1 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 32b468af8a cibuild: run checks on unchanged trees via CHECK_EPOCH (closes #89)
check / check (push) Failing after 1s
A bare `docker build .` keyed `make fmt-check-go`, `make lint`, the
prettier check, and `make test` on the build context, so on an unchanged
tree every check layer was a cache hit: the build exited 0 in under a
second having run none of them.

Add `ARG CHECK_EPOCH` immediately above the first check RUN in all three
check stages (lint, mdfmt, builder), and have script/cibuild pass a fresh
`--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH` each run. The changing value busts the cache from
that point down, while `go mod download` and `yarn install` above it stay
cached, so the build does not regress to cold. The false claim in
script/cibuild's header comment is corrected.

Running the checks for real surfaces the pre-existing intermittent
internal/cli test timeout (the gpg-subprocess flake in #62 / #67); that
defect is out of scope here.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-21 07:47:22 +00:00
14 changed files with 65 additions and 355 deletions
+2 -62
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@@ -1,64 +1,4 @@
# .dockerignore does NOT use .gitignore semantics. Docker matches with
# moby/patternmatcher: filepath.Match plus `**`, so `*` does not cross
# `/` and an unprefixed pattern is anchored at the context root. Every
# depth-independent pattern therefore needs `**/`, or `config/.env` and
# `certs/server.key` still ship while this file reads as solved. Only
# genuinely root-anchored entries go unprefixed. Never transplant these
# into .gitignore, where `**/` is wrong.
#
# Matching is case-sensitive, so secrets use character ranges rather
# than an ALL-CAPS twin, which would still miss `Server.Key`.
#
# Extend with this repo's own host-built artifacts, written anchored:
# `/myapp`, never `**/myapp`, which also matches `cmd/myapp/` and
# deletes the package directory from the context.
# .git is sent without its config. Without a VERSION build argument the
# stage that compiles runs `git describe --tags --always` on .git, which
# does not need .git/config; that file can hold a credential, such as a
# password in a remote URL or the token the CI checkout step stores there.
.git/config
# Agent scratch: one full checkout of the repo per in-flight agent.
# Anchored because it occurs once where agents run at the repo root.
# KNOWN GAP: a repo running agents in subdirectories still ships
# `services/api/.claude/` and must add its own anchored entry.
.claude
# Environment files. `*.env` covers bare `.env` and the `prod.env`
# convention. Re-include a committed template with a negation if the
# build needs one: `!docs/example.env`.
**/*.[eE][nN][vV]
**/.[eE][nN][vV].*
**/.[eE][nN][vV][rR][cC]
# Private keys and the bundles carrying them. Public certificates
# (*.crt, *.cer) are deliberately absent: they are legitimate inputs.
**/*.[pP][eE][mM]
**/*.[kK][eE][yY]
**/*.[pP]12
**/*.[pP][fF][xX]
**/[iI][dD]_[rR][sS][aA]
**/[iI][dD]_[dD][sS][aA]
**/[iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]
**/[iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519
# Dependencies: restored inside the image, never copied in.
**/node_modules
# OS metadata.
**/.DS_Store
**/Thumbs.db
# Editor state: never a build input, and it churns COPY.
**/*.swp
**/*.swo
**/*~
**/*.bak
**/.idea
**/.vscode
**/*.sublime-*
# This repo's own host-built archives (Makefile).
*.tmp *.tmp
*.dockerimage *.dockerimage
.git
node_modules
-12
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@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
root = true
[*]
indent_style = space
indent_size = 4
end_of_line = lf
charset = utf-8
trim_trailing_whitespace = true
insert_final_newline = true
[Makefile]
indent_style = tab
+2 -21
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@@ -10,24 +10,5 @@ modcache.tzst
# Generated manifest files # Generated manifest files
.index.mf .index.mf
# Secrets # Stale files
.env .drone.yml
.env.*
*.key
*.pem
# OS files
.DS_Store
Thumbs.db
# Editor files
*.swp
*.swo
*~
.idea/
.vscode/
# Go build artifacts
*.log
*.out
*.test
+1 -20
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@@ -60,26 +60,7 @@ RUN touch mfer/mf.pb.go
ARG CHECK_EPOCH ARG CHECK_EPOCH
RUN make test RUN make test
RUN cd cmd/mfer && go build -tags urfave_cli_no_docs -o /mfer .
# A build context sent as a tar archive, as upaas sends it, keeps its files'
# owners, and git refuses to read a checkout owned by another user.
RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /src
# The revision `mfer version` prints, stamped into main.Gitrev: the VERSION
# build argument when one is given (script/docker passes one), otherwise
# `git describe --tags --always` of the .git the build context carries: the
# tag on a tagged commit, tag-N-gHASH on a commit after one, the short commit
# when no tag is reachable. git ships in this base image. A context that
# carries .git and still yields no version fails the build.
ARG VERSION
RUN version="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
if [ -e .git ] && { [ -z "$version" ] || [ "$version" = dev ] || \
[ "$version" = unknown ]; }; then \
echo "no version could be derived although the build context carries .git" >&2; \
exit 1; \
fi; \
cd cmd/mfer && \
go build -tags urfave_cli_no_docs -ldflags "-X main.Gitrev=$version" -o /mfer .
FROM scratch FROM scratch
COPY --from=builder /mfer /mfer COPY --from=builder /mfer /mfer
+1 -14
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@@ -26,20 +26,6 @@ only thing left of the `chore/align-repo-policies` branch is the list below.
- 2026-09-21: made `script/cibuild` re-run the checks on an unchanged tree via a - 2026-09-21: made `script/cibuild` re-run the checks on an unchanged tree via a
changing `CHECK_EPOCH` build arg in each Dockerfile check stage (#89) changing `CHECK_EPOCH` build arg in each Dockerfile check stage (#89)
- 2026-10-02: a plain `docker build .` of a clone now stamps the tag or short
commit into `mfer version` instead of nothing: `.dockerignore` sends `.git`
(not `.git/config`), and the build stage takes the `VERSION` build argument,
otherwise `git describe --tags --always`, failing if `.git` is present and no
version comes out. `script/docker` is the canonical copy, which passes
`VERSION`; `bin/gitrev.sh` uses `--tags` too (#112)
- 2026-09-21: validate manifest entry paths on deserialize so untrusted `.mf`
files cannot make `Checker` stat or read outside `basePath` (#61)
- 2026-09-21: rewrote `script/test` to the canonical pattern (30s timeout,
`-race -cover`, quiet-first with verbose-on-failure rerun) and fixed the
process-global logger data race it surfaced (#67)
- 2026-09-21: added the canonical `.editorconfig`, made `.gitignore` cover
secrets, OS, editor, and Go artifacts, and removed the dead Drone CI
references from `.gitignore` and `bin/gitrev.sh` (#72)
- 2026-08-09: added `.prettierrc`/`.prettierignore`, gave `script/fmt` and - 2026-08-09: added `.prettierrc`/`.prettierignore`, gave `script/fmt` and
`script/fmt-check` one shared prettier file set via `script/prettier`, dropped `script/fmt-check` one shared prettier file set via `script/prettier`, dropped
the `|| true` that hid prettier failures, and added a node-based Dockerfile the `|| true` that hid prettier failures, and added a node-based Dockerfile
@@ -78,6 +64,7 @@ only thing left of the `chore/align-repo-policies` branch is the list below.
- Move FORMAT.md from repo root to docs/ and update the AGENTS.md reference - Move FORMAT.md from repo root to docs/ and update the AGENTS.md reference
- Pin Makefile-installed Go tools (`protoc-gen-go@v1.28.1`, - Pin Makefile-installed Go tools (`protoc-gen-go@v1.28.1`,
`golangci-lint@v2.12.2`) by module hash, not mutable tag `golangci-lint@v2.12.2`) by module hash, not mutable tag
- Set `make test` timeout to 30s (currently 10s)
- Add explicit README "Rationale" heading (content exists under other - Add explicit README "Rationale" heading (content exists under other
names); name the author in the README Description first line names); name the author in the README Description first line
- Reconcile root-level AGENTS.md with directory-hygiene policy (keep or - Reconcile root-level AGENTS.md with directory-hygiene policy (keep or
+6 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,12 @@
#!/bin/bash #!/bin/bash
# #
if [[ ! -z "$DRONE_COMMIT_SHA" ]]; then
echo "${DRONE_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
exit 0
fi
if [[ ! -z "$GITREV" ]]; then if [[ ! -z "$GITREV" ]]; then
echo $GITREV echo $GITREV
else else
git describe --tags --always --dirty=-dirty git describe --always --dirty=-dirty
fi fi
+8 -10
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@@ -679,13 +679,11 @@ func TestCheckDetectsManifestCorruption(t *testing.T) {
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs() fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(42)) //nolint:gosec // deterministic test data rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(42)) //nolint:gosec // deterministic test data
// Create many small files with random names so the manifest has many // Create many small files with random names to generate a ~1MB manifest
// entries and random single-byte flips land at varied offsets. Each // Each manifest entry is roughly 50-60 bytes, so we need ~20000 files
// manifest entry is roughly 50-60 bytes. Kept modest so the suite stays
// within its wall-clock budget under -race.
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(testDir, 0o755)) require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(testDir, 0o755))
numFiles := 1500 numFiles := 20000
for range numFiles { for range numFiles {
// Generate random filename // Generate random filename
filename := fmt.Sprintf("/testdir/%08x%08x%08x.dat", filename := fmt.Sprintf("/testdir/%08x%08x%08x.dat",
@@ -701,11 +699,11 @@ func TestCheckDetectsManifestCorruption(t *testing.T) {
exitCode := runCLI(opts) exitCode := runCLI(opts)
require.Equal(t, 0, exitCode, "generate should succeed") require.Equal(t, 0, exitCode, "generate should succeed")
// Read the valid manifest and verify it has real size. // Read the valid manifest and verify it's approximately 1MB
validManifest, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, testManifest) validManifest, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, testManifest)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(validManifest), 64*1024, require.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(validManifest), 1024*1024,
"manifest should be at least 64KB, got %d bytes", len(validManifest)) "manifest should be at least 1MB, got %d bytes", len(validManifest))
t.Logf("manifest size: %d bytes (%d files)", len(validManifest), numFiles) t.Logf("manifest size: %d bytes (%d files)", len(validManifest), numFiles)
// First corruption: truncate the manifest // First corruption: truncate the manifest
@@ -728,8 +726,8 @@ func TestCheckDetectsManifestCorruption(t *testing.T) {
exitCode = runCLI(opts) exitCode = runCLI(opts)
require.Equal(t, 0, exitCode, "check should pass with valid manifest") require.Equal(t, 0, exitCode, "check should pass with valid manifest")
// Now do 100 random corruption iterations // Now do 500 random corruption iterations
for i := range 100 { for i := range 500 {
// Corrupt: write a random byte at a random offset // Corrupt: write a random byte at a random offset
corrupted := make([]byte, len(validManifest)) corrupted := make([]byte, len(validManifest))
copy(corrupted, validManifest) copy(corrupted, validManifest)
+1 -1
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@@ -357,6 +357,6 @@ func (mfa *CLIApp) run(args []string) {
if err != nil { if err != nil {
mfa.exitCode = 1 mfa.exitCode = 1
log.Errorf("%s", err) log.WithError(err).Debugf("exiting")
} }
} }
+41 -34
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@@ -112,16 +112,13 @@ func DisableStyling() {
} }
// Init initializes the logger with the CLI handler and default log level. // Init initializes the logger with the CLI handler and default log level.
//
// It reconfigures the process-global apex/log logger under the write lock so
// the global is never mutated while another goroutine holds the read lock to
// read it in emit. Without this, parallel callers (e.g. the test suite) race
// Init's SetLevel/SetHandler against concurrent log calls.
func Init() { func Init() {
mu.Lock() mu.RLock()
defer mu.Unlock()
log.SetHandler(acli.New(stderr)) w := stderr
mu.RUnlock()
log.SetHandler(acli.New(w))
log.SetLevel(log.DebugLevel) // Let apex/log pass everything; we filter ourselves log.SetLevel(log.DebugLevel) // Let apex/log pass everything; we filter ourselves
} }
@@ -133,66 +130,74 @@ func isEnabled(l Level) bool {
return l >= currentLevel return l >= currentLevel
} }
// emit calls fn while holding the read lock if messages at level l are
// enabled. Holding the read lock across the apex/log call keeps the global
// logger from being read while Init reconfigures it under the write lock.
func emit(l Level, fn func()) {
mu.RLock()
defer mu.RUnlock()
if l >= currentLevel {
fn()
}
}
// Fatalf logs a formatted message at fatal level. // Fatalf logs a formatted message at fatal level.
func Fatalf(format string, args ...any) { func Fatalf(format string, args ...any) {
emit(FatalLevel, func() { log.Fatalf(format, args...) }) if isEnabled(FatalLevel) {
log.Fatalf(format, args...)
}
} }
// Fatal logs a message at fatal level. // Fatal logs a message at fatal level.
func Fatal(arg string) { func Fatal(arg string) {
emit(FatalLevel, func() { log.Fatal(arg) }) if isEnabled(FatalLevel) {
log.Fatal(arg)
}
} }
// Errorf logs a formatted message at error level. // Errorf logs a formatted message at error level.
func Errorf(format string, args ...any) { func Errorf(format string, args ...any) {
emit(ErrorLevel, func() { log.Errorf(format, args...) }) if isEnabled(ErrorLevel) {
log.Errorf(format, args...)
}
} }
// Error logs a message at error level. // Error logs a message at error level.
func Error(arg string) { func Error(arg string) {
emit(ErrorLevel, func() { log.Error(arg) }) if isEnabled(ErrorLevel) {
log.Error(arg)
}
} }
// Warnf logs a formatted message at warn level. // Warnf logs a formatted message at warn level.
func Warnf(format string, args ...any) { func Warnf(format string, args ...any) {
emit(WarnLevel, func() { log.Warnf(format, args...) }) if isEnabled(WarnLevel) {
log.Warnf(format, args...)
}
} }
// Warn logs a message at warn level. // Warn logs a message at warn level.
func Warn(arg string) { func Warn(arg string) {
emit(WarnLevel, func() { log.Warn(arg) }) if isEnabled(WarnLevel) {
log.Warn(arg)
}
} }
// Infof logs a formatted message at info level. // Infof logs a formatted message at info level.
func Infof(format string, args ...any) { func Infof(format string, args ...any) {
emit(InfoLevel, func() { log.Infof(format, args...) }) if isEnabled(InfoLevel) {
log.Infof(format, args...)
}
} }
// Info logs a message at info level. // Info logs a message at info level.
func Info(arg string) { func Info(arg string) {
emit(InfoLevel, func() { log.Info(arg) }) if isEnabled(InfoLevel) {
log.Info(arg)
}
} }
// Verbosef logs a formatted message at verbose level. // Verbosef logs a formatted message at verbose level.
func Verbosef(format string, args ...any) { func Verbosef(format string, args ...any) {
emit(VerboseLevel, func() { log.Infof(format, args...) }) if isEnabled(VerboseLevel) {
log.Infof(format, args...)
}
} }
// Verbose logs a message at verbose level. // Verbose logs a message at verbose level.
func Verbose(arg string) { func Verbose(arg string) {
emit(VerboseLevel, func() { log.Info(arg) }) if isEnabled(VerboseLevel) {
log.Info(arg)
}
} }
// Debugf logs a formatted message at debug level with caller location. // Debugf logs a formatted message at debug level with caller location.
@@ -211,10 +216,7 @@ func Debug(arg string) {
// DebugReal logs at debug level with caller info from the specified stack depth. // DebugReal logs at debug level with caller info from the specified stack depth.
func DebugReal(arg string, cs int) { func DebugReal(arg string, cs int) {
mu.RLock() if !isEnabled(DebugLevel) {
defer mu.RUnlock()
if DebugLevel < currentLevel {
return return
} }
@@ -273,6 +275,11 @@ func GetLevel() Level {
return currentLevel return currentLevel
} }
// WithError returns a log entry with the error attached.
func WithError(e error) *log.Entry {
return log.Log.WithError(e)
}
// Progressf prints a progress message that overwrites the current line. // Progressf prints a progress message that overwrites the current line.
// Use ProgressDone() when progress is complete to move to the next line. // Use ProgressDone() when progress is complete to move to the next line.
func Progressf(format string, args ...any) { func Progressf(format string, args ...any) {
-4
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@@ -312,10 +312,6 @@ func (c *Checker) FindExtraFiles(ctx context.Context, results chan<- Result) err
} }
func (c *Checker) checkFile(entry *MFFilePath, checkedBytes *FileSize) Result { func (c *Checker) checkFile(entry *MFFilePath, checkedBytes *FileSize) Result {
// entry.GetPath() is safe to join here: a manifest's entry paths are
// validated against the path invariants when it is loaded (see
// deserializeInner) or built (see Builder.AddFile), so a traversal or
// absolute path can never reach this point.
absPath := filepath.Join(string(c.basePath), entry.GetPath()) absPath := filepath.Join(string(c.basePath), entry.GetPath())
relPath := RelFilePath(entry.GetPath()) relPath := RelFilePath(entry.GetPath())
-14
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@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ var (
errDecompressedTooLarge = errors.New("decompressed data exceeds maximum allowed size") errDecompressedTooLarge = errors.New("decompressed data exceeds maximum allowed size")
errUUIDMismatch = errors.New("outer and inner UUID mismatch") errUUIDMismatch = errors.New("outer and inner UUID mismatch")
errInvalidFileFormat = errors.New("invalid file format") errInvalidFileFormat = errors.New("invalid file format")
errInvalidManifestPath = errors.New("manifest contains invalid path")
) )
// validateUUID checks that the byte slice is a valid UUID (16 bytes, parseable). // validateUUID checks that the byte slice is a valid UUID (16 bytes, parseable).
@@ -182,19 +181,6 @@ func (m *manifest) deserializeInner() error {
return errUUIDMismatch return errUUIDMismatch
} }
// Enforce the manifest path invariants on every entry as it is loaded,
// so that no consumer of a manifest — Checker today, any restore or
// extract path tomorrow — acts on a traversal or absolute path from an
// untrusted .mf. Reject loudly on the first offender rather than
// dropping entries, which would let a hostile manifest hide files from a
// check.
for _, f := range m.pbInner.GetFiles() {
err = ValidatePath(f.GetPath())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errInvalidManifestPath, err)
}
}
log.Infof("loaded manifest with %d files", len(m.pbInner.GetFiles())) log.Infof("loaded manifest with %d files", len(m.pbInner.GetFiles()))
return nil return nil
-145
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@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
//nolint:testpackage // white-box tests exercise unexported internals
package mfer
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/klauspost/compress/zstd"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protowire"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
)
// craftInnerBytes builds the wire bytes of an inner MFFile holding a single
// file entry whose path is exactly pathBytes. It writes the wire form by hand
// so a hostile path — including one that is not valid UTF-8 — can be embedded
// without proto.Marshal's own UTF-8 enforcement rejecting it first.
func craftInnerBytes(id uuid.UUID, pathBytes string) []byte {
entry := protowire.AppendTag(nil, 1, protowire.BytesType) // MFFilePath.path
entry = protowire.AppendString(entry, pathBytes)
inner := protowire.AppendTag(nil, 100, protowire.VarintType) // MFFile.version
inner = protowire.AppendVarint(inner, uint64(MFFile_VERSION_ONE))
inner = protowire.AppendTag(inner, 101, protowire.BytesType) // MFFile.files
inner = protowire.AppendBytes(inner, entry)
inner = protowire.AppendTag(inner, 102, protowire.BytesType) // MFFile.uuid
inner = protowire.AppendBytes(inner, id[:])
return inner
}
// wrapInner wraps inner MFFile wire bytes in a complete, well-formed .mf
// envelope (magic prefix, zstd-compressed payload, matching hash and UUID) so
// that deserialization reaches path validation rather than failing earlier on
// an integrity check.
func wrapInner(t *testing.T, id uuid.UUID, innerData []byte) []byte {
t.Helper()
var cbuf bytes.Buffer
zw, err := zstd.NewWriter(&cbuf, zstd.WithEncoderLevel(zstd.SpeedBestCompression))
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = zw.Write(innerData)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, zw.Close())
compressed := cbuf.Bytes()
sum := sha256.Sum256(compressed)
outer := &MFFileOuter{
InnerMessage: compressed,
Size: int64(len(innerData)),
Sha256: sum[:],
Uuid: id[:],
Version: MFFileOuter_VERSION_ONE,
CompressionType: MFFileOuter_COMPRESSION_ZSTD,
}
ob, err := proto.Marshal(outer)
require.NoError(t, err)
return append([]byte(MAGIC), ob...)
}
func TestDeserializeRejectsInvalidEntryPaths(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
path string
}{
{"parent traversal", "../escape"},
{"interior traversal", "a/../../escape"},
{"absolute path", "/etc/passwd"},
{"backslash path", `a\b`},
{"double slash", "a//b"},
{"empty path", ""},
{"invalid utf-8", "abc\xff"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
id := uuid.New()
data := wrapInner(t, id, craftInnerBytes(id, tt.path))
_, err := NewManifestFromReader(bytes.NewReader(data))
require.Error(t, err)
if tt.path == "abc\xff" {
// A path that is not valid UTF-8 cannot survive the proto3
// string decoder, which rejects it before path validation
// runs; the manifest is still refused at load time.
return
}
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInvalidManifestPath)
if tt.path != "" {
// ValidatePath quotes the path with %q; assert against the
// same rendering so escaped characters (e.g. a backslash)
// still match.
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), fmt.Sprintf("%q", tt.path),
"error must name the offending path")
}
})
}
}
func TestDeserializeValidManifestRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
hash := make([]byte, 34) // multihash: 2-byte prefix + 32-byte SHA-256
b := NewBuilder()
require.NoError(t, b.AddFileWithHash("dir/file.txt", 123, ModTime{}, hash))
var buf bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, b.Build(&buf))
m, err := NewManifestFromReader(bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes()))
require.NoError(t, err)
files := m.Files()
require.Len(t, files, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "dir/file.txt", files[0].GetPath())
assert.Equal(t, int64(123), files[0].GetSize())
}
// TestValidatePathRejectsInvalidUTF8 pins the ValidatePath rule that a manifest
// path must be valid UTF-8, independent of the proto decoder that also enforces
// it on the wire.
func TestValidatePathRejectsInvalidUTF8(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := ValidatePath("abc\xff")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errPathNotUTF8)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "UTF-8")
}
+2 -11
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@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/sh #!/bin/sh
# script/docker: build the Docker image tagged with the project name. # script/docker: build the Docker image tagged with the project name.
# Identical in all repos; the tag comes from script/projectname. # Identical in all repos; the tag comes from script/projectname.
# --no-cache because the gate phases the final stage depends on are RUN # Generic: needs no adaptation.
# steps, and a cached one is a check that did not run.
set -eu set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)" SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
@@ -10,15 +9,7 @@ ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
main() { main() {
cd "$ROOT" cd "$ROOT"
# Own line: a failing command substitution inside an argument does docker build -t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
# not trip `set -e`, so the inline form degrades silently to an
# empty constant. The VERSION build argument takes precedence over
# the version a build stage derives from the .git in the context.
version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
docker build --no-cache \
--build-arg VERSION="$version" \
-t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
} }
main "$@" main "$@"
+1 -6
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@@ -17,12 +17,7 @@ ensure_pb() {
main() { main() {
cd "$ROOT" cd "$ROOT"
ensure_pb ensure_pb
go test -timeout 30s -race -cover ./... || go test -v --timeout 10s ./...
{
echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"
go test -timeout 30s -race -v ./...
exit 1
}
} }
main "$@" main "$@"