \x91\x90*\xa5>\fݐ \x87\xbeaL\xc1\x05?\x0eR\xc18\xa4eՕ\xa95\xb9KʺoZ\xca\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3\xba\f-(\xb5/\xfd\x04\x00\x01\x01\x00\xa0\x06\x01\xaa\x06\a\n\x05a.txt\xb2\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3a[k'")
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("ZNAVSRFG\xa8\x06\x01\xb0\x06\x01\xb8\x06\x1f\xc2\x06 \x91\x90*\xa5>\fݐ \x87\xbeaL\xc1\x05?\x0eR\xc18\xa4eՕ\xa95\xb9KʺoZ\xca\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3\xba\f-(\xb5/\xfd\x04\x00\x01\x01\x00\xa0\x06\x01\xaa\x06\a\n\x05a.txt\xb2\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3a[k'")
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("ZNAVSRFG\xa8\x06\x01\xb0\x06\x01\xb8\x06V\xc2\x06 \xa3\xf7\x97\xa7\xf3\x87:\x90)\\ӊj\xb9\xf7\xfaTJ\x1b\xe7:\xee\xbe\"V\xe0:\x8d(Z\xd6%\xca\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3\xba\fc(\xb5/\xfd\x04\x00\xb1\x02\x00\xa0\x06\x01\xaa\x06=\n\x05a.txt\x10\x01\x1a$\n\"\x12 ʗ\x81\x12\xca\x1b\xbd\xca\xfa\xc21\xb3\x9a#\xdcM\xa7\x86\xef\xf8\x14|Nr\xb9\x80w\x85\xaf\xeeH\xbb\xf2\x12\v\b\x80\x92\xb8Ø\xfe\xff\xff\xff\x01\xb2\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3s\xeeG")
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("ZNAVSRFG\xa8\x06\x01\xb0\x06\x01\xb8\x06V\xc2\x06 ")
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("ZNAV")
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("ZNAVSRFG")
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("ZNAVSRFG\xa8\x06\x01\xb0\x06\x01\xb8\x06V\xc2\x06 \xa3\xf7\x97\xa7\xf3\x87:\x90)\\ӊj\xb9\xf7\xfaTJ\x1b\xe7:\xee\xbe\"V\xe0:\x8d(Z\xd6%\xca\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3\xba\fc(\xb5/\xfd\x04\x00\xb1\x02\x00\xa0\x06\x01")
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("ZNAVSRFX\xa8\x06\x01\xb0\x06\x01\xb8\x06V\xc2\x06 \xa3\xf7\x97\xa7\xf3\x87:\x90)\\ӊj\xb9\xf7\xfaTJ\x1b\xe7:\xee\xbe\"V\xe0:\x8d(Z\xd6%\xca\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3\xba\fc(\xb5/\xfd\x04\x00\xb1\x02\x00\xa0\x06\x01\xaa\x06=\n\x05a.txt\x10\x01\x1a$\n\"\x12 ʗ\x81\x12\xca\x1b\xbd\xca\xfa\xc21\xb3\x9a#\xdcM\xa7\x86\xef\xf8\x14|Nr\xb9\x80w\x85\xaf\xeeH\xbb\xf2\x12\v\b\x80\x92\xb8Ø\xfe\xff\xff\xff\x01\xb2\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3s\xeeG\x80")
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
go test fuzz v1
[]byte("ZNAVSRFG\xa8\x06\x01\xb0\x06\x01\xb8\x06\x01\xc2\x06 \xd6aQ\xa4\x85\xc0+\xbb\xca\x11\x11\a<\x019\x97\xb3\xbb3\xd0 \xd5U\xfa!\xaeAf<N@\x9d\xca\x06\x10\x93\x85\vpu\x85\xe4\x04\xe4\x95\x1a=\xdc\x1f\x05\xa3\xba\f\x12(\xb5/\xfd\xc0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\v\x00\x00\x00")
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+15 -5
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,24 @@
#!/bin/sh #!/bin/sh
# script/cibuild: run the CI build. The Dockerfile runs script/check # script/cibuild: run the CI build; the Gitea workflow runs this on push.
# (via make check), so a successful build implies all checks pass. # It builds the image with the same command as script/docker. --no-cache
# Generic: needs no adaptation. The Gitea workflow runs this on push. # because the checks the final stage depends on are RUN steps, and a
# cached one is a check that did not run.
set -eu set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)" SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
main() { main() {
cd "$ROOT" cd "$ROOT"
docker build . # Own line: a failing command substitution inside an argument does
# not trip `set -e`, so the inline form degrades silently to an
# empty constant. The VERSION build argument takes precedence over
# the version a build stage derives from the .git in the context.
version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
docker build --no-cache \
--build-arg VERSION="$version" \
-t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
} }
main "$@" main "$@"
+11 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
#!/bin/sh #!/bin/sh
# script/docker: build the Docker image tagged with the project name. # script/docker: build the Docker image tagged with the project name.
# Identical in all repos; the tag comes from script/projectname. # Identical in all repos; the tag comes from script/projectname.
# Generic: needs no adaptation. # --no-cache because the gate phases the final stage depends on are RUN
# steps, and a cached one is a check that did not run.
set -eu set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)" SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
@@ -9,7 +10,15 @@ ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
main() { main() {
cd "$ROOT" cd "$ROOT"
docker build -t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" . # Own line: a failing command substitution inside an argument does
# not trip `set -e`, so the inline form degrades silently to an
# empty constant. The VERSION build argument takes precedence over
# the version a build stage derives from the .git in the context.
version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
docker build --no-cache \
--build-arg VERSION="$version" \
-t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
} }
main "$@" main "$@"
Executable
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/fuzz: fuzz the manifest parser for one minute. Run by hand only:
# script/test already runs the committed seed corpus as ordinary tests,
# and CI never fuzzes. An input that fails is written to
# mfer/testdata/fuzz/FuzzNewManifestFromReader/; once the parser is fixed,
# commit it there as a regression seed.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
go test -run '^$' -fuzz '^FuzzNewManifestFromReader$' \
-fuzztime 1m -parallel 2 ./mfer
}
main "$@"
+6 -1
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,12 @@ ensure_pb() {
main() { main() {
cd "$ROOT" cd "$ROOT"
ensure_pb ensure_pb
go test -v --timeout 10s ./... go test -timeout 30s -race -cover ./... ||
{
echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"
go test -timeout 30s -race -v ./...
exit 1
}
} }
main "$@" main "$@"