5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot
d0e925bf70 docs: add reverse proxy security note to login rate limiting section
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2026-03-17 04:49:49 -07:00
user
e519ffa1e6 feat: add per-IP rate limiting to login endpoint
Add a token-bucket rate limiter (golang.org/x/time/rate) that limits
login attempts per client IP on POST /api/v1/login. Returns 429 Too
Many Requests with a Retry-After header when the limit is exceeded.

Configurable via LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT (requests/sec, default 1) and
LOGIN_RATE_BURST (burst size, default 5). Stale per-IP entries are
automatically cleaned up every 10 minutes.

Only the login endpoint is rate-limited per sneak's instruction —
session creation and registration use hashcash proof-of-work instead.
2026-03-17 04:48:46 -07:00
e36bd99ef6 security: enforce channel membership check in handleTopic (#75)
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## Summary

`handleTopic` in `internal/handlers/api.go` did NOT check that the user was a member of the channel before allowing them to set a topic. Any authenticated user could set the topic on any channel they hadn't joined.

## Changes

- **`internal/handlers/api.go`**: Added `IsChannelMember` check after resolving the channel ID and before calling `executeTopic`, mirroring the existing pattern in `handleChannelMsg`. Non-members now receive `ERR_NOTONCHANNEL` (442).
- **`internal/handlers/api_test.go`**: Added `TestTopicNonMember` — creates a channel with one user, then verifies a second user who hasn't joined receives numeric 442 when attempting to set the topic.

## Testing

- All existing tests pass
- New `TestTopicNonMember` test validates the fix
- `docker build .` passes clean (formatting, linting, tests, build)

closes #33

Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Reviewed-on: #75
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-17 12:47:00 +01:00
e9d794764b docs: document register/login and dual authentication model (#77)
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closes #36

The README claimed "no accounts" and "no passwords" but the codebase has `POST /api/v1/register` and `POST /api/v1/login` endpoints with bcrypt password hashing. This PR updates the README to accurately describe the dual authentication model.

## Changes

### Identity & Sessions section
- Renamed from "No Accounts" to "Dual Authentication Model"
- Documented anonymous sessions (`POST /api/v1/session`) as the instant-access path
- Documented optional account registration (`POST /api/v1/register`) with password requirements
- Documented login (`POST /api/v1/login`) for returning to registered accounts
- Updated rationale to explain why both paths exist

### API Reference
- Added `POST /api/v1/register` endpoint documentation: request/response format, field constraints (min 8 char password), error codes, curl example
- Added `POST /api/v1/login` endpoint documentation: request/response format, channel state initialization behavior, error codes, curl example

### Security Model → Authentication
- Added password hashing details (bcrypt at default cost)
- Documented that anonymous sessions have empty `password_hash` and cannot use `/login`
- Distinguished between anonymous and registered auth paths

### Design Principles
- Changed principle #2 from "No accounts" to "Accounts optional" with updated description

### Schema section
- Updated from outdated `users` table to actual `sessions` table (with `password_hash`, `signing_key`, `away_message`, `uuid` columns)
- Added `clients` table documentation (session_id FK, token, uuid)

### Session Lifecycle
- Added "Registered Account" flow diagram showing register → use → login-from-new-device

### Multi-Client Model
- Updated MVP note to document that `POST /api/v1/login` is the working multi-client mechanism

### Client Development Guide
- Added register and login curl examples alongside anonymous session creation
- Updated error handling and reconnection guidance for registered accounts

### Data Lifecycle
- Documented that registered sessions persist across logouts (unlike anonymous)
- Added client lifecycle documentation

### Other
- Fixed token storage description (SHA-256 hash, not raw)
- Updated "What didn't change" section to reflect optional accounts

Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #77
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-17 12:44:48 +01:00
052674b4ee feat: add runtime statistics to healthcheck endpoint (#80)
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## Summary

Expands the `/.well-known/healthcheck.json` endpoint with runtime statistics, giving operators visibility into server load and usage patterns.

closes #74

## New healthcheck fields

| Field | Source | Description |
|-------|--------|-------------|
| `sessions` | DB | Current active session count |
| `clients` | DB | Current connected client count |
| `queuedLines` | DB | Total entries in client output queues |
| `channels` | DB | Current channel count |
| `connectionsSinceBoot` | Memory | Total client connections since server start |
| `sessionsSinceBoot` | Memory | Total sessions created since server start |
| `messagesSinceBoot` | Memory | Total PRIVMSG/NOTICE messages since server start |

## Implementation

- **New `internal/stats` package** — atomic counters for boot-scoped metrics (`connectionsSinceBoot`, `sessionsSinceBoot`, `messagesSinceBoot`). Thread-safe via `sync/atomic`.
- **New DB queries** — `GetClientCount()` and `GetQueueEntryCount()` for current snapshot counts.
- **Healthcheck changes** — `Healthcheck()` now accepts `context.Context` to query the database. Response struct extended with all 7 new fields. DB-derived stats populated with graceful error handling (logged, not fatal).
- **Counter instrumentation** — Increments added at:
  - `handleCreateSession` → `IncrSessions` + `IncrConnections`
  - `handleRegister` → `IncrSessions` + `IncrConnections`
  - `handleLogin` → `IncrConnections` (new client for existing session)
  - `handlePrivmsg` → `IncrMessages` (covers both PRIVMSG and NOTICE)
- **Wired via fx** — `stats.Tracker` provided through Uber fx DI in both production and test setups.

## Tests

- `internal/stats/stats_test.go` — 5 tests covering all counter operations (100% coverage)
- `TestHealthcheckRuntimeStatsFields` — verifies all 7 new fields are present in the response
- `TestHealthcheckRuntimeStatsValues` — end-to-end: creates a session, joins a channel, sends a message, then verifies counts are nonzero

## README

Updated healthcheck documentation with full response shape, field descriptions, and project structure listing for `internal/stats/`.

Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Reviewed-on: #80
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-17 12:43:39 +01:00
20 changed files with 1241 additions and 1455 deletions

415
README.md
View File

@@ -113,8 +113,9 @@ mechanisms or stuffing data into CTCP.
Everything else is IRC. `PRIVMSG`, `JOIN`, `PART`, `NICK`, `TOPIC`, `MODE`, Everything else is IRC. `PRIVMSG`, `JOIN`, `PART`, `NICK`, `TOPIC`, `MODE`,
`KICK`, `353`, `433` — same commands, same semantics. Channels start with `#`. `KICK`, `353`, `433` — same commands, same semantics. Channels start with `#`.
Joining a nonexistent channel creates it. Channels disappear when empty. Nicks Joining a nonexistent channel creates it. Channels disappear when empty. Nicks
are unique per server. There are no accounts — identity is a key, a nick is a are unique per server. Identity starts with a key a nick is a display name.
display name. Accounts are optional: you can create an anonymous session instantly, or
register with a password for multi-client access to a single session.
### On the resemblance to JSON-RPC ### On the resemblance to JSON-RPC
@@ -148,16 +149,45 @@ not arbitrary choices — each one follows from the project's core thesis that
IRC's command model is correct and only the transport and session management IRC's command model is correct and only the transport and session management
need to change. need to change.
### Identity & Sessions — No Accounts ### Identity & Sessions — Dual Authentication Model
There are no accounts, no registration, no passwords. Identity is a signing The server supports two authentication paths: **anonymous sessions** for
key; a nick is just a display name. The two are decoupled. instant access, and **optional account registration** for multi-client access.
#### Anonymous Sessions (No Account Required)
The simplest entry point. No registration, no passwords.
- **Session creation**: client sends `POST /api/v1/session` with a desired - **Session creation**: client sends `POST /api/v1/session` with a desired
nick → server assigns an **auth token** (64 hex characters of nick → server assigns an **auth token** (64 hex characters of
cryptographically random bytes) and returns the user ID, nick, and token. cryptographically random bytes) and returns the user ID, nick, and token.
- The auth token implicitly identifies the client. Clients present it via - The auth token implicitly identifies the client. Clients present it via
`Authorization: Bearer <token>`. `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
- Anonymous sessions are ephemeral — when the session expires or the user
QUITs, the nick is released and there is no way to reclaim it.
#### Registered Accounts (Optional)
For users who want multi-client access (multiple devices sharing one session):
- **Registration**: client sends `POST /api/v1/register` with a nick and
password (minimum 8 characters) → server creates a session with the
password hashed via bcrypt, and returns the user ID, nick, and auth token.
- **Login**: client sends `POST /api/v1/login` with nick and password →
server verifies the password against the stored bcrypt hash and creates a
new client token for the existing session. This enables multi-client
access: logging in from a new device adds a client to the existing session
rather than creating a new one, so channel memberships and message queues
are shared. Note: login only works while the session still exists — if all
clients have logged out or the user has sent QUIT, the session is deleted
and the registration is lost.
- Registered accounts cannot be logged into via `POST /api/v1/session`
that endpoint is for anonymous sessions only.
- Anonymous sessions (created via `/session`) cannot be logged into via
`/login` because they have no password set.
#### Common Properties (Both Paths)
- Nicks are changeable via the `NICK` command; the server-assigned user ID is - Nicks are changeable via the `NICK` command; the server-assigned user ID is
the stable identity. the stable identity.
- Server-assigned IDs — clients do not choose their own IDs. - Server-assigned IDs — clients do not choose their own IDs.
@@ -165,11 +195,17 @@ key; a nick is just a display name. The two are decoupled.
in the token, no client-side decode. The server is the sole authority on in the token, no client-side decode. The server is the sole authority on
token validity. token validity.
**Rationale:** IRC has no accounts. You connect, pick a nick, and talk. Adding **Rationale:** IRC has no accounts. You connect, pick a nick, and talk.
registration, email verification, or OAuth would solve a problem nobody asked Anonymous sessions preserve that simplicity — instant access, zero friction.
about and add complexity that drives away casual users. Identity verification But some users want to access the same session from multiple devices without
is handled at the message layer via cryptographic signatures (see a bouncer. Optional registration with password enables multi-client login
[Security Model](#security-model)), not at the session layer. without adding friction for casual users: if you don't want an account,
don't create one. Note: in the current implementation, both anonymous and
registered sessions are deleted when the last client disconnects (QUIT or
logout); registration does not make a session survive all-client
removal. Identity verification at the message layer via cryptographic
signatures (see [Security Model](#security-model)) remains independent
of account registration.
### Nick Semantics ### Nick Semantics
@@ -207,12 +243,12 @@ User Session
└── Client C (token_c, queue_c) └── Client C (token_c, queue_c)
``` ```
**Current MVP note:** The current implementation creates a new user (with new **Multi-client via login:** The `POST /api/v1/login` endpoint adds a new
nick) per `POST /api/v1/session` call. True multi-client (multiple tokens client to an existing registered session, enabling true multi-client support
sharing one nick/session) is supported by the schema (`client_queues` is keyed (multiple tokens sharing one nick/session with independent message queues).
by user_id, and multiple tokens can point to the same user) but the session Anonymous sessions created via `POST /api/v1/session` always create a new
creation endpoint does not yet support "add a client to an existing session." user with a new nick. A future endpoint to "add a client to an existing
This will be added post-MVP. anonymous session" is planned but not yet implemented.
**Rationale:** The fundamental IRC mobile problem is that you can't have your **Rationale:** The fundamental IRC mobile problem is that you can't have your
phone and laptop connected simultaneously without a bouncer. Server-side phone and laptop connected simultaneously without a bouncer. Server-side
@@ -327,8 +363,8 @@ needs to revoke a token, change the expiry model, or add/remove claims, JWT
clients may break or behave incorrectly. clients may break or behave incorrectly.
Opaque tokens are simpler: Opaque tokens are simpler:
- Server generates 32 random bytes → hex-encodes → stores hash - Server generates 32 random bytes → hex-encodes → stores SHA-256 hash
- Client presents the token; server looks it up - Client presents the raw token; server hashes and looks it up
- Revocation is a database delete - Revocation is a database delete
- No clock skew issues, no algorithm confusion, no "none" algorithm attacks - No clock skew issues, no algorithm confusion, no "none" algorithm attacks
- Token format can change without breaking clients - Token format can change without breaking clients
@@ -355,6 +391,8 @@ The entire read/write loop for a client is two endpoints. Everything else
### Session Lifecycle ### Session Lifecycle
#### Anonymous Session
``` ```
┌─ Client ──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─ Client ──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │ │ │
@@ -385,6 +423,30 @@ The entire read/write loop for a client is two endpoints. Everything else
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
``` ```
#### Registered Account
```
┌─ Client ──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ 1. POST /api/v1/register │
│ {"nick":"alice", "password":"s3cret!!"} │
│ → {"id":1, "nick":"alice", "token":"a1b2c3..."} │
│ (Session created with bcrypt-hashed password) │
│ │
│ ... use the API normally (JOIN, PRIVMSG, poll, etc.) ... │
│ │
│ (From another device, while session is still active) │
│ │
│ 2. POST /api/v1/login │
│ {"nick":"alice", "password":"s3cret!!"} │
│ → {"id":1, "nick":"alice", "token":"d4e5f6..."} │
│ (New client added to existing session — channels │
│ and message queues are preserved. If all clients │
│ have logged out, session no longer exists.) │
│ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
### Queue Architecture ### Queue Architecture
``` ```
@@ -461,7 +523,7 @@ the same JSON envelope:
| `params` | array of strings | Sometimes | Sometimes | Additional IRC-style positional parameters. Used by commands like `MODE`, `KICK`, and numeric replies like `353` (NAMES). | | `params` | array of strings | Sometimes | Sometimes | Additional IRC-style positional parameters. Used by commands like `MODE`, `KICK`, and numeric replies like `353` (NAMES). |
| `body` | array or object | Usually | Usually | Structured message body. For text messages: array of strings (one per line). For structured data (e.g., `PUBKEY`): JSON object. **Never a raw string.** | | `body` | array or object | Usually | Usually | Structured message body. For text messages: array of strings (one per line). For structured data (e.g., `PUBKEY`): JSON object. **Never a raw string.** |
| `ts` | string (ISO 8601) | Ignored | Always | Server-assigned timestamp in RFC 3339 / ISO 8601 format with nanosecond precision. Example: `"2026-02-10T20:00:00.000000000Z"`. Always UTC. | | `ts` | string (ISO 8601) | Ignored | Always | Server-assigned timestamp in RFC 3339 / ISO 8601 format with nanosecond precision. Example: `"2026-02-10T20:00:00.000000000Z"`. Always UTC. |
| `meta` | object | Optional | If present | Extensible metadata. Used for cryptographic signatures (`meta.sig`, `meta.alg`), hashcash proof-of-work (`meta.hashcash`), content hashes, or any client-defined key/value pairs. Server relays `meta` verbatim except for `hashcash` which is validated on channels with `+H` mode. | | `meta` | object | Optional | If present | Extensible metadata. Used for cryptographic signatures (`meta.sig`, `meta.alg`), content hashes, or any client-defined key/value pairs. Server relays `meta` verbatim — it does not interpret or validate it. |
**Important invariants:** **Important invariants:**
@@ -951,13 +1013,12 @@ carries IRC-style parameters (e.g., channel name, target nick).
Inspired by IRC, simplified: Inspired by IRC, simplified:
| Mode | Name | Meaning | | Mode | Name | Meaning |
|------|----------------|---------| |------|--------------|---------|
| `+i` | Invite-only | Only invited users can join | | `+i` | Invite-only | Only invited users can join |
| `+m` | Moderated | Only voiced (`+v`) users and operators (`+o`) can send | | `+m` | Moderated | Only voiced (`+v`) users and operators (`+o`) can send |
| `+s` | Secret | Channel hidden from LIST response | | `+s` | Secret | Channel hidden from LIST response |
| `+t` | Topic lock | Only operators can change the topic | | `+t` | Topic lock | Only operators can change the topic |
| `+n` | No external | Only channel members can send messages to the channel | | `+n` | No external | Only channel members can send messages to the channel |
| `+H` | Hashcash | Requires proof-of-work for PRIVMSG (parameter: bits, e.g. `+H 20`) |
**User channel modes (set per-user per-channel):** **User channel modes (set per-user per-channel):**
@@ -968,56 +1029,6 @@ Inspired by IRC, simplified:
**Status:** Channel modes are defined but not yet enforced. The `modes` column **Status:** Channel modes are defined but not yet enforced. The `modes` column
exists in the channels table but the server does not check modes on actions. exists in the channels table but the server does not check modes on actions.
Exception: `+H` (hashcash) is fully enforced — see below.
### Per-Channel Hashcash (Anti-Spam)
Channels can require hashcash proof-of-work for every `PRIVMSG`. This is an
anti-spam mechanism: channel operators set a difficulty level, and clients must
compute a proof-of-work stamp bound to the specific channel and message before
sending.
**Setting the requirement:**
```
MODE #channel +H <bits> — require <bits> leading zero bits (1-40)
MODE #channel -H — disable hashcash requirement
```
**Stamp format:** `1:bits:YYMMDD:channel:bodyhash:counter`
- `bits` — difficulty (leading zero bits in SHA-256 hash of the stamp)
- `YYMMDD` — current date (prevents old token reuse)
- `channel` — channel name (prevents cross-channel reuse)
- `bodyhash` — hex-encoded SHA-256 of the message body (binds stamp to message)
- `counter` — hex nonce
**Sending a message to a hashcash-protected channel:**
Include the hashcash stamp in the `meta` field:
```json
{
"command": "PRIVMSG",
"to": "#general",
"body": ["hello world"],
"meta": {
"hashcash": "1:20:260317:#general:a1b2c3...bodyhash:1f4a"
}
}
```
**Server validation:** The server checks that the stamp is well-formed, meets
the required difficulty, is bound to the correct channel and message body, has a
recent date, and has not been previously used. Spent stamps are cached for 1
year to prevent replay attacks.
**Error responses:** If the channel requires hashcash and the stamp is missing,
invalid, or replayed, the server returns `ERR_CANNOTSENDTOCHAN (404)` with a
descriptive reason.
**Client minting:** The CLI provides `MintChannelHashcash(bits, channel, body)`
to compute stamps. Higher bit counts take exponentially longer to compute.
--- ---
@@ -1085,6 +1096,105 @@ TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/session \
echo $TOKEN echo $TOKEN
``` ```
### POST /api/v1/register — Register Account
Create a new user session with a password. The password is hashed
with bcrypt and stored server-side. The password enables login from
additional clients via `POST /api/v1/login` while the session
remains active.
**Request Body:**
```json
{"nick": "alice", "password": "mypassword"}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Constraints |
|------------|--------|----------|-------------|
| `nick` | string | Yes | 132 characters, must be unique on the server |
| `password` | string | Yes | Minimum 8 characters |
**Response:** `201 Created`
```json
{
"id": 1,
"nick": "alice",
"token": "494ba9fc0f2242873fc5c285dd4a24fc3844ba5e67789a17e69b6fe5f8c132e3"
}
```
| Field | Type | Description |
|---------|---------|-------------|
| `id` | integer | Server-assigned user ID |
| `nick` | string | Confirmed nick |
| `token` | string | 64-character hex auth token |
**Errors:**
| Status | Error | When |
|--------|-------|------|
| 400 | `invalid nick format` | Nick doesn't match allowed format |
| 400 | `password must be at least 8 characters` | Password too short |
| 409 | `nick already taken` | Another active session holds this nick |
**curl example:**
```bash
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/register \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"nick":"alice","password":"mypassword"}' | jq -r .token)
echo $TOKEN
```
### POST /api/v1/login — Login to Account
Authenticate with a previously registered nick and password. Creates a new
client token for the existing session, preserving channel memberships and
message queues. This is how multi-client access works for registered accounts:
each login adds a new client to the session.
On successful login, the server enqueues MOTD messages and synthetic channel
state (JOIN + TOPIC + NAMES for each channel the session belongs to) into the
new client's queue, so the client can immediately restore its UI state.
**Request Body:**
```json
{"nick": "alice", "password": "mypassword"}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Constraints |
|------------|--------|----------|-------------|
| `nick` | string | Yes | Must match a registered account |
| `password` | string | Yes | Must match the account's password |
**Response:** `200 OK`
```json
{
"id": 1,
"nick": "alice",
"token": "7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f"
}
```
| Field | Type | Description |
|---------|---------|-------------|
| `id` | integer | Session ID (same as when registered) |
| `nick` | string | Current nick |
| `token` | string | New 64-character hex auth token for this client |
**Errors:**
| Status | Error | When |
|--------|-------|------|
| 400 | `nick and password required` | Missing nick or password |
| 401 | `invalid credentials` | Wrong password, nick not found, or account has no password |
**curl example:**
```bash
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"nick":"alice","password":"mypassword"}' | jq -r .token)
echo $TOKEN
```
### GET /api/v1/state — Get Session State ### GET /api/v1/state — Get Session State
Return the current user's session state. Return the current user's session state.
@@ -1450,13 +1560,40 @@ Return server metadata. No authentication required.
### GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json — Health Check ### GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json — Health Check
Standard health check endpoint. No authentication required. Standard health check endpoint. No authentication required. Returns server
health status and runtime statistics.
**Response:** `200 OK` **Response:** `200 OK`
```json ```json
{"status": "ok"} {
"status": "ok",
"now": "2024-01-15T12:00:00.000000000Z",
"uptimeSeconds": 3600,
"uptimeHuman": "1h0m0s",
"version": "0.1.0",
"appname": "neoirc",
"maintenanceMode": false,
"sessions": 42,
"clients": 85,
"queuedLines": 128,
"channels": 7,
"connectionsSinceBoot": 200,
"sessionsSinceBoot": 150,
"messagesSinceBoot": 5000
}
``` ```
| Field | Description |
| ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- |
| `sessions` | Current number of active sessions |
| `clients` | Current number of connected clients |
| `queuedLines` | Total entries in client output queues |
| `channels` | Current number of channels |
| `connectionsSinceBoot` | Total client connections since server start |
| `sessionsSinceBoot` | Total sessions created since server start |
| `messagesSinceBoot` | Total PRIVMSG/NOTICE messages sent since server start |
--- ---
## Message Flow ## Message Flow
@@ -1641,9 +1778,16 @@ authenticity.
### Authentication ### Authentication
- **Session auth**: Opaque bearer tokens (64 hex chars = 256 bits of entropy). - **Session auth**: Opaque bearer tokens (64 hex chars = 256 bits of entropy).
Tokens are stored in the database and validated on every request. Tokens are hashed (SHA-256) before storage and validated on every request.
- **No passwords**: Session creation requires only a nick. The token is the - **Anonymous sessions**: `POST /api/v1/session` requires only a nick. No
sole credential. password, instant access. The token is the sole credential.
- **Registered accounts**: `POST /api/v1/register` accepts a nick and password
(minimum 8 characters). The password is hashed with bcrypt at the default
cost factor and stored alongside the session. `POST /api/v1/login`
authenticates against the stored hash and issues a new client token.
- **Password security**: Passwords are never stored in plain text. bcrypt
handles salting and key stretching automatically. Anonymous sessions have
an empty `password_hash` and cannot be logged into via `/login`.
- **Token security**: Tokens should be treated like session cookies. Transmit - **Token security**: Tokens should be treated like session cookies. Transmit
only over HTTPS in production. If a token is compromised, the attacker has only over HTTPS in production. If a token is compromised, the attacker has
full access to the session until QUIT or expiry. full access to the session until QUIT or expiry.
@@ -1791,13 +1935,26 @@ The database schema is managed via embedded SQL migration files in
**Current tables:** **Current tables:**
#### `users` #### `sessions`
| Column | Type | Description |
|----------------|----------|-------------|
| `id` | INTEGER | Primary key (auto-increment) |
| `uuid` | TEXT | Unique session UUID |
| `nick` | TEXT | Unique nick |
| `password_hash`| TEXT | bcrypt hash (empty string for anonymous sessions) |
| `signing_key` | TEXT | Public signing key (empty string if unset) |
| `away_message` | TEXT | Away message (empty string if not away) |
| `created_at` | DATETIME | Session creation time |
| `last_seen` | DATETIME | Last API request time |
#### `clients`
| Column | Type | Description | | Column | Type | Description |
|-------------|----------|-------------| |-------------|----------|-------------|
| `id` | INTEGER | Primary key (auto-increment) | | `id` | INTEGER | Primary key (auto-increment) |
| `nick` | TEXT | Unique nick | | `uuid` | TEXT | Unique client UUID |
| `token` | TEXT | Unique auth token (64 hex chars) | | `session_id`| INTEGER | FK → sessions.id (cascade delete) |
| `created_at`| DATETIME | Session creation time | | `token` | TEXT | Unique auth token (SHA-256 hash of 64 hex chars) |
| `created_at`| DATETIME | Client creation time |
| `last_seen` | DATETIME | Last API request time | | `last_seen` | DATETIME | Last API request time |
#### `channels` #### `channels`
@@ -1854,10 +2011,19 @@ skew issues) and simpler than UUIDs (integer comparison vs. string comparison).
- **Client output queue entries**: Pruned automatically when older than - **Client output queue entries**: Pruned automatically when older than
`QUEUE_MAX_AGE` (default 30 days). `QUEUE_MAX_AGE` (default 30 days).
- **Channels**: Deleted when the last member leaves (ephemeral). - **Channels**: Deleted when the last member leaves (ephemeral).
- **Users/sessions**: Deleted on `QUIT` or `POST /api/v1/logout`. Idle - **Sessions**: Both anonymous and registered sessions are deleted on `QUIT`
sessions are automatically expired after `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` (default or when the last client logs out (`POST /api/v1/logout` with no remaining
30 days) — the server runs a background cleanup loop that parts idle users clients triggers session cleanup). There is no distinction between session
from all channels, broadcasts QUIT, and releases their nicks. types in the cleanup path — `handleQuit` and `cleanupUser` both call
`DeleteSession` unconditionally. Idle sessions are automatically expired
after `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`
(default 30 days) — the server runs a background cleanup loop that parts
idle users from all channels, broadcasts QUIT, and releases their nicks.
- **Clients**: Individual client tokens are deleted on `POST /api/v1/logout`.
A session can have multiple clients; removing one doesn't affect others.
However, when the last client is removed (via logout), the entire session
is deleted — the user is parted from all channels, QUIT is broadcast, and
the nick is released.
--- ---
@@ -1885,6 +2051,8 @@ directory is also loaded automatically via
| `METRICS_USERNAME` | string | `""` | Basic auth username for `/metrics` endpoint. If empty, metrics endpoint is disabled. | | `METRICS_USERNAME` | string | `""` | Basic auth username for `/metrics` endpoint. If empty, metrics endpoint is disabled. |
| `METRICS_PASSWORD` | string | `""` | Basic auth password for `/metrics` endpoint | | `METRICS_PASSWORD` | string | `""` | Basic auth password for `/metrics` endpoint |
| `NEOIRC_HASHCASH_BITS` | int | `20` | Required hashcash proof-of-work difficulty (leading zero bits in SHA-256) for session creation. Set to `0` to disable. | | `NEOIRC_HASHCASH_BITS` | int | `20` | Required hashcash proof-of-work difficulty (leading zero bits in SHA-256) for session creation. Set to `0` to disable. |
| `LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT` | float | `1` | Allowed login attempts per second per IP address. |
| `LOGIN_RATE_BURST` | int | `5` | Maximum burst of login attempts per IP before rate limiting kicks in. |
| `MAINTENANCE_MODE` | bool | `false` | Maintenance mode flag (reserved) | | `MAINTENANCE_MODE` | bool | `false` | Maintenance mode flag (reserved) |
### Example `.env` file ### Example `.env` file
@@ -2006,11 +2174,21 @@ A complete client needs only four HTTP calls:
### Step-by-Step with curl ### Step-by-Step with curl
```bash ```bash
# 1. Create a session # 1a. Create an anonymous session (no account)
export TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/session \ export TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/session \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"nick":"testuser"}' | jq -r .token) -d '{"nick":"testuser"}' | jq -r .token)
# 1b. Or register an account (multi-client support)
export TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/register \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"nick":"testuser","password":"mypassword"}' | jq -r .token)
# 1c. Or login to an existing account
export TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"nick":"testuser","password":"mypassword"}' | jq -r .token)
# 2. Join a channel # 2. Join a channel
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
@@ -2143,9 +2321,11 @@ Clients should handle these message commands from the queue:
### Error Handling ### Error Handling
- **HTTP 401**: Token expired or invalid. Re-create session. - **HTTP 401**: Token expired or invalid. Re-create session (anonymous) or
re-login (registered account).
- **HTTP 404**: Channel or user not found. - **HTTP 404**: Channel or user not found.
- **HTTP 409**: Nick already taken (on session creation or NICK change). - **HTTP 409**: Nick already taken (on session creation, registration, or
NICK change).
- **HTTP 400**: Malformed request. Check the `error` field in the response. - **HTTP 400**: Malformed request. Check the `error` field in the response.
- **Network errors**: Back off exponentially (1s, 2s, 4s, ..., max 30s). - **Network errors**: Back off exponentially (1s, 2s, 4s, ..., max 30s).
@@ -2162,8 +2342,10 @@ Clients should handle these message commands from the queue:
4. **DM tab logic**: When you receive a PRIVMSG where `to` is not a channel 4. **DM tab logic**: When you receive a PRIVMSG where `to` is not a channel
(no `#` prefix), the DM tab should be keyed by the **other** user's nick: (no `#` prefix), the DM tab should be keyed by the **other** user's nick:
if `from` is you, use `to`; if `from` is someone else, use `from`. if `from` is you, use `to`; if `from` is someone else, use `from`.
5. **Reconnection**: If the poll loop fails with 401, the session is gone. 5. **Reconnection**: If the poll loop fails with 401, the token is invalid.
Create a new session. If it fails with a network error, retry with backoff. For anonymous sessions, create a new session. For registered accounts,
log in again via `POST /api/v1/login` to get a fresh token on the same
session. If it fails with a network error, retry with backoff.
--- ---
@@ -2275,6 +2457,49 @@ creating one session pays once and keeps their session.
- **Language-agnostic**: SHA-256 is available in every programming language. - **Language-agnostic**: SHA-256 is available in every programming language.
The proof computation is trivially implementable in any client. The proof computation is trivially implementable in any client.
### Login Rate Limiting
The login endpoint (`POST /api/v1/login`) has per-IP rate limiting to prevent
brute-force password attacks. This uses a token-bucket algorithm
(`golang.org/x/time/rate`) with configurable rate and burst.
| Environment Variable | Default | Description |
|---------------------|---------|-------------|
| `LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT` | `1` | Allowed login attempts per second per IP |
| `LOGIN_RATE_BURST` | `5` | Maximum burst of login attempts per IP |
When the limit is exceeded, the server returns **429 Too Many Requests** with a
`Retry-After: 1` header. Stale per-IP entries are automatically cleaned up
every 10 minutes.
> **⚠️ Security: Reverse Proxy Required for Production Use**
>
> The rate limiter extracts the client IP by checking the `X-Forwarded-For`
> header first, then `X-Real-IP`, and finally falling back to the TCP
> `RemoteAddr`. Both `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` are **client-controlled
> request headers** — any client can set them to arbitrary values.
>
> Without a properly configured reverse proxy in front of this server:
>
> - An attacker can **bypass rate limiting entirely** by rotating
> `X-Forwarded-For` values on each request (each value is treated as a
> distinct IP).
> - An attacker can **deny service to a specific user** by spoofing that user's
> IP in the `X-Forwarded-For` header, exhausting their rate limit bucket.
>
> **Recommendation:** Always deploy behind a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx, Caddy,
> Traefik) that strips or overwrites incoming `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP`
> headers with the actual client IP. If running without a reverse proxy, be
> aware that the rate limiting provides no meaningful protection against a
> targeted attack.
**Why rate limits here but not on session creation?** Session creation is
protected by hashcash proof-of-work (stateless, no IP tracking needed). Login
involves bcrypt password verification against a registered account — a
fundamentally different threat model where an attacker targets a specific
account. Per-IP rate limiting is appropriate here because the cost of a wrong
guess is borne by the server (bcrypt), not the client.
--- ---
## Roadmap ## Roadmap
@@ -2383,6 +2608,8 @@ neoirc/
│ │ └── healthcheck.go # Health check handler │ │ └── healthcheck.go # Health check handler
│ ├── healthcheck/ # Health check logic │ ├── healthcheck/ # Health check logic
│ │ └── healthcheck.go │ │ └── healthcheck.go
│ ├── stats/ # Runtime statistics (atomic counters)
│ │ └── stats.go
│ ├── logger/ # slog-based logging │ ├── logger/ # slog-based logging
│ │ └── logger.go │ │ └── logger.go
│ ├── middleware/ # HTTP middleware (logging, CORS, metrics, auth) │ ├── middleware/ # HTTP middleware (logging, CORS, metrics, auth)
@@ -2434,9 +2661,13 @@ neoirc/
build a working IRC-style TUI client against this API in an afternoon, the build a working IRC-style TUI client against this API in an afternoon, the
API is too complex. API is too complex.
2. **No accounts** — identity is a signing key, nick is a display name. No 2. **Accounts optional** — anonymous sessions are instant: pick a nick and
registration, no passwords, no email verification. Session creation is talk. No registration, no email verification. The cost of entry is a
instant. The cost of entry is a hashcash proof, not bureaucracy. hashcash proof, not bureaucracy. For users who want multi-client access
(multiple devices sharing one session), optional account registration
with password is available — but never required. Identity
verification at the message layer uses cryptographic signing,
independent of account status.
3. **IRC semantics over HTTP** — command names and numeric codes from 3. **IRC semantics over HTTP** — command names and numeric codes from
RFC 1459/2812. If you've built an IRC client or bot, you already know the RFC 1459/2812. If you've built an IRC client or bot, you already know the

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/logger" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/logger"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/middleware" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/middleware"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/server" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/server"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/stats"
"go.uber.org/fx" "go.uber.org/fx"
) )
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ func main() {
server.New, server.New,
middleware.New, middleware.New,
healthcheck.New, healthcheck.New,
stats.New,
), ),
fx.Invoke(func(*server.Server) {}), fx.Invoke(func(*server.Server) {}),
).Run() ).Run()

1
go.mod
View File

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ require (
github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0 github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0
go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0 go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.48.0 golang.org/x/crypto v0.48.0
golang.org/x/time v0.6.0
modernc.org/sqlite v1.45.0 modernc.org/sqlite v1.45.0
) )

2
go.sum
View File

@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ golang.org/x/text v0.7.0/go.mod h1:mrYo+phRRbMaCq/xk9113O4dZlRixOauAjOtrjsXDZ8=
golang.org/x/text v0.14.0/go.mod h1:18ZOQIKpY8NJVqYksKHtTdi31H5itFRjB5/qKTNYzSU= golang.org/x/text v0.14.0/go.mod h1:18ZOQIKpY8NJVqYksKHtTdi31H5itFRjB5/qKTNYzSU=
golang.org/x/text v0.34.0 h1:oL/Qq0Kdaqxa1KbNeMKwQq0reLCCaFtqu2eNuSeNHbk= golang.org/x/text v0.34.0 h1:oL/Qq0Kdaqxa1KbNeMKwQq0reLCCaFtqu2eNuSeNHbk=
golang.org/x/text v0.34.0/go.mod h1:homfLqTYRFyVYemLBFl5GgL/DWEiH5wcsQ5gSh1yziA= golang.org/x/text v0.34.0/go.mod h1:homfLqTYRFyVYemLBFl5GgL/DWEiH5wcsQ5gSh1yziA=
golang.org/x/time v0.6.0 h1:eTDhh4ZXt5Qf0augr54TN6suAUudPcawVZeIAPU7D4U=
golang.org/x/time v0.6.0/go.mod h1:3BpzKBy/shNhVucY/MWOyx10tF3SFh9QdLuxbVysPQM=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20180917221912-90fa682c2a6e/go.mod h1:n7NCudcB/nEzxVGmLbDWY5pfWTLqBcC2KZ6jyYvM4mQ= golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20180917221912-90fa682c2a6e/go.mod h1:n7NCudcB/nEzxVGmLbDWY5pfWTLqBcC2KZ6jyYvM4mQ=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20191119224855-298f0cb1881e/go.mod h1:b+2E5dAYhXwXZwtnZ6UAqBI28+e2cm9otk0dWdXHAEo= golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20191119224855-298f0cb1881e/go.mod h1:b+2E5dAYhXwXZwtnZ6UAqBI28+e2cm9otk0dWdXHAEo=
golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12/go.mod h1:hNGJHUnrk76NpqgfD5Aqm5Crs+Hm0VOH/i9J2+nxYbc= golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12/go.mod h1:hNGJHUnrk76NpqgfD5Aqm5Crs+Hm0VOH/i9J2+nxYbc=

View File

@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ import (
"fmt" "fmt"
"math/big" "math/big"
"time" "time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/hashcash"
) )
const ( const (
@@ -39,23 +37,6 @@ func MintHashcash(bits int, resource string) string {
} }
} }
// MintChannelHashcash computes a hashcash stamp bound to
// a specific channel and message body. The stamp format
// is 1:bits:YYMMDD:channel:bodyhash:counter where
// bodyhash is the hex-encoded SHA-256 of the message
// body bytes. Delegates to the internal/hashcash package.
func MintChannelHashcash(
bits int,
channel string,
body []byte,
) string {
bodyHash := hashcash.BodyHash(body)
return hashcash.MintChannelStamp(
bits, channel, bodyHash,
)
}
// hasLeadingZeroBits checks if hash has at least numBits // hasLeadingZeroBits checks if hash has at least numBits
// leading zero bits. // leading zero bits.
func hasLeadingZeroBits( func hasLeadingZeroBits(

View File

@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ type Config struct {
FederationKey string FederationKey string
SessionIdleTimeout string SessionIdleTimeout string
HashcashBits int HashcashBits int
LoginRateLimit float64
LoginRateBurst int
params *Params params *Params
log *slog.Logger log *slog.Logger
} }
@@ -78,6 +80,8 @@ func New(
viper.SetDefault("FEDERATION_KEY", "") viper.SetDefault("FEDERATION_KEY", "")
viper.SetDefault("SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT", "720h") viper.SetDefault("SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT", "720h")
viper.SetDefault("NEOIRC_HASHCASH_BITS", "20") viper.SetDefault("NEOIRC_HASHCASH_BITS", "20")
viper.SetDefault("LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT", "1")
viper.SetDefault("LOGIN_RATE_BURST", "5")
err := viper.ReadInConfig() err := viper.ReadInConfig()
if err != nil { if err != nil {
@@ -104,6 +108,8 @@ func New(
FederationKey: viper.GetString("FEDERATION_KEY"), FederationKey: viper.GetString("FEDERATION_KEY"),
SessionIdleTimeout: viper.GetString("SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT"), SessionIdleTimeout: viper.GetString("SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT"),
HashcashBits: viper.GetInt("NEOIRC_HASHCASH_BITS"), HashcashBits: viper.GetInt("NEOIRC_HASHCASH_BITS"),
LoginRateLimit: viper.GetFloat64("LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT"),
LoginRateBurst: viper.GetInt("LOGIN_RATE_BURST"),
log: log, log: log,
params: &params, params: &params,
} }

View File

@@ -1267,109 +1267,41 @@ func (database *Database) PruneOldMessages(
return deleted, nil return deleted, nil
} }
// GetChannelHashcashBits returns the hashcash difficulty // GetClientCount returns the total number of clients.
// requirement for a channel. Returns 0 if not set. func (database *Database) GetClientCount(
func (database *Database) GetChannelHashcashBits(
ctx context.Context, ctx context.Context,
channelID int64, ) (int64, error) {
) (int, error) { var count int64
var bits int
err := database.conn.QueryRowContext( err := database.conn.QueryRowContext(
ctx, ctx,
"SELECT hashcash_bits FROM channels WHERE id = ?", "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM clients",
channelID,
).Scan(&bits)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"get channel hashcash bits: %w", err,
)
}
return bits, nil
}
// SetChannelHashcashBits sets the hashcash difficulty
// requirement for a channel. A value of 0 disables the
// requirement.
func (database *Database) SetChannelHashcashBits(
ctx context.Context,
channelID int64,
bits int,
) error {
_, err := database.conn.ExecContext(ctx,
`UPDATE channels
SET hashcash_bits = ?, updated_at = ?
WHERE id = ?`,
bits, time.Now(), channelID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"set channel hashcash bits: %w", err,
)
}
return nil
}
// RecordSpentHashcash stores a spent hashcash stamp hash
// for replay prevention.
func (database *Database) RecordSpentHashcash(
ctx context.Context,
stampHash string,
) error {
_, err := database.conn.ExecContext(ctx,
`INSERT OR IGNORE INTO spent_hashcash
(stamp_hash, created_at)
VALUES (?, ?)`,
stampHash, time.Now())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"record spent hashcash: %w", err,
)
}
return nil
}
// IsHashcashSpent checks whether a hashcash stamp hash
// has already been used.
func (database *Database) IsHashcashSpent(
ctx context.Context,
stampHash string,
) (bool, error) {
var count int
err := database.conn.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM spent_hashcash
WHERE stamp_hash = ?`,
stampHash,
).Scan(&count) ).Scan(&count)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf( return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"check spent hashcash: %w", err, "get client count: %w", err,
) )
} }
return count > 0, nil return count, nil
} }
// PruneSpentHashcash deletes spent hashcash tokens older // GetQueueEntryCount returns the total number of entries
// than the cutoff and returns the number of rows removed. // in the client output queues.
func (database *Database) PruneSpentHashcash( func (database *Database) GetQueueEntryCount(
ctx context.Context, ctx context.Context,
cutoff time.Time,
) (int64, error) { ) (int64, error) {
res, err := database.conn.ExecContext(ctx, var count int64
"DELETE FROM spent_hashcash WHERE created_at < ?",
cutoff, err := database.conn.QueryRowContext(
) ctx,
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM client_queues",
).Scan(&count)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf( return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"prune spent hashcash: %w", err, "get queue entry count: %w", err,
) )
} }
deleted, _ := res.RowsAffected() return count, nil
return deleted, nil
} }

View File

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS channels (
topic TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', topic TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
topic_set_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', topic_set_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
topic_set_at DATETIME, topic_set_at DATETIME,
hashcash_bits INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
updated_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP updated_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
); );
@@ -62,14 +61,6 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS messages (
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_messages_to_id ON messages(msg_to, id); CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_messages_to_id ON messages(msg_to, id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_messages_created ON messages(created_at); CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_messages_created ON messages(created_at);
-- Spent hashcash tokens for replay prevention (1-year TTL)
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS spent_hashcash (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
stamp_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_spent_hashcash_created ON spent_hashcash(created_at);
-- Per-client message queues for fan-out delivery -- Per-client message queues for fan-out delivery
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS client_queues ( CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS client_queues (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package handlers
import ( import (
"context" "context"
"encoding/json" "encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt" "fmt"
"net/http" "net/http"
"regexp" "regexp"
@@ -12,16 +11,10 @@ import (
"time" "time"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/db" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/db"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/hashcash"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/pkg/irc" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/pkg/irc"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5" "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
) )
var (
errHashcashRequired = errors.New("hashcash required")
errHashcashReused = errors.New("hashcash reused")
)
var validNickRe = regexp.MustCompile( var validNickRe = regexp.MustCompile(
`^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_\-\[\]\\^{}|` + "`" + `]{0,31}$`, `^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_\-\[\]\\^{}|` + "`" + `]{0,31}$`,
) )
@@ -95,11 +88,10 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) fanOut(
request *http.Request, request *http.Request,
command, from, target string, command, from, target string,
body json.RawMessage, body json.RawMessage,
meta json.RawMessage,
sessionIDs []int64, sessionIDs []int64,
) (string, error) { ) (string, error) {
dbID, msgUUID, err := hdlr.params.Database.InsertMessage( dbID, msgUUID, err := hdlr.params.Database.InsertMessage(
request.Context(), command, from, target, nil, body, meta, request.Context(), command, from, target, nil, body, nil,
) )
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("insert message: %w", err) return "", fmt.Errorf("insert message: %w", err)
@@ -125,11 +117,10 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) fanOutSilent(
request *http.Request, request *http.Request,
command, from, target string, command, from, target string,
body json.RawMessage, body json.RawMessage,
meta json.RawMessage,
sessionIDs []int64, sessionIDs []int64,
) error { ) error {
_, err := hdlr.fanOut( _, err := hdlr.fanOut(
request, command, from, target, body, meta, sessionIDs, request, command, from, target, body, sessionIDs,
) )
return err return err
@@ -221,6 +212,9 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleCreateSession(
return return
} }
hdlr.stats.IncrSessions()
hdlr.stats.IncrConnections()
hdlr.deliverMOTD(request, clientID, sessionID, payload.Nick) hdlr.deliverMOTD(request, clientID, sessionID, payload.Nick)
hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, map[string]any{ hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, map[string]any{
@@ -300,7 +294,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) deliverWelcome(
[]string{ []string{
"CHANTYPES=#", "CHANTYPES=#",
"NICKLEN=32", "NICKLEN=32",
"CHANMODES=,,H," + "imnst", "CHANMODES=,,," + "imnst",
"NETWORK=neoirc", "NETWORK=neoirc",
"CASEMAPPING=ascii", "CASEMAPPING=ascii",
}, },
@@ -831,7 +825,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) HandleSendCommand() http.HandlerFunc {
writer, request, writer, request,
sessionID, clientID, nick, sessionID, clientID, nick,
payload.Command, payload.To, payload.Command, payload.To,
payload.Body, payload.Meta, bodyLines, payload.Body, bodyLines,
) )
} }
} }
@@ -842,7 +836,6 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) dispatchCommand(
sessionID, clientID int64, sessionID, clientID int64,
nick, command, target string, nick, command, target string,
body json.RawMessage, body json.RawMessage,
meta json.RawMessage,
bodyLines func() []string, bodyLines func() []string,
) { ) {
switch command { switch command {
@@ -855,7 +848,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) dispatchCommand(
hdlr.handlePrivmsg( hdlr.handlePrivmsg(
writer, request, writer, request,
sessionID, clientID, nick, sessionID, clientID, nick,
command, target, body, meta, bodyLines, command, target, body, bodyLines,
) )
case irc.CmdJoin: case irc.CmdJoin:
hdlr.handleJoin( hdlr.handleJoin(
@@ -956,7 +949,6 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handlePrivmsg(
sessionID, clientID int64, sessionID, clientID int64,
nick, command, target string, nick, command, target string,
body json.RawMessage, body json.RawMessage,
meta json.RawMessage,
bodyLines func() []string, bodyLines func() []string,
) { ) {
if target == "" { if target == "" {
@@ -988,11 +980,13 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handlePrivmsg(
return return
} }
hdlr.stats.IncrMessages()
if strings.HasPrefix(target, "#") { if strings.HasPrefix(target, "#") {
hdlr.handleChannelMsg( hdlr.handleChannelMsg(
writer, request, writer, request,
sessionID, clientID, nick, sessionID, clientID, nick,
command, target, body, meta, command, target, body,
) )
return return
@@ -1001,7 +995,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handlePrivmsg(
hdlr.handleDirectMsg( hdlr.handleDirectMsg(
writer, request, writer, request,
sessionID, clientID, nick, sessionID, clientID, nick,
command, target, body, meta, command, target, body,
) )
} }
@@ -1032,7 +1026,6 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleChannelMsg(
sessionID, clientID int64, sessionID, clientID int64,
nick, command, target string, nick, command, target string,
body json.RawMessage, body json.RawMessage,
meta json.RawMessage,
) { ) {
chID, err := hdlr.params.Database.GetChannelByName( chID, err := hdlr.params.Database.GetChannelByName(
request.Context(), target, request.Context(), target,
@@ -1073,180 +1066,16 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleChannelMsg(
return return
} }
hashcashErr := hdlr.validateChannelHashcash(
request, clientID, sessionID,
writer, nick, target, body, meta, chID,
)
if hashcashErr != nil {
return
}
hdlr.sendChannelMsg( hdlr.sendChannelMsg(
writer, request, command, nick, target, writer, request, command, nick, target, body, chID,
body, meta, chID,
) )
} }
// validateChannelHashcash checks whether the channel
// requires hashcash proof-of-work for messages and
// validates the stamp from the message meta field.
// Returns nil on success or if the channel has no
// hashcash requirement. On failure, it sends the
// appropriate IRC error and returns a non-nil error.
func (hdlr *Handlers) validateChannelHashcash(
request *http.Request,
clientID, sessionID int64,
writer http.ResponseWriter,
nick, target string,
body json.RawMessage,
meta json.RawMessage,
chID int64,
) error {
ctx := request.Context()
bits, bitsErr := hdlr.params.Database.GetChannelHashcashBits(
ctx, chID,
)
if bitsErr != nil {
hdlr.log.Error(
"get channel hashcash bits", "error", bitsErr,
)
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"internal error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return fmt.Errorf("channel hashcash bits: %w", bitsErr)
}
if bits <= 0 {
return nil
}
stamp := hdlr.extractHashcashFromMeta(meta)
if stamp == "" {
hdlr.respondIRCError(
writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
irc.ErrCannotSendToChan, nick, []string{target},
"Channel requires hashcash proof-of-work",
)
return errHashcashRequired
}
return hdlr.verifyChannelStamp(
request, writer,
clientID, sessionID,
nick, target, body, stamp, bits,
)
}
// verifyChannelStamp validates a channel hashcash stamp
// and checks for replay attacks.
func (hdlr *Handlers) verifyChannelStamp(
request *http.Request,
writer http.ResponseWriter,
clientID, sessionID int64,
nick, target string,
body json.RawMessage,
stamp string,
bits int,
) error {
ctx := request.Context()
bodyHashStr := hashcash.BodyHash(body)
valErr := hdlr.channelHashcash.ValidateStamp(
stamp, bits, target, bodyHashStr,
)
if valErr != nil {
hdlr.respondIRCError(
writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
irc.ErrCannotSendToChan, nick, []string{target},
"Invalid hashcash: "+valErr.Error(),
)
return fmt.Errorf("channel hashcash: %w", valErr)
}
stampKey := hashcash.StampHash(stamp)
spent, spentErr := hdlr.params.Database.IsHashcashSpent(
ctx, stampKey,
)
if spentErr != nil {
hdlr.log.Error(
"check spent hashcash", "error", spentErr,
)
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"internal error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return fmt.Errorf("check spent hashcash: %w", spentErr)
}
if spent {
hdlr.respondIRCError(
writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
irc.ErrCannotSendToChan, nick, []string{target},
"Hashcash stamp already used",
)
return errHashcashReused
}
recordErr := hdlr.params.Database.RecordSpentHashcash(
ctx, stampKey,
)
if recordErr != nil {
hdlr.log.Error(
"record spent hashcash", "error", recordErr,
)
}
return nil
}
// extractHashcashFromMeta parses the meta JSON and
// returns the hashcash stamp string, or empty string
// if not present.
func (hdlr *Handlers) extractHashcashFromMeta(
meta json.RawMessage,
) string {
if len(meta) == 0 {
return ""
}
var metaMap map[string]json.RawMessage
err := json.Unmarshal(meta, &metaMap)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
raw, ok := metaMap["hashcash"]
if !ok {
return ""
}
var stamp string
err = json.Unmarshal(raw, &stamp)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return stamp
}
func (hdlr *Handlers) sendChannelMsg( func (hdlr *Handlers) sendChannelMsg(
writer http.ResponseWriter, writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request, request *http.Request,
command, nick, target string, command, nick, target string,
body json.RawMessage, body json.RawMessage,
meta json.RawMessage,
chID int64, chID int64,
) { ) {
memberIDs, err := hdlr.params.Database.GetChannelMemberIDs( memberIDs, err := hdlr.params.Database.GetChannelMemberIDs(
@@ -1266,7 +1095,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) sendChannelMsg(
} }
msgUUID, err := hdlr.fanOut( msgUUID, err := hdlr.fanOut(
request, command, nick, target, body, meta, memberIDs, request, command, nick, target, body, memberIDs,
) )
if err != nil { if err != nil {
hdlr.log.Error("send message failed", "error", err) hdlr.log.Error("send message failed", "error", err)
@@ -1290,7 +1119,6 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleDirectMsg(
sessionID, clientID int64, sessionID, clientID int64,
nick, command, target string, nick, command, target string,
body json.RawMessage, body json.RawMessage,
meta json.RawMessage,
) { ) {
targetSID, err := hdlr.params.Database.GetSessionByNick( targetSID, err := hdlr.params.Database.GetSessionByNick(
request.Context(), target, request.Context(), target,
@@ -1315,7 +1143,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleDirectMsg(
} }
msgUUID, err := hdlr.fanOut( msgUUID, err := hdlr.fanOut(
request, command, nick, target, body, meta, recipients, request, command, nick, target, body, recipients,
) )
if err != nil { if err != nil {
hdlr.log.Error("send dm failed", "error", err) hdlr.log.Error("send dm failed", "error", err)
@@ -1426,7 +1254,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) executeJoin(
) )
_ = hdlr.fanOutSilent( _ = hdlr.fanOutSilent(
request, irc.CmdJoin, nick, channel, nil, nil, memberIDs, request, irc.CmdJoin, nick, channel, nil, memberIDs,
) )
hdlr.deliverJoinNumerics( hdlr.deliverJoinNumerics(
@@ -1596,7 +1424,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handlePart(
) )
_ = hdlr.fanOutSilent( _ = hdlr.fanOutSilent(
request, irc.CmdPart, nick, channel, body, nil, memberIDs, request, irc.CmdPart, nick, channel, body, memberIDs,
) )
err = hdlr.params.Database.PartChannel( err = hdlr.params.Database.PartChannel(
@@ -1813,6 +1641,32 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleTopic(
return return
} }
isMember, err := hdlr.params.Database.IsChannelMember(
request.Context(), chID, sessionID,
)
if err != nil {
hdlr.log.Error(
"check membership failed", "error", err,
)
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"internal error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
if !isMember {
hdlr.respondIRCError(
writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
irc.ErrNotOnChannel, nick, []string{channel},
"You're not on that channel",
)
return
}
hdlr.executeTopic( hdlr.executeTopic(
writer, request, writer, request,
sessionID, clientID, nick, sessionID, clientID, nick,
@@ -1850,7 +1704,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) executeTopic(
) )
_ = hdlr.fanOutSilent( _ = hdlr.fanOutSilent(
request, irc.CmdTopic, nick, channel, body, nil, memberIDs, request, irc.CmdTopic, nick, channel, body, memberIDs,
) )
hdlr.enqueueNumeric( hdlr.enqueueNumeric(
@@ -2013,10 +1867,11 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleMode(
return return
} }
_ = bodyLines
hdlr.handleChannelMode( hdlr.handleChannelMode(
writer, request, writer, request,
sessionID, clientID, nick, channel, sessionID, clientID, nick, channel,
bodyLines,
) )
} }
@@ -2025,7 +1880,6 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleChannelMode(
request *http.Request, request *http.Request,
sessionID, clientID int64, sessionID, clientID int64,
nick, channel string, nick, channel string,
bodyLines func() []string,
) { ) {
ctx := request.Context() ctx := request.Context()
@@ -2042,47 +1896,10 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleChannelMode(
return return
} }
lines := bodyLines()
if len(lines) > 0 {
hdlr.applyChannelMode(
writer, request,
sessionID, clientID, nick,
channel, chID, lines,
)
return
}
hdlr.queryChannelMode(
writer, request,
sessionID, clientID, nick, channel, chID,
)
}
// queryChannelMode sends RPL_CHANNELMODEIS and
// RPL_CREATIONTIME for a channel. Includes +H if
// the channel has a hashcash requirement.
func (hdlr *Handlers) queryChannelMode(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
sessionID, clientID int64,
nick, channel string,
chID int64,
) {
ctx := request.Context()
modeStr := "+n"
bits, bitsErr := hdlr.params.Database.
GetChannelHashcashBits(ctx, chID)
if bitsErr == nil && bits > 0 {
modeStr = fmt.Sprintf("+nH %d", bits)
}
// 324 RPL_CHANNELMODEIS // 324 RPL_CHANNELMODEIS
hdlr.enqueueNumeric( hdlr.enqueueNumeric(
ctx, clientID, irc.RplChannelModeIs, nick, ctx, clientID, irc.RplChannelModeIs, nick,
[]string{channel, modeStr}, "", []string{channel, "+n"}, "",
) )
// 329 RPL_CREATIONTIME // 329 RPL_CREATIONTIME
@@ -2107,156 +1924,6 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) queryChannelMode(
http.StatusOK) http.StatusOK)
} }
// applyChannelMode handles setting channel modes.
// Currently supports +H/-H for hashcash bits.
func (hdlr *Handlers) applyChannelMode(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
sessionID, clientID int64,
nick, channel string,
chID int64,
modeArgs []string,
) {
ctx := request.Context()
modeStr := modeArgs[0]
switch modeStr {
case "+H":
hdlr.setHashcashMode(
writer, request,
sessionID, clientID, nick,
channel, chID, modeArgs,
)
case "-H":
hdlr.clearHashcashMode(
writer, request,
sessionID, clientID, nick,
channel, chID,
)
default:
// Unknown or unsupported mode change.
hdlr.enqueueNumeric(
ctx, clientID, irc.ErrUnknownMode, nick,
[]string{modeStr},
"is unknown mode char to me",
)
hdlr.broker.Notify(sessionID)
hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request,
map[string]string{"status": "error"},
http.StatusOK)
}
}
const (
// minHashcashBits is the minimum allowed hashcash
// difficulty for channels.
minHashcashBits = 1
// maxHashcashBits is the maximum allowed hashcash
// difficulty for channels.
maxHashcashBits = 40
)
// setHashcashMode handles MODE #channel +H <bits>.
func (hdlr *Handlers) setHashcashMode(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
sessionID, clientID int64,
nick, channel string,
chID int64,
modeArgs []string,
) {
ctx := request.Context()
if len(modeArgs) < 2 { //nolint:mnd // +H requires a bits arg
hdlr.respondIRCError(
writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
irc.ErrNeedMoreParams, nick, []string{irc.CmdMode},
"Not enough parameters (+H requires bits)",
)
return
}
bits, err := strconv.Atoi(modeArgs[1])
if err != nil || bits < minHashcashBits ||
bits > maxHashcashBits {
hdlr.respondIRCError(
writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
irc.ErrUnknownMode, nick, []string{"+H"},
fmt.Sprintf(
"Invalid hashcash bits (must be %d-%d)",
minHashcashBits, maxHashcashBits,
),
)
return
}
err = hdlr.params.Database.SetChannelHashcashBits(
ctx, chID, bits,
)
if err != nil {
hdlr.log.Error(
"set channel hashcash bits", "error", err,
)
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"internal error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
hdlr.enqueueNumeric(
ctx, clientID, irc.RplChannelModeIs, nick,
[]string{
channel,
fmt.Sprintf("+H %d", bits),
}, "",
)
hdlr.broker.Notify(sessionID)
hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request,
map[string]string{"status": "ok"},
http.StatusOK)
}
// clearHashcashMode handles MODE #channel -H.
func (hdlr *Handlers) clearHashcashMode(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
sessionID, clientID int64,
nick, channel string,
chID int64,
) {
ctx := request.Context()
err := hdlr.params.Database.SetChannelHashcashBits(
ctx, chID, 0,
)
if err != nil {
hdlr.log.Error(
"clear channel hashcash bits", "error", err,
)
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"internal error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
hdlr.enqueueNumeric(
ctx, clientID, irc.RplChannelModeIs, nick,
[]string{channel, "+n"}, "",
)
hdlr.broker.Notify(sessionID)
hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request,
map[string]string{"status": "ok"},
http.StatusOK)
}
// handleNames sends NAMES reply for a channel. // handleNames sends NAMES reply for a channel.
func (hdlr *Handlers) handleNames( func (hdlr *Handlers) handleNames(
writer http.ResponseWriter, writer http.ResponseWriter,

View File

@@ -22,11 +22,11 @@ import (
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/db" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/db"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/globals" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/globals"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/handlers" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/handlers"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/hashcash"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/healthcheck" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/healthcheck"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/logger" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/logger"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/middleware" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/middleware"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/server" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/server"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/stats"
"go.uber.org/fx" "go.uber.org/fx"
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest" "go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
) )
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ func newTestServer(
return cfg, nil return cfg, nil
}, },
newTestDB, newTestDB,
stats.New,
newTestHealthcheck, newTestHealthcheck,
newTestMiddleware, newTestMiddleware,
newTestHandlers, newTestHandlers,
@@ -145,12 +146,14 @@ func newTestHealthcheck(
cfg *config.Config, cfg *config.Config,
log *logger.Logger, log *logger.Logger,
database *db.Database, database *db.Database,
tracker *stats.Tracker,
) (*healthcheck.Healthcheck, error) { ) (*healthcheck.Healthcheck, error) {
hcheck, err := healthcheck.New(lifecycle, healthcheck.Params{ //nolint:exhaustruct hcheck, err := healthcheck.New(lifecycle, healthcheck.Params{ //nolint:exhaustruct
Globals: globs, Globals: globs,
Config: cfg, Config: cfg,
Logger: log, Logger: log,
Database: database, Database: database,
Stats: tracker,
}) })
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("test healthcheck: %w", err) return nil, fmt.Errorf("test healthcheck: %w", err)
@@ -184,6 +187,7 @@ func newTestHandlers(
cfg *config.Config, cfg *config.Config,
database *db.Database, database *db.Database,
hcheck *healthcheck.Healthcheck, hcheck *healthcheck.Healthcheck,
tracker *stats.Tracker,
) (*handlers.Handlers, error) { ) (*handlers.Handlers, error) {
hdlr, err := handlers.New(lifecycle, handlers.Params{ //nolint:exhaustruct hdlr, err := handlers.New(lifecycle, handlers.Params{ //nolint:exhaustruct
Logger: log, Logger: log,
@@ -191,6 +195,7 @@ func newTestHandlers(
Config: cfg, Config: cfg,
Database: database, Database: database,
Healthcheck: hcheck, Healthcheck: hcheck,
Stats: tracker,
}) })
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("test handlers: %w", err) return nil, fmt.Errorf("test handlers: %w", err)
@@ -1135,6 +1140,42 @@ func TestTopicMissingBody(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestTopicNonMember(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
aliceToken := tserver.createSession("alice_topic")
bobToken := tserver.createSession("bob_topic")
// Only alice joins the channel.
tserver.sendCommand(aliceToken, map[string]any{
commandKey: joinCmd, toKey: "#topicpriv",
})
// Drain bob's initial messages.
_, lastID := tserver.pollMessages(bobToken, 0)
// Bob tries to set topic without joining.
status, _ := tserver.sendCommand(
bobToken,
map[string]any{
commandKey: "TOPIC",
toKey: "#topicpriv",
bodyKey: []string{"Hijacked topic"},
},
)
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", status)
}
msgs, _ := tserver.pollMessages(bobToken, lastID)
if !findNumeric(msgs, "442") {
t.Fatalf(
"expected ERR_NOTONCHANNEL (442), got %v",
msgs,
)
}
}
func TestPing(t *testing.T) { func TestPing(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t) tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("ping_user") token := tserver.createSession("ping_user")
@@ -1658,6 +1699,133 @@ func TestHealthcheck(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestHealthcheckRuntimeStatsFields(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
resp, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodGet,
tserver.url("/.well-known/healthcheck.json"),
nil,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf(
"expected 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode,
)
}
var result map[string]any
decErr := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result)
if decErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode healthcheck: %v", decErr)
}
requiredFields := []string{
"sessions", "clients", "queuedLines",
"channels", "connectionsSinceBoot",
"sessionsSinceBoot", "messagesSinceBoot",
}
for _, field := range requiredFields {
if _, ok := result[field]; !ok {
t.Errorf(
"missing field %q in healthcheck", field,
)
}
}
}
func TestHealthcheckRuntimeStatsValues(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("statsuser")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: joinCmd, toKey: "#statschan",
})
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: privmsgCmd,
toKey: "#statschan",
bodyKey: []string{"hello stats"},
})
result := tserver.fetchHealthcheck(t)
assertFieldGTE(t, result, "sessions", 1)
assertFieldGTE(t, result, "clients", 1)
assertFieldGTE(t, result, "channels", 1)
assertFieldGTE(t, result, "queuedLines", 0)
assertFieldGTE(t, result, "sessionsSinceBoot", 1)
assertFieldGTE(t, result, "connectionsSinceBoot", 1)
assertFieldGTE(t, result, "messagesSinceBoot", 1)
}
func (tserver *testServer) fetchHealthcheck(
t *testing.T,
) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
resp, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodGet,
tserver.url("/.well-known/healthcheck.json"),
nil,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf(
"expected 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode,
)
}
var result map[string]any
decErr := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result)
if decErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode healthcheck: %v", decErr)
}
return result
}
func assertFieldGTE(
t *testing.T,
result map[string]any,
field string,
minimum float64,
) {
t.Helper()
val, ok := result[field].(float64)
if !ok {
t.Errorf(
"field %q: not a number (got %T)",
field, result[field],
)
return
}
if val < minimum {
t.Errorf(
"expected %s >= %v, got %v",
field, minimum, val,
)
}
}
func TestRegisterValid(t *testing.T) { func TestRegisterValid(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t) tserver := newTestServer(t)
@@ -1962,6 +2130,121 @@ func TestSessionStillWorks(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestLoginRateLimitExceeded(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
// Exhaust the burst (default: 5 per IP) using
// nonexistent users. These fail fast (no bcrypt),
// preventing token replenishment between requests.
for range 5 {
loginBody, mErr := json.Marshal(
map[string]string{
"nick": "nosuchuser",
"password": "doesnotmatter",
},
)
if mErr != nil {
t.Fatal(mErr)
}
loginResp, rErr := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url("/api/v1/login"),
bytes.NewReader(loginBody),
)
if rErr != nil {
t.Fatal(rErr)
}
_ = loginResp.Body.Close()
}
// The next request should be rate-limited.
loginBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
"nick": "nosuchuser", "password": "doesnotmatter",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url("/api/v1/login"),
bytes.NewReader(loginBody),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Fatalf(
"expected 429, got %d",
resp.StatusCode,
)
}
retryAfter := resp.Header.Get("Retry-After")
if retryAfter == "" {
t.Fatal("expected Retry-After header")
}
}
func TestLoginRateLimitAllowsNormalUse(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
// Register a user.
regBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
"nick": "normaluser", "password": "password123",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url("/api/v1/register"),
bytes.NewReader(regBody),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = resp.Body.Close()
// A single login should succeed without rate limiting.
loginBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
"nick": "normaluser", "password": "password123",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp2, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url("/api/v1/login"),
bytes.NewReader(loginBody),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp2.Body.Close() }()
if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(resp2.Body)
t.Fatalf(
"expected 200, got %d: %s",
resp2.StatusCode, respBody,
)
}
}
func TestNickBroadcastToChannels(t *testing.T) { func TestNickBroadcastToChannels(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t) tserver := newTestServer(t)
aliceToken := tserver.createSession("nick_a") aliceToken := tserver.createSession("nick_a")
@@ -1989,397 +2272,3 @@ func TestNickBroadcastToChannels(t *testing.T) {
) )
} }
} }
// --- Channel Hashcash Tests ---
const (
metaKey = "meta"
modeCmd = "MODE"
hashcashKey = "hashcash"
)
func mintTestChannelHashcash(
tb testing.TB,
bits int,
channel string,
body json.RawMessage,
) string {
tb.Helper()
bodyHash := hashcash.BodyHash(body)
return hashcash.MintChannelStamp(bits, channel, bodyHash)
}
func TestChannelHashcashSetMode(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("hcmode_user")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: joinCmd, toKey: "#hctest",
})
_, lastID := tserver.pollMessages(token, 0)
// Set hashcash bits to 2 via MODE +H.
status, _ := tserver.sendCommand(
token,
map[string]any{
commandKey: modeCmd,
toKey: "#hctest",
bodyKey: []string{"+H", "2"},
},
)
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", status)
}
msgs, _ := tserver.pollMessages(token, lastID)
// Should get RPL_CHANNELMODEIS (324) confirming +H.
if !findNumeric(msgs, "324") {
t.Fatalf(
"expected RPL_CHANNELMODEIS (324), got %v",
msgs,
)
}
}
func TestChannelHashcashQueryMode(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("hcquery_user")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: joinCmd, toKey: "#hcquery",
})
// Set hashcash bits.
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: modeCmd,
toKey: "#hcquery",
bodyKey: []string{"+H", "5"},
})
_, lastID := tserver.pollMessages(token, 0)
// Query mode — should show +nH.
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: modeCmd,
toKey: "#hcquery",
})
msgs, _ := tserver.pollMessages(token, lastID)
found := false
for _, msg := range msgs {
code, ok := msg["code"].(float64)
if ok && int(code) == 324 {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatalf(
"expected RPL_CHANNELMODEIS (324), got %v",
msgs,
)
}
}
func TestChannelHashcashClearMode(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("hcclear_user")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: joinCmd, toKey: "#hcclear",
})
// Set hashcash bits.
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: modeCmd,
toKey: "#hcclear",
bodyKey: []string{"+H", "5"},
})
// Clear hashcash bits.
status, _ := tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: modeCmd,
toKey: "#hcclear",
bodyKey: []string{"-H"},
})
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", status)
}
// Now message should succeed without hashcash.
status, result := tserver.sendCommand(
token,
map[string]any{
commandKey: privmsgCmd,
toKey: "#hcclear",
bodyKey: []string{"test message"},
},
)
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf(
"expected 200, got %d: %v", status, result,
)
}
}
func TestChannelHashcashRejectNoStamp(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("hcreject_user")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: joinCmd, toKey: "#hcreject",
})
// Set hashcash requirement.
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: modeCmd,
toKey: "#hcreject",
bodyKey: []string{"+H", "2"},
})
_, lastID := tserver.pollMessages(token, 0)
// Send message without hashcash — should fail.
status, _ := tserver.sendCommand(
token,
map[string]any{
commandKey: privmsgCmd,
toKey: "#hcreject",
bodyKey: []string{"spam message"},
},
)
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", status)
}
msgs, _ := tserver.pollMessages(token, lastID)
// Should get ERR_CANNOTSENDTOCHAN (404).
if !findNumeric(msgs, "404") {
t.Fatalf(
"expected ERR_CANNOTSENDTOCHAN (404), got %v",
msgs,
)
}
}
func TestChannelHashcashAcceptValidStamp(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("hcaccept_user")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: joinCmd, toKey: "#hcaccept",
})
// Set hashcash requirement (2 bits = fast to mint).
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: modeCmd,
toKey: "#hcaccept",
bodyKey: []string{"+H", "2"},
})
_, lastID := tserver.pollMessages(token, 0)
// Mint a valid hashcash stamp.
msgBody, marshalErr := json.Marshal(
[]string{"hello world"},
)
if marshalErr != nil {
t.Fatal(marshalErr)
}
stamp := mintTestChannelHashcash(
t, 2, "#hcaccept", msgBody,
)
// Send message with valid hashcash.
status, result := tserver.sendCommand(
token,
map[string]any{
commandKey: privmsgCmd,
toKey: "#hcaccept",
bodyKey: []string{"hello world"},
metaKey: map[string]any{
hashcashKey: stamp,
},
},
)
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf(
"expected 200, got %d: %v", status, result,
)
}
if result["id"] == nil || result["id"] == "" {
t.Fatal("expected message id for valid hashcash")
}
// Verify the message was delivered.
msgs, _ := tserver.pollMessages(token, lastID)
if !findMessage(msgs, privmsgCmd, "hcaccept_user") {
t.Fatalf(
"message not received: %v", msgs,
)
}
}
func TestChannelHashcashRejectReplayedStamp(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("hcreplay_user")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: joinCmd, toKey: "#hcreplay",
})
// Set hashcash requirement.
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: modeCmd,
toKey: "#hcreplay",
bodyKey: []string{"+H", "2"},
})
_, _ = tserver.pollMessages(token, 0)
// Mint and send once — should succeed.
msgBody, marshalErr := json.Marshal(
[]string{"unique msg"},
)
if marshalErr != nil {
t.Fatal(marshalErr)
}
stamp := mintTestChannelHashcash(
t, 2, "#hcreplay", msgBody,
)
status, _ := tserver.sendCommand(
token,
map[string]any{
commandKey: privmsgCmd,
toKey: "#hcreplay",
bodyKey: []string{"unique msg"},
metaKey: map[string]any{
hashcashKey: stamp,
},
},
)
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", status)
}
_, lastID := tserver.pollMessages(token, 0)
// Replay the same stamp — should fail.
status, _ = tserver.sendCommand(
token,
map[string]any{
commandKey: privmsgCmd,
toKey: "#hcreplay",
bodyKey: []string{"unique msg"},
metaKey: map[string]any{
hashcashKey: stamp,
},
},
)
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", status)
}
msgs, _ := tserver.pollMessages(token, lastID)
// Should get ERR_CANNOTSENDTOCHAN (404).
if !findNumeric(msgs, "404") {
t.Fatalf(
"expected replay rejection (404), got %v",
msgs,
)
}
}
func TestChannelHashcashNoRequirementWorks(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("hcnone_user")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: joinCmd, toKey: "#nohashcash",
})
// No hashcash set — message should work.
status, result := tserver.sendCommand(
token,
map[string]any{
commandKey: privmsgCmd,
toKey: "#nohashcash",
bodyKey: []string{"free message"},
},
)
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf(
"expected 200, got %d: %v", status, result,
)
}
if result["id"] == nil || result["id"] == "" {
t.Fatal("expected message id")
}
}
func TestChannelHashcashInvalidBitsRange(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("hcbits_user")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: joinCmd, toKey: "#hcbits",
})
_, lastID := tserver.pollMessages(token, 0)
// Try to set bits to 0 — should fail.
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: modeCmd,
toKey: "#hcbits",
bodyKey: []string{"+H", "0"},
})
msgs, _ := tserver.pollMessages(token, lastID)
if !findNumeric(msgs, "472") {
t.Fatalf(
"expected ERR_UNKNOWNMODE (472), got %v",
msgs,
)
}
}
func TestChannelHashcashMissingBitsArg(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("hcnoarg_user")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: joinCmd, toKey: "#hcnoarg",
})
_, lastID := tserver.pollMessages(token, 0)
// Try to set +H without bits argument.
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: modeCmd,
toKey: "#hcnoarg",
bodyKey: []string{"+H"},
})
msgs, _ := tserver.pollMessages(token, lastID)
if !findNumeric(msgs, "461") {
t.Fatalf(
"expected ERR_NEEDMOREPARAMS (461), got %v",
msgs,
)
}
}

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package handlers
import ( import (
"encoding/json" "encoding/json"
"net"
"net/http" "net/http"
"strings" "strings"
@@ -10,6 +11,33 @@ import (
const minPasswordLength = 8 const minPasswordLength = 8
// clientIP extracts the client IP address from the request.
// It checks X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP headers before
// falling back to RemoteAddr.
func clientIP(request *http.Request) string {
if forwarded := request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); forwarded != "" {
// X-Forwarded-For may contain a comma-separated list;
// the first entry is the original client.
parts := strings.SplitN(forwarded, ",", 2) //nolint:mnd // split into two parts
ip := strings.TrimSpace(parts[0])
if ip != "" {
return ip
}
}
if realIP := request.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); realIP != "" {
return strings.TrimSpace(realIP)
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(request.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return request.RemoteAddr
}
return host
}
// HandleRegister creates a new user with a password. // HandleRegister creates a new user with a password.
func (hdlr *Handlers) HandleRegister() http.HandlerFunc { func (hdlr *Handlers) HandleRegister() http.HandlerFunc {
return func( return func(
@@ -82,6 +110,9 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleRegister(
return return
} }
hdlr.stats.IncrSessions()
hdlr.stats.IncrConnections()
hdlr.deliverMOTD(request, clientID, sessionID, payload.Nick) hdlr.deliverMOTD(request, clientID, sessionID, payload.Nick)
hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, map[string]any{ hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, map[string]any{
@@ -134,6 +165,21 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleLogin(
writer http.ResponseWriter, writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request, request *http.Request,
) { ) {
ip := clientIP(request)
if !hdlr.loginLimiter.Allow(ip) {
writer.Header().Set(
"Retry-After", "1",
)
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"too many login attempts, try again later",
http.StatusTooManyRequests,
)
return
}
type loginRequest struct { type loginRequest struct {
Nick string `json:"nick"` Nick string `json:"nick"`
Password string `json:"password"` Password string `json:"password"`
@@ -180,6 +226,8 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleLogin(
return return
} }
hdlr.stats.IncrConnections()
hdlr.deliverMOTD( hdlr.deliverMOTD(
request, clientID, sessionID, payload.Nick, request, clientID, sessionID, payload.Nick,
) )

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ import (
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/hashcash" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/hashcash"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/healthcheck" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/healthcheck"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/logger" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/logger"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/ratelimit"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/stats"
"go.uber.org/fx" "go.uber.org/fx"
) )
@@ -30,15 +32,11 @@ type Params struct {
Config *config.Config Config *config.Config
Database *db.Database Database *db.Database
Healthcheck *healthcheck.Healthcheck Healthcheck *healthcheck.Healthcheck
Stats *stats.Tracker
} }
const defaultIdleTimeout = 30 * 24 * time.Hour const defaultIdleTimeout = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
// spentHashcashTTL is how long spent hashcash tokens are
// retained for replay prevention. Per issue requirements,
// this is 1 year.
const spentHashcashTTL = 365 * 24 * time.Hour
// Handlers manages HTTP request handling. // Handlers manages HTTP request handling.
type Handlers struct { type Handlers struct {
params *Params params *Params
@@ -46,7 +44,8 @@ type Handlers struct {
hc *healthcheck.Healthcheck hc *healthcheck.Healthcheck
broker *broker.Broker broker *broker.Broker
hashcashVal *hashcash.Validator hashcashVal *hashcash.Validator
channelHashcash *hashcash.ChannelValidator loginLimiter *ratelimit.Limiter
stats *stats.Tracker
cancelCleanup context.CancelFunc cancelCleanup context.CancelFunc
} }
@@ -60,13 +59,24 @@ func New(
resource = "neoirc" resource = "neoirc"
} }
loginRate := params.Config.LoginRateLimit
if loginRate <= 0 {
loginRate = ratelimit.DefaultRate
}
loginBurst := params.Config.LoginRateBurst
if loginBurst <= 0 {
loginBurst = ratelimit.DefaultBurst
}
hdlr := &Handlers{ //nolint:exhaustruct // cancelCleanup set in startCleanup hdlr := &Handlers{ //nolint:exhaustruct // cancelCleanup set in startCleanup
params: &params, params: &params,
log: params.Logger.Get(), log: params.Logger.Get(),
hc: params.Healthcheck, hc: params.Healthcheck,
broker: broker.New(), broker: broker.New(),
hashcashVal: hashcash.NewValidator(resource), hashcashVal: hashcash.NewValidator(resource),
channelHashcash: hashcash.NewChannelValidator(), loginLimiter: ratelimit.New(loginRate, loginBurst),
stats: params.Stats,
} }
lifecycle.Append(fx.Hook{ lifecycle.Append(fx.Hook{
@@ -158,6 +168,10 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) stopCleanup() {
if hdlr.cancelCleanup != nil { if hdlr.cancelCleanup != nil {
hdlr.cancelCleanup() hdlr.cancelCleanup()
} }
if hdlr.loginLimiter != nil {
hdlr.loginLimiter.Stop()
}
} }
func (hdlr *Handlers) cleanupLoop(ctx context.Context) { func (hdlr *Handlers) cleanupLoop(ctx context.Context) {
@@ -288,20 +302,4 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) pruneQueuesAndMessages(
) )
} }
} }
// Prune spent hashcash tokens older than 1 year.
hashcashCutoff := time.Now().Add(-spentHashcashTTL)
pruned, err := hdlr.params.Database.
PruneSpentHashcash(ctx, hashcashCutoff)
if err != nil {
hdlr.log.Error(
"spent hashcash pruning failed", "error", err,
)
} else if pruned > 0 {
hdlr.log.Info(
"pruned spent hashcash tokens",
"deleted", pruned,
)
}
} }

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) HandleHealthCheck() http.HandlerFunc {
writer http.ResponseWriter, writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request, request *http.Request,
) { ) {
resp := hdlr.hc.Healthcheck() resp := hdlr.hc.Healthcheck(request.Context())
hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, resp, httpStatusOK) hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, resp, httpStatusOK)
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
package hashcash
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
var (
errBodyHashMismatch = errors.New(
"body hash mismatch",
)
errBodyHashMissing = errors.New(
"body hash missing",
)
)
// ChannelValidator checks hashcash stamps for
// per-channel PRIVMSG validation. It verifies that
// stamps are bound to a specific channel and message
// body. Replay prevention is handled externally via
// the database spent_hashcash table for persistence
// across server restarts (1-year TTL).
type ChannelValidator struct{}
// NewChannelValidator creates a ChannelValidator.
func NewChannelValidator() *ChannelValidator {
return &ChannelValidator{}
}
// BodyHash computes the hex-encoded SHA-256 hash of a
// message body for use in hashcash stamp validation.
func BodyHash(body []byte) string {
hash := sha256.Sum256(body)
return hex.EncodeToString(hash[:])
}
// ValidateStamp checks a channel hashcash stamp. It
// verifies the stamp format, difficulty, date, channel
// binding, body hash binding, and proof-of-work. Replay
// detection is NOT performed here — callers must check
// the spent_hashcash table separately.
//
// Stamp format: 1:bits:YYMMDD:channel:bodyhash:counter.
func (cv *ChannelValidator) ValidateStamp(
stamp string,
requiredBits int,
channel string,
bodyHash string,
) error {
if requiredBits <= 0 {
return nil
}
parts := strings.Split(stamp, ":")
if len(parts) != stampFields {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: expected %d, got %d",
errInvalidFields, stampFields, len(parts),
)
}
version := parts[0]
bitsStr := parts[1]
dateStr := parts[2]
resource := parts[3]
stampBodyHash := parts[4]
headerErr := validateChannelHeader(
version, bitsStr, resource,
requiredBits, channel,
)
if headerErr != nil {
return headerErr
}
stampTime, parseErr := parseStampDate(dateStr)
if parseErr != nil {
return parseErr
}
timeErr := validateTime(stampTime)
if timeErr != nil {
return timeErr
}
bodyErr := validateBodyHash(
stampBodyHash, bodyHash,
)
if bodyErr != nil {
return bodyErr
}
return validateProof(stamp, requiredBits)
}
// StampHash returns a deterministic hash of a stamp
// string for use as a spent-token key.
func StampHash(stamp string) string {
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(stamp))
return hex.EncodeToString(hash[:])
}
func validateChannelHeader(
version, bitsStr, resource string,
requiredBits int,
channel string,
) error {
if version != stampVersion {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s", errBadVersion, version,
)
}
claimedBits, err := strconv.Atoi(bitsStr)
if err != nil || claimedBits < requiredBits {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: need %d bits",
errInsufficientBits, requiredBits,
)
}
if resource != channel {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: got %q, want %q",
errWrongResource, resource, channel,
)
}
return nil
}
func validateBodyHash(
stampBodyHash, expectedBodyHash string,
) error {
if stampBodyHash == "" {
return errBodyHashMissing
}
if stampBodyHash != expectedBodyHash {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: got %q, want %q",
errBodyHashMismatch,
stampBodyHash, expectedBodyHash,
)
}
return nil
}
// MintChannelStamp computes a channel hashcash stamp
// with the given difficulty, channel name, and body hash.
// This is intended for clients to generate stamps before
// sending PRIVMSG to hashcash-protected channels.
//
// Stamp format: 1:bits:YYMMDD:channel:bodyhash:counter.
func MintChannelStamp(
bits int,
channel string,
bodyHash string,
) string {
date := time.Now().UTC().Format(dateFormatShort)
prefix := fmt.Sprintf(
"1:%d:%s:%s:%s:",
bits, date, channel, bodyHash,
)
counter := uint64(0)
for {
stamp := prefix + strconv.FormatUint(counter, 16)
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(stamp))
if hasLeadingZeroBits(hash[:], bits) {
return stamp
}
counter++
}
}

View File

@@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
package hashcash_test
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/hashcash"
)
const (
testChannel = "#general"
testBodyText = `["hello world"]`
)
func testBodyHash() string {
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(testBodyText))
return hex.EncodeToString(hash[:])
}
func TestChannelValidateHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
bodyHash := testBodyHash()
stamp := hashcash.MintChannelStamp(
testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
)
err := validator.ValidateStamp(
stamp, testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("valid channel stamp rejected: %v", err)
}
}
func TestChannelValidateWrongChannel(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
bodyHash := testBodyHash()
stamp := hashcash.MintChannelStamp(
testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
)
err := validator.ValidateStamp(
stamp, testBits, "#other", bodyHash,
)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected channel mismatch error")
}
}
func TestChannelValidateWrongBodyHash(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
bodyHash := testBodyHash()
stamp := hashcash.MintChannelStamp(
testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
)
wrongHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte("different body"))
wrongBodyHash := hex.EncodeToString(wrongHash[:])
err := validator.ValidateStamp(
stamp, testBits, testChannel, wrongBodyHash,
)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected body hash mismatch error")
}
}
func TestChannelValidateInsufficientBits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
bodyHash := testBodyHash()
// Mint with 2 bits but require 4.
stamp := hashcash.MintChannelStamp(
testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
)
err := validator.ValidateStamp(
stamp, 4, testChannel, bodyHash,
)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected insufficient bits error")
}
}
func TestChannelValidateZeroBitsSkips(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
err := validator.ValidateStamp(
"garbage", 0, "#ch", "abc",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("zero bits should skip: %v", err)
}
}
func TestChannelValidateBadFormat(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
err := validator.ValidateStamp(
"not:valid", testBits, testChannel, "abc",
)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected bad format error")
}
}
func TestChannelValidateBadVersion(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
bodyHash := testBodyHash()
stamp := "2:2:260317:#general:" + bodyHash + ":counter"
err := validator.ValidateStamp(
stamp, testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected bad version error")
}
}
func TestChannelValidateExpiredStamp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
bodyHash := testBodyHash()
// Mint with a very old date by manually constructing.
stamp := mintStampWithDate(
t, testBits, testChannel, "200101",
)
err := validator.ValidateStamp(
stamp, testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected expired stamp error")
}
}
func TestChannelValidateMissingBodyHash(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
bodyHash := testBodyHash()
// Construct a stamp with empty body hash field.
stamp := mintStampWithDate(
t, testBits, testChannel, todayDate(),
)
// This uses the session-style stamp which has empty
// ext field — body hash is missing.
err := validator.ValidateStamp(
stamp, testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected missing body hash error")
}
}
func TestBodyHash(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := []byte(`["hello world"]`)
bodyHash := hashcash.BodyHash(body)
if len(bodyHash) != 64 {
t.Fatalf(
"expected 64-char hex hash, got %d",
len(bodyHash),
)
}
// Same input should produce same hash.
bodyHash2 := hashcash.BodyHash(body)
if bodyHash != bodyHash2 {
t.Fatal("body hash not deterministic")
}
// Different input should produce different hash.
bodyHash3 := hashcash.BodyHash([]byte("different"))
if bodyHash == bodyHash3 {
t.Fatal("different inputs produced same hash")
}
}
func TestStampHash(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
hash1 := hashcash.StampHash("stamp1")
hash2 := hashcash.StampHash("stamp2")
if hash1 == hash2 {
t.Fatal("different stamps produced same hash")
}
// Same input should be deterministic.
hash1b := hashcash.StampHash("stamp1")
if hash1 != hash1b {
t.Fatal("stamp hash not deterministic")
}
}
func TestMintChannelStamp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
bodyHash := testBodyHash()
stamp := hashcash.MintChannelStamp(
testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
)
if stamp == "" {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty stamp")
}
// Validate the minted stamp.
validator := hashcash.NewChannelValidator()
err := validator.ValidateStamp(
stamp, testBits, testChannel, bodyHash,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("minted stamp failed validation: %v", err)
}
}

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/db" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/db"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/globals" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/globals"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/logger" "git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/logger"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/stats"
"go.uber.org/fx" "go.uber.org/fx"
) )
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ type Params struct {
Config *config.Config Config *config.Config
Logger *logger.Logger Logger *logger.Logger
Database *db.Database Database *db.Database
Stats *stats.Tracker
} }
// Healthcheck tracks server uptime and provides health status. // Healthcheck tracks server uptime and provides health status.
@@ -64,11 +66,22 @@ type Response struct {
Version string `json:"version"` Version string `json:"version"`
Appname string `json:"appname"` Appname string `json:"appname"`
Maintenance bool `json:"maintenanceMode"` Maintenance bool `json:"maintenanceMode"`
// Runtime statistics.
Sessions int64 `json:"sessions"`
Clients int64 `json:"clients"`
QueuedLines int64 `json:"queuedLines"`
Channels int64 `json:"channels"`
ConnectionsSinceBoot int64 `json:"connectionsSinceBoot"`
SessionsSinceBoot int64 `json:"sessionsSinceBoot"`
MessagesSinceBoot int64 `json:"messagesSinceBoot"`
} }
// Healthcheck returns the current health status of the server. // Healthcheck returns the current health status of the server.
func (hcheck *Healthcheck) Healthcheck() *Response { func (hcheck *Healthcheck) Healthcheck(
return &Response{ ctx context.Context,
) *Response {
resp := &Response{
Status: "ok", Status: "ok",
Now: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), Now: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
UptimeSeconds: int64(hcheck.uptime().Seconds()), UptimeSeconds: int64(hcheck.uptime().Seconds()),
@@ -76,6 +89,64 @@ func (hcheck *Healthcheck) Healthcheck() *Response {
Appname: hcheck.params.Globals.Appname, Appname: hcheck.params.Globals.Appname,
Version: hcheck.params.Globals.Version, Version: hcheck.params.Globals.Version,
Maintenance: hcheck.params.Config.MaintenanceMode, Maintenance: hcheck.params.Config.MaintenanceMode,
Sessions: 0,
Clients: 0,
QueuedLines: 0,
Channels: 0,
ConnectionsSinceBoot: hcheck.params.Stats.ConnectionsSinceBoot(),
SessionsSinceBoot: hcheck.params.Stats.SessionsSinceBoot(),
MessagesSinceBoot: hcheck.params.Stats.MessagesSinceBoot(),
}
hcheck.populateDBStats(ctx, resp)
return resp
}
// populateDBStats fills in database-derived counters.
func (hcheck *Healthcheck) populateDBStats(
ctx context.Context,
resp *Response,
) {
sessions, err := hcheck.params.Database.GetUserCount(ctx)
if err != nil {
hcheck.log.Error(
"healthcheck: session count failed",
"error", err,
)
} else {
resp.Sessions = sessions
}
clients, err := hcheck.params.Database.GetClientCount(ctx)
if err != nil {
hcheck.log.Error(
"healthcheck: client count failed",
"error", err,
)
} else {
resp.Clients = clients
}
queued, err := hcheck.params.Database.GetQueueEntryCount(ctx)
if err != nil {
hcheck.log.Error(
"healthcheck: queue entry count failed",
"error", err,
)
} else {
resp.QueuedLines = queued
}
channels, err := hcheck.params.Database.GetChannelCount(ctx)
if err != nil {
hcheck.log.Error(
"healthcheck: channel count failed",
"error", err,
)
} else {
resp.Channels = channels
} }
} }

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
// Package ratelimit provides per-IP rate limiting for HTTP endpoints.
package ratelimit
import (
"sync"
"time"
"golang.org/x/time/rate"
)
const (
// DefaultRate is the default number of allowed requests per second.
DefaultRate = 1.0
// DefaultBurst is the default maximum burst size.
DefaultBurst = 5
// DefaultSweepInterval controls how often stale entries are pruned.
DefaultSweepInterval = 10 * time.Minute
// DefaultEntryTTL is how long an unused entry lives before eviction.
DefaultEntryTTL = 15 * time.Minute
)
// entry tracks a per-IP rate limiter and when it was last used.
type entry struct {
limiter *rate.Limiter
lastSeen time.Time
}
// Limiter manages per-key rate limiters with automatic cleanup
// of stale entries.
type Limiter struct {
mu sync.Mutex
entries map[string]*entry
rate rate.Limit
burst int
entryTTL time.Duration
stopCh chan struct{}
}
// New creates a new per-key rate Limiter.
// The ratePerSec parameter sets how many requests per second are
// allowed per key. The burst parameter sets the maximum number of
// requests that can be made in a single burst.
func New(ratePerSec float64, burst int) *Limiter {
limiter := &Limiter{
mu: sync.Mutex{},
entries: make(map[string]*entry),
rate: rate.Limit(ratePerSec),
burst: burst,
entryTTL: DefaultEntryTTL,
stopCh: make(chan struct{}),
}
go limiter.sweepLoop()
return limiter
}
// Allow reports whether a request from the given key should be
// allowed. It consumes one token from the key's rate limiter.
func (l *Limiter) Allow(key string) bool {
l.mu.Lock()
ent, exists := l.entries[key]
if !exists {
ent = &entry{
limiter: rate.NewLimiter(l.rate, l.burst),
lastSeen: time.Now(),
}
l.entries[key] = ent
} else {
ent.lastSeen = time.Now()
}
l.mu.Unlock()
return ent.limiter.Allow()
}
// Stop terminates the background sweep goroutine.
func (l *Limiter) Stop() {
close(l.stopCh)
}
// Len returns the number of tracked keys (for testing).
func (l *Limiter) Len() int {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
return len(l.entries)
}
// sweepLoop periodically removes entries that haven't been seen
// within the TTL.
func (l *Limiter) sweepLoop() {
ticker := time.NewTicker(DefaultSweepInterval)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ticker.C:
l.sweep()
case <-l.stopCh:
return
}
}
}
// sweep removes stale entries.
func (l *Limiter) sweep() {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
cutoff := time.Now().Add(-l.entryTTL)
for key, ent := range l.entries {
if ent.lastSeen.Before(cutoff) {
delete(l.entries, key)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
package ratelimit_test
import (
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/ratelimit"
)
func TestNewCreatesLimiter(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(1.0, 5)
defer limiter.Stop()
if limiter == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil limiter")
}
}
func TestAllowWithinBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(1.0, 3)
defer limiter.Stop()
for i := range 3 {
if !limiter.Allow("192.168.1.1") {
t.Fatalf(
"request %d should be allowed within burst",
i+1,
)
}
}
}
func TestAllowExceedsBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Rate of 0 means no token replenishment, only burst.
limiter := ratelimit.New(0, 3)
defer limiter.Stop()
for range 3 {
limiter.Allow("10.0.0.1")
}
if limiter.Allow("10.0.0.1") {
t.Fatal("fourth request should be denied after burst exhausted")
}
}
func TestAllowSeparateKeys(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Rate of 0, burst of 1 — only one request per key.
limiter := ratelimit.New(0, 1)
defer limiter.Stop()
if !limiter.Allow("10.0.0.1") {
t.Fatal("first request for key A should be allowed")
}
if !limiter.Allow("10.0.0.2") {
t.Fatal("first request for key B should be allowed")
}
if limiter.Allow("10.0.0.1") {
t.Fatal("second request for key A should be denied")
}
if limiter.Allow("10.0.0.2") {
t.Fatal("second request for key B should be denied")
}
}
func TestLenTracksKeys(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(1.0, 5)
defer limiter.Stop()
if limiter.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected 0 entries, got %d", limiter.Len())
}
limiter.Allow("10.0.0.1")
limiter.Allow("10.0.0.2")
if limiter.Len() != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 entries, got %d", limiter.Len())
}
// Same key again should not increase count.
limiter.Allow("10.0.0.1")
if limiter.Len() != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 entries, got %d", limiter.Len())
}
}
func TestStopDoesNotPanic(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(1.0, 5)
limiter.Stop()
}

52
internal/stats/stats.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
// Package stats tracks runtime statistics since server boot.
package stats
import (
"sync/atomic"
)
// Tracker holds atomic counters for runtime statistics
// that accumulate since the server started.
type Tracker struct {
connectionsSinceBoot atomic.Int64
sessionsSinceBoot atomic.Int64
messagesSinceBoot atomic.Int64
}
// New creates a new Tracker with all counters at zero.
func New() *Tracker {
return &Tracker{} //nolint:exhaustruct // atomic fields have zero-value defaults
}
// IncrConnections increments the total connection count.
func (t *Tracker) IncrConnections() {
t.connectionsSinceBoot.Add(1)
}
// IncrSessions increments the total session count.
func (t *Tracker) IncrSessions() {
t.sessionsSinceBoot.Add(1)
}
// IncrMessages increments the total PRIVMSG/NOTICE count.
func (t *Tracker) IncrMessages() {
t.messagesSinceBoot.Add(1)
}
// ConnectionsSinceBoot returns the total number of
// client connections since boot.
func (t *Tracker) ConnectionsSinceBoot() int64 {
return t.connectionsSinceBoot.Load()
}
// SessionsSinceBoot returns the total number of sessions
// created since boot.
func (t *Tracker) SessionsSinceBoot() int64 {
return t.sessionsSinceBoot.Load()
}
// MessagesSinceBoot returns the total number of
// PRIVMSG/NOTICE messages sent since boot.
func (t *Tracker) MessagesSinceBoot() int64 {
return t.messagesSinceBoot.Load()
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
package stats_test
import (
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/stats"
)
func TestNew(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tracker := stats.New()
if tracker == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil tracker")
}
if tracker.ConnectionsSinceBoot() != 0 {
t.Errorf(
"expected 0 connections, got %d",
tracker.ConnectionsSinceBoot(),
)
}
if tracker.SessionsSinceBoot() != 0 {
t.Errorf(
"expected 0 sessions, got %d",
tracker.SessionsSinceBoot(),
)
}
if tracker.MessagesSinceBoot() != 0 {
t.Errorf(
"expected 0 messages, got %d",
tracker.MessagesSinceBoot(),
)
}
}
func TestIncrConnections(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tracker := stats.New()
tracker.IncrConnections()
tracker.IncrConnections()
tracker.IncrConnections()
got := tracker.ConnectionsSinceBoot()
if got != 3 {
t.Errorf(
"expected 3 connections, got %d", got,
)
}
}
func TestIncrSessions(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tracker := stats.New()
tracker.IncrSessions()
tracker.IncrSessions()
got := tracker.SessionsSinceBoot()
if got != 2 {
t.Errorf(
"expected 2 sessions, got %d", got,
)
}
}
func TestIncrMessages(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tracker := stats.New()
tracker.IncrMessages()
got := tracker.MessagesSinceBoot()
if got != 1 {
t.Errorf(
"expected 1 message, got %d", got,
)
}
}
func TestCountersAreIndependent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tracker := stats.New()
tracker.IncrConnections()
tracker.IncrSessions()
tracker.IncrMessages()
tracker.IncrMessages()
if tracker.ConnectionsSinceBoot() != 1 {
t.Errorf(
"expected 1 connection, got %d",
tracker.ConnectionsSinceBoot(),
)
}
if tracker.SessionsSinceBoot() != 1 {
t.Errorf(
"expected 1 session, got %d",
tracker.SessionsSinceBoot(),
)
}
if tracker.MessagesSinceBoot() != 2 {
t.Errorf(
"expected 2 messages, got %d",
tracker.MessagesSinceBoot(),
)
}
}