refactor: replace Bearer token auth with HttpOnly cookies

- Remove POST /api/v1/register endpoint entirely - Session creation (POST /api/v1/session) now sets neoirc_auth HttpOnly cookie instead of returning token in JSON body - Login (POST /api/v1/login) now sets neoirc_auth HttpOnly cookie instead of returning token in JSON body - Add PASS IRC command for setting session password (enables multi-client login via POST /api/v1/login) - All per-request auth reads from neoirc_auth cookie instead of Authorization: Bearer header - Cookie properties: HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure when behind TLS - Logout and QUIT clear the auth cookie - Update CORS to AllowCredentials:true with origin reflection - Remove Authorization from CORS AllowedHeaders - Update CLI client to use cookie jar (net/http/cookiejar) - Remove Token field from SessionResponse - Add SetPassword to DB layer, remove RegisterUser - Comprehensive test updates for cookie-based auth - Add tests: TestPassCommand, TestPassCommandShortPassword, TestPassCommandEmpty, TestSessionCookie - Update README extensively: auth model, API reference, curl examples, security model, design principles, roadmap closes #83
feat: per-channel hashcash proof-of-work for PRIVMSG anti-spam (#79 )
2026-03-17 20:33:12 -07:00 · 2026-03-18 03:40:33 +01:00 · 2026-03-18 03:38:36 +01:00 · 2026-03-17 12:47:00 +01:00 · 2026-03-17 12:44:48 +01:00 · 2026-03-17 12:43:39 +01:00
23 changed files with 2644 additions and 607 deletions
--- a/19
+++ b/19
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.PHONY: all build lint fmt fmt-check test check clean run debug docker hooks
+.PHONY: all build lint fmt fmt-check test check clean run debug docker hooks ensure-web-dist
 BINARY := neoircd
 VERSION := $(shell git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || echo "dev")
@@ -7,10 +7,21 @@ LDFLAGS := -X main.Version=$(VERSION) -X main.Buildarch=$(BUILDARCH)
 all: check build
-build:
+# ensure-web-dist creates placeholder files so //go:embed dist/* in
 # web/embed.go resolves without a full Node.js build.  The real SPA is
 # built by the web-builder Docker stage; these placeholders let
 # "make test" and "make build" work outside Docker.
 ensure-web-dist:
 	@if [ ! -d web/dist ]; then \
 		mkdir -p web/dist && \
 		touch web/dist/index.html web/dist/style.css web/dist/app.js && \
 		echo "==> Created placeholder web/dist/ for go:embed"; \
 	fi
 build: ensure-web-dist
 	go build -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o bin/$(BINARY) ./cmd/neoircd
-lint:
+lint: ensure-web-dist
 	golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
 fmt:
@@ -20,7 +31,7 @@ fmt:
 fmt-check:
 	@test -z "$$(gofmt -l .)" || (echo "Files not formatted:" && gofmt -l . && exit 1)
-test:
+test: ensure-web-dist
 	go test -timeout 30s -v -race -cover ./...
 # check runs all validation without making changes
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -113,8 +113,9 @@ mechanisms or stuffing data into CTCP.
 Everything else is IRC. `PRIVMSG`, `JOIN`, `PART`, `NICK`, `TOPIC`, `MODE`,
 `KICK`, `353`, `433` — same commands, same semantics. Channels start with `#`.
 Joining a nonexistent channel creates it. Channels disappear when empty. Nicks
-are unique per server. There are no accounts — identity is a key, a nick is a
+are unique per server. Identity starts with a key — a nick is a display name.
-display name.
+Accounts are optional: you can create an anonymous session instantly, or
 set a password via the PASS command for multi-client access to a single session.
 ### On the resemblance to JSON-RPC
@@ -148,28 +149,59 @@ not arbitrary choices — each one follows from the project's core thesis that
 IRC's command model is correct and only the transport and session management
 need to change.
-### Identity & Sessions — No Accounts
+### Identity & Sessions — Cookie-Based Authentication
-There are no accounts, no registration, no passwords. Identity is a signing
+The server uses **HTTP cookies** for all authentication. There is no separate
-key; a nick is just a display name. The two are decoupled.
+registration step — sessions start anonymous and can optionally set a password
 for multi-client access.
 #### Session Creation
 - **Session creation**: client sends `POST /api/v1/session` with a desired
-  nick → server assigns an **auth token** (64 hex characters of
+  nick → server sets an **HttpOnly auth cookie** (`neoirc_auth`) containing
-  cryptographically random bytes) and returns the user ID, nick, and token.
+  a cryptographically random token (64 hex characters) and returns the user
- The auth token implicitly identifies the client. Clients present it via
+  ID and nick in the JSON response body. No token appears in the JSON body.
-  `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
+- The auth cookie is HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, and Secure when behind TLS.
  Clients never need to handle the token directly — the browser/HTTP client
  manages cookies automatically.
 - Sessions start anonymous — no password required. When the session expires
  or the user QUITs, the nick is released.
 #### Setting a Password (Optional, for Multi-Client Access)
 For users who want to access the same session from multiple devices:
 - **Set password via IRC PASS command**: the authenticated client sends
  `POST /api/v1/messages` with `{"command":"PASS","body":["mypassword"]}`.
  The server hashes the password with bcrypt and stores it on the session.
  Password must be at least 8 characters.
 - **Login from another client**: `POST /api/v1/login` with nick and password →
  server verifies the password, creates a new client for the existing session,
  and sets an auth cookie. Channel memberships and message queues are shared.
  Login only works while the session still exists — if all clients have logged
  out or the user has sent QUIT, the session is deleted and the password is
  lost.
 #### Common Properties
 - Nicks are changeable via the `NICK` command; the server-assigned user ID is
  the stable identity.
 - Server-assigned IDs — clients do not choose their own IDs.
- Tokens are opaque random bytes, **not JWTs**. No claims, no expiry encoded
+- Auth cookies contain opaque random bytes, **not JWTs**. No claims, no expiry
-  in the token, no client-side decode. The server is the sole authority on
+  encoded in the token, no client-side decode. The server is the sole authority
-  token validity.
+  on cookie validity.
-**Rationale:** IRC has no accounts. You connect, pick a nick, and talk. Adding
+**Rationale:** IRC has no accounts. You connect, pick a nick, and talk.
-registration, email verification, or OAuth would solve a problem nobody asked
+Anonymous sessions preserve that simplicity — instant access, zero friction.
-about and add complexity that drives away casual users. Identity verification
+But some users want to access the same session from multiple devices without
-is handled at the message layer via cryptographic signatures (see
+a bouncer. The PASS command enables multi-client login without adding friction
-[Security Model](#security-model)), not at the session layer.
+for casual users: if you don't need multi-client, just create a session and
 go. Cookie-based auth eliminates token management from client code entirely —
 browsers and HTTP cookie jars handle it automatically. Note: both anonymous
 and password-protected sessions are deleted when the last client disconnects
 (QUIT or logout). Identity verification at the message layer via cryptographic
 signatures (see [Security Model](#security-model)) remains independent of
 password status.
 ### Nick Semantics
@@ -196,7 +228,7 @@ A single user session can have multiple clients (phone, laptop, terminal).
 - The server fans out all S2C messages to every active client queue for that
  user session.
 - `GET /api/v1/messages` delivers from the calling client's specific queue,
-  identified by the auth token.
+  identified by the auth cookie.
 - Client queues have **independent expiry/pruning** — one client going offline
  doesn't affect others.
@@ -207,12 +239,11 @@ User Session
 └── Client C (token_c, queue_c)
 ```
-**Current MVP note:** The current implementation creates a new session (with new
+**Multi-client via login:** The `POST /api/v1/login` endpoint adds a new
-nick) per `POST /api/v1/session` call. True multi-client (multiple clients
+client to an existing session (one that has a password set via PASS command),
-sharing one session/nick) is supported by the schema — `clients` references
+enabling true multi-client support (multiple cookies sharing one nick/session
-`sessions` via `session_id`, and `client_queues` is keyed by `client_id` — but
+with independent message queues). Sessions without a password cannot be
-the session creation endpoint does not yet support "add a client to an existing
+logged into.
 session." This will be added post-MVP.
 **Rationale:** The fundamental IRC mobile problem is that you can't have your
 phone and laptop connected simultaneously without a bouncer. Server-side
@@ -319,19 +350,22 @@ over binary is measured in bytes per message, not meaningful bandwidth. The
 canonicalization story (RFC 8785 JCS) is also well-defined for JSON, which
 matters for signing.
-### Why Opaque Tokens Instead of JWTs
+### Why Opaque Cookies Instead of JWTs
 JWTs encode claims that clients can decode and potentially rely on. This
 creates a coupling between token format and client behavior. If the server
 needs to revoke a token, change the expiry model, or add/remove claims, JWT
 clients may break or behave incorrectly.
-Opaque tokens are simpler:
+Opaque auth cookies are simpler:
- Server generates 32 random bytes → hex-encodes → stores hash
+- Server generates 32 random bytes → hex-encodes → stores SHA-256 hash →
- Client presents the token; server looks it up
+  sets raw hex as an HttpOnly cookie
- Revocation is a database delete
+- On each request, server hashes the cookie value and looks it up
 - Revocation is a database delete (cookie becomes invalid immediately)
 - No clock skew issues, no algorithm confusion, no "none" algorithm attacks
- Token format can change without breaking clients
+- Cookie format can change without breaking clients
 - Clients never handle tokens directly — browsers and HTTP cookie jars
  manage everything automatically
 ---
@@ -355,15 +389,18 @@ The entire read/write loop for a client is two endpoints. Everything else
 ### Session Lifecycle
 #### Session Creation
 ```
 ┌─ Client ──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
 │                                                            │
 │  1. POST /api/v1/session {"nick":"alice"}                  │
-│     → {"id":1, "nick":"alice", "token":"a1b2c3..."}       │
+│     → Set-Cookie: neoirc_auth=<token>; HttpOnly; ...       │
 │     → {"id":1, "nick":"alice"}                             │
 │                                                            │
 │  2. POST /api/v1/messages {"command":"JOIN","to":"#gen"}   │
 │     → {"status":"joined","channel":"#general"}             │
-│     (Server fans out JOIN event to all #general members)   │
+│     (Cookie sent automatically on all subsequent requests) │
 │                                                            │
 │  3. POST /api/v1/messages {"command":"PRIVMSG",            │
 │       "to":"#general","body":["hello"]}                    │
@@ -380,7 +417,37 @@ The entire read/write loop for a client is two endpoints. Everything else
 │  6. POST /api/v1/messages {"command":"QUIT"}               │
 │     → {"status":"quit"}                                    │
 │     (Server broadcasts QUIT, removes from channels,        │
-│      deletes session, releases nick)                       │
+│      deletes session, releases nick, clears cookie)        │
 │                                                            │
 └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
 ```
 #### Multi-Client via Password
 ```
 ┌─ Client A ────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
 │                                                            │
 │  1. POST /api/v1/session {"nick":"alice"}                  │
 │     → Set-Cookie: neoirc_auth=<token_a>; HttpOnly; ...     │
 │     → {"id":1, "nick":"alice"}                             │
 │                                                            │
 │  2. POST /api/v1/messages                                  │
 │     {"command":"PASS","body":["s3cret!!"]}                 │
 │     → {"status":"ok"}                                      │
 │     (Password set via IRC PASS command)                    │
 │                                                            │
 │  ... use the API normally (JOIN, PRIVMSG, poll, etc.) ...  │
 │                                                            │
 └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
 ┌─ Client B (another device, while session is still active) ┐
 │                                                            │
 │  3. POST /api/v1/login                                     │
 │     {"nick":"alice", "password":"s3cret!!"}                │
 │     → Set-Cookie: neoirc_auth=<token_b>; HttpOnly; ...     │
 │     → {"id":1, "nick":"alice"}                             │
 │     (New client added to existing session — channels       │
 │      and message queues are preserved.)                    │
 │                                                            │
 └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
 ```
@@ -461,7 +528,7 @@ the same JSON envelope:
 | `params`  | array of strings    | Sometimes | Sometimes | Additional IRC-style positional parameters. Used by commands like `MODE`, `KICK`, and numeric replies like `353` (NAMES). |
 | `body`    | array or object     | Usually   | Usually   | Structured message body. For text messages: array of strings (one per line). For structured data (e.g., `PUBKEY`): JSON object. **Never a raw string.** |
 | `ts`      | string (ISO 8601)   | Ignored   | Always    | Server-assigned timestamp in RFC 3339 / ISO 8601 format with nanosecond precision. Example: `"2026-02-10T20:00:00.000000000Z"`. Always UTC. |
-| `meta`    | object              | Optional  | If present | Extensible metadata. Used for cryptographic signatures (`meta.sig`, `meta.alg`), content hashes, or any client-defined key/value pairs. Server relays `meta` verbatim — it does not interpret or validate it. |
+| `meta`    | object              | Optional  | If present | Extensible metadata. Used for cryptographic signatures (`meta.sig`, `meta.alg`), hashcash proof-of-work (`meta.hashcash`), content hashes, or any client-defined key/value pairs. Server relays `meta` verbatim except for `hashcash` which is validated on channels with `+H` mode. |
 **Important invariants:**
@@ -667,6 +734,35 @@ Change the user's nickname.
 **IRC reference:** RFC 1459 §4.1.2
 #### PASS — Set Session Password
 Set a password on the current session, enabling multi-client login via
 `POST /api/v1/login`. The password is hashed with bcrypt and stored
 server-side.
 **C2S:**
 ```json
 {"command": "PASS", "body": ["mypassword"]}
 ```
 **Behavior:**
 - `body[0]` is the password. Must be at least 8 characters.
 - On success, the server responds with `{"status": "ok"}`.
 - If the password is too short or missing, the server sends
  ERR_NEEDMOREPARAMS (461) via the message queue.
 - Calling PASS again overwrites the previous password.
 - Once a password is set, `POST /api/v1/login` can be used with the nick
  and password to create additional clients on the same session.
 **Response:** `200 OK`
 ```json
 {"status": "ok"}
 ```
 **IRC reference:** Inspired by RFC 1459 §4.1.1 (PASS), repurposed for
 session password management.
 #### TOPIC — Set Channel Topic
 Set or change a channel's topic.
@@ -733,7 +829,7 @@ Destroy the session and disconnect from the server.
  quitting user. The quitting user does **not** receive their own QUIT.
 - The user is removed from all channels.
 - Empty channels are deleted (ephemeral).
- The user's session is destroyed — the auth token is invalidated, the nick
+- The user's session is destroyed — the auth cookie is invalidated, the nick
  is released.
 - Subsequent requests with the old token return HTTP 401.
@@ -951,12 +1047,13 @@ carries IRC-style parameters (e.g., channel name, target nick).
 Inspired by IRC, simplified:
 | Mode | Name           | Meaning |
-|------|--------------|---------|
+|------|----------------|---------|
 | `+i` | Invite-only    | Only invited users can join |
 | `+m` | Moderated      | Only voiced (`+v`) users and operators (`+o`) can send |
 | `+s` | Secret         | Channel hidden from LIST response |
 | `+t` | Topic lock     | Only operators can change the topic |
 | `+n` | No external    | Only channel members can send messages to the channel |
 | `+H` | Hashcash       | Requires proof-of-work for PRIVMSG (parameter: bits, e.g. `+H 20`) |
 **User channel modes (set per-user per-channel):**
@@ -967,14 +1064,64 @@ Inspired by IRC, simplified:
 **Status:** Channel modes are defined but not yet enforced. The `modes` column
 exists in the channels table but the server does not check modes on actions.
 Exception: `+H` (hashcash) is fully enforced — see below.
 ### Per-Channel Hashcash (Anti-Spam)
 Channels can require hashcash proof-of-work for every `PRIVMSG`. This is an
 anti-spam mechanism: channel operators set a difficulty level, and clients must
 compute a proof-of-work stamp bound to the specific channel and message before
 sending.
 **Setting the requirement:**
 ```
 MODE #channel +H <bits>    — require <bits> leading zero bits (1-40)
 MODE #channel -H           — disable hashcash requirement
 ```
 **Stamp format:** `1:bits:YYMMDD:channel:bodyhash:counter`
 - `bits` — difficulty (leading zero bits in SHA-256 hash of the stamp)
 - `YYMMDD` — current date (prevents old token reuse)
 - `channel` — channel name (prevents cross-channel reuse)
 - `bodyhash` — hex-encoded SHA-256 of the message body (binds stamp to message)
 - `counter` — hex nonce
 **Sending a message to a hashcash-protected channel:**
 Include the hashcash stamp in the `meta` field:
 ```json
 {
  "command": "PRIVMSG",
  "to": "#general",
  "body": ["hello world"],
  "meta": {
    "hashcash": "1:20:260317:#general:a1b2c3...bodyhash:1f4a"
  }
 }
 ```
 **Server validation:** The server checks that the stamp is well-formed, meets
 the required difficulty, is bound to the correct channel and message body, has a
 recent date, and has not been previously used. Spent stamps are cached for 1
 year to prevent replay attacks.
 **Error responses:** If the channel requires hashcash and the stamp is missing,
 invalid, or replayed, the server returns `ERR_CANNOTSENDTOCHAN (404)` with a
 descriptive reason.
 **Client minting:** The CLI provides `MintChannelHashcash(bits, channel, body)`
 to compute stamps. Higher bit counts take exponentially longer to compute.
 ---
 ## API Reference
 All endpoints accept and return `application/json`. Authenticated endpoints
-require `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header. The token is obtained from
+require the `neoirc_auth` cookie, which is set automatically by
-`POST /api/v1/session`.
+`POST /api/v1/session` and `POST /api/v1/login`.
 All API responses include appropriate HTTP status codes. Error responses have
 the format:
@@ -1003,11 +1150,18 @@ difficulty is advertised via `GET /api/v1/server` in the `hashcash_bits` field.
 | `pow_token` | string | Conditional | Hashcash stamp (required when server has `hashcash_bits` > 0) |
 **Response:** `201 Created`
 The response sets an `neoirc_auth` HttpOnly cookie containing the auth token.
 The JSON body does **not** include the token.
 ```
 Set-Cookie: neoirc_auth=494ba9fc...e3; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict
 ```
 ```json
 {
  "id": 1,
-  "nick": "alice",
+  "nick": "alice"
  "token": "494ba9fc0f2242873fc5c285dd4a24fc3844ba5e67789a17e69b6fe5f8c132e3"
 }
 ```
@@ -1015,7 +1169,16 @@ difficulty is advertised via `GET /api/v1/server` in the `hashcash_bits` field.
 |---------|---------|-------------|
 | `id`    | integer | Server-assigned user ID |
 | `nick`  | string  | Confirmed nick (always matches request on success) |
-| `token` | string  | 64-character hex auth token. Store this — it's the only credential. |
+
 **Cookie properties:**
 | Property   | Value |
 |------------|-------|
 | `Name`     | `neoirc_auth` |
 | `HttpOnly` | `true` (not accessible from JavaScript) |
 | `SameSite` | `Strict` (prevents CSRF) |
 | `Secure`   | `true` when behind TLS |
 | `Path`     | `/` |
 **Errors:**
@@ -1028,10 +1191,61 @@ difficulty is advertised via `GET /api/v1/server` in the `hashcash_bits` field.
 **curl example:**
 ```bash
-TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/session \
+# Use -c to save cookies, -b to send them
 curl -s -c cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/session \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-  -d '{"nick":"alice","pow_token":"1:20:260310:neoirc::3a2f1"}' | jq -r .token)
+  -d '{"nick":"alice","pow_token":"1:20:260310:neoirc::3a2f1"}'
-echo $TOKEN
+```
 ### POST /api/v1/login — Login to Account
 Authenticate with a nick and password (set via the PASS IRC command). Creates a
 new client for the existing session, preserving channel memberships and message
 queues. This is how multi-client access works: each login adds a new client to
 the session with its own auth cookie and message delivery queue.
 On successful login, the server enqueues MOTD messages and synthetic channel
 state (JOIN + TOPIC + NAMES for each channel the session belongs to) into the
 new client's queue, so the client can immediately restore its UI state.
 **Request Body:**
 ```json
 {"nick": "alice", "password": "mypassword"}
 ```
 | Field      | Type   | Required | Constraints |
 |------------|--------|----------|-------------|
 | `nick`     | string | Yes      | Must match an active session with a password set |
 | `password` | string | Yes      | Must match the session's password |
 **Response:** `200 OK`
 The response sets an `neoirc_auth` HttpOnly cookie for the new client.
 ```json
 {
  "id": 1,
  "nick": "alice"
 }
 ```
 | Field   | Type    | Description |
 |---------|---------|-------------|
 | `id`    | integer | Session ID |
 | `nick`  | string  | Current nick |
 **Errors:**
 | Status | Error | When |
 |--------|-------|------|
 | 400    | `nick and password required` | Missing nick or password |
 | 401    | `invalid credentials` | Wrong password, nick not found, or session has no password set |
 **curl example:**
 ```bash
 curl -s -c cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/login \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"nick":"alice","password":"mypassword"}'
 ```
 ### GET /api/v1/state — Get Session State
@@ -1075,13 +1289,13 @@ Each channel object:
 **curl example:**
 ```bash
 curl -s http://localhost:8080/api/v1/state \
-  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
+  -b cookies.txt | jq .
 ```
 **Reconnect with channel state initialization:**
 ```bash
 curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/state?initChannelState=1" \
-  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
+  -b cookies.txt | jq .
 ```
 ### GET /api/v1/messages — Poll Messages (Long-Poll)
@@ -1141,14 +1355,12 @@ real-time endpoint — clients call it in a loop.
 **curl example (immediate):**
 ```bash
-curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=0&timeout=0" \
+curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=0&timeout=0" | jq .
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
 ```
 **curl example (long-poll, 15s):**
 ```bash
-curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=42&timeout=15" \
+curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=42&timeout=15" | jq .
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
 ```
 ### POST /api/v1/messages — Send Command
@@ -1175,6 +1387,7 @@ reference with all required and optional fields.
 | `JOIN`    | `to`                |               | 200 OK          |
 | `PART`    | `to`                | `body`        | 200 OK          |
 | `NICK`    | `body`              |               | 200 OK          |
 | `PASS`    | `body`              |               | 200 OK          |
 | `TOPIC`   | `to`, `body`        |               | 200 OK          |
 | `MODE`    | `to`                |               | 200 OK          |
 | `NAMES`   | `to`                |               | 200 OK          |
@@ -1189,14 +1402,14 @@ All IRC commands return HTTP 200 OK. IRC-level success and error responses
 are delivered as **numeric replies** through the message queue (see
 [Numeric Replies](#numeric-replies) below). HTTP error codes (4xx/5xx) are
 reserved for transport-level problems: malformed JSON (400), missing/invalid
-auth tokens (401), and server errors (500).
+auth cookies (401), and server errors (500).
 **HTTP errors (transport-level only):**
 | Status | Error | When |
 |--------|-------|------|
 | 400    | `invalid request` | Malformed JSON or empty command |
-| 401    | `unauthorized` | Missing or invalid auth token |
+| 401    | `unauthorized` | Missing or invalid auth cookie |
 | 500    | `internal error` | Server-side failure |
 **IRC numeric error replies (delivered via message queue):**
@@ -1287,11 +1500,11 @@ events). Event messages are delivered via the live queue only.
 ```bash
 # Latest 50 messages in #general
 curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/history?target=%23general&limit=50" \
-  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
+  -b cookies.txt | jq .
 # Older messages (pagination)
 curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/history?target=%23general&before=100&limit=50" \
-  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
+  -b cookies.txt | jq .
 ```
 ### GET /api/v1/channels — List Channels
@@ -1322,18 +1535,22 @@ List members of a channel. The `{name}` parameter is the channel name
 **curl example:**
 ```bash
 curl -s http://localhost:8080/api/v1/channels/general/members \
-  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
+  -b cookies.txt | jq .
 ```
 ### POST /api/v1/logout — Logout
-Destroy the current client's auth token. If no other clients remain on the
+Destroy the current client's session cookie and server-side client record.
-session, the user is fully cleaned up: parted from all channels (with QUIT
+If no other clients remain on the session, the user is fully cleaned up:
-broadcast to members), session deleted, nick released.
+parted from all channels (with QUIT broadcast to members), session deleted,
 nick released. The auth cookie is cleared in the response.
-**Request:** No body. Requires auth.
+**Request:** No body. Requires auth cookie.
 **Response:** `200 OK`
 The response clears the `neoirc_auth` cookie.
 ```json
 {"status": "ok"}
 ```
@@ -1342,12 +1559,11 @@ broadcast to members), session deleted, nick released.
 | Status | Error | When |
 |--------|-------|------|
-| 401    | `unauthorized` | Missing or invalid auth token |
+| 401    | `unauthorized` | Missing or invalid auth cookie |
 **curl example:**
 ```bash
-curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/logout \
+curl -s -b cookies.txt -c cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/logout | jq .
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
 ```
 ### GET /api/v1/users/me — Current User Info
@@ -1371,7 +1587,7 @@ Return the current user's session state. This is an alias for
 **curl example:**
 ```bash
 curl -s http://localhost:8080/api/v1/users/me \
-  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
+  -b cookies.txt | jq .
 ```
 ### GET /api/v1/server — Server Info
@@ -1399,13 +1615,40 @@ Return server metadata. No authentication required.
 ### GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json — Health Check
-Standard health check endpoint. No authentication required.
+Standard health check endpoint. No authentication required. Returns server
 health status and runtime statistics.
 **Response:** `200 OK`
 ```json
-{"status": "ok"}
+{
  "status": "ok",
  "now": "2024-01-15T12:00:00.000000000Z",
  "uptimeSeconds": 3600,
  "uptimeHuman": "1h0m0s",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "appname": "neoirc",
  "maintenanceMode": false,
  "sessions": 42,
  "clients": 85,
  "queuedLines": 128,
  "channels": 7,
  "connectionsSinceBoot": 200,
  "sessionsSinceBoot": 150,
  "messagesSinceBoot": 5000
 }
 ```
 | Field                  | Description                                       |
 | ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- |
 | `sessions`             | Current number of active sessions                 |
 | `clients`              | Current number of connected clients               |
 | `queuedLines`          | Total entries in client output queues              |
 | `channels`             | Current number of channels                        |
 | `connectionsSinceBoot` | Total client connections since server start        |
 | `sessionsSinceBoot`    | Total sessions created since server start          |
 | `messagesSinceBoot`    | Total PRIVMSG/NOTICE messages sent since server start |
 ---
 ## Message Flow
@@ -1589,13 +1832,21 @@ authenticity.
 ### Authentication
- **Session auth**: Opaque bearer tokens (64 hex chars = 256 bits of entropy).
+- **Cookie-based auth**: Opaque HttpOnly cookies (64 hex chars = 256 bits of
-  Tokens are stored in the database and validated on every request.
+  entropy). Tokens are hashed (SHA-256) before storage and validated on every
- **No passwords**: Session creation requires only a nick. The token is the
+  request. Cookies are HttpOnly (no JavaScript access), SameSite=Strict
-  sole credential.
+  (CSRF protection), and Secure when behind TLS.
- **Token security**: Tokens should be treated like session cookies. Transmit
+- **Anonymous sessions**: `POST /api/v1/session` requires only a nick. No
-  only over HTTPS in production. If a token is compromised, the attacker has
+  password, instant access. The auth cookie is the sole credential.
-  full access to the session until QUIT or expiry.
+- **Password-protected sessions**: The PASS IRC command sets a bcrypt-hashed
  password on the session. `POST /api/v1/login` authenticates against the
  stored hash and issues a new client cookie.
 - **Password security**: Passwords are never stored in plain text. bcrypt
  handles salting and key stretching automatically. Sessions without a
  password cannot be logged into via `/login`.
 - **Cookie security**: Auth cookies should only be transmitted over HTTPS in
  production. If a cookie is compromised, the attacker has full access to the
  session until QUIT or expiry.
 ### Message Integrity
@@ -1632,8 +1883,10 @@ authenticity.
 - **HTTPS is strongly recommended** for production deployments. The server
  itself serves plain HTTP — use a reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy, etc.) for TLS
  termination.
- **CORS**: The server allows all origins by default (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`).
+- **CORS**: The server allows all origins with credentials
-  Restrict this in production via reverse proxy configuration if needed.
+  (`Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`), reflecting the request Origin.
  This enables cookie-based auth from cross-origin clients. Restrict origins
  in production via reverse proxy configuration if needed.
 - **Content-Security-Policy**: The server sets a strict CSP header on all
  responses, restricting resource loading to same-origin and disabling
  dangerous features (object embeds, framing, base tag injection). The
@@ -1746,9 +1999,9 @@ The database schema is managed via embedded SQL migration files in
 | `id`            | INTEGER  | Primary key (auto-increment) |
 | `uuid`          | TEXT     | Unique session UUID |
 | `nick`          | TEXT     | Unique nick |
-| `password_hash` | TEXT     | Password hash (default empty) |
+| `password_hash` | TEXT     | bcrypt hash (empty string for anonymous sessions) |
-| `signing_key`   | TEXT     | Ed25519 signing key (default empty) |
+| `signing_key`   | TEXT     | Public signing key (empty string if unset) |
-| `away_message`  | TEXT     | Away message (default empty) |
+| `away_message`  | TEXT     | Away message (empty string if not away) |
 | `created_at`    | DATETIME | Session creation time |
 | `last_seen`     | DATETIME | Last API request time |
@@ -1760,7 +2013,7 @@ Index on `(uuid)`.
 | `id`         | INTEGER  | Primary key (auto-increment) |
 | `uuid`       | TEXT     | Unique client UUID |
 | `session_id` | INTEGER  | FK → sessions.id (cascade delete) |
-| `token`      | TEXT     | Unique auth token (64 hex chars) |
+| `token`      | TEXT     | Unique auth token (SHA-256 hash of 64 hex chars) |
 | `created_at` | DATETIME | Client creation time |
 | `last_seen`  | DATETIME | Last API request time |
@@ -1823,10 +2076,19 @@ skew issues) and simpler than UUIDs (integer comparison vs. string comparison).
 - **Client output queue entries**: Pruned automatically when older than
  `QUEUE_MAX_AGE` (default 30 days).
 - **Channels**: Deleted when the last member leaves (ephemeral).
- **Users/sessions**: Deleted on `QUIT` or `POST /api/v1/logout`. Idle
+- **Sessions**: Both anonymous and password-protected sessions are deleted on `QUIT`
-  sessions are automatically expired after `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` (default
+  or when the last client logs out (`POST /api/v1/logout` with no remaining
-  30 days) — the server runs a background cleanup loop that parts idle users
+  clients triggers session cleanup). There is no distinction between session
-  from all channels, broadcasts QUIT, and releases their nicks.
+  types in the cleanup path — `handleQuit` and `cleanupUser` both call
  `DeleteSession` unconditionally. Idle sessions are automatically expired
  after `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`
  (default 30 days) — the server runs a background cleanup loop that parts
  idle users from all channels, broadcasts QUIT, and releases their nicks.
 - **Clients**: Individual client tokens are deleted on `POST /api/v1/logout`.
  A session can have multiple clients; removing one doesn't affect others.
  However, when the last client is removed (via logout), the entire session
  is deleted — the user is parted from all channels, QUIT is broadcast, and
  the nick is released.
 ---
@@ -1975,58 +2237,59 @@ A complete client needs only four HTTP calls:
 ### Step-by-Step with curl
 ```bash
-# 1. Create a session
+# 1a. Create a session (cookie saved automatically with -c)
-export TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/session \
+curl -s -c cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/session \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-  -d '{"nick":"testuser"}' | jq -r .token)
+  -d '{"nick":"testuser"}'
 # 1b. Optionally set a password for multi-client access
 curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"command":"PASS","body":["mypassword"]}'
 # 1c. Login from another device (saves new cookie)
 curl -s -c cookies2.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/login \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"nick":"testuser","password":"mypassword"}'
 # 2. Join a channel
-curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
+curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"command":"JOIN","to":"#general"}'
 # 3. Send a message
-curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
+curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"command":"PRIVMSG","to":"#general","body":["hello from curl!"]}'
 # 4. Poll for messages (one-shot)
-curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=0&timeout=0" \
+curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=0&timeout=0" | jq .
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
 # 5. Long-poll (blocks up to 15s waiting for messages)
-curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=0&timeout=15" \
+curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=0&timeout=15" | jq .
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
 # 6. Send a DM
-curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
+curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"command":"PRIVMSG","to":"othernick","body":["hey!"]}'
 # 7. Change nick
-curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
+curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"command":"NICK","body":["newnick"]}'
 # 8. Set channel topic
-curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
+curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"command":"TOPIC","to":"#general","body":["New topic!"]}'
 # 9. Leave a channel
-curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
+curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"command":"PART","to":"#general","body":["goodbye"]}'
 # 10. Disconnect
-curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
+curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"command":"QUIT","body":["leaving"]}'
 ```
@@ -2036,27 +2299,25 @@ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
 The key to real-time messaging is the poll loop. Here's the pattern:
 ```python
-# Python example
+# Python example — using requests.Session for automatic cookie handling
-import requests, json
+import requests, json, time
 BASE = "http://localhost:8080/api/v1"
-token = None
+session = requests.Session()  # Manages cookies automatically
 last_id = 0
-# Create session
+# Create session (cookie set automatically via Set-Cookie header)
-resp = requests.post(f"{BASE}/session", json={"nick": "pybot"})
+resp = session.post(f"{BASE}/session", json={"nick": "pybot"})
-token = resp.json()["token"]
+print(f"Session: {resp.json()}")
 headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
 # Join channel
-requests.post(f"{BASE}/messages", headers=headers,
+session.post(f"{BASE}/messages",
             json={"command": "JOIN", "to": "#general"})
 # Poll loop
 while True:
    try:
-        resp = requests.get(f"{BASE}/messages",
+        resp = session.get(f"{BASE}/messages",
                          headers=headers,
                          params={"after": last_id, "timeout": 15},
                          timeout=20)  # HTTP timeout > long-poll timeout
        data = resp.json()
@@ -2073,14 +2334,14 @@ while True:
 ```
 ```javascript
-// JavaScript/browser example
+// JavaScript/browser example — cookies sent automatically
-async function pollLoop(token) {
+async function pollLoop() {
  let lastId = 0;
  while (true) {
    try {
      const resp = await fetch(
        `/api/v1/messages?after=${lastId}&timeout=15`,
-        {headers: {'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}`}}
+        {credentials: 'same-origin'}  // Include cookies
      );
      if (resp.status === 401) { /* session expired */ break; }
      const data = await resp.json();
@@ -2112,9 +2373,11 @@ Clients should handle these message commands from the queue:
 ### Error Handling
- **HTTP 401**: Token expired or invalid. Re-create session.
+- **HTTP 401**: Auth cookie expired or invalid. Re-create session or
  re-login (if a password was set).
 - **HTTP 404**: Channel or user not found.
- **HTTP 409**: Nick already taken (on session creation or NICK change).
+- **HTTP 409**: Nick already taken (on session creation, registration, or
  NICK change).
 - **HTTP 400**: Malformed request. Check the `error` field in the response.
 - **Network errors**: Back off exponentially (1s, 2s, 4s, ..., max 30s).
@@ -2131,8 +2394,11 @@ Clients should handle these message commands from the queue:
 4. **DM tab logic**: When you receive a PRIVMSG where `to` is not a channel
   (no `#` prefix), the DM tab should be keyed by the **other** user's nick:
   if `from` is you, use `to`; if `from` is someone else, use `from`.
-5. **Reconnection**: If the poll loop fails with 401, the session is gone.
+5. **Reconnection**: If the poll loop fails with 401, the auth cookie is
-   Create a new session. If it fails with a network error, retry with backoff.
+   invalid. For sessions without a password, create a new session. For
   sessions with a password set (via PASS command), log in again via
   `POST /api/v1/login` to get a fresh cookie on the same session. If it
   fails with a network error, retry with backoff.
 ---
@@ -2291,8 +2557,10 @@ creating one session pays once and keeps their session.
  331-332 TOPIC, 352-353 WHO/NAMES, 366, 372-376 MOTD, 401-461 errors)
 - [ ] **Max message size enforcement** — reject oversized messages
 - [ ] **NOTICE command** — distinct from PRIVMSG (no auto-reply flag)
- [ ] **Multi-client sessions** — add client to existing session
+- [x] **Multi-client sessions** — set a password via PASS command, then
-  (share nick across devices)
+  login from additional devices via `POST /api/v1/login`
 - [x] **Cookie-based auth** — HttpOnly cookies replace Bearer tokens for
  all API authentication
 ### Future (1.0+)
@@ -2352,6 +2620,8 @@ neoirc/
 │   │   └── healthcheck.go  # Health check handler
 │   ├── healthcheck/        # Health check logic
 │   │   └── healthcheck.go
 │   ├── stats/              # Runtime statistics (atomic counters)
 │   │   └── stats.go
 │   ├── logger/             # slog-based logging
 │   │   └── logger.go
 │   ├── middleware/          # HTTP middleware (logging, CORS, metrics, auth)
@@ -2403,9 +2673,12 @@ neoirc/
   build a working IRC-style TUI client against this API in an afternoon, the
   API is too complex.
-2. **No accounts** — identity is a signing key, nick is a display name. No
+2. **Passwords optional** — anonymous sessions are instant: pick a nick and
-   registration, no passwords, no email verification. Session creation is
+   talk. No registration, no email verification. The cost of entry is a
-   instant. The cost of entry is a hashcash proof, not bureaucracy.
+   hashcash proof, not bureaucracy. For users who want multi-client access
   (multiple devices sharing one session), the PASS command sets a password
   on the session — but it's never required. Identity verification at the
   message layer uses cryptographic signing, independent of password status.
 3. **IRC semantics over HTTP** — command names and numeric codes from
   RFC 1459/2812. If you've built an IRC client or bot, you already know the
--- a/cmd/neoircd/main.go
+++ b/cmd/neoircd/main.go
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/logger"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/middleware"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/server"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/stats"
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 )
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ func main() {
 			server.New,
 			middleware.New,
 			healthcheck.New,
 			stats.New,
 		),
 		fx.Invoke(func(*server.Server) {}),
 	).Run()
--- a/internal/cli/api/client.go
+++ b/internal/cli/api/client.go
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/cookiejar"
 	"net/url"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
@@ -28,16 +29,19 @@ var errHTTP = errors.New("HTTP error")
 // Client wraps HTTP calls to the neoirc server API.
 type Client struct {
 	BaseURL    string
 	Token      string
 	HTTPClient *http.Client
 }
-// NewClient creates a new API client.
+// NewClient creates a new API client with a cookie jar
 // for automatic auth cookie management.
 func NewClient(baseURL string) *Client {
-	return &Client{ //nolint:exhaustruct // Token set after CreateSession
+	jar, _ := cookiejar.New(nil)
 	return &Client{
 		BaseURL: baseURL,
 		HTTPClient: &http.Client{ //nolint:exhaustruct // defaults fine
 			Timeout: httpTimeout,
 			Jar:     jar,
 		},
 	}
 }
@@ -79,8 +83,6 @@ func (client *Client) CreateSession(
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode session: %w", err)
 	}
 	client.Token = resp.Token
 	return &resp, nil
 }
@@ -121,6 +123,7 @@ func (client *Client) PollMessages(
 		Timeout: time.Duration(
 			timeout+pollExtraTime,
 		) * time.Second,
 		Jar: client.HTTPClient.Jar,
 	}
 	params := url.Values{}
@@ -145,10 +148,6 @@ func (client *Client) PollMessages(
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("new request: %w", err)
 	}
 	request.Header.Set(
 		"Authorization", "Bearer "+client.Token,
 	)
 	resp, err := pollClient.Do(request)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("poll request: %w", err)
@@ -304,12 +303,6 @@ func (client *Client) do(
 		"Content-Type", "application/json",
 	)
 	if client.Token != "" {
 		request.Header.Set(
 			"Authorization", "Bearer "+client.Token,
 		)
 	}
 	resp, err := client.HTTPClient.Do(request)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("http: %w", err)
--- a/internal/cli/api/hashcash.go
+++ b/internal/cli/api/hashcash.go
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"math/big"
 	"time"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/hashcash"
 )
 const (
@@ -37,6 +39,23 @@ func MintHashcash(bits int, resource string) string {
 	}
 }
 // MintChannelHashcash computes a hashcash stamp bound to
 // a specific channel and message body. The stamp format
 // is 1:bits:YYMMDD:channel:bodyhash:counter where
 // bodyhash is the hex-encoded SHA-256 of the message
 // body bytes. Delegates to the internal/hashcash package.
 func MintChannelHashcash(
 	bits int,
 	channel string,
 	body []byte,
 ) string {
 	bodyHash := hashcash.BodyHash(body)
 	return hashcash.MintChannelStamp(
 		bits, channel, bodyHash,
 	)
 }
 // hasLeadingZeroBits checks if hash has at least numBits
 // leading zero bits.
 func hasLeadingZeroBits(
--- a/internal/cli/api/types.go
+++ b/internal/cli/api/types.go
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ type SessionRequest struct {
 type SessionResponse struct {
 	ID   int64  `json:"id"`
 	Nick string `json:"nick"`
 	Token string `json:"token"`
 }
 // StateResponse is the response from GET /api/v1/state.
--- a/internal/db/auth.go
+++ b/internal/db/auth.go
@@ -16,80 +16,28 @@ var errNoPassword = errors.New(
 	"account has no password set",
 )
-// RegisterUser creates a session with a hashed password
+// SetPassword sets a bcrypt-hashed password on a session,
-// and returns session ID, client ID, and token.
+// enabling multi-client login via POST /api/v1/login.
-func (database *Database) RegisterUser(
+func (database *Database) SetPassword(
 	ctx context.Context,
-	nick, password string,
+	sessionID int64,
-) (int64, int64, string, error) {
+	password string,
 ) error {
 	hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword(
 		[]byte(password), bcryptCost,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
-		return 0, 0, "", fmt.Errorf(
+		return fmt.Errorf("hash password: %w", err)
 			"hash password: %w", err,
 		)
 	}
-	sessionUUID := uuid.New().String()
+	_, err = database.conn.ExecContext(ctx,
-	clientUUID := uuid.New().String()
+		"UPDATE sessions SET password_hash = ? WHERE id = ?",
-
+		string(hash), sessionID)
 	token, err := generateToken()
 	if err != nil {
-		return 0, 0, "", err
+		return fmt.Errorf("set password: %w", err)
 	}
-	now := time.Now()
+	return nil
 	transaction, err := database.conn.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, 0, "", fmt.Errorf(
 			"begin tx: %w", err,
 		)
 	}
 	res, err := transaction.ExecContext(ctx,
 		`INSERT INTO sessions
 		 (uuid, nick, password_hash,
 		  created_at, last_seen)
 		 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
 		sessionUUID, nick, string(hash), now, now)
 	if err != nil {
 		_ = transaction.Rollback()
 		return 0, 0, "", fmt.Errorf(
 			"create session: %w", err,
 		)
 	}
 	sessionID, _ := res.LastInsertId()
 	tokenHash := hashToken(token)
 	clientRes, err := transaction.ExecContext(ctx,
 		`INSERT INTO clients
 		 (uuid, session_id, token,
 		  created_at, last_seen)
 		 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
 		clientUUID, sessionID, tokenHash, now, now)
 	if err != nil {
 		_ = transaction.Rollback()
 		return 0, 0, "", fmt.Errorf(
 			"create client: %w", err,
 		)
 	}
 	clientID, _ := clientRes.LastInsertId()
 	err = transaction.Commit()
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, 0, "", fmt.Errorf(
 			"commit registration: %w", err,
 		)
 	}
 	return sessionID, clientID, token, nil
 }
 // LoginUser verifies a nick/password and creates a new
--- a/internal/db/auth_test.go
+++ b/internal/db/auth_test.go
@@ -6,63 +6,65 @@ import (
 	_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
 )
-func TestRegisterUser(t *testing.T) {
+func TestSetPassword(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	database := setupTestDB(t)
 	ctx := t.Context()
-	sessionID, clientID, token, err :=
+	sessionID, _, _, err :=
-		database.RegisterUser(ctx, "reguser", "password123")
+		database.CreateSession(ctx, "passuser")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	if sessionID == 0 || clientID == 0 || token == "" {
+	err = database.SetPassword(
 		ctx, sessionID, "password123",
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	// Verify we can now log in with the password.
 	loginSID, loginCID, loginToken, err :=
 		database.LoginUser(ctx, "passuser", "password123")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	if loginSID == 0 || loginCID == 0 || loginToken == "" {
 		t.Fatal("expected valid ids and token")
 	}
 	// Verify session works via token lookup.
 	sid, cid, nick, err :=
 		database.GetSessionByToken(ctx, token)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	if sid != sessionID || cid != clientID {
 		t.Fatal("session/client id mismatch")
 	}
 	if nick != "reguser" {
 		t.Fatalf("expected reguser, got %s", nick)
 	}
 }
-func TestRegisterUserDuplicateNick(t *testing.T) {
+func TestSetPasswordThenWrongLogin(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	database := setupTestDB(t)
 	ctx := t.Context()
-	regSID, regCID, regToken, err :=
+	sessionID, _, _, err :=
-		database.RegisterUser(ctx, "dupnick", "password123")
+		database.CreateSession(ctx, "wrongpw")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	_ = regSID
+	err = database.SetPassword(
-	_ = regCID
+		ctx, sessionID, "correctpass",
-	_ = regToken
+	)
-
+	if err != nil {
-	dupSID, dupCID, dupToken, dupErr :=
+		t.Fatal(err)
 		database.RegisterUser(ctx, "dupnick", "other12345")
 	if dupErr == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for duplicate nick")
 	}
-	_ = dupSID
+	loginSID, loginCID, loginToken, loginErr :=
-	_ = dupCID
+		database.LoginUser(ctx, "wrongpw", "wrongpass12")
-	_ = dupToken
+	if loginErr == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for wrong password")
 	}
 	_ = loginSID
 	_ = loginCID
 	_ = loginToken
 }
 func TestLoginUser(t *testing.T) {
@@ -71,23 +73,26 @@ func TestLoginUser(t *testing.T) {
 	database := setupTestDB(t)
 	ctx := t.Context()
-	regSID, regCID, regToken, err :=
+	sessionID, _, _, err :=
-		database.RegisterUser(ctx, "loginuser", "mypassword")
+		database.CreateSession(ctx, "loginuser")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	_ = regSID
+	err = database.SetPassword(
-	_ = regCID
+		ctx, sessionID, "mypassword",
-	_ = regToken
+	)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	sessionID, clientID, token, err :=
+	loginSID, loginCID, token, err :=
 		database.LoginUser(ctx, "loginuser", "mypassword")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	if sessionID == 0 || clientID == 0 || token == "" {
+	if loginSID == 0 || loginCID == 0 || token == "" {
 		t.Fatal("expected valid ids and token")
 	}
@@ -103,33 +108,6 @@ func TestLoginUser(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestLoginUserWrongPassword(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	database := setupTestDB(t)
 	ctx := t.Context()
 	regSID, regCID, regToken, err :=
 		database.RegisterUser(ctx, "wrongpw", "correctpass")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	_ = regSID
 	_ = regCID
 	_ = regToken
 	loginSID, loginCID, loginToken, loginErr :=
 		database.LoginUser(ctx, "wrongpw", "wrongpass12")
 	if loginErr == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for wrong password")
 	}
 	_ = loginSID
 	_ = loginCID
 	_ = loginToken
 }
 func TestLoginUserNoPassword(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
--- a/internal/db/queries.go
+++ b/internal/db/queries.go
@@ -1266,3 +1266,149 @@ func (database *Database) PruneOldMessages(
 	return deleted, nil
 }
 // GetClientCount returns the total number of clients.
 func (database *Database) GetClientCount(
 	ctx context.Context,
 ) (int64, error) {
 	var count int64
 	err := database.conn.QueryRowContext(
 		ctx,
 		"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM clients",
 	).Scan(&count)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
 			"get client count: %w", err,
 		)
 	}
 	return count, nil
 }
 // GetQueueEntryCount returns the total number of entries
 // in the client output queues.
 func (database *Database) GetQueueEntryCount(
 	ctx context.Context,
 ) (int64, error) {
 	var count int64
 	err := database.conn.QueryRowContext(
 		ctx,
 		"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM client_queues",
 	).Scan(&count)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
 			"get queue entry count: %w", err,
 		)
 	}
 	return count, nil
 }
 // GetChannelHashcashBits returns the hashcash difficulty
 // requirement for a channel. Returns 0 if not set.
 func (database *Database) GetChannelHashcashBits(
 	ctx context.Context,
 	channelID int64,
 ) (int, error) {
 	var bits int
 	err := database.conn.QueryRowContext(
 		ctx,
 		"SELECT hashcash_bits FROM channels WHERE id = ?",
 		channelID,
 	).Scan(&bits)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
 			"get channel hashcash bits: %w", err,
 		)
 	}
 	return bits, nil
 }
 // SetChannelHashcashBits sets the hashcash difficulty
 // requirement for a channel. A value of 0 disables the
 // requirement.
 func (database *Database) SetChannelHashcashBits(
 	ctx context.Context,
 	channelID int64,
 	bits int,
 ) error {
 	_, err := database.conn.ExecContext(ctx,
 		`UPDATE channels
 		 SET hashcash_bits = ?, updated_at = ?
 		 WHERE id = ?`,
 		bits, time.Now(), channelID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf(
 			"set channel hashcash bits: %w", err,
 		)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // RecordSpentHashcash stores a spent hashcash stamp hash
 // for replay prevention.
 func (database *Database) RecordSpentHashcash(
 	ctx context.Context,
 	stampHash string,
 ) error {
 	_, err := database.conn.ExecContext(ctx,
 		`INSERT OR IGNORE INTO spent_hashcash
 		 (stamp_hash, created_at)
 		 VALUES (?, ?)`,
 		stampHash, time.Now())
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf(
 			"record spent hashcash: %w", err,
 		)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // IsHashcashSpent checks whether a hashcash stamp hash
 // has already been used.
 func (database *Database) IsHashcashSpent(
 	ctx context.Context,
 	stampHash string,
 ) (bool, error) {
 	var count int
 	err := database.conn.QueryRowContext(ctx,
 		`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM spent_hashcash
 		 WHERE stamp_hash = ?`,
 		stampHash,
 	).Scan(&count)
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, fmt.Errorf(
 			"check spent hashcash: %w", err,
 		)
 	}
 	return count > 0, nil
 }
 // PruneSpentHashcash deletes spent hashcash tokens older
 // than the cutoff and returns the number of rows removed.
 func (database *Database) PruneSpentHashcash(
 	ctx context.Context,
 	cutoff time.Time,
 ) (int64, error) {
 	res, err := database.conn.ExecContext(ctx,
 		"DELETE FROM spent_hashcash WHERE created_at < ?",
 		cutoff,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf(
 			"prune spent hashcash: %w", err,
 		)
 	}
 	deleted, _ := res.RowsAffected()
 	return deleted, nil
 }
--- a/internal/db/schema/001_initial.sql
+++ b/internal/db/schema/001_initial.sql
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS channels (
    topic TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
    topic_set_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
    topic_set_at DATETIME,
    hashcash_bits INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
    created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
    updated_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
 );
@@ -61,6 +62,14 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS messages (
 CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_messages_to_id ON messages(msg_to, id);
 CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_messages_created ON messages(created_at);
 -- Spent hashcash tokens for replay prevention (1-year TTL)
 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS spent_hashcash (
    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
    stamp_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
    created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
 );
 CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_spent_hashcash_created ON spent_hashcash(created_at);
 -- Per-client message queues for fan-out delivery
 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS client_queues (
    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
--- a/internal/handlers/api.go
+++ b/internal/handlers/api.go
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package handlers
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
 	"regexp"
@@ -11,10 +12,16 @@ import (
 	"time"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/db"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/hashcash"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/pkg/irc"
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
 )
 var (
 	errHashcashRequired = errors.New("hashcash required")
 	errHashcashReused   = errors.New("hashcash reused")
 )
 var validNickRe = regexp.MustCompile(
 	`^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_\-\[\]\\^{}|` + "`" + `]{0,31}$`,
 )
@@ -29,6 +36,7 @@ const (
 	defaultMaxBodySize = 4096
 	defaultHistLimit   = 50
 	maxHistLimit       = 500
 	authCookieName     = "neoirc_auth"
 )
 func (hdlr *Handlers) maxBodySize() int64 {
@@ -39,23 +47,18 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) maxBodySize() int64 {
 	return defaultMaxBodySize
 }
-// authSession extracts the session from the client token.
+// authSession extracts the session from the auth cookie.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) authSession(
 	request *http.Request,
 ) (int64, int64, string, error) {
-	auth := request.Header.Get("Authorization")
+	cookie, err := request.Cookie(authCookieName)
-	if !strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
+	if err != nil || cookie.Value == "" {
 		return 0, 0, "", errUnauthorized
 	}
 	token := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
 	if token == "" {
 		return 0, 0, "", errUnauthorized
 	}
 	sessionID, clientID, nick, err :=
 		hdlr.params.Database.GetSessionByToken(
-			request.Context(), token,
+			request.Context(), cookie.Value,
 		)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, 0, "", fmt.Errorf("auth: %w", err)
@@ -64,6 +67,46 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) authSession(
 	return sessionID, clientID, nick, nil
 }
 // setAuthCookie sets the authentication cookie on the
 // response.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) setAuthCookie(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	request *http.Request,
 	token string,
 ) {
 	secure := request.TLS != nil ||
 		request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https"
 	http.SetCookie(writer, &http.Cookie{ //nolint:exhaustruct // optional fields
 		Name:     authCookieName,
 		Value:    token,
 		Path:     "/",
 		HttpOnly: true,
 		Secure:   secure,
 		SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
 	})
 }
 // clearAuthCookie removes the authentication cookie from
 // the client.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) clearAuthCookie(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	request *http.Request,
 ) {
 	secure := request.TLS != nil ||
 		request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https"
 	http.SetCookie(writer, &http.Cookie{ //nolint:exhaustruct // optional fields
 		Name:     authCookieName,
 		Value:    "",
 		Path:     "/",
 		HttpOnly: true,
 		Secure:   secure,
 		SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
 		MaxAge:   -1,
 	})
 }
 func (hdlr *Handlers) requireAuth(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	request *http.Request,
@@ -88,10 +131,11 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) fanOut(
 	request *http.Request,
 	command, from, target string,
 	body json.RawMessage,
 	meta json.RawMessage,
 	sessionIDs []int64,
 ) (string, error) {
 	dbID, msgUUID, err := hdlr.params.Database.InsertMessage(
-		request.Context(), command, from, target, nil, body, nil,
+		request.Context(), command, from, target, nil, body, meta,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("insert message: %w", err)
@@ -117,10 +161,11 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) fanOutSilent(
 	request *http.Request,
 	command, from, target string,
 	body json.RawMessage,
 	meta json.RawMessage,
 	sessionIDs []int64,
 ) error {
 	_, err := hdlr.fanOut(
-		request, command, from, target, body, sessionIDs,
+		request, command, from, target, body, meta, sessionIDs,
 	)
 	return err
@@ -212,12 +257,16 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleCreateSession(
 		return
 	}
 	hdlr.stats.IncrSessions()
 	hdlr.stats.IncrConnections()
 	hdlr.deliverMOTD(request, clientID, sessionID, payload.Nick)
 	hdlr.setAuthCookie(writer, request, token)
 	hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, map[string]any{
 		"id":   sessionID,
 		"nick": payload.Nick,
 		"token": token,
 	}, http.StatusCreated)
 }
@@ -291,7 +340,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) deliverWelcome(
 		[]string{
 			"CHANTYPES=#",
 			"NICKLEN=32",
-			"CHANMODES=,,," + "imnst",
+			"CHANMODES=,,H," + "imnst",
 			"NETWORK=neoirc",
 			"CASEMAPPING=ascii",
 		},
@@ -822,7 +871,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) HandleSendCommand() http.HandlerFunc {
 			writer, request,
 			sessionID, clientID, nick,
 			payload.Command, payload.To,
-			payload.Body, bodyLines,
+			payload.Body, payload.Meta, bodyLines,
 		)
 	}
 }
@@ -833,6 +882,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) dispatchCommand(
 	sessionID, clientID int64,
 	nick, command, target string,
 	body json.RawMessage,
 	meta json.RawMessage,
 	bodyLines func() []string,
 ) {
 	switch command {
@@ -845,7 +895,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) dispatchCommand(
 		hdlr.handlePrivmsg(
 			writer, request,
 			sessionID, clientID, nick,
-			command, target, body, bodyLines,
+			command, target, body, meta, bodyLines,
 		)
 	case irc.CmdJoin:
 		hdlr.handleJoin(
@@ -862,6 +912,11 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) dispatchCommand(
 			writer, request,
 			sessionID, clientID, nick, bodyLines,
 		)
 	case irc.CmdPass:
 		hdlr.handlePass(
 			writer, request,
 			sessionID, clientID, nick, bodyLines,
 		)
 	case irc.CmdTopic:
 		hdlr.handleTopic(
 			writer, request,
@@ -946,6 +1001,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handlePrivmsg(
 	sessionID, clientID int64,
 	nick, command, target string,
 	body json.RawMessage,
 	meta json.RawMessage,
 	bodyLines func() []string,
 ) {
 	if target == "" {
@@ -977,11 +1033,13 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handlePrivmsg(
 		return
 	}
 	hdlr.stats.IncrMessages()
 	if strings.HasPrefix(target, "#") {
 		hdlr.handleChannelMsg(
 			writer, request,
 			sessionID, clientID, nick,
-			command, target, body,
+			command, target, body, meta,
 		)
 		return
@@ -990,7 +1048,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handlePrivmsg(
 	hdlr.handleDirectMsg(
 		writer, request,
 		sessionID, clientID, nick,
-		command, target, body,
+		command, target, body, meta,
 	)
 }
@@ -1021,6 +1079,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleChannelMsg(
 	sessionID, clientID int64,
 	nick, command, target string,
 	body json.RawMessage,
 	meta json.RawMessage,
 ) {
 	chID, err := hdlr.params.Database.GetChannelByName(
 		request.Context(), target,
@@ -1061,9 +1120,172 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleChannelMsg(
 		return
 	}
-	hdlr.sendChannelMsg(
+	hashcashErr := hdlr.validateChannelHashcash(
-		writer, request, command, nick, target, body, chID,
+		request, clientID, sessionID,
 		writer, nick, target, body, meta, chID,
 	)
 	if hashcashErr != nil {
 		return
 	}
 	hdlr.sendChannelMsg(
 		writer, request, command, nick, target,
 		body, meta, chID,
 	)
 }
 // validateChannelHashcash checks whether the channel
 // requires hashcash proof-of-work for messages and
 // validates the stamp from the message meta field.
 // Returns nil on success or if the channel has no
 // hashcash requirement. On failure, it sends the
 // appropriate IRC error and returns a non-nil error.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) validateChannelHashcash(
 	request *http.Request,
 	clientID, sessionID int64,
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	nick, target string,
 	body json.RawMessage,
 	meta json.RawMessage,
 	chID int64,
 ) error {
 	ctx := request.Context()
 	bits, bitsErr := hdlr.params.Database.GetChannelHashcashBits(
 		ctx, chID,
 	)
 	if bitsErr != nil {
 		hdlr.log.Error(
 			"get channel hashcash bits", "error", bitsErr,
 		)
 		hdlr.respondError(
 			writer, request,
 			"internal error",
 			http.StatusInternalServerError,
 		)
 		return fmt.Errorf("channel hashcash bits: %w", bitsErr)
 	}
 	if bits <= 0 {
 		return nil
 	}
 	stamp := hdlr.extractHashcashFromMeta(meta)
 	if stamp == "" {
 		hdlr.respondIRCError(
 			writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
 			irc.ErrCannotSendToChan, nick, []string{target},
 			"Channel requires hashcash proof-of-work",
 		)
 		return errHashcashRequired
 	}
 	return hdlr.verifyChannelStamp(
 		request, writer,
 		clientID, sessionID,
 		nick, target, body, stamp, bits,
 	)
 }
 // verifyChannelStamp validates a channel hashcash stamp
 // and checks for replay attacks.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) verifyChannelStamp(
 	request *http.Request,
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	clientID, sessionID int64,
 	nick, target string,
 	body json.RawMessage,
 	stamp string,
 	bits int,
 ) error {
 	ctx := request.Context()
 	bodyHashStr := hashcash.BodyHash(body)
 	valErr := hdlr.channelHashcash.ValidateStamp(
 		stamp, bits, target, bodyHashStr,
 	)
 	if valErr != nil {
 		hdlr.respondIRCError(
 			writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
 			irc.ErrCannotSendToChan, nick, []string{target},
 			"Invalid hashcash: "+valErr.Error(),
 		)
 		return fmt.Errorf("channel hashcash: %w", valErr)
 	}
 	stampKey := hashcash.StampHash(stamp)
 	spent, spentErr := hdlr.params.Database.IsHashcashSpent(
 		ctx, stampKey,
 	)
 	if spentErr != nil {
 		hdlr.log.Error(
 			"check spent hashcash", "error", spentErr,
 		)
 		hdlr.respondError(
 			writer, request,
 			"internal error",
 			http.StatusInternalServerError,
 		)
 		return fmt.Errorf("check spent hashcash: %w", spentErr)
 	}
 	if spent {
 		hdlr.respondIRCError(
 			writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
 			irc.ErrCannotSendToChan, nick, []string{target},
 			"Hashcash stamp already used",
 		)
 		return errHashcashReused
 	}
 	recordErr := hdlr.params.Database.RecordSpentHashcash(
 		ctx, stampKey,
 	)
 	if recordErr != nil {
 		hdlr.log.Error(
 			"record spent hashcash", "error", recordErr,
 		)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // extractHashcashFromMeta parses the meta JSON and
 // returns the hashcash stamp string, or empty string
 // if not present.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) extractHashcashFromMeta(
 	meta json.RawMessage,
 ) string {
 	if len(meta) == 0 {
 		return ""
 	}
 	var metaMap map[string]json.RawMessage
 	err := json.Unmarshal(meta, &metaMap)
 	if err != nil {
 		return ""
 	}
 	raw, ok := metaMap["hashcash"]
 	if !ok {
 		return ""
 	}
 	var stamp string
 	err = json.Unmarshal(raw, &stamp)
 	if err != nil {
 		return ""
 	}
 	return stamp
 }
 func (hdlr *Handlers) sendChannelMsg(
@@ -1071,6 +1293,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) sendChannelMsg(
 	request *http.Request,
 	command, nick, target string,
 	body json.RawMessage,
 	meta json.RawMessage,
 	chID int64,
 ) {
 	memberIDs, err := hdlr.params.Database.GetChannelMemberIDs(
@@ -1090,7 +1313,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) sendChannelMsg(
 	}
 	msgUUID, err := hdlr.fanOut(
-		request, command, nick, target, body, memberIDs,
+		request, command, nick, target, body, meta, memberIDs,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		hdlr.log.Error("send message failed", "error", err)
@@ -1114,6 +1337,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleDirectMsg(
 	sessionID, clientID int64,
 	nick, command, target string,
 	body json.RawMessage,
 	meta json.RawMessage,
 ) {
 	targetSID, err := hdlr.params.Database.GetSessionByNick(
 		request.Context(), target,
@@ -1138,7 +1362,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleDirectMsg(
 	}
 	msgUUID, err := hdlr.fanOut(
-		request, command, nick, target, body, recipients,
+		request, command, nick, target, body, meta, recipients,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		hdlr.log.Error("send dm failed", "error", err)
@@ -1249,7 +1473,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) executeJoin(
 	)
 	_ = hdlr.fanOutSilent(
-		request, irc.CmdJoin, nick, channel, nil, memberIDs,
+		request, irc.CmdJoin, nick, channel, nil, nil, memberIDs,
 	)
 	hdlr.deliverJoinNumerics(
@@ -1419,7 +1643,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handlePart(
 	)
 	_ = hdlr.fanOutSilent(
-		request, irc.CmdPart, nick, channel, body, memberIDs,
+		request, irc.CmdPart, nick, channel, body, nil, memberIDs,
 	)
 	err = hdlr.params.Database.PartChannel(
@@ -1636,6 +1860,32 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleTopic(
 		return
 	}
 	isMember, err := hdlr.params.Database.IsChannelMember(
 		request.Context(), chID, sessionID,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		hdlr.log.Error(
 			"check membership failed", "error", err,
 		)
 		hdlr.respondError(
 			writer, request,
 			"internal error",
 			http.StatusInternalServerError,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	if !isMember {
 		hdlr.respondIRCError(
 			writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
 			irc.ErrNotOnChannel, nick, []string{channel},
 			"You're not on that channel",
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	hdlr.executeTopic(
 		writer, request,
 		sessionID, clientID, nick,
@@ -1673,7 +1923,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) executeTopic(
 	)
 	_ = hdlr.fanOutSilent(
-		request, irc.CmdTopic, nick, channel, body, memberIDs,
+		request, irc.CmdTopic, nick, channel, body, nil, memberIDs,
 	)
 	hdlr.enqueueNumeric(
@@ -1797,6 +2047,8 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleQuit(
 		request.Context(), sessionID,
 	)
 	hdlr.clearAuthCookie(writer, request)
 	hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request,
 		map[string]string{"status": "quit"},
 		http.StatusOK)
@@ -1836,11 +2088,10 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleMode(
 		return
 	}
 	_ = bodyLines
 	hdlr.handleChannelMode(
 		writer, request,
 		sessionID, clientID, nick, channel,
 		bodyLines,
 	)
 }
@@ -1849,6 +2100,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleChannelMode(
 	request *http.Request,
 	sessionID, clientID int64,
 	nick, channel string,
 	bodyLines func() []string,
 ) {
 	ctx := request.Context()
@@ -1865,10 +2117,47 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleChannelMode(
 		return
 	}
 	lines := bodyLines()
 	if len(lines) > 0 {
 		hdlr.applyChannelMode(
 			writer, request,
 			sessionID, clientID, nick,
 			channel, chID, lines,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	hdlr.queryChannelMode(
 		writer, request,
 		sessionID, clientID, nick, channel, chID,
 	)
 }
 // queryChannelMode sends RPL_CHANNELMODEIS and
 // RPL_CREATIONTIME for a channel. Includes +H if
 // the channel has a hashcash requirement.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) queryChannelMode(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	request *http.Request,
 	sessionID, clientID int64,
 	nick, channel string,
 	chID int64,
 ) {
 	ctx := request.Context()
 	modeStr := "+n"
 	bits, bitsErr := hdlr.params.Database.
 		GetChannelHashcashBits(ctx, chID)
 	if bitsErr == nil && bits > 0 {
 		modeStr = fmt.Sprintf("+nH %d", bits)
 	}
 	// 324 RPL_CHANNELMODEIS
 	hdlr.enqueueNumeric(
 		ctx, clientID, irc.RplChannelModeIs, nick,
-		[]string{channel, "+n"}, "",
+		[]string{channel, modeStr}, "",
 	)
 	// 329 RPL_CREATIONTIME
@@ -1893,6 +2182,156 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleChannelMode(
 		http.StatusOK)
 }
 // applyChannelMode handles setting channel modes.
 // Currently supports +H/-H for hashcash bits.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) applyChannelMode(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	request *http.Request,
 	sessionID, clientID int64,
 	nick, channel string,
 	chID int64,
 	modeArgs []string,
 ) {
 	ctx := request.Context()
 	modeStr := modeArgs[0]
 	switch modeStr {
 	case "+H":
 		hdlr.setHashcashMode(
 			writer, request,
 			sessionID, clientID, nick,
 			channel, chID, modeArgs,
 		)
 	case "-H":
 		hdlr.clearHashcashMode(
 			writer, request,
 			sessionID, clientID, nick,
 			channel, chID,
 		)
 	default:
 		// Unknown or unsupported mode change.
 		hdlr.enqueueNumeric(
 			ctx, clientID, irc.ErrUnknownMode, nick,
 			[]string{modeStr},
 			"is unknown mode char to me",
 		)
 		hdlr.broker.Notify(sessionID)
 		hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request,
 			map[string]string{"status": "error"},
 			http.StatusOK)
 	}
 }
 const (
 	// minHashcashBits is the minimum allowed hashcash
 	// difficulty for channels.
 	minHashcashBits = 1
 	// maxHashcashBits is the maximum allowed hashcash
 	// difficulty for channels.
 	maxHashcashBits = 40
 )
 // setHashcashMode handles MODE #channel +H <bits>.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) setHashcashMode(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	request *http.Request,
 	sessionID, clientID int64,
 	nick, channel string,
 	chID int64,
 	modeArgs []string,
 ) {
 	ctx := request.Context()
 	if len(modeArgs) < 2 { //nolint:mnd // +H requires a bits arg
 		hdlr.respondIRCError(
 			writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
 			irc.ErrNeedMoreParams, nick, []string{irc.CmdMode},
 			"Not enough parameters (+H requires bits)",
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	bits, err := strconv.Atoi(modeArgs[1])
 	if err != nil || bits < minHashcashBits ||
 		bits > maxHashcashBits {
 		hdlr.respondIRCError(
 			writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
 			irc.ErrUnknownMode, nick, []string{"+H"},
 			fmt.Sprintf(
 				"Invalid hashcash bits (must be %d-%d)",
 				minHashcashBits, maxHashcashBits,
 			),
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	err = hdlr.params.Database.SetChannelHashcashBits(
 		ctx, chID, bits,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		hdlr.log.Error(
 			"set channel hashcash bits", "error", err,
 		)
 		hdlr.respondError(
 			writer, request,
 			"internal error",
 			http.StatusInternalServerError,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	hdlr.enqueueNumeric(
 		ctx, clientID, irc.RplChannelModeIs, nick,
 		[]string{
 			channel,
 			fmt.Sprintf("+H %d", bits),
 		}, "",
 	)
 	hdlr.broker.Notify(sessionID)
 	hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request,
 		map[string]string{"status": "ok"},
 		http.StatusOK)
 }
 // clearHashcashMode handles MODE #channel -H.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) clearHashcashMode(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	request *http.Request,
 	sessionID, clientID int64,
 	nick, channel string,
 	chID int64,
 ) {
 	ctx := request.Context()
 	err := hdlr.params.Database.SetChannelHashcashBits(
 		ctx, chID, 0,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		hdlr.log.Error(
 			"clear channel hashcash bits", "error", err,
 		)
 		hdlr.respondError(
 			writer, request,
 			"internal error",
 			http.StatusInternalServerError,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	hdlr.enqueueNumeric(
 		ctx, clientID, irc.RplChannelModeIs, nick,
 		[]string{channel, "+n"}, "",
 	)
 	hdlr.broker.Notify(sessionID)
 	hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request,
 		map[string]string{"status": "ok"},
 		http.StatusOK)
 }
 // handleNames sends NAMES reply for a channel.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) handleNames(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
@@ -2412,6 +2851,8 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) HandleLogout() http.HandlerFunc {
 			)
 		}
 		hdlr.clearAuthCookie(writer, request)
 		hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request,
 			map[string]string{"status": "ok"},
 			http.StatusOK)
--- a/internal/handlers/api_test.go
+++ b/internal/handlers/api_test.go
--- a/internal/handlers/auth.go
+++ b/internal/handlers/auth.go
@@ -5,117 +5,11 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
-	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/db"
+	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/pkg/irc"
 )
 const minPasswordLength = 8
 // HandleRegister creates a new user with a password.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) HandleRegister() http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(
 		writer http.ResponseWriter,
 		request *http.Request,
 	) {
 		request.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
 			writer, request.Body, hdlr.maxBodySize(),
 		)
 		hdlr.handleRegister(writer, request)
 	}
 }
 func (hdlr *Handlers) handleRegister(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	request *http.Request,
 ) {
 	type registerRequest struct {
 		Nick     string `json:"nick"`
 		Password string `json:"password"`
 	}
 	var payload registerRequest
 	err := json.NewDecoder(request.Body).Decode(&payload)
 	if err != nil {
 		hdlr.respondError(
 			writer, request,
 			"invalid request body",
 			http.StatusBadRequest,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	payload.Nick = strings.TrimSpace(payload.Nick)
 	if !validNickRe.MatchString(payload.Nick) {
 		hdlr.respondError(
 			writer, request,
 			"invalid nick format",
 			http.StatusBadRequest,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	if len(payload.Password) < minPasswordLength {
 		hdlr.respondError(
 			writer, request,
 			"password must be at least 8 characters",
 			http.StatusBadRequest,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	sessionID, clientID, token, err :=
 		hdlr.params.Database.RegisterUser(
 			request.Context(),
 			payload.Nick,
 			payload.Password,
 		)
 	if err != nil {
 		hdlr.handleRegisterError(
 			writer, request, err,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	hdlr.deliverMOTD(request, clientID, sessionID, payload.Nick)
 	hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, map[string]any{
 		"id":    sessionID,
 		"nick":  payload.Nick,
 		"token": token,
 	}, http.StatusCreated)
 }
 func (hdlr *Handlers) handleRegisterError(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	request *http.Request,
 	err error,
 ) {
 	if db.IsUniqueConstraintError(err) {
 		hdlr.respondError(
 			writer, request,
 			"nick already taken",
 			http.StatusConflict,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	hdlr.log.Error(
 		"register user failed", "error", err,
 	)
 	hdlr.respondError(
 		writer, request,
 		"internal error",
 		http.StatusInternalServerError,
 	)
 }
 // HandleLogin authenticates a user with nick and password.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) HandleLogin() http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(
@@ -180,6 +74,8 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleLogin(
 		return
 	}
 	hdlr.stats.IncrConnections()
 	hdlr.deliverMOTD(
 		request, clientID, sessionID, payload.Nick,
 	)
@@ -190,9 +86,66 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleLogin(
 		request, clientID, sessionID, payload.Nick,
 	)
 	hdlr.setAuthCookie(writer, request, token)
 	hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, map[string]any{
 		"id":   sessionID,
 		"nick": payload.Nick,
 		"token": token,
 	}, http.StatusOK)
 }
 // handlePass handles the IRC PASS command to set a
 // password on the authenticated session, enabling
 // multi-client login via POST /api/v1/login.
 func (hdlr *Handlers) handlePass(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	request *http.Request,
 	sessionID, clientID int64,
 	nick string,
 	bodyLines func() []string,
 ) {
 	lines := bodyLines()
 	if len(lines) == 0 || lines[0] == "" {
 		hdlr.respondIRCError(
 			writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
 			irc.ErrNeedMoreParams, nick,
 			[]string{irc.CmdPass},
 			"Not enough parameters",
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	password := lines[0]
 	if len(password) < minPasswordLength {
 		hdlr.respondIRCError(
 			writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
 			irc.ErrNeedMoreParams, nick,
 			[]string{irc.CmdPass},
 			"Password must be at least 8 characters",
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	err := hdlr.params.Database.SetPassword(
 		request.Context(), sessionID, password,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		hdlr.log.Error(
 			"set password failed", "error", err,
 		)
 		hdlr.respondError(
 			writer, request,
 			"internal error",
 			http.StatusInternalServerError,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request,
 		map[string]string{"status": "ok"},
 		http.StatusOK)
 }
--- a/internal/handlers/handlers.go
+++ b/internal/handlers/handlers.go
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/hashcash"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/healthcheck"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/logger"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/stats"
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 )
@@ -30,10 +31,16 @@ type Params struct {
 	Config      *config.Config
 	Database    *db.Database
 	Healthcheck *healthcheck.Healthcheck
 	Stats       *stats.Tracker
 }
 const defaultIdleTimeout = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
 // spentHashcashTTL is how long spent hashcash tokens are
 // retained for replay prevention. Per issue requirements,
 // this is 1 year.
 const spentHashcashTTL = 365 * 24 * time.Hour
 // Handlers manages HTTP request handling.
 type Handlers struct {
 	params          *Params
@@ -41,6 +48,8 @@ type Handlers struct {
 	hc              *healthcheck.Healthcheck
 	broker          *broker.Broker
 	hashcashVal     *hashcash.Validator
 	channelHashcash *hashcash.ChannelValidator
 	stats           *stats.Tracker
 	cancelCleanup   context.CancelFunc
 }
@@ -60,6 +69,8 @@ func New(
 		hc:              params.Healthcheck,
 		broker:          broker.New(),
 		hashcashVal:     hashcash.NewValidator(resource),
 		channelHashcash: hashcash.NewChannelValidator(),
 		stats:           params.Stats,
 	}
 	lifecycle.Append(fx.Hook{
@@ -281,4 +292,20 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) pruneQueuesAndMessages(
 			)
 		}
 	}
 	// Prune spent hashcash tokens older than 1 year.
 	hashcashCutoff := time.Now().Add(-spentHashcashTTL)
 	pruned, err := hdlr.params.Database.
 		PruneSpentHashcash(ctx, hashcashCutoff)
 	if err != nil {
 		hdlr.log.Error(
 			"spent hashcash pruning failed", "error", err,
 		)
 	} else if pruned > 0 {
 		hdlr.log.Info(
 			"pruned spent hashcash tokens",
 			"deleted", pruned,
 		)
 	}
 }
--- a/internal/handlers/healthcheck.go
+++ b/internal/handlers/healthcheck.go
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) HandleHealthCheck() http.HandlerFunc {
 		writer http.ResponseWriter,
 		request *http.Request,
 	) {
-		resp := hdlr.hc.Healthcheck()
+		resp := hdlr.hc.Healthcheck(request.Context())
 		hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, resp, httpStatusOK)
 	}
 }
--- a/internal/hashcash/channel.go
+++ b/internal/hashcash/channel.go
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
 package hashcash
 import (
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 )
 var (
 	errBodyHashMismatch = errors.New(
 		"body hash mismatch",
 	)
 	errBodyHashMissing = errors.New(
 		"body hash missing",
 	)
 )
 // ChannelValidator checks hashcash stamps for
 // per-channel PRIVMSG validation. It verifies that
 // stamps are bound to a specific channel and message
 // body. Replay prevention is handled externally via
 // the database spent_hashcash table for persistence
 // across server restarts (1-year TTL).
 type ChannelValidator struct{}
 // NewChannelValidator creates a ChannelValidator.
 func NewChannelValidator() *ChannelValidator {
 	return &ChannelValidator{}
 }
 // BodyHash computes the hex-encoded SHA-256 hash of a
 // message body for use in hashcash stamp validation.
 func BodyHash(body []byte) string {
 	hash := sha256.Sum256(body)
 	return hex.EncodeToString(hash[:])
 }
 // ValidateStamp checks a channel hashcash stamp. It
 // verifies the stamp format, difficulty, date, channel
 // binding, body hash binding, and proof-of-work. Replay
 // detection is NOT performed here — callers must check
 // the spent_hashcash table separately.
 //
 // Stamp format: 1:bits:YYMMDD:channel:bodyhash:counter.
 func (cv *ChannelValidator) ValidateStamp(
 	stamp string,
 	requiredBits int,
 	channel string,
 	bodyHash string,
 ) error {
 	if requiredBits <= 0 {
 		return nil
 	}
 	parts := strings.Split(stamp, ":")
 	if len(parts) != stampFields {
 		return fmt.Errorf(
 			"%w: expected %d, got %d",
 			errInvalidFields, stampFields, len(parts),
 		)
 	}
 	version := parts[0]
 	bitsStr := parts[1]
 	dateStr := parts[2]
 	resource := parts[3]
 	stampBodyHash := parts[4]
 	headerErr := validateChannelHeader(
 		version, bitsStr, resource,
 		requiredBits, channel,
 	)
 	if headerErr != nil {
 		return headerErr
 	}
 	stampTime, parseErr := parseStampDate(dateStr)
 	if parseErr != nil {
 		return parseErr
 	}
 	timeErr := validateTime(stampTime)
 	if timeErr != nil {
 		return timeErr
 	}
 	bodyErr := validateBodyHash(
 		stampBodyHash, bodyHash,
 	)
 	if bodyErr != nil {
 		return bodyErr
 	}
 	return validateProof(stamp, requiredBits)
 }
 // StampHash returns a deterministic hash of a stamp
 // string for use as a spent-token key.
 func StampHash(stamp string) string {
 	hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(stamp))
 	return hex.EncodeToString(hash[:])
 }
 func validateChannelHeader(
 	version, bitsStr, resource string,
 	requiredBits int,
 	channel string,
 ) error {
 	if version != stampVersion {
 		return fmt.Errorf(
 			"%w: %s", errBadVersion, version,
 		)
 	}
 	claimedBits, err := strconv.Atoi(bitsStr)
 	if err != nil || claimedBits < requiredBits {
 		return fmt.Errorf(
 			"%w: need %d bits",
 			errInsufficientBits, requiredBits,
 		)
 	}
 	if resource != channel {
 		return fmt.Errorf(
 			"%w: got %q, want %q",
 			errWrongResource, resource, channel,
 		)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 func validateBodyHash(
 	stampBodyHash, expectedBodyHash string,
 ) error {
 	if stampBodyHash == "" {
 		return errBodyHashMissing
 	}
 	if stampBodyHash != expectedBodyHash {
 		return fmt.Errorf(
 			"%w: got %q, want %q",
 			errBodyHashMismatch,
 			stampBodyHash, expectedBodyHash,
 		)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // MintChannelStamp computes a channel hashcash stamp
 // with the given difficulty, channel name, and body hash.
 // This is intended for clients to generate stamps before
 // sending PRIVMSG to hashcash-protected channels.
 //
 // Stamp format: 1:bits:YYMMDD:channel:bodyhash:counter.
 func MintChannelStamp(
 	bits int,
 	channel string,
 	bodyHash string,
 ) string {
 	date := time.Now().UTC().Format(dateFormatShort)
 	prefix := fmt.Sprintf(
 		"1:%d:%s:%s:%s:",
 		bits, date, channel, bodyHash,
 	)
 	counter := uint64(0)
 	for {
 		stamp := prefix + strconv.FormatUint(counter, 16)
 		hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(stamp))
 		if hasLeadingZeroBits(hash[:], bits) {
 			return stamp
 		}
 		counter++
 	}
 }
--- a/internal/hashcash/channel_test.go
+++ b/internal/hashcash/channel_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
 package hashcash_test
 import (
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"testing"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/hashcash"
 )
 const (
 	testChannel  = "#general"
 	testBodyText = `["hello world"]`
 )
 func testBodyHash() string {
 	hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(testBodyText))
 	return hex.EncodeToString(hash[:])
 }
 func TestChannelValidateHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
 	bodyHash := testBodyHash()
 	stamp := hashcash.MintChannelStamp(
 		testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
 	)
 	err := validator.ValidateStamp(
 		stamp, testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("valid channel stamp rejected: %v", err)
 	}
 }
 func TestChannelValidateWrongChannel(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
 	bodyHash := testBodyHash()
 	stamp := hashcash.MintChannelStamp(
 		testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
 	)
 	err := validator.ValidateStamp(
 		stamp, testBits, "#other", bodyHash,
 	)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected channel mismatch error")
 	}
 }
 func TestChannelValidateWrongBodyHash(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
 	bodyHash := testBodyHash()
 	stamp := hashcash.MintChannelStamp(
 		testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
 	)
 	wrongHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte("different body"))
 	wrongBodyHash := hex.EncodeToString(wrongHash[:])
 	err := validator.ValidateStamp(
 		stamp, testBits, testChannel, wrongBodyHash,
 	)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected body hash mismatch error")
 	}
 }
 func TestChannelValidateInsufficientBits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
 	bodyHash := testBodyHash()
 	// Mint with 2 bits but require 4.
 	stamp := hashcash.MintChannelStamp(
 		testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
 	)
 	err := validator.ValidateStamp(
 		stamp, 4, testChannel, bodyHash,
 	)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected insufficient bits error")
 	}
 }
 func TestChannelValidateZeroBitsSkips(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
 	err := validator.ValidateStamp(
 		"garbage", 0, "#ch", "abc",
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("zero bits should skip: %v", err)
 	}
 }
 func TestChannelValidateBadFormat(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
 	err := validator.ValidateStamp(
 		"not:valid", testBits, testChannel, "abc",
 	)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected bad format error")
 	}
 }
 func TestChannelValidateBadVersion(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
 	bodyHash := testBodyHash()
 	stamp := "2:2:260317:#general:" + bodyHash + ":counter"
 	err := validator.ValidateStamp(
 		stamp, testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
 	)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected bad version error")
 	}
 }
 func TestChannelValidateExpiredStamp(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
 	bodyHash := testBodyHash()
 	// Mint with a very old date by manually constructing.
 	stamp := mintStampWithDate(
 		t, testBits, testChannel, "200101",
 	)
 	err := validator.ValidateStamp(
 		stamp, testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
 	)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected expired stamp error")
 	}
 }
 func TestChannelValidateMissingBodyHash(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
 	bodyHash := testBodyHash()
 	// Construct a stamp with empty body hash field.
 	stamp := mintStampWithDate(
 		t, testBits, testChannel, todayDate(),
 	)
 	// This uses the session-style stamp which has empty
 	// ext field — body hash is missing.
 	err := validator.ValidateStamp(
 		stamp, testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
 	)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected missing body hash error")
 	}
 }
 func TestBodyHash(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	body := []byte(`["hello world"]`)
 	bodyHash := hashcash.BodyHash(body)
 	if len(bodyHash) != 64 {
 		t.Fatalf(
 			"expected 64-char hex hash, got %d",
 			len(bodyHash),
 		)
 	}
 	// Same input should produce same hash.
 	bodyHash2 := hashcash.BodyHash(body)
 	if bodyHash != bodyHash2 {
 		t.Fatal("body hash not deterministic")
 	}
 	// Different input should produce different hash.
 	bodyHash3 := hashcash.BodyHash([]byte("different"))
 	if bodyHash == bodyHash3 {
 		t.Fatal("different inputs produced same hash")
 	}
 }
 func TestStampHash(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	hash1 := hashcash.StampHash("stamp1")
 	hash2 := hashcash.StampHash("stamp2")
 	if hash1 == hash2 {
 		t.Fatal("different stamps produced same hash")
 	}
 	// Same input should be deterministic.
 	hash1b := hashcash.StampHash("stamp1")
 	if hash1 != hash1b {
 		t.Fatal("stamp hash not deterministic")
 	}
 }
 func TestMintChannelStamp(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	bodyHash := testBodyHash()
 	stamp := hashcash.MintChannelStamp(
 		testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
 	)
 	if stamp == "" {
 		t.Fatal("expected non-empty stamp")
 	}
 	// Validate the minted stamp.
 	validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
 	err := validator.ValidateStamp(
 		stamp, testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("minted stamp failed validation: %v", err)
 	}
 }
--- a/internal/healthcheck/healthcheck.go
+++ b/internal/healthcheck/healthcheck.go
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/db"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/globals"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/logger"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/stats"
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 )
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ type Params struct {
 	Config   *config.Config
 	Logger   *logger.Logger
 	Database *db.Database
 	Stats    *stats.Tracker
 }
 // Healthcheck tracks server uptime and provides health status.
@@ -64,11 +66,22 @@ type Response struct {
 	Version       string `json:"version"`
 	Appname       string `json:"appname"`
 	Maintenance   bool   `json:"maintenanceMode"`
 	// Runtime statistics.
 	Sessions             int64 `json:"sessions"`
 	Clients              int64 `json:"clients"`
 	QueuedLines          int64 `json:"queuedLines"`
 	Channels             int64 `json:"channels"`
 	ConnectionsSinceBoot int64 `json:"connectionsSinceBoot"`
 	SessionsSinceBoot    int64 `json:"sessionsSinceBoot"`
 	MessagesSinceBoot    int64 `json:"messagesSinceBoot"`
 }
 // Healthcheck returns the current health status of the server.
-func (hcheck *Healthcheck) Healthcheck() *Response {
+func (hcheck *Healthcheck) Healthcheck(
-	return &Response{
+	ctx context.Context,
 ) *Response {
 	resp := &Response{
 		Status:        "ok",
 		Now:           time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
 		UptimeSeconds: int64(hcheck.uptime().Seconds()),
@@ -76,6 +89,64 @@ func (hcheck *Healthcheck) Healthcheck() *Response {
 		Appname:       hcheck.params.Globals.Appname,
 		Version:       hcheck.params.Globals.Version,
 		Maintenance:   hcheck.params.Config.MaintenanceMode,
 		Sessions:             0,
 		Clients:              0,
 		QueuedLines:          0,
 		Channels:             0,
 		ConnectionsSinceBoot: hcheck.params.Stats.ConnectionsSinceBoot(),
 		SessionsSinceBoot:    hcheck.params.Stats.SessionsSinceBoot(),
 		MessagesSinceBoot:    hcheck.params.Stats.MessagesSinceBoot(),
 	}
 	hcheck.populateDBStats(ctx, resp)
 	return resp
 }
 // populateDBStats fills in database-derived counters.
 func (hcheck *Healthcheck) populateDBStats(
 	ctx context.Context,
 	resp *Response,
 ) {
 	sessions, err := hcheck.params.Database.GetUserCount(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		hcheck.log.Error(
 			"healthcheck: session count failed",
 			"error", err,
 		)
 	} else {
 		resp.Sessions = sessions
 	}
 	clients, err := hcheck.params.Database.GetClientCount(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		hcheck.log.Error(
 			"healthcheck: client count failed",
 			"error", err,
 		)
 	} else {
 		resp.Clients = clients
 	}
 	queued, err := hcheck.params.Database.GetQueueEntryCount(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		hcheck.log.Error(
 			"healthcheck: queue entry count failed",
 			"error", err,
 		)
 	} else {
 		resp.QueuedLines = queued
 	}
 	channels, err := hcheck.params.Database.GetChannelCount(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		hcheck.log.Error(
 			"healthcheck: channel count failed",
 			"error", err,
 		)
 	} else {
 		resp.Channels = channels
 	}
 }
--- a/internal/middleware/middleware.go
+++ b/internal/middleware/middleware.go
@@ -126,18 +126,23 @@ func (mware *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 }
 // CORS returns middleware that handles Cross-Origin Resource Sharing.
 // AllowCredentials is true so browsers include cookies in
 // cross-origin API requests.
 func (mware *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return cors.Handler(cors.Options{ //nolint:exhaustruct // optional fields
-		AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"},
+		AllowOriginFunc: func(
 			_ *http.Request, _ string,
 		) bool {
 			return true
 		},
 		AllowedMethods: []string{
 			"GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS",
 		},
 		AllowedHeaders: []string{
-			"Accept", "Authorization",
+			"Accept", "Content-Type", "X-CSRF-Token",
 			"Content-Type", "X-CSRF-Token",
 		},
 		ExposedHeaders:   []string{"Link"},
-		AllowCredentials: false,
+		AllowCredentials: true,
 		MaxAge:           corsMaxAge,
 	})
 }
--- a/internal/server/routes.go
+++ b/internal/server/routes.go
@@ -75,10 +75,6 @@ func (srv *Server) setupAPIv1(router chi.Router) {
 		"/session",
 		srv.handlers.HandleCreateSession(),
 	)
 	router.Post(
 		"/register",
 		srv.handlers.HandleRegister(),
 	)
 	router.Post(
 		"/login",
 		srv.handlers.HandleLogin(),
--- a/internal/stats/stats.go
+++ b/internal/stats/stats.go
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
 // Package stats tracks runtime statistics since server boot.
 package stats
 import (
 	"sync/atomic"
 )
 // Tracker holds atomic counters for runtime statistics
 // that accumulate since the server started.
 type Tracker struct {
 	connectionsSinceBoot atomic.Int64
 	sessionsSinceBoot    atomic.Int64
 	messagesSinceBoot    atomic.Int64
 }
 // New creates a new Tracker with all counters at zero.
 func New() *Tracker {
 	return &Tracker{} //nolint:exhaustruct // atomic fields have zero-value defaults
 }
 // IncrConnections increments the total connection count.
 func (t *Tracker) IncrConnections() {
 	t.connectionsSinceBoot.Add(1)
 }
 // IncrSessions increments the total session count.
 func (t *Tracker) IncrSessions() {
 	t.sessionsSinceBoot.Add(1)
 }
 // IncrMessages increments the total PRIVMSG/NOTICE count.
 func (t *Tracker) IncrMessages() {
 	t.messagesSinceBoot.Add(1)
 }
 // ConnectionsSinceBoot returns the total number of
 // client connections since boot.
 func (t *Tracker) ConnectionsSinceBoot() int64 {
 	return t.connectionsSinceBoot.Load()
 }
 // SessionsSinceBoot returns the total number of sessions
 // created since boot.
 func (t *Tracker) SessionsSinceBoot() int64 {
 	return t.sessionsSinceBoot.Load()
 }
 // MessagesSinceBoot returns the total number of
 // PRIVMSG/NOTICE messages sent since boot.
 func (t *Tracker) MessagesSinceBoot() int64 {
 	return t.messagesSinceBoot.Load()
 }
--- a/internal/stats/stats_test.go
+++ b/internal/stats/stats_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
 package stats_test
 import (
 	"testing"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/stats"
 )
 func TestNew(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	tracker := stats.New()
 	if tracker == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected non-nil tracker")
 	}
 	if tracker.ConnectionsSinceBoot() != 0 {
 		t.Errorf(
 			"expected 0 connections, got %d",
 			tracker.ConnectionsSinceBoot(),
 		)
 	}
 	if tracker.SessionsSinceBoot() != 0 {
 		t.Errorf(
 			"expected 0 sessions, got %d",
 			tracker.SessionsSinceBoot(),
 		)
 	}
 	if tracker.MessagesSinceBoot() != 0 {
 		t.Errorf(
 			"expected 0 messages, got %d",
 			tracker.MessagesSinceBoot(),
 		)
 	}
 }
 func TestIncrConnections(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	tracker := stats.New()
 	tracker.IncrConnections()
 	tracker.IncrConnections()
 	tracker.IncrConnections()
 	got := tracker.ConnectionsSinceBoot()
 	if got != 3 {
 		t.Errorf(
 			"expected 3 connections, got %d", got,
 		)
 	}
 }
 func TestIncrSessions(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	tracker := stats.New()
 	tracker.IncrSessions()
 	tracker.IncrSessions()
 	got := tracker.SessionsSinceBoot()
 	if got != 2 {
 		t.Errorf(
 			"expected 2 sessions, got %d", got,
 		)
 	}
 }
 func TestIncrMessages(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	tracker := stats.New()
 	tracker.IncrMessages()
 	got := tracker.MessagesSinceBoot()
 	if got != 1 {
 		t.Errorf(
 			"expected 1 message, got %d", got,
 		)
 	}
 }
 func TestCountersAreIndependent(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	tracker := stats.New()
 	tracker.IncrConnections()
 	tracker.IncrSessions()
 	tracker.IncrMessages()
 	tracker.IncrMessages()
 	if tracker.ConnectionsSinceBoot() != 1 {
 		t.Errorf(
 			"expected 1 connection, got %d",
 			tracker.ConnectionsSinceBoot(),
 		)
 	}
 	if tracker.SessionsSinceBoot() != 1 {
 		t.Errorf(
 			"expected 1 session, got %d",
 			tracker.SessionsSinceBoot(),
 		)
 	}
 	if tracker.MessagesSinceBoot() != 2 {
 		t.Errorf(
 			"expected 2 messages, got %d",
 			tracker.MessagesSinceBoot(),
 		)
 	}
 }
--- a/pkg/irc/commands.go
+++ b/pkg/irc/commands.go
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ const (
 	CmdNames   = "NAMES"
 	CmdNick    = "NICK"
 	CmdNotice  = "NOTICE"
 	CmdPass    = "PASS"
 	CmdPart    = "PART"
 	CmdPing    = "PING"
 	CmdPong    = "PONG"
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
user	cd9fd0c5c5	refactor: replace Bearer token auth with HttpOnly cookies All checks were successful check / check (push) Successful in 2m21s Details - Remove POST /api/v1/register endpoint entirely - Session creation (POST /api/v1/session) now sets neoirc_auth HttpOnly cookie instead of returning token in JSON body - Login (POST /api/v1/login) now sets neoirc_auth HttpOnly cookie instead of returning token in JSON body - Add PASS IRC command for setting session password (enables multi-client login via POST /api/v1/login) - All per-request auth reads from neoirc_auth cookie instead of Authorization: Bearer header - Cookie properties: HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure when behind TLS - Logout and QUIT clear the auth cookie - Update CORS to AllowCredentials:true with origin reflection - Remove Authorization from CORS AllowedHeaders - Update CLI client to use cookie jar (net/http/cookiejar) - Remove Token field from SessionResponse - Add SetPassword to DB layer, remove RegisterUser - Comprehensive test updates for cookie-based auth - Add tests: TestPassCommand, TestPassCommandShortPassword, TestPassCommandEmpty, TestSessionCookie - Update README extensively: auth model, API reference, curl examples, security model, design principles, roadmap closes #83	2026-03-17 20:33:12 -07:00
clawbot	bf4d63bc4d	feat: per-channel hashcash proof-of-work for PRIVMSG anti-spam (#79 ) Some checks failed check / check (push) Failing after 1m48s Details closes #12 ## Summary Implements per-channel hashcash proof-of-work requirement for PRIVMSG as an anti-spam mechanism. Channel operators set a difficulty level via `MODE +H <bits>`, and clients must compute a proof-of-work stamp bound to the channel name and message body before sending. ## Changes ### Database - Added `hashcash_bits` column to `channels` table (default 0 = no requirement) - Added `spent_hashcash` table with `stamp_hash` unique key and `created_at` for TTL pruning - New queries: `GetChannelHashcashBits`, `SetChannelHashcashBits`, `RecordSpentHashcash`, `IsHashcashSpent`, `PruneSpentHashcash` ### Hashcash Validation (`internal/hashcash/channel.go`) - `ChannelValidator` type for per-channel stamp validation - `BodyHash()` computes hex-encoded SHA-256 of message body - `StampHash()` computes deterministic hash of stamp for spent-token key - `MintChannelStamp()` generates valid stamps (for clients) - Stamp format: `1:bits:YYMMDD:channel:bodyhash:counter` - Validates: version, difficulty, date freshness (48h), channel binding, body hash binding, proof-of-work ### Handler Changes (`internal/handlers/api.go`) - `validateChannelHashcash()` + `verifyChannelStamp()` — checks hashcash on PRIVMSG to protected channels - `extractHashcashFromMeta()` — parses hashcash stamp from meta JSON - `applyChannelMode()` / `setHashcashMode()` / `clearHashcashMode()` — MODE +H/-H support - `queryChannelMode()` — shows +nH in mode query when hashcash is set - Meta field now passed through the full dispatch chain (dispatchCommand → handlePrivmsg → handleChannelMsg → sendChannelMsg → fanOut → InsertMessage) - ISUPPORT updated: `CHANMODES=,H,,imnst` (H in type B = parameter when set) ### Replay Prevention - Spent stamps persisted to SQLite `spent_hashcash` table - 1-year TTL (per issue requirements) - Automatic pruning in cleanup loop ### Client Support (`internal/cli/api/hashcash.go`) - `MintChannelHashcash(bits, channel, body)` — computes stamps for channel messages ### Tests - 12 unit tests in `internal/hashcash/channel_test.go`: happy path, wrong channel, wrong body hash, insufficient bits, zero bits skip, bad format, bad version, expired stamp, missing body hash, body hash determinism, stamp hash, mint+validate round-trip - 10 integration tests in `internal/handlers/api_test.go`: set mode, query mode, clear mode, reject no stamp, accept valid stamp, reject replayed stamp, no requirement works, invalid bits range, missing bits arg ### README - Added `+H` to channel modes table - Added "Per-Channel Hashcash (Anti-Spam)" section with full documentation - Updated `meta` field description to mention hashcash ## How It Works 1. Channel operator sets requirement: `MODE #general +H 20` (20 bits) 2. Client mints stamp: computes SHA-256 hashcash bound to `#general` + SHA-256(body) 3. Client sends PRIVMSG with `meta.hashcash` field containing the stamp 4. Server validates stamp, checks spent cache, records as spent, relays message 5. Replayed stamps are rejected for 1 year ## Docker Build `docker build .` passes clean (formatting, linting, all tests). Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org> Reviewed-on: #79 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>	2026-03-18 03:40:33 +01:00
clawbot	efbd8fe9ff	docs: update README schema section to match sessions/clients tables (#76 ) All checks were successful check / check (push) Successful in 5s Details Updates the README Schema section and all related references throughout the document to accurately reflect the current database schema in `001_initial.sql`. ## Changes Schema section: - Renamed `users` table → `sessions` with new columns: `uuid`, `password_hash`, `signing_key`, `away_message` - Added new `clients` table (multi-client support: `uuid`, `session_id` FK, `token`, `created_at`, `last_seen`) - Added `topic_set_by` and `topic_set_at` columns to `channels` table - Updated `channel_members` FK from `user_id` → `session_id` - Added `params` column to `messages` table - Updated `client_queues` FK from `user_id` → `client_id` - Added cascade delete annotations to FK descriptions - Added index documentation for `sessions` and `clients` tables References throughout README: - Updated Queue Architecture diagram labels (`user_id=N` → `client_id=N`) - Updated `client_queues` description text (`user_id` → `client_id`) - Updated In-Memory Broker description to use `client_id` terminology - Updated Multi-Client Model MVP note to reflect sessions/clients architecture - Updated long-polling implementation detail to reference per-client notification channels closes #37 Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #76 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>	2026-03-18 03:38:36 +01:00
clawbot	e36bd99ef6	security: enforce channel membership check in handleTopic (#75 ) All checks were successful check / check (push) Successful in 1m48s Details ## Summary `handleTopic` in `internal/handlers/api.go` did NOT check that the user was a member of the channel before allowing them to set a topic. Any authenticated user could set the topic on any channel they hadn't joined. ## Changes - `internal/handlers/api.go`: Added `IsChannelMember` check after resolving the channel ID and before calling `executeTopic`, mirroring the existing pattern in `handleChannelMsg`. Non-members now receive `ERR_NOTONCHANNEL` (442). - `internal/handlers/api_test.go`: Added `TestTopicNonMember` — creates a channel with one user, then verifies a second user who hasn't joined receives numeric 442 when attempting to set the topic. ## Testing - All existing tests pass - New `TestTopicNonMember` test validates the fix - `docker build .` passes clean (formatting, linting, tests, build) closes #33 Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #75 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>	2026-03-17 12:47:00 +01:00
clawbot	e9d794764b	docs: document register/login and dual authentication model (#77 ) All checks were successful check / check (push) Successful in 1m46s Details closes #36 The README claimed "no accounts" and "no passwords" but the codebase has `POST /api/v1/register` and `POST /api/v1/login` endpoints with bcrypt password hashing. This PR updates the README to accurately describe the dual authentication model. ## Changes ### Identity & Sessions section - Renamed from "No Accounts" to "Dual Authentication Model" - Documented anonymous sessions (`POST /api/v1/session`) as the instant-access path - Documented optional account registration (`POST /api/v1/register`) with password requirements - Documented login (`POST /api/v1/login`) for returning to registered accounts - Updated rationale to explain why both paths exist ### API Reference - Added `POST /api/v1/register` endpoint documentation: request/response format, field constraints (min 8 char password), error codes, curl example - Added `POST /api/v1/login` endpoint documentation: request/response format, channel state initialization behavior, error codes, curl example ### Security Model → Authentication - Added password hashing details (bcrypt at default cost) - Documented that anonymous sessions have empty `password_hash` and cannot use `/login` - Distinguished between anonymous and registered auth paths ### Design Principles - Changed principle #2 from "No accounts" to "Accounts optional" with updated description ### Schema section - Updated from outdated `users` table to actual `sessions` table (with `password_hash`, `signing_key`, `away_message`, `uuid` columns) - Added `clients` table documentation (session_id FK, token, uuid) ### Session Lifecycle - Added "Registered Account" flow diagram showing register → use → login-from-new-device ### Multi-Client Model - Updated MVP note to document that `POST /api/v1/login` is the working multi-client mechanism ### Client Development Guide - Added register and login curl examples alongside anonymous session creation - Updated error handling and reconnection guidance for registered accounts ### Data Lifecycle - Documented that registered sessions persist across logouts (unlike anonymous) - Added client lifecycle documentation ### Other - Fixed token storage description (SHA-256 hash, not raw) - Updated "What didn't change" section to reflect optional accounts Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #77 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>	2026-03-17 12:44:48 +01:00
clawbot	052674b4ee	feat: add runtime statistics to healthcheck endpoint (#80 ) Some checks failed check / check (push) Has been cancelled Details ## Summary Expands the `/.well-known/healthcheck.json` endpoint with runtime statistics, giving operators visibility into server load and usage patterns. closes #74 ## New healthcheck fields \| Field \| Source \| Description \| \|-------\|--------\|-------------\| \| `sessions` \| DB \| Current active session count \| \| `clients` \| DB \| Current connected client count \| \| `queuedLines` \| DB \| Total entries in client output queues \| \| `channels` \| DB \| Current channel count \| \| `connectionsSinceBoot` \| Memory \| Total client connections since server start \| \| `sessionsSinceBoot` \| Memory \| Total sessions created since server start \| \| `messagesSinceBoot` \| Memory \| Total PRIVMSG/NOTICE messages since server start \| ## Implementation - New `internal/stats` package — atomic counters for boot-scoped metrics (`connectionsSinceBoot`, `sessionsSinceBoot`, `messagesSinceBoot`). Thread-safe via `sync/atomic`. - New DB queries — `GetClientCount()` and `GetQueueEntryCount()` for current snapshot counts. - Healthcheck changes — `Healthcheck()` now accepts `context.Context` to query the database. Response struct extended with all 7 new fields. DB-derived stats populated with graceful error handling (logged, not fatal). - Counter instrumentation — Increments added at: - `handleCreateSession` → `IncrSessions` + `IncrConnections` - `handleRegister` → `IncrSessions` + `IncrConnections` - `handleLogin` → `IncrConnections` (new client for existing session) - `handlePrivmsg` → `IncrMessages` (covers both PRIVMSG and NOTICE) - Wired via fx — `stats.Tracker` provided through Uber fx DI in both production and test setups. ## Tests - `internal/stats/stats_test.go` — 5 tests covering all counter operations (100% coverage) - `TestHealthcheckRuntimeStatsFields` — verifies all 7 new fields are present in the response - `TestHealthcheckRuntimeStatsValues` — end-to-end: creates a session, joins a channel, sends a message, then verifies counts are nonzero ## README Updated healthcheck documentation with full response shape, field descriptions, and project structure listing for `internal/stats/`. Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #80 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>	2026-03-17 12:43:39 +01:00