mfer/README.md

# mfer

Manifest file generator and checker.

# Problem Statement

Given a plain URL, there is no standard way to safely and programmatically download everything "under" that URL path.  `wget -r` can traverse directory listings if they're enabled, but every server has a different format, and this does not verify cryptographic integrity of the files, or enable them to be fetched using a different protocol other than HTTP/s.

Currently, the solution that people are using are sidecar files in the format of `SHASUMS` checksum files, as well as a `SHASUMS.asc` PGP detached signature.  This is not checksum-algorithm-agnostic and the sidecar file is not always consistently named.

# Proposed Solution

A standard, a manifest file format, and a tool for generating same.

The manifest file would be called `index.mf`, and the tool for generating such would be called `mfer`.

The manifest file would do several important things:

* have a standard filename, so if given `https://example.com/downloadpackage/` one could fetch `https://example.com/downloadpackage/index.mf` to enumerate the full directory listing.
* contain a version field for extensibility
* contain structured data (protobuf, json, or cbor)
* provide an inner signed container, so that the manifest file itself can embed a signature and a public key alongside in a single file
* contain a list of files, each with a relative path to the manifest
* contain manifest timestamp
* contain ctime/mtime information for files so that file metadata can be preserved
* contain cryptographic checksums in several different algorithms for each file
    * probably encoded with multihash to indicate algo + hash
    * sha256 at the minimum
    * would be nice to include an IPFS/IPLD CIDv1 root hash for each file, which likely involves doing an ipfs file object chunking

# Design Goals

* Replace SHASUMS/SHASUMS.asc files
* be easy to download/resume
* be easy to use across protocols (given an HTTPS url, fetch manifest, then download file contents via bittorrent or ipfs)

# Non-Goals
* Manifest generation speed
* Small manifest file size (within reason)

# Open Questions
* Should the manifest file include checksums of individual file chunks, or just for the whole assembled file?
    * If so, should the chunksize be fixed or dynamic?

# Tool Examples

* `mfer gen` / `mfer gen .`
    * recurses under current directory and writes out an `index.mf`
* `mfer check` / `mfer check .`
    * verifies checksums of all files in manifest, displaying error and exiting nonzero if any files are missing or corrupted
* `mfer fetch https://example.com/stuff/`
    * fetches `/stuff/index.mf` and downloads all files listed in manifest, optionally resuming any that already exist locally, and assures cryptographic integrity of downloaded files.

# Implementation Plan

## Phase One:

* golang module for reusability/embedding
* golang module client providing `mfer` CLI

## Phase Two:

* ES5 or TypeScript module for reusability/embedding
* ES5/TypeScript module client providing `mfjs` CLI

# Hopes And Dreams

* `aria2c https://example.com/manifestdirectory/`
    * (fetches `https://example.com/manifestdirectory/index.mf`, downloads and checksums all files, resumes any that exist locally already)
* `mfer fetch https://example.com/manifestdirectory/`

# Use Cases

## Web Images

I'd like to be able to put a bunch of images into a directory, generate a manifest, and then point a slideshow client (such as an ambient display, or a react app with the target directory in a query string arg) at that statically hosted directory, and have it discover the full list of images available at that URL.

## Software Distribution

I'd like to be able to download a whole tree of files available via HTTP resumably by either HTTP or IPFS/BitTorrent without a .torrent file.

## Filesystem Archive Integrity

I use filesystems that don't include data checksums, and I would like a cryptographically signed checksum file so that I can later verify that a set of archive files have not been modified, none are missing, and that the checksums have not been altered in storage by a second party.